Experience we all know to be a valuable asset, and experience in
war is the most costly of its kind. To enable those coming after us
to reconstruct the picture of war, Regimental Histories have proved
of infinite value. That such a record fills a sentimental want
hardly requires assertion.

My first feelings on being honoured with a request from the
Devonshire Regiment to write a preface to the account of their
“Work in South Africa, 1899-1902,” were, I confess, How could I
refuse so difficult a task gracefully? However, on further
consideration it seemed to me that undoubtedly such a preface
should be written by some one outside the corps itself. Onlookers,
as the saying goes, often see most of the game, and, being free
from personal bias, can often add something to what those engrossed
in the meshes of life’s details can only appreciate from a narrower
point of view.

From this standpoint, and as I was the General under whom the
1st Devons served longest in South Africa, it seemed obviously my
duty to attempt the task.

The “Work of the 1st Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment” is
portrayed in these pages. It therefore only remains for me to add,
for the benefit of coming generations, what manner of men these
were, who by their dogged devotion to duty helped to overcome the
Boer. Associated as one was with many corps in the close intimacy
of veldt life, it was a study of the deepest interest to note the
individuality that characterized each, and which was often as
clearly and as well defined as that of the men with whom one daily
came in contact.

During the many months of our intimate association, and in the
varied situations that presented themselves, I cannot call to mind
any single occasion on which the Devons were ever flurried or even
hurried. Their imperturbability of temper, even under the most
trying conditions, could not be surpassed.

Another characteristic of the corps was its inherent thrift.
They were, in fact, essentially a “self-help” corps. When a flood
came and washed away the bridge leading to the picket line, no
sapper was required to show them how to throw a suspension bridge
above the flood from tree to cliff. It was characteristic of the
Regiment that they carried out in war their peace training, never
allowing the atmosphere of excitement to distort their actions.

If we take Elandslaagte, Wagon Hill, or any of the hundred and
one ticklish night operations in which they took part, this trait
will be ever noteworthy, that they acted as was to be expected of
them, and made no fuss of having done so.

We have all read realistic descriptions of troops on the march
in South Africa, the writer using all his cunning to depict the
war-worn dirty condition of his heroes, seeming to glean
satisfaction from their grease-stained khaki. It must be admitted
that the South African War is responsible for a somewhat changed
condition of thought as regards cleanliness and its relation to
smartness. No such abstraction disturbed the Devons; a Devon man
was always clean. Individuals of some corps could be readily
identified by their battered helmets or split boots; not so the
Devons. No helmet badge was necessary for their identification, and
the veriest tyro could not fail to recognize at any time the
crisply washed Indian helmet cover.

It may be open to question whether it is for good or for evil
that we should broaden our views of what goes to make a smart and
useful fighting man, but the regimental system of the Devons was
for no innovation of a careless go-as-you-please style. I thus lay
stress on the individuality of the Devons in South Africa, because
it was this individuality of theirs, born of their regimental
system, which enabled them to claim so full a share in the success
of that long-drawn-out campaign.

No one can quite appreciatively follow the story of the work of
the Devons, unless he realizes the intense feeling of comradeship
that animates these West-country men. To work with Devonshire men
is to realize in the flesh the intensity of the local county
loyalty so graphically depicted by Charles Kingsley in his
Westward Ho! and other novels.

In conclusion, let me add, a more determined crew I never wish
to see, and a better regiment to back his orders a General can
never hope to have.

(Signature – Walter Kitchener)

DALHOUSIE, May, 1906.

PREFACE

BY THE AUTHOR

The story as told is an everyday account and a record of the
work of the men of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment during the
South African War.

It exemplifies the devotion to duty, the stubbornness in
adversity, and the great fighting qualities of the West-country
man, which qualities existed in the time of Drake, and which still
exist.

A repeating of their history of the past, a record of the
present, and an example for the generation to come.

{1}

CHAPTER I

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

1899

On returning from the North-West Frontier of India at the close
of the Tirah Expedition, 1897-8, the 1st Battalion Devonshire
Regiment, which had served with distinction under the command of
Colonel J.H. Yule in the campaign against the Afridi clans, was
ordered to proceed from Peshawar to Jullunder, at which place it
was quartered in 1898 and in the summer months of 1899, during
which time certain companies and detachments were furnished for
duty at Dalhousie, Kasauli, and Ghora Dakka (Murree Hills), and
located during the hot weather at these places.

{2}

Towards the latter end of August, 1899, news from South Africa
appeared ominous, and war seemed likely to break out between
England and the Transvaal.

On the 8th September, 1899, confidential instructions were
received from army head-quarters at Simla ordering the Regiment to
get ready to move at short notice to South Africa, and a few days
later further orders were received to entrain on the 16th September
for Bombay en route to the Transvaal, which country the
Regiment was destined not to reach for some months, and then only
after severe fighting.

The companies quartered at Dalhousie and Ghora Dakka with
difficulty joined the head-quarters at Jullunder before the 16th,
and the following marches are worthy of record:—

The Dalhousie detachment marched to Pathankote, a distance of
54-1/4 miles, in two days. Major Curry, who was in command, gave
each man a coolie for his baggage, and ordered the men to get to
Duneera the first day the best way they could. At Duneera they
halted for the night, and the next day pushed on in the same manner
to Pathankote, {3} where they immediately entrained and
proceeded to Jullunder.

The Ghora Dakka detachment under Lieutenant Emerson marched to
Rawal Pindi, a distance of fifty-four miles, in two days, and then
entrained for Jullunder.

No men fell out in either party, and considering the time of
year and the intense heat, they were fine performances.

Some officers were on leave in Cashmere, and only arrived at
Jullunder as the Regiment was entraining.

On September 16th, 1899, the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment,
under the command of Major C.W. Park, left Jullunder by rail for
Bombay with a strength as under:—

25 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 842 sergeants, rank and
file.

The following officers accompanied the battalion:—

Major C.W. Park, commanding.
Major M.C. Curry, second in command.
Captain M.G. Jacson.
Captain J.O. Travers.
Captain E.C. Wren.
{4}
Captain E.M. Morris.
Lieutenant P.H. Price-Dent.
Lieutenant J.E.I. Masterson.
Lieutenant A.F. Dalzel.
Lieutenant N.Z. Emerson.
Lieutenant G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harris.
2nd Lieutenant G.I. Watts.
2nd Lieutenant D.H. Blunt.
2nd Lieutenant H.R. Gunning.
2nd Lieutenant S.T. Hayley.
2nd Lieutenant H.W.F. Twiss.
Captain and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.
Captain and Quartermaster H. Honner.
Warrant Officer Sergeant-Major G.E. Mitchell.

The following officers were attached for duty to the
battalion:—

Major Burnside, R.A.M.C., in medical charge.
Lieutenant E.G. Caffin, Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant H.W.R. Cowie, Dorset Regiment.
Lieutenant A.M. Tringham, The Queen’s West Surrey Regiment.
{5}
Lieutenant J.A. Byrne, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Lieutenant E.E.M. Walker, Somersetshire Light Infantry.

En Route to Ladysmith

The following officers were absent from the battalion on leave
in England:—

Captain W.B. Lafone.
Captain G.M. Gloster.
Lieutenant H.N. Field.

Colonel J.H. Yule, commanding the battalion, was appointed to
the command of the Indian Infantry Brigade, South Africa, with the
temporary rank of brigadier-general. Major A.G. Spratt was placed
in charge of the depot and details left at Jullunder.

The Regiment arrived without incident on September 21st at
Bombay, having halted, for a few hours only, at the following
places:—

On September 17th at Aligarh.
   18th at Jhansi.
   19th at Hoshangabad.
   20th at Deolali.

Embarkation took place immediately on arrival, the transport
Sutlej taking five companies, {6} head-quarters, band and drums,
under Major C.W. Park; and the transport City of London
taking three companies under Major M.C. Curry.

On the latter vessel sailed also Sir George White’s Staff and
the Staff of the Indian Infantry Brigade.

The Sutlej sailed at noon on September 21st, and it was
reported that the ship was under sealed orders, and that her
destination was Delagoa Bay.

The days on board were occupied in keeping the men fit with
physical drill, free gymnastics, etc., and with instruction in
first-aid to the wounded and the use of the field-dressing and the
method of adjusting it.

On September 28th Agalega Island was sighted, and on the 30th
the ship was off the east coast of Madagascar.

On the 2nd October the S.S. Purnea with the 60th Rifles
on board was spoken, and communication by flag signal established,
both vessels inquiring for news. The Sutlej was the last to
leave port, but had nothing new to communicate.

At 7 a.m. on October 5th, in rough and {7} foggy weather,
the Sutlej arrived off the coast of Africa, and the fog
lifting about midday, she ran down the coastline for two hours, and
arrived outside the bar at Durban.

The ships conveying the 60th Rifles and the 53rd Battery arrived
an hour later. The Sutlej waited till 2 p.m. to enter the
harbour, and arrived alongside the quay at 4 p.m., when
disembarkation commenced at once in torrents of rain and heavy wind
squalls.

A deputation of the Durban “West of England” Association met the
Regiment on arrival and presented an address.

The first news received on landing was that war had not yet been
declared, but that it was inevitable, that President Kruger had
seized half a million of money on its way from Johannesburg to the
Cape, and that orders had been given by him to shoot any one
crossing the frontier. This may or may not have been true; a good
deal of perfectly reliable information was being circulated
about this time.

On the night of October 5th-6th the Regiment left in three
trains for Ladysmith. The rain and cold caused some inconvenience
to {8}
the men, as they were packed into open trucks, and obtained neither
shelter nor sleep. They were new to the game then, but they saw the
inside of many a coal truck later.

The journey to Pietermaritzburg was in the nature of a triumphal
procession, for at various points along the line small knots of old
men women and children, waving Union Jacks, cheered the troops most
lustily as the trains passed.

A remark frequently heard was “How glad they are to see us,” and
it was evident that these people at least, who were interested and
possessed homes in Natal, had not underrated the power and
intentions of the Transvaal. The Regiment had an enthusiastic
reception, as indeed did all troops passing to the front, flags and
handkerchiefs being waved from every house farm and village. At
some stations where a short stop was made to allow of other trains
getting on ahead, tea and refreshments were given out free, by
willing hands, to the soldiers in the trucks.

Trains were running with about 500 to 600 yards distance between
them.

{9}

On October 6th between 7 and 8 a.m. the trains conveying the
Regiment reached Pietermaritzburg, and here the men had breakfast.
Pushing on again with as little delay as possible and passing
Estcourt at about 3 p.m., and Colenso about 4 p.m., Ladysmith was
reached at 6 p.m.

Detraining took place at once, and the Regiment marched off to
Tin Town, about two miles distant, where camp was pitched in the
dark.

The infantry at this time in Ladysmith consisted of:—

The Gordon Highlanders.
The Devonshire Regiment.
The Gloucester Regiment.
The Liverpool Regiment.

Rumours of war and warlike preparation on the part of the Boers
were continually being circulated, and at daybreak on October 11th
the Transvaal Boers crossed the frontier of Natal 18,000 strong
with fourteen guns.

On October 12th, at 2 p.m., orders were received for the
Regiment to prepare at once to go out as part of a flying column
towards {10} Acton Holmes to check the advance of the
Free State Boers, who were reported to be crossing the Biggarsberg
by Vanreenen’s Pass; and at 2 a.m. a force consisting of four
regiments of cavalry, four batteries R.A., and three regiments of
infantry (Liverpools, Gordons, and Devons) left Ladysmith, and
after great delay reached Dewdrop at 9 a.m.

The cavalry having been sent on to gain touch, failed however to
do so, and the column returned at once to Ladysmith. The
information turned out to be incorrect.

On the return march the Regiment was joined by Captain W.B.
Lafone and Lieutenants Field and Green, who had arrived from
England.

On Sunday, October 15th, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who had
arrived about two days previously, marched out of the Tin Camp
Ladysmith to entrain for Dundee, which place it was reported the
Transvaal Boers were threatening; and on the same day the news was
confirmed that the armoured train at Mafeking had been twice
attacked.

It was said that our khaki uniform had {11} completely
nonplussed the Boers, and that they had expected to meet us coming
on in red, as in the days gone by, and that they were consequently
rather surprised and annoyed.

The Liverpool Regiment, 18th Hussars, and one battery left
Ladysmith by road for Colenso on October 18th, the Manchester
Regiment, the Devons, and Natal mounted troops covering their march
from the direction of Vanreenen’s Pass. Refugees continually coming
through into Ladysmith from Acton Holmes during the day, reported
fighting going on between Boers and Natal Carbineers.

On its return to Ladysmith the same day, the Regiment moved from
the Tin Town Camp and encamped on the football ground under the
convent hill, and towards sunset the whole army marched out of
Ladysmith into strategical positions outside the town. The Regiment
at this time was reserve battalion.

On October 19th the Boers cut the telegraph wire between Dundee
and Ladysmith, and captured near Elandslaagte Station a train
{12}
containing forty tons of flour consigned to the force at Dundee,
and the following morning the Devons, Gordons, one battery, 5th
Lancers, and some Colonial mounted infantry, moved out towards
Modder Station on the Ladysmith-Newcastle road.

At about 11 a.m. news was received that a fierce battle was
being fought at Dundee, and that a large force of Free State Boers
was advancing towards Ladysmith from Bester’s Station, having
crossed the Vanreenen’s Pass. The column was halted about four
miles out of Ladysmith, and three companies of the Devons under
Captain Travers were sent to hold Pepworth Hill on the flank
threatened by the Free State Boers. But at 4 p.m. Sir George White
came out and joined the force, and he ordered the column back into
Ladysmith.

He gave an account of the fighting at Dundee, which he had just
received. Dundee Camp was aroused in the morning by shells being
pitched into its midst. The artillery came into action, and the
60th Rifles and Dublin Fusiliers were then sent to capture the
position, which was occupied by 4000 Boers. {13} This was
gallantly carried. Another column of Boers was then turned on to,
and at 1.30 p.m. the enemy broke. Major-General Penn-Symons was
mortally wounded, and Major-General Yule had taken over command at
Dundee.

By next day a detachment of Boers had reached the neighbourhood
of Modder Station and had taken up a position near
Elandslaagte.

This detachment consisted of some 650 Boers, with two guns,
under the leadership of General Koch, who was charged with the task
of cutting off the retreat of the forces at Glencoe and Dundee, and
who had been sent forward for that purpose. General Koch had at the
same time practically joined hands with the Free State Boers, who
were in the neighbourhood of Bester’s Station on the
Ladysmith-Harrismith line.

In order to reoccupy Elandslaagte and to secure General Yule’s
line of retreat, Sir George White ordered out a force consisting of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of which four companies of the
Regiment formed a part, under the command of General French.
{14}
These companies went out in the morning by train under Major Curry,
and detrained near Modder Station.

One company and a Maxim gun under Captain Jacson and a squadron
5th Lancers were sent at 11 a.m. by road to Pepworth Hill to guard
the left flank of General French’s force against the Free State
Army, which might seriously threaten General French’s
communications with Ladysmith.

At 1 p.m. further reinforcements were sent out to General
French, and the three remaining companies of the Regiment were
ordered to proceed by train to Modder Station to join the wing
under Major Curry. The seven companies were then under the command
of Major Park.

The Boers occupied two cones of some low hills overlooking
Elandslaagte railway station. General French’s artillery came into
action on some high ground 4400 yards distant from the Boer
position, and between the two forces was an open undulating plain
affording little or no cover, and across which the attack had to be
delivered.

The Gordon Highlanders and Manchesters {15} were to
attack round the Boers’ left flank, whilst the Devons were to make
a frontal attack.

From the nature of the position which they had taken up, no
commanding positions affording flanking fire and protection to
their flanks were obtainable by the Boers. These were open and
could be easily threatened by the cavalry and the mounted
infantry.

The Boers had two guns in position on one of the two cones, and
with these guns they did good execution, knocking over a limber of
one of French’s batteries at the second shot, and practically
before his guns came into action.

General French’s force, now considerably augmented, marched off
at 2.30 p.m. The 1st Devon Regiment was formed in company column at
fifty paces as a reserve to the Manchester Regiment. After
proceeding about a mile heavy firing was heard on the right front,
direction was changed half-right, and the Regiment was then ordered
to form for attack on the left of the Manchesters, and to take up a
front of 500 yards.

{16}

Three companies were placed in the firing-line and supports
under Major Park, and four companies in reserve under Major Curry.
At about 3.15 p.m. the firing-line reached the top of a low hill,
and came in sight of the enemy’s position distant about 4400 yards.
Here a halt of a quarter of an hour was made, and at 3.30 p.m.
orders were received by the Regiment to make a frontal attack on
the position, to advance to within effective rifle range, and to
then hold on till a flank attack by the Manchesters and Gordons
came in on the right. The ground between the Regiment and the
position sloped slightly up to the foot of the low rocky hills, on
which the enemy was posted. There was no cover of any kind, except
a few ant-heaps, in the first half of the distance.

The firing-line advanced keeping intervals and covering a front
of about 600 yards, the centre being directed on to a conical hill
at the back of the enemy’s camp. The reserve followed in column of
companies, in single rank, at fifty paces distance between
companies. The enemy’s guns opened on the Regiment at once with
shrapnel, but most of {17} the shells went high, only one striking
the reserve companies.

A steady advance to about 1200 to 1300 yards from the position
was made, when, the rifle fire becoming rather heavy, fire was
opened by section volleys. The light was bad, and it was very
difficult to see the enemy or estimate the distances. In a few
minutes the supports reinforced, and the firing-line then pushed on
to the foot of the slope, and established itself in a shallow ditch
800 to 900 yards from the position. Here it held on, firing
sectional volleys, till the flank attack appeared on the hill,
apparently about 500 yards from the position.

An advance by companies from the right was then ordered, and,
the reserve reinforcing, a further 200 yards was gained. Some
bugling and shouting was then heard on the hill. A rush to 350
yards was now made, and, after a short pause to allow the men to
get breath, bayonets were fixed and the position charged, four
companies assaulting the detached hill on the left, the remaining
three companies assaulting the hill on which the enemy’s guns were.
F and G Companies were the first to reach {18} and take
possession of the guns, the Gordon Highlanders coming up on the
right shortly afterwards. The companies then moved on down the
reverse slope and opened fire on the retiring enemy. On the
detached hill only five of the enemy were found alive, and they
showed a white flag as the hill was charged.

The Regiment was then re-formed, and held the detached hill
during the night.

During the three hours it was under fire, the battalion kept
line and intervals carefully throughout, and adjusted sights and
fired as steadily as if on parade. It is to the perfect steadiness
of the men and the absence of all crowding that the very small
losses from the enemy’s fire, which at all times was heavy, can be
attributed.

The battalion’s losses were:—

Captain W.B. Lafone, slightly wounded.
2nd Lieutenants Gunning, Hailey, and Green, severely wounded.
Twenty-nine non-commissioned officers and men wounded.

Parties of men were busy during the night {19} collecting
the Boer wounded and taking them down to the laager. Among them was
General Koch, who was badly hit in several places. He died of his
wounds a few days afterwards in Ladysmith.

The losses of the Boers were estimated at 62 killed, 150
wounded, and 184 prisoners.

The force was moved back into Ladysmith early on the 22nd
morning, the infantry by rail, and cavalry by road. The company of
the Regiment and Maxim gun, which had been on Pepworth Hill during
the day and the following night, got back to camp the same
afternoon.

The 23rd was given up to rejoicings and congratulations over the
victory, and the two Boer flags which were captured were displayed
outside the officers’ mess tent.

The Free State Army had by now come across to the east, and were
in the neighbourhood of Modder Station, and on October 24th a
column was again ordered out with the object of assisting General
Yule’s force in from Dundee.

This column consisted of the 5th Lancers, {20} 19th
Hussars, Natal Carbineers, Border Mounted Rifles, Imperial Light
Horse, Devons, Liverpools, Gloucesters, 60th Rifles, and twenty
guns, in all about 5500 men.

The enemy was found posted on Tinta Inyoni Mountain, on the
summit of which they brought a gun into action and fired on to the
head of Sir G. White’s force, which was in column of route on the
road, but without doing any damage. The action began at 8.30
a.m.

At the commencement of the action the battalion was in reserve,
and was ordered to extend and lie down at the foot of the first
slope facing the enemy’s position, and some 300 yards north-west of
the railway line, sending scouts to the crest of the ridge to watch
the front. Four companies were shortly afterwards ordered to
advance in attack formation, forming their own supports, and to
place themselves on the left of the Gloucester Regiment, which was
in front of the Regiment at the time. The Regiment was then on the
extreme left of the firing-line. The four companies of the reserve
worked round under cover to a small nullah about 300 yards on
{21}
the left and then advanced up it. The firing-line advanced, under
slight rifle fire, across a rocky plateau till they gained a small
ridge overlooking the front, and opened fire by section volleys on
to a ridge about 800 yards in front, from which a rather heavy fire
was coming.

The Maxim gun under Lieutenant Price-Dent came into action in
rear of the left of the line and fired at the enemy to the left
front.

The enemy’s fire from this ridge was soon silenced, and from
that time the only objective the line had was a few scattered Boers
and their horses on the rear slope of the high hill to the left
front, some 2000 yards distant.

The reserve was deployed into two lines of double companies on
and below a small ridge of rocks some 250 yards in rear of the
firing-line. At about 2 p.m. the retirement commenced, and the
battalion gradually followed the Liverpool Regiment and became
rearguard. Ladysmith was reached about 3.30 p.m., after a
sixteen-mile march in torrents of rain.

{22}

The casualties of the battalion during the day were:—

1 private killed.¹
25 privates wounded, none dangerously.

Footnote 1:(return)
This private, the first man of the Regiment killed in the war,
was Private Winsor. He was shot dead through the heart by a stray
bullet.

This action was known as the action of Reitfontein.

On October 26th General Yule’s force marched into Ladysmith.
They had had a bad time, having marched in drenching rain, day and
night, from Sunday till Wednesday. The garrison of Ladysmith gave
them food on arrival, the Regiment supplying the Dublin Fusiliers
(officers and men) with refreshments.

On October 27th it was reported that the Boers were nearing
Ladysmith and attempting to surround the place, and a large force
was ordered out by Sir George White to reconnoitre.

This reconnaissance was under the command of Colonel Ian
Hamilton, and his column consisted of three cavalry regiments,
three batteries, and four infantry battalions, to {23} which was
added later one infantry battalion and one battery.

Having advanced beyond the Nek between Lombards Kop and Bulwana,
and having crossed the Modder Spruit on the Helpmakaar road, the
Regiment was sent on outpost duty to the left front, whilst the
main body of the force halted on the bank of the stream.

From the outpost line large bodies of the enemy were observed
advancing over Long Hill. Boers were also seen very busy on the
kopjes south of Long Hill, entrenching.

At 8 p.m. orders were received from the officer commanding the
column, in which it was explained that the force was to make a
night march and attack, the infantry to advance at 2 a.m.

The Boer position as seen by the Regiment on the outpost line
was some three miles in length, and the point of attack was to be
the extreme left of their position, viz. Farquhar’s Farm.

In the opinion of some the attack would have succeeded and the
evil days of the siege put back; in the opinion of others the
attack {24} could not possibly have succeeded on
account of the length of the Boer position, which they had had time
to strengthen and entrench, and which had not been definitely
reconnoitred.

At midnight fresh orders were received from Sir George White in
Ladysmith. The whole force was ordered to retire and to proceed
back at once into their positions in and about the town.

It was reported that the Boers were in great numbers, some
17,000 under Joubert, and that they had their big guns with
them.

The Regiment commenced their retirement as rearguard to the
force at 4 a.m., and reached camp at 6.30 a.m. on October 28th.

October 29th was a Sunday, and except for rumours, which were
prolific, a quiet day was spent.

The Boers were reported to be entrenching themselves a mile and
a half out on the Dundee road, and at the same time the Ladysmith
defences were being prepared, and blasting operations were being
carried out for the construction of military roads.

{25}

The battle of Farquhar’s Farm was fought on October 30th,
1899.

The whole army was ordered out at 3 a.m.

The battalion formed part of the reserve brigade under Colonel
Ian Hamilton. This reserve brigade took up a position under Limit
Hill, and facing Pepworth Hill from the south.

The plan of the day was to have been as follows, had everything
gone as it was proposed:—

Five regiments of infantry, all the mounted troops, and four
batteries of artillery were to move round the enemy’s left up the
Helpmakaar road towards Farquhar’s Farm (the direction of the
proposed night attack on the night 27th-28th) to attack and drive
in his left.

Two regiments of infantry with one mountain battery were to move
off to the left of the British position to hold the enemy’s right
(which comprised the whole of the Free State Army), and prevent him
from getting into Ladysmith.

The main attack was to be made in the centre by Colonel Ian
Hamilton’s Brigade by {26} an assault on Pepworth Hill, where the
Boer big guns were located, and which was the key of the
position.

The above was the plan; the result and the way in which it was
carried out is told in a few words.

The two infantry battalions and mountain battery, detailed to
guard the left flank, knocked up against the Free State Army under
Cronje (which was seen in the forenoon by the main body of General
White’s force, coming over Walker’s Hoek) on what is known now as
Surprise Hill, and which place is situated a little above and
nearer Ladysmith than Nicholson’s Nek. Cronje attacked them in the
dark, scattered the gun mules which stampeded, and after some hours
of hard fighting captured the lot.

The force on the right, under Sir George White’s personal
command, ran prematurely into Joubert’s Transvaal Army, which had
advanced from its previous and partly reconnoitred position, and
which had formed up ready to receive them in a position somewhat
nearer Ladysmith. It received a very heavy cross fire from big
guns, {27} field guns, machine guns, and musketry,
and was put to confusion, the artillery and the cavalry having some
difficulty in extricating themselves. General White took the
Manchester Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders from Hamilton’s
Brigade to cover the retirement, and his force came back into
Ladysmith fired into with wonderful accuracy, at a range of about
7000 yards, by the big gun on Pepworth. Of the remainder of
Hamilton’s Brigade, the Rifle Brigade (which had only arrived in
Ladysmith that day) and a half battalion Devon Regiment were told
off to bring up the rear, whilst the other half battalion of the
Devons was left on Limit Hill, two miles outside Ladysmith, to act
as a covering force.

The Naval Brigade under Lambton arrived at Limit Hill with three
naval 12-pounders just as the retirement was taking place, and they
were at once ordered back into the town. They returned without
coming into action. As they were retiring down the road past the
Piggery by the Orange Free State Junction Station, a well-aimed
shell from {28} Pepworth Hill upset one of their guns,
killing some of the ox-team and a gunner who was being carried back
wounded in an ambulance.

The half battalion of the regiment under Major Curry was ordered
to take up a defensive position on Limit Hill and to stay there for
the night.

The Boer force was within 1000 yards, and it was thought
probable that they would follow up their defeated foe. Their
patrols were continually coming to within 300-500 yards of the
Devons’ outpost line.

As the half battalion was well covered from view, it was deemed
expedient and prudent not to expose their position and weakness by
firing, but rather by lying quiet to trust to the Boer imagination,
allowing them to think there was a larger force in position at
Limit Hill than there really was. This plan was eminently
successful, for except for Boer patrols the position was not
threatened.

Orders were received by this half battalion at 9 a.m. on
November 2nd to retire on to Ladysmith. The defenders of Ladysmith
being unaware of the fact that any of their own troops were in
front of them, and mistaking {29} friend for foe, got down on their knees
to fire as the companies of the Devons appeared in sight.

The half battalion which had retired with the rest of the force
into Ladysmith on October 30th received orders at 10 a.m. on the
31st to strike camp, move off and form part of the garrison of
section “A” of the defences of Ladysmith, under the command of
Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B. The second half battalion followed
them.

{30}

CHAPTER II

SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

1899-1900

The siege of Ladysmith had now commenced; communication to the
south was interrupted on November 2nd, and on the same day the
Boers had their guns in action on Bulwana Mountain and were
shelling the works and town freely.

The perimeter of Ladysmith was divided into four sections, A, B,
C, D, under Colonel W.G. Knox, General Howard, Colonel Hamilton,
and Colonel Royston respectively. Section A extended from Devon
Post to Cove Redoubt; on the west of this was section B, extending
as far as Range Post on the Klip River. Section C included Maiden
Castle, Wagon Hill, and Cæsar’s Camp, whilst the plain
between Cæsar’s Camp and Devon Post was held by the Natal
Volunteers under Colonel Royston.

{31}

The battalion was ordered to take up the two posts of Cemetery
Hill and Helpmakaar Hill. These were the most eastern kopjes of the
defences. They skirted the Helpmakaar road and were immediately
under Bulwana and Gun Hill. These were distant only some five
thousand yards, and dominated Devon Post.

The battalion was distributed: three companies on Helpmakaar
Hill, two companies on Cemetery Hill, with three companies in
reserve near the road and river-bed immediately beneath Cemetery
Hill.

Devon Post received its first shells on the morning of the 3rd.
These were aimed at the tents of the reserve companies, which were
rather ostentatiously pitched on the plain by the river-bed under
Cemetery Hill. The shells were fired from a high-velocity 3-inch
gun on Bulwana. The tents were immediately moved closer under the
hill, where they were out of sight from Bulwana. The Boer guns were
then trained on to the working parties, and some fifty shells were
burst in the works (just commenced and affording little cover) on
Helpmakaar and Cemetery {32} Hill posts, but without doing much damage.
After this, owing to shell fire, it was impossible to work except
at night, or when Bulwana was obscured by fog. The fortifications
and defences were, however, hastily pushed forward, and the
platforms for the two large and ancient howitzers known as “Castor”
and “Pollux” were soon completed.

Shortly after the commencement of the siege one of the few
shells fired into Ladysmith which did any damage, burst amongst a
party of Natal Carbineers on the road under Cemetery Hill, killing
five men and seven horses.

On November 5th the Intombi Camp was formed, and all the wounded
and most of the women and children, with a few of the able-bodied
male civilian inhabitants of Ladysmith, were moved into the neutral
camp.

On November 6th and 7th, with the exception of a shell or two,
things were quiet on Devon Post, but on the evening of the 7th a
furious bombardment began at four o’clock, the Boer guns all round
firing into the town and at anything they could see moving. No
damage was done.

{33}

In addition to the works on Devon Post, which were manned by the
Regiment, a half-company picquet was told off nightly. This picquet
extended and lay down across the main road at the foot of the
forward work. It mounted after dark and was relieved before
daylight in the morning. Many will remember the spot where this
picquet was posted as the most ill-chosen, inconvenient, and hard
platform for a bed on a rainy night.

The nights of the 6th, 7th, and 8th were occupied in making the
works stronger and building additional works.

On November 9th the Boers made their first attempt against
Ladysmith. The attack commenced at 6 a.m. with heavy musketry fire
directed on to the northern defences; and three hours later the
attack developed on Helpmakaar Post and Cæsar’s Camp. Shells
came very thickly from two howitzers and three high-velocity
Creusot guns into Devon Post. This lasted till about 2 p.m., when
the action was concluded with a royal salute from the naval
batteries and three hearty cheers, which, started by the Naval
Brigade, were taken up all round the defences in honour of
{34}
the birthday of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. A curious ending to a
battle.

During the action a well-directed shell from one of Christie’s
ancient howitzers, which were now located on Helpmakaar Hill,
pitched with good effect into the middle of a large group of Boers
who were entrenching themselves on a small rise of ground
underneath Gun Hill.

Helpmakaar, which had always been a single-day post, was now
turned into a three days’ post, companies remaining in the fort for
three days before being relieved.

On the 11th three companies of the Regiment were sent out under
Captain Lafone to blow up a farm building under Bulwana, about one
and half miles distant from Devon Post. After a long delay, owing
to the blasting materials having been forgotten, the operation was
successfully carried out, and the party returned with only some
slight annoyance from the enemy’s pompom and a few shots from a
high-velocity gun stationed on Bulwana.

The Boer artillery on Bulwana and Gun Hill was well served, and
their shooting was excellent. One morning they opened with a
{35}
40-pounder howitzer, known under the name of “Weary Willy,” on to
the main work at Devon Post, at a portion of the work occupied by
“Walker’s Hotchkiss Gun Detachment.” About twelve consecutive shots
pitched within a five yards’ radius, and one crashed into and
nearly breached the parapet, which was here about six feet thick
and built of large stones.

The men worked on the 11th from dark till 1 a.m., when the works
were practically completed and sufficiently strengthened to answer
all purposes, although building was being carried on till the last
day of the siege, and the men were still building at the actual
moment when the relief cavalry were marching across the plain into
Ladysmith.

The willingness and the cheery manner in which the men of the
battalion worked at these defences are worthy of record. On
pitch-dark nights in pouring rain the men, wet to the skin, covered
with mud and filth, without a smoke, groping about in the dark to
find a likely stone, carried on the work in silence; and when the
word was passed along to knock off work, they “turned in” without a
grumble into a wet bivouac. There was no complaining, and
{36}
the men were never required by their officers to bring along the
stones faster. The only noise that broke the stillness of the night
was the incessant “click, click, click” of the picks at work
loosening the stones, and the men, in spite of the conditions under
which the work was being carried on, joked among themselves in an
undertone.

Work was nightly carried on from dark till midnight and
sometimes till 2 a.m., and the men turned out again to stand to
arms at 3.30 a.m.

By the middle of November the works at Devon Post were from
4-1/2 to 10 feet high, from 8 to 10 feet thick at the top (the
whole built roughly of stone), with the superior slope nearly flat,
exterior slope about 1/1, interior slope nearly upright. The front
work had a thickness at the bottom of about 18 feet, owing to the
work being constructed on the slope of the hill.

In the Trenches, Ladysmith

Things passed quietly with intermittent shell fire till the
afternoon of the 14th, when General Brocklehurst took out the
Cavalry Brigade and two batteries of artillery, with the intention
of turning the Boers off Rifleman’s {37} Ridge. This they failed to do,
and returned to their lines about 5 p.m. well peppered by the Boer
big guns, one shell from the big gun on Pepworth pitching into the
centre of the road just short of a battery of artillery which was
coming back into Ladysmith, near the defences on the north-west
front held by a detachment of the Dublin Fusiliers—an
accurate shot, and the distance measured on the map 10,500 yards.
Shortly afterwards the Naval Brigade in their turn did some good
shooting, pitching a shell on to the muzzle of the big gun on
Pepworth, and a few moments after this shot, another on to his
parapet. Boers were afterwards seen carrying litters away from the
work. This big gun never fired again during the siege, but the
Boers patched him up and he lived to do good work for them against
General Buller in his advance north to Lydenburg, and the Boers
finally blew him up in front of the battalion near Waterval, in the
Lydenburg district, when engaged with a column under General Walter
Kitchener.

For the next few days nothing of consequence occurred beyond the
usual shell fire, varied at intervals from day to night time. It
{38}
rained in torrents most of the time, and the men were continually
wet through. They however kept very fit, and there were very few in
hospital.

An amusing incident occurred on the 17th. Good targets being
scarce the Boers continually fired shell at any moving or
stationary object they could catch sight of—sometimes at a
single scout. They often fired their pompom at a range of about
5000 yards at the vultures feeding on the dead horses under Devon
Post. On this day they sent three 40-lb. shells at an old man named
Brown who contracted for the dead horses. Brown used to take these
out into the open in full view of the Boers, to some flat ground
under the Post, and there skin them at his leisure. The old man
would take his load out once a day in a four-horsed cart. If he was
seen by the Boers he would come back at a gallop pursued by Boer
shells. This time he came back on three wheels, much to the
amusement of Section A of the defences; the fourth wheel had come
off and he was in too great a hurry to readjust it, and it was in
consequence left behind. The old man was never hit.

{39}

On November 20th the Boers mounted some more guns on Bulwana and
also on Umbrella Tree Hill, which lay in the Nek between Bulwana
and Gun Hill. Colonel Knox ordered a dummy battery to be made at
night on the further side of the Klip River and out in the open.
Wooden imitation guns and imitation gunners were erected, and these
were worked with a string by a gunner concealed in the bank of the
river.

Captain Kincaid-Smith, with the two Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns
captured at Elandslaagte, of which he was now in charge, was to
open fire from Devon Post on to the Boer guns newly placed on
Umbrella Tree Hill, and as he was perfectly concealed and fired
smokeless powder, it was supposed that the Boers would imagine that
the firing came from the new dummy battery just erected.

Kincaid-Smith began firing at about six o’clock on the following
morning. He fired some five shells in perfect silence unanswered by
the Boers. He was then suddenly located by them, and shells were
hurled on to him from all sides and from all descriptions of guns.
This continued for a quarter of an hour {40} and then
slackened off. The Boers burst their shrapnel better than usual,
and in the evening just before dark one shrapnel got into a working
party on Devon Post, killing one man and severely wounding
another.

There was some heavy musketry fire during the night at a
reconnaissance party sent out from Ladysmith towards Umbrella Tree
Hill. The party had orders to disturb the Boers and draw their
fire. This they very successfully accomplished. On the 22nd night
another “disturbing party” was sent out under Captain Jacson,
consisting of one company of the Regiment and a party of cavalry,
to “stir up” the Boers on Flag Hill. It was pitch-dark, pouring
with rain, and the ground was covered with boulders of rocks. The
cavalry were obliged to leave their horses behind and proceed on
foot in front of the infantry; so little was gained by the
enterprise and no “stirring up” was effected.

Up to this date there had been very little news from the outside
world, but now the Regiment was informed that General French had
fought a successful engagement at Estcourt and had got in with the
cavalry. They were {41} also told that the garrison might expect
to be relieved by the 13th December by one division which was
coming up from Durban.

About November 22nd the news was received that the armoured
train at Colenso had been attacked, derailed, and captured.

On the 23rd Kincaid-Smith received orders to proceed with one of
his guns during the following night down to the river-bed near the
dummy battery and open fire if the Boers fired at it in the
morning. This they had done the previous day, much to every one’s
amusement. At daybreak he opened fire from the river-bed. After his
second shot the Boers found him and made wonderful practice,
bursting shrapnel all over him. No damage, however, was done as he
was well dug into the bank. They continued their shelling for an
hour, after which they turned their big guns on to Tunnel Hill for
a short time. This hill was held by the Liverpool Regiment, who
lost two killed and twelve wounded, of whom five died of their
wounds next day.

The works on Devon Post and Cemetery Hill were strengthened
during the next few nights until the front walls were from twelve
{42}
to fifteen feet thick. Most of this work was carried on in heavy
rain, which greatly added to the general discomfort of the men.

On November 28th the garrison was encouraged by the information
that the Boers had been badly beaten near Estcourt, that 3000 of
them had gone off (it was not reported where to!), and that General
Clery was at Colenso.

On November 30th General Clery opened up signalling
communication with Ladysmith by flashing his message with his
searchlight at night on to the clouds. The message, which was in
cipher, could be easily read by every one, but the garrison was
unable to reply as they had no searchlight.

In the early days of December, in order to keep the men as far
as possible in a condition for any eventualities, the Regiment
evacuated their works twice a week at dusk and went for a march
twice round the town. Starting at nightfall the works were regained
about 10 p.m. The exercise was good for the men’s limbs and the
change of scene undoubtedly nourishment for their minds, but it is
doubtful if it conduced to the health of the men, as during the
march they were smothered in their own {43} dust, and
also in that kicked up by the artillery horses exercising at the
same time and on the same roads. It certainly gave the men
something to think about besides rocks and stones and building, and
the walking stretched their legs.

On December 2nd Colonel Knox, desirous of carrying on the work
of building in the daytime as well as by night, ordered some canvas
screens to be put up in the Post, behind which the men could work
concealed from view. But although stained the colour of the
surroundings, the screens were seen at once by the Boers, and the
battalion was much troubled by a new gun stationed near Pepworth
Hill, which opened fire shortly after they were erected. One shell
from this howitzer topping the hill pitched within a yard of the
guard tent underneath, which was full of men. No damage was done,
however, beyond scattering the ammunition boxes and covering the
men with mud. The screens were then taken down, and on the
disappearance of the noxious objects the firing ceased, and the
Boers appeared pacified. At 10 p.m., whilst the Regiment was at
work building on Cemetery Hill, {44} an order came to parade at
once and march to a rendezvous down in the town in Lyle Street. It
was given out “for operations near Limit Hill.” On reaching the
rendezvous it was learnt that the force consisted of two brigades
of infantry, some batteries, and all the mounted troops. After half
an hour’s wait, a staff officer rode up to say that the operations
were cancelled.

About this time the siege newspaper, the Ladysmith Lyre,
came into existence. There were only four issues, on account of
want of paper.

Shelling continued daily with but little or no result. The Boers
were apparently much incensed with the Town Hall, upon which the
Geneva red cross flag was flying, and which was being used as a
hospital, for they continually fired at it till the flag was taken
down early in December, when they scarcely ever fired at it
again.

Town Hall, Ladysmith, Clock-Tower Damaged by Shell
Fire

On December 7th General Hunter made his sortie to Gun Hill. The
secret was well kept. In the evening, at dark, the battalion was
sent to Abattis Hill with orders to entrench, the scheme ostensibly
being that a {45} force was to go out and stir up the Boers
round Pepworth Hill whilst the Regiment threatened to attack the
Boers on the other flank.

At 11 p.m. a letter was received telling the officer commanding
the Devon Regiment to meet General Hunter under Devon Post at 11.30
p.m. Shortly after this hour a force of Colonial mounted infantry,
with General Hunter at their head, passed the post to assault Gun
Hill. This they found but sparsely guarded, and, dispersing the
small picquet, they succeeded in blowing up the two big guns and a
Maxim located there. The Regiment remained out till the operation
was over. It had been placed in this position on Abattis Hill to
act as a flank guard, with the object of preventing the Boers
attacking from the left round General Hunter’s rear, which was very
open, and to act as a support upon which General Hunter could fall
back in case his surprise failed and he was driven in.

This successful operation was accomplished with the loss of
seven men wounded.

The operation that followed was not, however, so successful.
Colonel Knox reported {46} that his mounted troops had gone out eight
miles up the Newcastle road past Limit Hill, and had not met or
seen a single Boer. He suggested that the Cavalry Brigade should go
out and capture and burn the Boer stores at Elandslaagte Station.
They proceeded to carry out the suggestion, starting at 7 a.m., but
they fell in with a large force of Boers under Pepworth Hill who
had been in their laagers when the reconnaissance was made and had
thus escaped detection. They came under heavy musketry fire as well
as shell fire, and retired back to Ladysmith with a loss of three
killed and fifteen wounded.

On December 10th an attack on Devon Post was expected, and
precautions taken accordingly. The attack, however, did not come
off.

On the night of December 10th the Rifle Brigade made a sortie
and blew up a Boer big gun on Surprise Hill. This attack was
admirably planned and carried out, but the losses sustained by the
Rifle Brigade were heavy, being fourteen killed and fifty wounded
out of the five companies employed. The Boers attacked them as they
were retiring; there was a good {47} deal of indiscriminate firing,
and the bayonet was freely used. The Boers lost considerably,
partly in the general mix-up, from their own fire, and partly owing
to the close-quarter combat with the Rifle Brigade.

The Regiment, with other troops, was ordered out with all
baggage on the night of the 12th, the rendezvous being the iron
bridge on the Vanreenen’s Pass road. On arrival there the order was
received to go home. This was supposed to be a rehearsal for a
sortie. On December 13th General Buller’s guns were heard for the
first time due south from Ladysmith, and at 8 p.m. the Regiment and
transport were inspected by Colonel Knox to see if everything was
complete and in readiness to move out, and on the 14th the Regiment
was placed with other troops in a flying column formed under the
personal command of Sir George White.

It was expected by all that General Buller would relieve the
Ladysmith garrison on December 15th.

The following day, December 15th, a very heavy cannonade
commenced at 6 a.m. in the direction of Colenso; and at 7 a.m. a
heliograph {48} message was sent into Ladysmith which told
the garrison that “the Boers are suffering terribly from our thirty
guns and 23,000 men.” The cannonade ceased at about 1 p.m.

This day the meat ration was reduced to 9 oz. per man, but 1-1/4
lb. of bread per man was still being issued.

December 16th being Dingaan’s Day, the garrison of Ladysmith was
treated to heavy shell fire at daybreak.

On December 17th the Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders were
told off as reserve battalions under the immediate orders of Sir
George White.

It was officially given out that Sir R. Buller had been unable
to make good his advance at Colenso, and that the garrison must be
prepared to hold on for another two weeks. The orders publishing
this news stated that the “Lieutenant-General regrets to have to
announce that the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief in South
Africa failed to make good his first attack on Colenso;
reinforcements will therefore not arrive as early as expected.”

On the evening of December 18th the Regiment {49} gave over
the good works they had completed on Devon Post and Cemetery Hill
to the Liverpool Regiment, and moved into the latter’s camp at
Tunnel Hill, or, as it was otherwise known, Railway Cutting
Camp.

Helpmakaar Hill, on account of being so exposed, had, at the
commencement of the siege, been considered indefensible and
untenable.

Under the vigorous superintendence of Colonel Knox, the
commandant of the section who planned the defences, the works on
this hill had by now been almost completed by the officers and men
of the Battalion.

The defences were as complete as possible—flanking works,
covered ways, splinter and shell-proof covers were dug or erected,
and the main trenches had been turned into defensible barracks with
head cover to keep off the rain.

It was possible to proceed from the reserve under Cemetery Hill
up to and round the front and main works, and round the other side
of the hill back to the reserve again, without once coming into
view from the Boer {50} positions on Gun Hill, Bulwana, or
elsewhere, a six-feet covering wall having been built for this
purpose. It was thus possible to send reinforcements to any part of
the works without exposure to fire or view.

During the siege this post was never attacked or seriously
threatened.

The Regiment, being now in the general reserve, was ordered to
be ready to jump into mule wagons, and be carted at a gallop to any
place where they might be required, at any moment, and on the 20th
the manoeuvre was put into execution.

It was not altogether a success.

At dusk the Regiment proceeded to the railway station and the
men were duly loaded up in the wagons. A start was then made, but
as the second wagon nearly took the whole station with it in its
endeavours to negotiate the first corner of the galvanized iron
goods shed, no great speed was effected, for this wagon and the
demolished corner of the shed blocked all further egress from the
station till the road was cleared. Shortly afterwards the wagons,
at last let loose, came into contact with the two city filth carts,
the “Powerful” {51} and “Terrible,” which were parading about
the streets on their own. These exceedingly powerful ironclads
completed the defeat of the mule wagons, upset finally their order
of going, and the retirement was effected in detachments. The
manoeuvre was never repeated.

Wonderful tales and reports were continually being circulated
from day to day. On one day there would perhaps be no news of any
value, followed on the next day by the most woeful tidings; but on
the third day, as if ashamed of themselves for furnishing such bad
news the previous day, the tale-bearers would turn the winter of
its discontent into the most glorious summer, by sending forth to
the garrison shaves bubbling over with pleasing items.

On the evening of the 21st a heliograph message was received
from the 2nd Battalion, which was with Sir Redvers Buller, stating
that at the Colenso fight on the 15th December Colonel Bullock,
Major Walter, and Lieutenant Smyth-Osbourne had been taken
prisoners, and Captains Goodwyn, Vigors, and Radcliffe and
Lieutenants Gardiner and Storey wounded.

After standing to arms daily at 4.15 a.m. {52} till
daylight, the Regiment was employed in building long stone
traverses, behind which the men were to live, and this work was
carried on again in the evening after dark by the light of candles.
The dimensions of the traverses were sixty yards long, eight feet
high, six feet (of stonework) thick at the top, and nine feet of
stonework at the base, the earth from a ditch in front being thrown
up at an angle of 1/1. They had a topping of sand-bags, with
intervals for air passage; and a tent, stretched lengthways from
the top down to ground, afforded the men shelter and
accommodation.

On December 22nd a serious catastrophe happened to a party of
the Gloucester Regiment, who were quartered in a small traverse
near those occupied by the Regiment. A shell caught the whole party
of twelve men as they were sitting away from the cover of the
traverse. Five were killed, four died of their wounds almost
immediately, and three were severely wounded.

A man with a telescope was now placed on the look-out, with
orders to blow a whistle if he saw the big gun on Bulwana turned
towards {53} the lines when firing; and as the shell
took about thirty seconds from the time of the discharge to reach
its mark, the warning gave the men time to get under cover.

There were frequently some very amusing incidents when the
look-out man blew his whistle. One morning whilst the business at
the orderly-room was being conducted, and a culprit being told off,
the whistle gave warning that the gun on Bulwana had fired, and in
the direction of Tunnel Hill. As all could not get inside the
orderly-room shelter, which was merely a hole dug into the side of
the hill, there was a general scuttle and sauve qui peut.
One officer, trying to get into the orderly-room from outside, ran
into another who was escaping from it to get into the first
traverse, and each tumbled over the other. The Quartermaster,
trying to crawl on his hands and knees under the tenting of the
second traverse, got blocked out, and at the same time shut out
another officer flying for safety. At the same moment a man jumped
from above on the Quartermaster’s back, and he, fancying that it
was the shell and that his end had come, gave himself up for lost.
All, however, {54} ended happily for the immediate
neighbourhood, for the look-out man had made a mistake, and the
shell, instead of arriving at Tunnel Hill, crashed into the
town.

All these incidents and accidents, individually very serious at
the time, were always amusing in the telling as soon as the tyranny
was overpast, and, resulting in a hearty laugh, helped to relieve
the strain.

The London Gazette of October 9th was signalled into
Ladysmith by the 2nd Battalion. This stated: “Major Park to be
Lieutenant-Colonel; Davies, 2nd-in-Command; Ellicombe, Major;
Radcliffe, Captain.”

A list of prices at this time in Ladysmith at the public auction
is of interest:—

Eggs per dozen, 11s. 6d.
Small vegetable marrow, 1s. 6d.
Twelve small carrots, 2s. 6d.
Small water melon (worth 1d.), 6s. 6d.
Condensed milk per tin, 5s. 6d.
Fifty-two small potatoes, £1 10s.
Chickens, each, 8s.
Ducks, 13s. 6d.
Dutch butter in tins, 6s. 6d. per lb.
1/2d. Manilla cigars, 1s.

{55}

There was no English smoking tobacco obtainable, and one bottle
of whisky changed hands at £5 10s.

December 25th, Christmas Day.

“Hark, the herald angels sing!” was forcibly brought to notice
by the whistling of shells passing overhead at daylight. No Divine
Service was therefore held. The garrison received the following
message from Her Majesty the Queen: “I wish you and all my brave
soldiers and sailors a happy Christmas. God protect and bless you
all.—V.R.I.” In the evening there was a soldiers’ sing-song
in the lines, which was finished off by three most hearty cheers
for Her Majesty. Christmas Day completed the eighth week of the
siege.

The losses which the 2nd Battalion sustained at Colenso were
heliographed into Ladysmith. These were 15 N.C.O.’s and 10 men
killed, 72 wounded, and 33 taken prisoners. This was in addition to
the officers wounded and taken prisoners already mentioned.

On December 27th, shortly after breakfast, a shell from the big
gun from Bulwana pitched and burst in the officers’ mess shelter,
where {56} fourteen officers had taken cover on the
whistle being blown. Lieutenant A.F. Dalzel was killed and the
following were wounded:—

Lieutenant P.H. Price-Dent, dangerously in the head.
Lieutenant Caffin, dangerously in arm and shoulder.
Lieutenant Byrne, slightly.
Lieutenant Tringham, slightly.
Lieutenant Kane, slightly.
Lieutenant Scafe, slightly.
Lieutenant Twiss, slightly.
Lieutenant Blunt, slightly.
Captain Lafone, slightly.
Private Laycock, mess waiter, slightly.

The wounded were taken into the Railway Cutting and there cared
for. They were then sent down to hospital in a church in the town.
Lieutenant Dalzel was buried that night in the cemetery after dark
during a heavy thunderstorm and in torrents of rain.

The men had a bad experience on the night of the 29th. The rain
flooded their bivouacs, and the morning found blankets and clothes
floating about in the water in the trenches. {57} Later on,
however, the weather cleared, the sun came out, and everything was
soon dried.

After a Wet Night in the Traverses, Ladysmith

At the latter end of December marksmen were sent out daily to
the hill-tops some 1000 yards in front of the line of forts to act
as countersnipers to the Boers, who continually fired at the
grazing guards. One man was hit twice in one day by a Boer sniper,
but only slightly wounded. It would appear from a letter written by
a Boer that these marksmen made it very uncomfortable for the Boer
snipers. In the letter, which was afterwards published in a Boer
newspaper, the correspondent, writing to a friend in Pretoria,
said: “I and my two comrades went out this morning to fire into the
English position. We had only just got to our hiding-place when one
of my comrades was shot dead; shortly after, my other comrade was
badly wounded, and I lay down and hid the whole day till dark, when
I got back to the laager.” This would go to prove that, comparing
him with the Boer, the British infantry soldier is not such a
duffer with his weapon as some of those in authority were in the
habit of asserting.

There was a good deal of musketry fire {58} whilst the
scouts were out, and it was supposed that shots were being
exchanged with the Boer snipers; but when the marksmen, who were
posted on the hills near the Orange Free State Junction Station and
just above the abandoned piggery, came back with portions of the
carcasses of pigs, it was evident that all the firing had not been
at Transvaal Boers.

Lieutenant Price-Dent died at 6 a.m. on the 31st December in the
Intombi Hospital. It was found that a piece of shell had penetrated
his brain and lodged there. He was buried in the Intombi
cemetery.

Up to the end of December things had been going fairly well with
the besieged. The Regiment had had plenty of hard work to keep them
fit, although they had been exposed to the elements and had had to
rough it considerably. But nothing in the way of disease had
troubled them. With the advent of January, however, whether it was
from want of exercise or from the surroundings of their new camp,
disease in the form of fever and dysentery became rife. They had
been situated formerly for the most part on a well-drained
{59}
kopje, whereas now they were down on the flat, and in a position
that was not altogether healthy. There were no longer any comforts
in the shape of tobacco, etc., and the news given to them from the
outside world in the place of food was of so poor a quality that
the men’s minds as well as their bodies were becoming affected.

The Regiment kept heart under the depressing circumstances in a
wonderful manner, and when Sir Redvers Buller kept putting off his
arrival from day to day and week to week, the news that he was
coming at last was generally received with a smile as if it was
rather a joke.

The Boers were very busy on New Year’s Day, 1900. It was
supposed that a number of excursion trains filled with the youth
and beauty of the Transvaal had arrived, and consequently the young
Boer blood was all for showing off. The big gun on Bulwana threw in
the aggregate during the day 1-1/2 tons of iron into the town, with
the result that two men were killed. There was likewise a good deal
of sniping, chiefly at the Indian “grass cuts.”

{60}

One shell thrown into Ladysmith on New Year’s Day had engraved
on it “Compliments of the season,” and contained a bursting charge
of liquorice in the place of melinite, and a paper on which was
written:—

“Good morning Mr. Franchise, don’t be so cowardly to stay in
holes, ye brave hero.
“Your faithfully,
“SMALL LONG TOM.”

Another blind shell picked up was full of sweetmeats.

Messages of good wishes to the garrison were received from Her
Majesty, from Sir Redvers Buller, and from the soldiers, sailors,
and civilians of Hong Kong.

Sir George White came round to see the Regiment in the evening,
and informed the officers that Sir Redvers Buller would make no
move for a fortnight. This was definite news, at any rate.

At dawn on January 3rd most of the naval guns fired off a large
amount of shell, and there was considerable guessing amongst the
uninitiated as to what was or were the targets. Shells fell at the
foot of Bulwana, near the {61} searchlight on the top, and also near
the big gun. It was afterwards learnt that all the shells were
meant for one particular spot on Bulwana, viz. the big gun.

On occasions it was the duty of the Regiment to send one company
to dismount the 4.7 gun known as “Lady Anne” and place it on carts
preparatory to its being shifted elsewhere. This was easily
accomplished at the commencement of the siege in one night by 100
men. At the end of the siege, however, owing to the weakness of the
men, the task was never completed under two nights, and then by 200
men.

About this time one company of the Regiment was ordered down to
the railway station as a station and bridge guard. This was a
three-days’ post, and was much appreciated, as the men, being quite
concealed amongst trees, had more freedom, and the officer in
command had a railway carriage to sleep in.

On January 5th the following moves took place, and as the
position of companies is important, they are given in full.

Three companies proceeded under Major Curry to Observation Hill
to relieve the companies {62} of the 60th Rifles ordered to
Cæsar’s Camp. One company was ordered to the railway station
as bridge guard. A half company was sent to form the Bell’s Spruit
picquet, the other half remaining at the Railway Cutting. In the
early hours of January 6th three fresh companies relieved those on
Observation Hill, the latter returning to the Railway Cutting; the
two companies at the railway bridge and at Bell’s Spruit stood fast
in their positions of the previous day.

The Boer attack of January 6th on the positions round Ladysmith
commenced on Wagon Hill at about 2.45 a.m., and the Boers were not
finally repulsed till after dark on the evening of the same
day.

As the great attack has been so ably described by various
authors, it will suffice here to give a rough outline of what took
place on Cæsar’s Camp and Wagon Hill prior to the companies
of the Regiment reaching the latter place.

The Boers attacked Wagon Hill at about 2.45 a.m., and amidst a
good deal of confusion on the top, where 4:7 gun was in the act of
being mounted, gained possession of the front {63} crest. Their
attempt to take Wagon Hill itself failed. Reinforcements consisting
of two companies Gordon Highlanders and three squadrons of I.L.H.
were sent to assist the 60th Rifles, the men of the I.L.H., and the
detachment of Sappers already engaged with the Boers.

The Railway Bridge, with Caesar’s Camp in Distance,
Ladysmith

An hour later the attack on Cæsar’s Camp developed. The
Manchesters were prepared for them, and one company Gordon
Highlanders was sent to reinforce. The Boers, unable to advance
against the front crest of Cæsar’s Camp, attempted to turn
the flank of the Manchesters along the northern slopes. This
attempt was foiled by the advance of the one company Gordon
Highlanders, assisted by the 53rd Battery which had come into
action on the plain below. The Rifle Brigade reinforced
Cæsar’s Camp at about 7 a.m., and two more companies of the
Gordons were sent there at about 2 p.m. By 10 a.m. the Boers had
been pushed back off Cæsar’s Camp, and Wagon Hill was
reported nearly clear.

Wagon Hill was further reinforced by the 18th Hussars at 10
a.m.

At 1 p.m. the Boers, who had always hung {64} on to their
crest line, again attempted to rush Wagon Hill point, and though
they gained a temporary advantage failed to establish
themselves.

Sir George White ordered that the hill should be cleared of
Boers at all costs before nightfall, and he sent the 5th Lancers
and 19th Hussars to support the troops already at Wagon Hill, and
at the same time three companies of the Devons were ordered to
proceed there with all dispatch.

At 10 a.m. the three companies of the Devons, which were in
camp, commanded respectively by Captain W.B. Lafone, Lieutenant
Masterson with Lieutenant Walker, and Lieutenant Field, the whole
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Park, had been ordered to proceed
to the camp near Iron Bridge vacated that morning by the Gordon
Highlanders, to be ready as a reserve if wanted.

At about 3.30 p.m. these three companies received orders to
proceed at once to Wagon Hill to reinforce Colonel Ian Hamilton’s
command and to push on, as help was urgently required. The
Adjutant, Captain H.S.L. Ravenshaw, was sent back to camp to order
{65}
rations and water to be sent out. Wagon Hill was reached at 4.45
p.m., and it was then ascertained that the 5th Lancers and 19th
Hussars had already been merged into the firing line, and that a
party of forty or fifty Boers were still in possession of the hill
some 100 yards in front of the ridge held by the Imperial Light
Horse, and directly in front of where the three companies were then
halted under cover, that these Boers had been holding on all day
there and inflicting great loss, and that our troops had been
unable to dislodge them. Colonel Park was asked if he could turn
them out by rushing them with the bayonet. He answered, “We will
try.” After the three companies had been formed up in column with
bayonets fixed and magazines charged, Colonel Park gave the order
to advance at fifty paces interval in quick time, and when the top
of the ridge was reached to charge the position occupied by the
Boers.

The charge took place in a blinding hail-storm, a time well
chosen, as the hail was beating into the faces of the Boers. The
men, before reaching the place where they formed up for the charge,
were wet through, {66} and had put on their warm coats which they
had carried strapped on to their belts.

When the storm was at its height, Colonel Park gave the order to
charge. Lieutenant Field, who commanded the leading company, rushed
forward up the slope, shouting, “Company, double charge!” He was
immediately followed at a distance of about ten yards by
Masterson’s company, which was immediately followed by Lafone’s. As
they got to the top of the crest they came in view of the sangar of
rocks held by the I.L.H. At the corner of this they had to change
direction half right, and the moment they reached it came under
fire from the Boers. There was necessarily some crowding at this
corner, owing to the change of direction, and the fact that the
companies in their eagerness had followed so soon the one behind
the other. There was, however, no halting, no dwelling here. On
they went to reach their goal, 130 yards away, over perfectly flat
open ground, fired into at short range from right, left, and front.
Three-parts of the way across Park directed the rear company more
to the right, the position the Boers occupied being in a
semicircle.

{67}

Lieut.-Colonel C.W. Park

The enemy held on, firing most heavily, until the charging lines
were within fifteen yards of them, and then ran down the slope and
disappeared behind a ridge of rocks some forty yards ahead, beyond
which the ground was dead and fell steeply away to the front.
Almost before the men could be secured in the position they had
won, bullets began to come in quickly from the right and left, and
the cover of the rocks had to be sought as several men were hit. A
few of the Boers who had been dislodged also crept back to the low
ridge of rocks in front and began firing, and it was at this time
that Captain Lafone and Lieutenant Field were hit. Lieutenant
Walker, Somerset Light Infantry, and about thirty-five men were hit
during the charge. Colonel Park was then the only officer left, the
three companies being commanded by non-commissioned officers.

Lieutenant Walker was one of the last shot dead in the charge.
He was shot through the head (as were most of the killed) within
fifteen yards of the kopje held by the Boers.

Lieutenant Field rushed forward beyond this kopje and lay down
in the open and commenced {68} firing at the Boers at the crest just
in front. He was very shortly afterwards shot through the head.

Captain Lafone was shot shortly before Lieutenant Field. He was
in the act of firing at the time, taking aim, and was shot by a
Boer lying in the grass some twenty-five yards away on his right
rear. Before he was killed he had suggested to Lieutenant Masterton
that some one should go back to the I.L.H. sangar to ask them to
direct their fire on to some Boers on the left front; these were
firing into the dead and wounded who had been hit during the charge
and left out in the open.

Lieutenant Masterton at once volunteered, and started to run
back over the 130 yards. He got most of the way across when he was
hit in the legs by a bullet, but he continued his course, and being
struck again fell, and was dragged behind cover by the I.L.H. He
delivered his message.

The position won was held until the Boers retired under cover of
darkness. The men were then placed in defensive positions, and
picquets told off.

The wounded were subsequently cared for, {69} and the dead
left where they had fallen till daylight.

Colonel Park described the fire of the Boers as like the crackle
of a piece of gorse in a blazing fire. Colour-Sergeant Palmer, who
so greatly distinguished himself both during and after the charge,
said the air was hot with bullets. His rifle was shot in two at the
lower band as he was taking aim, splinters grazing his face and
hands. Half the survivors had their clothing shot through, and the
majority of the killed were found to have been hit two or three
times.

The strength of the force was 5 officers and 184
non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 3 officers and 14 men
were killed and 1 officer and 34 men were wounded.

Although the loss was great, viz. nearly one-third of the total
number, it is a matter of surprise that more were not hit during
the run of 130 yards, exposed as they were for about three minutes
to magazine fire at a point-blank range. It can be accounted for by
the fact that the Boers crouching behind the rocks were rather
below than above the level of the men, and their fire being
consequently {70} directed upwards, the bullets passed high
and over the heads of the charging companies. This would explain
why the majority of the killed were shot through the head.
Lieutenant Walker was hit in the chin, the bullet cutting his
chin-strap and passing out at the back and top of his head.

The following morning, as the men were collecting and parading
preparatory to marching back to the railway cutting, Sir George
White rode up and addressed them. Shaking Colonel Park by the hand
he said: “I congratulate and thank you for the splendid work you
and your men did yesterday. It was magnificently done. I am afraid
you suffered very heavily, but you must remember that such work as
that cannot be done for the Empire without loss.”

Whilst the three companies were performing such gallant deeds on
the southern defences, the three companies under Major Curry were
holding their own on the north-west defences at Observation
Hill.

The Boers attacked this post heavily in the morning, and were
supported by six field-guns, which were supposed to have been the
Colenso {71} guns of General Buller’s army, shrapnel
being continually burst with excellent precision over the
defences.

Naval Battery Hill, Ladysmith

Monument Erected to Devons on Wagon Hill, On Spot Where the
Charge Took Place, Ladysmith

The account of the fighting which took place is told in Major
Curry’s own words:—

“The battle of Ladysmith commenced between 2 and 3 a.m. on
Cæsar’s Camp and soon we were engaged all round. The three
companies which had proceeded to Observation Hill originally had
just been relieved by three fresh companies. At about 4 a.m.
Lieutenant Emerson reported to me that there was a party of Boers
to his front, that he had fired on them, and that they had retired.
I thought it was the usual picquet and that they had gone right
back (it was too dark to see much); but such was not the case, for
they had concealed themselves in a fold in the ground about 300
yards to our front. Their strength must have been between seventy
and eighty.

“The enemy brought fire to bear on us from a 40-pounder
howitzer, a field-gun, and a hotchkiss on Surprise Hill, and from
one or two field-guns on the hill to our right over Hyde’s Farm.
They pounded away all the morning, and brought a continuous rifle
fire {72} on our position as well. At about 9.30
a.m. I heard a rattle of musketry from our centre work, and when I
went up there I found that the enemy, who had concealed themselves
in the fold in the ground in the early morning, had advanced right
up the hill and had got within a few yards of our sangars before
being seen. We killed nine and wounded twelve. They retired again
to their cover, where they remained for the greater part of the
day, slipping away by ones and twos back to their position. At
about 4 p.m. a tremendous thunder and hail storm came on, which
blotted out everything. The fire, which had ceased as the storm
came on, was not renewed. Our loss was two killed by rifle fire,
when the Boers made their attack. Our sangars were frequently
breached by the 40-lb. shell during the day, but there was no loss
from shell fire.”

These three companies were relieved by the Leicesters the next
evening.

Lieutenant Masterson was rewarded with the Victoria Cross, and
the following is the official account of his gallant
deed:—

“During the action at Wagon Hill, on the 6th January, 1900,
Lieutenant Masterson {73} commanded with the greatest gallantry and
dash one of the three companies of his regiment, which charged a
ridge held by the enemy, and captured the position.

“The companies were then exposed to a most heavy and galling
fire from the right and left front. Lieutenant Masterson undertook
to give a message to the Imperial Light Horse, who were holding a
ridge some hundred yards behind, to fire to the left front and
endeavour to check the enemy’s fire.

“In taking this message he crossed an open space of a hundred
yards, which was swept by a most heavy cross fire, and although
badly wounded in both thighs managed to crawl in and deliver his
message before falling exhausted into the Imperial Light Horse
trench. His unselfish heroism was undoubtedly the means of saving
several lives.”

The gallant conduct of Colour-Sergeant Palmer was brought to
notice under the following circumstances: When three companies of
the Regiment were ordered to charge the ridge held by the enemy on
Wagon Hill on January 6th, 1900, Colour-Sergeant Gilbert Palmer was
with the leading company, and he {74} at once dashed out to the
front with most conspicuous bravery, and went straight for the
point from which the heaviest fire was coming. The enemy ran before
they were reached, but the three companies were exposed to a
galling fire from the right, left, and front. Colour-Sergeant
Palmer got behind a rock and shot several of the enemy, at the same
time keeping a constant eye upon his own men, telling them when and
where to fire, and when to take cover. When all the company
officers were either killed or wounded, he at once recognized his
position as senior non-commissioned officer, and was invaluable in
getting orders passed to the other companies, and in superintending
the men till dark, when the enemy retired. He then, acting under
orders, personally placed the outpost line, saw to the collection
of the dead and wounded, and, in fact, rendered invaluable
assistance in every way.

His dash and pluck during the bayonet charge, his coolness and
steady courage under a heavy cross fire, and the power of command
and of quick and correct judgment displayed by him were most
brilliant. Colour-Sergeant {75} Palmer’s name was previously brought to
notice for gallant conduct at the battle of Elandslaagte on October
21st, 1899, so that this made the second occasion on which he
conspicuously distinguished himself.

The names of the following non-commissioned officers and men
were also brought to notice for gallantry on the
occasion:—

Lance-Corporal Gilbert Young.
   Frank John Rowe.
Private Henry Brimmicombe.
   R.G. Hansford.
   E. Norman.
   H. Cox.

The following message from Her Majesty the Queen was received by
Sir George White for promulgation:—

“To Sir George White,

“Ladysmith.

“Warmly congratulate you and all under your command on your
brilliant success. Greatly admire conduct of Devonshire
Regiment.

V.R.I.”

{76}

The following telegram was also received:—

“O/C Devon Regiment,

“Railway Cutting.

“G.O.C. directs me to convey direct to you the following message
from Sir R. Buller:—

“‘Congratulate all troops on gallant defence, especially Devon
Regiment.'”

The losses sustained by the garrison of Ladysmith on the 6th
January were:—

By the death of Captain Lafone the Regiment lost one of the
kindest-hearted and best officers that ever led a company.

The Boers’ losses are estimated at 64 killed and 119 wounded.
This estimate may be considered low, for the Standard and
Diggers’ News, copies of which were found later on in the war,
gave six full-length columns of killed and wounded amongst the
various commandos.

A large donga was utilized by the Boers as a dressing station.
The violent storm on the {77} afternoon of the 6th filled all the dry
dongas and turned them at once into mountain torrents. It is said
that all the wounded Boers in this donga were swept out into the
Klip River and drowned. The dead of the Regiment were buried with
those of other regiments, in a grave under Wagon Hill. Captain
Lafone and Lieutenant Field were buried in the cemetery in
Ladysmith.

On the morning of January 8th all the wounded were sent by train
to Intombi Camp, including Lieutenant Masterson, who was doing
well.

On January 9th the Regiment was concentrated at the railway
cutting, the company at the railway station having been permanently
relieved from the post by a company of the Liverpool Regiment. The
battalion was thus ready to be moved to any portion of the defences
requiring assistance, in case of attack.

The estimation in which the battalion was held at this time by
the Ladysmith garrison was well borne out by a remark made by Sir
George White. “The Devons,” he said, “have never failed me yet. On
the 6th they held one place and took another.”

{78}

A scare in the evening that the Boers were to attack again in
the morning caused various preparations to be made for their
advent. The garrison stood to arms at 3.15 a.m. awaiting the
attack.

It is a curious fact that the Regiment was never ordered to
stand to arms in the morning before three o’clock at any time
previous to or after the 6th January, and the only time the Boers
made a night attack they did so at 2.15 a.m. This was on January
6th, on which day the Regiment was ordered to stand to arms at 4.15
a.m.

During the night of January 9th-10th the naval guns fired in the
direction of Surprise Hill, and whilst this was proceeding the
mountain battery’s two remaining guns also threw some star shell in
the same direction. The Boers were hugely elated at the sight of
the star shell. This was probably the first time they had seen
them. They turned their searchlight on to the stars when they fell
on the ground, and cheered lustily. They evidently considered that
it was a performance got up for their special entertainment by
Messrs. Brock and Co., direct from the Crystal Palace.

{79}

The cause of all this shell fire was not known, but it would
appear as if information had been received that the Boers had been
collecting at the back of Surprise Hill the evening before, with a
view to a renewed attack. Nothing, however, in the shape of an
attack occurred, and at 3 a.m. firing ceased, and the sun rose in
the morning in tranquillity.

On the 11th three messages were received by the garrison
congratulating them on their good work of January 6th: one from the
Governor of Natal, one from Valparaiso, and one from General
Buller. The last named stated in his telegram that he would relieve
Ladysmith as soon as possible.

It was stated that Sir George White had heliographed to Sir
Redvers Buller informing him that there were over 2000 sick and
wounded in Intombi Hospital Camp, that he could not hold out for
much longer, and that he must not expect any assistance from him
when he made his effort. Sir Redvers Buller had replied that he was
sparing no effort to push forward, and that he hoped to be ready
soon.

{80}

The number of patients in the Intombi Hospital Camp had
increased by January 10th to—

Over 400 cases of dysentery;
600 cases of enteric fever;
200 cases not yet diagnosed, but probably enteric fever;
800 cases wounded and various.

The daily rations of the garrison now consisted of 1/2 lb. of
tinned meat and 1 lb. of bread per man.

Had it not been for the Indian Contingent there would have been
no flour at all in Ladysmith. All the flour, all the rum, in fact
almost everything that the garrison lived upon with the exception
of meat, was brought from India with the Indian Contingent, which
carried with it six months’ supply of every description.

From January 12th, another duty assigned to the Regiment was the
sending of two companies every morning at two o’clock to the
examining guard on the Newcastle road, which was situated just
under the 4.7 naval gun “Lady Anne.” They had orders to stop there
till {81} 4.30 a.m. to check any rush of Boers into
Ladysmith down the Newcastle road. Later on, the ground in front of
this post was covered with barbed wire entanglement, but up to this
time there was nothing at this point to prevent the Boers galloping
right into the town.

A Peaceful Sunday: Klip River and Camp of the Imperial
Light Horse, Ladysmith

As these two companies went to their places on the 12th, the
Boer searchlight on Bulwana was flashing everywhere, and the
mountain guns throwing star shell. It looked as if both sides
expected an attack. The officer commanding the two companies had
orders to operate on the flank of any attack made on the northern
defences.

On the following morning the garrison was told that General
Buller was moving round by Springfield; in the evening it was given
out that he was moving west of Chieveley and Colenso, and was
twelve miles from Ladysmith; and on the 14th the news came in that
he was at Potgieter’s Drift, and that General Warren was across the
Tugela River; and in confirmation of this last information heavy
gun fire was heard on the 17th in the direction of Potgieters, and
the relieving army’s balloon {82} was seen on the following day in the
same direction.

As an attack was expected on the night of the 19th on
Observation Hill, three companies of the Regiment under Major Curry
proceeded there in the evening and bivouacked, the remainder of the
Regiment being under orders to hold themselves in readiness to
proceed there at a moment’s notice. The night, however, passed
quietly, and the companies returned to their camp before dawn.

On January 20th better news was received from Sir Redvers
Buller; his advance had been very satisfactory. Reports stated that
he had reached Acton Holmes, and that four brigades had crossed the
Tugela. His shells were seen falling thickly on Thabba Nyama
mountain.

The tea and sugar rations were, however, cut down to half. The
health of the men began now to generally improve, probably owing to
better drinking water which was obtainable from the condenser,
recently arranged for, at the railway station.

Very heavy gun fire, night and day, was continually heard from
the direction of Spion {83} Kop and Acton Holmes, and on the 23rd a
demonstration was made from Ladysmith, the mounted troops going out
under cover of the fire of all the guns. The Ladysmith guns on all
the fronts opened, but were answered only by the Boer guns on Gun
Hill and Bulwana. There was but little musketry fire from Pepworth
direction, and Surprise Hill seemed deserted.

Still no relief appeared, and the rations were:—

12 oz. of beef,
1 lb. of bread.
Half ration of sugar.
Half ration of tea.

An order published on the 23rd gave hope:—

“Sir George White has received further satisfactory news as to
Sir R. Buller’s advance. The relief of Ladysmith may be said to be
within measurable distance.”

Very heavy gun fire was heard from 3 a.m. on the 24th till 2
p.m., and in the evening further encouragement was
circulated:—

“Reassuring news has been received from Sir R. Buller.”

{84}

No news from the relieving army was received on the 25th. Heavy
firing continued, and in the evening the Boers were seen trekking
from the direction of Spion Kop, all the laagers on the rear slopes
of the mountain clearing off and making for Vanreenen’s Pass and
Newcastle. In fact, the whole country round Spion Kop seemed about
to be hurriedly abandoned by the Boers. Great excitement prevailed
in Ladysmith.

An investigation of the slopes of Spion Kop through the glasses
at daybreak on the following morning proved, however,
disappointing, for the laagers which had cleared off the night
before were back again in their places. Moreover, the Boers round
Ladysmith were very truculent on the morning of the 26th, which
necessitated the garrison standing to arms till 6 a.m.

Prices at the weekly auction had gone up considerably.

Two vegetable marrows were sold for 5s. 6d.

Pumpkins fetched 2s. 6d. each.

A small plate of potatoes reached 11s.

Whilst four sticks (4 oz.) of black tobacco, {85} “Fair-maid”
brand, changed hands at £5 10s.

From now till the end of the siege two companies of the Regiment
were moved to a healthier spot, known as the “Convalescent Camp.”
It was situated at the eastern end of Convent Hill. This post was
relieved weekly, and as the men were concealed and in a healthier
position the change was much appreciated.

On the morning of January 27th a native runner brought in news.
His account was:—

“Boers lost heavily from artillery fire on Wednesday, and say
that the British artillery is too much for them. I saw six field
cornets dead on one wagon. Some English were taken prisoners, and
they were from the left flank attack. The English attacked Spion
Kop and surrounded the base of the hill, and the Boers lost heavily
from the English shrapnel fire. When the English got to the top of
the hill the Boers ran down the other side. The Boers are much
disheartened by their losses.”

Judging from the above, the native must {86} have then
run away and not have waited to see the finish, for in the evening
the following news came in:—

“Buller attacked Spion Kop, seized and occupied it, but was
driven off again the next night. Our loss is estimated at 200
killed and 300 wounded.”

With the knowledge that history has given the world about the
battle of Spion Kop, further comment is needless. The news above is
given as it was received by the garrison of Ladysmith, who of
course knew nothing but what was sent in in scraps by Sir Redvers
Buller, and what came in to the Intelligence Department by native
runners.

On the 30th the daily ration was further cut down to 1/2 lb. of
meat, 2 biscuits, 1/6 oz. of tea, and 1/2 oz. of sugar per man.
Horses, except those belonging to the artillery, went
rationless.

On January 31st horse-flesh was issued for the first time as a
ration.

One dozen whisky was raffled in the town, and fetched
£144—£1 10s. per wineglass!

{87}

The only news received from the outside world on February 2nd
was that—

“Sir R. Buller has retired behind the Tugela to rearrange, and
Sir John Lubbock has been made a peer.”

The question asked is, Who is Lubbock, and is he connected in
any way with the evacuation of Spion Kop?

Some say that the news is the wrong way about, and that Lubbock
has retired and Sir R. Buller been made a peer. Confirmation of the
news was anxiously awaited.

Whichever way it was, in the face of the evacuation of Spion Kop
it was poor news to feed a half-starved and anxious garrison on.
However, in the meantime the big gun on Bulwana had fired his great
shells into the Railway Cutting Camp and killed the doctor’s
horse.

About this time a decoction called “chevril” was issued to the
men. It was supplied by the 18th Hussars’ horses, whose bodies were
boiled down for the purpose. It was nourishing and the men liked
it, which was a good thing. There was nothing else by which to
recommend {88} it. The men were also allowed to go down
to the chevril factory, which was close to the station, and buy the
flesh of the horse after it had passed through the boiling process.
This did not appear appetizing, but again the men liked it, and
when cooked up with wild spinach which grew about the lines it was
considered very tasty.

Two items of news were received on February 4th, one being that
General Buller had again crossed the Tugela in three places and was
to be expected shortly, and the other that the garrison of
Ladysmith was to be attacked again next morning by 10,000 Boers.
Arrangements were made to meet the latter, the arrival of the
former being considered hypothetical. The garrison stood to arms at
three o’clock the following morning and anxiously awaited the dawn,
but everything went off quietly, and at 5.30 a.m. General Buller’s
guns commenced in three different directions. The sound of the
heavy gun fire increased in intensity, till at 2.30 p.m. the noise
could be compared to a heavy storm with incessant thunder.

The Regiment was now told off as part of {89} a flying
column. This was hopeful, as it was supposed that arrangements were
being made to co-operate with the relieving army.

At 5.15 a.m. on the 5th Buller’s guns began firing again and
continued the whole day.

For the next few days there was no news from the outside world.
Buller’s guns were heard incessantly, and one Boer big gun was seen
firing on Dornkloof, south of Manger’s Hill. A few of Buller’s
lyddite shells were bursting near him, and one shell was seen to
strike his magazine and explode it.

On the seventh night 100 men of the Regiment were again engaged
in shifting the 4.7 gun “Lady Anne.”

On the 9th nothing was heard of Buller’s guns—perfect
silence!

This gave rise to all sorts of reports, one actually given out
being that Buller had taken his position and could come in at any
time he liked, but he had been stopped by a telegram from the Cape
in order to allow of Lord Roberts pushing up through the Free
State; and then both Buller and Roberts would relieve Ladysmith and
take Bloemfontein respectively {90} on the same day. And this on
the very day on which Buller was retiring south of Tugela again
from Vaal Krantz.

It was now considered advisable to strengthen the defences held
by the Regiment by an additional work, and the men were kept hard
at it from 7.15 p.m. till 10 p.m. A dish of chevril was served out
to each man of the working party before turning in.

On February 13th information was received that Buller had taken
two positions on the north side of the Tugela with small
loss—one Krantz Kloof, and the other Vaal Krantz Spruit. This
information seemed somewhat belated. A message was also received
from Lord Roberts in which he stated that he had entered the Free
State with a very large force, chiefly of artillery and cavalry,
and hoped that the pressure on Ladysmith would shortly be reduced.
Heavy gun fire commenced in the Colenso direction on the night of
February 14th, and continued with slight interruption till the
18th; and on the 15th the Boer pompom was heard in action, which
went to show that the opposing forces were not very far from each
other.

{91}

At the last public auction ever held in the town, i.e. on the
14th evening, the prices were:—

Eggs, 48s. per dozen.
Vegetable marrows, 28s. each.
Mealies, 3s. 8d. each.
Pot of jam, 32s. 6d.
Crosse & Blackwell’s piccalilli, 19s. 6d.
Tin of ox tongue, 20s. 6d.
2 oz. stick of cake tobacco, 22s.
Fifty cigars, 10 guineas.

As much as 25s. per stick was paid about this time for two
ounces of cake tobacco. No Kaffir leaf tobacco was to be bought in
the town, although as much as £5 per leaf was offered.

On the 15th the Railway Cutting Camp again received the
attention of the Long Tom gunners on Bulwana, who pitched some
shells into the lines, but without doing damage.

The news of the relief of Kimberley was received by the garrison
on February 17th, and it was reported that General French had
captured five laagers.

On Sunday, the 18th, the battalion and 13th {92} Battery, the
remains of the Gloucester Regiment, and the Mountain Battery
assembled as usual under “Liverpool Castle” for Divine service. The
Reverend J. Tuckey officiated. The usual “extermination” service
and prayers for the “Right” were said, the hymns chosen
being—

There is a blessed home

Beyond this land of woe;

and

There is a green hill far away,

sung sadly to the accompaniment of Buller’s guns.

He appears to be nearer, and his shells have been bursting on a
hill and ridge in the distance, Colenso way.

The following statistics are of interest:—

Early in November the garrison of Ladysmith numbered about
13,500 men. During the siege there were over 10,500 admissions to
hospital.

Thirty-eight men had been killed by shell fire, and 430 men had
died of disease. Four shells only had accounted for nearly all the
thirty-eight.

{93}

On February 19th news was sent in that General Buller had
captured Cingolo Mountain and Monte Christo, and that excellent
progress was being made by him. The Boers were seen trekking north
all day; and in the evening Buller’s heliographs were seen flashing
from Monte Christo, and two guns on the same hill firing at the
Boers. With the exception of Buller’s heliograph and balloon this
was the first occasion that the relieving army was seen from
Ladysmith.

On February 22nd, with the intention of finding out whether
there had been any reduction in the investing force, the Regiment
with some mounted infantry were ordered to reconnoitre in the
direction of Flag Hill. A start was made at 3.30 a.m. Some sixty
Boers were encountered, and the Regiment was ordered back to camp
at 6.15 a.m., fired at by the sixty Boers.

Buller’s guns were heard firing incessantly all day and every
day. His shells were now seen bursting on a southern spur of
Bulwana and near Intombi Camp.

During the siege the Boers conceived the idea of flooding the
Ladysmith plain and the {94} town by damming the Klip River below
Intombi Camp. This dam was commenced towards the end of the siege,
but was not completed when Ladysmith was relieved. It was a good
target for the naval 12-pounder guns on Cæsar’s Camp, which
frequently fired at it. These in their turn received on such
occasions a good deal of attention from the Boer big gun on
Bulwana.

On the night of the 24th the 4.7 gun “Lady Anne” was again
moved; this was for the fourth and the last time. On the same night
very heavy rifle and Maxim gun fire was heard on the hills south of
Cæsar’s Camp. This continued for about one hour, when the
firing was taken up by the Boer outposts all round Ladysmith, a few
bullets reaching the Convalescent Camp on Convent Hill.

February 27th being Majuba Day, the garrison, expecting a
demonstration from the Boers, stood to arms at 4.15 a.m., but, much
to the astonishment of everybody, not a shot was fired. General
Buller sent the garrison in the following message:—

“Colenso rail bridge, which was totally destroyed, is under
repair; road bridge partially {95} destroyed; am doing very well,
but the country is difficult and my progress is slow; hope to be
with you soon.”

Official news was also received that Lord Roberts had surrounded
Cronje, who had surrendered with 4000 Boers, the English losses
being given as 1700 killed and wounded.

On the 28th rations were further cut down to one biscuit and
three ounces of mealies, with one pound of horse as before per man.
This was perhaps the most distressing circumstance connected with
the siege, and it had a most depressing effect. It was not so much
the reduction of the ration that was of consequence, as the reason
for the reduction. This could not be guessed at, and it gave rise
to conjectures, the chief being that Buller had again failed, and
could not get through. His shells had been seen bursting on the
hills, and that had encouraged the garrison; but the garrison had
been encouraged before by the sight of Buller’s shells bursting on
Thabba Nyama. Three days previously, owing to the good news
received from Buller, the garrison had been put on full rations,
but now, after {96} further good news, the order was
promulgated:—

“Highly satisfactory reports have been sent from General Buller
as to his advance, but the country is difficult and progress slow,
therefore I am obliged to reduce the ration, etc. etc.”

This sudden cancelling of the increase of the ration, and its
still further reduction in the face of the news received and in the
sight of Buller’s shells, was disappointing. Having ascertained
that the garrison could exist till April 15th and not longer, and
that then there would not be a horse, ox, or mule left, Sir George
White, much against his will, but to make things certain in case
General Buller was again checked, gave the orders for the reduction
on the day before the relief.

During the day the big gun on Bulwana made an attempt to reach
Observation Hill Post, which were the furthest works from him in
that direction. His attempt succeeded, and he put many shells into
the works. His record for the siege was an attempt to reach
{97}
Wagon Hill. He failed in this, but his range, as measured on the
map, was 11,560 yards, or 6 miles and 1000 yards.

February 28th, the last day of the siege, was very hot and
oppressive; everybody seemed depressed, trying to guess at some
reason for the ration reduction. At about 2 p.m., however, Major
Riddel, brigade-major to Colonel Knox, came up to the officers’
mess smiling all over, and said that excellent news, the very best,
had come in, but that “it is confidential, and I am not allowed
to say what it is.” He called for volunteers who were willing
and able to march seven miles and fight at the end of it. The whole
Regiment, officers and men, volunteered, but after a medical
examination had been made of the battalion, only one hundred men
were found to come up to requirements.

At about 3.30 p.m. the news was distributed that General Buller
had gained a complete victory over the Boers, who were in full
retreat. Hundreds of wagons were seen going off north towards
Modder Station and Vanreenens, and at 4 p.m. a derrick was seen
hoisted over the big gun on {98} Bulwana, and the naval guns opened fire
on him. The Boers dismounted him under a heavy fire from one 4.7
and two naval 12-pounders, and got him away.

At 6.20 p.m. a welcome sight greeted the eyes of the weary
garrison, for suddenly out of the bush appeared two squadrons of
mounted men, riding leisurely in across the plain from the
direction of Intombi, and the truth dawned on the garrison that
Ladysmith was at last and in reality relieved.

The siege had lasted four calendar months to the day.

Frantic cheering greeted them as they crossed the ford and
reached the town.

On the following day a column, consisting of the Devons, Gordon
Highlanders, three batteries of artillery, all the cavalry who had
horses, and the two mounted colonial corps, the whole under the
command of Colonel W.G. Knox, sallied forth at 10 a.m. towards
Modder Station to pursue and to stop the Boers getting their big
guns away by train. On arriving abreast of Pepworth Hill, which the
Boer rear-guard had occupied, the advanced troops, consisting of
Devons and the batteries, {99} came under rather a sharp fire. All
further progress was stopped, and the column returned to camp. The
Devons had two men wounded. Camp was reached at 4.30 p.m. The
battalion was met on the way home by Major Davies, Captains Bols
and Vigors, Lieutenants Lafone and Munro, all of the 2nd Battalion.
These had ridden in from their camp, and brought with them tobacco,
whisky, rum, and milk. The companies of the 2nd Battalion sent in
to their corresponding companies tea, sugar, tobacco, matches, etc.
These were all most eagerly accepted.

Sir Redvers Buller and his staff rode into Ladysmith in the
afternoon.

Explosions at Modder Station and on the railway could be heard,
signifying that the Boers were making good their retreat by blowing
up the bridges.

On March 3rd General Buller made his public entry into Ladysmith
at the head of his army. The march of Buller’s army through
Ladysmith was a pageant which those who took part in the siege will
never forget.

The garrison of Ladysmith lined the streets. {100} Sir
George White with his staff took his stand mounted, under the
damaged clock tower of the Town Hall—the Gordons on the one
hand, the Devons on the other—the Gordon pipers facing him on
the opposite side of the road.

It was a great sight, and those who had been through the siege
and had heard the words of their leader at the end, “Thank God we
have kept the flag flying,” knew it for a great sight.

General Buller rode at the head of his army, and received an
immense ovation, as did all his regiments and artillery as they
passed through the lines of the weedy, sickly-looking garrison.
These with their thin, pale faces cheered to the full bent of their
power, but after standing in the sun for some time they became
exhausted, and Sir Redvers sent back word for them to sit down,
which they gladly did, whilst the relievers, as they passed along,
chucked them bits of tobacco, ready cut up, from their small store,
small because they themselves were also hard put for luxuries.

The tramp! tramp! of these men, who to {101} the
weakly garrison appeared as veritable giants, will never be
forgotten, as they hurried past to the strains of the Gordons’
pipes, cheering with the utmost enthusiasm the figure of Sir George
White as they passed him. They were almost to a man reservists,
well covered, hard, and well set up. They were filthy, their
clothes were mended and patched, and most of them had scrubby
beards. Tied on to their belts in almost all cases was a Boer
blanket, telling that they had been busy in some Boer laager; on
the top of this a small bundle of sticks for each man to cook his
own tea, and by his side, attached to his belt, hung his black tin
pot. But how well they looked—the picture of vigour, health,
and strength, as they “tramp, tramp”—”tramp, tramp” through
the town.

A corps that came in for a good deal of notice was the Bearer
Company. They were at first taken for Boer prisoners, but when it
became known who they were they were much cheered. Clad in worn-out
“slops” they slouched along, in each man’s hand a pot of sorts,
enamel or china, and a bundle of something over each man’s
shoulder.

{102}

The meeting of the two battalions was not quite so emotional as
has been depicted by some authors. The 2nd Battalion, the
relievers, came through late at the rear of Buller’s army, and by
that time the 1st Battalion, the relieved, had been in the sun,
standing or sitting down on the curbstone, for some hours, and a
great many men had fallen out exhausted. Still the meeting was very
hearty, officers recognizing men and men old comrades. There was
little time to enact the scene so graphically described by one
author “which would make old men weep.” Buller’s army was straggled
out a good deal and the rear had to catch up, so if a pal was seen
he was gone next moment to give way to another pal. Most of the
reservists had been through the ranks of the 1st Battalion, and
with it through the Tirah Campaign; almost all were hurriedly
recognized, and a hearty and hasty shake of the hand was all the
greeting exchanged. Old jokes came to the fore, and were bandied
from one to the other as the 2nd Battalion hurried along. There was
no time for more—one battalion was in a hurry and the other
exhausted.

Devon Officers Remaining Fit for Duty at the End of the
Siege (Rajab—regimental Barber)

{103}

It was well on in the day before the 1st Battalion got back to
its camp at the Railway Cutting.

On Sunday, March 4th, a Thanksgiving Service was held on the
flat ground between the Convent Hill and the Naval Brigade Hill,
which was attended by Generals Buller and White, and on its
conclusion the battalion moved into tents outside the works and in
front of Gloucester Post.

It was a strange experience moving out into the open, away from
the protection of the works. The nerves of most had had a severe
strain from want of food and continual anxiety.

It was the anxiety which killed. There is nothing more conducive
to the deterioration of men’s minds than false alarms on an empty
stomach.

{104}

CHAPTER III

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH, AND THE ADVANCE NORTH
UNDER SIR REDVERS BULLER

1900

The first few days following the relief were employed in the
sorting and reading of four months’ mails and the opening up of
presents. Many complimentary telegrams were received by the
battalion from England.

Major Davies, Captain Bartlett, and Lieutenant Willis, all of
whom had been doing duty with the 2nd Battalion during the relief
operations, joined the battalion on the 7th with some eighty-six
men who had been sent from Jullunder.

The two battalions were together for a few days only, as the 2nd
Battalion after a short rest proceeded with Sir Redvers Buller’s
force towards Modder Spruit.

{105}

On March 10th the Ladysmith garrison was reorganized, the
battalion being placed in the 7th Brigade with the Gordon
Highlanders, the Manchester Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion Rifle
Brigade. This brigade was commanded by Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B.

Colonel Park, unfortunately struck down with enteric fever on
the last day of the siege, was shortly afterwards invalided to
England. In his absence Major Davies took over command of the
battalion, and Major Curry having been appointed Commandant of
Ladysmith, Captain Jacson took over the duties of
Second-in-Command. On March 14th the 7th Brigade marched to
Arcadia, seven miles out of Ladysmith on the Vanreenen’s Pass road,
camping on a kopje overlooking Dewdrop Spruit. The men were then
occupied in route marching and generally getting fit.

Brigadier-General Walter Kitchener

Brigadier-General Walter Kitchener arrived in camp on the 26th
March and took over the command of the 7th Brigade from Colonel
Knox, and on April 2nd the battalion, accompanied by General W.
Kitchener, marched to Brakfontein, seventeen miles distant under
Spion Kop, stopped there in camp on the 3rd, {106} when
parties of men went off to view the Boer positions on Spion Kop and
Vaal-Krantz, and returned to Arcadia on the 4th.

Innumerable presents were continually arriving from England for
the battalion, and the thanks of all are due especially to Mr.
Young of Torquay for the indefatigable manner in which he worked,
and for the numerous bundles and boxes of presents which he was
instrumental in collecting and dispatching both at this time and
also afterwards. All these presents were highly appreciated.

A draft of 180 men, consisting of reservists, section “D”
Militia Reservists, and recruits joined the battalion on the 7th;
amongst these were 120 married men.

At 11.30 a.m. on April 11th orders were received to move at once
into Ladysmith, which was to be reached at 2 p.m. The reason for
the sudden move was not explained. There was no transport. Out of
six wagons, the complement for a battalion on light field service
scale, there were only two in camp at the time. At Arcadia the
battalion, in common with the rest of the brigade, was allowed
tents, and told that it could have anything {107} it liked
to take with it. There was consequently a good deal more than six
carts could carry.

Towards evening, after the tents had been struck, packed, and
sent on ahead, and the battalion was waiting in the open for more
wagons, a most violent thunderstorm came on, lasting about two
hours. Ten men of one company which was holding a work on
Rifleman’s Ridge, between Arcadia and Ladysmith, were struck by
lightning, none, however, being killed. The battalion eventually
reached camp at Star Hill, just above the iron bridge outside
Ladysmith, at 3 a.m. wet to the skin. It was found that the tents
had arrived. These were pitched and the men turned in. The greater
part of the brigade did not reach Star Hill till the following
day.

On the 13th the Gordons and Devons moved camp to Hyde’s Farm
under Surprise Hill, the Devons proceeding next day to a camp under
Thornhill’s Kopje, throwing out picquets on that hill and also on
another kopje further out towards Nicholson’s Nek known as Devon
Kopje.

From this time till May 15th the battalion {108} remained
quietly encamped under Thornhill’s Kopje. Route marching and field
days occupied the men most mornings, hockey and football most
afternoons. The men suffered a good deal at first from jaundice,
which was chiefly the result of over-eating after their long
abstinence, but they got fit and recovered their strength
gradually; it was, however, fully six weeks to two months before
they were really ready to take the field.

In the meantime General Buller had turned the Biggarsberg, and
the Boers had fallen back on Laing’s Nek.

The 7th Brigade now formed part of the 4th Division under the
command of Major-General Neville Lyttleton, and on May 16th the
Regiment was ordered to proceed north to Modder’s Spruit. Here it
remained till the 20th, on which day it continued its march to
Elandslaagte, and encamped near the railway station. On the 23rd,
having handed in all tents and excess baggage, the Regiment marched
to Sunday’s River, where it joined up with the divisional
head-quarters, and on the following day formed the rear-guard on
the march to Black Craig Farm. Here {109} the division encamped in
the heart of the Biggarsberg.

Halting at Kalabis on the 25th, the division reached Ingagane on
the 26th.

Railway Bridge Destroyed by Boers, Ingagane

The brigade was now split up and placed on the line of
communications, and it was thought probable that the Regiment would
see no more fighting and that the war would soon be brought to a
conclusion. Of the four regiments in the brigade, the Manchester
Regiment had been left behind to garrison Jonono’s Kop and the
railway line near Elandslaagte, the Devons were left to garrison
Ingagane on the railway, and the Rifle Brigade was at Newcastle and
between that place and Ingogo at the foot of the Laing’s Nek pass.
The Gordon Highlanders were at Ingogo and guarded the railway line
still further north.

The Regiment itself was also split up. A detachment of one
company under Captain Travers (increased afterwards to two
companies) proceeded to occupy Dannhauser, and two companies under
Captain Bartlett were ordered to Rooi Pint on the high ground
between Ingagane and Newcastle. A battery of artillery was also
stationed at this place.

{110}

The remaining companies of the Regiment, including a 9th or K
company which had been created shortly after the siege, were posted
on the low hill overlooking Ingagane railway station.

On June 4th the 1st Cavalry Brigade arrived to form part of the
garrison of Ingagane. This brigade was commanded by
Brigadier-General Burn Murdoch, who was in charge of the line of
communication Newcastle-Dannhauser.

At Ingagane Hill the Regiment found itself again employed in
building stone walls. Entrenchments against attack were considered
necessary, for it was thought probable that the Boers would attempt
to break through from the north-east of the Free State on the west
and cross into Utrecht and Vryheid districts. The real danger,
however, lay on the east, for the Vryheid district long remained a
Boer stronghold, and parties of Boers frequently raided to the
Blood River in the immediate neighbourhood of Dannhauser.

It was owing to this that on June 15th a second company was sent
to reinforce Captain Travers at Dannhauser. The hill selected by
{111} Captain Travers for defence overlooked
Dannhauser railway station, and commanded a large extent of ground
to the east of the post. This hill was very strongly fortified, and
the works on it, designed and built by Captain Travers and his men,
were perhaps the best works for protection against musketry fire
constructed by the Regiment during the war.

Making Barbed-Wire Entanglement, Ingagane

News was received daily that thousands of Boers with dozens of
guns were on the eastern flank, with every intention of raiding,
cutting the line, and attacking Dannhauser. Dundee also, according
to the newspapers and the evidence of native scouts, was in deadly
peril from attack by Chris. Botha. It was, perhaps, on account of
these rumours that a column was formed to reconnoitre Utrecht. In
conjunction with another column which moved out from Ingogo, three
companies of the Regiment, with the Royal Dragoons and the 5th
Dragoon Guards and two field guns, moved out on the afternoon of
July 1st from Ingagane and camped at Tundega Farm. On the following
morning Tundega Hill was occupied by the infantry whilst the
cavalry reconnoitred over the Buffalo River to Utrecht,
{112} which was distant twenty miles. This
place was found occupied by about four hundred Boers, and after
some skirmishing and a good deal of firing the cavalry returned
with a loss of one Royal Dragoon taken prisoner. Next morning the
force returned to Ingagane. The operations were supposed to have
been very successful.

By the end of July the Regiment had quite recovered tone and
vigour, and was well and fit for any work, and on August 2nd, 1900,
orders were received to pack up and proceed by rail the following
day to Zandspruit. On the afternoon of the 3rd the Regiment
entrained in coal trucks for the north. Majuba and Laing’s Nek were
passed next morning at dawn, and at 7.30 a.m. Zandspruit was
reached.

The strength of the battalion was now 938 of all ranks. All
tents and excess baggage had been returned to store, and on the 6th
the Regiment marched to Meerzicht, where the remainder of General
Lyttleton’s 4th Division was found in bivouac. The 4th Division was
now complete and ready to march north with Sir Redvers Buller.

{113}

General Buller’s force moved out from Meerzicht on August 7th.
For some days previously the Boers had been occupying in force some
high ground known as Rooi Kopjes, a few miles north of Meerzicht,
and the Gordon Highlanders had already twice been slightly engaged
with them. The 7th Brigade advanced out of their camp in attack
formation, the Gordons leading the advance, the Devons in support.
Their objective was the Rooi Kopjes. These were found unoccupied,
and, having gained the summit, the 7th Brigade were ordered to make
a sweep round to the right.

The new objective was the high ground above Amersfoort. General
Buller’s line now occupied some five miles of front. A very high
wind was blowing, and it was not for some time that the
Head-quarter Staff, who at the time were with the 7th Brigade, knew
that the artillery of the 8th Brigade, which had marched direct on
Amersfoort, were in action, firing at some Boer guns mounted on the
Amersfoort Hills. The Boers were strongly entrenched on these hills
to the number of about 3000 to 4000 with fourteen guns under
{114} Chris. Botha and D. Joubert. The 7th
Brigade advanced across a large undulating plain, the Devons
leading. The Gordons had been sent round to the left to support
Dundonald’s Mounted Brigade, who had been checked by some fifty
Boers. About 6000 yards from the position Boer shells began to fall
among the companies of the leading battalion. One half battalion
under Major Davies thereupon opened out and advanced, while the
other half battalion was sent to the left under Captain Jacson,
with orders to proceed as rapidly as possible to the assistance of
the Gordon Highlanders, who, it was reported, were being heavily
threatened by the Boers on the extreme left. With the exception of
some shell fire the main advance was continued unopposed. The left
half battalion of the Regiment had to make a very long detour, and
on its arrival to the assistance of the Gordons it was found that
the Boer force, which was threatening the left flank, was simply
Dundonald’s mounted troops drawing up stationary behind some rising
ground.

After a stiff climb the summit of the Amersfoort Hills was
reached just before dark.

{115}

It was found that the Boers had evacuated their position, on
their left flank and rear being threatened by the 8th Brigade. The
leading battalion of this brigade, the 60th Rifles, came under some
heavy musketry fire from the houses in the town, and after several
casualties, which included four officers, Major Campbell,
commanding the 60th, threatened to burn the town if the firing was
not discontinued. The firing then ceased, and the Boers retired to
the hills north of the town.

The Boers had set fire to the long dry grass in every direction,
and it was chiefly by the light of these fires that regiments,
companies, and parties of mounted men found their way off the hill
on a pitch-dark night.

No orders had been circulated as to where the force was to halt
and bivouac for the night, and from every direction various bodies
of men groped their way in the dark towards the town, in the hopes
that when once there some orders might be obtained. It was late
when the half battalion under Captain Jacson found its bivouac and
joined hands again with that of Major Davies just outside the town.
{116} One company came in later, having
unfortunately lost its way in the dark.

Some of the leading wagons of the transport, which had been sent
along the direct road from Meerzicht to Amersfoort, broke down in a
bad drift, thus blocking the remainder. No wagons arrived in
Amersfoort that night, and the men after their long tramp, a
continuous march without a halt from 7.30 a.m. till about 8.30 at
night, were without greatcoats or blankets. The night was bitterly
cold, with a hard frost. Gangs of men went down to the town and
brought back wood. Soon fires began to light up in the Devons’ and
Gordons’ bivouacs, which were adjoining, and for the remainder of
the night groups of men sat round them trying to keep warm. The
four companies of the Regiment on outpost duty suffered very
severely, as they were without fires, none being allowed in the
outpost line.

The force halted at Amersfoort on the following day, owing
firstly to the fog which enveloped everything, and secondly to
allow of the baggage train coming up. This began to arrive at 10
a.m., having been detained at the drift the whole night.

{117}

During the fog a few Boers came down from the high ground above
the river and fired into the horses watering, at very close range.
They failed, however, to do any damage.

On August 9th the army continued its advance. On leaving
Amersfoort, a bad drift with a steep climb of half a mile on the
further side was met with, and the baggage was formed into two
columns. This was assisted up the hill by two companies of the
Regiment, Sir Redvers Buller personally superintending. Klippaal
Drift was reached late in the afternoon after a difficult march of
ten miles.

General Buller’s army was now on the high veldt in winter time.
The cold was intense, especially at night, when there were several
degrees of frost. Owing to the intense cold, two men of the Rifle
Brigade died from exposure during the night.

The Baggage of General Buller’s Army Crossing Beginderlyn
Bridge

On the following day the force continued its march to
Beginderlyn Bridge. This was found intact, and there was no
opposition, and the march was resumed on the 11th as far as
Kleinfontein. On August 12th Ermelo was {118} occupied,
and a few of the leading Boers belonging to the place
surrendered.

So far, and until Twyfelaar was reached, Buller’s army received
little or no opposition from the Boers. Chris. Botha, who had
occupied Amersfoort, had retired east after evacuating that place,
and was marching parallel to the British force and at a distance of
about ten miles on its right flank. They were evidently watching
Buller, probably thinking that he would turn east towards Piet
Retief, where almost all their stock, sheep, and cattle had been
driven, the mountainous and difficult country there being suitable
for its concealment and protection.

The main body of the Boers was concentrated between Belfast and
Machadodorp, north-east of Twyfelaar, in a country eminently suited
for what was considered their final effort. The valley of the
Komati River was exceedingly difficult country for the British army
to operate over. The Boers to the end of the war were very fond of
this country, and it was there, or in the vicinity towards Lake
Chrissie, that several engagements took place later on, during the
guerilla {119} stage of the war, not always in favour
of the British.

The town of Ermelo, which the Regiment was destined to see again
on several future occasions, was left on August 13th, on the
evening of which day the force reached Klipfontein. The Regiment,
being rear-guard, did not reach its bivouac till after dark.
Witbank was reached the following day, and communication was opened
up with General French’s column, fifteen miles to the north-west.
Carolina could be seen eight miles away to the north-east.

The force marched next day to Twyfelaar, and here a halt was
made till August 21st, in order to allow of Lord Roberts’s army,
which was advancing east from Pretoria along the Lorenzo Marques
railway, joining hands with General Buller’s army.

The rear-guard of the force was attacked by the Boers on August
21st on its march from Twyfelaar to Van Wycks Vlei. The Gordon
Highlanders lost nine killed and eight wounded, and the Liverpool
Mounted Infantry eight killed.

On the following morning a force consisting {120} of
Devons, Manchesters, Gordons, South African Light Horse, one field
battery, and the howitzers, advanced from Van Wycks Vlei under
General W. Kitchener, for the purpose of reconnoitring and driving
some Boers off the hills east of General Buller’s camp, so that the
road for the next day’s march might be cleared of the enemy. A
large number of Boers was seen in the direction of Carolina, and it
was supposed that Chris. Botha’s force was opposed to the column.
The Manchester Regiment led the advance, supported by the Devon
Regiment. The former, on crossing a nek to a low underlying hill,
came under a heavy rifle fire from the Boers below and across the
valley, and lost two killed and nine wounded. The force returned to
camp at 6 p.m.

On the following day Buller’s army advanced to Geluk, some five
or six miles, the battalion with the Gordons and mounted troops of
Dundonald’s Brigade, acting as rear-guard. A very difficult spruit,
with steep sides, was crossed, and the high hills on the further
side occupied. These had been held by the Boers in strength, but
they had retired on Buller’s {121} approach. As soon as the
infantry of the rear-guard had arrived in camp, the mounted troops
of the rear-guard were attacked rather sharply, but they managed to
hold their own and to beat off the Boers. Two companies of the
Liverpool Regiment, who formed part of the advance guard, fell into
an ambush and lost considerably, leaving, it was reported, some
eighty men either killed, wounded, or prisoners in the hands of the
Boers. Shortly after arrival in camp, five companies of the
Regiment were sent out on outpost duty, taking up a short line and
entrenching—two companies were entrenched in front and
furnished sentries, with three companies entrenched in rear in
support.

On August 24th and 25th the force stood fast, exchanging
occasional big gun and musketry fire with the Boers. Information
was received that Lord Roberts had entered Belfast on the 24th,
thus practically joining hands with Sir Redvers Buller.

The position taken up by the Boers already referred to, an
immensely powerful one, straddled the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway east
of Belfast and west of Machadodorp. Botha had {122} taken up
a front of some fifty miles in length, and his force numbered about
5000 men. His right rested on the broken mountainous country of
Elandskloof to the north, and his left on the mountains overlooking
the Komati to the south. His centre was at Bergendal Farm and the
rugged and precipitous hills in the rear of the farm, through which
wound the railway and road, his line of retreat, quite concealed
from the fire and view of the British force. On the extreme left a
big gun with two or three smaller pieces were mounted, but these
were useless to give much support to the centre, as they were too
distant. The line of retreat to Komati Poort, which, from the
nature of the country, could not be threatened except by an
extended movement round the north or south, lay along the
Belfast-Machadodorp road and the railway line.

Briefly, the course of the two days’ battle may be described as
follows:—

While Pole Carew threatened the centre at Belfast and the
position north of the railway, French was sent with his cavalry
division still further north to threaten the Boer line of retreat
towards Pilgrim’s Rest, and their right {123} flank.
Buller attacked the Boers’ left with the intention of driving it in
and getting behind their centre on their line of retreat. He on the
first day, however, could make no impression on them, and the two
forces held on to the position they were in for the night. On the
morning of the second day Buller, leaving a brigade of infantry and
Dundonald’s mounted brigade to watch the Boers’ left, moved across
their front under cover of the undulating slopes of ground, and
made an attack at Bergendal Farm and Kopje. After a sharp fight
this was carried, and the Boers retired all along their line in the
direction of Machadodorp.

It is necessary to state in detail the part played by the
Regiment.

On the morning of Sunday, August 26th, Buller’s force was put in
motion. The Regiment was advance guard to the division. When about
half a mile from the camp, the four advanced and extended companies
under Captain Jacson came under fire from some high ground on their
right flank, losing two men. Major Davies, proceeding along this
ridge of high ground with the remainder of the Regiment, forced the
Boers posted there off the {124} hills. The advance guard companies
then continued their march with orders to make Bergendal Farm their
point, but not to go beyond it.

When these companies had proceeded some four or five miles, it
was found that General Buller’s main body had changed direction to
the right and had gone east. On retracing their steps, the
companies with great difficulty ascertained the whereabouts of
Buller’s force. Sir Redvers was now attacking the Boer left within
a mile or two of his former camping ground. A message was then
received stating that the Regiment was at that time a left flank
guard to Buller’s army, and that the former advance guard companies
were to join the remainder of the Regiment.

The Boers, opposed to Buller in very considerable numbers, were
sangared on some low hills about 800 yards distant from and in
front of and below the high ridge over which his force had to
advance. Buller made his dispositions behind this high ridge. The
reverse slope was completely raked by the Boer fire, and no cover
except that afforded by some ant-hills was obtainable. The dropping
bullets {125} followed the form and slope of the hill,
so that neither front nor rear was secure.

Trekking with General Buller – 5-inch Guns on the
March

As soon as the Regiment was formed up, an order was sent to
advance. Captain Emerson with fifteen men extended, rushed down the
forward slope under a heavy fire, and took cover behind some
ant-hills. The moment the men showed over the crest line they were
met by a hail of bullets, and further advance was impossible.

Later, another order was sent to advance, but owing to the want
of cover it was found impossible for the line to make headway in
the face of the fire brought to bear upon it. It was not until the
Howitzer Battery was brought into action late in the day, to cover
the retirement of the advanced companies, that Captain Emerson and
his men were able to get back. This they did under a very heavy
fire from rifles and machine guns.

One company under Lieutenant Harris, which had been moved off to
the right, had advanced and got into an exposed place. The men took
cover behind ant-hills, and remained there for the rest of the day.
Three companies had been moved to the neighbourhood {126} of the
guns. These came under shell fire from the Boer guns and had some
casualties, amongst whom was Colour-Sergeant Burchell, who was shot
through the shoulder. Under General Buller’s direct supervision one
company was ordered forward. Immediately their four scouts showed
over the crest line a storm of bullets met them, and they were all
hit. The four scouts were found dead on the second day afterwards
by the Liverpool Mounted Infantry.

Dusk found the companies posted as under: Three companies
extended on the ridge on the left, with two companies extended in
support on the rear side of the hill. One company was extended on
the ridge in the centre, whilst three companies were near the guns,
three-quarters of a mile away on the right. One man was killed and
one wounded just at dark by unaimed fire and by the last shots
fired. The companies on the ridge retired to the crest of the hill
after dark and took up an entrenched outpost line for the night.
Rations were then issued for the following day. It was a
pitch-black night, and two cooks’ orderlies who had gone to fetch
their company’s {127} tea and sugar rations from their wagon,
missed their way in the dark when returning, and walked into the
Boer position, distant only a few hundred yards, and were made
prisoners. These two men were the first prisoners of war lost to
the battalion up to this date; and with the exception of one other
prisoner, who was temporarily in the hands of the Boers in the
Badfontein valley in the following year, they were the only men of
the battalion taken prisoners during the war. The casualties of the
battalion for the day were 6 killed, 15 wounded, and 2
prisoners.

Early the following morning the 7th Brigade, with the exception
of the Manchester Regiment, moved off to the left, the Rifle
Brigade, whose turn it was to lead, being in front. The guns
accompanied the brigade.

There was little or no opposition till the scouts came under
fire from Bergendal Kopje, or Drie Kraal as it was otherwise known.
This rocky kopje was strongly fortified and held by the Boers. A
Field Battery opened fire on to the kopje at about 3000 yards’
range from some rising ground. Shortly afterwards the remaining
guns—5-inch, 4.7’s, naval {128} 12-pounders, in all to the
number of about thirty-nine—commenced pouring shells on to
this one spot in the Boer position. This shelling continued for
about three hours.

Very early in the morning a train had been seen coming out from
Machadodorp with reinforcements. These, it was ascertained, were
the Johannesburg Police, to the number of about eighty, and they
formed the garrison of the kopje, about a hundred more being in the
farm behind the kopje. This kopje was a small hill covered with
large boulders. The rocks had been connected with large stones to
form sangars, behind which the garrison found cover. A pompom was
included in the armament of the position, which measured about
eighty yards by forty yards only. It fell away abruptly in the
rear, the farm and outbuildings lying very close under the steep
rear side of the hill.

The English shells fell with terrible accuracy into the sangars,
and there was an almost continuous explosion on the hill. Yet the
Boers kept up their fire till the Rifle Brigade were within ten
yards of them, and their pompom was in action, although partly
jammed and {129} firing single shots, till the very end.
This pompom was bravely served by one man, the remainder of the gun
team having been either killed or wounded. It is not known whether
this plucky fellow survived or not.

General Walter Kitchener, who was commanding the infantry
attack, decided to attack with the Rifle Brigade along the ridge
which ended in the kopje, which was slightly above the level of the
ridge. At the same time he ordered the Inniskilling Fusiliers to
attack over the low ground on the Rifle Brigade’s right, whilst the
Gordon Highlanders and the Devonshire Regiment were held in
support.

The Rifle Brigade started from the foot of the hills under which
they had taken cover, and which was about 1200 yards from the Boer
position, and almost immediately came under heavy musketry fire,
being much exposed on the high open ridge.

They, however, continued their advance in perfect order and
eventually rushed the kopje, the British shells dropping and the
Boers firing till the assault had been delivered. The Inniskillings
advanced across the low ground underneath the Rifle Brigade. Their
advance {130} was slightly delayed, and their delivery
of the assault was consequently later than that of the Rifle
Brigade. Captain Emerson with one company of the Regiment which had
been told off as escort to the Maxim guns, advanced with the
leading company of the Inniskillings.

The whole Boer position was evacuated as soon as their line had
been penetrated by the capture of the Bergendal Kopje.

The casualties amongst the Rifle Brigade were severe, owing to
the much exposed ground over which it was necessary for the attack
to be delivered, and to the fact that, as the extended lines
converged on to the small kopje, the men naturally became crowded
and formed a better mark for the Boer rifles. They lost two
officers and fourteen men killed and five officers and fifty men
wounded, of whom two officers died of their wounds the following
day. The Regiment had one man wounded.

The position was soon made good, although the Boers held on
tenaciously to a long rocky ridge in their rear to which they had
retired, till nightfall. The force bivouacked for the night near
the farm.

{131}

This action was known officially as the battle of Belfast.

A quiet night was passed, and next morning, August 28th, the
force occupied Machadodorp with slight opposition. The Boers were
seen retreating up the road leading to Lydenburg, and on the high
ground above the town they brought two big guns into action.

The Gordon Highlanders, in support of Dundonald’s Mounted
Brigade, were sent on through the town and occupied the high ground
on the far side, and the Boers retired before them.

The Boers had made a very hurried retirement. In Machadodorp on
the evening of the day of the fight, guns and cartloads of
ammunition were parked in the big open space in the centre of the
town. These were moved off very hurriedly on the approach of the
British force, and the guns had only reached the top of the hills
on the further side of Machadodorp when General Buller’s infantry
came in view. General Buller brought some long-range guns into
action and shelled them as they ascended the hill, but without
result.

{132}

From lack of efficient pursuit after the battle the evening
before, and a too cautious advance in the morning, an opportunity
to do the Boer forces considerable damage was apparently lost. A
wagon containing pompom ammunition was captured by Dundonald’s
Mounted Brigade, but the pompom itself got away, notwithstanding
the very slight opposition offered by the Boers.

The following day General Buller’s forces reached Helvetia Farm,
where General French’s column and General Pole Carew’s division
joined up.

With the object of releasing the prisoners who had been sent by
the Boers from Pretoria to Noitgedacht down the railway line
towards Komati Poort, General Buller’s force now turned eastwards
and marched along the heights on the north side of the railway. On
the first day out from Helvetia his cavalry saw some 2000 released
English prisoners marching up the line towards Waterval Onder from
the direction of Noitgedacht, and having been unable to obtain
touch with the Boers, the force retraced their steps, and encamped
some six miles from Helvetia at Vluchtfontein, and {133} at this
place a halt was made on the following day.

From here General Buller turned north, and on September 1st,
advancing up the Lydenburg road, reached Badfontein on the
Crocodile River. Here the army bivouacked for the night, and an
advance was made up the Badfontein valley next morning, but coming
into contact with the Boers who were holding the northern end of
the valley, his further progress was checked. The Boer position
extended along the high hills which straddled the road in a
semicircular position some eight miles from Badfontein.

The Regiment formed the infantry advance guard of the army, and
on reaching what was then named Redvers’ Kopje and afterwards known
as Devon Kopje, came under shell fire from three big guns which the
Boers had brought into action on the hills above. At this place the
Regiment stopped for the day, taking cover from shell fire behind
the large boulders of rocks of which the kopje was composed. The
remainder of Sir Redvers Buller’s force returned to its old
encampment of the previous night.

{134}

The two mounted brigades and one battery R.H.A., which had
advanced to the foot of the hills occupied by the Boers, returned
to camp at dusk.

As soon as it was dark, four companies of the Regiment were left
on Devon Kopje as an advanced post, whilst the remainder of the
Regiment retired to the rear of the hill and bivouacked. The kopje
was entrenched and everything made comfortable for the following
day. All the baggage wagons were sent back to the main camp during
the night.

September 3rd, 4th, and 5th were spent quietly in position, the
Boers on the 5th firing over the heads of the Regiment into the
brigade camp, but doing very little damage. On the evening of the
5th a hill to the east was shelled, and after some opposition from
the Boers, when Strathcona’s Horse had some casualties, the hill
was occupied by the 60th Rifles and the Leicester Regiment. A
battery of artillery was then hauled up the steep incline to the
top.

On the 6th, General Ian Hamilton having brought up
reinforcements consisting of a brigade, from Belfast by way of
Dullstrom, {135} thus turning the Boers’ right, General
Buller advanced the following day and found that the Boers had
evacuated their position. But, in ignorance of this retirement,
great preparations were made for a big fight.

The Devonshire Regiment headed the advance of the infantry. It
was divided into two half battalions, one half battalion under
Major Davies proceeding up the road in support of the mounted
troops, whilst five companies under Captain Jacson were sent more
to the left to attack the large farm at the foot of the hill, with
orders “to proceed as far as possible without severe loss.” These
manoeuvres having been accomplished in safety without a shot being
fired, the force reached the top and bivouacked some two miles
further on for the night. Owing to the steepness of the road the
baggage did not arrive till after midnight.

Lydenburg was occupied next day without opposition, the Boers
having retired to a position on Paardeplaats, a range of high and
irregular hills five miles distant from and overlooking Lydenburg
on the Mauchberg-Spitzkop road. From this position the Boers
{136} shelled the baggage, bursting shrapnel
over it as it defiled into the open in front of the town. The train
formed up and halted under cover behind a hill, and came into camp
at dusk.

The following morning, September 8th, Sir Redvers Buller decided
to attack the Boer position on Paardeplaats, and for this purpose
he detailed General Walter Kitchener’s brigade to advance up the
spurs of the hills against the Boers’ right, whilst General Ian
Hamilton’s brigade was to turn the Boers’ left, the attack being
covered by the artillery which proceeded up the main road in the
centre.

General Kitchener’s brigade moved out from Lydenburg on to the
race-course. The battalion being the leading regiment deployed and
advanced towards a hill jutting out into the plain, with the
mounted brigade of General Dundonald working round the left. This
hill was afterwards known to the Regiment as Ben Tor. As the
Regiment deployed into the open it came under shrapnel fire from
two big guns posted on Paardeplaats. The Regiment was, however,
extended, and had only one man wounded.

{137}

The Gordon Highlanders, who were in support, marched across the
Boers’ front, in rear of the extended Devons, in column of
companies. Several shells burst amongst them, and one shell,
bursting thirty feet above graze, took their volunteer company end
on and killed and wounded fifteen.

With Dundonald’s men on their left flank, four companies of the
Regiment under Captain Jacson advanced up the spurs without
opposition, whilst Major Davies, in command of the remaining
companies, climbed the spurs on Jacson’s right. Little or no
opposition was met with on this flank. Jacson’s companies were
reinforced by four companies of the Gordon Highlanders and the 60th
Rifles, and at 4 p.m., when nearing the summit, a thick mist came
on, and the flanking brigade halted. Meanwhile Davies, with two of
his companies, had reached the top of the hill and was proceeding
down the far side when the fog lifted. It was then ascertained that
the Boers, under cover of the fog, had left the position to which
they had clung with great determination, and had retired. The
position had been turned by Ian Hamilton’s right flank attack.

{138}

The thick mist saved the Boers, who would otherwise undoubtedly
have lost their big guns in their retirement.

Just before dark the companies of the Regiment, which had become
scattered, were collected, and Captain Jacson received an order to
return with these to the old camp on the far side of Lydenburg;
seven companies were thus taken down the hills over very rough
country to the old camp, a distance of nearly six miles. On arrival
there a message was received which stated that the army was
encamped half-way up the hill towards Paardeplaats. The seven
companies then returned, and finally reached camp very late. They
had been marching and climbing incessantly from 7.30 a.m. till 10
p.m.

The brigades had by this time become rather intermingled. Of
General Kitchener’s brigade the Manchester Regiment had been left
behind at Witklip, at the north end of the Badfontein valley. A
garrison had also been left at Lydenburg under General Howard,
consisting of the Rifle Brigade and Leicesters, with General
Brocklehurst’s Cavalry Brigade.

The Devonshire Regiment was now left {139} behind at
Paardeplaats, while General Buller’s force, consisting of the
Gordon Highlanders and the 60th Rifles, with Dundonald’s Mounted
Brigade, two Field Batteries, and the 5-inch guns, advanced on the
9th, the day following the capture of Paardeplaats, in the
direction of the Mauchberg.

The country was extremely difficult, and the Boer guns and
pompoms well served, and considerable opposition was met with in
the advance.

General Buller’s force reached the Mauchberg that evening and
proceeded on the following day to Devil’s Knuckles, down the steep
Mauchberg road (known as Hell’s Gate), where the two Boer big guns
again narrowly escaped capture, and so on to Spitzkop, just north
of Nelspruit on the Pretoria-Lorenzo Marques railway.

On the 10th four companies and two guns under Captain Jacson
were ordered to the Mauchberg. The companies got off by midday, and
after a stiff climb occupied the mountain just before dark. The top
of the Mauchberg, 8720 feet high, was found to be very extended,
and the garrison was much {140} split up. Company forts were erected
on the main features, and the place was held till the 20th, mostly
in thick fog and rain.

The Mauchberg post was the terminus of the telegraph line,
communication thence with General Buller’s head-quarters being
continued by visual signalling. The mountain was intersected by
deep kloofs and ravines, into most of which the Boers had collected
their families and supplies, in the hope that neither would be
found. These were all disclosed from the summit of the mountain,
which commanded a view of a great extent of country. General Buller
succeeded in collecting a large amount of stores from these
“caches.”

The families of Boers who surrendered with their stock were sent
into Lydenburg, together with any prisoners that had been
taken.

On the 11th two of the Mauchberg companies with the two guns
were ordered to proceed to Devil’s Knuckles, to supply picquets for
Dundonald’s Mounted Brigade which was stationed there, and on
September 20th the companies of the Regiment stationed at
Paardeplaats marched to the Mauchberg, {141} being
relieved at the former place by the Leicesters, the remaining two
Mauchberg companies proceeding to Devil’s Knuckles.

On the 21st the Regiment was again united and marched with
Dundonald’s Brigade down the Sabi Valley, reaching Sabi Drift that
evening, where the force bivouacked. The column under General
Dundonald remained at Sabi Drift till the 26th awaiting the arrival
of General Buller, who was returning from Spitzkop.

Devons Crossing the Sabi River

A story is told anent the positions out of which General
Buller’s infantry had turned the Boers, which goes to show the
estimation in which the British infantry were held by their
opponents. The words are those of General Botha, and were told to
an officer of the Head-quarter Staff. “I shall give it up,” he
said. “I have taken up position after position which I considered
impregnable; I have always been turned off by your infantry, who
come along in great lines in their dirty clothes with bags on their
backs. Nothing can stop them. I shall give it up.”

On September 25th the remainder of General Buller’s force
marched into Sabi {142} Drift, and on the 26th the army, united
again, advanced north for Pilgrim’s Rest. Burgher’s Nek and Mac-Mac
diggings were reached about noon on that day.

The pass over Burgher’s Nek was held by the Boers under Gravett,
Botha and the State treasure with a small escort having crossed
only a few hours before, whilst a portion of their army under
Viljoen retired at the same time to the north towards
Pietersburg.

The infantry of the advance guard was composed of four companies
of the Regiment under Captain Jacson. On reaching the foot of the
pass the mounted troops were checked and the artillery came into
action. The position occupied by the Boers was formidable—a
long stretch of high rugged hills, with the forward slope ending
precipitously. The pass lay over a Nek between two high shoulders
of hills. The Boers, exceedingly well posted, occupied the hills on
either side of the Nek, taking cover behind the immense boulders on
the summit.

After the artillery had been bombarding the south side of the
Nek for some considerable time, the mounted infantry were sent
forward to occupy the hill known as Grass Kop, but {143} were
unable to proceed. In the meantime, the four companies of the
advance guard had been moved off to the left and nearer to the
hills. They now got the order to attack and occupy the hill. Whilst
these companies moved off under cover of the undulating ground to
the foot of the hills, two companies with the Maxim gun took up a
position in rear to cover the advance, firing with a range of 1700
yards at the top of the hill. Most of the artillery came into
action at the same time and at the same objective. The foot of the
hill was reached by the attacking force with two casualties. One
company was then directed to the left to attack round the flank,
and the ascent of the precipitous side of the hill was commenced.
Crawling up a goat’s track in single file, on hands and knees,
through dense bush, the first portion of the ascent was
accomplished, and the little force formed up under a spur to get
breath before debouching into the open for the final rush to the
top. After a short halt the advance was continued to the summit,
the companies on their way coming under a smart shell fire from
their own guns (happily without casualties), {144} which
were bursting shrapnel with wonderful precision between the two
leading companies. Just before reaching the top the flanking
company, coming in from the left with a well-timed advance, joined
the general advance to the summit. It was found that the Boers had
retired, and fire was brought to bear on them as they descended the
rear slope of the hill. The high hill on the left of the pass was
then occupied, and the Nek over which the road passed cleared of
Boers.

A heliograph message from Sir Redvers Buller was received on the
summit, “Well done Devons!” and in Lord Roberts’ official dispatch
for the day it was notified that General Buller had occupied
Burgher’s Nek, and that “the pass had been turned by a half
battalion of the Devonshire Regiment, well led by Captain
Jacson.”

The four companies bivouacked on the top. Efforts were made by
those down below to get food and blankets up to them, but owing to
the steepness and difficulties of the climb and the darkness, it
was found impossible.

The head-quarter companies of the Regiment {145} were
engaged on outpost duty at the foot of the pass, where the army had
bivouacked, almost all the men being on duty.

On the following day the march was resumed, the head-quarter
companies of the Regiment being rear-guard to the force. The
companies on the hill were relieved by two companies of the
Regiment under Captain Wren. The road was extremely bad and crossed
by many drifts, which caused considerable delay, and it was not
till the early hours of morning that the rear-guard companies got
into camp. The bivouac was formed amongst the hills, some five
miles from Pilgrim’s Rest, which had been occupied the previous day
by Strathcona’s Horse.

On the 28th the march was continued through Pilgrim’s Rest to
the foot of Morgenzon Hill, the mounted troops surprising the Boers
on the summit and putting them to flight.

The baggage was safely brought up the six miles of steep hill on
the following day. The road, which was the old coaching highway
Pilgrim’s Rest-Lydenburg, was found in excellent condition, but it
was heavy work for {146} the oxen, and all wagons were double
spanned. The force camped on the summit, and halted there on the
30th.

A good number of Boers were reported in the vicinity to the west
and north, but they did not make their presence felt and Sunday was
spent quietly.

On October 1st Morgenzon was left and the march continued
towards Kruger’s Post and Lydenburg. It was a long, dusty road
through narrow valleys. Opposition was encountered at the
bifurcation of the Lydenburg-Morgenzon and Lydenburg-Ohrigstadt
roads, which, however, was soon overcome, the Boers retiring to the
hills out of reach of the guns, and Kruger’s Post was reached at 2
p.m.

Shortly after the Regiment had settled itself in its bivouac a
Boer big gun opened on to it from a hill about 6000 yards distant,
and not very far from the road. This gun also shelled the wagons as
they came into camp, necessitating their halting under cover and
coming in later. In the evening, about 6.30, the Boers brought
another gun into action on a hill due west of the camp, and shelled
the cavalry and infantry bivouacs for one and a {147} half
hours in the dark. After several shells had pitched into their
midst the Regiment moved out and formed up into two long lines and
entrenched.

It was whilst marching out to take up this position in the dark
that a shell emptied itself into the head of one company, killing
Lieutenant Cumin and severely wounding Captain Luxmoore and one
man. The South African Light Horse and Strathcona’s Horse had a
number of casualties amongst their men and horses.

The Boers by a skilful manoeuvre had kept their guns concealed,
ready to be brought into action as soon as General Buller’s army
had settled itself quietly in its bivouac. They expended some
cartloads of ammunition in this manner without interference. In the
early hours of the following morning a band of volunteers ascended
the hill to capture the guns. They had both been withdrawn and were
not traced.

On the morning of October 2nd Buller’s army reached Lydenburg
without further opposition. Lieutenant Cumin was buried in the
evening in Lydenburg cemetery.

{148}

On Saturday, October 6th, Sir Redvers Buller bade farewell to
his army. The troops lined the streets and roads and gave him a
hearty send-off. He was immensely popular with the men and they
were sorry to see him go.

General W. Kitchener took over command of the Lydenburg district
and its garrison, on Sir Redvers Buller’s departure.

On the writer asking Sir Redvers on the eve of the day of his
departure which was his best army—the one he commanded into
Ladysmith or the one with which he trekked north—he replied,
“The army I went north with was the best. I watched the Devons pass
me at Burgher’s Nek and it struck me how wonderfully well they
looked. I considered they were ready for anything I asked them to
do; but,” he added, “they surprised me with the pace they went up
the hill at Burgher’s Nek.”

{149}

CHAPTER IV

LYDENBURG

1900-1901

On October 8th, 1900, the battalion moved out of Lydenburg to
the Mission Station, three miles north of the town on the Kruger’s
Post road. The Mission Station was a collection of Kaffir houses,
containing some 500 Christian men, women, and children. The
mission-house was taken over as a post and fortified as soon as the
German pastor, who was found to be communicating with the Boers,
had been sent to Pretoria to be locked up.

Colonel C.W. Park, Mission Camp, Lydenburg

The site of the camp having been chosen, it was immediately
surrounded by company forts consisting of ditches four feet deep
and two feet wide for protection against shell fire, which it was
considered possible would be {150} brought to bear on the
camp. This entrenchment was finished in one afternoon.

Two guns of the 53rd Battery under Lieutenant Higgins, and one
5-inch gun under Second Lieutenant McLellan, were added to the
garrison.

The battalion stood to arms daily just before dawn.

On the 9th two companies under Captain Bartlett were moved to
Paardeplaats as a permanent garrison, whilst two companies under
Captain Travers were sent to Ben Tor.

On the 10th two companies of the Regiment, two guns, and one
company mounted infantry proceeded just before daylight to a farm
some six miles away, and burnt it. They encountered no opposition.
This company of mounted infantry was then added to the garrison for
permanent duty.

The two following days were employed in collecting forage from
different farm-houses. Very few Boers were seen, and there was
little or no opposition.

On the 24th, it having been ordained that all the Boer women in
the various towns were to be sent out to their husbands in the
laagers, {151} two companies and two guns under Captain
Ravenshaw were ordered to escort the ladies of Lydenburg over the
Spekboom Bridge on the Kruger’s Post road, and there hand them over
to their husbands and friends. Captain Ravenshaw went out with a
flag of truce and met the Boers, amongst whom was Erasmus. They
were most affable, and shook hands cordially. The women reached
Kruger’s Post that evening.

The next day General Walter Kitchener started out at 2 a.m. with
a column of infantry (Devons), mounted infantry and guns towards
Kruger’s Post for the purpose of shelling the farm. At dawn the
column crossed the Spekboom Bridge and mounted the hills in the
face of slight opposition. A 5-inch gun was then brought to the
front and shells dropped into Kruger’s Post, after which the column
returned to camp. A patrol of four Boers was captured, and there
were no casualties on the British side.

Very shortly after this the order concerning the Boer women was
cancelled and a fresh order was issued, which ordained that all
Boer women who were captured or gave themselves {152} up should
be confined in large concentration camps on the railway line.

On the evening of the 24th one company was ordered down from Ben
Tor to be posted on the hill overlooking the Spekboom Bridge. The
company proceeded there on the 25th escorted by two companies, two
guns, and some mounted infantry.

On the following day, as the Boers were threatening the Bridge
Post before the works were complete, one company and two guns were
sent out as a covering party.

The battalion was now split up; two companies under Lieutenant
Tringham proceeded to Witklip, two companies under Captain Bartlett
were at Paardeplaats, one company under Lieutenant Cowie was at Ben
Tor, one company under Captain Travers was at Bridge Post. Of the
three remaining companies one was holding the Mission House, and
the two others with the 5-inch gun and the two field guns formed
the garrison of the main camp.

On October 30th two companies from Mission Camp were ordered to
march at sunset through Lydenburg to the bank of the river. Here
they halted and had supper, {153} being eventually joined by the Rifle
Brigade. Starting again at 9 p.m. and marching all through the
night, they attacked some Boer laagers at dawn. After some heavy
firing the laagers, which had been completely surprised, were
captured with all their tents, etc. The column returned at 5 p.m.
the same day, when the companies redistributed themselves to their
various posts, having marched from 4 a.m. till 10.30 p.m. a
distance of thirty-five miles. There were four casualties, one of
which was a Devon man slightly wounded.

November was spent rather quietly by the battalion, the men
being employed in strengthening the various posts and making them
comfortable.

On November 7th one company was sent off to garrison Strathcona
Hill on the southern side of the town.

On the 8th General Walter Kitchener again attacked the Boers,
this time employing entirely mounted troops, He brought back with
him 1000 sheep, 50 ponies, and 20 wagons. Five Boers were killed,
and the mounted troops had two casualties.

Colonel Park returned from sick leave on {154} the 9th,
when Major Davies resumed his position as second in command.
Lieutenants Hext and Kane left shortly afterwards to join the
mounted infantry at Pretoria, and at the end of November Lieutenant
Woollcombe rejoined the Regiment from Maritzburg, Lieutenant Harris
returned from Pretoria with a draft of thirty-eight men, and
Lieutenant Twiss rejoined from hospital at Newcastle.

At the beginning of December the following was the distribution
of the companies of the Regiment:—

Two companies at Paardeplaats under Captain Bartlett.
One company at Ben Tor under Lieutenant Cowie.
One company at Bridge Post under Captain Travers.
One company at Strathcona Hill under Lieutenant Willis; and
Four companies at Mission Camp.

On December 9th and 10th a foraging expedition with three guns
and four companies of the Rifle Brigade went out towards Van Der
Merves’ Farm under Colonel Park. These {155} brought
back twenty-eight wagon loads of forage without experiencing any
opposition.

It was reported on the 12th that Nelspruit had been cut off by
the Boers and required assistance. A column was immediately formed,
composed of one squadron 19th Hussars, four companies Devons under
Major Davies, and four companies Rifle Brigade with some guns; the
whole proceeding under General Kitchener en route to the
Mauchberg and Devil’s Knuckles. Three companies of the Regiment had
been taken from Mission Camp and one from Paardeplaats.

A blizzard blowing all night and the following morning,
accompanied with thunder and heavy rain, delayed the advance of the
troops till noon, when a start was effected, and the Mauchberg was
occupied by the Devons without opposition.

Further advance down Hell’s Gate to the Devil’s Knuckles was
found impracticable owing to the state of the road. Troops from
Machadodorp had been sent to Lydenburg to act as a garrison whilst
the column was out; but instructions were received from
head-quarters on the 15th ordering the immediate {156} return of
the column to Lydenburg, as well as of the reinforcements back to
Machadodorp. The Devons had been, however, sent out from the
Mauchberg previous to the receipt of the order to retire. They
skirmished down the road towards Devil’s Knuckles, and in a very
thick fog Boers and British nearly walked into each other’s arms.
There was a good deal of musketry fire, with the result to the
British side of one Devon wounded. As was usually said on such
occasions, “Boers’ loss was probably very great.” The three
companies returned to Mission Camp late on the evening of the
16th.

On the 18th Major Davies was ordered to Witklip to take command
of the forts; he took with him one company as a reinforcement to
the garrison.

On Christmas Day the Regiment received a number of telegrams
from friends in England wishing them good luck. A race meeting was
held in the afternoon on the Lydenburg race-course. The public went
armed, and two field guns were brought into action on the course.
These precautions were necessary, for the Boers at this time were
very {157} busy, and on the night of December
28th-29th attacked the post at Helvetia, near Machadodorp, and
captured it.

The post contained a 4.7 naval gun called “Lady Roberts,” and
this, with the garrison of three companies of the Liverpool
Regiment, was taken, only one small fort manned by a small
contingent of about fifteen men holding out. General Walter
Kitchener left at once with four companies of the Rifle Brigade,
two companies of the Regiment (from Witklip), two guns, and the
mounted troops, in the hope of intercepting the Boers and
recovering the gun. The Boers, however, had made good their
retirement to the hills, and General Kitchener returned to
Lydenburg with the column on the 31st.

The Liverpool Regiment lost at Helvetia 4 killed, 27 wounded,
and 200 prisoners.

The Boers about this time attacked all along the line from
Lydenburg to Pretoria. The defences, except at Lydenburg, were of
the most meagre description. In fact, the works constructed by the
Rifle Brigade and the Devons at Lydenburg were the only works of
any strength, and these were as {158} complete as possible.
Witklip was being placed in a fortified condition, but up to the
time of the taking of Helvetia Post little had been done anywhere,
except at Lydenburg.

For the next few nights all posts round Lydenburg stood to arms
at 1.30 a.m. owing to the activity of the Boers, but it was not
till January 4th that they attacked the Bridge Hill Post. They
attempted to capture the picquet on the bridge over the Spekboom
River, but were beaten off.

About this time one company was ordered down from Paardeplaats
to Mission Camp, the garrison at Paardeplaats being thus reduced to
one company; and Witklip garrison was reinforced by the addition of
one company, which was sent there from Mission Camp.

On the early morning of January 8th the Boers made a
simultaneous attack on almost all posts on the line between Belfast
and Lydenburg. The following posts were attacked: Badfontein,
Schwarzkop, Helvetia, Machadodorp, Belfast, Pan, and Noitgedacht.
The Badfontein Post was shelled only, by a big gun mounted on the
hills west of the fort, {159} which failed, however, to reach the
post. The result of the general attack was that two posts only,
those at Belfast, were captured by the Boers. These were not held,
and the Boers retired, leaving twenty-four dead upon the ground.
The posts had been well prepared for defence after the disaster at
Helvetia.

A wire bridge over the Lydenburg River, constructed by
Lieutenant Green and the twelve men of the Maxim gun team, was
completed about this time, and as it attracted a good deal of
attention a description of it may be interesting.

The bridge had a span of sixty feet, and was constructed on the
system of the “jhula,” or rope bridge, of Cashmere, out of
telegraph wire. The roadway, to admit of one person at a time, was
made of two lengths of twisted wire, each ten strands thick. These
being stretched tightly across the river, and the ends well worked
into the ground and pegged down, were joined together by small
laths of wood two inches apart. Two more lengths, each ten strands
thick, were stretched from two uprights on each bank, at a
convenient height above the roadway, to form a support {160} for it.
These were joined on to the roadway by stout sticks, about one to
two feet apart, on either side to give stability. The bridge was
then secured up and down stream by wires to keep it steady. The
height of the bridge above the stream was about twenty feet.

Wire Bridge, Lydenburg

The chief cause of attraction and interest in the bridge to
outsiders was the fact that it had been constructed entirely by
British infantry without the aid of the Royal Engineers, and that
the plan had been thought out by them alone, and was not “in the
book.” The idea had been taken from some photographs of a Cashmere
“jhula,” and the work had been carried out from descriptions of the
rope bridges furnished by an officer of the Regiment who had
crossed them. All previous bridges had been washed away, but this
bridge was still standing at the end of the war, and was being
utilized then by the Kaffirs at Mission Camp as an easy access and
short cut to their cultivated fields.

On January 12th, as a larger convoy than usual was coming
through to Lydenburg, a small force under Captain Jacson,
consisting of two companies Devons, one company {161} mounted
infantry and one gun went out from Mission Camp to demonstrate
towards Schoeman’s Laager on the west. No Boers, however, were
seen, and the convoy came safely into Lydenburg without
opposition.

Several changes occurred in the disposition of the companies of
the Regiment during the latter half of January, 1901.

The head-quarters with three companies were stationed at Witklip
under Colonel Park. Two companies proceeded to Badfontein as a
garrison under Major Davies. One company held each of the posts at
Bridge Hill and Paardeplaats respectively. One company was in
charge of the Mission House, whilst one company was left at Mission
Camp to commence the construction of a new work south of the old
camp.

Wire Bridge, Lydenburg (General Kitchener and Colonel
Park)

These changes were made on account of some large convoys going
and coming to and from the railway line, larger escorts having to
be provided owing to the proximity and increased activity of the
Boers on the lines of communication. The convoys came through
safely without any trouble, and on January 30th Major Davies with
his two companies {162} returned to Witklip. The head-quarters
of the Regiment, with three companies, left Witklip the following
day and proceeded to Mission Camp. Further changes were made during
February, 1901, the post at Paardeplaats being given up and the
company posted there returning to Mission Camp.

Towards the latter end of January a flying column was organized
by General Walter Kitchener. The objective of this column was the
high hills south of Lydenburg towards Witpoort and Belfast. It was
under the personal command of the General, and was composed of the
following troops:—

1 squadron 19th Hussars.
1 battery R.F.A.
1 naval 12-pounder.
1 pompom.
1 company Manchester Mounted Infantry.
3 companies Devons under Captain Travers.

The column set out at 1 a.m. in the direction of Elandskloof. It
was a bright night, although a thick white mist hung everywhere.
The 19th Hussars, who knew the difficult country, conducted the
advance. After marching {163} for two hours the column found itself in
the hills. A halt was made whilst the three companies of the
Regiment extended and occupied the high ground which barred the
advance, to drive off any Boers who might be in possession. This
manoeuvre was executed without opposition. It was learnt, however,
that a Boer picquet had been on the top, and had galloped off on
the approach of the infantry. Daylight found the column in
possession of Elandskloof, which was reached after a difficult
climb by steep and circuitous paths. Shortly after daylight several
Boers were observed to be driving their cattle into kloofs above
the Badfontein valley for safety. An advance was made shortly
afterwards towards Schwartz Kopjes, which place was reached without
much opposition towards dark. At Schwartz Kopjes camp was formed
for the night, the infantry entrenching themselves in the kopjes
round the camp, with one company posted in a farmhouse about 400
yards west of the main camp.

On the following day General Kitchener ordered the mounted
troops and guns to make a reconnaissance towards Dulstroom. Whilst
{164} the rest of the force remained in camp,
the baggage under escort was sent towards Belfast. The
reconnoitring force fared badly, for after advancing a few miles
Boers in large numbers were seen collecting on the high hills due
west, and approaching at a rapid pace. The reconnoitring force was
shortly afterwards heavily engaged, and compelled to retire on to
the camp.

The infantry were now ordered to retire as rapidly as possible
to a ridge in rear, distant about 2000 to 2500 yards. The cavalry
retired hard pressed on to Schwartz Kopjes, which they held until
the infantry had completed their movement, when the cavalry again
retired back to the neighbourhood of the infantry. Schwartz kopjes
were immediately occupied by the Boers, who collected there in
large numbers and endeavoured to get round the flanks of the
column.

Followed hotly by the Boers, the column made a rapid retirement,
units covering each other until camp was reached. It was only then
that the Boers drew off. There was no further engagement that day
or during the night, and the column completed its advance
{165} next day to Belfast, where it arrived
about midday and camped to the south side of the railway.

The distribution of the garrison, carried out at the
commencement of February, continued more or less the same till the
time the Regiment left Lydenburg. Three companies were north of
Lydenburg, and were stationed at the Mission House, Mission Camp
Fort, and Bridge Hill. One company was at Strathcona Hill, south of
the town, two companies under the command of Major Davies were at
Witklip, whilst the three companies which had proceeded with
General Kitchener to Belfast were quartered on their return in
Lydenburg.

During this time Colonel Park was commanding the Lydenburg
district with Captain Ravenshaw as Brigade Major.

On February 5th the Boers attacked all the Lydenburg posts. The
attacks were not heavily pressed. There were no casualties on the
side of the defenders, whilst the Boers lost, as far as could be
ascertained, two killed and seven wounded.

On February 16th two Boers surrendered {166} at
Mission Camp. These stated that their friends in the laagers were
badly off for meat and had hardly any horses left, most of them
having died of horse-sickness.

Early in March, 1901, Colonel Park decided on raiding Piet
Schwartz’s laager, which was stationed on the ridge to the north of
and overlooking Kruger’s Post. His force consisted of three
companies Devons under Captain Jacson, three companies Rifle
Brigade, three companies Royal Irish, one squadron 19th Hussars,
three companies mounted infantry, three guns 53rd Battery, one
howitzer, and one pompom, and by the 12th his arrangements were
complete. The infantry were to make a night march and to attack at
dawn, whilst the mounted troops and guns were to be at Kruger’s
Post just after dawn to assist.

Under cover of darkness, the column rendezvoused at the Spekboom
Bridge, one company having gone on ahead to seize any Boers who
might be coming down at nightfall, as was their wont, to form a
picquet there.

A start was made from the bridge at about 9 p.m. Leaving the
main road on their left, {167} the column proceeded in single file,
Devons leading, along a footpath which led them over a Nek in the
hills and thence down into a donga. An accident, which might have
been attended with very unfortunate results, occurred at the very
commencement. The Royal Irish, who were in the rear, instead of
following and keeping in touch with the remainder of the column
missed connection, and went up the main road, on which, about two
miles ahead, was a Boer picquet. They were, however, stopped just
in time and turned back. This delayed the advance for about an
hour. Along the donga the march was continued for some six miles,
when a cross donga was met with, the sides of which were steep and
about fifteen feet high. The leading troops crossed and halted on
the far side till the rear closed up. The Maxim gun mules with
difficulty negotiated the obstacle, and the advance was, after one
hour’s halt, continued to Kruger’s Post.

The force kept to the donga almost the whole march, scarcely for
a moment leaving its shelter. Terribly rough going it was, with
long high grass soaking wet, and the men {168} tumbling
about into ruts and over rocks. On they trudged, twisting and
turning, up and down, falling about, with every now and then a
suppressed exclamation and an imprecation on rocks and ruts in
general and night marches in particular—no lights, no
smoking. No one except he who has done it knows what a strain it is
marching along through the dark night, without a word and without
the company of a pipe.

On emerging from the donga at Kruger’s Post on to the open veldt
a further halt was made; the leading troops lay down in the soaking
grass and were fast asleep in a moment.

It was found that the column had opened out considerably, and
must have stretched for some four miles from lead to end. The rate
of marching at the head of the column had been about two miles per
hour. This was found, over the rough ground, to be too quick to
allow of the rear keeping closed up—the pace should not have
exceeded one mile an hour.

The column having closed up and the sleeping men having with
difficulty been found and turned up out of the wet grass, a further
{169} advance was made. But now the direction
was to the right in order to avoid Kruger’s Post Farm, which was
occupied by the Boers. This took the column over some millraces, a
biggish jump for the men. The mules, having been relieved of their
loads, were man-handled across. Once over these and then a wade
through a stream knee deep, the ghostly column again halted. It was
now 3.30 a.m. The foot of the low hills behind which was the
laager, had been reached, and the officers were busy getting their
men collected.

An intelligence officer reports that if there is the slightest
delay dawn will break before the positions are reached. The first
streak of dawn is 4.45 a.m.

“May we go off now on our own?” is the question asked.

“All right; off you go!” is the cheery answer from Colonel
Park.

The Devons had the furthest to go, perhaps one and a half miles
to reach the far side of the laager. The Royal Irish were already
at the foot of the hill on the top of which was the position
assigned to them.

Two of the Rifle Brigade companies had {170}
unfortunately missed connection and had gone off into the
“Ewigkeit” in the dark, but one company was ready and handy to the
Nek which they had to occupy, to fill up the gap between the Devons
and the Royal Irish.

The Devons, who by this time were well together, started off,
Captain Travers with a guide leading. He had orders to take on with
him the two first companies, the guide showing him where to place
his men. On they went, running and walking, walking and running, up
the slippery road, across the Nek and then down into the valley
below. Two small groups of men were posted in the ditch leading up
to the Nek.

As the last man reached the knoll overlooking the Nek at the
place where the main road crossed it, and which was the right of
the Devons’ allotment of position, the two leading companies could
be heard down in the valley below stumbling amongst the stones,
getting into a position that would entirely cut off the Boers’
retreat down the main road leading north.

Mission Camp Fort, Lydenburg

Suddenly all was still: everything was ready. It was exactly
4.45 a.m.

{171}

All lay down and waited in breathless silence for the coming
dawn. The Devons had orders to withhold their fire as long as
possible, to make sure of the other units being in their places.
“That’s the position of the laager, just behind that little knoll,”
whispered an intelligence scout; “but it seems as if the bird has
flown.”

Mission Camp Fort, Lydenburg (Interior)

For some ten minutes the silence continued, with not so much as
the crack of a twig to interrupt it. What’s that? It’s a cock
crowing! There it is again! There’s another! The laager’s there
right enough, and we’ve got them!

In the far distance, Lydenburg way, the faint noise of musketry
fire could be heard; it was the mounted troops advancing and
driving in the Boer picquets on the road above the Spekboom Bridge,
eight miles back.

In about five minutes’ time the laager was roused by a Boer, who
commenced swearing roundly at some one in a very loud voice. One
man came out and posted himself on a little rise of ground, and
gazed, listening, Kruger’s Post way. He was joined by another, then
another, until there was a group of nine of them, {172} two
dressed in long white robes. It was thought that these were women.
Suddenly they all returned into the laager out of sight, only to
appear again in a few minutes on horseback. Three of them came
straight up to the high road just under the knoll where the Devons
were in readiness. They were allowed to go on, and they continued
their career down the road towards Kruger’s Post.

Now the utility of posting the groups in the ditch by the side
of the road became manifest. Suddenly from their direction crack!
went a single rifle, then a burst of rifle fire, which was
immediately taken up all round the circle.

No, not quite round; there was silence from the hill which
should have been occupied by the Royal Irish. A party of some
twenty Boers were seen ascending this hill, the top of which was
covered with big rocks. The Devons’ rifles as well as their Maxim
gun were turned on to them. The Boers, however, succeeded in
reaching the safety of the rocks a few moments before the ascending
Irish.

Meanwhile the firing had become general, and in the dim light
also a trifle mixed. The {173} Rifle Brigade fired into the two
Devon companies down in the valley and across the laager. The
latter in their turn fired at some Boers trying to escape through
the gap left open by the Royal Irish. These were striving with the
Boers for the possession of the rock-capped hill, and both were
being fired into by the Devons across the valley.

After some twenty minutes of sharp musketry fire the “cease
fire” sounded, and everything was again quiet; it was then found
that the whole laager had fallen into British hands. Two Boers were
killed, three wounded, and thirty-six captured, whilst the British
casualties were two killed and four wounded, all of them Royal
Irish.

The distance from Lydenburg to Piet Schwartz’s laager by road is
about eighteen miles; the distance marched by the column could not
have been under twenty miles, and this over very difficult ground.
The column had left Lydenburg at 7 p.m., and reached its
destination at 4.45 a.m.

Unfortunately, Piet Schwartz himself escaped capture, as he was
not in the laager; he had left it the previous day.

{174}

The mounted troops and guns were very slow in coming out, with
the result that a large quantity of cattle located in the various
kloofs which should have been captured, escaped. Abel Erasmus was
taken the following day.

The force bivouacked at Kruger’s Post for the night, and
returned to Lydenburg next day, bringing with it fifteen Boer
families in addition to the prisoners. On their return a wire was
received by Colonel Park from Lord Kitchener: “Highly appreciate
successful operation of Colonel Park and troops engaged.”

The remainder of the month was spent mostly in convoy work
between Witklip and Lydenburg. Whilst returning to Lydenburg with
one of these convoys, General Walter Kitchener, who was riding
ahead with a small escort, suddenly came across some Boers lying
concealed in the grass. He lost two of his own personal escort
killed, his own horse also being shot. He himself narrowly escaped
capture.

On April 10th an order was issued for the battalion to
concentrate in Lydenburg, preparatory {175} to a
general advance of three columns. The posts at Bridge Hill, Mission
Village, Strathcona, and Paardeplaats were evacuated, and the
company at Witklip withdrawn.

The destinations of the columns were as follows:—

One column under Colonel Park was to proceed in the Kruger’s
Post direction and to scour the country towards the north, and
later to join hands with General Kitchener’s column, which was to
proceed in a north-westerly direction, and the third column under
Colonel Douglas was to proceed from Witklip in a westerly
direction.

On the 12th, Lieutenant-Colonel Park handed over the command of
the battalion to Major Davies, who had arrived from Witklip, and
Captain Jacson took over the duties of second in command.

{176}

CHAPTER V

TREKKING IN THE NORTH-EAST TRANSVAAL

On April 13th, 1901, General Walter Kitchener commenced his long
trek with a night march.

His force consisted of—

Two guns 53rd F.B.R.A. under Major Johnson and Captain
Talbot-Ponsonby.
One 5-inch gun.
One 5-inch howitzer.
One naval 12-pounder.
One company mounted infantry.
1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment (20 officers and 900 men).
2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
The 6th Western Australians.

General Walter Kitchener’s column formed one of the many
operating at the time in a {177} combined movement in the Northern
Transvaal and bush veldt, under the direction of General Sir Bindon
Blood.

Two columns were sent north to drive the bush veldt, forcing any
Boers that might be located there on to the other columns, who were
acting as stops near the Tautes Berg and Bothas Berg, immediately
north of the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway line.

General Walter Kitchener decided to start his operations with an
attack on Schoeman’s laager, and for this purpose the Regiment was
ordered to take up a position before dawn which would cut off the
laager, situated in the Steenkampsberg mountains, near the entrance
of the Lydenburg road into the hills, from the north. This entailed
a night march of about sixteen miles. The remainder of the column
was to proceed by the main road and attack the laager at
daybreak.

The Regiment rendezvoused on the west side of the river, clear
of the town, before dusk. Here the men had food, and a start was
made at 7 p.m. The going at first was fairly simple, but once the
track was left the ground became rough, stony, and intersected
{178} with dongas. The advance was then made
in single file.

As an instance of how a small obstruction delays troops marching
in the dark, one small water-course 1-1/2 feet wide and about 1
foot deep delayed the head of the column for some thirty-five
minutes, till all the men had crossed and were closed up again, and
then in crossing one in every ten fell into it. The top of the
Steenkampsberg was reached at about 1 a.m., after a steep climb
over a rough track. The difficulty of the march was increased by a
thick fog. On the far side a steep cliff, at the bottom of which
was a deep donga and a mountain torrent, was encountered, and this
had to be negotiated on hands and knees. Slipping and sliding down,
the bottom of the donga was reached and the mountain torrent waded,
and then after a steep ascent the top of the plateau was
reached.

It was here that the laager was supposed to be situated, and an
extension was made and the advance continued. Just as the dawn was
breaking some flying Boers, appearing and disappearing in the fog,
were fired at by the leading extended company. The Boers had been
{179} disturbed prematurely and had escaped,
taking with them their pompom, but the wagon containing its
ammunition fell into the hands of the Regiment.

The actual position of the laager was found to be about one mile
away from where it had been previously located, and was very
difficult to find in the dark owing to the undulations of the
ground at the top of the ridge. Complete success under these
circumstances was scarcely probable, but as a test as to what a
regiment could do when called upon, the undertaking was effective
and complete.

After the Regiment had been engaged in long-range firing for
some time, the head of the main column appeared on the Lydenburg
road, and the force finally went into bivouac for the night at
Boshhoek. About 400 sheep and some cattle were picked up on the
neighbouring farms.

The following morning the column marched north down the Waterval
valley, and after the mounted troops had experienced some
opposition in very hilly and rough country, Boshfontein was
reached.

Shortly after the force had settled into {180} camp
heavy gun fire was heard from the direction of Waterval. The Boers’
shells exploded in the valley immediately to the north of the camp
and in the vicinity of a farm, where it would appear the Boers
considered the column should have bivouacked. After the explosion
of some twenty shells a louder report than usual was heard, and the
shelling ceased.

The mounted troops reported that the Boers were in position
above Waterval, where there was a large women’s laager.

In the dark of the morning, at three o’clock, General Kitchener
set his column in motion: four companies, with a 12-pounder and two
5-inch guns, under Major Davies, preceded the force, with the
intention of capturing the big Boer gun; four companies, with two
field guns, under Captain Jacson, made a flanking movement through
scrub and dongas round the left. Very little opposition was met
with. The mounted troops captured a few prisoners, and it was found
that the Boers had blown up their big gun. This was the gun that
had been situated on Pepworth Hill, and which had been disabled by
one of the Naval Brigade’s shells during the siege of Ladysmith.
Its {181} muzzle had been shortened, showing that
it had been damaged. The Boers had blown the gun to pieces. The
barrel of the gun was blown about fifty yards in front of the
emplacement, whilst the breech-block was found afterwards 1-1/2
miles in rear. They had destroyed also one pompom and one Maxim.
Twenty-eight Boers were captured, with about sixty head of cattle
and thirteen wagons. The Australians had one man killed and one man
wounded.

Remains of Boer Big Gun, Waterval

The Waterval valley was well watered and exceedingly rich in
crops, and the numerous farm-houses were full of families. These
were collected afterwards by Colonel Park’s column and sent into
Lydenburg.

On the 16th the column set out from Waterval in a north-westerly
direction, the objective being Secoconi’s country and Magnet
Heights. The first day found the force on the east bank of the
Steelpoort River. The Dwars River, which was found in full flood
owing to a very violent thunderstorm, had been forded on the way.
The Regiment was rear-guard to the column, and, owing to delay in
passing the baggage over the river, reached camp some {182}
considerable time after dark. The Australian mounted troops did not
halt at the Steelpoort, but, fording the river, pushed on to Magnet
Heights, which they occupied the same night. Park’s column had been
in touch with Kitchener’s in the morning.

Crossing the Steelport River

On the banks of the Dwars River Secoconi’s men were first met
with. These, armed with rifles of various patterns ancient and
modern, were out scouting for General Kitchener in all
directions.

At dawn on April 17th the crossing of the Steelpoort River was
commenced. One company of the Regiment was first sent across to
occupy the high ground on the far side and to cover the crossing.
The river was in flood owing to the heavy rain of the previous day,
and the water above the men’s waist. The advanced company having
got safely across and having occupied the high ground, the
remainder of the infantry were sent over without casualty. The
march was then continued towards Magnet Heights, which was reached
at dusk. Here camp was formed, and on the following day the march
was again resumed with mule transport only, through Secoconi’s
land.

{183}

Secoconi was at the time at war with a neighbouring tribe, and a
fringe of hills only, divided the combatant parties, but an
interval was called in their operations by mutual consent to allow
of the passage of the British through their respective countries.
On leaving behind the outposts of one, the outposts of the other
were met with.

Having reached this point to the north of the Transvaal, General
Kitchener’s column was in a position to turn south, and, in
conjunction with other columns on his right and left hand, to sweep
the bush veldt and mountains southward towards the railway, near
which another force under the personal command of Sir Bindon Blood,
who was in charge of the entire operations, was drawn up ready to
intercept any Boers who might try to move across the railway from
north to south.

At Vergelegen, where the column halted for the night of the
18th, some of Secoconi’s headmen came into camp for an interview.
They were much impressed with what they saw, patted the 5-inch gun
with friendly concern, and having relieved the General of his
tobacco-pouch and a box of cigars, and offering their {184}
assistance when not busy with their neighbours, returned to their
kraals.

The mounted troops were sent on ahead the same day to Pokwani
town, where it was supposed the Boers had collected a quantity of
cattle. No trace, however, of either Boers or cattle was found
there.

The columns comprising the drive southward were in constant
communication with each other by signalling. Plumer’s column was
immediately on Kitchener’s right, holding the line of the
Oliphant’s River, thus preventing the Boers, who were scattered in
small groups in the bush veldt, from escaping in the direction of
Pietersburg, whilst Park’s column was operating on Kitchener’s
left, thus preventing the Boers breaking back towards Waterval and
the Steenkampsberg mountains.

Gradually Kitchener’s column moved southward, driving the Boers
off the high ground and picking them up with their cattle and
families in the low or bush veldt. To do this with greater effect
the column was divided, one portion consisting of the battalion,
one gun, the I.L.H. and Australians under Colonel Davies proceeding
in a north-westerly direction {185} to stop the Boers breaking
back into the bush veldt in rear, whilst General Kitchener with the
remainder of the column marched over the high ground overlooking
the bush veldt, and on the direct road to the south. On the 22nd
Davies’ column reached Enkeldedoorn, whilst General Kitchener with
the Rifle Brigade occupied Vaal Kop on the morning of the 23rd. On
the first day out the mounted troops of Davies’ force, scouring the
bush in their advance, captured 23 prisoners, 8 wagons, 450 head of
cattle, and 4000 sheep. They also brought in a number of families,
some of whom had been hiding for months in kloofs and dongas in
great fear of the Kaffirs. One woman with her children was seen
weeping by the side of the track, and on being asked the reason,
she implored that she also might be taken into the railway and not
left behind. She was comforted by an assurance that the column
would return and that she would be taken in.

Stores were now running short, and the biscuit and sugar rations
were reduced to half.

In order to keep connection between the two portions of General
Kitchener’s column, {186} two companies were left at Enkeldedoorn
under the command of Captain Bartlett. These also formed a “stop”
to prevent the Boers breaking back, and a post to which prisoners’
families and cattle could be forwarded on their way to join the
head-quarters at Paardeplaats, whither General Kitchener had gone
from Vaal Kop.

The Regiment, with the Australian mounted troops, operating
through dense bush proceeded in the direction of the Oliphant’s
River, capturing a considerable number of prisoners, cattle,
wagons, and families, amongst the prisoners being Commandant
Fourie.

Eight privates of the Regiment, who were escorting an ammunition
cart, and who had lost their way, captured six Boers with all their
cattle and brought them into camp.

When within twelve miles of the Oliphant’s River, Davies,
hearing that Commandant Schroeder with a small commando was
directly between him and Plumer’s column on the Oliphant’s River,
split his force into two. The infantry, comprising five companies
of the Regiment, were sent back under Captain Jacson, with all the
prisoners wagons and {187} families to Enkeldedoorn, while Davies
himself, with the Australians and one gun, started in pursuit of
Schroeder. On nearing the Oliphant’s River it was ascertained that
Schroeder, with forty-one men and one Maxim gun and several wagons,
had been forced by Davies’ mounted troops across the river into the
hands of Plumer, who had them in safe keeping.

Jacson’s train of prisoners reached Enkeldedoorn on April 26th,
and on the following day he received orders to proceed at once to
Zuikerboschplaats and to take with him Bartlett’s two companies
from Enkeldedoorn. This place was reached at dusk, and shortly
afterwards Davies brought up his Australians to the same camp, his
column being then again united. The northern part of the bush veldt
having been swept clear of Boers, Davies then moved due south and
scoured the country round the Tafel Kop mountain, capturing a
number of prisoners and wagons. Haartebeestfontein was reached late
in the evening of the 28th, some of the companies of the Regiment
having marched over hill and dale through thick scrub more than
twenty miles. Four men had lost their way and were missing.

{188}

Orders were received on the following day from General Kitchener
for Davies’ force to rejoin head-quarters at Paardeplaats. An early
start was made at 6 a.m. Lackau, 12-1/2 miles, was reached at 11
a.m., and here the column halted and the cattle outspanned till
2.30 p.m. The heat in the bush veldt was excessive, and was very
trying to the men and cattle. At 2.30 p.m. the march was again
resumed, and after another ten miles Paardeplaats was reached at
dusk.

It had been a hot and dusty march of 22-1/2 miles, and the men
and cattle were rather “done up.” On arrival it was found that the
General had moved on to Goedgedacht.

As soon as it was dark rockets were fired to try and direct the
four missing men into camp, but without success.

On the following day the battalion with the Australians marched
down the steep Zaaiplaats Pass to Buffelsvlei, bivouacking for the
night on the banks of the Buffelsvlei River.

On arrival there it was again found that the General had moved
on to Rooi Plaats, and that the 2nd Rifle Brigade had proceeded by
the Tautesberg road with prisoners and families {189} and
cattle to Wonderfontein on the railway line.

May 1st found the force at Rooi Plaats, and here a halt was made
on the 2nd. Two companies under Captain Bartlett were dispatched to
Diepkloof and two companies under Captain Wren to Waterval in order
to block the two roads to the north from the Botha’s Berg, and to
stop the Boers breaking back.

On May 3rd the Regiment with the Australian mounted infantry
reached Waterval, and on the following day proceeded to Blinkwater.
Two companies with two guns under Captain Ponsonby, R.A., were left
behind to cover the retirement of some mounted infantry, with
orders to rejoin in the evening.

General Blood, with the whole of his personal command, had left
Blinkwater on the previous day for Middleburg, and on the 5th
General Kitchener received orders to follow him. The column marched
that day to Rooi Kop, twelve miles distant on the Middleburg road,
and on the following day two companies Devon Regiment, two
companies Rifle Brigade, five guns and one howitzer, with the sick,
the whole under Captain Jacson, left for Bankfontein, {190} where
they were joined next morning by the remainder of General
Kitchener’s column.

At Bankfontein a telegram was received which announced that
Major Davies had been promoted to the brevet rank of
lieutenant-colonel, Major Curry granted a D.S.O., and Captain
Jacson was to be promoted to the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel
on attaining the rank of major.

A halt was made at Bankfontein from the 8th till the 11th, when
the force refitted, and on May the 12th the column marched to
Rondebosch on the outskirts of Middleburg.

In the early part of May, 1901, a further drive on a large scale
was organized by head-quarters. This was intended to traverse the
whole of the Eastern Transvaal south of the railway. The columns
were to be extended from Middleburg through Carolina up to the
Swazi border on the east, and then, with a circling movement based
on Middleburg, gradually to sweep the country through Ermelo
towards Bethel. Having rounded up all this country, the drive,
extending from Bethel on the south to the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway
on the north, was by a combined movement to the westward,
{191} to push all the Boers remaining in this
part of the country with their cattle on to Johannesburg-Springs
and the Pretoria-Standerton railway lines, which were guarded. The
movement was under the direction of Sir Bindon Blood, and his
forces consisted of eight columns.

The battalion found itself again under the command of General
Walter Kitchener, forming part of his column, which was composed of
the following troops:—

1st Devonshire Regiment.
2nd Rifle Brigade.
6th West Australians (450 strong).
2nd I.L.H. (800 strong).
Four guns 53rd Field Battery R.A.
One 5-inch gun.
One naval 12-pounder.

Its position in the drive was on the left or outside edge of the
circle of the operations.

The forces were put in motion on the 13th May, on which day
Kitchener, advancing in the direction of the Swazi border, marched
to Zaaiplaats (12-1/2 miles), and thence without {192} incident
through Riet Kuil, reaching Schoonora on the 15th. In the
neighbourhood of Schoonora Commandant Trichardt, with 170 of his
followers, was surprised by the Australian mounted infantry, who
killed one Boer and captured 300 head of cattle. A considerable
number of Boers were reported to be in the neighbourhood.

The drifts over which the column had to pass after leaving Riet
Kuil were bad, and only two companies reached Schoonora that night.
The remainder of the battalion, which was rear-guard to the column,
bivouacked with the baggage three miles out of camp near a branch
of the Klein Oliphants River, and joined up with the column next
morning. The following day Mooiplaats was reached, when a large
number of cattle and some families were taken.

On May 16th the column moved to Grobellars Recht. Here the Boers
were found in large numbers under Botha. The 5th and 6th West
Australians whilst operating on the right flank of the column were
ambushed, losing one officer and six men killed and thirteen
wounded. The Boers were very {193} truculent and gave
considerable trouble, and the force was not in camp till dark. It
was not, however, disturbed during the night.

The column left Grobellars Recht on the 16th with the 5th and
6th West Australians as rear-guard, supported by the Devonshire
Regiment. The Boers followed up smartly for some hours, but there
were no casualties, and camp was reached at Kromkrans at about 4
p.m. Smutsoog was reached the next day. On the march Pulteney’s
column, which was seen in the distance, mistaking Kitchener’s
column for a commando of Boers, shelled them with field guns. Their
shooting was accurate, and it was not till General Kitchener
threatened to send a 5-inch shell at them that they desisted.
Fortunately no damage was done. From Smutsoog the column proceeded
to Goedevervachting, a few Boers sniping the column on the
march.

Much inconvenience was experienced from the cold, as it froze
hard every night.

On the 20th the column marched to Florence, passing Bothwell and
Lake Chrissie, and on the following day reached Veltevreden. Here
the 2nd Rifle Brigade and the West {194} Australians left the
column. On the march to Veltevreden a few Boers were seen, and
there was some firing at the rear-guard.

On the following day a short march brought the force to Uitkyk,
where a halt was made on the 23rd.

On the 24th the column on its march to Schapenberg captured 800
cattle and 4000 sheep, and five Boers surrendered.

A halt was made on the 25th and 26th at Schapenberg. Here 16,000
sheep, which were being driven along with the column, were
slaughtered. These, daily increasing in number, hampered the
movements of the rearguard on the march to such an extent, that it
was found impossible to drive them on to the railway; they were
therefore slaughtered.

Lekkerloop was reached on the 27th, on which day the I.L.H.
captured twenty-two prisoners. A halt was made at Lekkerloop from
the 28th to 31st, during which time the I.L.H. under Colonel
Mackenzie were busy capturing prisoners and clearing the
country.

On June 1st the column marched to Bushman’s Kop, proceeding on
the following day to Vierwonden, crossing the Theespruit en
route. {195} The I.L.H. brought six prisoners into
camp with them. The main column halted at Vierwonden from the 3rd
till the 8th, whilst Captain Bartlett left for Hoilake on the 3rd
in command of three companies as escort to a convoy, and on the 4th
Captain Wren was ordered with one company and five guns to
Bonnybraes. On the 9th the column marched to Bonnybraes, Colonel
Mackenzie and the I.L.H. bringing in eighteen Boers and about 400
cattle and some families.

A halt was made at Bonnybraes on the 10th. The column was
reunited on the 11th at Fernyhaugh, and on the 12th marched to
Busby, the march being greatly delayed by a bad drift over the
Umpolosi River. Ring Kink was reached on the 13th, and Woodstock on
the 14th. Thirty Boer rifles were found on Woodstock Farm.

The column was then divided. Seven companies of the Regiment
under Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, with the 2nd I.L.H. and the 5th
and 6th West Australians, left Woodstock at 1 a.m., the remainder
of the column proceeding, under General Kitchener’s personal
command, further south towards Bank Kop to {196} round up
some Boers reported in that neighbourhood.

Davies’ mounted troops captured during the day fourteen Boers,
some families, 100 cattle, 1000 sheep, and six wagons. This column
marched twenty-two miles and camped for the night at Blaukrans,
where Colonel Davies rested his men on the 16th.

Colbank was reached on the 17th, when all mounted troops left to
join Kitchener’s column at Bank Kop.

The following day the Regiment marched to Kranspan and joined up
with General Kitchener. The column captured that day several
families and twenty-two Boers. On the 19th the whole column marched
in the direction of Ermelo, and camped for the night on a hill
overlooking the town. Camp was reached at nightfall after a very
long, dusty, and tiring march, the rear-guard getting in after
dark.

On the 20th the force marched through Ermelo to Driehook. A
number of Boers followed up the rear-guard, and there was a good
deal of firing, but no casualties. The march was resumed on the
following day and {197} Kranspoort was reached. On the 22nd the
column marched to Witbank, the rear-guard being engaged almost the
whole march. A halt was made at Witbank. The West Australians were
here again ambushed, losing two men killed, one officer and two men
wounded, and five taken prisoners.

Three hundred Boers were reported on the left flank at
nightfall, and preparations were made to receive a night attack,
which, however, did not come off. On the following day a dense fog
delayed the march till 9 a.m., and it was not till late that Vaal
Bank was reached. The rear-guard, consisting of the Devon Regiment
and the 6th West Australians, was engaged the whole day with the
Boers, who followed the column right up to the new camp. That night
the whole Regiment was on outpost duty.

The rear-guard was engaged heavily the following day during the
march to Bankpan.

Campbell’s and Babington’s columns were on the immediate right.
The Devons halted for the day at Bankpan, when the 5th and 6th West
Australians left to join Campbell’s {198} column at Middlekraal, the
18th Hussars exchanging over to Kitchener’s column.

A night march was made on the 26th for the purpose of
surrounding a farm some eight miles distant. This was accomplished
by midnight. No Boers were taken. The column halted till daylight,
when the march was again resumed, and Erstegeluk reached in the
afternoon. A number of Boers were surprised in the neighbouring
farms by the mounted troops; and shortly after camp was formed, a
body of Boers attempted to drive in the outposts and to attack the
camp, but without success.

The following day Bethel was reached, and camp was formed close
to Colonel Babington’s column. The 18th Hussars, reconnoitring to
the south-east of Bethel, were surprised by a large party of Boers.
Lieutenant Green, Devonshire Regiment, who was in charge of the
Colt gun attached to the 18th Hussars and which was manned by men
of the Devonshire Regiment, behaved very gallantly in bringing his
gun at once into action and engaging the Boers within a range of
500 yards, thus covering the cavalry and giving them time to
rally.

{199}

On June 29th the march was resumed, and the column reached
Schurvekop, the rear-guard receiving a good deal of attention from
the Boers. Camp was formed at Middlekraal on the following day.
Here Campbell’s column was again met with.

Middlekraal was left on July 1st, and the column marched in the
direction of Springs. A number of Boers were in the vicinity of the
first camp, Witbank, and the camp was sniped during the night. The
following day the column marched to Bakenlaagte, the scene of the
disaster to Benson’s column, the rear-guard being followed up by a
few Boers.

After a short march the following day Grootpan was reached, and
at 8 p.m. three companies of the Regiment under Captain Bartlett,
and the 5th and 6th West Australians, made a night march to the
south, capturing a picquet of six Boers early next morning. The
column, after a twelve-miles’ march, reached Sondagskraal on the
4th at 1 p.m. On arrival there news was received that a Boer
convoy, accompanied by Louis Botha, was in the neighbourhood of
Trichardtsfontein, about fifteen miles from Sondagskraal.

{200}

General Kitchener determined to intercept this convoy, and for
this reason the following force under his personal command, viz.
two squadrons 19th Hussars, 5th and 6th West Australians, and four
companies of the Devonshire Regiment under Captain Jacson, set out
the same evening. The mounted troops of Colville’s column
co-operated. Trichardtsfontein was reached an hour before dawn,
when the place was found deserted. A halt was made there for the
day, when Colville’s column left.

Dawn–After a Night March, Trichardtsfontein

At nightfall several Boers were seen on the hills in the
vicinity, and there was every reason to suppose that a night attack
was contemplated by them. Preparations were made accordingly, but
the night was passed quietly.

At dawn the return march was commenced. The Boers attacked the
rear-guard before it left camp and before it was formed up, and
engaged it the whole way back to Sondagskraal, until finally they
came under fire of the 5-inch gun in position in that camp.

During the preceding thirty-one hours the four companies of the
Regiment had marched forty-two miles.

{201}

Whilst this enterprise was being undertaken the remainder of the
battalion, with the transport of the column, had remained at
Sondagskraal under Colonel Davies.

On the 7th the force marched to Goedehoop, and proceeding
without incident on the 8th to Brakfontein, on the 9th to Strypan,
reached Springs on the 10th. The last two marches were long and
tiring, and what little strength was left in the oxen was
exhausted. The men likewise required a rest and a refit after their
long trek from Lydenburg, which had extended through Secoconi’s
country in the Northern Transvaal, down south to Middleburg, thence
east to the Swazi border and over the Eastern Transvaal, reaching
as far south as Bethel, to Springs, near Johannesburg. Eighty per
cent of the men had on arrival at Springs neither shirts nor socks,
and the bitter cold of the high veldt pierced keenly through the
thin Indian khaki drill. The column required generally doing up
before again “taking the floor.” It was expected by all that the
infantry at least would be relieved by a fresh battalion.

But it was not to be, for General Walter {202} Kitchener
insisted on the Devons accompanying him, and his column set out
again from Springs on the 14th on a trek to the north, and without
much fighting or incident reached Middleburg on July 22nd. The
country through which the column passed was cleared of everything
living, including Kaffirs.

Three days’ halt was allowed the column at Middleburg, and on
the 25th a start was again made for the north. It was now composed
as under:—

Four guns 81st Field Battery R.A., under Major Simpson.
One pompom.
19th Hussars.
5th and 6th West Australians.
Half company Scottish Horse.
Half company Mounted Infantry.
Seven companies Devonshire Regiment.

Two companies under Captain Bartlett had left on the 24th July
to garrison Elands River station, on the Pretoria-Lorenzo
railway.

The seven companies with General Kitchener marched out 723
strong.

Two other columns were operating with {203} General
Kitchener, one under Colonel Park and the other under Colonel
Campbell. The whole were under the supreme command of General
Walter Kitchener.

On the first day out the 19th Hussars captured a pompom and
about sixty prisoners of Ben Viljoen’s and Muller’s commandos after
a very gallant little action in which five men of the 19th Hussars
especially distinguished themselves. A great number of cattle and
many wagons were also taken, and the Boers lost about twelve killed
and twenty wounded.

General Walter Kitchener’s column encamped at Rooi Kraal for a
few days before moving to a camp at Diep Kloof, from which place
convoys were sent to the railway for stores for the three
columns.

The first of these convoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson left
on August 1st, marched to Middleburg, by Blinkwater and
Elandslaagte, and reached Middleburg in three days; halted one day
there to load up, and returned via Elandslaagte and Noitgedacht to
Diepkloof in three more days, receiving on their return the
congratulations of General Kitchener on their performance.

{204}

On the 10th another convoy, again under Lieutenant-Colonel
Jacson, with an escort composed of men of the Devons and Leicesters
and some Scottish mounted infantry and two field guns, started for
Wonderfontein.

This convoy consisted of all the wagons of the columns of
Colonels Park and Campbell and General Kitchener, which had to be
filled up at the railway line and brought back.

Waterval was reached on the 10th, Rhenoster Hoek on the 11th,
Sterkloop on the 12th, Uitflucht on the 13th, and Wonderfontein on
the 14th. Slight opposition was met with, and three Boers were
captured with wagons containing a quantity of grain.

The convoy having halted and loaded up on the 15th, started on
its return journey on the 16th.

The journey to Wonderfontein had been up the Steelpoort valley,
and the road had been found difficult. It was very much intersected
with water-courses running off the high veldt, and these
necessitated frequent halts to allow of the passage of the wagons
in single file, and the reclosing up of the convoy after
crossing.

{205}

A different road over the high veldt, thus avoiding the
water-courses, was chosen for the return journey, and it was
perhaps fortunate that this new road was selected, as it was
reported afterwards that Ben Viljoen had taken up a position at the
time in the Steelpoort valley to intercept the return column.

On the 16th the convoy marched to Panplaats; on the 17th to
Roedekop (where some of Viljoen’s men were met with and some more
of his grain carts captured), Blinkwater on the 18th, and Diepkloof
on the 19th.

After a few days’ scouring of the country round Diepkloof and
the valley towards the Oliphants River, the three columns
concentrated at Blinkwater. Here an entrenched camp was formed
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson, consisting of the
baggage of the three columns, the hospitals, and most of the field
guns, with a garrison included amongst which were four companies of
the Regiment.

Park’s and Campbell’s columns marched east into the hills in the
Ohrigstadt direction, Park penetrating almost as far as Pilgrim’s
Rest, while General Kitchener’s column moved {206} south
towards Middleburg. On September 3rd the force was broken up,
Colonel Park’s column being left in the neighbourhood of
Blinkwater, whilst General Kitchener’s column marched towards the
railway at Wonderfontein, which was reached on September 5th.

On arrival at Wonderfontein it was found that trekking was for
the time being, finished. Orders were received for the Regiment to
entrain for Machadodorp for the purpose of garrisoning the railway
blockhouses.

The General’s farewell order to the Regiment on its leaving the
column with which it had been so long associated was as
follows:—

“COLUMN ORDER BY MAJOR-GENERAL F.W. KITCHENER
“Wonderfontein, September 5th, 1901.
“It has been the privilege of the Major-General to include the
1st Devon Regiment in his command since the relief of Ladysmith,
and it is with great regret that he has now to part with the last
fighting unit of the 7th Brigade. The reputation earned by the
Regiment at Elandslaagte and Ladysmith is a {207} matter of
history. Since that time this excellent corps has fought and
marched in summer rain and winter frost during many long months,
through the length and breadth of the Eastern Transvaal.
“The face of the country will remain for many years scarred with
the trenches they have dug and the works they have made. They have
proved on all occasions what a sound regimental system worked by
thoroughly sound officers, N.C.O.s, and men can do.
“The Major-General and all in number one column wish the Devons
good luck and a pleasant time in the near future.”

On September 6th the Regiment entrained. The General and his
staff and the whole column turned out to give the Regiment a hearty
farewell. Machadodorp was reached at about 2 p.m., and all the
posts round the town were taken over from the Royal Irish
Fusiliers. The railway blockhouses in the neighbourhood of
Machadodorp were also taken over. Colonel Davies was appointed
commandant of the station, and Captain Ravenshaw station staff
officer.

{208}

During September and October six companies were located on the
Lydenburg road as far as Witklip, holding the following
posts:—Helvetia, Schwartzkop, Schoeman’s Kloof, Badfontein,
and Witklip. Two companies remained at Machadodorp with the
battalion head-quarters.

In October, one company under Captain Holland and Lieutenant
Willis, whilst acting as escort to a party erecting blockhouses in
the Badfontein valley, was attacked by Ben Viljoen and about three
hundred Boers. The Boers galloped down from the hills on to the
extended company. The men behaved with great gallantry, and
finally, after a sharp and mixed-up fight, drove off the Boers. One
man of the company fell into their hands and was stripped and left.
Lieutenant Willis, for gallantry on this occasion, was rewarded
with the D.S.O., and Lance-Corporal Cummings was promoted corporal
by the Commander-in-Chief for gallantry in the field.

During the first week of November, orders were received for the
1st Battalion to proceed to Standerton en route to India.
The 2nd Battalion had been quartered there for a considerable
{209} time, and a transfer of men was effected
from one battalion to the other. The two battalions spent Christmas
together.

Devons En Route to Durban

On January 1st (1902) the 1st Battalion entrained at daylight
for Durban.

The battalion met with a great reception at Maritzburg, where a
halt was made for nine hours. Here each man was presented by the
ladies of that place with a pipe, half a pound of tobacco, and a
pockethandkerchief.

The battalion sailed from South Africa for India, with the
following officers and 922 rank and file:—

Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel T.A.H. Davies, D.S.O.
Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel M.G. Jacson.
Captain E.C. Wren.
T.C.B. Holland.
G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harries.
G.I. Watts.
D.H. Blunt.
H.R. Gunning.
S.T. Hailey.
H.W.F. Twiss.
{210} E.S.C. Willis.
W.E. Scafe.
G.F.A. Kane.
2nd Lieutenant C. Edward-Collins.
M.D. Young.
C.W. Hext.
A.M. Mills.
R.C. Wrey.
Brevet-Major and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.

Of the above, it may be noted that the following left India with
the battalion in 1899:—

Bt. Lieut.-Colonel M.G. Jacson.
Captain E.C. Wren.
G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harries.
G.I. Watts.
D.H. Blunt.
H.R. Gunning.
S.T. Hayley.
H.W.F. Twiss.
Bt-Major and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.

{211}

The following officers of the battalion remained behind in South
Africa:—

Colonel C.W. Park, A.D.C., commanding a column.
Captain and Bt.-Major E.M. Morris, South African
Constabulary.
Captain Bartlett, D.A.A.G. for Intelligence.
Vyvyan, Provost Marshal, Barberton.
Travers, South African Constabulary.

Lieutenant-General Lyttleton met the battalion at Howick on its
way to Durban, and wished them “farewell.”

The following telegram was received at Durban from Lord
Kitchener, commanding the forces in South Africa:—

“To O.C. 1st Devon Regiment,
Durban.
“From Lord Kitchener,
Johannesburg.

“Please express to officers and men of the Regiment under your
command my high appreciation of their services in South Africa
{212} during the war, which has already
enhanced the great reputation of the Regiment. In bidding you
good-bye, I associate myself with all your comrades remaining in
the country in hearty wishes for your future good luck.”

It should be added to the records of the battalion, which
throughout two years and three months had fought and marched
incessantly in South Africa, that it had never once experienced the
slightest trace of an “unfortunate incident,” and had during that
time lost only three prisoners of war, two of whom lost their way
in the dark at Geluk and marched into enemy’s lines, the third
having been taken during the company fight in the Badfontein valley
against 300 of Ben Viljoen’s men. The miles traversed by the
battalion in the long continuous treks during the war are
summarized as under. The miles are measured off the map simply from
place to place and from camp to camp, and they do not include the
distances marched in fighting, flanking, or other movements, or in
convoy work and expeditions in the Lydenburg district, which, if
included, would probably double the distance marched.

{213}

Trek under Sir Redvers Buller.

August 7th till October 2nd, 1900.

Zandspruit to Lydenburg, 271 miles in 54 days, including all
halts.

Trek under General Walter Kitchener.

April 13th till September 2nd, 1901.

Lydenburg, Secoconi’s country, Middleburg, Swazi Border, Bethel,
Springs, Middleburg, Bothas Berg, and country north of the railway
line. 1006 miles in 141 days, including all halts.

On the evening of January 1st the Regiment embarked on the s.s.
Armenian, and was followed by the 2nd battalion Gordon
Highlanders, who embarked on January 2nd.

On January 3rd the ship conveying the two regiments sailed for
Bombay, which port was reached on January 18th.

Lord Northcote, the Governor of Bombay, received the two
regiments on disembarkation and addressed them, congratulating them
on their good work in South Africa.

The Devons entrained the same evening for Shahjehanpur in the
United Provinces.

{214}

The honours gained by the officers and men of the battalion were
as follows:—

1. Colonel Yule to be C.B.
2. Lieutenant-Colonel Park to be Brevet-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp to
the King.
3. Major Davies, D.S.O., to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel.
4. Major Curry granted D.S.O.
5. Captain Jacson to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel on promotion to
the rank of Major.
6. Captain Norton Goodwyn, D.S.O., to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel
on promotion to the rank of Major.
7. Captain Travers granted D.S.O.
8. Captain and Adjutant Ravenshaw to be Brevet-Major.
9. Captain Masterson to be Brevet-Major and awarded the Victoria
Cross.
10. Captain E.M. Morris to be Brevet-Major.
11. Lieutenant Emerson granted D.S.O.
12. Willis granted D.S.O.

{215}

Attached Officers.

13. Lieutenant Tringham, the Queen’s, granted D.S.O.
14. Lieutenant Cowie, Dorset Regiment, granted D.S.O.

The following officers of the 1st Battalion were mentioned in
dispatches:—

Colonel Yule—once.
Brevet-Colonel Park, A.D.C.—twice.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, D.S.O.—twice.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Jacson—twice.
Goodwyn—twice.
Major Curry, D.S.O.—twice.
Brevet-Major Ravenshaw—four times.
Masterson, V.C.—twice.
Captain W.B. Lafone—twice.
Bartlett—once.
Travers, D.S.O.—once.
Wren—once.
Smyth-Osbourne—twice.
Luxmore—once.
Lieutenant Field—twice.
Emerson, D.S.O.—three times.
{216} Willis, D.S.O.—once.
Tringham, D.S.O. (attached)—once.
Cowie, D.S.O. (attached)—twice.
Twiss—once.
Harris—once.
Green—once.
Watts—once.
Gardiner—once.

Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

The following were granted Distinguished Conduct
Medals:—

Colour-Sergeant Payne.
Horswell.
Palmer.
Burnell.
Webb.
Aplin.
Sergeant Pitt.
Downing.
Hudson.
Williams.
Lance-Sergeant Poulter.
Young.
Rowe.
{217} Corporal Hansford.
Private Boulton.
Davies.

The following non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned
in dispatches:—

Colour-Sergeant Palmer—four times.
Payne—twice.
Horswell—once.
Burnell—once.
Webb—once.
Burchell—once.
Sergeant Hudson—once.
Downing—once.
Young—twice.
Poulter—once.
Curtis—once.
Lance-Sergeant Rowe—twice.
Corporal Hayes—once (promoted sergeant).
Lance-Corporal Cummings—once (promoted corporal).
Private Brimicombe—twice.
Norman—three times.
Cox—twice.
Smith—once.
{218} Youlden—once.
Clay—once.
Edwards—once.
Hayman—once.
Davies—once.
Hansford—twice.
Boulton—once.

Monument Erected in Ladysmith Cemetery

The following is a list of the killed and wounded and of those
who died of disease during the campaign:—

Officers: Killed.

Captain W.B. Lafone.
Lieutenant Field.
Dalzel.
Price-Dent.
2nd Lieutenant Cumin.
Carey.
Lieutenant Walker, Somerset Light Infantry (attached).

Wounded.

Captain Lafone—twice.
Masterson.
Luxmore.
2nd Lieutenant Twiss.
{219} Scafe.
Kane.
Lieutenant Caffin (attached).
Tringham (attached).
Byrne (attached).
2nd Lieutenant Gunning.
Hayley.
Green.

N.C.O.’s and Men.

Killed and died of wounds and diseases.

Private Taylor, died of disease Ladysmith.
Forman, killed Ladysmith.
Salter
Nolloth, died of disease Ladysmith.
Richards
Edwards
Paddon, died of disease Transvaal.
Hayward
Morgan, died of wounds
Manley, died of disease
Goff, killed Transvaal.
Brockett, killed Ladysmith.
Cook, died of disease Ladysmith.
Banfield, died of wounds Ladysmith.
Sullivan, died of disease “
{220} Woolacott, died of disease
Transvaal.
Penfold
Silvester, died of disease Ladysmith.
Marsh
Nunn
Lance-Corporal Leonard, died of disease Ladysmith.
Private Evans, died of disease Ladysmith.
Parrott, killed Transvaal.
Arthur, died of disease Transvaal.
Luck
Mathews
Clements, died of disease Ladysmith.
Seager, died of wounds Ladysmith
Connabeer, died of disease Ladysmith
Swannell
Lance-Corporal Spear, died of disease.
Private Litton, killed Ladysmith.
Vinnicombe, died of disease.
Down
Rowland
Lance-Corporal Pratt, killed Ladysmith.
Private Bibb, killed Ladysmith.
Harvey
Woods, died of wounds received Ladysmith.
{221} Hornsby, died of wounds received
Ladysmith.
Private Milton, died of disease Ladysmith.
Firminger
Vicary
Newbury
Lane
Sheridan
Horswell
Lance-Corporal Vern, killed Ladysmith.
Private Bamsey, killed Ladysmith.
Fair
Roper
Davidson
Curtis
Marden
Brown
Newcombe
Lance-Corporal Pigeon, died of wounds received Ladysmith.
Private Bevan, died of wounds received Ladysmith.
Private Page, died of wounds received Ladysmith.
Private Vern, died of disease.
{222} Rosser died of disease.
Clotworthy
Turner
Ponting
Rawbone
Jeffries, died of wounds.
Young, died of disease.
Davidson
Cunningham
Lance-Corporal Murfin, died of disease.
Private Livermore
Corporal Wright
Private Humphrey, killed.
Bowles, died of disease.
Watts
Meade
Phillips
Kingham
Winsor, killed Reitfontein.
Mayne, died of disease.
Tayler
Pike
Trenchard
Salter, killed Geluk.
Cole
Mcgrath
{223} Smith
Lashbrook, died of wounds.
Rowe, died of disease.
Holmes
Conian

N.C.O.’s and Men Wounded.

Private Bidwell.
Turner.
Pirouet.
Spiller.
Laycock.
Wright.
Col.-Sergeant Webb.
Corporal Shapland.
Bradford.
Lance-Corporal Millward.
Lance-Corporal Bennet.
Lance-Corporal Whitman.
Private Cox.
Norman.
Palmer.
Webber.
Lemon.
Private Lock.
Hutchings.
Bevan.
Orchard.
Spreadbury.
Barnett.
Cox.
Hay.
Page.
King.
Saunders.
Wheaton.
Stapley.
Brazil.
West.
Onyett.
Winson.
Dudley.
Lott.
Hornsby.
{224} Fordham.
Turner.
Varndell.
Mower.
Taylor.
Colour-Sergeant Burchell.
Sergeant Williams.
Hawkins.
Corporal Lovell.
Saunders.
Private Lupton.
Harford.
Parrott.
Mahoney.
Allen.
Curtiss.
O’Brien.
Brown.
Gray.
Anstey.
Lucas.
Sergeant Leach.
Private Capp.
Gander.
Private Gregory.
Reynolds.
Devitte.
Osmonde.
Burge.
Newton.
Reed.
Lance-Corporal Bromford—twice.
Private Rowe.
Sussex.
Ward.
Smith.
Easton.
Legatt.
Col.-Sergeant Palmer.
Private Bray.
Lance-Corporal Spear.
Private Kean.
Welch.
Peckham.
Lance-Corpl. Quick.
Private Burns.
Simmons.
Palmer.

Total number of killed and wounded and died of
disease:—

{225}

A large memorial is erected to the memory of those who fell on
January 6th at Wagon Hill, Ladysmith, on the spot where the charge
took place. It bears the following inscription:

To the glory of God,

and in memory of

the following Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers,

and Men of the

1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment,

who fell in the gallant and

successful charge made across this

place by three companies during the

fight on 6th January, 1900.

Siege of Ladysmith.

Captain W.B. Lafone.
Lieutenant H.N. Field.
Lance-Corpl. J. Pigeon.
W.D. Pratt.
A. Vern.
Private T. Bamsey.
A. Bevan.
J. Bibb.
W. Brown.
A. Curtis.
W. Davidson.
Private W. Fair.
W. Harvey.
E. Hornsby.
T. Litton.
H. Marden.
W. Newcombe.
F.W.J. Page.
G. Roper.
J. Seager.
W. Woods.

Lieutenant E.E.M. Walker, Somerset Light Infantry (attached).

“Semper Fidelis.”

{226}

A marble monument is erected in Ladysmith cemetery to those who
were killed or died of disease during the siege of Ladysmith, and
their names are recorded on it. A small iron cross was also placed
at the head of the grave of every man of the Regiment who was
killed or who died of disease during the war.

These memorials were erected by the officers, non-commissioned
officers, and men of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, to the
memory of their gallant comrades.

WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD.

PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH

THE RECORD OF A REGIMENT OF THE LINE

BEING

A REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THE 1ST BATTALION DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT DURING THE BOER WAR 1899-1902

BY COLONEL M. JACSON

London: HUTCHINSON & CO.

Paternoster Row 1908

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PREFACE

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL W. KITCHENER

PREFACE

BY THE AUTHOR

CHAPTER I

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

1899

CHAPTER II

SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

1899-1900

CHAPTER III

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH, AND THE ADVANCE NORTH UNDER SIR REDVERS BULLER

1900

CHAPTER IV

LYDENBURG

1900-1901

CHAPTER V

TREKKING IN THE NORTH-EAST TRANSVAAL

A REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THE 1ST BATTALION DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT
DURING THE BOER WAR 1899-1902

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH, AND THE ADVANCE NORTH
UNDER SIR REDVERS BULLER