THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

by Theodore A. Dodge

To the members of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of
whose researches into the history of our Civil War the following pages
form but a modest part, this volume is, with Sincere Regard, Dedicated by
the author.

CONTENTS

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

I.   INTRODUCTION

II.   CONDITION OF
THE COMBATANTS

III.   HOOKER
AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

IV.
  THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

V.   DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK

VI.   THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID

VII.   THE FEINT BY
THE LEFT WING

VIII.   THE
REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING

IX.
  LEE’S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS

X.   HOOKER’S ADVANCE FRIDAY

XI.   THE POSITION AT
CHANCELLORSVILLE

XII.   JACKSON’S
MARCH, AND SICKLES’S ADVANCE

XIII.
  HOOKER’S THEORIES AND CHANCES

XIV.   POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH
CORPS

XV.   THE
SITUATION AT SIX O’CLOCK

XVI.   JACKSON’S
ATTACK

XVII.   THE
CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS

XVIII.   HOOKER’S PARRY

XIX.   THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK

XX.   STONEWALL JACKSON

XXI.   THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW

XXII.   THE FIGHT AT
FAIRVIEW

XXIII.   THE
LEFT CENTRE

XXIV.   THE
NEW LINES

XXV.   SUNDAY’S
MISCARRIAGE

XXVI.   SEDGWICK’S
CHANGE OF ORDERS

XXVII.   SEDGWICK’S
ASSAULT

XXVIII.   SEDGWICK
MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER

XXIX.   SALEM
CHURCH

XXX.   SEDGWICK
IN DIFFICULTY

XXXI.   SEDGWICK
WITHDRAWS

XXXII.   HOOKER’S
CRITICISMS

XXXIII.      HOOKER’S
FURTHER PLANS

XXXIV.   THE
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES

XXXV.   OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS

XXXVI.   HOOKER’S RESUME OF THE
CAMPAIGN

XXXVII.   SOME
RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE

APPENDIX.

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

I. INTRODUCTION.

It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861-65,
that enough has already been written upon the campaign of
Chancellorsville. And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the
histories now before the public, which give a coup-d’oeil more or less
accurate of this ten-days’ passage of arms. But none of these spread
before the reader facts sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular
theory advanced by each to account for the defeat of the Army of the
Potomac on this field.

The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and of Howard,
its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a small degree
owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon Sedgwick for his failure
to execute a practically impossible order; the truly remarkable blunders
into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to lapse, in endeavoring to explain
away his responsibility for the disaster; the bare fact, indeed, that the
Army of the Potomac was here beaten by Lee, with one-half its force; and
the very partial publication, thus far, of the details of the campaign,
and the causes of our defeat,—may stand as excuse for one more
attempt to make plain its operations to the survivors of the one hundred
and eighty thousand men who there bore arms, and to the few who harbor
some interest in the subject as mere history.

To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share in
this defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the memory of
a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done his country
signal service; and to avoid the imputation of baldly throwing down the
gauntlet of ungracious criticism. All reference to Gen. Hooker’s skill or
conduct in this, one of the best conceived and most fatally mismanaged of
the many unsuccessful advances of the Army of the Potomac, is made with
sincere appreciation of his many admirable qualities, frankly, and
untinged by bitterness. But it must be remembered, that Gen. Hooker has
left himself on record as the author of many harsh reflections upon his
subordinates; and that to mete out even justice to all requires
unvarnished truth.

The most uncalled-for slur upon the conduct of his lieutenants probably
occurs in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.
Before withdrawing from the south side of the Rappahannock, after the
decisive events of the battle-field had cooped up the army between the
river and its intrenchments, Hooker called together all his corps
commanders, and requested their several opinions as to the advisability of
attack or retreat. Whatever discussion may have then been had, it was
generally understood, in after-days, that all but one of these generals
had expressed himself freely for an immediate advance. In referring to
this understanding, while denying its correctness, Hooker used the
following language:—

“So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers more
valiant after the fight than while it is pending; and, when a truthful
history of the Rebellion shall be written, it will be found that the Army
of the Potomac is not an exception.”

Merely to characterize as ungenerous this aspersion upon the courage of
such men as then served under Hooker, savors of error on the side of
leniency. And, inasmuch as these words strike, as it were, the keynote of
all the statements which Hooker has vouchsafed with reference to these
events, they might be assumed fairly to open the door to unsparing
criticism. But it is hoped that this course has been avoided; and that
what censure is dealt out to Gen. Hooker in the succeeding pages will be
accepted, even by his advocates, in the kindly spirit in which it is
meant, and in which every soldier of the beloved old Army of the Potomac
must uniformly refer to every other.

There is, moreover, no work on Chancellorsville which results from
research into all records now accessible.

The work of Allan and Hotchkiss, of 1867, than which nothing can be more
even-handed, or more admirable as far as it goes, adopts generally the
statements made in the reports of the Confederate generals: and these are
necessarily one-sided; reports of general officers concerning their own
operations invariably are. Allan and Hotchkiss wrote with only the
Richmond records before them, in addition to such information from the
Federal standpoint as may be found in general orders, the evidence given
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and newspaper
correspondence. At that time many of the Federal reports were not to be
had: such as were at the War Department were hardly accessible. Reports
had been duly made by all superior officers engaged in and surviving this
campaign, excepting only the general in command; but, strange to say, not
only did Gen. Hooker refrain from making a report, but he retained in his
personal possession many of the records of the Army of the Potomac
covering the period of his command, and it is only since his death that
these records have been in part recovered by the Secretary of War. Some
are still missing, but they probably contain no important matter not fully
given elsewhere.

Although Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
“Without an exception I forwarded to that office”—the War Department—”all
the reports and returns and information concerning the army, and furnished
them promptly, and, as I think, as no other army commander has done,” his
memory had at the moment played him traitor, for a considerable part of
these records were not disposed of as stated. It should be remarked,
however, that Hooker is not singular in this leaning towards the meum in
the matter of records.

The sources relied on for the facts herein given are the reports of the
officers engaged, both Federal and Confederate, added to many private
notes, memoranda, and maps, made by them; the testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, which included Hooker’s examination;
and the maps made by the Engineer Department of the United-States Army,
and those of Capt. Hotchkiss.

This latter officer was the topographical engineer of the Second Corps of
the Army of Northern Virginia, and made his surveys by order of Gen. Lee
immediately after the campaign. They are of the greatest assistance and
value.

Eighteen years have elapsed since North and South crossed swords upon this
memorable field; and it would seem that all Americans can now contemplate
with unruffled heart the errors under which “the Army of the Potomac was
here beaten without ever being fought,” as well as boast with equal pride,
not only of the abundant courage displayed by either side, but of the calm
skill with which Gen. Lee wrested victory from a situation desperately
compromised, and of the genius of that greatest of his lieutenants, Thomas
J. Jackson, who here sealed with his blood his fidelity to the cause he
loved so well.

It has been said that this campaign furnishes as much material for the
psychological as for the military student. And certainly nothing less than
a careful analysis of Hooker’s character can explain the abnormal
condition into which his mental and physical energy sank during the second
act of this drama. He began with really masterly moves, speedily placing
his wary adversary at the saddest disadvantage. But, having attained this
height, his power seemed to pass away as from an over-tasked mind. With
twice the weight of arm, and as keen a blade, he appeared quite unable to
parry a single lunge of Lee’s, quite unable to thrust himself. He allowed
his corps commanders to be beaten in detail, with no apparent effort to
aid them from his abundant resources, the while his opponent was demanding
from every man in his command the last ounce of his strength. And he
finally retired, dazed and weary, across the river he had so ably and
boastingly placed behind him ten days before, against the opinion of
nearly all his subordinates; for in this case the conditions were so plain
that even an informal council of war advised a fight.

With character-study, however, this sketch has nothing to do. It is
confined to describing events, and suggesting queries for the curious in
military history.

II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS.

The first two years of civil strife had closed. The American people, which
so far had shown more aptness at learning than skill in waging war, may be
said to have passed through its apprenticeship in arms. The broad plan of
operations, intelligently but rudely conceived at the outset by the
greater spirits among our commanders, began to be more clearly grasped.
The political strategy of both contestants made Virginia the field on
which the left wing of the Federal armies pivoted, while the right swung
farther and farther south and east, and the Confederates gallantly
struggled for every foot of territory, yielding only to the inexorable.
This right wing had already possession of the Mississippi as far south as
Vicksburg, around which place Grant was preparing to tighten his coils; it
had occupied the line of the Tennessee River, and had rendered useless to
the Confederates the railroad from Memphis to Chattanooga, which had been
the great central artery between Richmond and the trans-Mississippi
States. The Southern partisans, with Morgan and Forrest as typical chiefs,
had up to this period played, in the West especially, a very important
part. They as much exceeded our cavalry in enterprise as they had
advantage over it in knowledge of the country and in assistance from its
population. They had on more than one occasion tapped the too long and
slender lines of operation of our foremost armies. They had sent Grant to
the right-about from his first march on Vicksburg, thus neutralizing
Sherman’s attempt at Chickasaw Bayou. They had compelled Buell to forfeit
his hardly-earned footing, and to fall back from the Tennessee River to
Louisville at the double-quick in order to beat Bragg in the race towards
the gate of the Northern States, which disaster was happily soon retrieved
by the latter’s bloody check before Murfreesborough. Yet, despite these
back-sets, the general course of events showed that Providence remained on
the side of the heaviest battalions; and the spring of 1863 saw our armies
extended from the pivot midway between the rival capitals in a more or
less irregular line, and interrupted by the Alleghany Mountains, to
Vicksburg and the Father of Waters.

Great as was the importance of success in Virginia, the Confederates had
appreciated the fact as had not the political soldiers at the head of the
Federal department of war. Our resources always enabled us to keep more
men, and more and better material, on this battle-ground, than the
Confederates could do; but this strength was constantly offset by the
ability of the Southern generals, and their independence of action, as
opposed to the frequent unskilfulness of ours, who were not only never
long in command, but were then tied hand and foot to some ideal plan for
insuring the safety of Washington. The political conditions under which
the Army of the Potomac had so far constantly acted had never allowed it
to do justice to its numbers, mobility, or courage; while Mr. Lincoln, who
actually assumed the powers of commander-in-chief, technically intrusted
to him by the Constitution, was swayed to and fro by his own fears for the
safety of his capital, and by political schemes and military obtuseness at
his elbow.

Whether the tedious delays and deferred success, occasioned by these
circumstances, were not eventually a benefit, in that they enabled the
country to bring forth in the fulness of time the conditions leading to
the extinguishment of slavery, which an earlier close of the war might not
have seen; not to mention the better appreciation by either combatant of
the value of the other, which a struggle to the bitter end alone could
generate,—is a question for the political student. But it will
always remain in doubt whether the practical exhaustion of the resources
of the South was not a condition precedent to ending the war,—whether,
in sooth, the “last ditch” was not actually reached when Lee surrendered
at Appomattox.

In the West, merit had by this time brought to the surface the generals
who later led us to successful victories. Their distance from the central
controlling power resulted in their being let alone to work out their own
salvation. Opposed to them had been some excellent but not the best of the
Confederate leaders; while Virginia boasted the elite of the Southern
troops, the strongest of the captains, and the most daring of the
lieutenants, developed by the war.

Since the Russian campaign of Bonaparte, no such vast forces had been
under arms. To command these required not only the divine military spark,
but hardly-acquired experience. And the mimic war which the elements of
European army life always affords had been wanting to educate our
generals. It is not wonderful, then, that two years of fruitless
campaigning was needed to teach our leaders how to utilize on such
difficult terrain material equally vast in extent and uncouth in quality.
For, however apt the American to learn the trade of war,—or any
other,—it is a moot-point whether his independence of character is
compatible with the perfect soldier, as typified in Friedrich’s regiments,
or the Old Guard.

But ability, native or acquired, forced its way to the front; and the
requisite experience was gradually gained, for the school was one where
the trade was quickly taught. Said Gen. Meade on one occasion, “The art of
war must be acquired like any other. Either an officer must learn it at
the academy, or he must learn it by experience in the field. Provided he
has learned it, I don’t care whether he is a West-Pointer, or not.”

In the East, then, the army had been led by McDowell, McClellan, Pope, and
Burnside, to victory and defeat equally fruitless. The one experiment so
far tried, of giving the Army of the Potomac a leader from the West,
culminating in the disaster of the second Bull Run, was not apt to be
repeated within the year. That soldier of equal merit and modesty, whom
the Army of the Potomac had been gradually educating as its future and
permanent leader, was still unpretentiously commanding a corps, and
learning by the successes and failures of his superiors. And who shall say
that the results accomplished by Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, and
Meade, were not largely due to their good fortune in not being too early
thrust to the front? “For,” as says Swinton, “it was inevitable that the
first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation’s ignorance of war.”

In the South, the signs of exhaustion had not yet become grave. The
conscription act, passed in April, 1862, had kept the ranks full. The hope
of foreign intervention, though distant, was by no means wholly abandoned.
Financial matters had not yet assumed an entirely desperate complexion.
Nor had the belief in the royalty of cotton received its coup de grace.
The vigor and courage of the Confederacy were unabated, and the unity of
parties in the one object of resistance to invasion doubled its effective
strength. Perhaps this moment was the flood-tide of Southern enthusiasm
and confidence; which, after the Pennsylvania campaign, began to ebb. It
is not intended to convey the idea that the South was prosperous. On the
contrary, those who read the signs aright, saw and predicted its
approaching decline. But, as far as its power of resistance went, it was
at its highest when compared with the momentarily lessened aggressiveness
of the North. For the anti-war party was doing its best to tie the hands
of the administration; and, while this in no wise lessened the flow of men
and material to the front, it produced a grave effect upon the moral
strength which our chiefs were able to infuse into their method of
conducting the war.

III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

The unfortunate course of events during the early winter of 1862-63 had
resulted in a grievous loss of morale in the Army of the Potomac. The
useless slaughter of Marye’s Heights was, after a few weeks, succeeded by
that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; and Gen. Burnside
retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be
it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard, of all. Sumner, whom
the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was
relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became
senior general officer, and succeeded to the command.

No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. He
had forced himself upon its notice. From Bull Run, after which action he
is said to have remarked to Mr. Lincoln that he knew more than any one on
that field; through Williamsburg, where he so gallantly held his own
against odds during the entire day, and with exhausted ammunition, until
relieved by Kearney; before Richmond; during the Seven Days; in the
railroad-cutting at Manassas; at Antietam, where he forced the fighting
with so much determination, if not wisdom, on the Union right; up to
Fredericksburg, where, after a personal protest to his commanding officer,
he went in and fought his troops “until he thought he had lost as many men
as he was ordered to lose,”—Hooker’s character as man and soldier
had been marked. His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank,
manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion
about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted
attention; and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own
commander. He was a representative man.

It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washington
pseudo-strategists who were his military advisers, could not distinguish,
in selecting a chief who should be capable of leading the Army of the
Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, who achieves
brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader, upon whose
sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only the instruction for
health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, of each of his
subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correct decision and
immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopic changes of a
campaign or a battle-field. It required more knowledge of the requisites
of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, than Mr. Lincoln had
had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of the army, to insure a
happy choice.

And, doubtless, Hooker’s self-assertiveness, success as a brigade,
division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability,
shared equally in procuring his appointment. No one will deny Hooker’s
capacity in certain directions, or up to a given test. His whole career
shows an exceptional power in “riding to orders.” But he sadly lacked that
rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary to lead a
hundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as Lee.

Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker’s character than the
odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln’s somewhat equivocal letter to him at the
time of his appointment, here following:—

General,—I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac.
Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient
reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some
things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you
to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe
you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You
have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable,
quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good
rather than harm; but I think that during Gen. Burnside’s command of the
army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as
you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most
meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such way as to
believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government
needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it,
that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success
can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I
will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost
of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do
for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse
into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence
from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to
put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get
any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware
of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance
go forward, and give us victories.

Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest
words, took leave of the army.

The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence,
which, since McClellan’s re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was
to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this
weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once
began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the power of organization,—were
accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded
speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience.

The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled
with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with
an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac to
accomplish any thing, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the rate of
two hundred a day, facilitated by relatives, who sent from home civilian
clothing to soldiers at the front. Hooker states that he found 2,922
officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls of the
army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures
were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of
the ranks. Furloughs in reasonable quantity were allowed to deserving men
and a limited number of officers. Work was found for the rank and file in
drill and outpost duty sufficient to prevent idle habits. The commissariat
was closely watched, and fresh rations more frequently issued, which much
improved the health of the army. The system of picket-duty was more
thoroughly developed, and so vigilantly carried out as to impress its
importance upon, as well as teach its details to, the troops.

The cavalry, hitherto distributed by regiments throughout the army, was
now consolidated into one corps, and from this time became a valuable
element in the service, for it daily grew in efficiency. And such
opportunities of doing field-work as a body were afforded it as
circumstances allowed.

The grand divisions of Burnside were abolished, and the army divided into
seven infantry corps.

The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs
in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he
improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in
command prior to Chancellorsville. Himself says before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War: “During the season of preparation the army made
rapid strides in discipline, instruction and morale, and early in April
was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations.” And Swinton well
sums up: “Under Hooker’s influence the tone of the army underwent a change
which would appear astonishing had not its elastic vitality been so often
proved.”

On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard,
consisted of about a hundred and thirty thousand men under the colors,—”for
duty equipped,” according to the morning report,—distributed among
the several army corps as follows:—

IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth, awaiting orders to move,
Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks’s Ford
above, to Port Royal (or Skenker’s Neck) below Fredericksburg, a line some
fifteen miles in length as the crow flies. The crests of the hills on
which lay the Army of Northern Virginia were from three-quarters of a mile
to a mile and a half back from, and substantially parallel to, the river.
Rifle-pits commanded every available crossing, which, being few and
difficult, were easily guarded. Continuous lines of infantry parapets,
broken by battery epaulements located for sweeping the wide approaches
from the river, extended the whole distance; while abattis strengthened
every place which the nature of the ground allowed an attacking column to
pass.

The roads by which the various detachments of the army could
intercommunicate for concentration upon any given point were numerous and
well kept up, and were familiar to all commanding and staff officers.

Lee’s forces numbered about sixty thousand men, for duty, distributed in
the following organizations. As the brigades nearly equalled our divisions
in size, they are given by name.

Hotchkiss and Allan state that there may have been three to five thousand
more men in line at the time of Hooker’s attack.

As will be noticed from the table, only part of Longstreet’s corps was
present. The main body had been sent, about Feb. 1, under command of its
chief, to operate in the region between Petersburg and Suffolk, where our
forces under Peck were making a demonstration. This detail reduced Lee’s
army by nearly one-quarter.

During the winter, Lee’s forces had been distributed as follows:—

The old battle-ground of Dec. 13 was occupied by the First Corps; while
Jackson with his Second Corps held Hamilton’s Crossing, and extended his
lines down to Port Royal. Stuart’s cavalry division prolonged the left to
Beverly Ford on the upper Rappahannock, and scoured the country as far as
the Pamunkey region. Hampton’s brigade of cavalry had been sent to the
rear to recruit, and Fitz Lee’s had taken its place at Culpeper, from
which point it extended so as to touch Lee’s left flank at Banks’s Ford.
The brigade of W. H. F. Lee was on the Confederate right. Stuart retained
command of the entire force, but had his headquarters at Culpeper.

The supplies of the army were received by the Fredericksburg and Richmond
Railroad from the capital, and from the depots on the Virginia Central.
Lee had been assiduous in re-organizing his forces, in collecting an
abundance of supplies, in checking desertions, and in procuring
re-enforcements. And the vigor with which the conscription was pushed
swelled his strength so materially that in three months Jackson’s corps
alone shows an increase from a force of twenty-five thousand up to
thirty-three thousand men “for duty.” The staff of the army was created a
separate organization. The cavalry had already been successfully
consolidated. And now the artillery was embodied in a special organization
under Gen. Pendleton, and an engineer regiment put on foot.

The morale of the Army of Northern Virginia could not be finer. The forced
retreat of McClellan from before Richmond; the driving of Pope from his
vaunted positions in its front; the Maryland campaign with its deliberate
withdrawal from an army of twice its strength; finally the bloody check to
Burnside,—had furnished a succession of triumphs which would lend
any troops self-confidence and high courage. But, in addition to all this,
the average of the men of this army were older and more hardened soldiers
than those of the Army of the Potomac. The early conscription acts of the
Confederacy had made it difficult for men once inured to the steady
bearing and rough life of the soldier, and to the hard fare of camp-life,
to withdraw from the ranks.

In Hooker’s testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War
occurs this tribute to the Confederate infantry: “Our artillery had always
been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in
discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did
equal Lee’s army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own,
intellectually and physically, that army has, by discipline alone,
acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed, in my
judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it,
nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel
armies.”

The cavalry force was small, but energetic and enterprising to a degree as
yet by no means equalled by our own. The artillery was neither as good,
nor as well equipped or served, as ours, but was commanded with
intelligence, and able to give a good account of itself.

V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK.

An attack of Lee’s position in front, even had Burnside’s experience not
demonstrated its folly, seemed to promise great loss of life without
corresponding success.

To turn his right flank required the moving of pontoon trains and
artillery over the worst of roads for at least twenty miles, through a
country cut up by a multitude of streams running across the route to be
taken, and emptying into either the Potomac or Rappahannock; all requiring
more or less bridging.

Lee’s spy system was excellent. It has been claimed in Southern reports,
that his staff had deciphered our signal code by watching a station at
Stafford. And Butterfield admits this in one of his despatches of May 3.
He would speedily ascertain any such movement, and could create formidable
intrenchments on one side the river, as fast as we could build or repair
roads on which to move down, upon the other. Moreover, there was a
thousand feet of stream to bridge at the first available place below
Skenker’s Neck.

There remained nothing to do but to turn Lee’s left flank; and this could
only be accomplished by stratagem, for Lee had strengthened every part of
the river by which Hooker could attempt a passage.

But this problem was, despite its difficulties, still possible of
solution; and Hooker set himself to work to elucidate it.

So soon as he had matured his plan, which he elaborated with the greatest
care, but kept perfectly secret from every one until the movements
themselves developed it, although making use of the knowledge and skill of
all his generals both before and during its initiation, he speedily
prepared for its vigorous execution. In May, the term of service of some
twenty-two thousand nine-months and two-years men would expire. These men
he must seek to utilize in the campaign.

The first intimation of a forward movement received by the army at large,
apart from the Cavalry Corps, had been a circular of April 13, notifying
commanding officers to have their troops supplied with eight days’
rations, and a hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, sixty to be carried
by the soldiers, and the balance on the pack-mules.

After the battle of Fredericksburg, the army had returned to substantially
the same positions and quarters occupied before; and here the men had
housed themselves for the winter. The Mud March had broken up these
cantonments; but after a few days’ absence the several regiments returned
to their old camps, and the same huts had generally been re-occupied by
the same men. But when Fighting Joe Hooker’s orders to march were issued,
no one dreamed of any thing but victory; and the Army of the Potomac
burned its ships. Nothing was left standing but the mud walls from which
the shelter-tent roofs had been stripped, and an occasional chimney. Many
of the men (though contrary to orders) set fire to what was left, and the
animus non revertendi was as universal as the full confidence that now
there lay before the Army of the Potomac a certain road, whatever might
bar the path, to the long-wished-for goal of Richmond.

VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID.

Hooker proposed to open his flank attack by cutting Lee’s communications.
Accordingly, on April 12, Gen. Stoneman, commanding the Cavalry Corps,
received orders to march at seven A.M. next day, with his whole force
except one brigade. He was to ascend the Rappahannock, keeping well out of
view, and masking his movement with numerous small detachments,—alleging
a chase of Jones’s guerillas in the Shenandoah valley, as his objective.
The river was to be crossed west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. At
Culpeper he was to destroy or disperse Fitz Lee’s brigade of some two
thousand cavalry, and at Gordonsville the infantry provost-guard; thence
to push down the Virginia Central to the Fredericksburg and Richmond
Railroad, destroying every thing along the road. As the enemy would
probably retreat by the latter route, he was to select strong points on
the roads parallel to it, intrench, and hold his ground as obstinately as
possible. If Lee retreated towards Gordonsville, he was to harass him day
and night. The Confederates had but five thousand sabres to oppose him.
“Let your watchword be, Fight! and let all your orders be, Fight, Fight,
FIGHT!” exclaimed enthusiastic Joe Hooker in this order. The primary
object was to keep the Confederates from retreating to Richmond; and
Stoneman was to rely on Hooker’s being up with him in six days, or before
his supplies were exhausted. If possible, he was to detach at the most
available points parties to destroy every thing in the direction of
Charlottesville, and of the Pamunkey.

The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton’s brigade, which accompanied Hooker’s
headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the 15th Stoneman
threw a division across the river at Rappahannock station, where the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river. But a sudden rise in
consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to return by swimming the
horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check, that “their efforts to
establish themselves on the south side of the river were successfully
resisted by Stuart.” But the rise in the river was the actual cause. There
was no crossing of swords.

At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery were
sent to Kelley’s Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to hold these
crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstration on the
part of the enemy.

The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point until the
27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under the orders
of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between the 15th and
27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker, remained in camp along
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might not have
crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. It could
not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly have been able
to call Stuart’s entire force away from Lee’s army. Nor was it impossible,
in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Even to threaten Lee’s
communications would have seriously affected the singleness of purpose he
displayed in this campaign.

But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon the
manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, as a
matter almost apart from the one under consideration.

And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first effort
of this ill-fated campaign.

It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force of
an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is illustrated
in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker left himself but
a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery, to do the scouting
for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had he retained a sufficient
force to march with the main body, there would no doubt have been at least
a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sent out to near Old Wilderness
Tavern and along the Orange plank road to the junction of the Brock road.
Jackson’s movements would then have been fully known.

The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps when
in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an army.

VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.

Gen. Hooker’s plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy’s
communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy’s
attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across the
river on the right.

As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down the
river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light
camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which he
returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourth Michigan,
went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats.

These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman’s raid,
which at these dates should have been well on Lee’s rear, and to unsettle
Lee’s firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker was preparing to
deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movements failed of much of
their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson’s corps was drawn down to the
vicinity, and remained there some days.

On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, and
Sixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the First at
Pollock’s Mills Creek, and the Sixth at Franklin’s Crossing, by 3.30 A.M.,
on Wednesday; and the Third at a place enabling it to cross in support of
either of the others at 4.30 A.M. The troops to remain concealed until the
movement begins. Artillery to be posted by Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery
of the army, to protect the crossing. Gen. Benham to have two bridges laid
by 3.30 A.M. at each crossing. Troops, as needed, to be detailed to aid
his engineer brigade.

Gen. Sedgwick to command the three corps, and make a demonstration in full
force on Wednesday morning to secure the telegraph road. Should any
considerable force be detached to meet the movement of the right wing,
Sedgwick is to carry the works at all hazards. Should the enemy retreat
towards Richmond, he is to pursue on the Bowling-Green road, fighting
wherever he reaches them, while Hooker will pursue on parallel roads more
to the west.

This order was punctually obeyed. Gen. Hunt placed forty-two guns at
Franklin’s, forty at Pollock’s Mill, and sixteen at Traveller’s Rest, a
mile below, a number more being held in reserve. Those in position were so
disposed as to “enfilade the rifle-pits, crush the fire of the enemy’s
works on the hill, cover the throwing of the bridges, and protect the
crossing of the troops.” (Hunt.)

These three corps camped that night without fires, and the pontoons were
carried to the river by hand to insure secrecy.

At daybreak, Wednesday, Russell’s brigade crossed in boats at Franklin’s
with little opposition. The bridges were then constructed; and Brooks’s
division passed over with a battery, and established itself strongly on
the south side.

At the lower crossing, Reynolds’s attempts to throw the bridges early in
the morning were defeated by sharpshooters and a supporting regiment. But
about half-past eight, the fog, which had been quite dense, lifted; and
under fire of the artillery the Confederates were driven away, and the
crossing made by Wadsworth.

During Wednesday and Thursday the entire command was held in readiness to
force a passage at any time, the bridge-heads being held by Brooks and
Wadsworth respectively.

VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.

Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent judgment
displayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of the
army-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he had
brought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact,
that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued were
carried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was on hand
at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, be confined
to orders given prior to the time when the fighting began.

On April 26 the commanding officers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were
directed to march Monday morning, the 27th, towards Kelley’s Ford, on the
Rappahannock,—some fifteen miles above its junction with the
Rapidan,—Howard leading.

As much secrecy as possible was enjoined, and the men were not to be
allowed to go down to the river. Eight days’ rations to be carried in the
haversacks. Each corps to take a battery and two ambulances to a division,
the pack-train for small ammunition, and a few wagons for forage only. The
rest of the trains to be parked in the vicinity of Banks’s Ford out of
sight. A sufficient detail, to be made from the troops whose term was
about to expire, to be left behind to guard camp, and do provost duty.

Meade was ordered to march the Fifth Corps in connection with the Eleventh
and Twelfth, and equipped in similar manner.

The three corps to be in camp at Kelley’s Ford, in positions indicated, by
four P.M. on Tuesday.

The first day’s march was to the vicinity of Hartwood Church. Next day, at
four A.M., the head of the column was in motion; and at four P.M. the
three corps were in camp at Kelley’s Ford.

At six P.M. the pontoon-bridge was begun, under charge of Capt. Comstock
of the engineers, by a detail mostly from the Eleventh Corps. Some four
hundred men of Buschbeck’s brigade crossed in boats, and attacked the
enemy’s pickets, which retired after firing a single shot. About ten P.M.
the bridge was finished, and the troops crossed; the Eleventh Corps during
the night, and the Twelfth Corps next morning. The Seventeenth
Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment was sent out as flankers to prevent the
Confederate scouting-parties from annoying the column. In this they failed
of entire success; as the rear of the Eleventh Corps was, during the day,
shelled by a Confederate battery belonging to Stuart’s horse artillery,
and the Twelfth Corps had some slight skirmishing in its front with
cavalry detachments from the same command.

As soon as Hooker had seen to the execution of his first orders, he
transferred his headquarters to Morrisville, five miles north of Kelley’s
Ford, and superintended the execution of the crossing and advance. Urging
Meade to equal celerity and secrecy in uncovering United-States Ford, he
instructed Slocum, should Meade’s crossing at Ely’s be resisted, to push a
column on the south side of the Rapidan to open the latter ford.

At Germania Ford, on the Rapidan, previously seized by an advance party of
three or four smart marching regiments, a small body of one hundred and
twenty-five Confederate infantry, guarding the supplies for the rebuilding
of the bridge, then in progress, was captured.

The cavalry and artillery crossed at once by the ford, as well as a
portion of the infantry, the latter wading almost to the armpits. But the
construction of the bridge was soon temporarily completed by Gens. Geary
and Kane; and the rest of the troops and the pack-mules passed safely, by
the light of huge bonfires lighted on the banks. The men were in the
highest possible spirits, and testified to their enjoyment of the march by
the utmost hilarity.

At daylight the Twelfth Corps led the column, Geary in advance. Near the
Wilderness, the head of column was attacked from the south by some cavalry
and a couple of guns. Stuart had come up from Raccoon Ford the day
previous. But a slight demonstration cleared the road; and Stuart retired,
sending part of his force to Fredericksburg, and accompanying the rest to
Spotsylvania Court House.

About two P.M., Thursday, these two corps, under command of Slocum,
reached Chancellorsville, and found a portion of the Fifth Corps already
in position there. The Twelfth Corps was deployed south of the plank road,
with left at the Chancellor House, and the right near Wilderness Church,
which line the Eleventh Corps prolonged to the vicinity of Hunting Creek.

The Fifth Corps had marched to Kelley’s Ford, and crossed in rear of the
Twelfth Corps. From here, Sykes’s and Griffin’s divisions marched towards
Ely’s Ford, preceded by Col. Devin’s Sixth New York Cavalry, which
surprised the pickets at that place. The troops crossed by wading.
Humphreys remained behind to cover the passage of the trains, and after
followed the column.

On crossing the Rapidan, Sykes was pushed towards United-States Ford, to
dislodge the Confederate force there, by thus taking in reverse their
position, while Griffin marched to Chancellorsville. The whole corps soon
after united at the latter place, and was located with its right joining
Slocum, and the left extending towards the river, facing Mine Run.

A skirmish of no particular moment had occurred between Griffin and
Anderson, as the former reached Chancellorsville. Anderson had been
retiring before the Federal advance, on the plank road towards
Fredericksburg. His rear guard made a short stand at the crossroads, but
withdrew after a few rounds; and Anderson took up a position near Mine
Road, where numerous ravines, perpendicular to the river, afforded
excellent successive lines of defence.

On reaching Chancellorsville, Slocum took command of the three corps there
assembled. He was ordered to ascertain, by a cavalry party, whether the
enemy were detaching any considerable force from Fredericksburg to meet
his column. If not, an advance at all hazards was to be made, and a
position on the plank road which would uncover Banks’s Ford to be secured.
If the enemy were in strong force, Slocum was to select a position, and
compel his attack. Not a moment was to be lost until the troops were
concentrated at Chancellorsville. “From that moment all will be ours,”
said Hooker.

The inconsistency of these orders can be explained only by marked
ignorance of the country. To secure a position which would uncover Banks’s
Ford was certainly a great desideratum; but the possession of
Chancellorsville was far from accomplishing this end, as we shall see.

So admirably planned and executed were all orders up to this time, that on
Thursday, by two P.M., three corps of nearly forty thousand men were
concentrated on Lee’s flank, while the latter was still unaware of the
presence of any considerable Federal force in this vicinity.

On Monday Couch had been ordered to march two divisions of his (Second)
corps to Banks’ Ford, but to keep back from the river, and to show no more
than the usual pickets. One brigade and a battery to be sent to
United-States Ford, there to relieve an equal detail of the Eleventh
Corps, which would rejoin its command. All their artillery to move with
these two divisions, and to be ready to cover a forced crossing. The
division whose camps at Falmouth were most easily seen by the enemy from
across the river (it happened to be Gibbon’s) to be left in camp to do
picket and provost duty. The Third Corps would be available in case the
enemy himself attempted a crossing. Gibbon to be ready to join the command
at any time.

On Thursday, as soon as Anderson withdrew Mahone’s and Posey’s brigades
from United-States Ford, which he did when Meade’s crossing at Ely’s had
flanked that position, Couch, whose bridge was all ready to throw, was
ordered to cross, and march in support towards the heaviest firing. This
he did, with French and Hancock, and reached Chancellorsville the same
evening.

Swinton, rather grandiloquently, says, “To have marched a column of fifty
thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage and encumbered with
artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles in two days; to have bridged and
crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with the loss of half a
dozen men, one wagon, and two mules,—is an achievement which has few
parallels, and which well deserves to rank with Prince Eugene’s famous
passage of the Adige.”

However exaggerated this praise may be, Hooker nevertheless deserves high
encomiums on his management of the campaign so far. Leaving Stoneman’s
delay out of the question, nothing had gone wrong or been mismanaged up to
the present moment. But soon Hooker makes his first mistake.

At 12.30 on Thursday, the Third Corps, which lay near Franklin’s Crossing,
on the north side of the river, received orders to proceed by the shortest
route, and concealed from the enemy, to United-States Ford, to be across
the river by seven A.M., Friday; in pursuance of which order, Sickles
immediately started, in three columns, following the ravines to Hamet’s,
at the intersection of the Warrenton pike and United-States Ford road.
Here he bivouacked for the night. At five A.M. Friday he marched to the
ford, and passed it with the head of his column at seven A.M., Birney
leading, Whipple and Berry in the rear. Leaving Mott’s brigade and a
battery to protect the trains at the ford, he then pushed on, and reported
at Chancellorsville at nine A.M. Under Hooker’s orders he massed his corps
near the junction of the roads to Ely’s and United-States Fords, in the
open near Bullock’s, sending a brigade and a battery to Dowdall’s Tavern.

Hooker, meanwhile, had arrived at Chancellorsville, and taken command. He
at once issued this characteristic order:—

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 47.

It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces to
the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that
our enemy must ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences, and
give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.

The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a
succession of splendid achievements.

Pleasonton, during Thursday, pushed out towards Fredericksburg and
Spotsylvania Court House to observe the enemy.

Fitz Hugh Lee had bivouacked this evening at Todd’s Tavern. Stuart, with
his staff, had started towards Fredericksburg to report the condition of
affairs to Gen. Lee. It was a bright moonlight night. A mile or two on the
road he ran against a party of Federal horsemen, the advance of the Sixth
New York Cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. McVicar. Sending back for the Fifth
Virginia Cavalry, Lee attacked the Federal troopers, leading in person at
the head of his staff; but, being repulsed, he sent for the entire brigade
to come up, with which he drove back McVicar’s detachment.

The combat lasted some time, and was interesting as being a night affair,
in which the naked weapon was freely used. Its result was to prevent
Pleasonton from reaching Spotsylvania Court House, where he might have
destroyed a considerable amount of stores.

The position on Thursday evening was then substantially this. At
Hamilton’s Crossing there was no change. Each party was keenly scanning
the movements of the other, seeking to divine his purpose. Sedgwick and
Reynolds were thus holding the bulk of Lee’s army at and near
Fredericksburg. Hooker, with four corps, and Sickles close by, lay at
Chancellorsville, with only Anderson’s small force in his front, and with
his best chances hourly slipping away. For Lee, by this time aware of the
real situation, hesitated not a moment in the measures to be taken to meet
the attack of his powerful enemy.

IX. LEE’S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS.

Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thus
discovered check.

Pollard says: “Lee calmly watched this” (Sedgwick’s) “movement, as well as
the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated the
enemy’s design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division of his
own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking the
result of fighting him in detail.”

Lossing states Lee’s object as twofold: to retain Banks’s Ford, so as to
divide Hooker’s army, and to keep his right wing in the Wilderness.

Let us listen to Lee himself. In his report he says he was convinced on
Thursday, as Sedgwick continued inactive, that the main attack would be
made on his flank and rear. “The strength of the force which had crossed,
and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the principal
effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter.”

He states that on April 14 he was informed that Federal cavalry was
concentrating on the upper Rappahannock. On the 21st, that small bodies of
infantry had appeared at Kelley’s Ford. These movements, and the
demonstrations at Port Royal, “were evidently intended to conceal the
designs of the enemy,” who was about to resume active operations.

The Federal pontoon bridges and troops below Fredericksburg “were
effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river’s bed
and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the other side
completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river.”

“As at the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select
positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than
incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his
crossing.”

At the time of Hooker’s flank movement, there were between the
Rappahannock and Rapidan no troops excepting some twenty-seven hundred
cavalry under Stuart, forming Lee’s extreme left. But Stuart made up for
his small numbers by his promptness in conveying to his chief information
of every movement and of the size of every column during Hooker’s passage
of the rivers. And the capture of a few prisoners from each of the Fifth,
Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps enabled him and his superior to gauge the
dimensions of the approaching army with fair accuracy.

But until Thursday night the plan of Hooker’s attack was not sufficiently
developed to warrant decisive action on the part of Lee.

Of the bulk of the Confederate forces, Early’s division was ahead at
Hamilton’s Crossing, intrenched in an almost impregnable position. On
Wednesday, April 29, the rest of Jackson’s corps was moved up from below,
where Doubleday’s and Morrow’s demonstrations had until now kept it.

A. P. Hill’s and Trimble’s divisions were in the second and third lines on
this wing; while Anderson and McLaws, the only troops of Longstreet’s
corps left with the Army of Northern Virginia, held the intrenchments
along the river above Fredericksburg. Barksdale was in the town. Pendleton
with the reserve artillery was at Massaponax.

When, from Sedgwick’s inactivity and the information received from Stuart,
Lee, on Wednesday afternoon, had been led to suspect that the main attack
might be from the columns crossing above, he had immediately ordered
Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville with Wright’s brigade, and with Mahone
and Posey from United-States Ford, so soon as that position was
compromised, leaving a few companies there to dispute its possession as
long as possible.

We have seen how Anderson engaged Meade near Chancellorsville as the
latter advanced, and then retired to a position near Mine-Run road. Here
was the crest of a hill running substantially north and south. Gen. Lee
had already selected this line; and Col. Smith, his chief engineer, had
drawn up a plan of intrenchments. Anderson detailed men, who, during the
night, threw up some strong field-works.

Late Thursday night Lee appears first fully to have matured his plan for
parrying Hooker’s thrust.

Barksdale’s brigade was left at Fredericksburg, where during the winter it
had been doing picket-duty, to form the left of the line remaining to
oppose Sedgwick. Part of Pendleton’s reserve artillery was near by; while
Early, commanding this entire body, held Hamilton’s Crossing. He had a
force of eighty-five hundred muskets, and thirty pieces of artillery.

The rest of his army Lee at once took well in hand, and moved out to meet
the Army of the Potomac. McLaws was hurried forward to sustain the line
taken up by Anderson. He arrived on the ground by daylight of Friday, and
went into position in rifle-pits on the right about Smith’s Hill.

Jackson, equally alert, but having a longer distance to march from the
extreme right along the military road, arrived about eight A.M., took
command, and, as was his wont, ordered an immediate advance, throwing
Owens’s regiment of cavalry forward to reconnoitre.

Posey and Wright followed Owens on the plank road, with Alexander’s
battalion of artillery. Mahone, and Jordan’s battery detached from
Alexander, marched abreast of his right, on the pike.

McLaws followed Mahone, and Wilcox and Perry were called from Banks’s Ford
to sustain this column, which McLaws directed; while Jackson, following on
the plank road, watched the operations of the left.

X. HOOKER’S ADVANCE FRIDAY.

So far the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac had been at Falmouth,
where still remained Gen. Butterfield, Hooker’s chief of staff. The last
order from this point had been on Thursday to Gen. Sedgwick, who was
therein notified that headquarters would be that night at
Chancellorsville; that an advance would be made Friday morning along the
plank road (meaning probably the pike) towards Fredericksburg, to uncover
Banks’s Ford, thus making a shorter communication through Butterfield, who
would still remain at Falmouth. This order substantially recapitulates
former instructions, and is full of the flash and vim of an active mind,
till then intent on its work and abreast of the situation. It urges on
Sedgwick co-operation with the right wing, and the most vigorous pushing
of the enemy. It impresses on him that both wings will be within easy
communication, and ready to spring to one another’s assistance.

Slower than his adversary, and failing to follow up with vigor his
advantage already gained, Hooker assumes command in person, and
reconnoitres the ground between himself and Fredericksburg. He then orders
Meade, with Griffin, followed by Humphreys, and with three batteries, to
march along the river road to some commanding point between Mott and Colin
Runs; his advance to be masked by throwing out small parties, and his
command to be in position by two P.M., while Sykes’s division, supported
by Hancock’s division of the Second Corps, march out the turnpike to a
corresponding distance, each force then deploying towards the other, and
engaging the enemy supposed to be in that vicinity.

A third column, consisting of the Twelfth Corps, he orders to march by the
plank road, and to be massed near Tabernacle Church, masked in like
manner; to be in position by midday, so that the Eleventh Corps can move
up to take position a mile in its rear as reserve, by two P.M.

French’s division of the Second Corps, and one battery, are ordered to
Todd’s Tavern, from which detachments are to be thrown out on the various
roads.

The unemployed troops are massed at Chancellorsville, out of the roads.
Pleasonton holds his cavalry brigade there in readiness to move. Hooker
announces his headquarters at Tabernacle Church as soon as the movement
opens.

Immediately after (11.30 A.M., Friday,) Sedgwick is directed to threaten
an attack at one P.M., in the direction of Hamilton’s Crossing, to
ascertain whether the enemy is hugging his defences in full force. A corps
is to be used with proper supports, but nothing more than a demonstration
to be made. If certain that the enemy is there in force, Sedgwick is to
make no attack.

Sedgwick did not receive this order until about five P. M., but
nevertheless made a display in force of Reynolds’s corps, with Newton and
Brooks in support. But a countermand was soon received, and the troops
withdrawn.

As Hooker supposed his enemy to be in line somewhere midway between
Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, the purpose of these orders to
Sedgwick is not plain. Meade, Sykes, and Slocum were ordered to attack the
enemy when met. Sedgwick could aid such an attack by pushing the force in
his front at Hamilton’s. But a mere demonstration to find out whether the
heights were strongly held could have no effect upon the real advance, nor
procure Hooker any timely information.

The movement of the three columns out of the Wilderness begins at eleven
A.M. It is in accordance with the declared plans of Hooker, and with sound
policy. For Chancellorsville is of all places the worst in which to
deliver or accept a general engagement, and every mile’s advance towards
Fredericksburg brings the army into more open ground.

Meade, with Griffin and Humphreys, advances on the river road to within a
short distance of Banks’s Ford, near Decker’s farm. He can easily seize
the ford, the possession of which lessens the distance between the wings
by six miles. It is the objective Hooker has had in view ever since the
movement began. He is preparing to deploy towards Sykes.

Sykes,—to quote Warren,—”on gaining the ridge about a mile and
a quarter from Chancellorsville, found the enemy advancing, and driving
back our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and
firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, which formed
the enemy’s advance. Gen. Sykes moved forward in double-quick time,
attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss, till he had
gained the position assigned him.”

This is a crest in front of the heavy forest, and in range of Anderson’s
rifle-pits. The Federal skirmishers are the Seventeenth United-States
Infantry, supported by Burbank’s brigade.

McLaws is in his front, and deploys across the pike, Semmes on the left of
the road, Mahone, Perry, and Wofford on the right. Jordan’s battery is
posted on the Mine road.

Sykes brings up Weed’s battery, and opens on Semmes, and drives in his
skirmishers, but can make no serious impression on his line. McLaws sends
word to Jackson that Sykes is attacking in force, and that the country is
favorable for a flank attack.

Jackson orders Kershaw through the woods to join Semmes’s left, and sends
Wilcox up the Mine road to extend the Confederate right, and head off a
Federal advance from this direction.

Sykes thus finds himself overlapped on both flanks. He throws Ayres’s
regular brigade out on his left, and the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New
York on his right. His position is difficult, but he determines to hold it
as long as possible.

It is noon. No sounds are heard from the parallel columns. Sykes has to
make his line very thin, but holds his ground. If supported, he can
maintain himself.

But at this juncture he receives orders to fall back on Chancellorsville,
and slowly retires to McGee’s; later to his old position, Hancock taking
his place in the front line; and he next morning at daylight is also
withdrawn, and takes up the line he retains until Sunday morning.

Slocum, in like manner on the plank road, meets Posey and Wright, and a
small affair occurs. But Wright is sent along the unfinished railroad, and
outflanks him. He is also at this moment ordered to retire.

Meade has had similar orders, and has likewise withdrawn; and Wilcox is
sent to Banks’s Ford to hold it.

Wright continues his movement along the railroad, as far as Welford’s or
Catherine’s Furnace, when, finding himself beyond communication with his
superior, he, in connection with Stuart, who has been holding this point,
determines to feel the Union line. Two regiments and a battery are thrown
in along the road to Dowdall’s Tavern, preceded by skirmishers. Our
pickets fall back, and through the dense wood the Confederates reach our
line. But they are warmly received, and retire. This is six P.M. Wright
now joins his division.

Lee has arrived, and assumes command.

Jackson’s divisions, thus following up our retiring columns, by nightfall
occupy a line from Mine road to Welford’s Furnace. A regiment of cavalry
is on the Mine road, and another on the river road as outposts. Stuart
remains at the Furnace. McLaws occupies the crest east of Big-Meadow
Swamp, and Anderson prolongs his lines westwardly.

Let us now examine into these operations of Friday.

This movement towards Fredericksburg was not a sudden idea of Hooker’s,
but the result of a carefully studied plan. In his order of April 3, to
Sedgwick, he says that he proposes to assume the initiative, advance along
the plank road, and uncover Banks’s Ford, and at once throw bridges
across. Gen. Butterfield, in a communication to Sedgwick of April 30,
says, “He (Hooker) expected when he left here, if he met with no serious
opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg to-morrow noon or
shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrow night.” In his
testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker says,
“The problem was, to throw a sufficient force of infantry across at
Kelley’s Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy’s
forces, holding the United-States and Banks’s Ford, by attacking them in
the rear, and as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforce the
marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the flank
of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful,
his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the
left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the
enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his
detaching an overwhelming force to his left.”

Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight near
Banks’s Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that point
from below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick’s crossing.

There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness,
in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville. This is, of all places in
that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general
commanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towards
Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings,
woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms.

Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier
communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, and
advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from imperative
reasons alone.

Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, thus: “They”—the forces on the turnpike and
plank road—”had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the
column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be
advancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged from
the forest at that moment” (this is a very imperfect statement of the
facts); “but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, I was
satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist
the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail.”
And in another place, “When I marched out on the morning of the 1st of May
I could get but few troops into position: the column had to march through
narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast enough to prevent their
being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance. On assuming my position,
Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon repulsed, the column
thrown back in confusion into the open ground. It could not live there.
The roads through the forest were not unlike bridges to pass. A mile or
more in advance of the position I had would have placed me beyond the
forest, where, with my superior forces, the enemy would in all probability
have been beaten.”

This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts. Listen to his
subordinates’ statements.

Gen. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
with reference to this falling-back: “It was totally unexpected to me: I
thought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible. We
had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them.” “After Friday
I was apprehensive we should not have the success we had expected.” “I
think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle after surprising the
enemy.” “I think we should have attacked the enemy immediately.” “I must
give my opinion, since you ask me; for I have an opinion, as a military
man, from the general facts I know, and that I suppose I am obliged to
express. My opinion is that we should not have been withdrawn, called
back, on Friday afternoon. We had advanced along the road to
Fredericksburg to attack the enemy: the troops were in fine spirits, and
we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to have fought the enemy
there. They came out, and attacked one division of the corps I belonged
to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville. What caused Gen.
Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this general position,
which was about perpendicular to the plank road leading to Fredericksburg,
I am not able to say, because, being only a division commander, the facts
were not stated to me. But I have heard it said that he received some
erroneous information about the enemy’s advancing on his flank from the
direction of Orange Court House. It was my opinion, we should have
attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from
the enemy.”

He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to
Chancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerable
confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into
place.

Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground “produced among the
soldiers a feeling of uncertainty.”

Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: “I
consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at
Chancellorsville…. I believe, if all… had pushed right down to Banks’s
Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. But I have no
doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, and still kept
pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen. Sedgwick.”

Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most
useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this
campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, when the
latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker’s orders to
retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters to explain the
importance of holding the position, which was formidable and had great
tactical advantages. Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could get back to
the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and the position lost. He
says: “I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville. I should have
advanced and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him to attack me.
The character of the country was the great reason for advancing.”

And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Army of
the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertainty
engendered by the withdrawal from Jackson’s front on this unlucky day.

A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Friday
evening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making the advance
again. Warren says: “I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more
zeal than convincing argument.” But Hooker held to his own opinion. He
could not appreciate the weakness of assuming the defensive in the midst
of the elan of a successful advance.

It is not difficult to state what Hooker should have done. He had a
definite plan, which was to uncover and use Banks’s Ford. He should have
gone on in the execution of this plan until arrested by superior force, or
until something occurred to show that his plan was inexpedient. To retire
from an enemy whom you have gone out to attack, and whom you have already
placed at a disadvantage, before striking a blow, is weak generalship
indeed.

Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville at noon Thursday. Lee was still in
Fredericksburg. The troops were able to march many miles farther without
undue taxing. They should have been pushed out that afternoon to the open
ground and to Banks’s Ford. To fail in this, was the first great error of
the campaign. There had not been a moment’s delay allowed from the time
the troops reached the river until they were massed at Chancellorsville,
and the proposed movement nearly completed. One continued pressure, never
let up, had constantly been exerted by the headquarters of the army. The
troops had been kept in constant movement towards Banks’s Ford. Hooker had
all but reached his goal. Suddenly occurred a useless, unexplained pause
of twenty-four hours. And it was during this unlucky gap of time that Lee
occupied the ground which Hooker’s cavalry could have seized, and which
should have been held at all hazards.

Nor is this error excusable from ignorance of the terrain. For Hooker had
shown his knowledge of the importance of celerity; and his own declared
plan made Banks’s Ford, still a half-dozen miles distant, his one
objective. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, he thus refers to his plan: “As soon as Couch’s divisions and Sykes’s
corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, in the first
instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks’s Ford, which was six miles
down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the
left wing of the army.” And if the troops had needed repose, a few hours
would have sufficed; and, the succeeding night being clear moonlight, a
forward movement was then entirely feasible.

Dating from this delay of Thursday, every thing seemed to go wrong.

More curious still is Hooker’s conduct on Friday, when his three columns
came into presence of the enemy. What every one would have expected of
Fighting Joe was, that at this supreme moment his energy would have risen
to its highest pitch. It was a slight task to hold the enemy for a few
hours. Before ordering the columns back, Hooker should have gone in person
to Sykes’s front. Here he would have shortly ascertained that Jackson was
moving around his right. What easier than to leave a strong enough force
at the edge of the Wilderness, and to move by his left towards Banks’s
Ford, where he already had Meade’s heavy column? This would have kept his
line of communication with United-States Ford open, and, while uncovering
Banks’s Ford, would at the same time turn Jackson’s right. It is not as if
such a movement carried him away from his base, or uncovered his
communications. It was the direct way to preserve both.

But at this point Hooker faltered. Fighting Joe had reached the
culminating desire of his life. He had come face to face with his foe, and
had a hundred and twenty thousand eager and well-disciplined men at his
back. He had come to fight, and he—retreated without crossing
swords.

XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nor defence.
The ground was not open enough for artillery, except down the few roads,
and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless. Infantry could not
advance steadily in line. The ground was such in Hooker’s front, that Lee
could manoeuvre or mass his troops unseen by him. Our own troops were so
located, that to re-enforce any portion of the line, which might be
attacked, with sufficient speed, was impossible.

Anderson (as has been stated) had been ordered by Lee to hold
Chancellorsville; but after examination of the ground, and consultation
with Mahone and Posey, he concluded to transcend his instructions, and
retired to the junction of Mine Road and the turnpike. He assumed that the
superiority of this latter ground would excuse his failure to hold his
position in the Wilderness.

Gen. Hancock says: “I consider that the position at Chancellorsville was
not a good one. It was a flat country, and had no local military
advantages.”

And the testimony of all our general officers is strongly to the same
effect.

The position to which Hooker retired was the same which the troops,
wearied with their march of Thursday, had taken up without any expectation
of fighting a battle there. Hooker had desired to contract his lines
somewhat after Friday’s check; but the feeling that farther retreat would
still more dishearten the men, already wondering at this unexplained
withdrawal, and the assurance of the generals on the right that they could
hold it against any force the enemy could bring against their front,
decided him in favor of leaving the line as it was, and of strengthening
it by breastworks and abattis.

Having established his troops in position, Hooker further strengthened his
right wing at Chancellorsville to the detriment of his left below
Fredericksburg; and at 1.55 A.M., Saturday, ordered all the bridges at
Franklin’s Crossing, and below, to be taken up, and Reynolds’s corps to
march at once, with pack-train, to report at headquarters.

This corps reached him Saturday night, and was deployed upon the extreme
right of the new position then being taken up by the army.

The line as now established lay as follows:—

Meade held the left, extending from a small bluff near Scott’s Dam on the
Rappahannock, and covering the roads on the river, along a crest between
Mine and Mineral Spring Runs towards and within a short mile of
Chancellorsville.

This crest was, however, commanded from several points on the east, and,
according to the Confederate authorities, appeared to have been carelessly
chosen. Meade’s front, except at the extreme river-flank, was covered by
impenetrable woods. The Mine road intersected his left flank, and the
River road was parallel to and a mile in his front.

Couch joined Meade’s right, and extended southerly to Chancellorsville,
with Hancock thrown out on his front, and facing east, astride the River
road, and up to and across the old turnpike; his line being formed south
of this road and of the Chancellor clearing. The division of French, of
Couch’s corps, was held in reserve along the United-States Ford road.

From here to Dowdall’s Tavern the line made a southerly sweep outwards,
like a bent bow, of which the plank road was the string.

As far as Hazel Grove, at the centre of the bow, Slocum’s Twelfth Corps
held the line, Geary’s division joining on to Couch, and Williams on the
right. From Slocum’s right to the extreme right of the army, the Eleventh
Corps had at first been posted; but Hooker determined on Saturday morning
that the line was too thin here, and thrust Birney’s division of the Third
Corps in between Slocum and Howard. The rest of the Third Corps was in
reserve, massed in columns of battalions, in Bullock’s clearing, north of
the Chancellor house, with its batteries at the fork of the roads leading
to the United-States and Ely’s Fords.

Towards sunset of Friday, Birney had advanced a strong line of
skirmishers, and seized a commanding position in his front. Birney’s line
then lay along the crest facing Scott’s Run from Dowdall’s to Slocum’s
right.

Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade was massed at headquarters, ready for duty at
any point.

Howard held the line, from Dowdall’s Tavern (Melzi Chancellor’s) to beyond
Talley’s farm on the old pike, with his right flank substantially in the
air, and with two roads, the main thoroughfares from east to west,
striking in on his right, parallel to his position.

As will be noticed from the map, the right, being along the pike, was
slightly refused from the rest of the line, considering the latter as
properly lying along the road to headquarters. From Dowdall’s west, the
rise along the pike was considerable, and at Talley’s the crest was high.
The whole corps lay on the watershed of the small tributaries of the
Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers.

As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as the
Wilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstacle
which superiority in numbers could not overcome. And a heavy force, massed
in the clearing at Dowdall’s as a point d’appui, was indispensable to
safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the ground afforded nothing for
this flank to lean upon.

Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, having
withdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, after
surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early on
Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the
forces under his command.

The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great natural
strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled under-growth,
behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis, and approached by
few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And, while it is true that the
position was difficult to carry by direct assault, full compensation
existed in other tactical advantages to the army taking the offensive. It
is not probable that Lee, in Hooker’s place, would have selected such
ground. “Once in the wood, it was difficult to tell any thing at one
hundred yards. Troops could not march without inextricable confusion.”
Despite which fact, however, the density of these very woods was the main
cause of Lee’s success.

In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent. As
in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and peculiarly
so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or been forced to
choose by Friday’s easily accepted check. There were no debouches for
throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume the offensive. There
was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were like a heavy curtain in his
front. His left wing was placed so as to be of absolutely no value. His
right flank was in the air. One of the roads on which he must depend for
retreat was readily assailable by the enemy. And he had in his rear a
treacherous river, which after a few hours’ rain might become impassable,
with but a single road and ford secured to him with reasonable certainty.

And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable over-estimates
of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not this reason to allege
for having retired to await Lee’s attack. For he had just received
excellent information from Richmond, to the effect that Lee’s rations
amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seen that he told
Slocum, on Thursday, that his column of nearly forty thousand men was much
stronger than any force Lee could detach against him. Hooker acknowledges
as much in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
when, in answer to the question, “What portion of the enemy lay between
you and Gen. Sedgwick?” he replied:—

“Lee’s army at Fredericksburg numbered sixty thousand, not including the
artillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying the
posts at Culpeper and Gordonsville. I think my information on this point
was reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. The enemy
left eight thousand men to occupy the lines about Fredericksburg; Jackson
marched off to my right with twenty-five thousand; and Lee had the balance
between me and Sedgwick.”

It will be well to remember this acknowledgment, when we come to deal with
Hooker’s theories of the force in his own front on Sunday and Monday.

XII. JACKSON’S MARCH, AND SICKLES’S ADVANCE.

Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plank
road, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw that it
was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by direct
assault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissance
towards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, no
mention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of the
Federal reports.

It is not improbable that Lee received information, crude but useful,
about this portion of our army, from some women belonging to Dowdall’s
Tavern. When the Eleventh Corps occupied the place on Thursday, a watch
was kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between the
corps breaking camp to move out to Slocum’s support on Friday morning, and
its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared. This
fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard.

However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtless
ascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of making a
stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that its position
was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasoned justly that
Hooker, in canvassing the events of Friday, would most probably look for
an attack on his left or front.

Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federal
rations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed the
situation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested a
movement with his entire corps around Hooker’s right flank, to seize
United-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac. This
hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mention as
Jackson’s, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederate
authorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced with
dash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave “the great
flanker” twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, his
assistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning report)
with which to make a march which must at best take all day, constantly
exposing his own flank to the Federal assault. It separated for a still
longer time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving Lee with only
Anderson’s and McLaws’s divisions,—some seventeen thousand men,—with
which to resist the attack of thrice that number, which Hooker, should he
divine this division of forces, could throw against him, the while he kept
Jackson busy with the troops on his own right flank.

On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a
defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army of
the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remain quiet
during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee’s engrossing his attention by
constant activity in his front, the stratagem might succeed. And in case
of failure, each wing had open ground and good roads for retreat, to form
a junction towards Gordonsville.

Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presence of
a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the very
aggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson’s former flank
attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders to proceed
to its immediate execution.

For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twice his
strength, Lee is not entitled to commendation. It is justifiable only—if
at all—by the danger of the situation, which required a desperate
remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it. Had it resulted
disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have been a serious blow
to Lee’s military prestige. The “nothing venture, nothing have” principle
applies to it better than any maxim of tactics.

Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with some local
guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with the greatest
speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at on Hooker’s
right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, with Rodes,
commanding D. H. Hill’s division, in the advance, and A. P. Hill bringing
up the rear.

Jackson’s route lay through the woods, along the road on which rested
Lee’s line. His corps, since Friday’s manoeuvres, was on the left; and, as
he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fill the gap,
first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of the plank road,
and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at the Furnace,
Mahone’s brigade.

This wood-road led to Welford’s or Catherine’s Furnace, from which place a
better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock (or
Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches, each of
which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart.

Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, for
the passage of his artillery and trains. In many places the bottom, none
too reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, that it had
to be corduroyed to pull the guns through. But these men were used to
marches of unequalled severity, and their love for their leader made no
work too hard when “Old Jack” shared it with them. And although they had
already been marching and fighting continuously for thirty hours, this
circuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully done, with an alacrity
nothing but willing and courageous hearts, and a blind belief that they
were outwitting their enemy, could impart.

His progress was masked by Stuart, who interposed his cavalry between
Jackson and the Union lines, and constantly felt of our skirmishers and
pickets as he slowly kept abreast with the marching column.

At the Furnace comes in another road, which, a short distance above, forks
so as to lead to Dowdall’s Tavern on the left, and to touch the Union
lines by several other branches on the right. It was this road down which
Wright and Stuart had advanced the evening before in their attack on our
lines.

Here, in passing Lewis’s Creek (Scott’s Run) and some elevated ground near
by, the column of Jackson had to file in full view of the Union troops,
barely a mile and a half away. The movement was thus fully observed by us,
hundreds of field-glasses pointing steadily at his columns.

It seems somewhat strange that Jackson should have made this march,
intended to be quite disguised, across the Furnace-clearing. For there was
another equally short route, making a bend southward through the woods,
and, though possibly not so good as the one pursued, subsequently found
available for the passage of Jackson’s trains, when driven from the
Furnace by Sickles. It is probably explained, however, by the fact that
this route, selected during the night, was unfamiliar to Jackson, and that
his aides and guides had not thought of the point where the troops were
thus put en evidence. And Jackson may not have been with the head of the
column.

So early as eight o’clock Birney of the Third Corps, whose division had
been thrust in between Howard and Slocum, reported to Sickles that a
movement in considerable force was being made in our front. Sickles
conveyed the information to Hooker, who instructed him to investigate the
matter in person. Sickles pushed out Clark’s rifled battery, with a
sufficient support, to shell the passing column. This, says Sickles,
obliged it to abandon the road. It was observed that the column was a
large one, and had a heavy train. Sickles considered it either a movement
for attack on our right, or else one in retreat. If the former, he
surmised at the time that he had arrested it; if the latter, that the
column had taken a more available route.

It was while Rodes was filing past the Furnace that the first attack by
Clark’s battery was made; and Col. Best, with the Twenty-third Georgia
Regiment, was sent out beyond the Furnace to hold the road. Best
subsequently took position in and about the Furnace buildings, and placed
some troops in the railroad cutting south.

Sickles, meanwhile, had again reported to Hooker, and been instructed to
strengthen his reconnoissance. But it was noon before this order was
given, and he was then advised to push out with great caution. He asked
for the whole of Birney’s division, and another one in support. With these
he thought to get possession of the road on which the enemy was moving,
and, if it was a retreat, cut him off; if a flank movement, thrust himself
in between the two bodies of the enemy. Hooker accorded this request; and
Birney was advanced a mile and a half through the woods, bridging two or
three arms of Scott’s Run, and some marshy ground, and making his way with
great difficulty. Two regiments of Berdan’s sharpshooters were thrown out
in front, and the Twentieth Indiana Infantry led Birney’s division.
Considerable opposition was encountered, say the reports of these
regiments; but after some skirmishing, Berdan managed to surround Best’s
command, and captured nearly the entire force.

Why Birney advanced through the woods is not readily understood; for there
was a good road close by his position, leading to the Furnace, by using
which many hours could have been saved.

From the prisoners of the Twenty-third Georgia, and some others
intercepted, it was clearly ascertained, by two P.M., that Jackson was
moving towards our right flank, with, as the prisoners stated, some forty
thousand men.

These facts Sickles also reported to Hooker, requesting Pleasonton’s
cavalry, and his own third division, to cooperate in a flank attack, which
he seems to have assumed he could make on Jackson. Hooker ordered Whipple
up into supporting distance to Birney, with instructions to connect the
latter with Slocum; and directed Williams (Slocum’s right division) to
cover the left of the advancing column, and if necessary attack the enemy
there. Howard received instructions from Capt. Moore, who had been
announced in general orders as on Hooker’s staff, to cover Birney’s right;
and he detached his reserve brigade, the best and largest in the Eleventh
Corps, commanded by Barlow, and led it out in person to its position.

Hooker subsequently denied having sent Capt. Moore to Howard, alleging the
order to have emanated from Sickles; but, as Capt. Moore was on Hooker’s
staff, Howard certainly could do no less than he did, supposing the order
to be by authority from headquarters.

Sickles now imagined that every thing promised the most brilliant success.
He was preparing to make his attack, as he supposed,—to judge, at
least, from what he says,—on Jackson’s flank. “McLaws’s opposition
had all but ceased,” says he; “and it was evident that in a few moments
five or six regiments would be cut off, and fall into our hands.”

But Sickles had been deceived by a simple rear-guard of the enemy; while
Jackson, by a long circuit, was not only far beyond his reach, but in
position to crush Howard, and cut off Sickles from communication with the
rest of the army.

Pleasonton, whom Hooker had sent out to Sickles’s aid, held his three
regiments and Martin’s horse-battery, in the clearing at Scott’s Run,
being unable to operate to any advantage on the ground occupied by Birney.
Three or four other Third-Corps batteries were also here for a similar
reason.

When Sickles’s attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-third Georgia,
was made, Col. Brown’s battalion of Confederate artillery happened to be
within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson, and placed on a
cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting. Here, gathering a few
detached companies in support, he opened smartly upon Sickles. The latter,
bearing in mind his orders impressing caution in his advance, was for the
moment checked, long enough, at all events, to enable Jackson’s trains to
get out of reach by the lower road.

Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown’s fire became quite
annoying. He accordingly placed Livingstone’s, and afterwards Randolph’s,
batteries in position, and spent some time in silencing the Confederate
guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward his skirmishers, and
occupied Welford’s house, while Graham, with four regiments, got
possession of the railroad cutting.

By this time Jackson’s troops had passed a couple of miles beyond the
Furnace; but on hearing of Sickles’s attack, and the capture of an entire
regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptly retraced his
steps with his own and Thomas’s brigades, and supported Brown’s excellent
work. So soon as the trains had got well along, these two brigades
rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard was undertaken by
Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson ordered out, and threw
across his own left flank to engage the attention of Sickles’s column.

Jackson’s divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles from
Sickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force. Jackson
had marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road. When he reached the Orange
plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observe the
position of the Union lines. Riding up alone, so as not to attract
attention, after—as Cooke affirms—driving the Federal cavalry
from the spot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was
not yet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops farther
along the Brock road to the old turnpike.

But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee’s cavalry, supported by Paxton, along the plank
road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discovered and met.

By four P.M. he had reached the right and rear of the Union line; while
Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortable headquarters
at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state, retaining just
enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under the circumstances,
were the most unfortunate possible.

For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow’s brigade, the only
general reserve of the “key of his position,” as himself has called it,
and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple, and
protected on the left by Williams; but about five P.M. he ordered Geary
from his position on Slocum’s left, to move forward, and make an attack
down the plank road. This order Geary carried out in person with several
regiments. He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and was considerably
advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered to return to his
position.

Hooker’s right flank, of less than ten thousand men, was thus isolated
from the rest of the army, with no supports within two miles.

And yet the full evidence of Jackson’s whereabouts was before him. There
had been a constant feeling of the Union lines (by Stuart’s cavalry and
some infantry skirmishers) all day, gradually working from east to west.
This fact was noticed by many officers, and is particularly referred to by
Pleasonton, Warren, and Howard. Jackson’s columns and trains had been
strongly reconnoitred, their force estimated, and their direction noted.
The question as to what might be the objective of such a movement, had
been the main topic of discussion during the day throughout the right of
the army.

At noon a cavalry picket on the plank road was driven in, and gave notice
of the passing of a heavy column a mile beyond our lines. About 3.30 P.M.
the leading divisions of Jackson’s corps, arriving on the old turnpike,
sent a party forward to feel our lines, and a ten-minutes’ skirmish
resulted, when the Confederate party withdrew. There had been a number of
minor attacks on our outlying pickets, some of them occurring when Gen.
Howard was present. All these facts were successively reported to
headquarters.

About the same time two men, sent out as spies, came in, and reported the
enemy crossing the plank road on our right, in heavy columns. These men
were despatched by Howard to Hooker, with instructions to the officer
accompanying them to see that Hooker promptly received their information.
On the other hand, a half-hour before Jackson’s attack came, Howard sent a
couple of companies of cavalry out the plank road to reconnoitre. These
men, from negligence or cowardice, failed to go far enough to ascertain
the presence of Jackson, and returned and reported all quiet. This report
was, however, not forwarded to Hooker.

There was not an officer or man in the Eleventh Corps that afternoon who
did not discuss the possibility of an attack in force on our right, and
wonder how the small body thrown across the road on the extreme flank
could meet it. And yet familiar with all the facts related, for that they
were reported to him there is too much cumulative evidence to doubt, and
having inspected the line so that he was conversant with its situation,
Hooker allowed the key of his position to depend upon a half-brigade and
two guns, facing the enemy, while the balance of the wing, absolutely in
the air, turned its back upon the general whose attack was never equalled
for its terrible momentum during our war, or excelled in any, and whose
crushing blows had caused the brave old Army of the Potomac more than once
to stagger.

Moreover, the “key of the position” was confided to a corps which was not
properly part of the Army of the Potomac, and untried as yet. For not only
had the Eleventh Corps, as a corps, seen no active service, but the most
of its regiments were made up of raw troops, and the elements of which the
corps was composed were to a degree incongruous. Of itself this fact
should have caused Hooker to devote serious attention to his right flank.

XIII. HOOKER’S THEORIES AND CHANCES.

Hooker and Sickles have both stated that the plan of the former was to
allow this movement of Jackson’s to develop itself: if it was a retreat,
to attack the column at the proper time; if a tactical flank movement, to
allow it to be completed, and then thrust himself between the two wings of
Lee’s army, and beat them in detail. This admirable generalization lacked
the necessary concomitant of intelligent and speedy execution.

Now, Hooker had his choice between two theories of this movement of
Jackson. It was a retreat from his front, either because Lee deemed
himself compromised, or for the purpose of making new strategic
combinations; or it was the massing of troops for a flank attack. It could
mean nothing else. Let us, then, do Hooker all the justice the situation
will allow.

All that had occurred during the day was fairly explainable on the former
hypothesis. If Jackson was passing towards Culpeper, he would naturally
send flanking parties out every road leading from the one his own columns
were pursuing, towards our lines, for strictly defensive purposes. The
several attacks of the day might have thus occurred. This assumption was
quite justifiable.

And this was the theory of Howard. He knew that Hooker had all the
information obtained along the entire line, from prisoners and scouts. He
naturally concluded, that if there was any reasonable supposition that an
attack from the west was intended, Hooker would in some way have notified
him. But, far from doing this, Hooker had inspected and approved his
position, and had ordered Howard’s reserve away. To be sure, early in the
morning, Hooker had told him to guard against an attack on the right: but
since then circumstances had absolutely changed; Barlow had been taken
from him, and he conjectured that the danger of attack had passed. How
could he assume otherwise?

Had he suspected an attack down the pike, had he received half an hour’s
warning, he could, and naturally would, assuming the responsibility of a
corps commander, have changed front to rear so as to occupy with his corps
the line along the east side of the Dowdall’s clearing, which he had
already intrenched, and where he had his reserve artillery. He did not do
so; and it is more easy to say that he was to blame, than to show good
cause for the stigma cast upon him for the result of this day.

However much Hooker’s after-wit may have prompted him to deny it, his
despatch of 4.10 P.M., to Sedgwick, shows conclusively that he himself had
adopted this theory of a retreat. “We know that the enemy is flying,” says
he, “trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles’s divisions are among
them.”

And it is kinder to Hooker’s memory to assume that he did not apprehend a
flank attack on this evening. If he did, his neglect of his position was
criminal. Let us glance at the map.

We know how the Eleventh Corps lay, its reserve removed, with which it
might have protected a change of front, should this become necessary, and
itself facing southerly. What was on its left, to move up to its support
in case of an attack down the pike? Absolutely not a regiment between
Dowdall’s and Chancellorsville, and near the latter place only one
division available. This was Berry’s, still luckily massed in the open
north of headquarters. And to Sickles’s very deliberate movement alone is
due the fact that Berry was still there when the attack on Howard burst;
for Sickles had bespoken Berry’s division in support of his own advance
just at this juncture.

Birney, who was the prop of Howard’s immediate left, had been advanced
nearly two miles through the thickets to the south to attack an imaginary
enemy. Whipple had followed him. Of Slocum’s corps, Williams had been sent
out “two or three miles,” to sweep the ground in his front, and Geary
despatched down the plank road “for the purpose of cutting off the train
of the enemy, who was supposed to be in retreat towards Gordonsville.” To
oppose the attack of a column of not far from twenty-five thousand men,
there was thus left a brigade front of four small regiments, and the flank
of a corps of eight thousand men more, without reserves, and with no
available force whatever for its support, should it be overwhelmed.

Is any criticism needed upon this situation? And who should be responsible
for it?

In a defensive battle it is all-important that the general in command
should hold his troops well in hand, especially when the movements of the
enemy can be concealed by the terrain. The enemy is allowed his choice of
massing for an attack on any given point: so that the ability to
concentrate reserve troops on any threatened point is an indispensable
element of safety. It may be assumed that Hooker was, at the moment of
Jackson’s attack, actually taking the offensive. But on this hypothesis,
the feebleness of his advance is still more worthy of criticism. For
Jackson was first attacked by Sickles as early as nine A.M.; and it was
six P.M. before the latter was ready to move upon the enemy in force. Such
tardiness as this could never win a battle.

While all this had been transpiring on the right, Lee, to keep his
opponent busy, and prevent his sending re-enforcements to the flank
Jackson was thus threatening, had been continually tapping at the lines in
his front. But, owing to the small force left with him, he confined this
work to Hooker’s centre, where he rightly divined his headquarters to be.
About seven A.M. the clearing at Chancellorsville was shelled by some of
Anderson’s batteries, obliging the trains there parked to go to the rear
into the woods.

Hancock states that the enemy frequently opened with artillery, and made
infantry assaults on his advanced line of rifle-pits, but was always
handsomely repulsed. “During the sharp contests of that day, the enemy was
never able to reach my principal line of battle, so stoutly and
successfully did Col. Miles (who commanded the advanced line) contest the
ground.”

Col. Miles says his line was constantly engaged skirmishing with the enemy
during the day. At about three P.M. the Confederates massed troops in two
columns, one on each side the road, flanked by a line some eight hundred
yards long, in the woods. An impetuous charge was made to within twenty
yards of the abattis, but it was baffled by our sturdy front.

Sickles, then still in reserve, had made a reconnoissance early on
Saturday, in Hancock’s front, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and
Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, covered by some sharpshooters; had
driven in the enemy’s pickets, and found him, to all appearances, in
force. This was Anderson’s line.

The Twelfth Corps had also made a reconnoissance down the plank road later
in the day, but with no immediate results.

All that was accomplished was a mere feeling of the other’s lines by
either force. Hooker vainly endeavored to ascertain Lee’s strength at
various places in his front. Lee, to good purpose, strove to amuse Hooker
by his bustle and stir, to deceive him as to the weakness of his force,
and to gain time.

During the afternoon of Saturday, Hooker had a rare chance of redeeming
his error made, the day before, in withdrawing from the open country to
the Wilderness, and of dealing a fatal blow to his antagonist. He knew
that Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, was struggling through
difficult roads towards his right. Whatever his object, the division of
Lee’s forces was a fact. He knew that there could be left in his front not
more than an equal number. It was actually less than eighteen thousand
men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee’s strength, could not estimate
it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation he could make.
Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready to mass on any
given point. He ought to have known that Lee was too astute a tactician
seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson was manoeuvring to gain
his right. And all Lee’s conduct during the day was palpable evidence that
he was seeking to gain time.

However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating, he was
bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as he did
Jackson’s whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery. Had he thrown the entire
Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above indicated, to arrest
or retard an attack if made; had he drawn troops from Meade on the extreme
left, where half an hour’s reconnoitring would have shown that nothing was
in his front, and from Couch’s reserves in the centre; had he thrown heavy
columns out where Birney was, to prevent the re-union of Jackson and Lee,
and to make a determined attack upon the latter’s left while Hancock
pressed him in front,—half the vigor displayed in the early days of
this movement would have crushed the Army of Northern Virginia beyond
recovery for this campaign. Lee’s only salvation would have lain in
instant withdrawal from our front, and a retreat towards Gordonsville to
re-unite with his lieutenant.

However he might have disposed his forces for an attack on Saturday
afternoon, he could have committed no mistake as great as the half-way
measures which have been narrated. And if the heavy fighting of Sunday had
been done the day before with any thing like the dispositions suggested,
it could have scarcely failed of brilliant success for the Army of the
Potomac.

But six o’clock came: Hooker still lay listlessly awaiting an attack, with
his forces disjointedly lodged, and with no common purpose of action; and
Jackson had gathered for his mighty blow.

It is but fair to give weight to every circumstance which shall moderate
the censure attributable to Hooker for his defeat in this campaign. Early
in the morning, after his inspection of the lines on the right, which was
made with thoroughness, and after receipt of the first news of the
movement of troops across our front, Hooker issued the following circular:—

MAJOR-GEN. SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GEN. HOWARD.

I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the disposition
you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the
enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to
examine the ground, and determine upon the positions you will take in that
event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he
advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet
this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong
enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up; and there
appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the
general’s opinion, as favorably posted as might be.

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right.
Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be,
in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

Although addressed to Slocum as well as Howard, this order scarcely
applied with much force to the former, who occupied the right centre of
the army, with Birney lying between him and the Eleventh Corps. Howard
carried out his part of these instructions as well as circumstances
allowed. He posted Barlow’s brigade, his largest and best, on the
Buschbeck line, in position for a general reserve for the corps, and took
advantage of the ground in a manner calculated to strengthen his flank,
and to enable it to cover a change of front if necessary; he placed his
reserve artillery on the right of the rifle-pits running across the road
at Dowdall’s; he located several regiments on Dowdall’s clearing so as to
wheel to the west or south as might be required; Major Hoffman was set to
work, and spent the entire day locating and supervising the construction
of field-works; and generally, Howard disposed the forces under his
command after a fashion calculated to oppose a stubborn resistance to
attacks down the pike, should they be made.

Later on in the day, we have seen how Hooker’s aide, Capt. Moore, ordered
this brigade of Barlow’s away from its all-important position. We have
seen Hooker’s dispositions of the Third and Twelfth Corps. We have seen
Hooker’s 4.10 P.M. order to Sedgwick. No room is left to doubt that
Hooker’s opinion, if he had any, underwent a change after issuing these
instructions, and that he gave up the idea of an attack upon the right.
His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing Howard that he had done
so.

But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during the
afternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough? If he
supposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right, was it not the
duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the threatened flank
was properly protected,—that the above order was carried out as he
intended it should be? No attack sufficient to engross his attention had
been made, or was particularly threatened elsewhere; and a ten-minutes’
gallop would bring him from headquarters to the questionable position. He
had some excellent staff-officers—Gen. Warren among others—who
could have done this duty; but there is no evidence of any one having been
sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that no inspection by, or by the order
of, Gen. Hooker was made during the day, after the one in the early
morning.

It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended right
the evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that position
could be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true. But
when half his enemy’s forces, after this disposition was made, are moved
to and massed on his right, and have actually placed themselves where they
can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to urge this plea? Hooker
claims that his “instructions were utterly and criminally disregarded.”
But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote military routine, must hold him
accountable for the removal of Barlow (for how can a general shelter
himself from the consequences of the acts of his subordinates, when these
acts are in pursuance of orders received from his own aide-de-camp?), and
himself acknowledges the disposition made of Sickles and Slocum, can the
facts be fairly said to sustain the charge? There was, moreover, so much
bitterness exhibited after this campaign, that, had the facts in the
slenderest degree warranted such action, formal charges would assuredly
have been brought against Howard and his division commanders, on the
demand alike of the commander-in-chief and a disappointed public.

XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference to an
attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike and the
plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs the turnpike,
and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of the Rappahannock
and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the right by some high
and easily-defended ground near Talley’s.

Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He has less
than four thousand men under his command. Von Gilsa’s brigade has, until
this morning, been half a mile farther out the pike, and across the road;
but on receipt of Hooker’s 9.30 order has been withdrawn, and now lies
with two regiments astride and north of the pike, some distance beyond
Talley’s, the rest skirting the south of it. His right regiment leans upon
that portion of the Brock road which is the prolongation of the eastern
branch, and which, after crossing the plank road and pike, bears
north-westerly, and loses itself in the woods where formerly was an old
mill. McLean’s brigade prolongs von Gilsa’s line towards Schurz.
Dieckman’s battery has two pieces trained westerly down the pike, and four
on Devens’s left, covering, near Talley’s Hill, the approaches from the
plank road. Devens has the Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteers
as a reserve, near the pike.

Schurz’s (third) division continues this line on the edge of the woods to
Dowdall’s. His front hugs the eastern side of the clearing between the
pike and the plank road, thence along the latter to the fork.
Schimmelpfennig’s brigade is on the right, adjoining Devens;
Krzyzanowski’s on the left. Three regiments of the former are on the line,
and two in reserve: the latter has two regiments on the line, and two in
reserve. On Schurz’s right wing, the troops are shut in between thick
woods and their rifle-pits, with no room whatever to manoeuvre or deploy.
This condition likewise applies to many of the regiments in Devens’s line.
The pike is the means of inter-communication, running back of the woods in
their rear. Dilger’s battery is placed near Dowdall’s, at the intersection
of the roads.

Steinwehr considers himself the reserve division. He is more or less
massed near Dowdall’s. Buschbeck’s brigade is in the clearing south of the
road, but has made a line of rifle-pits across the road, facing west, at
the edge of the open ground. Two regiments are deployed, and two are in
reserve. His other brigade, Barlow’s, has been sent out nearly two miles,
to protect Birney’s right, leaving no general reserve whatever for the
corps. Wiederich’s battery is on Steinwehr’s right and left, trained
south.

Three batteries are in reserve on the line of Buschbeck’s rifle-pits
running north and south. Barlow had been, as above stated, massed as a
general reserve of the corps on Buschbeck’s right,—the only reserve
the corps could boast, and a most necessary one.

Two companies, and some cavalry and artillery, have been sent to the point
where the Ely’s Ford road crosses Hunting Creek.

Devens states that his pickets were kept out a proper distance, and that
he had constant scouting-parties moving beyond them. In his report he
recapitulates the various attacks made during the day. Shortly after noon,
cavalry attacked his skirmishers, but drew off. This was Stuart protecting
Jackson’s flank, and feeling for our lines. Then two men, sent out from
Schimmelpfennig’s front, came in through his, and were despatched to
Hooker with their report that the enemy was in great force on our flank.
Later, Lieut. Davis, of Devens’s staff, with a cavalry scout, was fired
upon by Confederate horse. Then von Gilsa’s skirmishers were attacked by
infantry,—again Stuart seeking to ascertain our position: after
which the pickets were pushed farther out. Cavalry was afterwards sent
out, and returned with information that some Confederate troopers, and
part of a battery, were in the woods on our right.

But all this seems to have been explained as a retreat. “The unvarying
report was, that the enemy is crossing the plank road, and moving towards
Culpeper.”

The ground about Dowdall’s is a clearing of undulating fields, closed on
three sides, and open to the west. As you stand east of the fork of the
roads, you can see a considerable distance down the plank road, leading to
Orange Court House. The pike bears off to the right, and runs up hill for
half a mile, to the eminence at Talley’s.

The dispositions recited were substantially the same as those made when
the corps arrived here on Thursday. They were, early Saturday morning,
inspected by Hooker in person, and pronounced satisfactory. As he rode
along the line with Howard, and with each division commander in
succession, he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. His exclamation
to Howard, several times repeated, as he examined the position,—his
mind full of the idea of a front attack, but failing to seize the danger
of the two roads from the west,—was: “How strong! How strong!”

An hour or two later, having ascertained the Confederate movement across
our front, he had sent his circular to Howard and Slocum. Later still, as
if certain that the enemy was on the retreat, he depleted Howard’s line by
the withdrawal of Barlow, and made dispositions which created the gap of
nigh two miles on Howard’s left.

Howard, during the day, frequently inspected the line, and all
dispositions were approved by him.

And, when Barlow was ordered out to the front, both Howard and Steinwehr
accompanied him. They returned to Dowdall’s Tavern just as Jackson
launched his columns upon the Eleventh Corps.

XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O’CLOCK.

It is now six o’clock of Saturday, May 2, 1863, a lovely spring evening.
The Eleventh Corps lies quietly in position. Supper-time is at hand. Arms
are stacked on the line; and the men, some with accoutrements hung upon
the stacks, some wearing their cartridge-boxes, are mostly at the fires
cooking their rations, careless of the future, in the highest spirits and
most vigorous condition. Despite the general talk during the entire
afternoon, among officers and rank and file alike, of a possible attack
down the pike, all but a few are happily unsuspicious of the thunder-cloud
gathering on their flank. There is a general feeling that it is too late
to get up much of a fight to-day.

The breastworks are not very substantial. They are hastily run up out of
rails from the fences, logs from barns in the vicinity, and newly felled
trees. The ditch skirting the road has been deepened for this temporary
purpose. Abattis, to a fair extent, has been laid in front. But the whole
position faces to the south, and is good for naught else.

Nor were our men in those days as clever with the spade as we afterwards
became. This is clearly shown in the defences.

There is some carelessness apparent. Ambulances are close by the line.
Ammunition-wagons and the train of pack-mules are mixed up with the
regiments. Even a drove of beeves is herded in the open close by. All
these properly belong well to the rear. Officers’ servants and camp-gear
are spread abroad in the vicinity of each command, rather more comfortably
ensconced than the immediate presence of the enemy may warrant.

The ground in the vicinity is largely clearing. But dense woods cover the
approaches, except in some few directions southerly. Down the roads no
great distance can be seen; perhaps a short mile on the plank road, not
many hundred yards on the turnpike.

Little Wilderness Church, in the rear of the position, looks deserted and
out of place. Little did its worshippers on last sabbath day imagine what
a conflict would rage about its walls before they again could meet within
its peaceful precincts.

There may be some absence of vigilance on the part of the pickets and
scouts; though it is not traceable in the reports, nor do any of the
officers concerned remember such. But the advanced line is not intrenched
as Miles’s line in front of Hancock has been. Less care, rather than more
carelessness, is all that can be observed on this score.

Meanwhile Jackson has ranged his corps, with the utmost precaution and
secrecy, in three lines, at right angles to the pike, and extending about
a mile on either side. All orders are given in a low tone. Cheering as
“Old Jack” passes along is expressly prohibited.

Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill’s division, leads, with Iverson’s and Rodes’s
brigades to the left of the road, and Doles’s and Colquitt’s to the right.
Rodes’s orders to his brigades are to push on steadily, to let nothing
delay or retard them. Should the resistance at Talley’s Hill, which Rodes
expects, render necessary the use of artillery, the line is to check its
advance until this eminence is carried. But to press on, and let no
obstacle stand in the way, is the watchword.

Two hundred yards in rear of the first line, Colston, commanding Trimble’s
division, ranges his brigades, Nichols and Jones on the left, and Colston
on the right of the road; Ramseur in support.

A. P. Hill’s division is not yet all up; but, as part reaches the line, it
is formed in support of Colston, the balance following in column on the
pike.

The second and third lines are ordered to re-enforce the first as occasion
requires.

Two pieces of Stuart’s horse-artillery accompany the first line on the
pike.

The regiments in the centre of the line appear to have been formed in
columns with intervals, each brigade advancing in line of columns by
regiment. The troops are not preceded by any skirmishers. The line on the
wings is probably not so much massed. It is subsequently testified by many
in the Eleventh Corps, that the centre of the line appears to advance en
echiquier, the front companies of each line of columns firing while the
rear columns are advancing through the intervals.

The march through the woods up to Dowdall’s clearing has not disturbed the
lines so materially as to prevent the general execution of such a
manoeuvre.

But the Confederate reports show that the regiments were all in line and
not in column. The appearance of columns was due to the fact that the
second and third lines, under Colston and A. P. Hill, were already
pressing up close in the rear of the first under Rodes, thus making a mass
nine deep. The intervals between regiments were accidental, occasioned by
the swaying of the line to and fro as it forced its way through the
underbrush.

It is perhaps no more than fair to say that whatever laxity was apparent
at this hour in the Eleventh Corps was by no means incompatible with a
readiness to give a good account of itself if an attack should be made
upon its front.

XVI. JACKSON’S ATTACK.

Such is the situation at six P.M. Now Jackson gives the order to advance;
and a heavy column of twenty-two thousand men, the best infantry in
existence, as tough, hardy, and full of elan, as they are ill-fed,
ill-clothed, and ill-looking, descends upon the Eleventh Corps, whose only
ready force is four regiments, the section of a battery, and a weak line
of pickets.

The game, in which these woods still abound, startled at the unusual
visitors, fly in the advance of Jackson’s line towards and across the
Dowdall clearing, and many a mouth waters, as fur and feather in tempting
variety rush past; while several head of deer speedily clear the dangerous
ground, before the bead of willing rifles can be drawn upon them.

This sudden appearance of game causes as much jollity as wonder. All are
far from imagining its cause.

The next sound is that of bugles giving the command, and enabling the
advancing troops to preserve some kind of alignment. At this the wary
prick up their ears. Surprise stares on every face. Immediately follows a
crash of musketry as Rodes sweeps away our skirmish line as it were a
cobweb. Then comes the long and heavy roll of veteran infantry fire, as he
falls upon Devens’s line.

The resistance which this division can make is as nothing against the
weighty assault of a line moving by battalions in mass. Many of the
regiments do their duty well. Some barely fire a shot. This is frankly
acknowledged in many of the reports. What can be expected of new troops,
taken by surprise, and attacked in front, flank, and rear, at once? Devens
is wounded, but remains in the saddle, nor turns over the command to
McLean until he has reached the Buschbeck line. He has lost one-quarter of
his four thousand men, and nearly all his superior officers, in a brief
ten minutes.

Schurz’s division is roused by the heavy firing on the right, in which
even inexperienced ears detect something more than a mere repetition of
the picket-fight of three hours gone. Its commanding officers are at once
alert. Regimental field and staff are in the saddle, and the men behind
the stacks, leaving canteens, haversacks, cups with the steaming evening
coffee, and rations at the fires. Arms are taken. Regiments are confusedly
marched and counter-marched into the most available positions, to meet an
emergency which some one should have anticipated and provided for. The
absence of Barlow is now fatal.

On comes Jackson, pursuing the wreck of the First division. Some of
Schurz’s regiments break before Devens has passed to the rear. Others
stand firm until the victorious Confederates are upon them with their yell
of triumph, then steadily fall back, turning and firing at intervals; but
nowhere a line which can for more than a brief space retard such an onset.

Down the road towards Chancellorsville, through the woods, up every side
road and forest path, pours a stream of fugitives. Ambulances and oxen,
pack-mules and ammunition-wagons, officers’ spare horses mounted by
runaway negro servants, every species of the impedimenta of camp-life,
commissary sergeants on all-too-slow mules, teamsters on still-harnessed
team-horses, quartermasters whose duties are not at the front, riderless
steeds, clerks with armfuls of official papers, non-combatants of all
kinds, mixed with frighted soldiers whom no sense of honor can arrest,
strive to find shelter from the murderous fire.

No organization is left in the Eleventh Corps but one brigade of
Steinwehr’s division. Buschbeck has been speedily formed by a change of
front, before Devens and Schurz have left the field, in the line of
intrenchments built across the road at Dowdall’s at the edge of the
clearing. No sooner in place than a scattering fire by the men is opened
upon friends and foes alike. Dilger’s battery trains some of its guns down
the road. The reserve artillery is already in position at the north of
this line, and uses spherical case with rapidity. Howard and his staff are
in the thickest of the fray, endeavoring to stem the tide. As well oppose
resistance to an avalanche.

Buschbeck’s line stubbornly holds on. An occasional squad, still clinging
to the colors of its regiment, joins itself to him, ashamed of falling
thus disgracefully to the rear. Officers make frantic exertions to rally
their men; useless effort. In little less than half an hour this last
stand has been swept away, and the Eleventh Corps is in confused retreat
down the pike towards headquarters, or in whatever direction affords an
outlet from the remorseless hail.

The general confusion which reigned can scarcely be more accurately
described than by detailing the experience of a single regiment. The One
Hundred and Nineteenth New York Volunteers was in Schurz’s division. It
was commanded by an officer of German birth, but long since an American
citizen. No more gallant, intelligent man wore uniform, or one better
fitted for a pattern soldier. Well read in military matters, he had never
yet been under fire, and was nervously anxious to win his spurs. The
regiment was a good one; but only three or four officers, and a small
percentage of enlisted men, had seen service.

This regiment faced south on the pike just west of the fork in the roads.
Under arms in an instant, when the firing was heard on the right, it was
soon ordered by one of Schurz’s aides to throw itself across the fork, and
hold it at all hazards. But the suddenness of the attack had momentarily
robbed Col. Peissner of his steadiness, for he was a good drill-master.
Instead of facing to the right, counter-marching, filing to the left
across the road, and coming to a front,—the simplest if longest
movement being the best in times of such excitement,—he faced to the
left because his left was nearest to the fork, filed to the left, and
then, instead of coming on the left by file into line, he moved astride
the roads, and ordered “Front!” This brought the regiment in line with its
back to the enemy. The men instinctively came each to an about-face, and
the file closers broke through to the now rear. There was no time to
correct the error. The regiment, which would have fought well under proper
circumstances, from the start lost confidence in its officers and itself.
Still it held its ground until it had burned almost twenty rounds, and
until the Confederate line was within fifty yards in its face, and had
quite outflanked it. Then the raking volleys of such a front as Jackson
was wont to present, and, more than all, the fire of Buschbeck’s brigade
in its immediate rear, broke it; and it melted away, leaving only a
platoon’s strength around the colors, to continue for a brief space the
struggle behind the Buschbeck line, while the rest fled down the road, or
through the woods away from the deadly fire. This regiment lost its entire
color-guard, and nearly one-half of its complement killed or wounded.

There is much discrepancy as to the time during which the Eleventh Corps
made resistance to Jackson’s advance. All reliable authorities put the
time of the attack as six P.M. When the last gun was fired at the
Buschbeck rifle-pits, it was dusk, at that season about quarter past
seven. It seems reasonably settled, therefore, that the corps retarded the
Confederate advance over about a mile of ground for exceeding an hour. How
much more can be expected of ten thousand raw troops telescoped by
twenty-five thousand veterans?

Rodes, now quite mixed with Colston’s line, still pressed on, and between
Hooker’s headquarters and his elated foe there was scarce an organized
regiment. Hooker’s fatal inability to grasp the situation, and his
ordering an advance of all troops on Howard’s left as far as the Second
Corps, had made him almost defenceless. The troops which should have been
available to stem this adverse tide were blindly groping in the woods, two
miles in front,—in pursuit of Jackson.

One cannot but wonder just where Sickles expected to find Jackson. There
can be little doubt that he did think he was about to strike Jackson’s
flank. His testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War
constantly refers to this belief; and he says that he “was about to open
his attack in full force,” was holding Pleasonton’s cavalry in hand,
desiring to lead the attack with his infantry, when the news of the
disaster to the Eleventh Corps was brought to him; and that every thing
seemed to indicate the most brilliant success from thus throwing himself
upon Jackson’s flank and rear. He refers to McLaws being in his front, but
this is an error. McLaws was on Lee’s right flank, three miles away. It
was with Archer of Jackson’s corps, and with Posey and Wright of
Anderson’s division, that he had to do.

The reports are by no means clear as to the details of these movements.
Birney states in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, that he found that he and Barlow “had got into the midst of the rebel
army, the supports on the left not having come up.” He therefore formed
his command into a huge square, with the artillery in the centre, holding
the road over which Jackson had passed. “The fire upon his left flank from
musketry was galling.” This came from Anderson’s brigades.

Hayman, Graham and Ward were pushed out along the road, and “found the
enemy in some force on three sides.” This apparently shows that Birney,—who
had the immediate command of the troops in front,—was quite
uncertain of what was before him, or just what he was expected to do.

This much is, however, clear: Jackson’s small rearguard had succeeded in
holding the road which he had traversed, at some point near Welford’s; and
here this force remained until Jackson was well along towards the plank
road. Then Anderson in his turn made a diversion on the other side of
Birney, which kept the latter busy for at least a couple of hours.

Sickles’s orders were to advance cautiously. This was Hooker’s doing.
Hence exception cannot fairly be taken to either Birney’s or Sickles’s
conduct for lack of energy. But the latter must have singularly underrated
Jackson’s methods, if he thought he could strike him at a given point, so
many hours after his passage. For Jackson was first observed near the
Furnace about eight A.M., and Sickles was just getting ready to attack him
in this same place at six P.M.

The errors of judgment on this entire day can scarcely be attributed to
any one but the general commanding. He was the one to whom all reports
were sent. He had knowledge of every thing transpiring. He it was who was
responsible for some sensible interpretation of the information brought
him, and for corresponding action in the premises.

So much for Sickles’s advance. It could not well have been more ill-timed
and useless. But his gallant work of the coming night and morrow, when
Hooker left him almost alone to resist the fierce assaults of our
victorious and elated foe, was ample compensation for his subordinate
share in the triviality and fatal issue of Saturday’s manoeuvring. Nor can
blame fall upon him in as full measure as upon Hooker; although he seems
illy to have construed what was transpiring in his front, and what he
reported may have seriously misled his chief.

Perhaps no officers, during our Civil War, were placed in a more
lamentably awkward position than Devens, and in a less degree Schurz, on
this occasion. Having been fully convinced by the events of the afternoon
that an attack down the pike was highly probable, having carefully
reported all these events to his immediate commander, Devens was left
without inspection, counsel, or help. He might have gone in person to
Howard, but he did not dare leave his division. He might have sent
messages which more urgently represented his own anxiety. But when the
blow came, he did all that was possible, and remained, wounded, in
command, and assisted in re-organizing some relics of his division behind
the Buschbeck works.

Schurz was with Howard a good part of the day, and his opinions were
expressed to that officer. To Schurz’s personal bearing here, or on any
other occasion, no possible exception can be taken.

XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

There can be no attempt to gainsay that the Eleventh Corps, on this
luckless Saturday, did not do its whole duty. That it was panic-stricken,
and that it decamped from a field where as a corps it had not fought, is
undeniable. But portions of the corps did fight, and the entire corps
would doubtless have fought well under favorable circumstances. It is but
fair, after casting upon the corps the aspersion of flight from before the
enemy, to do it what justice is possible, and to palliate the bad conduct
of the whole by bearing testimony to the good conduct of some of its
parts.

It has been called a German corps. This is not quite exact. Of nearly
thirteen thousand men in the corps, only forty-five hundred were Germans.
But it must be admitted that so many officers high in rank were of that
nationality, that the general tendency and feeling were decidedly unlike
the rest of the army. Moreover, there is not wanting testimony to show
that there were some who wore shoulder-straps in the corps who gave
evidence of having taken up the profession of arms to make money, and not
to fight.

The artillery of the corps did well. Those general officers who most
severely rebuke the conduct of the corps, all say a word in favor of the
service of the guns. Dilger, on the road, just at Buschbeck’s line, fired
with his own hands from his last gun a round of canister when the
Confederates were within a dozen yards. Most of the guns had been well
served, but had been sent to the rear in time to save them from capture.

The reserve artillery did its duty, nor limbered up until the Confederate
line had outflanked its position, rendered it useless, and jeopardized its
safety.

All the guns that were saved were put into action an hour later, and did
effective service on the Fairview crest, in company with the artillery of
the Third and Twelfth Corps.

At the time of the attack, which was made by Jackson without an advance of
skirmishers, Devens’s reserve regiments were ordered up to support von
Gilsa. There appears to have been something like a stand attempted; but
the left wing of the Confederate line speedily enveloped von Gilsa’s
front, and showed in rear of his right flank, when his regiments melted
away.

Devens states in his report that a new line might have been formed on Gen.
Schurz’s division, if the latter had maintained his ground, but
acknowledges that the falling-back of his own troops “must undoubtedly
have added to the difficulties encountered by the command of that
officer.”

Schurz’s report is very clear and good. This is partly attributable to the
avalanche of abuse precipitated upon his division by the press, which
called forth his detailed explanation, and an official request for
permission to publish his report. There existed a general understanding
that Schurz held the extreme right; and the newspapermen, to all
appearance, took pleasure in holding a German responsible, in their early
letters, for the origin of the panic. This error, together with the fact
of his having discussed the situation during the day with Gen. Howard, and
of his having remained of the opinion that an attack on our right was
probable, accounts for the care exhibited in his statements. That he did
harbor such fears is proved by his having, of his own motion, after the
attack of three o’clock, placed the Fifty-Eighth New York, Eighty-Second
Ohio, and Twenty-Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, near Hawkins’s farm, in the
north part of the Dowdall clearing, and facing west. Still Schurz’s report
is only a careful summary of facts otherwise substantiated. He deals no
more in his own opinions than a division commander has a right to do.

Schurz states that he strongly advised that the entire corps should take
up the Buschbeck line, not considering the woods a reliable point d’appui.
For they were thick enough to screen the manoeuvring of the enemy, but
not, as the event showed, to prevent his marching through them to the
attack.

When the onset came, it was impossible quickly to change front. Schurz’s
regiments were all hemmed in between the rifle-pits before them and the
woods in their rear. Still, more than half of the regiments of this
division appear to have maintained their credit, and the testimony would
tend to show that the men burned from five to thirty rounds each. But
without avail. They were telescoped. Their defences were rendered useless.
The enemy was on both sides of and perpendicular to them. It is an open
question whether, at that time, any two divisions of the army could have
changed front and made a good defence under these circumstances. Later in
the war our soldiers were more habituated, particularly in the West, to
fighting on either side of their breastworks. But these were raw troops.
And this was not the first, nor was it the last, panic in the Army of the
Potomac. But the corps had, as ill-luck willed it, nothing in its rear to
repair or conceal its discomfiture.

Buschbeck’s brigade had better opportunities, and acted correspondingly
better. It had time to occupy the rifle-pits facing west before the enemy
had completed the destruction of the first and third divisions.
Buschbeck’s stand covered a full half-hour. He was re-enforced by many
fragments of broken regiments, holding together under such officers as had
escaped utter demoralization. The troops remained behind these works until
outflanked on right and left, for Jackson’s front of over two miles easily
enveloped any line our little force could form.

During the early part of the attack, Colquitt’s brigade ran across the
pickets of Devens’s and Schurz’s south front, which there had been no time
to call in. Instead of joining in the advance, Colquitt remained to engage
these latter, deeming it essential to protect Jackson’s right. This was
the nucleus of one of the many detached engagements of this day. Several
bodies of Union troops thus isolated were captured en masse.

The reports of the officers concerned, as a rule, possess the merit of
frankness. As an instance, Col. Hartung, of the Seventy-Fourth New York,
relates that he had no opportunity to fire a shot until after he arrived
behind the Buschbeck intrenchments. The facts would appear to be given in
an even-handed way, in all the reports rendered.

Little remains to be said. The Eleventh Corps was panic-stricken, and did
run, instead of retreating. It was a mere disorganized mass in a half-hour
from the beginning of the attack, with but a few isolated regiments, and
one brigade, retaining a semblance of orderliness.

But was it so much the misbehavior of the troops as the faultiness of the
position they occupied?

The corps was got together again before Sunday morning, in a condition to
do good service. Had it been tested, it would, in all probability, have
fought well.

The loss of the corps was one-quarter of its effective.

Some time after the battle of Chancellorsville, a motion was made to break
up the Eleventh Corps, and distribute its regiments among the others; but
it was not done. Hooker then remarked that he would yet make that corps
fight, and be proud of its name. And it subsequently did sterling service.
Gen. Thomas remarked, in congratulating Hooker on his victory at Lookout
Mountain, that “the bayonet-charge of Howard’s troops, made up the side of
a steep and difficult hill, over two hundred feet high, completely routing
and driving the enemy from his barricades on its top,… will rank with
the most distinguished feats of arms of this war.” And it is asserted that
this encomium was well earned, and that no portion of it need be set down
to encouragement.

In their evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker
and Sickles both testify that the panic of the Eleventh Corps produced a
gap in the line, and that this was the main cause of disaster on this
field. But the fatal gap was made long before the Eleventh Corps was
attacked. It was Hooker’s giddy blunder in ordering away, two miles in
their front, the entire line from Dowdall’s to Chancellorsville, that made
it.

This was the gap which enabled Jackson to push his advance to within a few
hundred yards of Chancellorsville before he could be arrested. This was
what made it possible for him to join his right to Lee’s left wing next
day. Had Hooker but kept his troops in hand, so as to have moved up Birney
sharply in support, to have thrown forward Berry and Whipple if required,
the Confederate advance would, in all human probability, have been checked
at Dowdall’s; Lee and Jackson would still have been separated by a
distance of two miles; and of this perilous division excellent advantage
could have yet been taken at daylight Sunday by the Army of the Potomac.

Hooker’s testimony includes the following attempt to disembarrass himself
of the onus of the faulty position of the Eleventh Corps and its
consequences: “No pickets appear to have been thrown out; and I have
reason to suppose that no effort was made by the commander of the corps on
the right to follow up and keep himself advised of Jackson’s movements,
although made in broad daylight, and with his full knowledge. In this way
the Eleventh Corps was lost to me, and more than that, because its bad
conduct impaired the confidence that the corps of the army had in one
another. I observed this fact during the night, from the firing on the
picket-lines, as well as from the general manner of the troops, if a gun
was fired by the enemy: after that, the whole line would let off their
pieces. The men seemed to be nervous; and during the coming-in of the
Eleventh Corps I was fearful, at one time, that the whole army would be
thrown into confusion by it. Some of my staff-officers killed half a dozen
of the men in trying to arrest their flight.”

It is not intended, by what has been said, to exonerate Howard at the
expense of Hooker. To Howard will always be imputed, and justly, a certain
part of the blame; for there were, during the afternoon, enough
indications of a probable attack down the pike to make a prudent
corps-commander either assume the responsibility of a change of front,—as
it could advantageously be made on the Buschbeck line prolonged,—or
else, at least, so strongly urge the facts on his superior that no blame
could cling to his own skirts. But neither can Hooker’s larger share of
blame he shifted off his own to Howard’s shoulders. While it may be said
that the latter did not exhibit the activity which the questionable aspect
of affairs demanded,—for he did not personally inspect his lines
after the early morning hours,—it is equally true that the commander
of the army utterly neglected his right wing, though he had every
circumstance relating to its danger reported to him.

XVIII. HOOKER’S PARRY.

The position of the Army of the Potomac is critical in the extreme. But
several circumstances come to the rescue. It is almost dark. The rebel
lines have become inextricably mixed. Colston, who has gradually moved up
to Rodes’s support, is so completely huddled together with this latter’s
command, that there is no organization left. Still Jackson’s veterans
press on, determined to crush our army beyond recovery, and drive it from
United-States Ford. Stuart has in fact, at his own suggestion, got orders
to move his cavalry division in that direction, and occupy the road to
Ely’s. A. P. Hill’s division is still intact in rear of the two leading
lines, now shuffled into one quite unmanageable mass, but still
instinctively pushing forward.

So faulty have Hooker’s dispositions been, in advancing his entire right
centre without filling the gap, that the only available troops to throw
into the breach, after the rapid destruction of the Eleventh Corps, are
Berry’s division of the old Third. These hardened soldiers are still in
reserve on the clearing, north of headquarters. It is fortunate, indeed,
that they are still there; for Sickles has just asked for their detail to
join his own column out in the woods, and an hour ago Berry would
certainly have been sent.

This division is at once thrown across the pike on the first crest below
Fairview, west of Chancellorsville. The artillery of the Eleventh Corps is
in part re-assembled. Capt. Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps,
has already trained his guns upon the advancing Confederate columns, to
protect the new line. But Berry is almost alone. Hays’s brigade of the
Second Corps, on his right, is his only support. The Excelsior brigade is
rapidly pushed into the woods, north of the plank road; the Fourth
Excelsior and the First Massachusetts south. Carr’s brigade is kept in
second line, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. The men, with the
instinctive pride of self-reliance, move up with the steadiness of
veterans on drill, regardless of the stream of fugitives breaking through
their intervals.

The flight of the Eleventh Corps has stampeded part of the Third Corps
artillery. But it is re-assembled in short order, and at once thrown into
service. Capt. Best manages by seven P.M. to get thirty-four guns into
line on the crest, well served. Himself is omnipresent. Dimick’s and
Winslow’s batteries under Osborn, Berry’s chief of artillery, join this
line on the hill, leaving a section of Dimick on the road. And such part
of the disjecta membra of the Eleventh Corps as retains semblance of
organization is gathered in support of the guns. Capt. Best has begun to
fire solid shot over the heads of Berry’s men into the woods beyond; and,
as Gen. Lee says, the Confederate advance is checked in front of this
crest by the vigorous opposition encountered.

Hurried orders are despatched to Geary to withdraw his attack, and
re-occupy his breastworks. This he straightway accomplishes. Similar
orders are carried to Williams. But, before the latter can retrace his
steps, Jackson’s columns have reached the right of his late position.
Anderson also advances against him; so that Williams is obliged to move
cautiously by his left, and change front when he arrives where his line
had lately joined Geary’s and, being unable to take up his old post, he
goes into position, and prolongs Berry, south of the pike. It is long
after dark before he ascertains his bearings, and succeeds in massing his
division where it is needed.

Anxious as Jackson is to press on,—”Give me one hour more of
daylight, and I will have United-States Ford!” cries he,—he finds
that he must re-establish order in his scattered forces before he can
launch this night attack upon our newly formed but stubbornly maintained
lines.

Nor is the darkness the most potent influence toward this end. Illy as
Sickles’s advance has resulted thus far, it is now a sovereign element in
the salvation of the Army of the Potomac. His force at the Furnace,
Birney, Whipple, Barlow, and Pleasonton, amounts to fifteen thousand men,
and over forty guns. None of these officers are the men to stand about
idle. No sooner has Sickles been persuaded by a second courier,—the
first he would not credit,—that the Eleventh Corps has been
destroyed, and that Jackson is in his rear, than he comprehends that now,
indeed, the time has come to batter Jackson’s flank. He orders his column
to the right about, and moves up with all speed to the clearing, where
Pleasonton has held his cavalry, near Birney’s old front.

Howard, upon being attacked, had sent hurriedly for a cavalry regiment.
Pleasonton, having received orders to send him one, instructed Major Huey,
commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to march to Dowdall’s and
report to Howard. Huey set out by the wood road which leads through Hazel
Grove into the plank road. From the testimony of the persons chiefly
concerned it would appear that, at the time this order was given by
Pleasonton to Huey, there was at Hazel Grove, where the cavalry regiments
were drawn up, no sign whatever of the disaster to Howard. There were no
fugitives nor any confusion. Nor does the evidence show that Pleasonton
ordered any charge on the enemy: it rather shows that Huey was not
directed to go at urgent speed. And he must have been very deliberate in
his movement, for by the time the cavalry had reached the vicinity of the
plank road, Jackson had demolished the Eleventh Corps, and had advanced so
far that the head of this cavalry column, marching by twos, suddenly came
upon the Confederate lines. The officers in the lead at once gave the
order to charge, and right gallantly did these intrepid horsemen ride down
into the seething mass of exultant Confederate infantry. The shock was
nobly given and home, but was, of course, in the woods and against such
odds, of no great effect. Thirty men and three officers, including Major
Keenan, were killed. Only one Confederate report—Iverson’s—mentions
this charge. Its effect was local only.

Three batteries of Whipple’s division had remained in the Hazel Grove
clearing while the infantry had advanced towards the Furnace. When the
rout of the Eleventh Corps became clear, these eighteen guns were ordered
in battery, facing about north-west, by their commander, Capt. Huntington,
and kept up a heavy fire upon the woods through which Jackson was pushing
his way. Pleasonton, for his part, trained Martin’s horse-battery in the
same direction. Other guns were later added to these, and all expended a
good deal of ammunition on the enemy’s lines. But there was no fighting at
Hazel Grove rising to the distinction of a battle. The importance given to
it by Sickles and Pleasonton is not borne out by the facts. There was no
Federal loss, to speak of; nor do the Confederate reports make any comment
upon this phase of the battle. They probably supposed these guns to be an
extension of the line of batteries at Fairview. As such they were, without
question, of no inconsiderable use.

Meanwhile Birney, sending word to Barlow that they run danger of being cut
off, and detailing the Twentieth Indiana and Sixty-third Pennsylvania
Volunteers as rearguard, rejoins Sickles and Pleasonton in the clearing,
and both move up to sustain his flank.

So soon as Jackson’s guns gave Lee the intimation of his assault, the
latter advanced upon the Union line with sufficient vigor to prevent
Hooker from sending re-enforcements to his right. The attack was sharp;
and a general inclination to the left was ordered, to connect with
Jackson’s right as the latter brought his columns nearer. “These orders
were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy’s intrenchments,
while several batteries played with good effect upon his lines until
prevented by increasing darkness.” (Lee.)

McLaws reports: “My orders were to hold my position, not to engage
seriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that Gen.
Jackson had attacked… when I ordered an advance along the whole line to
engage with the skirmishers, which were largely re-enforced, and to
threaten, but not attack seriously; in doing which Gen. Wofford became so
seriously engaged, that I directed him to withdraw, which was done in good
order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to their
intrenchments.”

The movement of Anderson towards the left made a gap of considerable
distance in the Confederate line “but the skirmishers of Gen. Semmes, the
entire Tenth Georgia, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy to his
intrenchments.”

These accounts vary in no wise from those of the Union generals, who held
their positions in front of both Anderson and McLaws, and kept inside
their field-works.

Meade, whose line on the left of the army was not disturbed, sent Sykes’s
division, so soon as the Eleventh Corps rout became known to him, to the
junction of the roads to Ely’s and United-States Fords, to hold that point
at all hazards, and form a new right flank. This was done with Sykes’s
accustomed energy. Nor was he reached by Jackson’s line, and before
morning Reynolds fell in upon his right.

XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK.

When his troops had been summarily brought to a standstill by Berry’s firm
ranks and the heavy artillery fire, Jackson determined to withdraw his
first and second lines to Dowdall’s clearing to reform, and ordered A. P.
Hill forward to relieve them.

While this manoeuvre, rendered extremely difficult by the nature of the
woods in which the fighting had been done, but which Hooker was in no
condition to interfere with, was in progress, Sickles and Pleasonton,
whose position was considerably compromised, sought measures to
re-establish communication with the headquarters of the army.

Sickles despatched Col. Hart, with a cavalry escort, to Hooker, bearing a
detailed statement of his situation. This officer experienced no little
difficulty in reaching Chancellorsville. The roads being in possession of
the enemy, he was forced to make his way through the woods and ravines.
But after the lapse of a number of hours he succeeded in his mission, and
brought back word to hold on to the position gained. Sickles had so
advised, and had, moreover, requested permission to make a night attack,
to recover some guns, caissons, and Whipple’s ammunition-train, which had
been left in the woods in Sickles’s front, and to enable him to join his
right to Slocum’s new line, thrown out in prolongation of Berry.

It will be observed that Sickles was now facing northerly, and that his
rear had no obstacle on which to rest, so as to save him from the attack
of Lee, had the latter been aware of the weakness of his position.

In view of this fact, a move was made somewhat to his right, where a crest
was occupied near Hazel Grove. Here, says Pleasonton, “with the support of
Gen. Sickles’s corps we could have defeated the whole rebel army.” It was
clearly a strong position; for it is thus referred to by Stuart, after our
troops had been next day withdrawn: “As the sun lifted the mist that
shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right
was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered
thirty pieces to that point. The effect of this fire upon the enemy’s
batteries was superb.” Its possession by the Confederates did, in fact,
notably contribute to the loss of the new lines at Chancellorsville in
Sunday morning’s action.

From this position, at precisely midnight, Sickles made a determined
onslaught upon the Confederate right. It was clear, full moonlight, and
operations could be almost as well conducted as during the daytime, in
these woods.

Birney stationed Ward in the first line, and Hays in the second, one
hundred yards in the rear. The regiments moved by the right of companies,
with pieces uncapped, and strict orders to rely solely upon the bayonet.
On the road from the Furnace north, parallel to which the columns moved,
the Fortieth New York, Seventeenth Maine, and Sixty-Third Pennsylvania
Volunteers pushed in, in columns of companies at full distance.

Berry had been notified to sustain this attack by a movement forward from
his lines, if it should strike him as advisable.

The attack was made with consummate gallantry. Sickles states that he
drove the enemy back to our original lines, enabling us for the moment to
re-occupy the Eleventh Corps rifle-pits, and to re-capture several pieces
of artillery, despite the fire of some twenty Confederate guns which had
been massed at Dowdall’s.

Thus attacked in flank, though the Confederate right had been refused at
the time of Pleasonton’s fight, and still remained so, Hill’s line replied
by a front movement of his left on Berry, without being able, however, to
break the latter’s line.

Slocum states that he was not aware that this advance was to be made by
Sickles across his front. Imagining it to be a movement by the enemy on
Williams, he ordered fire to be opened on all troops that appeared, and
fears “that our losses must have been severe from our own fire.” Williams,
however, does not think so much damage was done, and alleges that he
himself understood what the movement was, without, however, quoting the
source of his information.

The Confederate reports state that this attack was met and repulsed by the
Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-third North-Carolina regiments, with
small difficulty or loss.

It is, however, probable that these as much underrate the vigor and effect
of the attack, as Sickles may overstate it. It is not impossible that some
portion of the Eleventh Corps position was actually reached by these
columns. The road down which the movement was made strikes the plank road
but a short distance east of the position of Buschbeck’s line. This ground
was not held in force by Jackson’s corps at the moment, and it was not
difficult for Sickles to possess himself temporarily of some portion of
that position. But it must have been a momentary occupation.

Birney retired to Hazel Grove after this sally, having recovered part of
Whipple’s train, and one or two guns.

There can be found in the Confederate and Union reports alike, numerous
statements which are not sustained by other testimony. As a sample, Gen.
Lane of A. P. Hill’s division states that a Lieut. Emack and four men
captured an entire Pennsylvania regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Smith. The
nearest approach to this is found in the capture of Col. Mathews and two
hundred men of the One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania, while
Williams was moving by his left to regain his old ground. But it is highly
probable that it required more than five men to effect the capture.

A wise rebuke of careless statements in official reports is found in the
following indorsements on a report made of the operations of the One
Hundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania:—

In forwarding this report, which I do merely as a matter of duty, it is
incumbent upon me to say that it is a complete romance from beginning to
end. Col. Collis has had his attention called to these errors, but has
refused to correct them.

This paper is forwarded with attention called to Brig.-Gen. Graham’s
indorsement. The officer is under arrest on charges of misbehavior before
the enemy.

XX. STONEWALL JACKSON.

It is probable that the wounding of Jackson at this juncture was the most
effectual cause of the Confederate check on Saturday night. It occurred
just after Jackson had concluded to withdraw his first and second lines to
Dowdall’s, there to re-form, and was making dispositions to move up A. P.
Hill to relieve them. Orders had been issued to the troops not to fire
unless at Union cavalry appearing in their front. Jackson, with some
staff-officers and orderlies, had ridden out beyond his lines, as was his
wont, to reconnoitre. On his return he was fired at by his own men, being
mistaken in the gloom for a Federal scout. Endeavoring to enter at another
place, a similar error was made, this time killing some of the party, and
wounding Jackson in several places. He was carried to the rear. A few days
after, he died of pneumonia brought on by his injury, which aggravated a
cold he was suffering from at the time.

A. P. Hill was wounded somewhat later that night.

After the disabling of these two officers, Stuart was sent for, and
promptly assumed command. With Col. Alexander, chief artillery officer
present for duty, (Gen. Crutchfield being wounded,) he spent the night
rectifying the Confederate lines, and selecting positions for his
batteries. It had been Jackson’s plan to push forward at night, to secure
the speediest results of his victory. But Stuart, after the attacks upon
his right by Sickles and Pleasonton, and having in view the disorganized
condition of his troops, thought wise to defer a general assault until
daylight. Having submitted the facts to Jackson, and received word from
this officer to use his own discretion in the matter, he decided to afford
his troops a few hours of rest. They were accordingly halted in line, and
lay upon their arms, an ample force of skirmishers thrown out in front.

No better place than this will be found in which to say a few words about
the remarkable man who planned and led this movement about Hooker’s flank,—a
manoeuvre which must have been condemned as foolhardy if unsuccessful, but
whose triumph wove a final wreath to crown his dying brows.

Thomas J. Jackson entered West Point a poor boy, essentially a son of the
people. He was a classmate of McClellan, Foster, Reno, Stoneman, Couch,
Gibbon, and many other noted soldiers, as well those arrayed against as
those serving beside him. His standing in his class was far from high; and
such as he had was obtained by hard, persistent work, and not by apparent
ability. He was known as a simple, honest, unaffected fellow, rough, and
the reverse of social; but he commanded his companions sincere respect by
his rugged honesty, the while his uncouth bearing earned him many a jeer.

He was graduated in 1846, and went to Mexico as second lieutenant of the
First United-States Artillery. He was promoted to be first lieutenant “for
gallant and meritorious services at Vera Cruz.” Twice mentioned in Scott’s
reports, and repeatedly referred to by Worth and Pillow for gallantry
while with Magruder’s battery, he emerged from that eventful campaign with
fair fame and abundant training.

We find him shortly afterwards professor at the Virginia Military
Institute of Lexington. Here he was known as a rigid Presbyterian, and a
“fatalist,” if it be fatalism to believe that “what will be will be,”—Jackson’s
constant motto.

Tall, gaunt, awkward, grave, brief, and business-like in all he did,
Jackson passed for odd, “queer,”—insane almost, he was thought by
some,—rather than a man of uncommon reserve power.

It was only when on parade, or when teaching artillery practice, that he
brightened up; and then scarcely to lose his uncouth habit, but only to
show by the light in his eye, and his wrapt attention in his work, where
lay his happiest tendencies.

His history during the war is too well known to need to be more than
briefly referred to. He was made colonel of volunteers, and sent to
Harper’s Ferry in May, 1861, and shortly after promoted to a brigade. He
accompanied Joe Johnston in his retreat down the valley. At Bull Run,
where his brigade was one of the earliest in the war to use the bayonet,
he earned his soubriquet of “Stonewall” at the lips of Gen. Bee. But in
the mouths of his soldiers his pet name was “Old Jack,” and the term was a
talisman which never failed to inflame the heart of every man who bore
arms under his banner.

Jackson possessed that peculiar magnetism which stirs the blood of
soldiers to boiling-point. Few leaders have ever equalled him in his
control of troops. His men had no questions to ask when “Old Jack” led the
way. They believed in him as did he in his star; and the impossible only
arrested the vigor of their onset, or put a term to their arduous marches.

His campaign in the valley against Fremont and Shields requires no praise.
And his movement about McClellan’s flank at Mechanicsville, and his still
more sterling manoeuvre in Pope’s campaign, need only to be called to
mind.

In the field he was patient, hard-working, careless of self, and full of
forethought for his men; though no one could call for and get from troops
such excessive work, on the march or in action. No one could ask them to
forego rations, rest, often the barest necessaries of life, and yet
cheerfully yield him their utmost efforts, as could “Old Jack.”

He habitually rode an old sorrel horse, leaning forward in a most
unmilitary seat, and wore a sun-browned cap, dingy gray uniform, and a
stock, into which he would settle his chin in a queer way, as he moved
along with abstracted look. He paid little heed to camp comforts, and
slept on the march, or by snatches under trees, as he might find occasion;
often begging a cup of bean-coffee and a bit of hard bread from his men,
as he passed them in their bivouacs, He was too uncertain in his
movements, and careless of self, for any of his military family to be able
to look after his physical welfare. In fact, a cold occasioned by lending
his cloak to one of his staff, a night or two before Chancellorsville, was
the primary cause of the pneumonia, which, setting in upon his exhausting
wounds, terminated his life.

Jackson was himself a bad disciplinarian. Nor had he even average powers
of organization. He was in the field quite careless of the minutiae of
drill. But he had a singularly happy faculty for choosing men to do his
work for him. He was a very close calculator of all his movements. He
worked out his manoeuvres to the barest mathematical chances, and insisted
upon the unerring execution of what he prescribed; and above all be
believed in mystery. Of his entire command, he alone knew what work he had
cut out for his corps to do. And this was carried so far that it is said
the men were often forbidden to ask the names of the places through which
they marched. “Mystery,” said Jackson, “mystery is the secret of success
in war, as in all transactions of human life.”

Jackson was a professing member of the Presbyterian Church, and what is
known as a praying man. By this is meant, that, while he never
intentionally paraded or obtruded upon his associates his belief in the
practical and immediate effect of prayer, he made no effort to hide his
faith or practice from the eyes of the world. In action, while the whole
man was wrought up to the culminating pitch of enthusiasm, and while every
fibre of his mind and heart was strained towards the achievement of his
purpose, his hand would often be instinctively raised upwards; and those
who knew him best, believed this to be a sign that his trust in the help
of a Higher Power was ever present.

Jackson was remarkable as a fighter. In this he stands with but one or two
peers. Few men in the world’s history have ever got so great results from
armed men as he was able to do. But to judge rightly of his actual
military strength is not so easy as to award this praise. Unless a general
has commanded large armies, it is difficult to judge of how far he may be
found wanting if tried in that balance. In the detached commands which he
enjoyed, in the Valley and elsewhere, his strategic ability was marked:
but these commands were always more or less limited; and, unlike Lee or
Johnston, Jackson did not live long enough to rise to the command of a
large army upon an extended and independent field of operations.

In Gen. Lee, Jackson reposed an implicit faith. “He is the only man I
would follow blindfold,” said Jackson. And Lee’s confidence in his
lieutenant’s ability to carry out any scheme he set his hand to, was
equally pronounced. Honestly, though with too much modesty, did Lee say:
“Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the
country, to have been disabled in your stead.”

But, illy as Lee could spare Jackson, less still could the Army of
Northern Virginia spare Robert E. Lee, the greatest in adversity of the
soldiers of our civil war. Still, after Jackson’s death, it is certain
that Lee found no one who could attempt the bold manoeuvres on the field
of battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined the
name of Jackson to all posterity.

It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to larger commands,
he would have been found equal to the full exigencies of the situation.
Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited but independent scope,
seems to testify to the fact that he was far from having reached his
limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done; and he never appears to have
been taxed to the term of his powers, in any operation which he undertook.

Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice to
account for Jackson’s military success. But those alone who have served
under his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his has
sounded them: they only can testify to the full measure of the strength of
Stonewall Jackson.

XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.

Gen. Hooker’s testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War
comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him
with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a report
of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it to
some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsville is
thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of the Eleventh
Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap to arrest
Jackson, “and if possible to seize, and at all hazards hold, the high
ground abandoned by that corps,” he says:—

“Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported that
the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position,
and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on the
Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was
communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace out a
new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night,
as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy
should renew the attack the next morning.”

“The position” at Dowdall’s “was the most commanding one in the vicinity.
In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to
enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps.” “To wrest this
position from the enemy after his batteries were established upon it,
would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as
fast as they were thrown upon it.” Slender columns of infantry were at
this time among Hooker’s pet ideas.

“Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as
practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the
movement which had been ordered to be made on our left.”

“The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o’clock in the morning,
and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring
into action until eleven o’clock, when orders were given for the army to
establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The position
I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and I kept the
troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling me to hear
of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick.” Thus much Hooker.

The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially that
to which the operation of Saturday had led.

The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and
Twelfth Corps, supported by Whipple’s Second brigade (Bowman’s), in front
to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry.

In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile
from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest
less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in its
front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear, deepening
to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry’s division held this
line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had fought over
since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat later was
Whipple’s First brigade (Franklin’s). Berdan’s sharpshooters formed a
movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown out by Berry
from his own troops.

A section of Dimick’s battery was trained down the road.

Williams’s division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank
road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to
it; while Mott’s brigade was massed in rear of Williams’s right.

Near Williams’s left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came Geary’s
division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the day before; and
on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not materially changed its
position since Friday.

The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared
fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high
crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview.

At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until just before
daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as an almost
impregnable point d’appui, and which, so long as it was held, practically
prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee’s severed wings,
had lain Birney’s and Whipple’s divisions. This point they had occupied,
(as already described,) late the evening before, after Sickles and
Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson’s right brigades. But
Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession of this height would
enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the other’s lines; and
before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move back to
Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp had to be
bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all but Graham had
been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade by Archer of
Hill’s command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove height; but it
was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and caisson stalled in the
swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, and was directed to place
his two divisions so as to strengthen the new line at Fairview.

Reynolds’s corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat blind
instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, from the
Rapidan to the junction of Ely’s and United-States Ford roads, in a
location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh and
eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into action at
all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his enforced
inactivity.

The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relieved
Meade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds’s left, (having rapidly moved
to the cross roads at dusk on Saturday;) while Meade with the rest of his
corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into position to support
this entire line on the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac. Thus
three strong army corps henceforth disappear from effective usefulness in
the campaign.

The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectified
during the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of A.
P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archer on
the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extending
towards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was in
reserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refused from
the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible drive Sickles
from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view to forcing a
connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry by the Catharpen
road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with like purpose.

Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble’s division; while Rodes,
who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, now made the
third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on the right of the
line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grove crest, and at
Melzi Chancellor’s, in the clearing, where the Eleventh Corps had met its
disaster.

There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry’s, Whipple’s,
and Birney’s divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams’s of the Twelfth,)
consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the whole of Jackson’s corps,
now reduced to about the same effective; while Anderson, on the left of
the plank road, feeling out towards the Furnace, and McLaws on the right,
with seventeen thousand men between them, confronted our left centre,
consisting of Geary of the Twelfth, and Hancock of the Second Corps,
numbering not much above twelve thousand for duty.

Owing to Hooker’s ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability to
concentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contest in
which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederate
success to offset our intrenchments.

The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk and
freshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever,
unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and River roads.

Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker’s confidence, thus explains his
understanding of the situation Saturday night: “The position of the Third
Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson’s cavalry” (? corps),
“cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee’s right. No
thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our side; and,
unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive battle. By our
leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy to hold
our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be thrown upon
his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it. To render
this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, (about
twenty thousand strong,) was to leave his position in front of the enemy’s
lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon Gen. Lee’s rear at daylight.”

This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it was
impracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee’s rear by daylight. The
balance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even if
unassisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success.

To examine into its manner of execution.

XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW.

At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men, who had
been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave orders for a
slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal or Archer and
McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that Sickles was being
withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart’s order was interpreted
as a command for the anticipated general attack, and the advancing columns
soon provoked the fire of the expectant Federals.

Seeing that the men were ready for their work, rations or no rations,
Stuart wisely refrained from recalling them; and Berry and Williams
betimes felt the shock of the strong line of A. P. Hill, which Alexander
seconded by opening with his artillery in full action. The Confederates
forged ahead with the watchword, “Charge, and remember Jackson!” And this
appeal was one to nerve all hearts to the desperate task before them.

Hotchkiss thus describes the field of operations of this morning: “The
first line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up in
the night, and was very formidable. The engineer division of the Union
Army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had been unremittingly
engaged in its construction. A vast number of trees had been felled, and
formed into a heavy rampart, all approach to which was rendered extremely
difficult by an abattis of limbs and brushwood. On the south side of the
road this line is situated upon a ridge, on the Chancellorsville side of
Lewis Creek, one of the numerous head-waters of the Mattapony. It is
intersected by the smaller branches of this creek, and the ravines in
which they run. These ravines extended behind the Federal lines, almost to
the plank road, and afforded excellent positions for successive stands. In
the morning, Sickles extended to the west of the creek, and held the
elevated plateau at Hazel Grove. This is the most commanding point, except
Fairview, in the vicinity. On the north of the plank road, the ground is
more level. The line thus crossed several small branches, the origin of
some small tributaries of the Rappahannock, but the ravines on that side
are not considerable. From the ridge occupied by the first line, the
ground falls away to the east, until the valley of another branch of Lewis
Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an abrupt
slope to the Fairview hill, which rises directly from it on the eastern
side. From the first line of the creek, extends on both sides of the road
a dense forest. From the latter point to Fairview heights, and to
Chancellorsville, on the south side of the road, the country is cleared.
This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs from near
Chancellorsville, between Fairview and the works occupied by Slocum. It
extends some distance on the north of the road.

“Behind the front line of works, there were some defences in the valley
near the creek, not constituting a connecting line, however; and these in
turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which covered the
Fairview heights, and were more strongly constructed even than the first.”

It was at just the time of Rodes’s assault, that Birney had received
orders to withdraw from his cardinal position at the angle made by Geary
and Williams, and to form as a second and third line near the plank road,
a duty there was an abundance of troops to fill. He retired, and ployed
into brigade columns by regiments, immediately beyond the crest of
Fairview hill. Here, placing batteries in position, he shelled the field
from which he had just withdrawn. This crest, however, Archer speedily
occupied; and on its summit Stuart, with better foresight than Hooker,
posted some thirty guns under Walker, which enfiladed our lines with
murderous effect during the remainder of the combat of Sunday, and
contributed largely to our defeat.

The attack of the Confederates was made, “as Jackson usually did, in heavy
columns” (Sickles), and was vigorous and effective. According to their own
accounts, the onset was met with equal cheerful gallantry. While Archer
occupied Hazel Grove, McGowan and Lane assaulted the works held by
Williams, carried them with an impetuous rush, and pushed our troops well
back. This rapid success was largely owing to a serious breach made in the
Union line by the decampment of the Third Maryland Volunteers, a full
regiment of Knipe’s brigade, which held the right of Williams’s division
on the plank road. The regiment was composed of new men, no match for
Jackson’s veterans. They stood as well as raw troops can, in the face of
such an onslaught; but after a loss of about a hundred men, they yielded
ground, and were too green to rally. Into the gap thus made, quickly
poured a stream of Lane’s men, thus taking both Berry’s and Williams’s
lines in reverse. The Second Brigade was compelled to change front to meet
this new attack: Mott was instantly thrown forward to fill the interval;
and after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle he regained the lost ground,
and captured eight stands of colors and about a thousand prisoners. This
separated Archer from the main line, and took in their turn McGowan and
Lane in reverse, precipitately driving them back, and enabling our columns
to regain the ground lost by the fierceness of the Confederate inroad.
This sally in reverse likewise carried back Lane and Heth, the entire
corps having suffered severely from the excellent service of the Federal
guns. But the effect on Williams’s division of this alternating gain and
loss, had been to cause it to waver; while having for an instant captured
our works, was encouragement to our foes.

On the north of the road, Pender and Thomas had at first won equal fortune
against Berry’s works, but their success had been equally short-lived. For
the falling-back of Jackson’s right, and the cheering of the Union line as
its fire advanced in hot pursuit, gave at the same moment notice to the
Confederate left that it was compromised, and to our own brave boys the
news of their comrades’ fortune. Pender and Thomas were slowly but surely
forced back, under a withering fire, beyond the breastworks they had won.
A second time did these veterans rally for the charge, and a second time
did they penetrate a part of our defences; only, however, to be taken in
flank again by Berry’s right brigade, and tumbled back to their
starting-point. But their onset had shown so great determination, that
Ward was despatched to sustain Berry’s right, lest he should be eventually
over-matched.

The Federal line on the north of the plank road had thus doggedly resisted
the most determined attacks of Jackson’s men, and had lost no ground. And
so hard pressed indeed was Pender by gallant Berry’s legions, that
Colquitt’s brigade was sent to his relief. Pender’s men had early expended
all their ammunition, word whereof was sent to Stuart, but merely to evoke
renewal of that stubborn officer’s orders to hold their ground with the
bayonet, and at all hazards. And such orders as these were wont to be
obeyed by these hardened warriors.

The three Confederate lines of attack had soon, as on yesternight, become
one, as each pushed forward to sustain the other. The enemy “pressed
forward in crowds rather than in any regular formation” (Sickles); but the
momentum of these splendid troops was well-nigh irresistible. Nichols’s
brigade of Trimble’s division, and Iverson’s and Rodes’s of Rodes’s
division, pressed forward to sustain the first line on the north of the
road, and repel the flank attack, constantly renewed by Berry. Another
advance of the entire line was ordered. Rodes led his old brigade in
person. The Confederates seemed determined, for Jackson’s sake, to carry
and hold the works which they had twice gained, and out of which they had
been twice driven; for, with “Old Jack” at their head, they had never
shown a sterner front.

Now came the most grievous loss of this morning’s conflict. Gallant Berry,
the life of his division, always in the hottest of the fire, reckless of
safety, had fallen mortally wounded, before Ward’s brigade could reach his
line. Gen. Revere assumed command, and, almost before the renewal of the
Confederate attack, “heedless of their murmurs,” says Sickles’s report,
“shamefully led to the rear the whole of the Second Brigade, and portions
of two others, thus subjecting these proud soldiers, for the first time,
to the humiliation of being marched to the rear while their comrades were
under fire. Gen. Revere was promptly recalled with his troops, and at once
relieved of command.” Revere certainly gives no satisfactory explanation
of his conduct; but he appears to have marched over to the vicinity of
French of the Second Corps, upon the White House clearing, and reported to
him with a large portion of his troops. Revere was subsequently
courtmartialled for this misbehavior, and was sentenced to dismissal; but
the sentence was revoked by the President, and he was allowed to resign.

Col. Stevens was speedily put in command in Revere’s stead; but he, too,
soon fell, leaving the gallant division without a leader, nearly half of
its number off the field, and the remainder decimated by the bloody
contest of the past four hours. Moreover, Gen. Hays, whose brigade of
French’s division had been detached in support of Berry, where it had done
most gallant work, was at the same time wounded and captured by the enemy.

It was near eight o’clock. The artillery was quite out of ammunition,
except canister, which could not be used with safety over the heads of our
troops. Our outer lines of breastworks had been captured, and were held by
the enemy. So much as was left of Berry’s division was in absolute need of
re-forming. Its supports were in equally bad plight. The death of Berry,
and the present location of our lines in the low ground back of the crest
just lost, where the undergrowth was so tangled and the bottom so marshy,
that Ward, when he marched to Berry’s relief, had failed to find him,
obliged the Federals to fall back to the Fairview heights, and form a new
line at the western edge of the Chancellor clearing, where the artillery
had been so ably sustaining the struggle now steadily in progress since
daylight. Sickles himself supervised the withdrawal of the line, and its
being deployed on its new position.

The receding of the right of the line also necessitated the falling-back
of Williams. The latter officer had, moreover, been for some time quite
short of ammunition; and though Graham had filled the place of a part of
his line, and had held it for nearly two hours, repeatedly using the
bayonet, Williams was obliged to give way before Stuart’s last assault.
But Graham was not the man readily to accept defeat; and, as Williams’s
line melted away, he found himself isolated, and in great danger of being
surrounded. Gen. Birney fortunately became aware of the danger before it
was too late; and, hastily gathering a portion of Hayman’s brigade, he
gallantly led them to the charge in person; and, under cover of this
opportune diversion, Graham contrived to withdraw in good order, holding
McGowan severely in check.

The Union troops now establish their second line near Fairview. The
Confederates’ progress is arrested for the nonce. It is somewhat after
eight A.M. A lull, premonitory only of a still fiercer tempest,
supervenes.

But the lull is of short duration. Re-forming their ranks as well as may
be on the south of the road, the Confederates again assault the Union
second line, on the crest at Fairview. But the height is not readily
carried. The slope is wooded, and affords good cover for an assault. But
the artillery on the summit can now use its canister; and the Union troops
have been rallied and re-formed in good order. The onset is met and driven
back, amid the cheers of the victorious Federals.

Nor are Stuart’s men easily discouraged. Failure only seems to invigorate
these intrepid legions to fresh endeavors. Colston’s and Jones’s brigades,
with Paxton’s, Ramseur’s, and Doles’ of the third line, have re-enforced
the first, and passed it, and now attack Williams with redoubled fury in
his Fairview breastworks, while Birney sustains him with his last man and
cartridge. The Confederate troops take all advantage possible of the
numerous ravines in our front; but the batteries at Fairview pour a heavy
and destructive fire of shell and case into their columns as they press
on. Every inch of ground is contested by our divisions, which hold their
footing at Fairview with unflinching tenacity.

Meanwhile Doles, moving under cover of a hill which protects him from the
Federal batteries, and up a little branch coming from the rear of
Fairview, takes in reverse the left of Williams’s line, which has become
somewhat separated from Geary, (whose position is thus fast becoming
untenable,) moves up, and deploys upon the open ground at
Chancellorsville. But he finds great difficulty in maintaining his
footing, and would have at once been driven back, when Paxton’s (old
Stonewall) brigade comes up to his support on the double-quick. Jackson’s
spirit for a while seems to carry all before it; the charge of these two
brigades against our batteries fairly bristles with audacity; but our guns
are too well served, and the gallant lines are once again decimated and
hustled back to the foot of the crest.

The seizure of Hazel Grove, from which Sickles had retired, had now begun
to tell against us. It had enabled the Confederates not only to form the
necessary junction of their hitherto separated wings, but to enfilade our
lines in both directions. The artillery under Walker, Carter, Pegram, and
Jones, was admirably served, and much better posted than our own guns at
Fairview. For this height absolutely commanded the angle made by the lines
of Geary and Williams, and every shot went crashing through heavy masses
of troops. Our severest losses during this day from artillery-fire
emanated from this source, not to speak of the grievous effect upon the
morale of our men from the enfilading missiles.

About eight A.M., French, one of whose brigades, (Hays’s,) had been
detached in support of Berry, and who was in the rifle-pits on the Ely’s
Ford road near White House, facing east, perceiving how hotly the conflict
was raging in his rear, on the right of the Third Corps line, and having
no enemy in his own front, assumed the responsibility of placing four
regiments of Carroll’s brigade in line on the clearing, facing
substantially west, and formed his Third Brigade on their right,
supporting the left batteries of the Fifth Corps. This was a complete
about-face.

Soon after taking up this position, Hooker ordered him forward into the
woods, to hold Colquitt and Thomas in check, who were advancing beyond the
right of Sickles’s position at Fairview, and compromising the withdrawal
to the new lines which was already determined upon. Says French: “In a
moment the order was given. The men divested themselves of all but their
fighting equipment, and the battalions marched in line across the plain
with a steady pace, receiving at the verge of the woods the enemy’s fire.
It was returned with great effect, followed up by an impetuous charge….
The enemy, at first panic-stricken by the sudden attack on his flank,
broke to the right in masses, leaving in our hands several hundred
prisoners, and abandoning a regiment of one of our corps in the same
situation.”

But French had not driven back his antagonist to any considerable distance
before himself was outflanked on his right by a diversion of Pender’s. To
meet this new phase of the combat, he despatched an aide to Couch for
re-enforcements; and soon Tyler’s brigade appeared, and went in on his
right. This fight of French and Tyler effectually repelled the danger
menacing the White House clearing. It was, however, a small affair
compared to the heavy fighting in front of Fairview. And, the yielding of
Chancellorsville to the enemy about eleven A.M. having rendered untenable
the position of these brigades, they were gradually withdrawn somewhat
before noon.

Still Jackson’s lines, the three now one confused mass, but with
unwavering purpose, returned again and again to the assault. Our regiments
had become entirely depleted of ammunition; and, though Birney was ordered
to throw in his last man to Williams’s support, it was too late to prevent
the latter from once more yielding ground.

For, having resisted the pressure of Stuart’s right for nearly four hours,
his troops having been for some time with empty cartridge-boxes,
twenty-four hours without food, and having passed several nights without
sleep, while intrenching, Williams now felt that he could no longer hold
his ground. The enemy was still pressing on, and the mule-train of small
ammunition could not be got up under the heavy fire. His artillery had
also exhausted its supplies; Sickles was in similar plight; Jackson’s men,
better used to the bayonet, and possessing the momentum of success, still
kept up their vigorous blows. Williams’s line therefore slowly fell to the
rear, still endeavoring to lean on Sickles’s left.

Sickles, who had kept Hooker informed of the condition of affairs as they
transpired, and had repeatedly requested support, now sent a more urgent
communication to him, asking for additional troops. Major Tremaine reached
headquarters just after the accident to Hooker, and received no
satisfaction. Nor had a second appeal better results. What should and
could easily have been done at an earlier moment by Hooker,—to wit,
re-enforce the right centre (where the enemy was all too plainly using his
full strength and making the key of the field), from the large force of
disposable troops on the right and left,—it was now too late to
order.

Before nine A.M., Sickles, having looked in vain for re-enforcements,
deemed it necessary to withdraw his lines back of Fairview crest. Himself
re-formed the divisions, except that portion withdrawn by Revere, and led
them to the rear, where the front line occupied the late artillery
breastworks. Ammunition was at once re-distributed.

We had doubtless inflicted heavy losses upon the Confederates. “Their
formation for attack was entirely broken up, and from my headquarters they
presented to the eye the appearance of a crowd, without definite
formation; and if another corps had been available at the moment to have
relieved me, or even to have supported me, my judgment was that not only
would that attack of the enemy have been triumphantly repulsed, but that
we could have advanced on them, and carried the day.” (Sickles.)

On the Chancellorsville open occurred another sanguinary struggle. Stuart
still pressed on with his elated troops, although his men were beginning
to show signs of severe exhaustion. Franklin’s and Mott’s brigades, says
Sickles, “made stern resistance to the impulsive assaults of the enemy,
and brilliant charges in return worthy of the Old Guard.”

But, though jaded and bleeding from this prolonged and
stubbornly-contested battle, Jackson’s columns had by no means relaxed
their efforts. The blows they could give were feebler, but they were
continued with the wonderful pertinacity their chief had taught them; and
nothing but the Chancellor clearing, and with it the road to
Fredericksburg, would satisfy their purpose.

And a half-hour later, Sickles, finding himself unsupported on right and
left, though not heavily pressed by the enemy, retired to
Chancellorsville, and re-formed on the right of Hancock, while portions of
three batteries held their ground, half way between Chancellorsville and
Fairview, and fired their last rounds, finally retiring after nearly all
their horses and half their men had been shot, but still without the loss
of a gun.

With characteristic gallantry, Sickles now proposed to regain the Fairview
crest with his corps, attacking the enemy with the bayonet; and he thinks
it could have been done. But, Hooker having been temporarily disabled, his
successor or executive, Couch, did not think fit to license the attempt.
And shortly after, Hooker recovered strength sufficient to order the
withdrawal to the new lines at White House; and Chancellorsville was
reluctantly given up to the enemy, who had won it so fairly and at such
fearful sacrifice.

In retiring from the Chancellor clearing, Sickles states that he took,
instead of losing, prisoners and material. This appears to be true, and
shows how Stuart had fought his columns to the utmost of their strength,
in driving us from our morning’s position. He says: “At the conclusion of
the battle of Sunday, Capt. Seeley’s battery, which was the last battery
that fired a shot in the battle of Chancellorsville, had forty-five horses
killed, and in the neighborhood of forty men killed and wounded;” but “he
withdrew so entirely at his leisure, that he carried off all the harness
from his dead horses, loading his cannoneers with it.” “As I said before,
if another corps, or even ten thousand men, had been available at the
close of the battle of Chancellorsville, on that part of the field where I
was engaged, I believe the battle would have resulted in our favor.” Such
is the testimony of Hooker’s warmest supporter. And there is abundant
evidence on the Confederate side to confirm this assumption.

The losses of the Third Corps in the battle of Sunday seem to have been
the bulk of that day’s casualties.

There can be no limit to the praise earned by the mettlesome veterans of
Jackson’s corps, in the deadly fight at Fairview. They had continuously
marched and fought, with little sleep and less rations, since Thursday
morning. Their ammunition had been sparse, and they had been obliged to
rely frequently upon the bayonet alone. They had fought under
circumstances which rendered all attempts to preserve organization
impossible. They had charged through tangled woods against
well-constructed field-works, and in the teeth of destructive
artillery-fire, and had captured the works again and again. Never had
infantry better earned the right to rank with the best which ever bore
arms, than this gallant twenty thousand,—one man in every four of
whom lay bleeding on the field.

Nor can the same meed of praise be withheld from our own brave legions.
Our losses had been heavier than those of the enemy. Generals and
regimental commanders had fallen in equal proportions. Our forces had,
owing to the extraordinary combinations of the general in command, been
outnumbered by the enemy wherever engaged. While we had received the early
assaults behind breastworks, we had constantly been obliged to recapture
them, as they were successively wrenched from our grasp,—and we had
done it. Added to the prestige of success, and the flush of the charge,
the massing of columns upon a line of only uniform strength had enabled
the Confederates to repeatedly capture portions of our intrenchments, and,
thus taking the left and right in reverse, to drive back our entire line.
But our divisions had as often done the same. And well may the soldiers
who were engaged in this bloody encounter of Sunday, May 3, 1863, call to
mind with equal pride that each met a foeman worthy of his steel.

Say Hotchkiss and Allan: “The resistance of the Federal army had been
stubborn. Numbers, weight of artillery, and strength of position, had been
in its favor. Against it told heavily the loss of morale due to the
disaster of the previous day.”

XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE.

While the bulk of the fighting had thus been done by the right centre,
Anderson was steadily forcing his way towards Chancellorsville. He had
Wright’s, Posey’s, and Perry’s brigades on the left of the plank road, and
Mahone’s on the right, and was under orders to press on to the Chancellor
clearing as soon as he could join his left to Jackson’s right. He speaks
in his report as if he had little fighting to do to reach his destination.
Nor does Geary, who was in his front, mention any heavy work until about
nine A.M.; for Geary’s position was jeopardized by the enfilading fire of
Stuart’s batteries on the Hazel-Grove hill, and by the advance of Stuart’s
line of battle, which found his right flank in the air. He could scarcely
be expected to make a stubborn contest under these conditions.

While thus hemmed in, Geary “obeyed an order to retire, and form my
command at right angles with the former line of battle, the right resting
at or near the Brick House,” (Chancellorsville). While in the execution of
this order, Hooker seems to have changed his purpose, and in person
ordered him back to his original stand, “to hold it at all hazards.”

In some manner, accounted for by the prevalent confusion, Greene’s and
Kane’s brigades had, during this change of front, become separated from
the command, and had retired to a line of defence north of the Chancellor
House. But on regaining the old breastworks, Geary found two regiments of
Greene’s brigade still holding them.

Now ensued a thorough-going struggle for the possession of these
breastworks, and they were tenaciously hung to by Geary with his small
force, until Wright had advanced far beyond his flank, and had reached the
Chancellor clearing; when, on instructions from Slocum, he withdrew from
the unequal strife, and subsequently took up a position on the left of the
Eleventh Corps.

Anderson now moved his division forward, and occupied the edge of the
clearing, where the Union forces were still making a last stand about
headquarters.

McLaws, meanwhile, in Couch’s front, fought mainly his skirmishers and
artillery. Hancock strengthened Miles’s outpost line, who “held it nobly
against repeated assaults.”

While this is transacting, Couch orders Hancock to move up to the
United-States Ford road, which he imagines to be threatened by the enemy;
but the order is countermanded when scarcely begun. There is assuredly a
sufficiency of troops there.

But Hancock is soon obliged to face about to ward off the advance of the
enemy, now irregularly showing his line of battle upon the
Chancellorsville clearing, while Sickles and Williams slowly and sullenly
retire from before him.

The enemy is gradually forcing his way towards headquarters. Hancock’s
artillery helps keep him in check for a limited period; but the batteries
of Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, all directing a converging fire on the
Chancellor House, make it, under the discouraging circumstances, difficult
for him to maintain any footing.

When Couch had temporarily assumed command, Hancock, before Geary was
forced from his intrenchments by Anderson, disposed the Second Corps, with
its eighteen pieces of artillery, in two lines, facing respectively east
and west, about one mile apart. But Geary’s relinquishment of the
rifle-pits allowed the flanks of both the lines to be exposed, and
prevented these dispositions from answering their purpose. Hancock clung
to his ground, however, until the enemy had reached within a few hundred
yards. Then the order for all troops to be withdrawn within the new lines
was promulgated, and the removal of the wounded from the Chancellor House
was speedily completed,—the shelling by the enemy having set it on
fire some time before.

Hancock’s artillery at the Chancellor House certainly suffered severely;
for, during this brief engagement, Leppien’s battery lost all its horses,
officers, and cannoneers, and the guns had to be removed by an infantry
detail, by hand.

The Confederate army now occupied itself in refitting its shattered ranks
upon the plain. Its organization had been torn to shreds, during the
stubborn conflict of the morning, in the tangled woods and marshy ravines
of the Wilderness; but this had its full compensation in the possession of
the prize for which it had contended. A new line of battle was formed on
the plank road west of Chancellorsville, and on the turnpike east. Rodes
leaned his right on the Chancellor House, and Pender swung round to
conform to the Federal position. Anderson and McLaws lay east of Colston,
who held the old pike, but were soon after replaced by Heth, with part of
A. P. Hill’s corps.

In the woods, where Berry had made his gallant stand opposite the fierce
assaults of Jackson, and where lay by thousands the mingled dead and
wounded foes, there broke out about noon a fire in the dry and inflammable
underbrush. The Confederates detailed a large force, and labored bravely
to extinguish the flames, equally exhibiting their humanity to suffering
friend and foe; but the fire was hard to control, and many wounded
perished in the flames.

XXIV. THE NEW LINES.

The new lines, prepared by Gens. Warren and Comstock, in which the Army of
the Potomac might seek refuge from its weaker but more active foe, lay as
follows:—

Birney describes the position as a flattened cone. The apex touched
Bullock’s, (White House or Chandler’s,) where the Mineral-Spring road,
along which the left wing of the army had lain, crosses the road from
Chancellorsville to Ely’s Ford.

Bullock’s lies on a commanding plateau, with open ground in its front,
well covered by our artillery. This clearing is north of and larger than
the Chancellor open, and communicates with it. The position of the troops
on the left was not materially changed, but embraced the corps of Howard
and Slocum. The right lay in advance of and along the road to Ely’s, with
Big Hunting Run in its front, and was still held by Reynolds. At the apex
were Sickles and Couch.

The position was almost impregnable, and covered in full safety the line
of retreat to United-States Ford, the road to which comes into the Ely’s
Ford road a half-mile west of Bullock’s.

To these lines the Second, Third, and Twelfth Corps retired, unmolested by
the enemy, and filed into the positions assigned to each division.

Only slight changes had been made in the situation of Meade since he took
up his lines on the left of the army. He had, with wise forethought, sent
Sykes at the double-quick, after the rout of the Eleventh Corps, to seize
the cross-roads to Ely’s and United-States Fords. Here Sykes now occupied
the woods along the road from Bullock’s to connect with Reynolds’s left.

Before daylight Sunday morning, Humphreys, relieved by a division of the
Eleventh Corps, had moved to the right, and massed his division in rear of
Griffin, who had preceded him on the line, and had later moved to Geary’s
left, on the Ely’s Ford road. At nine A.M., he had sent Tyler’s brigade to
support Gen. French, and with the other had held the edge of
Chancellorsville clearing, while the Third and Twelfth Corps retired to
the new lines.

And, when French returned to these lines, he fell in on Griffin’s left.

About noon of Sunday, then, the patient and in no wise discouraged Union
Army lay as described, while in its front stood the weary Army of Northern
Virginia, with ranks thinned and leaders gone, but with the pride of
success, hardly fought for and nobly earned, to reward it for all the
dangers and hardships of the past few days.

Gen. Lee, having got his forces into a passable state of re-organization,
began to reconnoitre the Federal position, with a view to another assault
upon it. It was his belief that one more hearty effort would drive Hooker
across the river; and he was ready to make it, at whatever cost. But,
while engaged in the preparation for such an attempt, he received news
from Fredericksburg which caused him to look anxiously in that direction.

XXV. SUNDAY’S MISCARRIAGE.

The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles,
furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having more or
less remote or immediate effect upon each other.

The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantly called
upon to manoeuvre explains “why the numerous bloody battles fought between
the armies of the Union and of the secessionists should have been so
indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, will help to
relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequently made at home and
abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in battle,—battles
that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests, where artillery and
cavalry could play no part; where the troops could not be seen by those
controlling their movements; where the echoes and reverberations of sound
from tree to tree were enough to appall the strongest hearts engaged, and
yet the noise would often be scarcely heard beyond the immediate scene of
strife. Thus the generals on either side, shut out from sight and from
hearing, had to trust to the unyielding bravery of their men till couriers
from the different parts of the field, often extending for miles, brought
word which way the conflict was resulting, before sending the needed
support. We should not wonder that such battles often terminated from the
mutual exhaustion of both contending forces, but rather, that, in all
these struggles of Americans against Americans, no panic on either side
gave victory to the other, like that which the French under Moreau gained
over the Austrians in the Black Forest.” (Warren.)

The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz., to drive their
opponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite their right and
left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road to Fredericksburg,
where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish this end, they attacked the
centre of Hooker’s army,—the right centre particularly,—which
blocked their way towards both objects.

It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it is
abundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony already
quoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy’s plans, he had acquired
full knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart’s corps was
still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought the evening
before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially changed their
position in front of Geary and Hancock. He could have ascertained, by an
early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps-commanders did so on
their own responsibility,) that there was no enemy whatsoever confronting
his right and left flanks, where three corps, the First, Fifth, and
Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the foe. And the obvious
thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to hold these flanks, which
were protected by almost insuperable natural obstacles, as well as
formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous troops well in hand, as
a central reserve, in the vicinity of headquarters, to be launched against
the attacking columns of the enemy, wherever occasion demanded.

Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses of
Saturday, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half the
number. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was put to
good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. On the
other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely a quarter
was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for duty was given
no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking the onset of the
elated champions of the South.

Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker’s inertness. There
was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with his fresh
and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front by Hunting
Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strong column from
his front, and take Stuart’s line of battle in reverse. Indeed, a short
march of three miles by the Ely’s Ford, Haden’s Ford, and Greenwood Gold
Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy, would have enabled
Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank, or seize Dowdall’s
clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negative all Stuart’s efforts
in front of Fairview. Or an advance through the forest would have
accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground was difficult, and cut
up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground had been, in this campaign,
no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor would it have been to Reynolds, had
he been given orders to execute such a manoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in
his testimony: “The action raged with the greatest fury near us on our
left.” “I thought that the simple advance of our corps would take the
enemy in flank, and would be very beneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds
once or twice contemplated making this advance on his own responsibility.
Col. Stone made a reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable.”

The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corps on
the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine and River
roads to attack McLaws’s right flank. Barely three miles would have
sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operating distance
of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fit for such
work, after its defeat of Saturday night. But testimony is abundant to
show that the corps was fully able to do good service early on Sunday
morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flight from
Dowdall’s had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hooker was
apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcely deem
them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meade available
for the work proposed.

Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hooker
conceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wing under
Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Hercules instead
of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculations were that
Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin’s and Pollock’s crossings,
three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilize his corps, pass
the river, capture the heights, where in December a few Southern brigades
had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, march a dozen miles, and
fall upon Lee’s rear, all in the brief space of four or five hours. And it
was this plan he chose to put into execution, deeming others equal to the
performance of impossibilities, while himself could not compass the
easiest problems under his own eye.

To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of the
performances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would be
but fair. But Sedgwick’s execution of his orders must stand on its own
merits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere.

An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker’s sluggishness, is that he
was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, between nine
and ten A.M., on the porch of the Chancellor House, listening to the heavy
firing at the Fairview crest, when a shell struck and dislodged one of the
pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck and stunned him; and he was
doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitated for work.

But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to have
entirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander,
but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the general
direction of affairs himself.

And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker’s thorough inability to grasp
the situation, and handle the conditions arising from the responsibility
of so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at latest Friday
morning. And from this time his enervation was steadily on the increase.
For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday morning’s conflict was
already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at early dawn so to dispose his
forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams if over-matched, or to broach
some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy’s attention to his own safety.

It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. But the
odium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are guiltless
of the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the prime source
of this fallacy has been Hooker’s ever-ready self-exculpation by
misinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while his subordinates
have held their peace. And this is not alone for the purpose of
vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and its
corps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired to
reiterate what has already been said,—that it is in all appreciation
of Hooker’s splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in
this campaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain
Hooker’s courage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever
commanded an army corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for.
But Hooker could not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his
predecessor, he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to
himself. Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved the
shifting of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of his subordinates,—principally
Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullest estimation of Hooker’s brilliant
conduct on other fields, is in no wise incompatible with the freest
censure for the disasters of this unhappy week. For truth awards praise
and blame with equal hand; and truth in this case does ample justice to
the brave old army, ample justice to Hooker’s noble aides.

The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately the intentions
of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Saturday night. It was
self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held in check, so
long as Jackson’s corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed, they would
have necessarily remained on the defensive so long as isolated. Instead,
then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one division of the Twelfth, to
confront Jackson’s magnificent infantry, had Hooker withdrawn an entire
additional corps, (he could have taken two,) and thrown these troops in
heavy masses at dawn on Stuart, while Birney retained Hazel Grove, and
employed his artillery upon the enemy’s flank; even the dauntless men,
whose victories had so often caused them to deem themselves invincible,
must have been crushed by the blows inflicted.

But there is nothing at all, on this day, in the remotest degree
resembling tactical combination. And, long before the resistance of our
brave troops had ceased, all chances of successful parrying of Lee’s
skilful thrusts had passed away.

Hooker’s testimony is to the effect that he was merely lighting on Sunday
morning to retain possession of the road by which Sedgwick was to join
him, and that his retiring to the lines at Bullock’s was predetermined.

The following extract from the records of the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, illustrates both this statement, and Hooker’s method of
exculpating himself by crimination of subordinates. “Question to Gen.
Hooker.—Then I understand you to say, that, not hearing from Gen.
Sedgwick by eleven o’clock, you withdrew your troops from the position
they held at the time you ordered Gen. Sedgwick to join you.

“Answer.—Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantage
I was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference in
corps-commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone and
character to his corps. Some of our corps-commanders, and also officers of
other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight.”

But, apart from the innuendo, all this bears the stamp of an
after-thought. If an army was ever driven from its position by fair
fighting, our troops were driven from Chancellorsville. And it would seem,
that, if there was any reasonable doubt on Saturday night that the Army of
the Potomac could hold its own next day, it would have been wiser to have
at once withdrawn to the new lines, while waiting for the arrival of
Sedgwick. For here the position was almost unassailable, and the troops
better massed; and, if Lee had made an unsuccessful assault, Hooker would
have been in better condition to make a sortie upon the arrival of the
Sixth Corps in his vicinity, than after the bloody and disheartening work
at Fairview.

Still the inactivity of Hooker, when Sedgwick did eventually arrive within
serviceable distance, is so entire a puzzle to the student of this
campaign, that speculation upon what he did then actually assume as facts,
or how he might have acted under any other given conditions, becomes
almost fruitless.

XXVI. SEDGWICK’S CHANGE OF ORDERS.

Let us return to the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, where
operations now demanded Lee’s undivided skill. This was properly the left
wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstration below
Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to cross the river
above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It had consisted of three
corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effected its purpose, it will
be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick’s command both the First
and Third Corps, leaving him with his own, the Sixth, to guard the
crossings of the river; while Gibbon’s division of the Second Corps did
provost duty at the camp at Falmouth, and held itself in readiness to move
in any direction at a moment’s notice.

From this time on, the Sixth Corps may be more properly considered as a
detached command, than as the left wing of the Army of the Potomac.

And, beyond some demonstrations in aid of Hooker’s manoeuvring, Sedgwick
had been called on to perform no actual service up to the evening of May
2.

On May 1, a demonstration in support of Hooker’s advance from
Chancellorsville had been ordered, and speedily countermanded, on account
of the despatch having reached Sedgwick later than the hour set for his
advance.

On the forenoon of May 2, Hooker had given Sedgwick discretionary
instructions to attack the enemy in his front, “if an opportunity presents
itself with a reasonable expectation of success.”

Then came the despatch of 4.10 P.M., May 2, already quoted, and received
by Sedgwick just before dark:—

“The general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick cross the river as soon
as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with every thing in it,
and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying, trying to
save his trains: two of Sickles’s divisions are among them.”

This despatch was immediately followed by another: “The major-general
commanding directs you to pursue the enemy by the Bowling-Green road.”

In pursuance of these and previous orders, Sedgwick transferred the
balance of the Sixth Corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, one
division being already there to guard the bridge-head. Sedgwick’s orders
of May 1 contemplated the removal of the pontoons before his advance on
the Bowling-Green road, as he would be able to leave no sufficient force
to guard them. But these orders were received so late as daylight on the
2d; and the withdrawal of the bridges could not well be accomplished in
the full view of the enemy, without prematurely developing our plans.

The order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road having been again repeated,
Sedgwick put his command under arms, advanced his lines, and forced the
enemy—Early’s right—from that road and back into the woods.
This was late in the evening of Saturday.

On the same night, after the crushing of the Eleventh Corps, we have seen
how Hooker came to the conclusion that he could utilize Sedgwick in his
operations at Chancellorsville. He accordingly sent him the following
order, first by telegraph through Gen. Butterfield, at the same time by an
aide-de-camp, and later by Gen. Warren:—

The major-general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick crosses the
Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once
take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect
with us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on
the road. He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train of
small ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will
probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and
between us we will use him up. Send word to Gen. Gibbon to take possession
of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest
messenger. Send word that it is delivered to Gen. Sedgwick.

At eleven P.M., when this order of ten o’clock was received, Sedgwick had
his troops placed, and his dispositions taken, to carry out the orders to
pursue, on the Bowling-Green road, an enemy indicated to him as in rapid
retreat from Hooker’s front; and was actually in bivouac along that road,
while a strong picket-line was still engaged skirmishing with the force in
his front. By this time the vanguard of his columns had proceeded a
distance variously given as from one to three miles below the bridges in
this direction; probably near the Bernard House, not much beyond Deep
Creek.

It is to be presumed that the aide who bore the despatch, and reached
Sedgwick later than the telegram, gave some verbal explanation of this
sudden change of Hooker’s purpose; but the order itself was of a nature to
excite considerable surprise, if not to create a feeling of uncertainty.

Sedgwick changed his dispositions as speedily as possible, and sent out
his orders to his subordinates within fifteen minutes after receipt of
Hooker’s despatch; but it was considerably after midnight before he could
actually get his command faced about, and start the new head of column
toward Fredericksburg.

Knowing the town to be occupied by the Confederates, Sedgwick was obliged
to proceed with reasonable caution the five or six miles which separated
his command from Fredericksburg. And the enemy appears to have been
sufficiently on the alert to take immediate measures to check his progress
as effectually as it could with the troops at hand.

Fredericksburg and the heights beyond were held by Early’s division and
Barksdale’s brigade, with an adequate supply of artillery,—in all
some eighty-five hundred men. Sedgwick speaks, in his testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, as if he understood at this time that
Early controlled a force as large as his own; but he had been advised by
Butterfield that the force was judged to be much smaller than it actually
was.

In his report, Early does not mention Sedgwick’s advance on the
Bowling-Green road, nor is it probable that Sedgwick had done more than to
advance a strong skirmish-line beyond his column in that direction.
Early’s line lay, in fact, upon the heights back of the road, his right at
Hamilton’s Crossing, and with no considerable force on the road itself. So
that Sedgwick’s advance was skirmishing with scouting-parties, sent out to
impede his march.

Early had received general instructions from Lee, in case Sedgwick should
remove from his front, to leave a small force to hold the position, and
proceed up the river to join the forces at Chancellorsville. About eleven
A.M. on the 2d, this order was repeated, but by error in delivery (says
Lee) made unconditional. Early, therefore, left Hays and one regiment of
Barksdale at Fredericksburg, and, sending part of Pendleton’s artillery to
the rear, at once began to move his command along the plank road to join
his chief.

As this manoeuvre was in progress, his attention was called to the early
movements of Sedgwick, and, sending to Lee information on this point, he
received in reply a correction of the misdelivered order. He therefore
about-faced, and returned to his position at a rapid gait.

It is doubtful whether by daylight, and without any considerable
opposition, Sedgwick could have marched the fifteen miles to
Chancellorsville in the few hours allotted him. Nor is it claimed by
Hooker that it was possible for Sedgwick to obey the order of ten P.M.
literally; for it was issued under the supposition that Sedgwick was still
on the north bank of the river. But Hooker does allege that Sedgwick took
no pains to keep him informed of what he was doing; whence his incorrect
assumption. To recross the river for the purpose of again crossing at
Fredericksburg would have been a lame interpretation of the speedy
execution of the order urged upon Sedgwick. He accordingly shifted his
command, and, in a very short time after receiving the despatch, began to
move by the flank on the Bowling-Green road towards Fredericksburg,
Newton’s division in the advance, Howe following, while Brooks still held
the bridge-head.

It was a very foggy night; which circumstance, added to the fact that
Sedgwick was, in common with all our generals, only imperfectly familiar
with the lay of the land, and that the enemy, active and well-informed,
enveloped him with a curtain of light troops, to harass his movement in
whatever direction, materially contributed to the delay which ensued.

And Sedgwick appears to have encountered Early’s pickets, and to have done
some skirmishing with the head of his column, immediately after passing
west of Franklin’s Crossing, which, moreover, gave rise to some
picket-firing all along the line, as far as Deep Run, where Bartlett
confronted the enemy. As the outskirts of the town were entered, four
regiments of Wheaton’s and Shaler’s brigades were sent forward against the
rifle-pits of the enemy, and a gallant assault was made by them. But it
was repulsed, with some loss, by the Confederates, who, as on Dec. 13,
patiently lay behind the stone wall and rifle-pits, and reserved their
fire until our column was within twenty yards. Then the regiments behind
the stone wall, followed by the guns and infantry on the heights, opened a
fire equally sudden and heavy, and drove our columns back upon the main
body. The assault had been resolute, as the casualties testify, “one
regiment alone losing sixty-four men in as many seconds” (Wheaton); but
the darkness, and uncertainty of our officers with regard to the position,
made its failure almost a foregone conclusion. This was about daylight.
“The force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to show that the
intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost.” (Sedgwick.)

The officer by whom the order to Sedgwick had been sent, Capt.
Raderitzchin, had not been regularly appointed in orders, but was merely a
volunteer aide-de-camp on Gen. Hooker’s staff.

Shortly after he had been despatched, Gen. Warren requested leave himself
to carry a duplicate of the order to Sedgwick, (Capt. Raderitzchin being
“a rather inexperienced, headlong young man,”) for Warren feared the “bad
effect such an impossible order would have on Gen. Sedgwick and his
commanders, when delivered by him.” And, knowing Warren to be more
familiar with the country than any other available officer, Hooker
detached him on this duty, with instructions again to impress upon
Sedgwick the urgent nature of the orders. Warren, with an aide, left
headquarters about midnight, and reached Sedgwick before dawn.

As daylight approached, Warren thought he could see that only two
field-pieces were on Marye’s heights, and that no infantry was holding the
rifle-pits to our right of it. But the stone-wall breastworks were held in
sufficient force, as was demonstrated by the repulse of the early assault
of Shaler and Wheaton.

And Warren was somewhat in error. Barksdale, who occupied Fredericksburg,
had been closely scanning these movements of Sedgwick’s. He had some
fourteen hundred men under his command. Six field-pieces were placed near
the Marye house. Several full batteries were on Lee’s hill, and near
Howison’s. And, so soon as Fredericksburg was occupied by our forces,
Early sent Hays to re-enforce Barksdale; one regiment of his brigade
remaining on Barksdale’s right, and the balance proceeding to Stansbury’s.

For, at daylight on Sunday, Early had received word from Barksdale, whose
lines at Fredericksburg were nearly two miles in length, that the Union
forces had thrown a bridge across the river opposite the Lacy house; and
immediately despatched his most available brigade to sustain him.

Early’s line, however, was thin. Our own was quite two and a half miles in
length, with some twenty-two thousand men; and Early’s eighty-five hundred
overlapped both our flanks. But his position sufficiently counterbalanced
this inequality. Moreover his artillery was well protected, while the
Union batteries were quite without cover, and in Gibbon’s attempted
advance, his guns suffered considerable damage.

Brooks’s division was still on the left of the Federal line, near the
bridge-heads. Howe occupied the centre, opposite the forces on the
heights, to our left of Hazel Run. Newton held the right as far as the
Telegraph road in Fredericksburg.

Gibbon’s division had been ordered by Butterfield to cross to
Fredericksburg, and second Sedgwick’s movement on the right. Gibbon states
that he was delayed by the opposition of the enemy to his laying the
bridge opposite the Lacy house, but this was not considerable. He appears
to have used reasonable diligence, though he did not get his bridge thrown
until daylight. Then he may have been somewhat tardy in getting his
twenty-five hundred men across. And, by the time he got his bridge thrown,
Sedgwick had possession of the town.

It was seven A.M. when Gibbon had crossed the river with his division, and
filed into position on Sedgwick’s right. Gibbon had meanwhile reported in
person to Sedgwick, who ordered him to attempt to turn the enemy’s left at
Marye’s, while Howe should open a similar movement on his right at Hazel
Run. Gens. Warren and Gibbon at once rode forward to make a
reconnoissance, but could discover no particular force of the enemy in our
front. Just here are two canals skirting the slope of the hill, and
parallel to the river, which supply power to the factories in the town.
The generals passed the first canal, and found the bridge across it
intact. The planks of the second canal-bridge had been removed, but the
structure itself was still sound.

Gibbon at once ordered these planks to be replaced from the nearest
houses. But, before this order could be carried out, Warren states that he
saw the enemy marching his infantry into the breastworks on the hill,
followed by a battery. This was Hays, coming to Barksdale’s relief. But
the breastworks contained a fair complement before.

Gibbon’s attempt was rendered nugatory by the bridge over the second canal
being commanded from the heights, the guns on which opened upon our
columns with shrapnel, while the gunners were completely protected by
their epaulements. And a further attempt by Gibbon to cross the canal by
the bridge near Falmouth, was anticipated by the enemy extending his line
to our right.

Gen. Warren states that Gen. Gibbon “made a very considerable
demonstration, and acted very handsomely with the small force he had,—not
more than two thousand men. But so much time was taken, that the enemy got
more troops in front of him than he could master.”

Gen. Howe had been simultaneously directed to move on the left of Hazel
Run, and turn the enemy’s right; but he found the works in his front
beset, and the character of the stream between him and Newton precluded
any movement of his division to the right.

By the time, then, that Sedgwick had full possession of the town, and
Gibbon and Howe had returned from their abortive attempt to turn the
enemy’s flanks, the sun was some two hours high. As the works could not be
captured by surprise, Sedgwick was reduced to the alternative of
assaulting them in regular form.

It is not improbable that an earlier attack by Gibbon on Marye’s heights,
might have carried them with little loss, and with so much less expense of
time that Sedgwick could have pushed beyond Salem Church, without being
seriously impeded by troops sent against him by Gen. Lee.

And, as the allegation of all-but criminal delay on the part of Gen.
Sedgwick is one of the cardinal points of Hooker’s self-defence on the
score of this campaign, we must examine this charge carefully.

Sedgwick asserts with truth, that all despatches to him assumed that he
had but a handful of men in his front, and that the conclusions as to what
he could accomplish, were founded upon utterly mistaken premises. Himself
was well aware that the enemy extended beyond both his right and left, and
the corps knew by experience the nature of the intrenchments on the
heights.

Moreover, what had misled Butterfield into supposing, and informing
Sedgwick, as he did, that the Fredericksburg heights had been abandoned,
was a balloon observation of Early’s march to join Lee under the mistaken
orders above alluded to. The enemy was found to be alert wherever Sedgwick
tapped him, and his familiarity with every inch of the ground enabled him
to magnify his own forces, and make every man tell; while Sedgwick was
groping his way through the darkness, knowing his enemy’s ability to lure
him into an ambuscade, and taking his precautions accordingly.

XXVII. SEDGWICK’S ASSAULT.

Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general assault, he can scarcely
be blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four months before,
a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defences against
half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without careful dispositions
seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear to be almost
supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable time consumed in
these precautions.

There had been a more or less continuous artillery-fire, during the entire
morning, from our batteries stationed on either side of the river. This
was now redoubled to prepare for the assault. Newton’s batteries
concentrated their fire on the stone wall, until our troops had neared it,
when they directed it upon the crest beyond; while like action was
effected to sustain Howe.

Instructions were issued to the latter, who at once proceeded to form
three storming columns under Gen. Neill, Col. Grant, and Col. Seaver, and
supported them by the fire of his division artillery.

Sedgwick at the same time ordered out from Newton’s division two other
columns, one under Col. Spear, consisting of two regiments, supported by
two more under Gen. Shaler, and one under Col. Johns of equal size, to
move on the plank road, and to the right of it, flanked by a line under
Col. Burnham, with four regiments, on the left of the plank road. This
line advanced manfully at a double-quick against the rifle-pits, neither
halting nor firing a shot, despite the heavy fire they encountered, until
they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works, while the
columns pressed boldly forward to the crest, and carried the works in
their rear. All the guns and many prisoners were captured. This was a
mettlesome assault, and as successful as it was brief and determined.

Howe’s columns, in whose front the Confederate skirmishers occupied the
railroad-cutting and embankment, while Hays and two regiments of Barksdale
were on Lee’s and adjacent hills, as soon as the firing on his right was
heard, moved to the assault with the bayonet; Neill and Grant pressing
straight for Cemetery hill, which, though warmly received, they carried
without any check. They then faced to the right, and, with Seaver
sustaining their left, carried the works on Marye’s heights, capturing
guns and prisoners wholesale.

A stand was subsequently attempted by the Confederates on several
successive crests, but without avail.

The loss of the Sixth Corps in the assault on the Fredericksburg heights
was not far from a thousand men, including Cols. Spear and Johns,
commanding two of the storming columns.

The assault of Howe falls in no wise behind the one made by Newton. The
speedy success of both stands out in curious contrast to the deadly work
of Dec. 13. “So rapid had been the final movement on Marye’s hill, that
Hays and Wilcox, to whom application had been made for succor, had not
time to march troops from Taylor’s and Stansbury’s to Barksdale’s aid.”
(Hotchkiss and Allan.)

The Confederates were now cut in two: Wilcox and Hays were left north of
the plank road, but Hays retreated round the head of Sedgwick’s column,
and rejoined Early. Wilcox, who, on hearing of Sedgwick’s manoeuvres
Sunday morning, had hurried with a portion of his force to Barksdale’s
assistance at Taylor’s, but had arrived too late to participate in the
action, on ascertaining Sedgwick’s purpose, retired slowly down the plank
road, and skirmished with the latter’s head of column. And he made so
determined a stand near Guest’s, that considerable time was consumed in
brushing it away before Sedgwick could hold on his course.

Early appears to deem the carrying of the Fredericksburg heights to
require an excuse on his part. He says in his report about our preliminary
assaults: “All his efforts to attack the left of my line were thwarted,
and one attack on Marye’s hill was repulsed. The enemy, however, sent a
flag of truce to Col. Griffin, of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment, who
occupied the works at the foot of Marye’s hill with his own and the
Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment, which was received by him imperfectly;
and it had barely returned before heavy columns were advanced against the
position, and the trenches were carried, and the hill taken.” “After this
the artillery on Lee’s hill, and the rest of Barksdale’s infantry, with
one of Hays’s regiments, fell back on the Telegraph road; Hays with the
remainder being compelled to fall back upon the plank road as he was on
the left.” Later, “a line was formed across the Telegraph road, at Cox’s
house, about two miles back of Lee’s hill.”

Barksdale says, “With several batteries under the command of Gen.
Pendleton, and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not less
than three miles to defend, extending from Taylor’s hill on the left, to
the foot of the hills in the rear of the Howison house.”

Gen. Wilcox, he goes on to state, from Banks’s Ford, had come up with
three regiments as far as Taylor’s, and Gen. Hays was also in that
vicinity; but “the distance from town to the points assailed was so short,
the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removing troops from
one part of the line to another was so great, that it was utterly
impossible for either Gen. Wilcox or Gen. Hays to reach the scene of
action in time to afford any assistance whatever. It will then be seen
that Marye’s hill was defended by but one small regiment, three companies,
and four pieces of artillery.”

Barksdale further states that, “upon the pretext of taking care of their
wounded, the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second assault at
Marye’s hill, which was granted by Col. Griffin; and thus the weakness of
our force at that point was discovered.”

The bulk of Early’s division was holding the heights from Hazel Run to
Hamilton’s Crossing; and the sudden assault on the Confederate positions
at Marye’s, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity of
sustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfair use
was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale.

The loss in this assault seems heavy, when the small force of Confederates
is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, inasmuch as the
guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but the infantry fire was very
telling; and, as already stated, both colonels commanding the assaulting
columns on the right were among the casualties.

The enemy’s line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks’s Ford
and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton’s Crossing,
it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersed Early’s forces,
and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. But orders precluded
anything but an immediate advance.

The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions,
so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee’s
pressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it was
feasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. If
this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to assume that he could
have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early’s attention and forestall attacks
on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of his corps, the
vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals were hardest
pressed, say ten A.M., and most needed a diversion in their favor.

Not that Hooker’s salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick’s so
doing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. But
it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground for
fault-finding.

Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick’s whole manoeuvre is good
enough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, and
would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more been required
of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his orders, it
may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren—

“It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does a
large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force will
stop him.”

“The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve
thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind of
picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing
without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, a
little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At daylight,
the head of Gen. Sedgwick’s troops had got into Fredericksburg. I think
some little attempt had been made to move forward a skirmish-line, but
that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in position.”

“My opinion was, that, under the circumstances, the most vigorous effort
possible ought to have been made, without regard to circumstances, because
the order was peremptory.” But this statement is qualified, when, in his
examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, to a question
as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick’s vigorous and energetic
attempt to comply with Hooker’s order would have led to a different result
of the battle, Warren answered: “Yes, sir! and I will go further, and say
that I think there might have been more fighting done at the other end of
the line. I do not believe that if Gen. Sedgwick had done all he could,
and there had not been harder fighting on the other end of the line, we
would have succeeded.”

If, at eleven P.M., when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediately
marched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town,
and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness of the
night, but pushing on his men as best he might, it is not improbable that
he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle by daylight. But is
it not also probable that his corps would have been in questionable
condition for either a march or a fight? It would be extravagant to expect
that the organization of the corps could be preserved in any kind of form,
however slight the opposition. And, as daylight came on, the troops would
have scarcely been in condition to offer brilliant resistance to the
attack, which Early, fully apprised of all their movements, would have
been in position to make upon their flank and rear.

Keeping in view all the facts,—that Sedgwick was on unknown ground,
with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and with
Sedgwick’s every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where a few
months before one man had been more than a match for ten; that the night
was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares by this order,—it
seems that to expect him to carry the heights before daylight, savors of
exorbitance.

But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered in
some of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorous
construction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheaton and
Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against the
works. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of the
instructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the canal, and
Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the assaulting columns, after
ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless.

All this, however, in no wise whatsoever shifts any part of the
responsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker’s to Sedgwick’s
shoulders. The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and impracticable.
Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick’s corps as an element in his
problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville.

Sedgwick’s movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid than
those of Sickles on Saturday, and no one has undertaken to criticise the
latter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attacking
Sedgwick in force until Monday at six P.M., as will shortly be detailed,
when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon on
Sunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, precious as
every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing to assault
Sedgwick’s position in front of Banks’s Ford.

In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show how
unreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from Gen.
Butterfield’s testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.
“From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was not
over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. This
information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday by Gen.
Sedgwick. They told me they were left there with orders, that, if they did
not receive re-enforcements by a certain time, to withdraw; that they did
withdraw about eleven o’clock on Saturday night, but met re-enforcements
coming up, and turned back and re-occupied the works. The statement may
have been false, or may have been true.” It was clearly Early’s march
under his mistaken instructions, which the prisoners referred to. “If
true, it would show that a bold movement of Gen. Sedgwick’s command on
Saturday night, would have taken Marye’s heights, and put him well on the
road towards Gen. Hooker before daylight.” To the question whether the
order could have been actually carried out: “There was a force of the
enemy there, but in my judgment not sufficient to have prevented the
movement, if made with a determined attack. Night attacks are dangerous,
and should be made only with very disciplined troops. But it seemed to me
at the time that the order could have been executed.”

Gibbon, on the contrary, is of opinion that the strict execution of the
order was impracticable, but that probably an assault could have been made
at daylight instead of at eleven A.M. He recollects being very impatient
that morning about the delay,—not, however, being more specific in
his testimony.

XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER.

So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, he
made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in
Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of the
river, and to shield the bridges.

“Gen. Brooks’s division was now given the advance, and he was farthest in
the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place.” Brooks had so
extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw with
extreme caution. “This necessarily consumed a considerable time, and
before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at Chancellorsville
had ceased.” (Warren.)

This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under the stringency
of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the then leading
division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate assistance to Hooker
at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming columns assaulted Marye’s
heights, Hooker had already been driven into his lines at White House. And
though none of his strictures upon Sedgwick’s tardiness, as affecting his
own situation, will bear the test of examination, time will not be
considered wholly ill-spent in determining where Sedgwick might have been
more expeditious. It no doubt accords with military precedents, to
alternate in honoring the successive divisions of a corps with the post of
danger; but it may often be highly improper to arrest an urgent progress
in order to accommodate this principle. And it was certainly inexpedient
in this case, despite the fact that Newton and Howe had fought their
divisions, while Brooks had not yet been under fire.

“The country being open, Gen. Brooks’s division was formed in a column of
brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the front and
flank in advance, and the artillery on the road.” (Warren.) The New Jersey
brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett’s brigade on the left, of the
road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might be attacked as
soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoid the usual
manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, or from an
extended order of march.

Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This “greatly
extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, and put it out
of support, in a measure, of the division in advance.” (Warren.) Howe
brought up the rear.

Meanwhile Wilcox, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest’s, as long as his
slender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River road
near Taylor’s. But Sedgwick’s cautious advance gave him the opportunity of
sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish along the
plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery by
cross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. Here he
took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance to Sedgwick,
until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at that place, he
withdrew to the position assigned him in the line of battle now formed by
that officer.

When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plank
road, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring to reach
the depots at Hamilton’s, he concentrated at Cox’s all his forces, now
including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word to
McLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that he
would on the morrow attack Marye’s heights with his right, and extend his
left over to join the main line.

XXIX. SALEM CHURCH.

It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured his
stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his
communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee and
Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at first
Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purpose to
destroy the line in Lee’s rear, but that he was checked by Early. The
nature, however, of Sedgwick’s orders precluded his doing this, and there
is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. And it was not
long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out towards the
battle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilcox in his front.

McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson’s, was
accordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilcox; while
Anderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns, was
sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold that
important position. McLaws arrived about two P.M., and found Wilcox
skirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a few hundred
yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilcox’s right, and
Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late, as he had
been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plank roads to guard
them. McLaws’s guns were concentrated on the road, but were soon withdrawn
for lack of ammunition.

Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse near by,
in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederate line
was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where a clearing
lay at their back.

When Sedgwick’s column reached the summit along the road, about a mile
from Salem Church, Wilcox’s cavalry skirmishers were met, and a section of
artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, where
Wilcox was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground was quite
open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are not
considerable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, and
as far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, and
the woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road.

Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his division
being on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, so
soon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries (Rigby,
Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the road, not far
from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the caissons and
limbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling fire, and,
passing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods where lay Wilcox
and Semmes and Mahone. Wilcox’s skirmishers and part of his line gave way
before Brooks’s sturdy onset, which created no little confusion; but
Wilcox and Semmes in person headed some reserve regiments, and led them to
the charge. An obstinate combat ensues. Bartlett has captured the
schoolhouse east of the church, advances, and again breaks for a moment
the Confederate line. Wilcox throws in an Alabama regiment, which delivers
a fire at close quarters, and makes a counter-charge, while the rest of
his brigade rallies on its colors, and again presses forward. The church
and the schoolhouse are fought for with desperation, but only after a
heroic defence can the Confederates recapture them. Bartlett withdraws
with a loss of two-fifths of his brigade, after the most stubborn contest.
The line on the north of the road is likewise forced back. A series of
wavering combats, over this entire ground, continues for the better part
of an hour; but the enemy has the upper hand, and forces our line back
towards the toll-house.

Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks had
thus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a loss of
nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton has meanwhile
formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe’s division later
falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorously followed up his
retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister at short range, the
distance of our batteries from the woods being not much over five hundred
yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLaws states, that it is
impossible to make head against this new line; and the Confederates
sullenly retire to their position near the church, which they had so
successfully held against our gallant assaults, followed, but not
seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks’s and Newton’s regiments.

Wheaton’s brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position on
the right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford’s line; but our
left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advanced ground
from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile from Salem
Church.

The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable to engage
seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined to the
infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable share in the
day’s work, and had earned their laurels well.

It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle.

Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line.

The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg.

Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, passes the
following comment upon this action:—

“Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on
about three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could not
carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights
differently, we might have won that place also.”

“Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough supported
by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was just one of those
wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been stronger at that
moment, we would have won; not being so, they won.”

It is probable, that, had Brooks’s attack been delayed until Newton and
Howe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keep
possession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed. But it
was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtful whether the
capture of Salem heights would have materially altered the event. It was
the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing which determined the
result of this campaign. Sedgwick’s corps could effect nothing by its own
unaided efforts.

XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY.

So soon as Wilcox had retired from Banks’s Ford to oppose Sedgwick’s
advance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, and
established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who up to this
time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, reaching
Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, telegraphed
Sedgwick as follows:—

“I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, and
repulsed the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack him
to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in force
unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for
him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up
communication with Gen. Benham at Banks’s Ford and Fredericksburg. You can
go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks’s Ford would bring
you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than
falling back to Fredericksburg.”

And later:—

“I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that we contracted
our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy’s last
assault with ease. The troops are in good position. Gen. Hooker says you
are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You
need not try to force the position you attacked at five P.M. Look to the
safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, by way of
Fredericksburg or Banks’s Ford: the latter would enable you to join us
more readily.”

The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P.M. next day, and
was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, in his
testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, rather
apologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on the score
of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflects the ideas of
Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence, fathered by
Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that there was then no
idea of retiring across the river.

And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not, in
tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick,
either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his mind
plainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet failings.
And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in good-will, ability,
or conduct, it is strange that there should not be some apparent
expression of it. It was only when he was driven to extremity in
explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit suggested Sedgwick
as an available scapegoat.

During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid
himself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker’s defences. And,
trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his opponent’s
lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson’s remaining three brigades to the
forces opposing Sedgwick’s wing, leaving only Jackson’s corps, now
numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with his eighty
thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself repaired to the
battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the intention of driving
Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again concentrate all his
powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville.

By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox’s, and
with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only a few of
Gibbon’s men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and instructed
to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to join McLaws, feeling
our position with Smith’s brigade, and ascertaining the left of our line
to lie near Taylor’s, and to extend from there down to the plank road.

At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick’s knowledge, that
the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut him off
from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks’s Ford as a possible
outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to throw a force
about Howe’s left, and seize the approaches to the ford; but it was timely
met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this affair two hundred
prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any serious movement to cut
him off from Banks’s Ford, Sedgwick had already formed Howe’s division in
line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, from the river to the plank
road.

In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from Sedgwick
only general—in fact, vague—and rare instructions, as to the
dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular
manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon
information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line, over
two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men.

The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this
condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across
Banks’s Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a
disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick had
scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee’s twenty-five thousand,
and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with the left
on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks’s Ford, running
southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south side for
nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which Wheaton had
held the night before. This was a long, weak position, depending upon no
natural obstacles; but it was, under the circumstances, well defended by a
skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen.
Newton’s division held the right of this line, facing west; Gen. Brooks
had Russell’s brigade, also posted so as to face west, on the left of
Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert faced south, the former resting his
left somewhere near Howe’s right brigade. This portion of the line was, on
Monday afternoon, re-enforced by Wheaton’s brigade of Newton’s division,
withdrawn from the extreme right; and here it rendered effective service
at the time the attack was made on Howe, and captured a number of
prisoners. The bulk of Howe’s division lay facing east, from near Guest’s
house to the river. The whole line of battle may be characterized,
therefore, as a rough convex order,—or, to describe it more
accurately, lay on three sides of a square, of which the Rappahannock
formed the fourth. This line protected our pontoon-bridges at Scott’s Dam,
a mile below Banks’s Ford.

No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where
he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks’s Ford, and
attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight.

Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till
night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker’s caution
to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the information that
he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far away to direct him
with intelligence.

Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, till
Tuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later page.

Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall’s
brigade of Gibbon’s division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and
occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated with
McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; but McLaws,
not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the troops Early
and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of Anderson, whom he
knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem Church.

Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been making
preparations for a demonstration against Hooker’s left at
Chancellorsville, and had there amused himself by shelling a park of
supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at the crossing
of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived about eleven A.M. at
the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he was got into line on
Early’s left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so stubbornly
defended against Brooks.

Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by
one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg.

The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary
reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick’s centre by a vigorous assault;
and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch of
the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in our
front.

“Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the
broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of
ascertaining the disposition of the enemy’s forces.” (Lee.) But more or
less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day,—to cover the
disposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately to
ascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held by
Sedgwick’s divisions.

Not until six were Lee’s preparations completed to his satisfaction; but
about that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a general
advance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of the
line, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill on
which Downman’s house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up the
hills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre.

On Early’s left came Anderson, whose brigades extended—in order,
Wright, Posey, Perry—to a point nearly as far as, but not joining,
McLaws’s right at about Shed’s farm; Mahone of Anderson’s division
remained on McLaws’s extreme left, where he had been placed on account of
his familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilcox occupied his
ground of Sunday.

Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command the
Union artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws’s line.
It was Alexander’s opening fire which was the signal for the general
assault.

The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and was held
in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. “The speedy approach
of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the success of the
attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river.” “His right brigades,
under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the direction of
the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they could only join in the
pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity, and
rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our own
troops. Their movements were consequently slow.” (Lee.)

Early’s assault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns,
and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began, and
Hays’s and Hoke’s brigades (says Early) were thrown into some confusion by
coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, below Guest’s house.
Barksdale remained at Marye’s hill, with Smith on his left in reserve.

The weakness of Howe’s long line, obliged that officer carefully to study
his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to an interior
line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed his reserves
accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line, held by Gen.
Neill’s brigade, and two regiments of Grant’s, was a small covering of
woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficient artillery, were
concentrated. The main assault was made upon his left by Hoke and Hays.
Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe’s firm front, though made
with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous attack upon his right was
by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed back, and, by suddenly
advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturing nearly all the Eighth
Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by the over-advance of our eager
troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon’s brigade, which was enabled to
move down a ravine in rear of Howe’s right, and compelled its hasty
withdrawal.

Meanwhile Neill’s brigade, on Howe’s left, was overpowered by Early’s
fierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we had lost
nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to the previously
selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hoke and Hays, the
Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton’s division and Butler’s regular
battery, sent to Howe’s support by Sedgwick, opened upon them so sharp a
fire, that they retired in headlong confusion, largely increased by the
approaching darkness. This terminated the fight on the left, and Howe’s
line was no further molested during the night.

Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked by
McLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has been laid
down. It is one of those frequent assertions, made in the best of faith,
but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of a recent
combat and from unreliable evidence.

XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS.

Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee’s attack the necessity of contracting his
lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton’s and Brooks’s divisions and the
Light Brigade (Col. Burnham’s), were ordered to fall rapidly back upon
Banks’s Ford, where they took position on the heights in the vicinity, and
in Wilcox’s rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, and disposed on
Newton’s right.

In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Howe
appears to think that he was unfairly dealt with by Sedgwick; in fact,
that his division was intentionally left behind to be sacrificed. But this
opinion is scarcely justified by the condition of affairs and subsequent
events.

Following are the important despatches which passed, during the latter
part of these operations, between Hooker and Sedgwick:—

I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my
communication with Banks’s Ford. The enemy are in possession of the
heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and
are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday morning was
twenty-two thousand men. I do not know my losses, but they were large,
probably five thousand men. I cannot use the cavalry. It depends upon the
condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here.
Howe reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg.

The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river
wherever (? whenever) necessary.

The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you
reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the
Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow P.M. Please let
the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by telegraph
from Banks’s Ford as soon as possible.

The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish you
to cross the river at Banks’s Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The
batteries at Banks’s Ford command the position. If it is practicable for
you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, near Banks’s Ford,
you will do so. It is very important that we retain position at Banks’s
Ford. Gen. Tyler commands the reserve artillery there.

I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can hold
until night, I shall cross at Banks’s Ford, under instructions from Gen.
Hooker, given by Brig.-Gen. Warren.

The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such
attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not
improbable that bridges at Banks’s Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me
strongly if I am attacked?

P. S.—My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them
above and below from attack, with the additional assistance of Gen.
Benham’s brigade alone.

If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall be
of the character he anticipates, it is the intention of the general to
advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the south
side of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could desire.
It is for this reason he desires that your troops may not cross the
Rappahannock.

I expect to advance to-morrow morning, which will be likely to relieve
you. You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing.
Tell Gen. Benham to put down the other bridge if you desire it.

I occupy the same position as yesterday when Gen. Warren left me. I have
no means of judging enemy’s force about me—deserters say forty
thousand. I shall take a position near Banks’s Ford, and near the Taylor
house, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren; officers have already gone to
select a position. It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are
occupied by two divisions of the enemy.

It is of vital importance that you should take a commanding position near
Fredericksburg, which you can hold to a certainty till to-morrow. Please
advise me what you can do in this respect. I enclose substance of a
communication sent last night. Its suggestions are highly important, and
meet my full approval. There are positions on your side commanded by our
batteries on the other side I think you could take and hold. The general
would recommend as one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor’s is
situated.

GEN. HOOKER.

I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the
Rappahannock until to-morrow.

GEN. HOOKER,

United-States Ford.

My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north
side of Banks’s Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would
withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it
by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel
obliged to withdraw.

I shall hold my position as ordered on south of Rappahannock.

Despatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent any
force crossing. Acknowledge this.

Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw
countermanded. Acknowledge both.

Gen. Hooker’s order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately.

GEN. BUTTERFIELD.

I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in
camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up.

These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, with
the hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can be
imputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the one
could not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of the
despatches is explained by the difficulty of communication between
headquarters and the Sixth Corps.

The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt of
Sedgwick’s despatch saying he would hold the corps south of the river, was
received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which was exceptionally
delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circumstances, put into course
of execution.

As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander’s
artillery began dropping shells in the neighborhood of the bridges and
river banks; and Gen. Wilcox, with his own and Kershaw’s brigades,
followed up Sedgwick’s movements to the crossing, and used his artillery
freely.

When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwick was taken
aback by the receipt of Hooker’s despatch of 1.20 A.M., countermanding the
order to withdraw as above quoted.

The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, the corps
could not now re-cross, except by forcing the passage, as the Confederates
absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with a heavy body of
troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid of Sedgwick, upon
conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk of his army upon
Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any event have
successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice but to go into
camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the ford, and guard the
river.

The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days’ engagements were
4,925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags, fifteen
guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundred prisoners, and
lost no material. These captures are not conceded by the Confederate
authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped in such confusion
as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements, and material of
all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of all facts, and the due
weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothing was lost by the
Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the dead and wounded.

Gibbon’s division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of the
river, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy’s was taken up. Warren says, “Gen.
Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, and
retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsville
pretty nearly all day.” This Warren plainly esteems a poor sample of
generalship, and he does not understand why Hooker did not order an
assault. “I think it very probable we could have succeeded if it had been
made.” “Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted,”—”‘tired’ would
express it.”

Lee’s one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so as to
be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he could now again
turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who lay listlessly
expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently oblivious of his maxim
enjoined upon Stoneman, “that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every
thing in war.”

Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate lines at
and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at once ordered
back to the old battle-field. “They reached their destination during the
afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm, which continued
throughout the night, and most of the following day.” (Lee.)

Wilcox and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road; Mahone,
Posey, and Perry, along the plank road.

Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mine
roads, and the latter rejoined his division.

The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to assault Hooker’s
position at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by no
means idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its details,
was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to develop his
plans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the terrain would
have yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous blow would disable
his antagonist for this campaign, and he was unwilling to delay in
striking it.

XXXII. HOOKER’S CRITICISMS.

Let us now examine into Hooker’s various criticisms upon Sedgwick’s
conduct.

Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised of his
movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby from
intelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick the
despatch to join him at Chancellorsville, “it was written under the
impression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock.” But
could Hooker rationally assume this to be the case when he had, five hours
before, ordered Sedgwick to cross and pursue a flying enemy, and well knew
that he had a portion of his forces already guarding the bridge-heads on
the Fredericksburg side?

“The night was so bright that… no special difficulty was apprehended in
executing the order.” In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, shortly after
midnight, a fog appears to have arisen from the river, which considerably
impeded the movements of the Sixth Corps. This Hooker knew from Sedgwick’s
report, which he was bound to believe, unless evidence existed to show the
contrary. “As will be seen, the order was peremptory, and would have
justified him in losing every man of his command in its execution.”

Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account of his
familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter the necessity
of strict compliance with the order.

“I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick’s men had
shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have encountered
less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, it was late when
he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in readiness to attack the
heights in rear of the town, which was about eleven o’clock A.M. on the
3d, the enemy had observed his movement, and concentrated almost their
entire force at that point to oppose him.” “He had the whole force of the
enemy there to run against in carrying the heights beyond Fredericksburg,
but he carried them with ease; and, by his movements after that, I think
no one would infer that he was confident in himself, and the enemy took
advantage of it. I knew Gen. Sedgwick very well: he was a classmate of
mine, and I had been through a great deal of service with him. He was a
perfectly brave man, and a good one; but when it came to manoeuvring
troops, or judging of positions for them, in my judgment he was not able
or expert. Had Gen. Reynolds been left with that independent command, I
have no doubt the result would have been very different.” “When the attack
was made, it had to be upon the greater part of the enemy’s force left on
the right: nevertheless the troops advanced, carried the heights without
heavy loss, and leisurely took up their line of march on the plank road,
advancing two or three miles that day.”

Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were all
spread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon. No
doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, to obey that
order; but, as in “losing every man in his command” in its execution, he
would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to his chief, he did
the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion as to the method of
attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker’s assumption that Sedgwick was on
the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, and not Sedgwick’s fault.
Hooker might certainly have supposed that Sedgwick had obeyed his previous
orders, in part at least.

Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: “I have
understood that evidence has appeared before the Committee censuring me
very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, in accordance
with the order of Gen. Hooker. I now affirm that it was impossible to have
made the movement, if there had not been a rebel soldier in front of me.”

“I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes time in taking the heights
of Fredericksburg.”

Sedgwick did “shoulder arms and advance” as soon as he received the order;
but the reports show plainly enough that he encountered annoying
opposition so soon as he struck the outskirts of the town; that he threw
forward assaulting columns at once; and that these fought as well as the
conditions warranted, but were repulsed.

It is not intended to convey the impression that there was no loss of time
on Sedgwick’s part. On the contrary, he might certainly have been more
active in some of his movements. No doubt there were other general
officers who would have been. But it is no exaggeration to insist that his
dispositions were fully as speedy as those of any other portion of the
army in this campaign.

Hooker not only alleges that “in his judgment, Gen. Sedgwick did not obey
the spirit of his order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it,” but
quotes Warren as saying that Sedgwick “would not have moved at all if he
[Warren] had not been there; and that, when he did move, it was not with
sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre his troops.” It
is very doubtful whether Warren ever put his opinion in so strong a way as
thus quoted by Hooker from memory. His report does speak of Gibbon’s
slowness in coming up, and of his thus losing the chance of crossing the
canals and taking the breastworks before the Confederates filed into them.
But beyond a word to the effect that giving the advance to Brooks’s
division, after the capture of the heights, “necessarily consumed a
considerable time,” Warren does not in his report particularly criticise
Sedgwick’s movements. And in another place he does speak of the order of
ten P.M. as an “impossible” one.

Gen. Warren’s testimony on this subject is of the highest importance, as
representing Gen. Hooker in person. As before stated, he carried a
duplicate of Hooker’s order of ten P.M., to Sedgwick, with instructions
from the general to urge upon Sedgwick the importance of the utmost
celerity. Moreover, Warren knew the country better than any one else, and
was more generally conversant with Hooker’s plans, ideas, and methods,
being constantly at his side. “Gen. Sedgwick was ordered to be in his
position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could be there.”

“If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we ought to
have destroyed Lee’s army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard
the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with his twenty
thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became
isolated.”

Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: “Early in the campaign I had come
to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would be impossible to
carry works by an assault in front, provided they were properly
constructed and properly manned;” and refers to the Fredericksburg assault
of Dec. 13, to illustrate this position, saying that they (the enemy)
“could destroy men faster than I could throw them on the works;” and, “I
do not know of an instance when rifle-pits, properly constructed and
properly manned, have been taken by front assaults alone.”

And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly to throw
himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in his command
rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waiting properly to
dispose his men, or feel the enemy.

As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have seen
how Brooks’s march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how his
attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men.

There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement
of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after the
campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point and nothing
more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his superior.
It has but one error of consequence, viz., the assumption that the three
divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under command of Gen. Lee,
attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks and Newton. It was
Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade of Anderson, who attacked
Howe.

But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and contains serious errors.
Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards Chancellorsville was
received “just after dark, say eight o’clock,” whereas it was not sent
until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten P.M. from Falmouth; nor did
Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.M. Howe evidently remembered the order
to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, as the one to march to
Chancellorsville,—when speaking of time of delivery. The deductions
Gen. Howe makes from errors like this are necessarily somewhat warped. But
let us give all due weight to the testimony of an able soldier. He states
that his attack on Marye’s heights was made on a mere notice from
Sedgwick, that he was about to attack, and desired Howe to assist; that he
received on Sunday evening a bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the
left of the corps must be protected, and that he consequently moved his
own left round to the river; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to
strengthen his position for defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not
properly look after his division. “Not receiving any instruction or
assistance from Gen. Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of
ourselves. It seemed to me, from the movements or arrangements made during
the day, that there was a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of
the position which we held.” Sedgwick’s entire confidence in Howe’s
ability to handle his division, upon general instructions of the object to
be attained, might account fully for a large part of this apparent
vagueness. But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was,
that no necessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the
river.

Gen. Howe’s testimony is very positive as to the possibility of the Sixth
Corps complying with Hooker’s order as given. He thinks a night attack
could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that they could
have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on the road to
Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinion that Brooks’s
division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, with proper
support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooks made to do this
very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding to failure.

It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he has
certainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded on
errors of fact.

The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe’s before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which the
report of the commander of a brigade is entitled, whose duties allowed him
to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. Though
his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe’s, he, too, mistakes the hour of the
urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summoned before the
Committee, unless as a partisan.

“My object” (continues Hooker) “in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at the
time named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at
Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May.” This statement is not
only characteristic of Hooker’s illogical method, but disingenuous to the
degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, was a
strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armed and
equipped, having in their front less than half their number of
Confederates. In view of Hooker’s above-quoted opinion about rifle-pits;
of the fact that in his testimony he says: “Throughout the Rebellion I
have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I
had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;” of the fact that the
enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would so remain if he only
kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and Pleasonton, at the angle
south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the fact that he had unused
reserves greater in number than the entire force of the enemy,—is it
not remarkable that, in Hooker’s opinion, nothing short of a countermarch
of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture of formidable and
sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the Army of Northern
Virginia during an entire half year,) and an advance of nearly twelve
miles,—all of which was to be accomplished between eleven and
daylight of a day in May,—could operate to “relieve him from the
position in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May”?

“I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee’s
rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee
would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and
thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from
his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville.” Well enough, but
was Sedgwick’s corps the only one to accomplish this? Where were Reynolds,
and Meade, and Howard, forsooth?

There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick’s authority to
withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his so
doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick had
really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons existed,
and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to do so. But
Hooker states that “my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick retain a position
on the south side of the river, in order that I might leave a sufficient
force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force
re-cross the river, march down to Banks’s Ford, and turn the enemy’s
position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I was thwarted, because
the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to withdraw and cover
Banks’s Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who bore the order
countermanding the withdrawal.”

Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a
position at Taylor’s, the point where the Fredericksburg heights approach
the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights were by
that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, the
proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, with
two-thirds of Lee’s whole army surrounding his one corps, though he did
reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief’s
suggestions.

But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson’s corps in his
front,—some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,—to move
upon his enemy, “attack and destroy him,” and himself fall upon Lee’s
rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks’s Ford? And Hooker had all
Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange for
attempting this simplest of manoeuvres.

It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic
piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack
the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one
indicated. From the stirring words, “Let your watchword be Fight, and let
all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!” of April 12, to the inertia and
daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yet Hooker, to
judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied himself that he
did all that was to be expected of an active and intelligent commander.

The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many
of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War: “Question.—Can you tell why it was not
ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps
was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when
you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick’s engagement with the enemy? Answer.—I
have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the
river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers
and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know
why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn. I think
the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they
were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were.”

“Question.—Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army
had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a
victory there? Answer.—I think we should have taken the offensive
when the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick.”

Again Hooker: “During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the
right,” (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) “from one end of the line to the
other, to feel the enemy’s strength, and find a way and place to attack
him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him
behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could
destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent
campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained.”

Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had
had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state of
facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his
subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern
press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson’s corps
opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time enough to
erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses himself
from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four to one.
Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that at the
time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before him? It is
a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and revocatory
evidence.

Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt the
enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire
division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force on
our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been done
with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee left
behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not strange
that the purposelessness of the commander should result in half-hearted
work by the subordinates.

The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker’s and the actual
facts, shows palpably who is in the right.

“At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: ‘I am occupying
the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with
Banks’s Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg
in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to
drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I
do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I
can’t use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your
force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing
from Fredericksburg.’

“Question.—When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you
have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at
Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?

“Answer.—I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker
might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I
think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker
had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights
of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me
the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A.M.
of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the
bridges. This is the despatch: ‘Despatch this moment received. Withdraw;
cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt.’

“This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing,
between three and four o’clock, the orders to cross were countermanded,
and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch was
dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:—

“‘Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw
countermanded. Acknowledge both.’

“In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker
that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me to
cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced the
movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over, when
the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was wholly
impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker.”

To place in juxtaposition Hooker’s testimony and Sedgwick’s, in no wise
militates against the latter.

There is one broad criticism which may fairly he passed upon Sedgwick’s
withdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge that
his remaining in position might be of some assistance to his chief,
instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyond
danger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubborn
flghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks’s Ford, against even Lee
with his twenty-four thousand.

But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could have destroyed
his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, with the
advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. Moreover, to
demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, which, in this
campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac was able to make.

Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, or
himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, might have,
accomplished so much. But if we assume, that having an eye to the numbers
and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well as to the
character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick was bound to
dispute further the possession of Banks’s Ford, in order to lend a
questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear by comparison the
conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the general
commanding, bottled up behind their defences at Chancellorsville!

XXXIII. HOOKER’S FURTHER PLANS.

Hooker states: “Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick had said
he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position, and
hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I proposed to
leave troops enough where I was, to occupy the enemy there, and throw the
rest of my force down the river, and re-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole
of Lee’s army, except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick, would
be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it.

“As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeing no
object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing it would be
more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin’s
Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right
was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night between the
5th and 6th of May.”

Now, the Franklin’s Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by
Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had been
fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning the
Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve no
purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made, is
the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the open country
he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1.

“Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th and
5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council of war, but
to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I considered a
desperate move against the enemy in our front.” Be it remembered that the
“desperate move” was one of eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand more
(Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against at the outside forty-five
thousand men, if Early should be ordered up to re-enforce Lee. And Hooker
knew the force of Lee, or had as good authority for knowing it as he had
for most of the facts he assumed, in condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from
the statements of prisoners we had taken, very nearly an exact estimate
could be made of the then numbers of the Army of Northern Virginia.

All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum,
who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles;
while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantage
under Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War,) says: “I understood from him” (Couch) “always that he was in
favor of fighting then.” Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat; but
the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes to show
the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated.

Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and, with
one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack, in full
force,—Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to this
purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed himself,
confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint. He allowed
the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly refrained
from putting his opinion against that of men trained to the profession of
arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment. But he claimed,
with some reason, that the political horizon was dark; that success by the
Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance of disaster. If, he
alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be the last one the
country would raise. Washington might be captured; and the effect of this
loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be greatly dreaded. The
enemies of the administration were strong, and daily gaining ground. It
was necessary that the Army of the Potomac should not run the risk of
destruction. It was the last hold of the Republican party in Virginia.
Better re-cross and recuperate, and then attempt another campaign, than
run any serious risk now. These grounds largely influenced him in agreeing
with the general-in-chief’s determination to retire across the river. But
there were other reasons, which Sickles states in his testimony. The
rations with which the men had started had given out, and there had been
no considerable issue since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a
rule, unusually careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made
for supplying the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday
noon till Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with
communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a
ten-days’ absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look of
almost a predetermination to accept defeat.

Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over
supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm. Parts
of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of the
others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at any
moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of these
circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he might judge it
better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the possibility of
victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross again so as to join
the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in condition to count on
for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received almost daily through
channels more or less irregular, showed that communications were still
open, and that the operations of the Cavalry Corps had not succeeded in
interrupting them in any serious manner. On the coming Sunday, the time of
service of thirty-eight regiments was up. Many of these conditions could
have been eliminated from the problem, if measures had been seasonably
taken; but they now became critical elements in the decision to be made.
And Hooker, despite his well-earned reputation as a fighting man, was
unable to arrive at any other than the conclusion which Falstaff so
cautiously enunciated, from beneath his shield, at the battle of
Shrewsbury, that “the better part of valor is discretion.”

XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.

Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; and
during the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepared a
new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, to
secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. Capt.
Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warren on the
east, of the United-States Ford road. “A continuous cover and abattis was
constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott’s Dam, around to the mouth of
Hunting Run on the Rapidan. The roads were put in good order, and a third
bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4.30 P.M., and lasted till late at
night. The movement to re-cross was begun by the artillery, as per order,
at 7.30 and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in the river so great as to
submerge the banks at the ends of the bridges on the north bank, and the
velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away.” “The upper bridge
was speedily taken up, and used to piece out the ends of the other two,
and the passage was again made practicable. Considerable delays, however,
resulted from this cause.” “No troops took up position in the new line
except the rearguard, composed of the Fifth Corps, under Gen. Meade, which
was done about daylight on the 6th.” “The proper dispositions were made
for holding this line till all but the rearguard was past the river; and
then it quietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing.” (Warren.) The last of the
army re-crossed about eight A.M., May 6.

Testimony of Gen. Henry J. Hunt:—

“A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset, the general and his staff
re-crossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in order to
see to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south side of the
river, which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was looking after
them, in the darkness, to see that they had been destroyed as directed, an
engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had been carried away, or
were being carried away, by the flood. I found the chief engineer, Capt.
Comstock; and we proceeded together to examine the bridges, and we found
that they were all utterly impassable. I then proceeded to Gen. Meade’s
camp, and reported the condition of affairs to him. All communication with
Gen. Hooker being cut off, Gen. Meade called the corps commanders
together; and, as the result of that conference, I believe, by order of
Gen. Couch at any rate, I was directed to stop the movement of the
artillery, which was withdrawn from the lines, and let them resume their
positions, thus suspending the crossing. On my return to the bridges, I
found that one had been re-established, and the batteries that were down
there had commenced re-crossing the river. I then sought Gen. Hooker up,
on the north side of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the
movement for one day, as it was certain we could not all cross over in a
night. I stated to him that I doubted whether we could more than get the
artillery, which was ordered to cross first, over before daylight: he
refused to postpone the movement, and it proceeded. No opposition was made
by the enemy, nor was the movement disturbed, except by the attempt to
place batteries on the points from which our bridges could be reached, and
to command which I had already posted the necessary batteries on my own
responsibility. A cannonade ensued, and they were driven off with loss,
and one of their caissons exploded: we lost three or four men killed, and
a few horses, in this affair. That is about all that I remember.”

Gen. Barnes’s brigade assisted in taking up the bridges; and all were
safely withdrawn by four P.M. on Wednesday, under superintendence of Major
Spaulding of the engineer brigade.

All who participated in this retreat will remember the precarious position
of the masses of troops, huddled together at the bridge-heads as in a
cul-de-sac, during this eventful night, and the long-drawn breath of
relief as the hours after dawn passed, and no further disposition to
attack was manifested by Lee. This general was doubtless profoundly
grateful that the Army of the Potomac should retire across the
Rappahannock, and leave his troops to the hard-earned rest they needed so
much more than ourselves; but little thanks are due to Hooker, who was, it
seems, on the north side of the river during these critical moments, that
the casualties of the campaign were not doubled by a final assault on the
part of Lee, while we lay in this perilous situation, and the unmolested
retreat turned into another passage of the Beresina. Providentially, the
artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had expended almost its last
round of ammunition previous to this time.

But several hospitals of wounded, in care of a number of medical officers
and stewards, were left behind, to be removed a few days later under a
flag of truce.

The respective losses of the two armies are thus officially given:—

Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation as general
on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other.

Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War: “I lost under those operations” (viz., the Chancellorsville campaign)
“one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance. Of
course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms and knapsacks.”

The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand five
hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition. And,
while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is asserted by them that they
captured thirteen.

The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern
Virginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces to
the shelter of their old camps, need no comment. They are characteristic
to a degree.

The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on
the achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all
that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is
sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or
prevented by human sagacity or resources.

In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a
general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of
its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it
represents.

By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to
ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, and
conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline
battle whenever its interests or honor may command it.

By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage of
the river were undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared to
follow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of every
officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride.

We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long marches,
crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; and whenever we
have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received.

We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteen colors,
captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed hors du combat eighteen
thousand of our foe’s chosen troops.

We have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores, damaged
his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his
capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation.

We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave
companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have
fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle.

By command of Major-Gen. Hooker.

With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army
his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men during the
arduous operations in which they have just been engaged.

Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy,
strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on
the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor that
has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety
beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the
praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to
return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal
deliverance He has wrought.

It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday
next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto His name.

Let us not forget in our rejoicing the brave soldiers who have fallen in
defence of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve
to emulate their noble example.

The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to
whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success.

The following letter from the President of the Confederate States is
communicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of their
success:—

“I have received your despatch, and reverently unite with you in giving
praise to God for the success with which he has crowned our arms. In the
name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the troops
under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great
victories which our army has achieved. The universal rejoicing produced by
this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and
the brave who are numbered among the killed and the wounded.”

The following is equally characteristic:—

Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Order No. 49? If so,
do not answer me.

Jackson is dead, and Lee beats McClellan in his untruthful bulletins.

XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS.

As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issued
orders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps of
the Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeeding day
for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. The order read
as follows:—

I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that you will
march at seven o’clock A.M., on the 13th inst., with all your available
force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy’s position
on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond,
isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on
him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat.

To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock
by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of the enemy, and
throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to mask your
movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy, by the people
in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert suspicion it
may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in pursuit of Jones’s
guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah Valley, in
the direction of Winchester. He further suggests that you select for your
place of crossing the Rappahannock, some point to the west of the
Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can only be determined by the
circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance.

In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run against Fitz Hugh
Lee’s brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it
is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your
advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command.

At Gordonsville, the enemy have a small provost-guard of infantry, which
it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your
forward movement. From there it is expected that you will push forward to
the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton’s
Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad-bridges, trains
of cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraphic communication, etc.
The general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to
accomplish this work effectually.

As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest
one for the enemy to retire on, it is most probable that he will avail
himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, for
this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest positions, such
as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order to check or
prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, attack
his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and out of
supplies.

Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit.

If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor
to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, on the
march, and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column
large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take small
ones. Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight,
Fight, FIGHT; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as
the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you
with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, and, after
they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them from Richmond,
and sooner or later they must fall into our hands.

The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object
of your movement the cutting of the enemy’s communication with Richmond by
the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines; and he
wishes to make every thing subservient to that object. He desires that you
will keep yourself informed of the enemy’s whereabouts, and attack him
wherever you find him.

If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you to
detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy
depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the Aquia
Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy bridges, etc., or the
crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, destroying the
ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all
greatly contribute to our complete success.

You may rely upon the general’s being in communication with you before
your supplies are exhausted.

Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.

A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o’clock for
Kelly’s Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United-States Ford
and Banks’s Ford, to threaten and hold those places.

It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward
movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must
depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear
in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in war,
and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the
enterprise on which you are about to embark.

In pursuance of which order, the corps broke camp near Belle-Plain, and
encamped on the evening of April 13, beyond Morrisville. On April 14, it
moved down to the vicinity of the bridge at Rappahannock station, which,
after a slight skirmish by Gregg, was taken possession of. Beverly Ford,
some miles above, was also examined, and the north bank occupied.
Preparations for an early move on the morning of the 14th were made. Gen.
Buford, commanding the cavalry reserve, remained at Kelly’s Ford during
the 14th, in order to draw the attention of the Confederates to that
point, and indulged in a little artillery skirmish.

During the night a heavy rain set in, and before morning the river was no
longer fordable by the artillery and pack-trains.

As is well known, it takes no great rainfall to swell the Rappahannock and
Rapidan rivers, and their tributaries, to the proportion of torrents. Nor
are more than a few hours necessary to raise these rivers and runs, and
even the dry ravines, to an impassable depth. Gregg mentions in his report
that a small stream, which, on the 13th, could be crossed at one step, had
swelled to such a flood, that when, on the 15th, a regiment was obliged to
cross it, there were lost one man and two horses by drowning.

So that, after crossing one division, Stoneman found that it would
probably be isolated on account of the impracticability of crossing the
rest of the corps, and consequently ordered its immediate return. And this
was accomplished none too soon, by swimming the horses.

On reporting all these facts to Hooker, Stoneman was ordered to go into
camp, where he remained, along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, until
the 27th.

The following letter is of interest, in this connection, as showing how
keen Mr. Lincoln’s intuitions occasionally were.

It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning,
and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives me
considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be
calculated upon. Gen. S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the
expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which
were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance from the
enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach
his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross;
and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how many days will it
take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I
greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very
anxious.

On the 28th, Stoneman received the following additional orders:—

I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that the
instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant, are so
far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such points as
you may determine between Kelly’s and Rappahannock Fords, and for a
portion of your force to move in the direction of Raccoon Ford and Louisa
Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying into execution that
part of your original instructions, which relates to the enemy’s forces
and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and the
line itself; the operations of this column to be considered as masking the
column which is directed to move, by forced marches, to strike and destroy
the line of the Aquia and Richmond Railroad.

You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to
unite; and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, or near that
line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off the
retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your
instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same.

You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that shall not be
practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over
before eight o’clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep
for your pack-animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge
at Kelly’s Ford.

You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns with
a copy of this, and of your original instructions.

These two orders would appear to be specific enough. The first is not
modified by the second to any great extent; and the primary object of both
is unmistakably to interrupt, by a bold stroke, Lee’s main communications
with Richmond by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.

The point on which the two columns, spoken of in the order of April 28,
were to unite, was suggested as somewhere on the Pamunkey; and the one
column was to go at once about its work, while the other masked its march,
and after joined it.

Under these orders, Stoneman proceeded to get the corps together,—the
distance of many outlying pickets delaying him almost a day,—and
finally crossed the Rappahannock by five P.M. of the 29th, a portion of
his troops using Kelly’s Ford, in connection with Slocum’s column.

He then assembled his division and brigade commanders, spread his maps
before them, and made them acquainted with his orders and plans.

Averell, with his own division, Davis’s brigade of Pleasonton’s division,
and Tidball’s battery, was instructed to push for Culpeper Court House;
while Stoneman, with Gregg’s division, Buford’s reserve brigade, and
Robertson’s battery, moved on Stevensburg.

It was expected that Averell would reach Brandy Station the same night
(29th), driving before him the enemy, who was in very small force in his
front. And when Stoneman got well on his way, he despatched Capt.
Drummond, with a squadron, from beyond Rocky Run, by crossroads, to Brandy
Station, to bring intelligence of Averell’s movements. The latter had,
however, not reached that place. And, learning later in the evening that
he had leisurely gone into camp, close by the place where the forces had
crossed, Stoneman sent him word that he must turn the enemy in his front
over to him, while himself pushed on towards Richmond.

This order read as follows:—

The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed
by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy as
vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible,
drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over to
you.

And Hooker justly claims that it was an entire misinterpretation of his
instructions, which were to have Averell join Stoneman’s column, so soon
as he had masked the latter’s movement towards the Aquia and Richmond
Railroad.

On May 3, Averell, who had done nothing but skirmish for a couple of days
with a force of about one-fifth his own, and had then retired to Ely’s
Ford, and gone into camp, was relieved, and Pleasonton placed in command
of his division.

The pack-mules and lead-horses of Stoneman’s column were left with the
main army, till the expected junction should be made by its advance south
of the Rappahannock. Stoneman had with him but five or six days’ rations;
but he relied upon Hooker’s assurance that he would be up with him before
these rations were exhausted. Every officer and man, the generals and
their staffs setting the example, took with them only what they could
carry on their horses. Nor, despite the cold drenching rain, which fell
plentifully, were any camp-fires lighted the first few nights. Stoneman
seems to have been abundantly ambitious of doing his work thoroughly, and
issued stirring orders to his subordinates, calling upon them for every
exertion which they were capable of making.

On reaching Raccoon Ford, over the Rapidan, Stoneman found it guarded by
the Confederate cavalry. He therefore sent Buford to a point six miles
below, where he was able to cross, and, marching up the south bank, to
uncover Raccoon Ford. The main body was then put over.

Stoneman’s column was in the saddle by two A.M. of the 31st. But it proved
to be too foggy to push on: he had as yet no guides, and he was obliged to
wait for daylight.

He then hurried Gregg on to Louisa Court House, which place was reached
during the night of May 1, and details were speedily set to work tearing
up the railroads. Buford was sent by way of the North Anna to the same
point; and at ten A.M., May 2, the entire force was at Louisa.

From here a squadron was despatched towards Gordonsville, to ascertain the
meaning of the movement of several trains of troops, which had passed up
from Richmond in that direction the evening previous. Parties were also
sent out to Tolersville and Frederickshall Stations, to destroy whatever
material could be found there. Still another destroyed Carr’s Bridge on
the North Anna.

The balance of the force was set to work to break up the Virginia Central;
and for a distance of eighteen miles the telegraph, stations, tanks, and
cars were burned, and the rails torn up, and bent and twisted over
bonfires.

The command then marched for Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and, arriving
at Thompson’s Cross-roads at ten P.M. of May 2, headquarters were
established at this point.

Here Stoneman seems to have become entirely oblivious of his instructions,
and to have substituted for them ideas originating in his own brain. He
assembled his officers, and informed them that “we had dropped like a
shell in that region of country, and he intended to burst it in every
direction.”

Instead, therefore, of pressing with his main force for some point on the
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and destroying it thoroughly, as he
was particularly instructed to do, that being the one great object to be
achieved, he contented himself with sending Kilpatrick with the Second
New-York Cavalry, and Davis with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to operate,
the former against the railroad-bridges over the Chickahominy, and the
latter at Ashland and Atlee; and also despatched Wyndham, of the First
New-Jersey Cavalry, to strike Columbia, and destroy the canal-aqueduct
over the Rivanna river, and if possible make a dash at the railroad-bridge
over the Appomattox; while two regiments under Gregg were to follow down
the South Anna to destroy its bridges, followed by the Fifth United-States
Cavalry to see that the destruction was complete.

These parties were directed to rally on Stoneman, who was thus left with
five hundred men of Buford’s reserve, or else to push through to
Gloucester Point, or Yorktown, as circumstances should dictate.

In pursuance of these orders, Gregg’s column, which, on May 2, had burned
the depots at Orange Court House, on May 3, moved down the South Anna, as
far as the bridge where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the stream,
and attempted to destroy it; but finding it protected by some infantry,
and a couple of guns, he seems to have decided not to attack this force,
and fell back upon the reserve. On the 5th, he destroyed the bridge at
Yanceyville.

Kilpatrick marched some distance by daylight on the 3d, kept himself
hidden through the day, marched again at nightfall, and reached Hungary
Station at daylight the 4th. Here he destroyed the depot, and several
miles of road, passed the Virginia Central at Meadow’s Bridge, which he
likewise burned, with all cars and material he could find in the vicinity,
and camped at night in the rear of Hanover.

On the 5th, he pushed into Gloucester Point, destroying on the way a train
of fifty-six wagons, and some twenty thousand bushels of corn in depots.
He captured thirty prisoners, but paroled them.

Capt. Merritt with the Second United-States Cavalry, demolished a number
of bridges and fords on the South Anna, and reached Ashland Station; but
was unable to destroy the bridge at this place, which was guarded by an
infantry force with part of a battery.

Col. Davis, on May 3, also reached Ashland, burned the trestle south of
the town, and tore up the telegraph-line. He captured and destroyed some
wagon-trains, containing about a hundred wagons, fired the depot and some
material at Hanover, and bivouacked seven miles from Richmond. He was,
however, precluded by his orders from trying to enter the capital, though
he seems to have had a good opportunity for so doing.

On May 4, at Tunstall, on the York and Richmond Railroad, he met some
resistance from a force of Confederate infantry with a battery; but,
retracing his steps, he turned up in due season at Gloucester Point.

Col. Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a large
amount of stores, a number of canal-boats, and several bridges over the
James-River canal. For lack of blasting-materials he was unable to destroy
the aqueduct over the Rivanna river. It was solid enough to have delayed
him at least forty-eight hours. The bridge over the James river to Elk
Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the canal as far as
possible. He returned to Thompson’s Cross-roads the same day with W. H.
Fitz Lee at his heels.

Capt. Harrison, with a part of Buford’s reserves, had, on May 4, somewhat
of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming’s Cross-roads; but without effect
upon the movements of the command. And another squadron crossed sabres
with the enemy at Shannon’s.

Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroled at the
time. A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent to Richmond in
one party, with word that the Union cavalry was following close upon them.

To quote Stoneman’s own reasons, the six days’ rations with which he left
camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that there had been
ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessary from the stores
destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vague rumors having
reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac; having accomplished,
as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averell having been withdrawn,
thus leaving Lee ready to attack him,—Stoneman sent Buford with six
hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity of Gordonsville, and a small
party out the Bowling-Green road, and marched his main body to Orange
Court House.

At noon of the 6th, he assembled his entire command at Orange Springs;
thence marched to Raccoon Ford, and crossed on the 7th.

On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly’s, having to
swim about twenty yards.

Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he then
returned to camp.

During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, the roads
had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th.

Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid: “This failure is the
more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments of
cavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force under
Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country in
rear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond,
was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army was
collected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with
little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one-fourth of
Stoneman’s force.”

And further:—

“Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in
the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more
than a few days’ rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted his
communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his army, or
forced him to retreat.”

They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be of
use, found in their line of march. “The citizens were in many cases
entirely stripped of the necessaries of life.”

Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enough to
throw his main body in Lee’s rear, so as substantially to cut his
communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. To accomplish
this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, which should keep
whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinity of Orange
Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column was beyond their
reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select a rallying point on the
Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene of operations. Every thing
was to be subordinate to cutting the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.

If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and day
for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, he
might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee’s line of
supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected his
strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor of his
operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick.

Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, to
accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but it
would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the
disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more.

His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem to
understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a
body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, to
perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to
destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a couple
of guns.

And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the
raiders got back to camp.

Hooker’s criticism in this instance is quite just: “On the 4th, the
cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of
it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and
the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our
prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy’s
communications had been interrupted. An examination of the instructions
Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his
operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a
greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished
less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear
of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time it was in his power
to have done it, can readily be estimated. But instead, that important arm
of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarrassed me in
my subsequent operations. Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and
obtained a sick-leave; and I requested that it might be indefinitely
extended to him. It is charitable to suppose that Gens. Stoneman and
Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations
in conformity with their own views and inclinations.”

XXXVI. HOOKER’S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the general
result of the movement:—

“I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with
the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole
loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen
thousand.”

“I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under
those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one
ambulance.” “In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to
Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The
troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than the
enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and great
results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when the nation
required a victory.” “I would like to speak somewhat further of this
matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim of some of Gen.
McClellan’s admirers, and I do not know but of others, to circulate
erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned from
Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more
men than I could use; and I fought no general battle, for the reason that
I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not more than three
or three and a half corps, on the right, were engaged in that fight.”

And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: “My
impression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same
road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I should add in
my testimony that before leaving Falmouth, to make this move, I had a
million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had gunboats in
readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey River, in order to
replenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemy
could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When
I gave the order to Gen. Sedgwick, I expected that Lee would be whipped by
manoeuvre. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same
line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper and
Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or sixty miles nearer Richmond than
himself.”

Criticism upon such an eccentric summing-up of the results of the campaign
of Chancellorsville, is too unprofitable a task to reward the attempt. But
assuredly the commander of the gallant Army of the Potomac stands alone in
his measure of the importance of the movement, or of the disastrous nature
of the defeat.

XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE.

I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial-party
on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, and care for the
wounded officers and soldiers of my command.

General,—I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday,
requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead and
wounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret that their
position is such, being immediately within our lines, that the necessities
of war forbid my compliance with your request, which, under other
circumstances, it would give me pleasure to grant. I will accord to your
dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon my own; but, if
there is any thing which your medical director here requires which we
cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive from you such
medical supplies as you may think proper to furnish. Consideration for
your wounded prompts me to add, that, from what I learn, their comfort
would be greatly promoted by additional medical attendance and medical
supplies.

Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of
eleven A.M. and 12.30. The army had previously re-crossed the river, and
was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with
it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemy a
general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed
three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go
in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length
to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length
turned up. One portion did nothing.

My dear Sir,—The recent movement of your army is ended without
effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the
enemy’s communications. What next? If possible I would be very glad of
another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the
enemy’s communication being broken; but neither for this reason or any
other do I wish any thing done in desperation or rashness. An early
movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent
one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in your
mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without
interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I,
incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan
for the army.

His Excellency, President of the United States.

I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, and in
answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspend operations
on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to
extricate the army from its present position. If in the first effort we
failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of the small number of
troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen, and
could not be provided against. After its occurrence the chances of success
were so much lessened, that I felt another plan might be adopted in place
of that we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At
all events, a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other
case it was certain to follow the absence of success. I may add that this
consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return
to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the
enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn
the feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed,
for it is no fault of theirs (if I may except one corps) that our last
efforts were not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose details are not
wanted of me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be
adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It
has this to recommend it: it will be one in which the operations of all
the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal
supervision.

General,—The reasons that prevented me from complying with your
request with reference to your wounded no longer existing, I have the
honor to inform you that you can extend to them such attentions as they
may require. All persons whom it may be necessary to send within my lines
for this purpose will remain until the wounded are finally disposed of.
The burial of your dead has already been provided for.

I have directed that those of your wounded who desire it, shall be paroled
and transferred within your lines, should you be willing to receive them;
those in the vicinity of Chancellorsville at the United-States Mine Ford,
and those on the battlefield of Salem Church at Banks’s Ford or
Fredericksburg. As your wounded generally occupy the few houses in the
vicinity of the late battle-field, the transportation of this army cannot
be employed in conveying them to the river until my own wounded have been
removed to a place of shelter. As soon as this can be accomplished, I will
cause such of your wounded as may desire to be paroled, to be delivered at
the points above indicated, upon being advised of your willingness to
receive them. In the mean time they shall have such care as is given to my
own.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter of yesterday in case the
original may not have reached you.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two communications of
May 6 and 7 this moment. If agreeable to you, I would like to send medical
supplies and attendance to my wounded, and, at such times as the state of
the stream will permit, send ambulances for them via the fords designated
in your communications, viz., United-States and Banks’s Fords. I will,
with your consent, send parties to those fords with supplies at an early
hour to-morrow. The swollen state of the Rappahannock probably preventing
the crossing of any vehicles with supplies, I shall have to depend upon
you for transportation for them. I will receive the wounded at the points
named as soon as it can be done. I will send an officer to
Chancellorsville, with your consent, to arrange the details, which,
judging from your letter, with the state of the river, cannot now be
determined by correspondence. Upon an intimation from you as to any
deficiency in your immediate necessities of medical supplies of your own,
by reason of their use for my wounded or other causes, I shall with
pleasure replace them. I would be obliged for approximate information
concerning the number of wounded, that a sufficient amount of supplies may
be forwarded. I would be under obligations for an early reply.

The relatives and friends of several of the officers of this army who fell
in the recent battles, have visited my headquarters with the view, if
possible, of proceeding to the battle-fields to recover the bodies of
those near to them. I therefore have the honor to ask whether any person
will be permitted to visit the battle-fields for the purpose indicated, or
whether any arrangement can be made for sending to the lines of this army
the bodies of such of our fallen officers as may have friends here seeking
for them.

General,—In reply to your communication of the 9th inst., I have the
honor to state that it will give me pleasure to afford every facility to
relatives and friends of officers killed in the late battles, to recover
their bodies; but I have no means of identifying them, or of ascertaining
the fields on which they fell. If you will have me informed, I will cause
search to be made.

APPENDIX.

In February and March, 1886, there was delivered at the Lowell Institute,
in Boston, a series of lectures upon the late civil war, by the following
gentlemen:—

These lecturers were well equipped for their task. Earnest study of their
respective subjects had been attested by numerous volumes published by
them relating to the war. The desire to have the truth told was apparent
in the presence of three Confederate officers among the number; and the
special feature of the course seemed to be, that not only was the truth
spoken in the most unvarnished manner, but that it was listened to with
marked approval by overflowing audiences.

Perhaps the most invidious subject fell to my lot. What I said was merely
a summary of the foregoing pages. But one point in my lecture aroused the
ire of some of Gen. Hooker’s partisans, and was made the subject of
attacks so bitter that virulence degenerated into puerility. The occasion
of this rodomontade was a meeting of Third-Corps veterans, and its outcome
was a series of resolutions aimed at the person who had dared to reflect
on Gen. Hooker’s capacity, and to refer to the question of Gen. Hooker’s
habitual use of stimulants. The public mention of my name was as
sedulously avoided as a reference to his satanic majesty is wont to be in
the society of the superstitious; but the exuberance of the attack must
have afforded unbounded satisfaction to its authors, as it very apparently
did to the audience.

Following are the resolutions, which are of mild flavor compared to their
accompanying seasoning of speeches:—

The veterans of the Third Army Corps assembled here to-day, soldiers who
served under Gen. Joseph Hooker in his division, corps, and army,
re-affirm their lifelong affection for their old commander, their
admiration for his brilliant achievements as one of the prominent generals
of our armies, and protest against the recent revival of unjust assaults
made on his conduct at Chancellorsville. Whether, after one of the most
noted tactical victories of modern times, having placed the Army of
the Potomac across the Rappahannock River on the flank of Lee, he might
have gained a still farther advanced position; whether the failure of the
cavalry to fully accomplish what was expected of it; whether the disaster
to the Eleventh Corps and the delay in the advance of the Sixth Corps,—are
to be attributed to errors of judgment of Gen. Hooker or of the
subordinate commanders, are points which will be discussed again and again
with profit to the military student. But we, who witnessed his successful
generalship at Williamsburg, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run, and
Antietam, have no language at our command strong enough to express our
contempt for any one who, twenty years after the war, affirms that on any
occasion in battle, with the lives of his men and the cause of his country
in his keeping, Gen. Hooker was incapacitated for performing his whole
duty as an officer by either the use of liquor or by the want of it.

We protest against oft-repeated statements that “Fighting Joe Hooker,”
while one of the bravest and ablest division commanders in the army, was
possibly equal to handling a corps, but proved a failure as an independent
commander. Assigned to the Army of the Potomac in January, 1863, after the
disaster at Fredericksburg and the failure of oft-repeated campaigns, our
army demoralized by defeat, desertions, and dissensions, Gen. Hooker
re-organized his forces, stopped desertions, brought back to their colors
thousands of absentees, and in three months revived confidence,
re-established discipline, and enabled his army to take the field
unsurpassed in loyalty, courage, and efficiency, as was shown at
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. We say Chancellorsville because, although
not a victory for us, the campaign inflicted on the enemy losses at
least equal to our own; and we say also Gettysburg because that
victory was won by the army Hooker had re-organized, and led with such
matchless skill from Falmouth to the eve of the battle.

Whatever ambition he may have had to command armies, it did not prevent
his cheerfully serving his country under junior officers, giving them
faithful support, and his record shows no instance of his removal from
command by his superiors.

Here in his native State, amid the homes of so many of his old brigade,
the survivors of the Third Army Corps, all witnesses of his genius, valor,
and devotion to duty, indorse his record as a soldier, as a gentleman, and
as a patriot, and sincerely believe that history will assign to Major-Gen.
Joseph Hooker a place among the greatest commanders of the late civil war.

The italics are mine. “One of the most noted tactical victories of modern
times,” applied to Chancellorsville, is refreshing. Equally so is the
exultant claim that “we inflicted on the enemy losses at least equal to
our own.” The infliction of loss on the enemy has always been understood
by military men to be an incident rather than the object of war.

The following reply in “The Boston Herald” of April 11, 1886, explains
itself:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD.

In the call for the meeting of the Third Corps Gettysburg Re-union
Association, held at Music Hall on Fast Day, was the following clause:—

“Loyalty to the memory of our beloved commander, Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker,
makes it a duty, on this occasion, to protest against unjust and
uncalled-for criticisms on his military record as commander of the Army of
the Potomac.”

It having been intimated to me by some old brother officers of the Third
Corps, that my late Lowell lecture on Chancellorsville was the occasion of
this proposed protest, I wrote to the chairman of the committee which
called the meeting, asking for an opportunity to reply to this protest,
within such bounds as even-handedness and the purposes of the meeting
would allow. The committee answered that it could not see the propriety of
turning the occasion into a public debate, and referred me to the press. I
do not object to their decision, made, no doubt, upon what appeared to
them sufficient grounds; but as the occasion was turned into a public
debate—one-sided, to be sure—I ask you for space, to reply in
your valued columns.

As an old Third-Corps man, I attended the meeting at Music Hall. The
treasurer did not object to selling me a ticket to the dinner. I expected
to hear some new facts about Hooker and Chancellorsville. I expected to
hear some new deductions from old facts. I do not consider myself beyond
making an occasional lapse even in a carefully prepared piece of work, and
am always open to correction. But, to my surprise (with the exception of a
conjecture that Lee’s object in his march into Pennsylvania was to wreck
the anthracite-coal industry), there was not one single fact or statement
laid before the meeting, or the company at dinner, which has not already
been, in its minutest details, canvassed and argued at a length covering
hundreds of pages in the volumes on Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and
Allen, Swinton, Bates, the Comte de Paris, Doubleday, and myself, not to
speak of numberless and valuable brochures by others. The bulk of the time
devoted to talking on this occasion was used in denunciation of the wretch—in
other words, myself—who alleged that Joseph Hooker was drunk at
Chancellorsville, or at any other time. This denunciation began with a
devout curse in the chaplain’s prayer, culminated in a set of fierce
resolutions, and ended with the last after-dinner speech.

One thing particularly struck me. There was no one, of all who spoke, who
began to say as many things in favor of Joseph Hooker as I for years have
done; and not in fleeting words, but printed chapters. There was plenty of
eulogy, in nine-tenths of which I joined with all my heart. But it was of
the soldiers’-talk order,—cheering and honest and loyal, appealing
to the sentiments rather than the intelligence. What I have said of Hooker
has been solid praise of his soldierly worth, shown to be borne out by the
facts. Barring, in all I say, the five fighting days at Chancellorsville,
I have yet to find the man who has publicly, and in print, eulogized
Hooker as I have done; and no one among the veterans gathered together
Fast Day applauded with more sincerity than I, all the tributes to his
memory. For though, as some one remarked, it is true that I “fought mit
Sigel,” and decamped from Chancellorsville with the Eleventh Corps; it is
also true that I passed through the fiery ordeal of the Seven Days, and
fought my way across the railroad-cutting at Manassas, side by side with
Joseph Hooker, under the gallant leadership of that other hero Philip
Kearney. It was very evident that but few of the speakers, as well as
auditors, had themselves heard or read what I actually said. The result of
“coaching” for the occasion by some wire-puller was painfully apparent.
Let us see what was said. I give the entire paragraph from my Lowell
lecture:—

“It has been surmised that Hooker, during this campaign, was incapacitated
by a habit of which, at times, he had been the victim. There is, rather,
evidence that he was prostrated by too much abstemiousness, when a
reasonable use of stimulants might have kept his nervous system at its
normal tension. It was certainly not the use of alcohol, during this time,
which lay at the root of his indecision.”

If that is an accusation that Hooker was then drunk, if it does not rather
lean toward an exculpation from the charge of drunkenness, then I can
neither write nor read the English language. As is well known, the
question of Hooker’s sudden and unaccountable loss of power, during the
fighting half of this campaign, coupled with the question of drunkenness,
has been bandied to and fro for years. The mention alone of
Chancellorsville has been enough, ever since that day, to provoke a query
on this very subject, among civilians and soldiers alike. In a lecture on
the subject, I deemed it judicious to lay this ghost as well as might be.
Had I believed that Hooker was intoxicated at Chancellorsville, I should
not have been deterred by the fear of opposition from saying so. Hooker’s
over-anxious friends have now turned into a public scandal what was
generally understood as an exoneration, by intentionally distorting what
was said into an implication that Hooker was so besotted as to be
incapable of command. What I have written of his marching the army to this
field and to the field of Gettysburg is a full answer to such unnecessary
perversion. Let these would-be friends of Hooker remember that this
calumny is of their own making, not mine. I am as sorry for it, as they
ought to be. If the contempt expressed in the resolutions they passed had
been silent, instead of boisterous, Hooker’s memory would have suffered
far less damage.

Gens. Sickles and Butterfield are doubtless good witnesses, though they
sedulously refrained from any testimony on the subject, contenting
themselves with declamation. But they are not the only good witnesses.
After the loss of a leg at Gettysburg, I was ordered to duty in the War
Department, where I served in charge of one or other bureau for seven
years. I have heard this Hooker question discussed in all its bearings, in
the office of the Secretary of War or Adjutant-General, by nearly every
leading officer of the army, hundreds of whom had known Hooker from West
Point up. I have had abundant opportunity of forming an opinion, and I
have expressed it. Let him who garbles its meaning, bear the blame.

This action by many veterans of the Third Corps—even though procured
by design from their thoughtless and open soldier’s nature—is,
however, much more sweeping and important. To the world at large it is a
general condemnation of every thing which can be said in criticism of
Hooker. It will reach far and wide, and in this light I desire to say what
I do. The resolutions passed at the meeting explicitly protest against the
statement that Hooker proved a failure as an independent commander. This
needs notice at greater length than the question of sobriety or
drunkenness. Few have studied the details of the campaign of
Chancellorsville as carefully as I; but one other author has spread the
facts so fully before the reading public. No part of my recent criticism
before the Lowell Institute was new. It was embodied at much greater
length four years ago, in my “History of Chancellorsville;” the reception
of which volume by press, public, and soldiers, has been its own best
excuse. Gen. Hooker, though making no report, has put on record his
explanation of this campaign. Before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, he stated his views as follows: “I may say here, the battle of
Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg,
and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of
Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand…. In my opinion,
there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except to
accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except one
corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was high,
the army in splendid condition, and greater results were expected from it.
When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle;
in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no general battle,
for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so.”

To speak thus of a passage of arms lasting a week and costing seventeen
thousand men is, to say the least, abnormal.

In trying to shift the onus of failure from his own shoulders he said:
“Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear to
be unwilling to go into a fight…. So far as my experience extends, there
are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight than while it is
pending, and when a truthful history of the Rebellion shall be written, it
will be found that the Army of the Potomac is not an exception.”

This slur is cast upon men like Reynolds, Meade, Couch, Sedgwick, Slocum,
Howard, Hancock, Humphreys, Sykes, Warren, Birney, Whipple, Wright,
Griffin, and many others equally gallant. To call it ungenerous, is a mild
phrase. It certainly does open the door to unsparing criticism. Hooker
also concisely stated his military rule of action: “Throughout the
Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as
the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter.” And in
his initial orders to Stoneman, in opening the campaign, came the true
ring of the always gallant corps commander, “Let your watchword be
‘Fight!’ and let all your orders be, ‘Fight, fight, fight!'”

I might here say that the only attempt, on Fast Day, to exculpate Hooker
for the disaster of Chancellorsville was not of an order which can be
answered. When one speaker asks, “If Gen. Hooker tells us that it was wise
to withdraw across the river, is not that enough for you and me, my
comrades?” I can only say that history is not so easily satisfied. To
another speaker, who states that when Hooker had planted himself in Lee’s
flank by crossing the river, Lee ought, by all the rules of war, to have
retreated, but when he didn’t he upset all Hooker’s calculations; that
when Jackson made his “extra hazardous” march around Hooker’s flank, he
ought, by all rules of war, to have been destroyed, but when he was not he
upset all Hooker’s calculations, and that therefore Hooker was forced to
retreat,—it is quite beyond my ability to reply. When Gen. Sickles
throws the blame upon Howard for the defeat of the Eleventh Corps, by
reading the 9.30 A.M. order, without saying one word about Hooker’s
actions, change of plans, and despatches from that hour till the attack at
6 P.M., he makes any thinking man question seriously the sincerity of what
he calls history. When Gen. Butterfield indulges in innuendoes against
Gen. Meade, whose chief of staff he was, and insults his memory in the
effort to exculpate the Third Corps from a charge no one has ever made, or
thought of making, against it, the fair-minded can only wonder why he goes
out of his way to call any one to task for criticising Hooker. Not one
word was spoken on Fast Day which does not find its full and entire answer
in the already published works on Chancellorsville. It was all a mere
re-hash, and poorly cooked at that. To rely on the four reasons given by
the Committee on the Conduct of the War as a purgation of Hooker from
responsibility for our defeat at Chancellorsville, simply deserves no
notice. It is all of a piece with the discussion of the Third-Corps fight
at Gettysburg on July 2. No one ever doubted that the Third Corps fought,
as they always did, like heroes that day. What has been alleged is merely
that Sickles did not occupy and protect Little Round Top, as he would have
done if he had had the military coup d’oeil.

Now, I desire to compare with Hooker’s recorded words, and the utterances
of Fast Day, the actual performance, and see what “loyalty to Hooker,” as
voted in Music Hall, means. Chancellorsville bristles with points of
criticism, and there are some few points of possible disagreement. Of the
latter the principal ones upon which Hooker’s formal apologists rely, are
the destruction of the Eleventh Corps through Howard’s alleged
carelessness, and the failure of Sedgwick to perform the herculean task
assigned to him in coming to Hooker’s support. Allowing, for the moment,
that Howard and Sedgwick were entirely at fault, and eliminating these two
questions entirely from the issue, let us see what Hooker himself did,
bearing in mind that he has officially acknowledged that he knew,
substantially, the number of Lee’s army, and bearing also in mind that the
following are facts which can be disputed only by denying the truth and
accuracy of all the reports, Federal and Confederate, taken as a body; and
these happen to dovetail into each other in one so consistent whole, that
they leave to the careful student none but entirely insignificant items
open to doubt.

From Saturday at 8 A.M. till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours, Hooker
with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the First Corps,
nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wings of Lee’s army
of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand men respectively, being all
the while cognizant of the facts. Had ever a general a better chance to
whip his enemy in detail? And yet we were badly beaten in this fight. Now,
if loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that his conduct of this
campaign was even respectable, it follows that the Army of the Potomac,
respectably led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, two
to one. Will the soldiers of the ever-faithful army accept this as an
explanation of our defeat?

Again: from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A.M., twenty-one hours, Hooker,
with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a
force of twenty-seven thousand. If loyalty to Hooker requires us to
believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the
Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern
Virginia, three to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of our
defeat?

Again: from Monday at 9 A.M. till Tuesday at 4 P.M., thirty-one hours,
against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch
(the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army would
be defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eighty
thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of nineteen
thousand, while the rest turned upon and demolished Sedgwick. If loyalty
to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable
generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be
defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, four to one. Shall we accept
this as an explanation of our defeat?

If there is in the world’s military history a parallel to this
extraordinary generalship, for which any one who has even pretended to
study the art of war is able to find an excuse, I have failed to find such
an instance in the course of many years’ reading, and shall be happy to
have it pointed out to me. Hooker’s wound cannot be alleged in
extenuation. If he was disabled, his duty was to turn the command over to
Couch, the next in rank. If he did not do this, he was responsible for
what followed. And he retained the command himself, only using Couch as
his mouthpiece.

I have always maintained, that, man for man, the Army of the Potomac was
at any time the equal of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that, man for
man, the old Third Corps has proved itself good for Jackson’s in its
palmiest days. When, therefore, the Army of the Potomac was, as here,
defeated or bottled up by one-half, one-third, or one-quarter its force of
the enemy, my loyalty to that army demands that I seek a reason other than
Hooker’s alleged lack of heart of his subordinate officers. And this
reason is only to be found in Hooker’s inability to handle so many men.
All the resolutions in the world, passed under a furore of misstatement
and misconception, even by such a noble body of men as Third-Corps
veterans, will not re-habilitate Joseph Hooker’s military character during
these five days, nor make him other than a morally and intellectually
impotent man from May 1 to May 5, 1863. Loyalty to Hooker, so-called, is
disloyalty to the grand old army, disloyalty to the seventeen thousand men
who fell, disloyalty to every comrade who fought at Chancellorsville. I
begrudge no man the desire to blanket facts and smother truth in order to
turn a galling defeat into a respectable campaign; I begrudge no man his
acceptance of Hooker’s theory that Chancellorsville was not a disaster; I
begrudge no one his faith in Hooker as a successful battle-field commander
of the Army of the Potomac. But let it be well understood that this faith
of necessity implies the fact that the Army of the Potomac was unable or
unwilling to fight one-quarter its number of Lee’s troops. I prefer my
faith in the stanch, patient army, in its noble rank and file, in its
gallant officers, from company to corps; and I refuse to accept Hooker’s
insult to his subordinates as any explanation for allowing the Army of the
Potomac to “be here defeated without ever being fought.”

The Army of the Potomac was better than its commanders from first to last.
It was, beyond speaking, superior to its commander during the fighting
days at Chancellorsville. As a corps commander, Joseph Hooker will always
be a type and household word. In logistics, even as commander of the Army
of the Potomac, he deserves high praise. But when it comes to fighting the
army at Chancellorsville, let whoso will keep his loyalty to Hooker,
without protest from me. I claim for myself and the bulk of my comrades
the right, equally without protest, sneers, or resolutions, to express my
loyalty to the rank and file, my loyalty to the officers, and my loyalty
to the army as a whole. And I claim, moreover, the right, without protest,
sneers, or resolutions, to show that on this field it was the general
commanding, and not the army, whose lapses caused defeat. Not that I
object to these Fast-Day resolutions. I believe that I can still struggle
onward in life, even under the contempt of their authors. But partisanship
in matters of history is a boomerang which always flies back to whack its
thrower. And Fast Day’s performance was baldly partisan.

I am satisfied to abide the verdict of all soldiers, of all citizens, who
ever studied the facts of this campaign. What ever the action of any
meeting of old soldiers may be under partial knowledge of facts, under the
influence of heated or sectional discussion, or under the whipping-in of a
member of Hooker’s staff, I do not believe that with the issue squarely
put before them, and the facts plainly stated, any but a very
inconsiderable fraction, and that not the most intelligent one, of the men
of the Army of the Potomac, will give their suffrage to what has been
suddenly discovered to be loyalty due to Gen. Joseph Hooker, as against
loyalty to the Army of the Potomac.

The recent course of lectures at the Lowell Institute was intended to be a
purely military one. There was no intention of bringing politics or
sectional pride into the discussion, and it was thought that the lectures
could to-day be delivered without rousing a breath of ancient animosity.
If there was any campaign during our civil war which was especially, in a
military sense, a glorious one for the rebels, and an ignominious one for
us, it was Chancellorsville. It is indeed a pity that the skill of the one
side and the errors of the other cannot be once again pointed out, that
the true and only possible explanation of Hooker’s one hundred and thirty
thousand men being defeated by Lee’s sixty thousand cannot be once again
stated, without eliciting from a body of veterans of the old Third Corps a
set of condemnatory resolutions. There has been some very heated criticism
of the recent lectures, and not a little fault-finding with the lecturers.
I presume that none of the gentlemen who participated in the course would
feel like denying the inference, so often suggested, that the censors
might have done much better than they were able to do. Such censors
generally can. These dozen lecturers have all been earnest students of our
civil war, as is abundantly testified by the twenty odd volumes on the
subject published by them since the reports of operations became
available; and they keenly feel that modesty which is always bred of
study. Such as they had, they were glad to give the public; nor do they in
any wise shrink from generous disagreement or courteous criticism. I
submit, however, that some of the carping which has been indulged in is
scarcely apt to lead to the correction of errors, or the elucidation of
truth. It is passing strange, that, at this late day, one may not
criticise the military operations without arousing the evil spirit of the
war. Can we not aim at truth, rather than self-gratulation, which will
live no longer than we do? Criticism has always been indulged in, always
will be. If a Frederick may be dissected by a Lloyd, if a Napoleon may be
sat on in judgment by a Lanfrey, may not the merest tyro in the art of war
he pardoned for reviewing Hooker? The gallant soldier who helped make
history rarely writes history. The same spirit which sent him to the front
in 1861 generally keeps him busy to-day with the material interests of the
country. Despite the certainly novel fling of Fast Day at one who went
into service as a mere boy, it remains a fact that rank, without the
devoted study of years and a single eye to truth, will not enable any one
to write history. It was proven beyond a peradventure on Fast Day, that
the command of a corps, let alone a division, will not of itself breed a
historian. Partisanship never will.

Truth will get written some day. I myself prefer to write as an American,
forgetting North and South, and to pass down to those who will write
better than any of us, as one who tried to speak the truth, whomsoever it
struck. It is not I who criticise, who condemn Joseph Hooker: it is the
maxims of every master, of every authority on the art of war. Not one of
Hooker’s apologists can turn to the history of a master’s achievements, or
to a volume of any accepted authority, without finding his pet commander
condemned, in every action, and on every page, for the faults of the
fighting days at Chancellorsville.