A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
By Aristotle
Translated From The Greek Of Aristotle By William Ellis, A.M.
London &.Toronto Published By J M Dent & Sons Ltd. &.In New
York By E. P. Dutton &. Co
First Issue Of This Edition 1912 Reprinted 1919, 1923, 1928
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Politics of Aristotle is the second part of a treatise of which the
Ethics is the first part. It looks back to the Ethics as the Ethics looks
forward to the Politics. For Aristotle did not separate, as we are
inclined to do, the spheres of the statesman and the moralist. In the
Ethics he has described the character necessary for the good life, but
that life is for him essentially to be lived in society, and when in the
last chapters of the Ethics he comes to the practical application of his
inquiries, that finds expression not in moral exhortations addressed to
the individual but in a description of the legislative opportunities of
the statesman. It is the legislator’s task to frame a society which shall
make the good life possible. Politics for Aristotle is not a struggle
between individuals or classes for power, nor a device for getting done
such elementary tasks as the maintenance of order and security without too
great encroachments on individual liberty. The state is “a community of
well-being in families and aggregations of families for the sake of a
perfect and self-sufficing life.” The legislator is a craftsman whose
material is society and whose aim is the good life.
In an early dialogue of Plato’s, the Protagoras, Socrates asks Protagoras
why it is not as easy to find teachers of virtue as it is to find teachers
of swordsmanship, riding, or any other art. Protagoras’ answer is that
there are no special teachers of virtue, because virtue is taught by the
whole community. Plato and Aristotle both accept the view of moral
education implied in this answer. In a passage of the Republic (492 b)
Plato repudiates the notion that the sophists have a corrupting moral
influence upon young men. The public themselves, he says, are the real
sophists and the most complete and thorough educators. No private
education can hold out against the irresistible force of public opinion
and the ordinary moral standards of society. But that makes it all the
more essential that public opinion and social environment should not be
left to grow up at haphazard as they ordinarily do, but should be made by
the wise legislator the expression of the good and be informed in all
their details by his knowledge. The legislator is the only possible
teacher of virtue.
Such a programme for a treatise on government might lead us to expect in
the Politics mainly a description of a Utopia or ideal state which might
inspire poets or philosophers but have little direct effect upon political
institutions. Plato’s Republic is obviously impracticable, for its author
had turned away in despair from existing politics. He has no proposals, in
that dialogue at least, for making the best of things as they are. The
first lesson his philosopher has to learn is to turn away from this world
of becoming and decay, and to look upon the unchanging eternal world of
ideas. Thus his ideal city is, as he says, a pattern laid up in heaven by
which the just man may rule his life, a pattern therefore in the meantime
for the individual and not for the statesman. It is a city, he admits in
the Laws, for gods or the children of gods, not for men as they are.
Aristotle has none of the high enthusiasm or poetic imagination of Plato.
He is even unduly impatient of Plato’s idealism, as is shown by the
criticisms in the second book. But he has a power to see the possibilities
of good in things that are imperfect, and the patience of the true
politician who has learned that if he would make men what they ought to
be, he must take them as he finds them. His ideal is constructed not of
pure reason or poetry, but from careful and sympathetic study of a wide
range of facts. His criticism of Plato in the light of history, in Book
II. chap, v., though as a criticism it is curiously inept, reveals his own
attitude admirably: “Let us remember that we should not disregard the
experience of ages; in the multitude of years, these things, if they were
good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has
been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in other
cases men do not use the knowledge which they have.” Aristotle in his
Constitutions had made a study of one hundred and fifty-eight
constitutions of the states of his day, and the fruits of that study are
seen in the continual reference to concrete political experience, which
makes the Politics in some respects a critical history of the workings of
the institutions of the Greek city state. In Books IV., V., and VI. the
ideal state seems far away, and we find a dispassionate survey of
imperfect states, the best ways of preserving them, and an analysis of the
causes of their instability. It is as though Aristotle were saying: “I
have shown you the proper and normal type of constitution, but if you will
not have it and insist on living under a perverted form, you may as well
know how to make the best of it.” In this way the Politics, though it
defines the state in the light of its ideal, discusses states and
institutions as they are. Ostensibly it is merely a continuation of the
Ethics, but it comes to treat political questions from a purely political
standpoint.
This combination of idealism and respect for the teachings of experience
constitutes in some ways the strength and value of the Politics, but it
also makes it harder to follow. The large nation states to which we are
accustomed make it difficult for us to think that the state could be
constructed and modelled to express the good life. We can appreciate
Aristotle’s critical analysis of constitutions, but find it hard to take
seriously his advice to the legislator. Moreover, the idealism and the
empiricism of the Politics are never really reconciled by Aristotle
himself.
It may help to an understanding of the Politics if something is said on
those two points.
We are accustomed since the growth of the historical method to the belief
that states are “not made but grow,” and are apt to be impatient with the
belief which Aristotle and Plato show in the powers of the lawgiver. But
however true the maxim may be of the modern nation state, it was not true
of the much smaller and more self-conscious Greek city. When Aristotle
talks of the legislator, he is not talking in the air. Students of the
Academy had been actually called on to give new constitutions to Greek
states. For the Greeks the constitution was not merely as it is so often
with us, a matter of political machinery. It was regarded as a way of
life. Further, the constitution within the framework of which the ordinary
process of administration and passing of decrees went on, was always
regarded as the work of a special man or body of men, the lawgivers. If we
study Greek history, we find that the position of the legislator
corresponds to that assigned to him by Plato and Aristotle. All Greek
states, except those perversions which Aristotle criticises as being
“above law,” worked under rigid constitutions, and the constitution was
only changed when the whole people gave a commission to a lawgiver to draw
up a new one. Such was the position of the AEsumnetes, whom Aristotle
describes in Book III. chap, xiv., in earlier times, and of the pupils of
the Academy in the fourth century. The lawgiver was not an ordinary
politician. He was a state doctor, called in to prescribe for an ailing
constitution. So Herodotus recounts that when the people of Cyrene asked
the oracle of Delphi to help them in their dissensions, the oracle told
them to go to Mantinea, and the Mantineans lent them Demonax, who acted as
a “setter straight” and drew up a new constitution for Cyrene. So again
the Milesians, Herodotus tells us, were long troubled by civil discord,
till they asked help from Paros, and the Parians sent ten commissioners
who gave Miletus a new constitution. So the Athenians, when they were
founding their model new colony at Thurii, employed Hippodamus of Miletus,
whom Aristotle mentions in Book II, as the best expert in town-planning,
to plan the streets of the city, and Protagoras as the best expert in
law-making, to give the city its laws. In the Laws Plato represents one of
the persons of the dialogue as having been asked by the people of Gortyna
to draw up laws for a colony which they were founding. The situation
described must have occurred frequently in actual life. The Greeks thought
administration should be democratic and law-making the work of experts. We
think more naturally of law-making as the special right of the people and
administration as necessarily confined to experts.
Aristotle’s Politics, then, is a handbook for the legislator, the expert
who is to be called in when a state wants help. We have called him a state
doctor. It is one of the most marked characteristics of Greek political
theory that Plato and Aristotle think of the statesman as one who has
knowledge of what ought to be done, and can help those who call him in to
prescribe for them, rather than one who has power to control the forces of
society. The desire of society for the statesman’s advice is taken for
granted, Plato in the Republic says that a good constitution is only
possible when the ruler does not want to rule; where men contend for
power, where they have not learnt to distinguish between the art of
getting hold of the helm of state and the art of steering, which alone is
statesmanship, true politics is impossible.
With this position much that Aristotle has to say about government is in
agreement. He assumes the characteristic Platonic view that all men seek
the good, and go wrong through ignorance, not through evil will, and so he
naturally regards the state as a community which exists for the sake of
the good life. It is in the state that that common seeking after the good
which is the profoundest truth about men and nature becomes explicit and
knows itself. The state is for Aristotle prior to the family and the
village, although it succeeds them in time, for only when the state with
its conscious organisation is reached can man understand the secret of his
past struggles after something he knew not what. If primitive society is
understood in the light of the state, the state is understood in the light
of its most perfect form, when the good after which all societies are
seeking is realised in its perfection. Hence for Aristotle as for Plato,
the natural state or the state as such is the ideal state, and the ideal
state is the starting-point of political inquiry.
In accordance with the same line of thought, imperfect states, although
called perversions, are regarded by Aristotle as the result rather of
misconception and ignorance than of perverse will. They all represent, he
says, some kind of justice. Oligarchs and democrats go wrong in their
conception of the good. They have come short of the perfect state through
misunderstanding of the end or through ignorance of the proper means to
the end. But if they are states at all, they embody some common conception
of the good, some common aspirations of all their members.
The Greek doctrine that the essence of the state consists in community of
purpose is the counterpart of the notion often held in modern times that
the essence of the state is force. The existence of force is for Plato and
Aristotle a sign not of the state but of the state’s failure. It comes
from the struggle between conflicting misconceptions of the good. In so
far as men conceive the good rightly they are united. The state represents
their common agreement, force their failure to make that agreement
complete. The cure, therefore, of political ills is knowledge of the good
life, and the statesman is he who has such knowledge, for that alone can
give men what they are always seeking.
If the state is the organisation of men seeking a common good, power and
political position must be given to those who can forward this end. This
is the principle expressed in Aristotle’s account of political justice,
the principle of “tools to those who can use them.” As the aim of the
state is differently conceived, the qualifications for government will
vary. In the ideal state power will be given to the man with most
knowledge of the good; in other states to the men who are most truly
capable of achieving that end which the citizens have set themselves to
pursue. The justest distribution of political power is that in which there
is least waste of political ability.
Further, the belief that the constitution of a state is only the outward
expression of the common aspirations and beliefs of its members, explains
the paramount political importance which Aristotle assigns to education.
It is the great instrument by which the legislator can ensure that the
future citizens of his state will share those common beliefs which make
the state possible. The Greeks with their small states had a far clearer
apprehension than we can have of the dependence of a constitution upon the
people who have to work it.
Such is in brief the attitude in which Aristotle approaches political
problems, but in working out its application to men and institutions as
they are, Aristotle admits certain compromises which are not really
consistent with it.
1. Aristotle thinks of membership of a state as community in pursuit of
the good. He wishes to confine membership in it to those who are capable
of that pursuit in the highest and most explicit manner. His citizens,
therefore, must be men of leisure, capable of rational thought upon the
end of life. He does not recognise the significance of that less conscious
but deep-seated membership of the state which finds its expression in
loyalty and patriotism. His definition of citizen includes only a small
part of the population of any Greek city. He is forced to admit that the
state is not possible without the co-operation of men whom he will not
admit to membership in it, either because they are not capable of
sufficient rational appreciation of political ends, like the barbarians
whom he thought were natural slaves, or because the leisure necessary for
citizenship can only be gained by the work of the artisans who by that
very work make themselves incapable of the life which they make possible
for others. “The artisan only attains excellence in proportion as he
becomes a slave,” and the slave is only a living instrument of the good
life. He exists for the state, but the state does not exist for him.
2. Aristotle in his account of the ideal state seems to waver between two
ideals. There is the ideal of an aristocracy and the ideal of what he
calls constitutional government, a mixed constitution. The principle of
“tools to those who can use them” ought to lead him, as it does Plato, to
an aristocracy. Those who have complete knowledge of the good must be few,
and therefore Plato gave entire power in his state into the hands of the
small minority of philosopher guardians. It is in accordance with this
principle that Aristotle holds that kingship is the proper form of
government when there is in the state one man of transcendent virtue. At
the same time, Aristotle always holds that absolute government is not
properly political, that government is not like the rule of a shepherd
over his sheep, but the rule of equals over equals. He admits that the
democrats are right in insisting that equality is a necessary element in
the state, though he thinks they do not admit the importance of other
equally necessary elements. Hence he comes to say that ruling and being
ruled over by turns is an essential feature of constitutional government,
which he admits as an alternative to aristocracy. The end of the state,
which is to be the standard of the distribution of political power, is
conceived sometimes as a good for the apprehension and attainment of which
“virtue” is necessary and sufficient (this is the principle of
aristocracy), and sometimes as a more complex good, which needs for its
attainment not only “virtue” but wealth and equality. This latter
conception is the principle on which the mixed constitution is based. This
in its distribution of political power gives some weight to “virtue,” some
to wealth, and some to mere number. But the principle of “ruling and being
ruled by turns” is not really compatible with an unmodified principle of
“tools to those who can use them.” Aristotle is right in seeing that
political government demands equality, not in the sense that all members
of the state should be equal in ability or should have equal power, but in
the sense that none of them can properly be regarded simply as tools with
which the legislator works, that each has a right to say what will be made
of his own life. The analogy between the legislator and the craftsman on
which Plato insists, breaks down because the legislator is dealing with
men like himself, men who can to some extent conceive their own end in
life and cannot be treated merely as means to the end of the legislator.
The sense of the value of “ruling and being ruled in turn” is derived from
the experience that the ruler may use his power to subordinate the lives
of the citizens of the state not to the common good but to his own private
purposes. In modern terms, it is a simple, rough-and-ready attempt to
solve that constant problem of politics, how efficient government is to be
combined with popular control. This problem arises from the imperfection
of human nature, apparent in rulers as well as in ruled, and if the
principle which attempts to solve it be admitted as a principle of
importance in the formation of the best constitution, then the
starting-point of politics will be man’s actual imperfection, not his
ideal nature. Instead, then, of beginning with a state which would express
man’s ideal nature, and adapting it as well as may be to man’s actual
shortcomings from that ideal, we must recognise that the state and all
political machinery are as much the expression of man’s weakness as of his
ideal possibilities. The state is possible only because men have common
aspirations, but government, and political power, the existence of
officials who are given authority to act in the name of the whole state,
are necessary because men’s community is imperfect, because man’s social
nature expresses itself in conflicting ways, in the clash of interests,
the rivalry of parties, and the struggle of classes, instead of in the
united seeking after a common good. Plato and Aristotle were familiar with
the legislator who was called in by the whole people, and they tended
therefore to take the general will or common consent of the people for
granted. Most political questions are concerned with the construction and
expression of the general will, and with attempts to ensure that the
political machinery made to express the general will shall not be
exploited for private or sectional ends.
Aristotle’s mixed constitution springs from a recognition of sectional
interests in the state. For the proper relation between the claims of
“virtue,” wealth, and numbers is to be based not upon their relative
importance in the good life, but upon the strength of the parties which
they represent. The mixed constitution is practicable in a state where the
middle class is strong, as only the middle class can mediate between the
rich and the poor. The mixed constitution will be stable if it represents
the actual balance of power between different classes in the state. When
we come to Aristotle’s analysis of existing constitutions, we find that
while he regards them as imperfect approximations to the ideal, he also
thinks of them as the result of the struggle between classes. Democracy,
he explains, is the government not of the many but of the poor; oligarchy
a government not of the few but of the rich. And each class is thought of,
not as trying to express an ideal, but as struggling to acquire power or
maintain its position. If ever the class existed in unredeemed nakedness,
it was in the Greek cities of the fourth century, and its existence is
abundantly recognised by Aristotle. His account of the causes of
revolutions in Book V. shows how far were the existing states of Greece
from the ideal with which he starts. His analysis of the facts forces him
to look upon them as the scene of struggling factions. The causes of
revolutions are not described as primarily changes in the conception of
the common good, but changes in the military or economic power of the
several classes in the state. The aim which he sets before oligarchs or
democracies is not the good life, but simple stability or permanence of
the existing constitution.
With this spirit of realism which pervades Books IV., V., and VI. the
idealism of Books I., II., VII., and VIII. is never reconciled. Aristotle
is content to call existing constitutions perversions of the true form.
But we cannot read the Politics without recognising and profiting from the
insight into the nature of the state which is revealed throughout.
Aristotle’s failure does not lie in this, that he is both idealist and
realist, but that he keeps these two tendencies too far apart. He thinks
too much of his ideal state, as something to be reached once for all by
knowledge, as a fixed type to which actual states approximate or from
which they are perversions. But if we are to think of actual politics as
intelligible in the light of the ideal, we must think of that ideal as
progressively revealed in history, not as something to be discovered by
turning our back on experience and having recourse to abstract reasoning.
If we stretch forward from what exists to an ideal, it is to a better
which may be in its turn transcended, not to a single immutable best.
Aristotle found in the society of his time men who were not capable of
political reflection, and who, as he thought, did their best work under
superintendence. He therefore called them natural slaves. For, according
to Aristotle, that is a man’s natural condition in which he does his best
work. But Aristotle also thinks of nature as something fixed and
immutable; and therefore sanctions the institution of slavery, which
assumes that what men are that they will always be, and sets up an
artificial barrier to their ever becoming anything else. We see in
Aristotle’s defence of slavery how the conception of nature as the ideal
can have a debasing influence upon views of practical politics. His high
ideal of citizenship offers to those who can satisfy its claims the
prospect of a fair life; those who fall short are deemed to be different
in nature and shut out entirely from approach to the ideal.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
First edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and second
book of OEconomica), 5 vols. by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495-8;
re-impression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by
Grynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550;
later editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis (Greek
and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol. contains the Index by Bonitz, 1831-70;
Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols. 1848-74.
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS: Edited by T. Taylor, with Porphyry’s Introduction, 9
vols., 1812; under editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, 1908.
Later editions of separate works:
De Anima: Torstrik, 1862; Trendelenburg, 2nd edition, 1877, with English
translation, E. Wallace, 1882; Biehl, 1884, 1896; with English, R. D.
Hicks, 1907.
Ethica: J. S. Brewer (Nicomachean), 1836; W. E. Jelf, 1856; J. E. T.
Rogers, 1865; A. Grant, 1857-8, 1866, 1874, 1885; E. Moore, 1871, 1878,
4th edition, 1890; Ramsauer (Nicomachean), 1878, Susemihl, 1878, 1880,
revised by O. Apelt, 1903; A. Grant, 1885; I. Bywater (Nicomachean), 1890;
J. Burnet, 1900.
Historia Animalium: Schneider, 1812; Aubert and Wimmer, 1860, Dittmeyer,
1907.
Metaphysica: Schwegler, 1848; W. Christ, 1899.
Organon: Waitz, 1844-6.
Poetica: Vahlen, 1867, 1874, with Notes by E. Moore, 1875; with English
translation by E. R. Wharton, 1883, 1885; Uberweg, 1870, 1875; with German
translation, Susemihl, 1874; Schmidt, 1875; Christ, 1878; I. Bywater,
1898; T. G. Tucker, 1899.
De Republics, Atheniensium: Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F. G. Kenyon,
1891, 3rd edition, 1892; Kaibel and Wilamowitz—Moel-lendorf, 1891,
3rd edition, 1898; Van Herwerden and Leeuwen (from Kenyon’s text), 1891;
Blass, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1903; J. E. Sandys, 1893.
Politica: Susemihl, 1872; with German, 1878, 3rd edition, 1882; Susemihl
and Hicks, 1894, etc.; O. Immisch, 1909.
Physica: C. Prantl, 1879.
Rhetorica: Stahr, 1862; Sprengel (with Latin text), 1867; Cope and Sandys,
1877; Roemer, 1885, 1898.
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ONE OR MORE WORKS: De Anima (with Parva
Naturalia), by W. A. Hammond, 1902. Ethica: Of Morals to Nicomachus, by E.
Pargiter, 1745; with Politica, by J. Gillies, 1797, 1804, 1813; with
Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Taylor, 1818, and later editions. Nicomachean
Ethics, 1819; mainly from text of Bekker, by D. P. Chase, 1847; revised
1861, and later editions with an introductory essay by G. H. Lewes
(Camelot Classics), 1890; re-edited by J. M. Mitchell (New Universal
Library), 1906, 1910; with an introductory essay by Prof. J.H. Smith
(Everyman’s Library), 1911; by R.W.Browne (Bohn’s Classical Library),
1848, etc.; by R. Williams, 1869, 1876; by W. M. Hatch and others (with
translation of paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes), edited by
E. Hatch, 1879; by F, H. Peters, 1881; J. E. C. Welldon, 1892; J. Gillies
(Lubbock’s Hundred Books), 1893. Historia Animalium, by R. Creswell
(Bohn’s Classical Library), 1848; with Treatise on Physiognomy, by T.
Taylor, 1809. Metaphysica, by T. Taylor, 1801; by J. H. M’Mahon (Bohn’s
Classical Library), 1848. Organon, with Porphyry’s Introduction, by O. F.
Owen (Bohn’s Classical Library), 1848. Posterior Analytics, E. Poste,
1850; E. S. Bourchier, 1901; On Fallacies, E. Poste, 1866. Parva Naturalia
(Greek and English), by G. R. T. Ross, 1906; with De Anima, by W. A.
Hammond, 1902. Youth and Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration, W. Ogle,
1897. Poetica, with Notes from the French of D’Acier, 1705; by H. J. Pye,
1788, 1792; T. Twining, 1789,1812, with Preface and Notes by H. Hamilton,
1851; Treatise on Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Hobbes (Bohn’s Classical
Library), 1850; by Wharton, 1883 (see Greek version), S. H. Butcher, 1895,
1898, 3rd edition, 1902; E. S. Bourchier, 1907; by Ingram Bywater, 1909.
De Partibus Animalium, W. Ogle, 1882. De Republica Athenientium, by E.
Poste, 1891; F. G. Kenyon, 1891; T. J. Dymes, 1891. De Virtutibus et
Vitiis, by W. Bridgman, 1804. Politica, from the French of Regius, 1598;
by W. Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley’s Universal Library), 1893
(Lubbock’s Hundred Books); by E. Walford (with AEconomics, and Life by Dr.
Gillies) (Bohn’s Classical Library), 1848; J. E. C. Welldon, 1883; B.
Jowett, 1885; with Introduction and Index by H. W. C. Davis, 1905; Books
i. iii. iv. (vii.) from Bekker’s text by W. E. Bolland, with Introduction
by A. Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other philosophers), 1597,
1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica: A summary by T. Hobbes, 1655 (?), new
edition, 1759; by the translators of the Art of Thinking, 1686, 1816; by
D. M. Crimmin, 1812; J. Gillies, 1823; Anon. 1847; J. E. C. Welldon, 1886;
R. C. Jebb, with Introduction and Supplementary Notes by J. E. Sandys,
1909 (see under Poetica and Ethica). Secreta Secretorum (supposititious
work), Anon. 1702; from the Hebrew version by M. Gaster, 1907, 1908.
Version by Lydgate and Burgh, edited by R. Steele (E.E.T.S.), 1894, 1898.
LIFE, ETC.: J. W. Blakesley, 1839; A Crichton (Jardine’s Naturalist’s
Library), 1843; J. S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates, Aristotle,
etc., 1871; G. Grote, Aristotle, edited by A. Bain and G. C. Robertson,
1872, 1880; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, 1875,
1880; A. Grant (Ancient Classics for English readers), 1877; T. Davidson,
Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals (Great Educators), 1892.
A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
As we see that every city is a society, and every society Ed. is
established for some good purpose; for an apparent [Bekker 1252a] good is
the spring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the principle
upon which they are every one founded, and this is more especially true of
that which has for its object the best possible, and is itself the most
excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now this is called a city, and
the society thereof a political society; for those who think that the
principles of a political, a regal, a family, and a herile government are
the same are mistaken, while they suppose that each of these differ in the
numbers to whom their power extends, but not in their constitution: so
that with them a herile government is one composed of a very few, a
domestic of more, a civil and a regal of still more, as if there was no
difference between a large family and a small city, or that a regal
government and a political one are the same, only that in the one a single
person is continually at the head of public affairs; in the other, that
each member of the state has in his turn a share in the government, and is
at one time a magistrate, at another a private person, according to the
rules of political science. But now this is not true, as will be evident
to any one who will consider this question in the most approved method.
As, in an inquiry into every other subject, it is necessary to separate
the different parts of which it is compounded, till we arrive at their
first elements, which are the most minute parts thereof; so by the same
proceeding we shall acquire a knowledge of the primary parts of a city and
see wherein they differ from each other, and whether the rules of art will
give us any assistance in examining into each of these things which are
mentioned.
CHAPTER II
Now if in this particular science any one would attend to its original
seeds, and their first shoot, he would then as in others have the subject
perfectly before him; and perceive, in the first place, that it is
requisite that those should be joined together whose species cannot exist
without each other, as the male and the female, for the business of
propagation; and this not through choice, but by that natural impulse
which acts both upon plants and animals also, for the purpose of their
leaving behind them others like themselves. It is also from natural causes
that some beings command and others obey, that each may obtain their
mutual safety; for a being who is endowed with a mind capable of
reflection and forethought is by nature the superior and governor, whereas
he whose excellence is merely corporeal is formect to be a slave; whence
it follows that the different state of master [1252b] and slave is equally
advantageous to both. But there is a natural difference between a female
and a slave: for nature is not like the artists who make the Delphic
swords for the use of the poor, but for every particular purpose she has
her separate instruments, and thus her ends are most complete, for
whatsoever is employed on one subject only, brings that one to much
greater perfection than when employed on many; and yet among the
barbarians, a female and a slave are upon a level in the community, the
reason for which is, that amongst them there are none qualified by nature
to govern, therefore their society can be nothing but between slaves of
different sexes. For which reason the poets say, it is proper for the
Greeks to govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian and a slave were by
nature one. Now of these two societies the domestic is the first, and
Hesiod is right when he says, “First a house, then a wife, then an ox for
the plough,” for the poor man has always an ox before a household slave.
That society then which nature has established for daily support is the
domestic, and those who compose it are called by Charondas homosipuoi,
and by Epimenides the Cretan homokapnoi; but the society of many
families, which was first instituted for their lasting, mutual advantage,
is called a village, and a village is most naturally composed of the
descendants of one family, whom some persons call homogalaktes, the
children and the children’s children thereof: for which reason cities were
originally governed by kings, as the barbarian states now are, which are
composed of those who had before submitted to kingly government; for every
family is governed by the elder, as are the branches thereof, on account
of their relationship thereunto, which is what Homer says, “Each one ruled
his wife and child;” and in this scattered manner they formerly lived. And
the opinion which universally prevails, that the gods themselves are
subject to kingly government, arises from hence, that all men formerly
were, and many are so now; and as they imagined themselves to be made in
the likeness of the gods, so they supposed their manner of life must needs
be the same. And when many villages so entirely join themselves together
as in every respect to form but one society, that society is a city, and
contains in itself, if I may so speak, the end and perfection of
government: first founded that we might live, but continued that we may
live happily. For which reason every city must be allowed to be the work
of nature, if we admit that the original society between male and female
is; for to this as their end all subordinate societies tend, and the end
of everything is the nature of it. For what every being is in its most
perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a
man, a horse, or a house: besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and
the end which we [1253a] desire, must be best; but a government complete
in itself is that final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a
city is a natural production, and that man is naturally a political
animal, and that whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for
society, must be either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in
Homer, who is reviled for being “without society, without law, without
family.” Such a one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition, and as
solitary as the birds. The gift of speech also evidently proves that man
is a more social animal than the bees, or any of the herding cattle: for
nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who
enjoys it. Voice indeed, as being the token of pleasure and pain, is
imparted to others also, and thus much their nature is capable of, to
perceive pleasure and pain, and to impart these sensations to others; but
it is by speech that we are enabled to express what is useful for us, and
what is hurtful, and of course what is just and what is unjust: for in
this particular man differs from other animals, that he alone has a
perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and it is a participation
of these common sentiments which forms a family and a city. Besides, the
notion of a city naturally precedes that of a family or an individual, for
the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts, for if you take away the
whole man, you cannot say a foot or a hand remains, unless by
equivocation, as supposing a hand of stone to be made, but that would only
be a dead one; but everything is understood to be this or that by its
energic qualities and powers, so that when these no longer remain, neither
can that be said to be the same, but something of the same name. That a
city then precedes an individual is plain, for if an individual is not in
himself sufficient to compose a perfect government, he is to a city as
other parts are to a whole; but he that is incapable of society, or so
complete in himself as not to want it, makes no part of a city, as a beast
or a god. There is then in all persons a natural impetus to associate with
each other in this manner, and he who first founded civil society was the
cause of the greatest good; for as by the completion of it man is the most
excellent of all living beings, so without law and justice he would be the
worst of all, for nothing is so difficult to subdue as injustice in arms:
but these arms man is born with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may
apply to the most opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be the
most wicked, the most cruel, the most lustful, and most gluttonous being
imaginable; for justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the
state is regulated, and these rules are the criterion of what is right.
CHAPTER III
SINCE it is now evident of what parts a city is composed, it will be
necessary to treat first of family government, for every city is made up
of families, and every family [1253b] has again its separate parts of
which it is composed. When a family is complete, it consists of freemen
and slaves; but as in every subject we should begin with examining into
the smallest parts of which it consists, and as the first and smallest
parts of a family are the master and slave, the husband and wife, the
father and child, let us first inquire into these three, what each of them
may be, and what they ought to be; that is to say, the herile, the
nuptial, and the paternal. Let these then be considered as the three
distinct parts of a family: some think that the providing what is
necessary for the family is something different from the government of it,
others that this is the greatest part of it; it shall be considered
separately; but we will first speak of a master and a slave, that we may
both understand the nature of those things which are absolutely necessary,
and also try if we can learn anything better on this subject than what is
already known. Some persons have thought that the power of the master over
his slave originates from his superior knowledge, and that this knowledge
is the same in the master, the magistrate, and the king, as we have
already said; but others think that herile government is contrary to
nature, and that it is the law which makes one man a slave and another
free, but that in nature there is no difference; for which reason that
power cannot be founded in justice, but in force.
CHAPTER IV
Since then a subsistence is necessary in every family, the means of
procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family, for
without necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. As in all
arts which are brought to perfection it is necessary that they should have
their proper instruments if they would complete their works, so is it in
the art of managing a family: now of instruments some of them are alive,
others inanimate; thus with respect to the pilot of the ship, the tiller
is without life, the sailor is alive; for a servant is as an instrument in
many arts. Thus property is as an instrument to living; an estate is a
multitude of instruments; so a slave is an animated instrument, but every
one that can minister of himself is more valuable than any other
instrument; for if every instrument, at command, or from a preconception
of its master’s will, could accomplish its work (as the story goes of the
statues of Daedalus; or what the poet tells us of the tripods of Vulcan,
“that they moved of their own accord into the assembly of the gods “), the
shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play of itself; nor would the
architect want servants, or the [1254a] master slaves. Now what are
generally called instruments are the efficients of something else, but
possessions are what we simply use: thus with a shuttle we make something
else for our use; but we only use a coat, or a bed: since then making and
using differ from each other in species, and they both require their
instruments, it is necessary that these should be different from each
other. Now life is itself what we use, and not what we employ as the
efficient of something else; for which reason the services of a slave are
for use. A possession may be considered in the same nature as a part of
anything; now a part is not only a part of something, but also is nothing
else; so is a possession; therefore a master is only the master of the
slave, but no part of him; but the slave is not only the slave of the
master, but nothing else but that. This fully explains what is the nature
of a slave, and what are his capacities; for that being who by nature is
nothing of himself, but totally another’s, and is a man, is a slave by
nature; and that man who is the property of another, is his mere chattel,
though he continues a man; but a chattel is an instrument for use,
separate from the body.
CHAPTER V
But whether any person is such by nature, and whether it is advantageous
and just for any one to be a slave or no, or whether all slavery is
contrary to nature, shall be considered hereafter; not that it is
difficult to determine it upon general principles, or to understand it
from matters of fact; for that some should govern, and others be governed,
is not only necessary but useful, and from the hour of their birth some
are marked out for those purposes, and others for the other, and there are
many species of both sorts. And the better those are who are governed the
better also is the government, as for instance of man, rather than the
brute creation: for the more excellent the materials are with which the
work is finished, the more excellent certainly is the work; and wherever
there is a governor and a governed, there certainly is some work produced;
for whatsoever is composed of many parts, which jointly become one,
whether conjunct or separate, evidently show the marks of governing and
governed; and this is true of every living thing in all nature; nay, even
in some things which partake not of life, as in music; but this probably
would be a disquisition too foreign to our present purpose. Every living
thing in the first place is composed of soul and body, of these the one is
by nature the governor, the other the governed; now if we would know what
is natural, we ought to search for it in those subjects in which nature
appears most perfect, and not in those which are corrupted; we should
therefore examine into a man who is most perfectly formed both in soul and
body, in whom this is evident, for in the depraved and vicious the body
seems [1254b] to rule rather than the soul, on account of their being
corrupt and contrary to nature. We may then, as we affirm, perceive in an
animal the first principles of herile and political government; for the
soul governs the body as the master governs his slave; the mind governs
the appetite with a political or a kingly power, which shows that it is
both natural and advantageous that the body should be governed by the
soul, and the pathetic part by the mind, and that part which is possessed
of reason; but to have no ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to
all; and this holds true not only of man, but of other animals also, for
tame animals are naturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous
that both should be under subjection to man; for this is productive of
their common safety: so is it naturally with the male and the female; the
one is superior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is
governed; and the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to all
mankind. Those men therefore who are as much inferior to others as the
body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use of them
is their bodies, in which their excellence consists; and if what I have
said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is advantageous to them to
be always under government. He then is by nature formed a slave who is
qualified to become the chattel of another person, and on that account is
so, and who has just reason enough to know that there is such a faculty,
without being indued with the use of it; for other animals have no
perception of reason, but are entirely guided by appetite, and indeed they
vary very little in their use from each other; for the advantage which we
receive, both from slaves and tame animals, arises from their bodily
strength administering to our necessities; for it is the intention of
nature to make the bodies of slaves and freemen different from each other,
that the one should be robust for their necessary purposes, the others
erect, useless indeed for what slaves are employed in, but fit for civil
life, which is divided into the duties of war and peace; though these
rules do not always take place, for slaves have sometimes the bodies of
freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it is evident that if some bodies
are as much more excellent than others as the statues of the gods excel
the human form, every one will allow that the inferior ought to be slaves
to the superior; and if this is true with respect to the body, it is still
juster to determine in the same manner, when we consider the soul; though
it is not so easy to perceive the beauty of [1255a] the soul as it is of
the body. Since then some men are slaves by nature, and others are
freemen, it is clear that where slavery is advantageous to any one, then
it is just to make him a slave.
CHAPTER VI
But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the contrary
opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become a slave two
different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law is a certain
compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is adjudged to be the
property of the conquerors: but many persons who are conversant in law
call in question this pretended right, and say that it would be hard that
a man should be compelled by violence to be the slave and subject of
another who had the power to compel him, and was his superior in strength;
and upon this subject, even of those who are wise, some think one way and
some another; but the cause of this doubt and variety of opinions arises
from hence, that great abilities, when accompanied with proper means, are
generally able to succeed by force: for victory is always owing to a
superiority in some advantageous circumstances; so that it seems that
force never prevails but in consequence of great abilities. But still the
dispute concerning the justice of it remains; for some persons think, that
justice consists in benevolence, others think it just that the powerful
should govern: in the midst of these contrary opinions, there are no
reasons sufficient to convince us, that the right of being master and
governor ought not to be placed with those who have the greatest
abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the right which the law
gives (for that which is legal is in some respects just), insist upon it
that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that they say it is wholly so,
for it may happen that the principle upon which the wars were commenced is
unjust; moreover no one will say that a man who is unworthily in slavery
is therefore a slave; for if so, men of the noblest families might happen
to be slaves, and the descendants of slaves, if they should chance to be
taken prisoners in war and sold: to avoid this difficulty they say that
such persons should not be called slaves, but barbarians only should; but
when they say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by
nature, which was what we at first said; for we must acknowledge that
there are some persons who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves,
but others in no situation; thus also it is with those of noble descent:
it is not only in their own country that they are Esteemed as such, but
everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on this account at home only;
as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other
not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:
Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they distinguish
the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from each other by
their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it reasonable, that
as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a good man
should be descended; and this is what nature desires to do, but frequently
cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt has some reason
in it, and that these persons are not slaves, and those freemen, by the
appointment of nature; and also that in some instances it is sufficiently
clear, that it is advantageous to both parties for this man to be a slave,
and that to be a master, and that it is right and just, that some should
be governed, and others govern, in the manner that nature intended; of
which sort of government is that which a master exercises over a slave.
But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both; for the same thing is useful
to the part and to the whole, to the body and to the soul; but the slave
is as it were a part of the master, as if he were an animated part of his
body, though separate. For which reason a mutual utility and friendship
may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when they are placed
by nature in that relation to each other, for the contrary takes place
amongst those who are reduced to slavery by the law, or by conquest.
CHAPTER VII
It is evident from what has been said, that a herile and a political
government are not the same, or that all governments are alike to each
other, as some affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of freemen, the
other to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for that is
what prevails in every house; but a political state is the government of
free men and equals. The master is not so called from his knowing how to
manage his slave, but because he is so; for the same reason a slave and a
freeman have their respective appellations. There is also one sort of
knowledge proper for a master, another for a slave; the slave’s is of the
nature of that which was taught by a slave at Syracuse; for he for a
stipulated sum instructed the boys in all the business of a household
slave, of which there are various sorts to be learnt, as the art of
cookery, and other such-like services, of which some are allotted to some,
and others to others; some employments being more honourable, others more
necessary; according to the proverb, “One slave excels another, one master
excels another:” in such-like things the knowledge of a slave consists.
The knowledge of the master is to be able properly to employ his slaves,
for the mastership of slaves is the employment, not the mere possession of
them; not that this knowledge contains anything great or respectable; for
what a slave ought to know how to do, that a master ought to know how to
order; for which reason, those who have it in their power to be free from
these low attentions, employ a steward for this business, and apply
themselves either to public affairs or philosophy: the knowledge of
procuring what is necessary for a family is different from that which
belongs either to the master or the slave: and to do this justly must be
either by war or hunting. And thus much of the difference between a master
and a slave.
CHAPTER VIII
[1256a] As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by all
means inquire into the nature of property in general, and the acquisition
of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the first place
then, some one may doubt whether the getting of money is the same thing as
economy, or whether it is a part of it, or something subservient to it;
and if so, whether it is as the art of making shuttles is to the art of
weaving, or the art of making brass to that of statue founding, for they
are not of the same service; for the one supplies the tools, the other the
matter: by the matter I mean the subject out of which the work is
finished, as wool for the cloth and brass for the statue. It is evident
then that the getting of money is not the same thing as economy, for the
business of the one is to furnish the means of the other to use them; and
what art is there employed in the management of a family but economy, but
whether this is a part of it, or something of a different species, is a
doubt; for if it is the business of him who is to get money to find out
how riches and possessions may be procured, and both these arise from
various causes, we must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is part
of money-getting or something different, and in general, whether the same
is not true of every acquisition and every attention which relates to
provision. But as there are many sorts of provision, so are the methods of
living both of man and the brute creation very various; and as it is
impossible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes
the lives of animals so different from each other. Of beasts, some live in
herds, others separate, as is most convenient for procuring themselves
food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and others on
whatsoever they light on, nature having so distinguished their course of
life, that they can very easily procure themselves subsistence; and as the
same things are not agreeable to all, but one animal likes one thing and
another another, it follows that the lives of those beasts who live upon
flesh must be different from the lives of those who live on fruits; so is
it with men, their lives differ greatly from each other; and of all these
the shepherd’s is the idlest, for they live upon the flesh of tame
animals, without any trouble, while they are obliged to change their
habitations on account of their flocks, which they are compelled to
follow, cultivating, as it were, a living farm. Others live exercising
violence over living creatures, one pursuing this thing, another that,
these preying upon men; those who live near lakes and marshes and rivers,
or the sea itself, on fishing, while others are fowlers, or hunters of
wild beasts; but the greater part of mankind live upon the produce of the
earth and its cultivated fruits; and the manner in which all those live
who follow the direction of nature, and labour for their own subsistence,
is nearly the same, without ever thinking to procure any provision by way
of exchange or merchandise, such are shepherds, husband-men, [1256b]
robbers, fishermen, and hunters: some join different employments together,
and thus live very agreeably; supplying those deficiencies which were
wanting to make their subsistence depend upon themselves only: thus, for
instance, the same person shall be a shepherd and a robber, or a
husbandman and a hunter; and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that
mode of life which necessity points out. This provision then nature
herself seems to have furnished all animals with, as well immediately upon
their first origin as also when they are arrived at a state of maturity;
for at the first of these periods some of them are provided in the womb
with proper nourishment, which continues till that which is born can get
food for itself, as is the case with worms and birds; and as to those
which bring forth their young alive, they have the means for their
subsistence for a certain time within themselves, namely milk. It is
evident then that we may conclude of those things that are, that plants
are created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men; the
tame for our use and provision; the wild, at least the greater part, for
our provision also, or for some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing
us with clothes, and the like. As nature therefore makes nothing either
imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these
things for men: for which reason what we gain in war is in a certain
degree a natural acquisition; for hunting is a part of it, which it is
necessary for us to employ against wild beasts; and those men who being
intended by nature for slavery are unwilling to submit to it, on which
occasion such a. war is by nature just: that species of acquisition then
only which is according to nature is part of economy; and this ought to be
at hand, or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is necessary to be
kept in store to live upon, and which are useful as well for the state as
the family. And true riches seem to consist in these; and the acquisition
of those possessions which are necessary for a happy life is not infinite;
though Solon says otherwise in this verse:
for they may be fixed as in other arts; for the instruments of no art
whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude; but
riches are a number of instruments in domestic and civil economy; it is
therefore evident that the acquisition of certain things according to
nature is a part both of domestic and civil economy, and for what reason.
CHAPTER IX
There is also another species of acquisition which they [1257a]
particularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety; and by this indeed
it seems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many persons
suppose, from their near relation to each other, that this is one and the
same with that we have just mentioned, but it is not the same as that,
though not very different; one of these is natural, the other is not, but
rather owing to some art and skill; we will enter into a particular
examination of this subject. The uses of every possession are two, both
dependent upon the thing itself, but not in the same manner, the one
supposing an inseparable connection with it, the other not; as a shoe, for
instance, which may be either worn, or exchanged for something else, both
these are the uses of the shoe; for he who exchanges a shoe with some man
who wants one, for money or provisions, uses the shoe as a shoe, but not
according to the original intention, for shoes were not at first made to
be exchanged. The same thing holds true of all other possessions; for
barter, in general, had its original beginning in nature, some men having
a surplus, others too little of what was necessary for them: hence it is
evident, that the selling provisions for money is not according to the
natural use of things; for they were obliged to use barter for those
things which they wanted; but it is plain that barter could have no place
in the first, that is to say, in family society; but must have begun when
the number of those who composed the community was enlarged: for the first
of these had all things in common; but when they came to be separated they
were obliged to exchange with each other many different things which both
parties wanted. Which custom of barter is still preserved amongst many
barbarous nations, who procure one necessary with another, but never sell
anything; as giving and receiving wine for corn and the like. This sort of
barter is not contradictory to nature, nor is it any species of
money-getting; but is necessary in procuring that subsistence which is so
consonant thereunto. But this barter introduced the use of money, as might
be expected; for a convenient place from whence to import what you wanted,
or to export what you had a surplus of, being often at a great distance,
money necessarily made its way into commerce; for it is not everything
which is naturally most useful that is easiest of carriage; for which
reason they invented something to exchange with each other which they
should mutually give and take, that being really valuable itself, should
have the additional advantage of being of easy conveyance, for the
purposes of life, as iron and silver, or anything else of the same nature:
and this at first passed in value simply according to its weight or size;
but in process of time it had a certain stamp, to save the trouble of
weighing, which stamp expressed its value. [1257b]
Money then being established as the necessary medium of exchange, another
species of money-getting soon took place, namely, by buying and selling,
at probably first in a simple manner, afterwards with more skill and
experience, where and how the greatest profits might be made. For which
reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly conversant about
trade, and the business of it to be able to tell where the greatest
profits can be made, being the means of procuring abundance of wealth and
possessions: and thus wealth is very often supposed to consist in the
quantity of money which any one possesses, as this is the medium by which
all trade is conducted and a fortune made, others again regard it as of no
value, as being of none by nature, but arbitrarily made so by compact; so
that if those who use it should alter their sentiments, it would be worth
nothing, as being of no service for any necessary purpose. Besides, he who
abounds in money often wants necessary food; and it is impossible to say
that any person is in good circumstances when with all his possessions he
may perish with hunger.
Like Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable wish had everything he
touched turned into gold. For which reason others endeavour to procure
other riches and other property, and rightly, for there are other riches
and property in nature; and these are the proper objects of economy: while
trade only procures money, not by all means, but by the exchange of it,
and for that purpose it is this which it is chiefly employed about, for
money is the first principle and the end of trade; nor are there any
bounds to be set to what is thereby acquired. Thus also there are no
limits to the art of medicine, with respect to the health which it
attempts to procure; the same also is true of all other arts; no line can
be drawn to terminate their bounds, the several professors of them being
desirous to extend them as far as possible. (But still the means to be
employed for that purpose are limited; and these are the limits beyond
which the art cannot proceed.) Thus in the art of acquiring riches there
are no limits, for the object of that is money and possessions; but
economy has a boundary, though this has not: for acquiring riches is not
the business of that, for which reason it should seem that some boundary
should be set to riches, though we see the contrary to this is what is
practised; for all those who get riches add to their money without end;
the cause of which is the near connection of these two arts with each
other, which sometimes occasions the one to change employments with the
other, as getting of money is their common object: for economy requires
the possession of wealth, but not on its own account but with another
view, to purchase things necessary therewith; but the other procures it
merely to increase it: so that some persons are confirmed in their belief,
that this is the proper object of economy, and think that for this purpose
money should be saved and hoarded up without end; the reason for which
disposition is, that they are intent upon living, but not upon living
well; and this desire being boundless in its extent, the means which they
aim at for that purpose are boundless also; and those who propose to live
well, often confine that to the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense; so
that as this also seems to depend upon what a man has, all their care is
to get money, and hence arises the other cause for this art; for as this
enjoyment is excessive in its degree, they endeavour to procure means
proportionate to supply it; and if they cannot do this merely by the art
of dealing in money, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply
all their powers to a purpose they were not by nature intended for. Thus,
for instance, courage was intended to inspire fortitude, not to get money
by; neither is this the end of the soldier’s or the physician’s art, but
victory and health. But such persons make everything subservient to
money-getting, as if this was the only end; and to the end everything
ought to refer.
We have now considered that art of money-getting which is not necessary,
and have seen in what manner we became in want of it; and also that which
is necessary, which is different from it; for that economy which is
natural, and whose object is to provide food, is not like this unlimited
in its extent, but has its bounds.
CHAPTER X
We have now determined what was before doubtful, whether or no the art of
getting money is his business who is at the head of a family or a state,
and though not strictly so, it is however very necessary; for as a
politician does not make men, but receiving them from the hand of nature
employs them to proper purposes; thus the earth, or the sea, or something
else ought to supply them with provisions, and this it is the business of
the master of the family to manage properly; for it is not the weaver’s
business to make yarn, but to use it, and to distinguish what is good and
useful from what is bad and of no service; and indeed some one may inquire
why getting money should be a part of economy when the art of healing is
not, as it is as requisite that the family should be in health as that
they should eat, or have anything else which is necessary; and as it is
indeed in some particulars the business both of the master of the family,
and he to whom the government of the state is entrusted, to see after the
health of those under their care, but in others not, but the physician’s;
so also as to money; in some respects it is the business of the master of
the family, in others not, but of the servant; but as we have already
said, it is chiefly nature’s, for it is her part to supply her offspring
with food; for everything finds nourishment left for it in what produced
it; for which reason the natural riches of all men arise from fruits and
animals. Now money-making, as we say, being twofold, it may be applied to
two purposes, the service of the house or retail trade; of which the first
is necessary and commendable, the other justly censurable; for it has not
its origin in [1258b] nature, but by it men gain from each other; for
usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune by
money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally
intended, namely exchange.
And this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the breeding
of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury is money bred
of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most against nature.
CHAPTER XI
Having already sufficiently considered the general principles of this
subject, let us now go into the practical part thereof; the one is a
liberal employment for the mind, the other necessary. These things are
useful in the management of one’s affairs; to be skilful in the nature of
cattle, which are most profitable, and where, and how; as for instance,
what advantage will arise from keeping horses, or oxen, or sheep, or any
other live stock; it is also necessary to be acquainted with the
comparative value of these things, and which of them in particular places
are worth most; for some do better in one place, some in another.
Agriculture also should be understood, and the management of arable
grounds and orchards; and also the care of bees, and fish, and birds, from
whence any profit may arise; these are the first and most proper parts of
domestic management.
With respect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method of doing
this is by merchandise, which is carried on in three different ways,
either by sending the commodity for sale by sea or by land, or else
selling it on the place where it grows; and these differ from each other
in this, that the one is more profitable, the other safer. The second
method is by usury. The third by receiving wages for work done, and this
either by being employed in some mean art, or else in mere bodily labour.
There is also a third species of improving a fortune, that is something
between this and the first; for it partly depends upon nature, partly upon
exchange; the subject of which is, things that are immediately from the
earth, or their produce, which, though they bear no fruit, are yet useful,
such as selling of timber and the whole art of metallurgy, which includes
many different species, for there are various sorts of things dug out of
the earth.
These we have now mentioned in general, but to enter into particulars
concerning each of them, though it might be useful to the artist, would be
tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, those are the most
excellent wherein chance has the least to do, and those are the meanest
which deprave the body, those the most servile in which bodily strength
alone is chiefly wanted, those most illiberal which require least skill;
but as there are books written on these subjects by some persons, as by
Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, upon husbandry and
planting; and by others on other matters, [1259b] let those who have
occasion consult them thereon; besides, every person should collect
together whatsoever he hears occasionally mentioned, by means of which
many of those who aimed at making a fortune have succeeded in their
intentions; for all these are useful to those who make a point of getting
money, as in the contrivance of Thales the Milesian (which was certainly a
gainful one, but as it was his it was attributed to his wisdom, though the
method he used was a general one, and would universally succeed), when
they reviled him for his poverty, as if the study of philosophy was
useless: for they say that he, perceiving by his skill in astrology that
there would be great plenty of olives that year, while it was yet winter,
having got a little money, he gave earnest for all the oil works that were
in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low price, there being no one to
bid against him; but when the season came for making oil, many persons
wanting them, he all at once let them upon what terms he pleased; and
raising a large sum of money by that means, convinced them that it was
easy for philosophers to be rich if they chose it, but that that was not
what they aimed at; in this manner is Thales said to have shown his
wisdom. It indeed is, as we have said, generally gainful for a person to
contrive to make a monopoly of anything; for which reason some cities also
take this method when they want money, and monopolise their commodities.
There was a certain person in Sicily who laid out a sum of money which was
deposited in his hand in buying up all the iron from the iron merchants;
so that when the dealers came from the markets to purchase, there was no
one had any to sell but himself; and though he put no great advance upon
it, yet by laying out fifty talents he made an hundred. When Dionysius
heard this he permitted him to take his money with him, but forbid him to
continue any longer in Sicily, as being one who contrived means for
getting money inconsistent with his affairs. This man’s view and Thales’s
was exactly the same; both of them contrived to procure a monopoly for
themselves: it is useful also for politicians to understand these things,
for many states want to raise money and by such means, as well as private
families, nay more so; for which reason some persons who are employed in
the management of public affairs confine themselves to this province only.
CHAPTER XII
There are then three parts of domestic government, the masters, of which
we have already treated, the fathers, and the husbands; now the government
of the wife and children should both be that of free persons, but not the
[I259b] same; for the wife should be treated as a citizen of a free state,
the children should be under kingly power; for the male is by nature
superior to the female, except when something happens contrary to the
usual course of nature, as is the elder and perfect to the younger and
imperfect. Now in the generality of free states, the governors and the
governed alternately change place; for an equality without any preference
is what nature chooses; however, when one governs and another is governed,
she endeavours that there should be a distinction between them in forms,
expressions, and honours; according to what Amasis said of his laver. This
then should be the established rule between the man and the woman. The
government of children should be kingly; for the power of the father over
the child is founded in affection and seniority, which is a species of
kingly government; for which reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter “the
father of gods and men,” who was king of both these; for nature requires
that a king should be of the same species with those whom he governs,
though superior in some particulars, as is the case between the elder and
the younger, the father and the son.
CHAPTER XIII
It is evident then that in the due government of a family, greater
attention should be paid to the several members of it and their virtues
than to the possessions or riches of it; and greater to the freemen than
the slaves: but here some one may doubt whether there is any other virtue
in a slave than his organic services, and of higher estimation than these,
as temperance, fortitude, justice, and such-like habits, or whether they
possess only bodily qualities: each side of the question has its
difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein do they differ
from freemen? and that they do not, since they are men, and partakers of
reason, is absurd. Nearly the same inquiry may be made concerning a woman
and a child, whether these also have their proper virtues; whether a woman
ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and whether a child is temperate
or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be general, whether the virtues of
those who, by nature, either govern or are governed, are the same or
different; for if it is necessary that both of them should partake of the
fair and good, why is it also necessary that, without exception, the one
should govern, the other always be governed? for this cannot arise from
their possessing these qualities in different degrees; for to govern, and
to be governed, are things different in species, but more or less are not.
And yet it is wonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other
not; for if he who is to govern should not be temperate and just, how can
he govern well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well?
for he who is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will never do what he
ought: it is evident then that both parties ought to be virtuous; but
there is a difference between them, as there is between those who by
nature command and who by nature obey, and this originates in the soul;
for in this nature has planted the governing and submitting principle, the
virtues of which we say are different, as are those of a rational and an
irrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be extended
farther, and that there are in nature a variety of things which govern and
are governed; for a freeman is governed in a different manner from a
slave, a male from a female, and a man from a child: and all these have
parts of mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus a slave can
have no power of determination, a woman but a weak one, a child an
imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to moral
virtues; all must be supposed to possess them, but not in the same manner,
but as is best suited to every one’s employment; on which account he who
is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his business is
entirely that of an architect, and reason is the architect; while others
want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for their station;
from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is common to all
those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and a woman are not
the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though Socrates thought
otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in commanding, the woman’s
in obeying; and the same is true in other particulars: and this will be
evident to those who will examine different virtues separately; for those
who use general terms deceive themselves when they say, that virtue
consists in a good disposition of mind, or doing what is right, or
something of this sort. They do much better who enumerate the different
virtues as Georgias did, than those who thus define them; and as Sophocles
speaks of a woman, we think of all persons, that their ‘virtues should be
applicable to their characters, for says he,
but it is not a man’s; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident that
his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present situation, but
to that in which he will be complete, and his preceptor. In like manner
the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we laid it down
as a maxim, that the use of a slave was to employ him in what you wanted;
so that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted in his station,
only that he may not neglect his work through idleness or fear: some
person may question if what I have said is true, whether virtue is not
necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often through idleness
neglect their work, but the difference between them is very great; for a
slave is connected with you for life, but the artificer not so nearly: as
near therefore as the artificer approaches to the situation of a slave,
just so much ought he to have of the virtues of one; for a mean artificer
is to a certain point a slave; but then a slave is one of those things
which are by nature what they are, but this is not true [1260b] of a
shoemaker, or any other artist. It is evident then that a slave ought to
be trained to those virtues which are proper for his situation by his
master; and not by him who has the power of a master, to teach him any
particular art. Those therefore are in the wrong who would deprive slaves
of reason, and say that they have only to follow their orders; for slaves
want more instruction than children, and thus we determine this matter. It
is necessary, I am sensible, for every one who treats upon government, to
enter particularly into the relations of husband and wife, and of parent
and child, and to show what are the virtues of each and their respective
connections with each other; what is right and what is wrong; and how the
one ought to be followed, and the other avoided. Since then every family
is part of a city, and each of those individuals is part of a family, and
the virtue of the parts ought to correspond to the virtue of the whole; it
is necessary, that both the wives and children of the community should be
instructed correspondent to the nature thereof, if it is of consequence to
the virtue of the state, that the wives and children therein should be
virtuous, and of consequence it certainly is, for the wives are one half
of the free persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to be
formed. As then we have determined these points, we will leave the rest to
be spoken to in another place, as if the subject was now finished; and
beginning again anew, first consider the sentiments of those who have
treated of the most perfect forms of government.
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others best
for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they wish, it is
necessary to examine into the polity of those states which are allowed to
be well governed; and if there should be any others which some persons
have described, and which appear properly regulated, to note what is right
and useful in them; and when we point out wherein they have failed, let
not this be imputed to an affectation of wisdom, for it is because there
are great defects in all those which are already established, that I have
been induced to undertake this work. We will begin with that part of the
subject which naturally presents itself first to our consideration. The
members of every state must of necessity have all things in common, or
some things common, and not others, or nothing at all common. To have
nothing in common is evidently impossible, for society itself is one
species of [1261a] community; and the first thing necessary thereunto is a
common place of habitation, namely the city, which must be one, and this
every citizen must have a share in. But in a government which is to be
well founded, will it be best to admit of a community in everything which
is capable thereof, or only in some particulars, but in others not? for it
is possible that the citizens may have their wives, and children, and
goods in common, as in Plato’s Commonwealth; for in that Socrates affirms
that all these particulars ought to be so. Which then shall we prefer? the
custom which is already established, or the laws which are proposed in
that treatise?
CHAPTER II
Now as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties, so
neither does the cause for which he would frame his government in this
manner seem agreeable to reason, nor is it capable of producing that end
which he has proposed, and for which he says it ought to take place; nor
has he given any particular directions for putting it in practice. Now I
also am willing to agree with Socrates in the principle which he proceeds
upon, and admit that the city ought to be one as much as possible; and yet
it is evident that if it is contracted too much, it will be no longer a
city, for that necessarily supposes a multitude; so that if we proceed in
this manner, we shall reduce a city to a family, and a family to a single
person: for we admit that a family is one in a greater degree than a city,
and a single person than a family; so that if this end could be obtained,
it should never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the city; for a
city does not only consist of a large number of inhabitants, but there
must also be different sorts; for were they all alike, there could be no
city; for a confederacy and a city are two different things; for a
confederacy is valuable from its numbers, although all those who compose
it are men of the same calling; for this is entered into for the sake of
mutual defence, as we add an additional weight to make the scale go down.
The same distinction prevails between a city and a nation when the people
are not collected into separate villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now
those things in which a city should be one are of different sorts, and in
preserving an alternate reciprocation of power between these, the safety
thereof consists (as I have already mentioned in my treatise on Morals),
for amongst freemen and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all
cannot govern at the same time, but either by the year, or according to
some other regulation or time, by which means every one in his turn will
be in office; as if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange
occupations, and not always be employed in the same calling. But as it is
evidently better, that these should continue to exercise their respective
trades; so also in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better
that the government should continue in the same hands; but where it
[1261b] is not (as nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is
just, be the administration good or bad, that all should partake of it),
there it is best to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals
by turns submit to those who are at that time magistrates, as they will,
in their turns, alternately be governors and governed, as if they were
different men: by the same method different persons will execute different
offices. From hence it is evident, that a city cannot be one in the manner
that some persons propose; and that what has been said to be the greatest
good which it could enjoy, is absolutely its destruction, which cannot be:
for the good of anything is that which preserves it. For another reason
also it is clear, that it is not for the best to endeavour to make a city
too much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than a single
person, a city than a family; and indeed Plato supposes that a city owes
its existence to that sufficiency in themselves which the members of it
enjoy. If then this sufficiency is so desirable, the less the city is one
the better.
CHAPTER III
But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as much as
possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place by
permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine (though
this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is entirely one), for
the word All is used in two senses; if it means each individual, what
Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for each person will say, this
is his own son, and his own wife, and his own property, and of everything
else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own. But those who
have their wives and children in common will not say so, but all will say
so, though not as individuals; therefore, to use the word all is evidently
a fallacious mode of speech; for this word is sometimes used
distributively, and sometimes collectively, on account of its double
meaning, and is the cause of inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning.
Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their own, using the
word all in its distributive sense, would be well, but is impossible: in
its collective sense it would by no means contribute to the concord of the
state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience attending this
proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care of; for all men
regard more what is their own than what others share with them in, to
which they pay less attention than is incumbent on every one: let me add
also, that every one is more negligent of what another is to see to, as
well as himself, than of his own private business; as in a family one is
often worse served by many servants than by a few. Let each citizen then
in the state have a thousand children, but let none of them be considered
as the children of that individual, but let the relation of father and
child be common to them all, and they will all be neglected. Besides, in
consequence of this, [1262a] whenever any citizen behaved well or ill,
every person, be the number what it would, might say, this is my son, or
this man’s or that; and in this manner would they speak, and thus would
they doubt of the whole thousand, or of whatever number the city
consisted; and it would be uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when
it was born, who was to take care of it: and which do you think is better,
for every one to say this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two
thousand or ten thousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms
of government, where one man calls another his son, another calls that
same person his brother, another nephew, or some other relation, either by
blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while
another regards him as one of the same parish and the same tribe; and it
is better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity than a son
after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some persons
from suspecting that they are brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers to
each other; for, from the mutual likeness there is between the sire and
the offspring, they will necessarily conclude in what relation they stand
to each other, which circumstance, we are informed by those writers who
describe different parts of the world, does sometimes happen; for in Upper
Africa there are wives in common who yet deliver their children to their
respective fathers, being guided by their likeness to them. There are also
some mares and cows which naturally bring forth their young so like the
male, that we can easily distinguish by which of them they were
impregnated: such was the mare called Just, in Pharsalia.
CHAPTER IV
Besides, those who contrive this plan of community cannot easily avoid the
following evils; namely, blows, murders involuntary or voluntary,
quarrels, and reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be
guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly related
to us; though not to those who are not connected to us by any tie of
affinity: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen oftener
amongst those who do not know how they are connected to each other than
those who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the first of these,
they admit of a legal expiation, but amongst the latter that cannot be
done. It is also absurd for those who promote a community of children to
forbid those who love each other from indulging themselves in the last
excesses of that passion, while they do not restrain them from the passion
itself, or those intercourses which are of all things most improper,
between a Father and a son, a brother and a brother, and indeed the thing
itself is most absurd. It is also ridiculous to prevent this intercourse
between the nearest relations, for no other reason than the violence of
the pleasure, while they think that the relation of father and daughter,
the brother and sister, is of no consequence at all. It seems also more
advantageous for the state, that the husbandmen should have their wives
and children in common than the military, for there will be less affection
[1262b] among them in that case than when otherwise; for such persons
ought to be under subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek
after innovations. Upon the whole, the consequences of such a law as this
would be directly contrary to those things which good laws ought to
establish, and which Socrates endeavoured to establish by his regulations
concerning women and children: for we think that friendship is the
greatest good which can happen to any city, as nothing so much prevents
seditions: and amity in a city is what Socrates commends above all things,
which appears to be, as indeed he says, the effect of friendship; as we
learn from Aristophanes in the Erotics, who says, that those who love one
another from the excess of that passion, desire to breathe the same soul,
and from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would
necessarily follow, that both or one of them must be destroyed. But now in
a city which admits of this community, the tie of friendship must, from
that very cause, be extremely weak, when no father can say, this is my
son; or son, this is my father; for as a very little of what is sweet,
being mixed with a great deal of water is imperceptible after the mixture,
so must all family connections, and the names they go by, be necessarily
disregarded in such a community, it being then by no means necessary that
the father should have any regard for him he called a son, or the brothers
for those they call brothers. There are two things which principally
inspire mankind with care and love of their offspring, knowing it is their
own, and what ought to be the object of their affection, neither of which
can take place in this sort of community. As for exchanging the children
of the artificers and husbandmen with those of the military, and theirs
reciprocally with these, it will occasion great confusion in whatever
manner it shall be done; for of necessity, those who carry the children
must know from whom they took and to whom they gave them; and by this
means those evils which I have already mentioned will necessarily be the
more likely to happen, as blows, incestuous love, murders, and the like;
for those who are given from their own parents to other citizens, the
military, for instance, will not call them brothers, sons, fathers, or
mothers. The same thing would happen to those of the military who were
placed among the other citizens; so that by this means every one would be
in fear how to act in consequence of consanguinity. And thus let us
determine concerning a community of wives and children.
CHAPTER V
We proceed next to consider in what manner property should be regulated in
a state which is formed after the most perfect mode of government, whether
it should be common or not; for this may be considered as a separate
question from what had been determined concerning [1263a] wives and
children; I mean, whether it is better that these should be held separate,
as they now everywhere are, or that not only possessions but also the
usufruct of them should be in common; or that the soil should have a
particular owner, but that the produce should be brought together and used
as one common stock, as some nations at present do; or on the contrary,
should the soil be common, and should it also be cultivated in common,
while the produce is divided amongst the individuals for their particular
use, which is said to be practised by some barbarians; or shall both the
soil and the fruit be common? When the business of the husbandman devolves
not on the citizen, the matter is much easier settled; but when those
labour together who have a common right of possession, this may occasion
several difficulties; for there may not be an equal proportion between
their labour and what they consume; and those who labour hard and have but
a small proportion of the produce, will certainly complain of those who
take a large share of it and do but little for that. Upon the whole, as a
community between man and man so entire as to include everything possible,
and thus to have all things that man can possess in common, is very
difficult, so is it particularly so with respect to property; and this is
evident from that community which takes place between those who go out to
settle a colony; for they frequently have disputes with each other upon
the most common occasions, and come to blows upon trifles: we find, too,
that we oftenest correct those slaves who are generally employed in the
common offices of the family: a community of property then has these and
other inconveniences attending it.
But the manner of life which is now established, more particularly when
embellished with good morals and a system of equal laws, is far superior
to it, for it will have the advantage of both; by both I mean properties
being common, and divided also; for in some respects it ought to be in a
manner common, but upon the whole private: for every man’s attention being
employed on his own particular concerns, will prevent mutual complaints
against each other; nay, by this means industry will be increased, as each
person will labour to improve his own private property; and it will then
be, that from a principle of virtue they will mutually perform good
offices to each other, according to the proverb, “All things are common
amongst friends;” and in some cities there are traces of this custom to be
seen, so that it is not impracticable, and particularly in those which are
best governed; some things are by this means in a manner common, and
others might be so; for there, every person enjoying his own private
property, some things he assists his friend with, others are considered as
in common; as in Lacedaemon, where they use each other’s slaves, as if
they were, so to speak, their own, as they do their horses and dogs, or
even any provision they may want in a journey.
It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make
the use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to it is the
particular [1263b] business of the legislator. And also with respect to
pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is, that a man should
think he has something which he may call his own; for it is by no means to
no purpose, that each person should have an affection for himself, for
that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover is justly censured; for we
mean by that, not one that simply loves himself, but one that loves
himself more than he ought; in like manner we blame a money-lover, and yet
both money and self is what all men love. Besides, it is very pleasing to
us to oblige and assist our friends and companions, as well as those whom
we are connected with by the rights of hospitality; and this cannot be
done without the establishment of private property, which cannot take
place with those who make a city too much one; besides, they prevent every
opportunity of exercising two principal virtues, modesty and liberality.
Modesty with respect to the female sex, for this virtue requires you to
abstain from her who is another’s; liberality, which depends upon private
property, for without that no one can appear liberal, or do any generous
action; for liberality consists in imparting to others what is our own.
This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good appearance
and specious pretences to humanity; and when first proposed to any one,
must give him great pleasure, as he will conclude it to be a wonderful
bond of friendship, connecting all to all; particularly when any one
censures the evils which are now to be found in society, as arising from
properties not being common, I mean the disputes which happen between man
and man, upon their different contracts with each other; those judgments
which are passed in court in consequence of fraud, and perjury, and
flattering the rich, none of which arise from properties being private,
but from the vices of mankind. Besides, those who live in one general
community, and have all things in common, oftener dispute with each other
than those who have their property separate; from the very small number
indeed of those who have their property in common, compared with those
where it is appropriated, the instances of their quarrels are but few. It
is also but right to mention, not only the inconveniences they are
preserved from who live in a communion of goods, but also the advantages
they are deprived of; for when the whole comes to be considered, this
manner of life will be found impracticable.
We must suppose, then, that Socrates’s mistake arose from the principle he
set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a family and a city
ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely; for there is a
point beyond which if a city proceeds in reducing itself to one, it will
be no longer a city.
There is also another point at which it will still continue to be a city,
but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be worse than
none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who sing in concert
to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to be made one, and a
community, as I have already said, by education; as property at
Lacedaemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made common by their
legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any education, and think
thereby to make his city excellent and respectable, will be absurd, while
he expects to form it by such regulations, and not by manners, philosophy,
and laws. And whoever [1264a] would establish a government upon a
community of goods, ought to know that he should consult the experience of
many years, which would plainly enough inform him whether such a scheme is
useful; for almost all things have already been found out, but some have
been neglected, and others which have been known have not been put in
practice. But this would be most evident, if any one could see such a
government really established: for it would be impossible to frame such a
city without dividing and separating it into its distinct parts, as public
tables, wards, and tribes; so that here the laws will do nothing more than
forbid the military to engage in agriculture, which is what the
Lacedaemonians are at present endeavouring to do.
Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of government
should be pursued with respect to the individuals in the state where there
is a community of goods established; for though the majority of his
citizens will in general consist of a multitude of persons of different
occupations, of those he has determined nothing; whether the property of
the husbandman ought to be in common, or whether each person should have
his share to himself; and also, whether their wives and children ought to
be in common: for if all things are to be alike common to all, where will
be the difference between them and the military, or what would they get by
submitting to their government? and upon what principles would they do it,
unless they should establish the wise practice of the Cretans? for they,
allowing everything else to their slaves, forbid them only gymnastic
exercises and the use of arms. And if they are not, but these should be in
the same situation with respect to their property which they are in other
cities, what sort of a community will there be? in one city there must of
necessity be two, and those contrary to each other; for he makes the
military the guardians of the state, and the husbandman, artisans, and
others, citizens; and all those quarrels, accusations, and things of the
like sort, which he says are the bane of other cities, will be found in
his also: notwithstanding Socrates says they will not want many laws in
consequence of their education, but such only as may be necessary for
regulating the streets, the markets, and the like, while at the same time
it is the education of the military only that he has taken any care of.
Besides, he makes the husbandmen masters of property upon paying a
tribute; but this would be likely to make them far more troublesome and
high-spirited than the Helots, the Penestise, or the slaves which others
employ; nor has he ever determined whether it is necessary to give any
attention to them in these particulars, nor thought of what is connected
therewith, their polity, their education, their laws; besides, it is of no
little consequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be
framed so as to preserve the community of the military.
Besides, if he makes the wives common, while the property [1264b]
continues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the same
care which the man bestows upon his fields? nor will the inconvenience be
remedied by making property as well as wives common; and it is absurd to
draw a comparison from the brute creation, and say, that the same
principle should regulate the connection of a man and a woman which
regulates theirs amongst whom there is no family association.
It is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has done;
for he would have persons of the same rank always in office, which becomes
the cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no account, but more
particularly amongst those who are of a courageous and warlike
disposition; it is indeed evidently necessary that he should frame his
community in this manner; for that golden particle which God has mixed up
in the soul of man flies not from one to the other, but always continues
with the same; for he says, that some of our species have gold, and others
silver, blended in their composition from the moment of their birth: but
those who are to be husbandmen and artists, brass and iron; besides,
though he deprives the military of happiness, he says, that the legislator
ought to make all the citizens happy; but it is impossible that the whole
city can be happy, without all, or the greater, or some part of it be
happy. For happiness is not like that numerical equality which arises from
certain numbers when added together, although neither of them may
separately contain it; for happiness cannot be thus added together, but
must exist in every individual, as some properties belong to every
integral; and if the military are not happy, who else are so? for the
artisans are not, nor the multitude of those who are employed in inferior
offices. The state which Socrates has described has all these defects, and
others which are not of less consequence.
CHAPTER VI
It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ
afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to consider
briefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates has
thoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in what
manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated, how
property should be established, and government conducted.
Now he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and soldiers,
and from these he select a third part who are to be senators and govern
the city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman and artificer
shall have any or what share in the government, or whether they shall have
arms, and join with the others in war, or not. He thinks also that the
women ought to go to war, and have the same education as the soldiers; as
to other particulars, he has filled his treatise with matter foreign to
the purpose; and with respect to education, he has only said what that of
the guards ought to be.
[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which that
contains, for he has there said but little concerning government; and this
government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a manner as to
impart to its members a more entire community of goods than is to be found
in other cities, he almost brings round again to be the same as that other
government which he had first proposed; for except the community of wives
and goods, he has framed both his governments alike, for the education of
the citizens is to be the same in both; they are in both to live without
any servile employ, and their common tables are to be the same, excepting
that in that he says the women should have common tables, and that there
should be a thousand men-at-arms, in this, that there should be five
thousand.
All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and inquisitive;
but that they are all true it may probably be too much to say. For now
with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be acknowledged that he
would want the country of Babylonia for them, or some one like it, of an
immeasurable extent, to support five thousand idle persons, besides a much
greater number of women and servants. Every one, it is true, may frame an
hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it ought to be possible. It has been
said, that a legislator should have two things in view when he frames his
laws, the country and the people. He will also do well, if he has some
regard to the neighbouring states, if he intends that his community should
maintain any political intercourse with them, for it is not only necessary
that they should understand that practice of war which is adapted to their
own country, but to others also; for admitting that any one chooses not
this life either in public or private, yet there is not the less occasion
for their being formidable to their enemies, not only when they invade
their country, but also when they retire out of it.
It may also be considered whether the quantity of each person’s property
may not be settled in a different manner from what he has done it in, by
making it more determinate; for he says, that every one ought to have
enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had said to live well,
which is the most comprehensive expression. Besides, a man may live
moderately and miserably at the same time; he had therefore better have
proposed, that they should live both moderately and liberally; for unless
these two conspire, luxury will come in on the one hand, or wretchedness
on the other, since these two modes of living are the only ones applicable
to the employment of our substance; for we cannot say with respect to a
man’s fortune, that he is mild or courageous, but we may say that he is
prudent and liberal, which are the only qualities connected therewith.
It is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for the
increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance
uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of women
who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it would
because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case would not
be the same in such a state which he proposes and those which now actually
unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the property is divided
amongst the whole community, be their numbers what they will; but as it
could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they were many or
few, would have nothing at all. But it is more necessary than even to
regulate property, to take care that the increase of the people should not
exceed a certain number; and in determining that, to take into
consideration those children who will die, and also those women who will
be barren; and to neglect this, as is done in several cities, is to bring
certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the cause of sedition and
evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest legislators, thought
the families and the number of the citizens should continue the same;
although it should happen that all should have allotments at the first,
disproportionate to their numbers.
In Plato’s Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter what
we think would be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in that
treatise to point out how the governors are to be distinguished from the
governed; for he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp ought to be
made, and of another the woof, so ought some to govern, and others to be
governed. But since he admits, that all their property may be increased
fivefold, why should he not allow the same increase to the country? he
ought also to consider whether his allotment of the houses will be useful
to the community, for he appoints two houses to each person, separate from
each other; but it is inconvenient for a person to inhabit two houses. Now
he is desirous to have his whole plan of government neither a democracy
nor an oligarchy, but something between both, which he calls a polity, for
it is to be composed of men-at-arms. If Plato intended to frame a state in
which more than in any other everything should be common, he has certainly
given it a right name; but if he intended it to be the next in perfection
to that which he had already framed, it is not so; for perhaps some
persons will give the preference to the Lacedaemonian form of government,
or some other which may more completely have attained to the aristocratic
form.
Some persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed of
all others blended together, for which reason they commend that of
Lacedaemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, a
monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical part,
the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be found the
democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some say, that in
the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common meal and daily
course of life, in which the democratical form is represented. It is also
said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that the best form of government
must, be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though such a mixture
no one else would ever allow to be any government at all, or if it is, the
worst possible; those propose what is much better who blend many
governments together; for the most perfect is that which is formed of many
parts. But now in this government of Plato’s there are no traces of a
monarchy, only of an oligarchy and democracy; though he seems to choose
that it should rather incline to an oligarchy, as is evident from the
appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by lot is common to
both; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a member of the
assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take part in the management of
public affairs, while others are passed over, makes the state incline to
an oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich
may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may correspond
with their fortunes.
The same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the manner
of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all are obliged
to vote for those who are senators of the first class, afterwards they
vote for the same number out of the second, and then out of the third; but
this compulsion to vote at the election of senators does not extend to the
third and fourth classes and the first and second class only are obliged
to vote for the fourth. By this means he says he shall necessarily have an
equal number of each rank, but he is mistaken—for the majority will
always consist of those of the first rank, and the most considerable
people; and for this reason, that many of the commonalty not being obliged
to it, will not attend the elections. From hence it is evident, that such
a state will not consist of a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be
further proved by what we shall say when we come particularly to consider
this form of government.
There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the senate,
when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect others; for
by this means, if a certain number choose to combine together, though not
very considerable, the election will always fall according to their
pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes concerning government
in his book of Laws.
CHAPTER VII
There are also some other forms of government, which have been proposed
either by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians, all of which
come much nearer to those which have been really established, or now
exist, than these two of Plato’s; for neither have they introduced the
innovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for the
women, but have been contented to set out with establishing such rules as
are absolutely necessary.
There are some persons who think, that the first object of government
should be to regulate well everything relating to private property; for
they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions whatsoever.
For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed, that the
fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought was not
difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled, but that it
was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long established;
but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of circumstances
introduced by these means, that the rich should give marriage portions,
but never receive any, while the poor should always receive, but never
give.
But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in
circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no citizen
should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the lowest
census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who would establish
this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to consider; that while
they regulate the quantity of provisions which each individual shall
possess, they ought also to regulate the number of his children; for if
these exceed the allotted quantity of provision, the law must necessarily
be repealed; and yet, in spite of the repeal, it will have the bad effect
of reducing many from wealth to poverty, so difficult is it for innovators
not to fall into such mistakes. That an equality of goods was in some
degree serviceable to strengthen the bands of society, seems to have been
known to some of the ancients; for Solon made a law, as did some others
also, to restrain persons from possessing as much land as they pleased.
And upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their
property, as among the Locrians, unless they can prove that some notorious
misfortune has befallen them. They were also to preserve their ancient
patrimony, which custom being broken through by the Leucadians, made their
government too democratic; for by that means it was no longer necessary to
be possessed of a certain fortune to be qualified to be a magistrate. But
if an equality of goods is established, this may be either too much, when
it enables the people to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges
them to live hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the
legislator to establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper
medium. Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in
such a manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it
would be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should
entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of circumstances;
but this can never be attained unless they are properly educated under the
direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say, that this in what he
himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality of property and one plan
of education in his city. But he should have said particularly what
education he intended, nor is it of any service to have this to much one;
for this education may be one, and yet such as will make the citizens
over-greedy, to grasp after honours, or riches, or both. Besides, not only
an inequality of possessions, but also of honours, will occasion [1267a]
seditions, but this upon contrary grounds; for the vulgar will be
seditious if there be an inequality of goods, by those of more elevated
sentiments, if there is an equality of honours.
For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he thinks
an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would then have
no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy what they
desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desire extend beyond the
common necessaries of life, they were be wicked to gratify them; and not
only so, but if their wishes point that way, they will do the same to
enjoy those pleasures which are free from the alloy of pain. What remedy
then shall we find for these three disorders. And first, to prevent
stealing from necessity, let every one be supplied with a moderate
subsistence, which may make the addition of his own industry necessary;
second to prevent stealing to procure the luxuries of life, temperance be
enjoined; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure in itself seek for
it only in philosophy, all others want the assistance of men.
Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not
from necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to keep him
from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief, but
tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would only be salutary to
prevent little crimes. He has also been very desirous to establish such
rules as will conduce to perfect the internal policy of his state, and he
ought also to have done the same with respect to its neighbours and all
foreign nations; for the considerations of the military establishment
should take place in planning every government, that it may not be
unprovided in case of a war, of which he has said nothing; so also with
respect to property, it ought not only to be adapted to the exigencies of
the state, but also to such dangers as may arise from without.
Thus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more
powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive
out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be able to go
to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of this he has
determined nothing; it must indeed be allowed that it is advantageous to a
community to be rather rich than poor; probably the proper boundary is
this, not to possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful
neighbour to attack you, any more than he would those who had not so much
as yourself; thus when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus
advised him to consider what time it would require to take the city, and
then would have him determine whether it would answer, for that he should
choose, if it would even take less than he proposed, to quit the place;
his saying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the business and give over
the siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an equality of goods
amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet, to say truth, no very
great one; for men of great abilities will stomach their being put upon a
level with the rest of the community. For which reason they will very
often appear ready for every commotion and sedition; for the wickedness of
mankind is insatiable. For though at first two oboli might be sufficient,
yet when once it is become customary, they continually want something
more, until they set no limits to their expectations; for it is the nature
of our desires to be boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But
for this purpose the first object is, not so much to establish an equality
of fortune, as to prevent those who are of a good disposition from
desiring more than their own, and those who are of a bad one from being
able to acquire it; and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior
station, and not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the
equality of goods, for he has extended his regulation only to land;
whereas a man’s substance consists not only in this, but also in slaves,
cattle, money, and all that variety of things which fall under the name of
chattels; now there must be either an equality established in all these,
or some certain rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears
too by his laws, that he intends to establish only a small state, as all
the artificers are to belong to the public, and add nothing to the
complement of citizens; but if all those who are to be employed in public
works are to be the slaves of the public, it should be done in the same
manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly regulated it at
Athens. From these particulars any one may nearly judge whether Phaleas’s
community is well or ill established.
CHAPTER VIII
Hippodamus, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived the art of laying
out towns, and separated the Pireus. This man was in other respects too
eager after notice, and seemed to many to live in a very affected manner,
with his flowing locks and his expensive ornaments, and a coarse warm vest
which he wore, not only in the winter, but also in the hot weather. As he
was very desirous of the character of a universal scholar, he was the
first who, not being actually engaged in the management of public affairs,
sat himself to inquire what sort of government was best; and he planned a
state, consisting of ten thousand persons, divided into three parts, one
consisting of artisans, another of husbandmen, and the third of soldiers;
he also divided the lands into three parts, and allotted one to sacred
purposes, another to the public, and the third to individuals. The first
of these was to supply what was necessary for the established worship of
the gods; the second was to be allotted to the support of the soldiery;
and the third was to be the property of the husbandman. He thought also
that there need only be three sorts of laws, corresponding to the three
sorts of actions which can be brought, namely, for assault, trespasses, or
death. He ordered also that there should be a particular court of appeal,
into which all causes might be removed which were supposed to have been
unjustly determined elsewhere; which court should be composed of old men
chosen for that purpose. He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass
sentence by votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on
which he should write, that he found the party guilty, if it was so, but
if not, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one
part of the indictment but not of the other, he should express that also
on the tablet; for he disapproved of that general custom already
established, as it obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they
determined positively either on the one side or the other. He also made a
law, that those should be rewarded who found out anything for the good of
the city, and that the children of those who fell in battle should be
educated at the public expense; which law had never been proposed by any
other legislator, though it is at present in use at Athens as well as in
other cities, he would have the magistrates chosen out of the people in
general, by whom he meant the three parts before spoken of; and that those
who were so elected should be the particular guardians of what belonged to
the public, to strangers, and to orphans.
These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in Hippodamus’s
plan. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his division of the
citizens into three parts; for the artisans, the husbandmen, and the
soldiers are to compose one community, where the husbandmen are to have no
arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, which would in a manner
render them slaves to the soldiery. It is also impossible that the whole
community should partake of all the honourable employments in it—for
the generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily be appointed
out of the soldiery, and indeed the most honourable magistrates; but as
the two other parts will not have their share in the government, how can
they be expected to have any affection for it? But it is necessary that
the soldiery should be superior to the other two parts, and this
superiority will not be easily gained without they are very numerous; and
if they are so, why should the community consist of any other members? why
should any others have a right to elect the magistrates? Besides, of what
use are the husbandmen to this community? Artisans, ’tis true, are
necessary, for these every city wants, and they can live upon their
business. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the soldiers with provisions,
they would be properly part of the community; but these are supposed to
have their private property, and to cultivate it for their own use.
Moreover, if the soldiers themselves are to cultivate that common land
which is appropriated for their support, there will be no distinction
between the soldier and the husbandman, which the legislator intended
there should be; and if there should be any others who are to cultivate
the private property of the husbandman and the common lands of the
military, there will be a fourth order in the state which will have no
share in it, and always entertain hostile sentiments towards it. If any
one should propose that the same persons should cultivate their own lands
and the public ones also, then there would be a deficiency [1268b] of
provisions to supply two families, as the lands would not immediately
yield enough for themselves and the soldiers also; and all these things
would occasion great confusion.
Nor do I approve of his method of determining causes, when he would have
the judge split the case which comes simply before him; and thus, instead
of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now when any matter is brought to
arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer together upon the
business that is before them; but when a cause is brought before judges it
is not so; and many legislators take care that the judges shall not have
it in their power to communicate their sentiments to each other. Besides,
what can prevent confusion on the bench when one judge thinks a fine
should be different from what another has set it at; one proposing twenty
minae, another ten, or be it more or less, another four, and another five;
and it is evident, that in this manner they will differ from each other,
while some will give the whole damages sued for, and others nothing; in
this situation, how shall their determinations be settled? Besides, a
judge cannot be obliged to perjure himself who simply acquits or condemns,
if the action is fairly and justly brought; for he who acquits the party
does not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought
not to pay a fine of twenty minae. But he that condemns him is guilty of
perjury if he sentences him to pay twenty minae while he believes the
damages ought not to be so much.
Now with respect to these honours which he proposes to bestow on those who
can give any information useful to the community, this, though very
pleasing in speculation, is what the legislator should not settle, for it
would encourage informers, and probably occasion commotions in the state.
And this proposal of his gives rise also to further conjectures and
inquiries; for some persons have doubted whether it is useful or hurtful
to alter the established law of any country, if even for the better; for
which reason one cannot immediately determine upon what he here says,
whether it is advantageous to alter the law or not. We know, indeed, that
it is possible to propose to new model both the laws and government as a
common good; and since we have mentioned this subject, it may be very
proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for it contains some
difficulties, as I have already said, and it may appear better to alter
them, since it has been found useful in other sciences.
Thus the science of physic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so is
the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and powers; so that one may lay
it down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold good in the
art of government. And it may also be affirmed, that experience itself
gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too simple and barbarous;
which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the city, and to buy their
wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all the remains of old laws which
we have are very simple; for instance, a law in Cuma relative to murder.
If any person who prosecutes another for murder can produce a certain
number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the accused person shall
be held guilty. Upon the whole, all persons ought to endeavour to follow
what is right, and not what is established; and it is probable that the
first men, whether they sprung out of the earth, or were saved from some
general calamity, had very little understanding or knowledge, as is
affirmed of these aborigines; so that it would be absurd to continue in
the practice of their rules. Nor is it, moreover, right to permit written
laws always to remain without alteration; for as in all other sciences, so
in politics, it is impossible to express everything in writing with
perfect exactness; for when we commit anything to writing we must use
general terms, but in every action there is something particular to
itself, which these may not comprehend; from whence it is evident, that
certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if we
consider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to require
great caution; for when the advantage proposed is trifling, as the
accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws is of bad consequence,
it is evidently better to pass over some faults which either the
legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for the alterations will
not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying the magistrates will be
of disservice. Besides, the instance brought from the arts is fallacious;
for it is not the same thing to alter the one as the other. For a law
derives all its strength from custom, and this requires long time to
establish; so that, to make it an easy matter to pass from the established
laws to other new ones, is to weaken the power of laws. Besides, here is
another question; if the laws are to be altered, are they all to be
altered, and in every government or not, and whether at the pleasure of
one person or many? all which particulars will make a great difference;
for which reason we will at present drop the inquiry, to pursue it at some
other time.
CHAPTER IX
There are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to the
government established at Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in almost all
other states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do not promote
the best establishment possible? the other is whether there is anything,
if we consider either the principles upon which it is founded or the
executive part of it, which prevents the form of government that they had
proposed to follow from being observed; now it is allowed that in every
well-regulated state the members of it should be free from servile labour;
but in what manner this shall be effected is not so easy to determine; for
the Penestse have very often attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots the
Lacedaemonians, for they in a manner continually watch an opportunity for
some misfortune befalling them. But no such thing has ever happened to the
Cretans; the [1269b] reason for which probably is, that although they are
engaged in frequent wars with the neighbouring cities, yet none of these
would enter into an alliance with the revolters, as it would be
disadvantageous for them, who themselves also have their villains. But now
there is perpetual enmity between the Lacedaemonians and all their
neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Their slaves
also first revolted from the Thessalians while they were engaged in wars
with their neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and the Magnesians. It
seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet something very troublesome to
keep upon proper terms with them; for if you are remiss in your discipline
they grow insolent, and think themselves upon an equality with their
masters; and if they are hardly used they are continually plotting against
you and hate you. It is evident, then, that those who employ slaves have
not as yet hit upon the right way of managing them.
As to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is hurtful to
the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for as a man and his
wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a city to be divided
into two parts, we must allow that the number of men and women will be
equal.
In whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we must
look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it there
happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city a collection
of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently accomplished his
design; but in the meantime the women were quite neglected, for they live
without restraint in every improper indulgence and luxury. So that in such
a state riches will necessarily be in general esteem, particularly if the
men are governed by their wives, which has been the case with many a brave
and warlike people except the Celts, and those other nations, if there are
any such, who openly practise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem
not improperly to have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of
this character are greatly addicted either to the love of women or of
boys, for which reason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in their
state were done by the authority of the women. For what is the difference,
if the power is in the hands of the women, or in the hands of those whom
they themselves govern? it must turn to the same account. As this boldness
of the women can be of no use in any common occurrences, if it was ever
so, it must be in war; but even here we find that the Lacedaemonian women
were of the greatest disservice, as was proved at the time of the Theban
invasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities,
but made more disturbance than even the enemy.
The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is
easily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home
upon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards the
Arcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end, their
military life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them to obey
the precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus
endeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his laws, upon
their refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that the women were
the causes of these things, and of course all the fault was theirs. But we
are not now considering where the fault lies, or where it does not lie,
but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the women are
not well regulated, as I have already said, it must not only occasion
faults which are disgraceful to the state, but also increase the love of
money. In the next place, fault may be found with his unequal division of
property, for some will have far too much, others too little; by which
means the land will come into few hands, which business is badly regulated
by his laws. For he made it infamous for any one either to buy or sell
their possessions, in which he did right; but he permitted any one that
chose it to give them away, or bequeath them, although nearly the same
consequences will arise from one practice as from the other. It is
supposed that near two parts in five of the whole country is the property
of women, owing to their being so often sole heirs, and having such large
fortunes in marriage; though it would be better to allow them none, or a
little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now every one is permitted to
make a woman his heir if he pleases; and if he dies intestate, he who
succeeds as heir at law gives it to whom he pleases. From whence it
happens that although the country is able to support fifteen hundred horse
and thirty thousand foot, the number does not amount to one thousand.
And from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly
regulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined for
want of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings they
used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to prevent
there being a want of men while they carried on long wars; it is also
affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand; but be
that as it will, an equality of property conduces much to increase the
number of the people. The law, too, which he made to encourage population
was by no means calculated to correct this inequality; for being willing
that the Spartans should be as numerous as [1270b] possible, to make them
desirous of having large families he ordered that he who had three
children should be excused the night-watch, and that he who had four
should pay no taxes: though it is very evident, that while the land was
divided in this manner, that if the people increased there must many of
them be very poor.
Nor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the
ephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last
importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so that
it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that office, who,
from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been many instances
of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. And these men,
being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin the city:
and, because their power was too great and nearly tyrannical, their kings
were obliged to natter them, which contributed greatly to hurt the state;
so that it altered from an aristocracy to a democracy. This magistracy is
indeed the great support of the state; for the people are easy, knowing
that they are eligible to the first office in it; so that, whether it took
place by the intention of the legislator, or whether it happened by
chance, this is of great service to their affairs; for it is necessary
that every member of the state should endeavour that each part of the
government should be preserved, and continue the same. And upon this
principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to their honour;
the wise and good from their attachment to the senate, a seat wherein they
consider as the reward of virtue; and the common people, that they may
support the ephori, of whom they consist. And it is proper that these
magistrates should be chosen out of the whole community, not as the custom
is at present, which is very ridiculous. The ephori are the supreme judges
in causes of the last consequence; but as it is quite accidental what sort
of persons they may be, it is not right that they should determine
according to their own opinion, but by a written law or established
custom. Their way of life also is not consistent with the manners of the
city, for it is too indulgent; whereas that of others is too severe; so
that they cannot support it, but are obliged privately to act contrary to
law, that they may enjoy some of the pleasures of sense. There are also
great defects in the institution of their senators. If indeed they were
fitly trained to the practice of every human virtue, every one would
readily admit that they would be useful to the government; but still it
might be debated whether they should be continued judges for life, to
determine points of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as
well as the body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the
legislator could not depend upon them as good men, their power must be
inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the
members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in
many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if they had
been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not. But it may be
said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the magistrates. They have
indeed in this particular very great power; but I affirm that they should
not be entrusted with this control in the manner they are. Moreover, the
mode of choice which they make use of at the election of their senators is
very childish. Nor is it right for any one to solicit for a place he is
desirous of; for every person, whether he chooses it or not, ought to
execute any office he is fit for. But his intention was evidently the same
in this as in the other parts of his government. For making his citizens
ambitious after honours, with men of that disposition he has filled his
senate, since no others will solicit for that office; and yet the
principal part of those crimes which men are deliberately guilty of arise
from ambition and avarice.
We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful to
the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a
consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the
legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable and
completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them as not
being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that were at
variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of the kings
the safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common meals at
first well established: for these should rather have been provided at the
public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon, every one was
obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very poor, and could by
no means bear the expense, by which means the contrary happened to what
the legislator desired: for he intended that those public meals should
strengthen the democratic part of his government: but this regulation had
quite the contrary effect, for those who were very poor could not take
part in them; and it was an observation of their forefathers, that the not
allowing those who could not contribute their proportion to the common
tables to partake of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other persons
have censured his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without reason,
as it gave rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is in a manner
set up in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the army for life.
[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure, which
Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution was
calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to make
them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state depended
thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their victories: for they
knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other employment than war. In
this particular also they were mistaken, that though they rightly thought,
that those things which are the objects of contention amongst mankind are
better procured by virtue than vice, yet they wrongfully preferred the
things themselves to virtue. Nor was the public revenue well managed at
Sparta, for the state was worth nothing while they were obliged to carry
on the most extensive wars, and the subsidies were very badly raised; for
as the Spartans possessed a large extent of country, they were not exact
upon each other as to what they paid in. And thus an event contrary to the
legislator’s intention took place; for the state was poor, the individuals
avaricious. Enough of the Lacedaemonian government; for these seem the
chief defects in it.
CHAPTER X
The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few
particulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its
contrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the
constitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete; and
in general most new things are an improvement upon the old. For they say,
that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles he went abroad
and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for the Lycians are a
colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first settled there adopted
that body of laws which they found already established by the inhabitants;
in like manner also those who now live near them have the very laws which
Minos first drew up.
This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it is
entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all the
maritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one side
from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from Triopium
and Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the empire of the
sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others planted colonies:
at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily. There is this
analogy between the customs of the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, the
Helots cultivate the grounds [1272a] for the one, the domestic slaves for
the other. Both states have their common meals, and the Lacedaemonians
called these formerly not psiditia but andpia, as the
Cretans do; which proves from whence the custom arose. In this particular
their governments are also alike: the ephori have the same power with
those of Crete, who are called kosmoi; with this difference only,
that the number of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators are the
same as those whom the Cretans call the council. There was formerly also a
kingly power in Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved, and the command of
their armies was given to the kosmoi. Every one also has a vote in
their public assembly; but this has only the power of confirming what has
already passed the council and the kosmoi.
The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the Lacedaemonians,
for at Lacedaemon each individual was obliged to furnish what was assessed
upon him; which if he could not do, there was a law which deprived him of
the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned: but in Crete they
were furnished by the community; for all the corn and cattle, taxes and
contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged to furnish, were
divided into parts and allotted to the gods, the exigencies of the state,
and these public meals; so that all the men, women, and children were
maintained from a common stock. The legislator gave great attention to
encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as very useful to the citizens. He
also endeavoured, that his community might not be too populous, to lessen
the connection with women, by introducing the love of boys: whether in this
he did well or ill we shall have some other opportunity of considering.
But that the public meals were better ordered at Crete than at Lacedaemon
is very evident.
The institution of the kosmoi, was still worse than that of the
ephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy and
some peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who will be
elected: but the Lacedaemonians have this advantage which the others have
not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a share in the
highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the state: whereas
among the Cretans the kosmoi are not chosen out of the people in
general, but out of some certain families, and the senate out of the kosmoi.
And the same observations which may be made on the senate at Lacedaemon
may be applied to these; for their being under no control, and their
continuing for life, is an honour greater than they merit; and to have
their proceedings not regulated by a written law, but left to their own
discretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections, although
the people share not in the management of public affairs, this is no proof
of a well-constituted government, as the kosmoi have no opportunity
of being bribed like the ephori, as they live in an [1272b] island far
from those who would corrupt them.) But the method they take to correct
that fault is absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very often either
their fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire together and
turn out the kosmoi. They are also permitted to resign their office
before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by law it would be
well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which is a bad rule to
follow. But what is worst of all is, that general confusion which those
who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary course of justice; which
sufficiently shows what is the nature of the government, or rather lawless
force: for it is usual with the principal persons amongst them to collect
together some of the common people and their friends, and then revolt and
set up for themselves, and come to blows with each other. And what is the
difference, if a state is dissolved at once by such violent means, or if
it gradually so alters in process of time as to be no longer the same
constitution? A state like this would ever be exposed to the invasions of
those who were powerful and inclined to attack it; but, as has been
already mentioned, its situation preserves it, as it is free from the
inroads of foreigners; and for this reason the family slaves still remain
quiet at Crete, while the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the
Cretans take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any
foreign troops have made an attack upon the island; and their ravages soon
proved the ineffectualness of their laws. And thus much for the government
of Crete.
CHAPTER XI
The government of Carthage seems well established, and in many respects
superior to others; in some particulars it bears a near resemblance to the
Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the Cretans, the
Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things very like each
other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many excellent constitutions
this may show how well their government is framed, that although the
people are admitted to a share in the administration, the form of it
remains unaltered, without any popular insurrections, worth notice, on the
one hand, or degenerating into a tyranny on the other. Now the
Carthaginians have these things in common with the Lacedaemonians: public
tables for those who are connected together by the tie of mutual
friendship, after the manner of their Phiditia; they have also a
magistracy, consisting of an hundred and four persons, similar to the
ephori, or rather selected with more judgment; for amongst the
Lacedaemonians, all the citizens are eligible, but amongst the
Carthaginians, they are chosen out of those of the better sort: there is
also some analogy between the king and the senate in both these
governments, though the Carthaginian method of appointing their kings is
best, for they do not confine themselves to one family; nor do they permit
the election to be at large, nor have they any regard to seniority; for if
amongst the candidates there are any of greater merit than the rest, these
they prefer to those who may be older; for as their power is very
extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account, they may be very
hurtful to the state, as they have always been to the Lacedaemonians; also
the greater part of those things which become reprehensible by their
excess are common to all those governments which we have described.
Now of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established their
mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and democracy, some
incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy: for instance, if the
kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point in debate, they can
choose whether they will bring it before the people or no; but if they
disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not only to hear what
has been approved of by the senate, but are finally to determine upon it;
and whosoever chooses it, has a right to speak against any matter
whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not permitted in other cases.
The five, who elect each other, have very great and extensive powers; and
these choose the hundred, who are magistrates of the highest rank: their
power also continues longer than any other magistrates, for it commences
before they come into office, and is prolonged after they are out of it;
and in this particular the state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are
not elected by lot, but by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money,
they are the greatest supporters imaginable of an aristocracy.
The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in one
court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same influence.
The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an
oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained by
many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to be
persons of family only, but of fortune also; as it is impossible for those
who are in bad circumstances to support the dignity of their office, or to
be at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men of fortune to
be magistrates make a state incline to an oligarchy, and men of abilities
to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of proceeding which took
place in the polity of Carthage; for they have an eye to these two
particulars when they elect their officers, particularly those of the
highest rank, their kings and their generals. It must be admitted, that it
was a great fault in their legislator not to guard against the
constitution’s degenerating from an aristocracy; for this is a most
necessary thing to provide for at first, that those citizens who have the
best abilities should never be obliged to do anything unworthy their
character, but be always at leisure to serve the public, not only when in
office, but also when private persons; for if once you are obliged to look
among the wealthy, that you may have men at leisure to serve you, your
greatest offices, of king and general, will soon become venal; in
consequence of which, riches will be more honourable than virtue and a
love of money be the ruling principle in the city-for what those who have
the chief power regard as honourable will necessarily be the object which
the [1273b] citizens in general will aim at; and where the first honours
are not paid to virtue, there the aristocratic form of government cannot
flourish: for it is reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their
places should generally make an advantage of what they laid out their
money for; as it is absurd to suppose, that if a man of probity who is
poor should be desirous of gaining something, a bad man should not
endeavour to do the same, especially to reimburse himself; for which
reason the magistracy should be formed of those who are most able to
support an aristocracy. It would have been better for the legislature to
have passed over the poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care
to have ensured them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to
public affairs.
It seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices,
which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one
person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not make
the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state is not
small it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons to have a
share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not only more
usual, but everything is better and sooner done, when one thing only is
allotted to one person: and this is evident both in the army and navy,
where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and is under command.
But as their government inclines to an oligarchy, they avoid the ill
effects of it by always appointing some of the popular party to the
government of cities to make their fortunes. Thus they consult this fault
in their constitution and render it stable; but this is depending on
chance; whereas the legislator ought to frame his government, that there
the no room for insurrections. But now, if there should be any general
calamity, and the people should revolt from their rulers, there is no
remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. And these are the
particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian
governments which seem worthy of commendation.
CHAPTER XII
Some of those persons who have written upon government had never any share
in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything worthy of
notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others were legislators,
some in their own cities, others were employed in regulating the
governments of foreign states. Some of them only composed a body of laws;
others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus; and Solon, who did both.
The Lacedaemonians have been already mentioned. Some persons think that
Solon was an excellent legislator, who could dissolve a pure oligarchy,
and save the people from that slavery which hung over them, and establish
the ancient democratic form of government in his country; wherein every
part of it was so framed as to be well adapted to the whole. In the senate
of Areopagus an oligarchy was preserved; by the manner of electing their
[1274a] magistrates, an aristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a
democracy.
Solon seems not to have altered the established form of government, either
with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their magistrates; but
to have raised the people to great consideration in the state by allotting
the supreme judicial department to them; and for this some persons blame
him, as having done what would soon overturn that balance of power he
intended to establish; for by trying all causes whatsoever before the
people, who were chosen by lot to determine them, it was necessary to
flatter a tyrannical populace who had got this power; which contributed to
bring the government to that pure democracy it now is.
Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the
latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended the
courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular proceeded
increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. But it is
evident that this was not Solon’s intention, but that it arose from
accident; for the people being the cause of the naval victory over the
Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted themselves under factious
demagogues, although opposed by the better part of the citizens. He
thought it indeed most necessary to entrust the people with the choice of
their magistrates and the power of calling them to account; for without
that they must have been slaves and enemies to the other citizens: but he
ordered them to elect those only who were persons of good account and
property, either out of those who were worth five hundred medimns, or
those who were called xeugitai, or those of the third census, who were
called horsemen.
As for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were
incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western
Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those
also in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some persons
endeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the first person of
note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in that business while
he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the prophetic art:
and they say, that Thales was his companion; and that Lycurgus and
Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and Charondas of Zaleucus; but those
who advance this, advance what is repugnant to chronology. Philolaus also,
of the family of the Bacchiades, was a Theban legislator. This man was
very fond of Diocles, a victor in the Olympic games, and when he left his
country from a disgust at an improper passion which his mother Alithoe had
entertained for him, and settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where
they both died, and where they still show their tombs placed in view of
each other, but so disposed, that one of them looks towards Corinth, the
other does not; the reason they give for this is, that Diodes, from his
detestation of his mother’s passion, would have his tomb so placed that no
one could see Corinth from it; but Philolaus chose that it might be seen
from his: and this was the cause of their living at Thebes. [1274b]
As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he upon
adoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in particular did to
preserve the number of families. Charondas did nothing new, except in
actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took into
particular consideration. He also drew up his laws with greater elegance
and accuracy than even any of our present legislators. Philolaus
introduced the law for the equal distribution of goods; Plato that for the
community of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables for
the women; and one concerning drunkenness, that they might observe
sobriety in their symposiums. He also made a law concerning their warlike
exercises; that they should acquire a habit of using both hands alike, as
it was necessary that one hand should be as useful as the other.
As for Draco’s laws, they were published when the government was already
established, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning,
except their severity on account of the enormity of their punishments.
Pittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up any form of
government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man beat any person
he should be punished more than if he did it when sober; for as people are
more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober, he paid no consideration to
the excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded only the common
benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a lawgiver to the Thracian talcidians.
There are some laws of his concerning murders and heiresses extant, but
these contain nothing that any one can say is new and his own. And thus
much for different sorts of governments, as well those which really exist
as those which different persons have proposed.
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its
different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a
city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city did
this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy, or the
tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the politician
and legislator have in view in all they do: but government is a certain
ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a collective body, and,
like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is evident our first inquiry
must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a certain number of citizens. So
that we must consider whom we ought to call citizen, and who is one; for
this is often doubtful: for every one will not allow that this character
is applicable to the same person; for that man who would be a citizen in a
republic would very often not be one in an oligarchy. We do not include in
this inquiry many of those who acquire this appellation out of the
ordinary way, as honorary persons, for instance, but those only who have a
natural right to it.
Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this
sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be
sufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws, and
may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different nations,
between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose, are allowed;
although it very often happens, that sojourners have not a perfect right
therein without the protection of a patron, to whom they are obliged to
apply, which shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In
like manner, with respect to boys who are not yet enrolled, or old men who
are past war, we admit that they are in some respects citizens, but not
completely so, but with some exceptions, for these are not yet arrived to
years of maturity, and those are past service; nor is there any difference
between them. But what we mean is sufficiently intelligible and clear, we
want a complete citizen, one in whom there is no deficiency to be
corrected to make him so. As to those who are banished, or infamous, there
may be the same objections made and the same answer given. There is
nothing that more characterises a complete citizen than having a share in
the judicial and executive part of the government.
With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that no
person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else not till
some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as a juryman’s,
and a member of the general assembly: but probably some one may say these
are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities any share in
the government; though surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have
the principal power in the state bear no office in it. But this objection
is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about words; as there is no
general term which can be applied both to the office of a juryman and a
member of the assembly. For the sake of distinction, suppose we call it an
indeterminate office: but I lay it down as a maxim, that those are
citizens who could exercise it. Such then is the description of a citizen
who comes nearest to what all those who are called citizens are. Every one
also should know, that of the component parts of those things which differ
from each other in species, after the first or second remove, those which
follow have either nothing at all or very little common to each.
Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, and that
some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as possible: for
it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies and degeneracies in
them must be far inferior to those which are without such faults. What I
mean by degeneracies will be hereafter explained. Hence it is clear that
the office of a citizen must differ as governments do from each other: for
which reason he who is called a citizen has, in a democracy, every
privilege which that station supposes. In other forms of government he may
enjoy them; but not necessarily: for in some states the people have no
power; nor have they any general assembly, but a few select men.
The trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons; as at
Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before some of
the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and so on; some
being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another: and thus at
Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our former
description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some governments
the office of a juryman and a member of the general assembly is not an
indeterminate one; but there are particular persons appointed for these
purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen or members
of the general assembly, and this either for all causes and all public
business whatsoever, or else for some particular one: and this may be
sufficient to show what a citizen is; for he who has a right to a share in
the judicial and executive part of government in any city, him we call a
citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is a collective body of
such persons sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life.
CHAPTER II
In common use they define a citizen to be one who is sprung from citizens
on both sides, not on the father’s or the mother’s only. Others carry the
matter still further, and inquire how many of his ancestors have been
citizens, as his grandfather, great-grandfather, etc., but some persons
have questioned how the first of the family could prove themselves
citizens, according to this popular and careless definition. Gorgias of
Leontium, partly entertaining the same doubt, and partly in jest, says,
that as a mortar is made by a mortar-maker, so a citizen is made by a
citizen-maker, and a Larisssean by a Larisssean-maker. This is indeed a
very simple account of the matter; for if citizens are so, according to
this definition, it will be impossible to apply it to the first founders
or first inhabitants of states, who cannot possibly claim in right either
of their father or mother. It is probably a matter of still more
difficulty to determine their rights as citizens who are admitted to their
freedom after any revolution in the state. As, for instance, at Athens,
after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Clisthenes enrolled many
foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes; and the doubt with respect
to them was, not whether they were citizens or no, but whether they were
legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may have this further
[1276a] doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen when he is illegally
made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is no citizen at all, were in
the same predicament: but since we see some persons govern unjustly, whom
yet we admit to govern, though not justly, and the definition of a citizen
is one who exercises certain offices, for such a one we have defined a
citizen to be, it is evident, that a citizen illegally created yet
continues to be a citizen, but whether justly or unjustly so belongs to
the former inquiry.
CHAPTER III
It has also been doubted what was and what was not the act of the city;
as, for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy or a
tyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts; as if the
right to receive the money was in the tyrant and not in the state, and
many other things of the same nature; as if any covenant was founded for
violence and not for the common good. So in like manner, if anything is
done by those who have the management of public affairs where a democracy
is established, their actions are to be considered as the actions of the
state, as well as in the oligarchy or tyranny.
And here it seems very proper to consider this question, When shall we say
that a city is the same, and when shall we say that it is different?
It is but a superficial mode of examining into this question to begin with
the place and the people; for it may happen that these may be divided from
that, or that some one of them may live in one place, and some in another
(but this question may be regarded as no very knotty one; for, as a city
may acquire that appellation on many accounts, it may be solved many
ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one common place, when shall
we say that they inhabit the same city, or that the city is the same? for
it does not depend upon the walls; for I can suppose Peloponnesus itself
surrounded with a wall, as Babylon was, and every other place, which
rather encircles many nations than one city, and that they say was taken
three days when some of the inhabitants knew nothing of it: but we shall
find a proper time to determine this question; for the extent of a city,
how large it should be, and whether it should consist of more than one
people, these are particulars that the politician should by no means be
unacquainted with. This, too, is a matter of inquiry, whether we shall say
that a city is the same while it is inhabited by the same race of men,
though some of them are perpetually dying, others coming into the world,
as we say that a river or a fountain is the same, though the waters are
continually changing; or when a revolution takes place shall we [1276b]
say the men are the same, but the city is different: for if a city is a
community, it is a community of citizens; but if the mode of government
should alter, and become of another sort, it would seem a necessary
consequence that the city is not the same; as we regard the tragic chorus
as different from the comic, though it may probably consist of the same
performers: thus every other community or composition is said to be
different if the species of composition is different; as in music the same
hands produce different harmony, as the Doric and Phrygian. If this is
true, it is evident, that when we speak of a city as being the same we
refer to the government there established; and this, whether it is called
by the same name or any other, or inhabited by the same men or different.
But whether or no it is right to dissolve the community when the
constitution is altered is another question.
CHAPTER IV
What has been said, it follows that we should consider whether the same
virtues which constitute a good man make a valuable citizen, or different;
and if a particular inquiry is necessary for this matter we must first
give a general description of the virtues of a good citizen; for as a
sailor is one of those who make up a community, so is a citizen, although
the province of one sailor may be different from another’s (for one is a
rower, another a steersman, a third a boatswain, and so on, each having
their several appointments), it is evident that the most accurate
description of any one good sailor must refer to his peculiar abilities,
yet there are some things in which the same description may be applied to
the whole crew, as the safety of the ship is the common business of all of
them, for this is the general centre of all their cares: so also with
respect to citizens, although they may in a few particulars be very
different, yet there is one care common to them all, the safety of the
community, for the community of the citizens composes the state; for which
reason the virtue of a citizen has necessarily a reference to the state.
But if there are different sorts of governments, it is evident that those
actions which constitute the virtue of an excellent citizen in one
community will not constitute it in another; wherefore the virtue of such
a one cannot be perfect: but we say, a man is good when his virtues are
perfect; from whence it follows, that an excellent citizen does not
possess that virtue which constitutes a good man. Those who are any ways
doubtful concerning this question may be convinced of the truth of it by
examining into the best formed states: for, if it is impossible that a
city should consist entirely of excellent citizens (while it is necessary
that every one should do well in his calling, in which consists his
excellence, as it is impossible that all the citizens should have the same
[1277a] qualifications) it is impossible that the virtue of a citizen and
a good man should be the same; for all should possess the virtue of an
excellent citizen: for from hence necessarily arise the perfection of the
city: but that every one should possess the virtue of a good man is
impossible without all the citizens in a well-regulated state were
necessarily virtuous. Besides, as a city is composed of dissimilar parts,
as an animal is of life and body; the soul of reason and appetite; a
family of a man and his wife—property of a master and a slave; in
the same manner, as a city is composed of all these and many other very
different parts, it necessarily follows that the virtue of all the
citizens cannot be the same; as the business of him who leads the band is
different from the other dancers. From all which proofs it is evident that
the virtues of a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find
those virtues united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen?
for we say, such a one is an excellent magistrate and a prudent and good
man; but prudence is a necessary qualification for all those who engage in
public affairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education of those who
are intended to command should, from the beginning, be different from
other citizens, as the children of kings are generally instructed in
riding and warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says:
As if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to
themselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a good
magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the magistrate,
it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be the same as the
virtue of the other, although it may be true of some particular citizen;
for the virtue of the magistrate must be different from the virtue of the
citizen. For which reason Jason declared that was he deprived of his
kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not knowing how to live a
private man. But it is a great recommendation to know how to command as
well as to obey; and to do both these things well is the virtue of an
accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a good man consists only in
being able to command, but the virtue of a good citizen renders him
equally fit for the one as well as the other, the commendation of both of
them is not the same. It appears, then, that both he who commands and he
who obeys should each of them learn their separate business: but that the
citizen should be master of and take part in both these, as any one may
easily perceive; in a family government there is no occasion for the
master to know how to perform the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy
the labour of others; for to do the other is a servile part. I mean by the
other, the common family business of the slave.
There are many sorts of slaves; for their employments are various: of
these the handicraftsmen are one, who, as their name imports, get their
living by the labour of their hands, and amongst these all mechanics are
included; [1277b] for which reasons such workmen, in some states, were not
formerly admitted into any share in the government; till at length
democracies were established: it is not therefore proper for any man of
honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to learn
these servile employments without they have occasion for them for their
own use; for without this was observed the distinction between a master
and a slave would be lost. But there is a government of another sort, in
which men govern those who are their equals in rank, and freemen, which we
call a political government, in which men learn to command by first
submitting to obey, as a good general of horse, or a commander-in-chief,
must acquire a knowledge of their duty by having been long under the
command of another, and the like in every appointment in the army: for
well is it said, no one knows how to command who has not himself been
under command of another. The virtues of those are indeed different, but a
good citizen must necessarily be endowed with them; he ought also to know
in what manner freemen ought to govern, as well as be governed: and this,
too, is the duty of a good man. And if the temperance and justice of him
who commands is different from his who, though a freeman, is under
command, it is evident that the virtues of a good citizen cannot be the
same as justice, for instance but must be of a different species in these
two different situations, as the temperance and courage of a man and a
woman are different from each other; for a man would appear a coward who
had only that courage which would be graceful in a woman, and a woman
would be thought a talker who should take as large a part in the
conversation as would become a man of consequence.
The domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the
man’s business to acquire subsistence, the woman’s to take care of it. But
direction and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to those
who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for both
parties; but with this the governed have no concern, it is theirs to
entertain just notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while those who
govern are the musicians who play on them. And thus much to show whether
the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same, or if it is
different, and also how far it is the same, and how far different.
CHAPTER V
But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those
only are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or whether
the mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those who are not
permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible that the
virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for these also are
citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be citizens, where shall
they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a] sojourners nor foreigners? or
shall we say that there will no inconvenience arise from their not being
citizens, as they are neither slaves nor freedmen: for this is certainly
true, that all those are not citizens who are necessary to the existence
of a city, as boys are not citizens in the same manner that men are, for
those are perfectly so, the others under some conditions; for they are
citizens, though imperfect ones: for in former times among some people the
mechanics were either slaves or foreigners, for which reason many of them
are so now: and indeed the best regulated states will not permit a
mechanic to be a citizen; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then
attribute the virtue we have described to every citizen or freeman, but to
those only who are disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are
employed by one person in them are slaves; those who do them for money are
mechanics and hired servants: hence it is evident on the least reflection
what is their situation, for what I have said is fully explained by
appearances. Since the number of communities is very great, it follows
necessarily that there will be many different sorts of citizens,
particularly of those who are governed by others, so that in one state it
may be necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but
in others it may be impossible; as particularly in an aristocracy, where
honours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for it is impossible for one
who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to acquire the practice
of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired servants are not admitted to be
citizens; because there a man’s right to bear any office is regulated by
his fortune; but mechanics are, for many citizens are very rich.
There was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the government
till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the law invites
strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some democracies the
son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also observed in many
others with respect to natural children; but it is through want of
citizens regularly born that they admit such: for these laws are always
made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants; so, as their numbers
increase, they first deprive the children of a male or female slave of
this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last of all they will
admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were both free.
That there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be as
completely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from what has
been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon’s
treating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger or sojourner is
one who does not partake of the honours of the state: and whenever the
right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it is for the sake of
the inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it is plain whether the
virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same or different:
and we find that in some states it is the same, in others not; and also
that this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the
lead, or are capable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone
or in conjunction with others.
CHAPTER VI
Having established these points, we proceed next to consider whether one
form of government only should be established, or more than one; and if
more, how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences between
them. The form of government is the ordering and regulating of the city,
and all the offices in it, particularly those wherein the supreme power is
lodged; and this power is always possessed by the administration; but the
administration itself is that particular form of government which is
established in any state: thus in a democracy the supreme power is lodged
in the whole people; on the contrary, in an oligarchy it is in the hands
of a few. We say then, that the form of government in these states is
different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in others. Let us
first determine for whose sake a city is established; and point out the
different species of rule which man may submit to in social life.
I have already mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family, and
the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally formed for
society, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign assistance,
he will of his own accord desire to live with others; not but that mutual
advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables each person to live
more agreeably; and this is indeed the great object not only to all in
general, but also to each individual: but it is not merely matter of
choice, but they join in society also, even that they may be able to live,
which probably is not without some share of merit, and they also support
civil society, even for the sake of preserving life, without they are
grievously overwhelmed with the miseries of it: for it is very evident
that men will endure many calamities for the sake of living, as being
something naturally sweet and desirable. It is easy to point out the
different modes of government, and we have already settled them in our
exoteric discourses. The power of the master, though by nature equally
serviceable, both to the master and to the slave, yet nevertheless has for
its object the benefit of the master, while the benefit of the slave
arises accidentally; for if the slave is destroyed, the power of the
master is at an end: but the authority which a man has over his wife, and
children, and his family, which we call domestic government, is either for
the benefit of those who are under subjection, or else for the common
benefit of the whole: but its particular object is the benefit of the
governed, as we see in other arts; in physic, for instance, and the
gymnastic exercises, wherein, if any benefit [1279a] arise to the master,
it is accidental; for nothing forbids the master of the exercises from
sometimes being himself one of those who exercises, as the steersman is
always one of the sailors; but both the master of the exercises and the
steersman consider the good of those who are under their government.
Whatever good may happen to the steersman when he is a sailor, or to the
master of the exercises when he himself makes one at the games, is not
intentional, or the object of their power; thus in all political
governments which are established to preserve and defend the equality of
the citizens it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as was natural,
every one expected that each of his fellow-citizens should in his turn
serve the public, and thus administer to his private good, as he himself
when in office had done for others; but now every one is desirous of being
continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage which he makes of
public business and being in office; as if places were a never-failing
remedy for every complaint, and were on that account so eagerly sought
after.
It is evident, then, that all those governments which have a common good
in view are rightly established and strictly just, but those who have in
view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong principles, and
are widely different from what a government ought to be, for they are
tyranny over slaves, whereas a city is a community of freemen.
CHAPTER VII
Having established these particulars, we come to consider next the
different number of governments which there are, and what they are; and
first, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined this,
their defects will be evident enough.
It is evident that every form of government or administration, for the
words are of the same import, must contain a supreme power over the whole
state, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands of one
person, or a few, or many; and when either of these apply their power for
the common good, such states are well governed; but when the interest of
the one, the few, or the many who enjoy this power is alone consulted,
then ill; for you must either affirm that those who make up the community
are not citizens, or else let these share in the advantages of government.
We usually call a state which is governed by one person for the common
good, a kingdom; one that is governed by more than one, but by a few only,
an aristocracy; either because the government is in the hands of the most
worthy citizens, or because it is the best form for the city and its
inhabitants. When the citizens at large govern for the public good, it is
called a state; which is also a common name for all other governments, and
these distinctions are consonant to reason; for it will not be difficult
to find one person, or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but
almost impossible to meet with the majority [1279b] of a people eminent
for every virtue; but if there is one common to a whole nation it is
valour; for this is created and supported by numbers: for which reason in
such a state the profession of arms will always have the greatest share in
the government.
Now the corruptions attending each of these governments are these; a
kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy,
and a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy where the good
of one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy considers only
the rich, and a democracy only the poor; but neither of them have a common
good in view.
CHAPTER VIII
It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each of
these states, which is not without some difficulty, for he who would enter
into a philosophical inquiry into the principles of them, and not content
himself with a superficial view of their outward conduct, must pass over
and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them. A tyranny
then is, as has been said, a monarchy, where one person has an absolute
and despotic power over the whole community and every member therein: an
oligarchy, where the supreme power of the state is lodged with the rich: a
democracy, on the contrary, is where those have it who are worth little or
nothing. But the first difficulty that arises from the distinctions which
we have laid down is this, should it happen that the majority of the
inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for this is a democracy)
should be rich, the question is, how does this agree with what we have
said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever happen that the poor
compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, but from their
superior abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is what they call
an oligarchy; it should seem then that our definition of the different
states was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one suppose that the
majority of the people were poor, and the minority rich, and then describe
the state in this manner, that an oligarchy was a government in which the
rich, being few in number, possessed the supreme power, and that a
democracy was a state in which the poor, being many in number, possessed
it, still there will be another difficulty; for what name shall we give to
those states we have been describing? I mean, that in which the greater
number are rich, and that in which the lesser number are poor (where each
of these possess the supreme power), if there are no other states than
those we have described. It seems therefore evident to reason, that
whether the supreme power is vested in the hands of many or few may be a
matter of accident; but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the
hands of the few, it will be a government of the rich; when in the hands
of the many, it will be a government of the poor; since in all countries
there are many poor and few rich: it is not therefore the cause that has
been already assigned (namely, the number of people in power) that makes
the difference between the two governments; but an oligarchy and democracy
differ in this from each other, in the poverty of those who govern in the
one, and the riches I28oa of those who govern in the other; for when the
government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it is
an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy: but,
as we have already said, the one will be always few, the other numerous,
but both will enjoy liberty; and from the claims of wealth and liberty
will arise continual disputes with each other for the lead in public
affairs.
CHAPTER IX
Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and a
democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men have some
natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein only to a certain
degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely just; as,
for instance, what is equal appears just, and is so; but not to all; only
among those who are equals: and what is unequal appears just, and is so;
but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals; which circumstance
some people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the reason for which is,
they judge for themselves, and every one almost is the worst judge in his
own cause. Since then justice has reference to persons, the same
distinctions must be made with respect to persons which are made with
respect to things, in the manner that I have already described in my
Ethics.
As to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their dispute
is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason
above assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and also
because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some
particulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for instance, if
some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the
whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose
them equal in the whole: but what is absolutely just they omit; for if
civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing
property, every one’s right in the city would be equal to his fortune; and
then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be valid;
for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should have an
equal share in the hundred along with him who brought in all the rest,
either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired.
Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its members;
but that they might live well: for otherwise a state might be composed of
slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for these have no
share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after their own choice; nor
is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from injuries, or for a
commercial intercourse: for then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and
all other nations between whom treaties of commerce subsist, would be
citizens of one city; for they have articles to regulate their exports and
imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual
defence; but [1280b] yet they have not all the same magistrates
established among them, but they are different among the different people;
nor does the one take any care, that the morals of the other should be as
they ought, or that none of those who have entered into the common
agreements should be unjust, or in any degree vicious, only that they do
not injure any member of the confederacy. But whosoever endeavours to
establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices
of each individual who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the
first care of him who would found a city, truly deserving that name, and
not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it
is merely an alliance for self-defence; differing from those of the same
cast which are made between different people only in place: for law is an
agreement and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the
citizens of their intending to do justice to each other, though not
sufficient to make all the citizens just and good: and that this is faact
is evident, for could any one bring different places together, as, for
instance, enclose Megara and Corinth in a wall, yet they would not be one
city, not even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other, though
this inter-community contributes much to make a place one city. Besides,
could we suppose a set of people to live separate from each other, but
within such a distance as would admit of an intercourse, and that there
were laws subsisting between each party, to prevent their injuring one
another in their mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another a
husbandman, shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten
thousand, still all that they would have together in common would be a
tariff for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same
city. And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough,
for even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one
should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be
alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and prevent any
injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted to be a
city by those who think correctly, if they preserved the same customs when
they were together as when they were separate.
It is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor
established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other; but
that these things are the necessary consequences of a city, although they
may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a society of people
joining together with their families and their children to live agreeably
for the sake of having their lives as happy and as independent as
possible: and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in
one place and intermarry with each other: hence in all cities there are
family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to promote
friendship; for a love of sociability is friendship itself; so that the
end then for which a city is established is, that the inhabitants of it
may live happy, and these things are conducive to that end: for it is a
community of families and villages for the sake of a perfect independent
life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake of living well and
happily. It is not therefore founded for the purpose of men’s merely
[1281a] living together, but for their living as men ought; for which
reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power
in the city than those who are their equals in family and freedom, but
their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth but are
below them in worth. It is evident from what has been said, that in all
disputes upon government each party says something that is just.
CHAPTER X
It may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to be lodged. Shall
it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper persons,
or one better than the rest, or with a tyrant? But whichever of these we
prefer some difficulty will arise. For what? shall the poor have it
because they are the majority? they may then divide among themselves, what
belongs to the rich: nor is this unjust; because truly it has been so
judged by the supreme power. But what avails it to point out what is the
height of injustice if this is not? Again, if the many seize into their
own hands everything which belongs to the few, it is evident that the city
will be at an end. But virtue will never destroy what is virtuous; nor can
what is right be the ruin of the state: therefore such a law can never be
right, nor can the acts of a tyrant ever be wrong, for of necessity they
must all be just; for he, from his unlimited power, compels every one to
obey his command, as the multitude oppress the rich. Is it right then that
the rich, the few, should have the supreme power? and what if they be
guilty of the same rapine and plunder the possessions of the majority,
that will be as right as the other: but that all things of this sort are
wrong and unjust is evident. Well then, these of the better sort shall
have it: but must not then all the other citizens live unhonoured, without
sharing the offices of the city; for the offices of a city are its
honours, and if one set of men are always in power, it is evident that the
rest must be without honour. Well then, let it be with one person of all
others the fittest for it: but by this means the power will be still more
contracted, and a greater number than before continue unhonoured. But some
one may say, that it is wrong to let man have the supreme power and not
the law, as his soul is subject to so many passions. But if this law
appoints an aristocracy, or a democracy, how will it help us in our
present doubts? for those things will happen which we have already
mentioned.
CHAPTER XI
Other particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to
prove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather
than with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain what
doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one individual
of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet when these many
are joined together, it does not follow but they may be better qualified
for it than those; and this not separately, but as a collective body; as
the public suppers exceed those which are given at one person’s private
expense: for, as they are many, each person brings in his share of virtue
and wisdom; and thus, coming together, they are like one man made up of a
multitude, with many feet, many hands, and many intelligences: thus is it
with respect to the manners and understandings of the multitude taken
together; for which reason the public are the best judges of music and
poetry; for some understand one part, some another, and all collectively
the whole; and in this particular men of consequence differ from each of
the many; as they say those who are beautiful do from those who are not
so, and as fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the
several beautiful parts which were dispersed among different originals
into one, although the separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be
handsomer than in the picture.
But if this distinction is to be made between every people and every
general assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful
whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a few,
it is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to brutes: and
indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but that nothing
prevents what I have said being true of the people in some states. The
doubt then which we have lately proposed, with all its consequences, may
be settled in this manner; it is necessary that the freemen who compose
the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but as
they are neither men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles of
virtue, it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the state,
both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance; from the one of
which they will do what is wrong, from the other they will mistake: and
yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the government; for
when there are many poor people who are incapable of acquiring the honours
of their country, the state must necessarily have many enemies in it; let
them then be permitted to vote in the public assemblies and to determine
causes; for which reason Socrates, and some other legislators, gave them
the power of electing the officers of the state, and also of inquiring
into their conduct when they came out of office, and only prevented their
being magistrates by themselves; for the multitude when they are collected
together have all of them sufficient understanding for these purposes,
and, mixing among those of higher rank, are serviceable to the city, as
some things, which alone are improper for food, when mixed with others
make the whole more wholesome than a few of them would be.
But there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it seems,
that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who was then
sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician; but such a one
must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in every other
practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give an account of
his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other arts: those whose
business is physic may be divided into three sorts, the first of these is
he who makes up the medicines; the second prescribes, and is to the other
as the architect is to the mason; the third is he who understands the
science, but never practises it: now these three distinctions may be found
in those who understand all other arts; nor have we less opinion of their
judgment who are only instructed in the principles of the art than of
those who practise it: and with respect to elections the same method of
proceeding seems right; for to elect a proper person in any science is the
business of those who are skilful therein; as in geometry, of
geometricians; in steering, of steersmen: but if some individuals should
know something of particular arts and works, they do not know more than
the professors of them: so that even upon this principle neither the
election of magistrates, nor the censure of their conduct, should be
entrusted to the many.
But probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to resume
the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal indeed,
although we allow that each individual knows less of these affairs than
those who have given particular attention to them, yet when they come
together they will know them better, or at least not worse; besides, in
some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the best judge;
namely, in those the works of which are understood by those who do not
profess them: thus he who builds a house is not the only judge of it, for
the master of the family who inhabits it is a better; thus also a
steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made it; and he who
gives an entertainment than the cook. What has been said seems a
sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is another that follows:
for it seems absurd that the power of the state should be lodged with
those who are but of indifferent morals, instead of those who are of
excellent characters. Now the power of election and censure are of the
utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some states they
entrust to the people; for the general assembly is the supreme court of
all, and they have a voice in this, and deliberate in all public affairs,
and try all causes, without any objection to the meanness of their
circumstances, and at any age: but their treasurers, generals, and other
great officers of state are taken from men of great fortune and worth.
This difficulty also may be solved upon the same principle; and here too
they may be right, for the power is not in the man who is member of the
assembly, or council, but the assembly itself, and the council, and the
people, of which each individual of the whole community are the parts, I
mean as senator, adviser, or judge; for which reason it is very right,
that the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands; for the
people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the property
of all these collectively is more than the property of any person or a few
who fill the great offices of the state: and thus I determine these
points.
The first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme power
should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or magistrates,
either one or more, should be authorised to determine those cases which
the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is impossible for them, in
general language, to explain themselves upon everything that may arise:
but what these laws are which are established upon the best foundations
has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter of some question:
but the laws of every state will necessarily be like every state, either
trifling or excellent, just or unjust; for it is evident, that the laws
must be framed correspondent to the constitution of the government; and,
if so, it is plain, that a well-formed government will have good laws, a
bad one, bad ones.
CHAPTER XII
Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so
particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding of
civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this which
is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that justice is
a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers are agreed when
they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and to whom; and that
equals ought to receive equal: but we should know how we are to determine
what things are equal and what unequal; and in this there is some
difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the politician. Some persons
will probably say, that the employments of the state ought to be given
according to every particular excellence of each citizen, if there is no
other difference between them and the rest of the community, but they are
in every respect else alike: for justice attributes different things to
persons differing from each other in their character, according to their
respective merits. But if this is admitted to be true, complexion, or
height, or any such advantage will be a claim for a greater share of the
public rights. But that this is evidently absurd is clear from other arts
and sciences; for with respect to musicians who play on the flute
together, the best flute is not given to him who is of the best family,
for he will play never the better for that, but the best instrument ought
to be given to him who is the best artist.
If what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still
further: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the flute,
but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them are more
valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art in a higher
degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes ought to be
given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and fortune should
have a reference to the business in hand; but these have none. Moreover,
according to this reasoning, every possible excellence might come in
comparison with every other; for if bodily strength might dispute the
point with riches or liberty, even any bodily strength might do it; so
that if one person excelled in size more than another did in virtue, and
his size was to qualify him to take place of the other’s virtue,
everything must then admit of a comparison with each other; for if such a
size is greater than virtue by so much, it is evident another must be
equal to it: but, since this is impossible, it is plain that it would be
contrary to common sense to dispute a right to any office in the state
from every superiority whatsoever: for if one person is slow and the other
swift, neither is the one better qualified nor the other worse on that
account, though in the gymnastic races a difference in these particulars
would gain the prize; but a pretension to the offices of the state should
be founded on a superiority in those qualifications which are useful to
it: for which reason those of family, independency, and fortune, with
great propriety, contend with each other for them; for these are the fit
persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist of all poor men than
it can of all slaves But if such persons are requisite, it is evident that
those also who are just and valiant are equally so; for without justice
and valour no state can be supported, the former being necessary for its
existence, the latter for its happiness.
CHAPTER XIII
It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all, or
at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and inquired
into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the right of
being considered as the necessary means of making the citizens happy, as
we have already said. As those who are equal in one particular are not
therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular are
not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all those governments which
are established upon a principle which supposes they are, are erroneous.
We have already said, that all the members of the community will dispute
with each other for the offices of the state; and in some particulars
justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they have
the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right to the soil is vested
in the community; and also because their fidelity is in general most to be
depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the point with
each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have a right to a
higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, for honourable descent is
everywhere of great esteem: nor is it an improper conclusion, that the
descendants of men of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble
birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family: for the same reason also
we justly say, that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions. Justice,
for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society, that all others
must yield her the precedence.
Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few;
and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared with
them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they are. But should it
ever happen that all these should inhabit the [1283b] same city, I mean
the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as usually make
up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason to dispute
concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every community
which we have mentioned there is no dispute where the supreme power should
be placed; for as these differ from each other, so do those in whom that
is placed; for in one state the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious,
and thus each according to their separate manners. Let us however consider
what is to be done when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the
same city. If the virtuous should be very few in number, how then shall we
act? shall we prefer the virtuous on account of their abilities, if they
are capable of governing the city? or should they be so many as almost
entirely to compose the state?
There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim
the honours of government: for those who found them either on fortune or
family have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since it
is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found
richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be justly
vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is of the best
family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon family merit:
and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might arise on the score
of virtue, if there is one man better than all the other men of worth who
are in the same community; it seems just, by the same reasoning, that he
should enjoy the supreme power. And upon this principle also, while the
many suppose they ought to have the supreme command, as being more
powerful than the few, if one or more than one, though a small number
should be found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it
than they.
All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles are
justly founded on which these persons would establish their right to the
supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them: for with
respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their fortune,
they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing hinders but
that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better or richer than
the few, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity.
As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may
answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would
establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for the
use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the circumstances
we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything consists in its
equality; that therefore which is equally right will be advantageous to
the whole state, and to every member of it in common.
Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government and
also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition, it is
true, is different in different states: the best is that in which a man is
enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of virtue during his whole
life, both in his public and private state. But should there be one
person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, though
not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue of the many, or
their political abilities, should be too inferior to come in comparison
with theirs, if more than one; or if but one, with his only; such are not
to be considered as part of the city; for it would be doing them injustice
to rate them on a level with those who are so far their inferiors in
virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them like a god
amongst men. From whence it is evident, that a system of laws must be
calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such
men, therefore, are not the object of law; for they are themselves a law:
and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in the
penalties of a law: for probably they might say what Antisthenes tells us
the lions did to the hares when they demanded to be admitted to an equal
share with them in the government. And it is on this account that
democratic states have established the ostracism; for an equality seems
the principal object of their government. For which reason they compel all
those who are very eminent for their power, their fortune, their
friendships, or any other cause which may give them too great weight in
the government, to submit to the ostracism, and leave the city for a
stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the Argonauts served
Hercules, for they refused to take him with them in the ship Argo on
account of his superior valour. For which reason those who hate a tyranny
and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to Thrasybulus, must
not think there was nothing to be said in its defence; for the story goes,
that Periander said nothing to the messenger in answer to the business he
was consulted about, but striking off those ears of corn which were higher
than the rest, reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger,
without knowing the cause of what was done, related the fact to
Thrasybulus, who understood by it that he must take off all the principal
men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only; nor is it
tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in
oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the
same power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great; and what
is done in one city is done also by those who have the supreme power in
separate states; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the Chians,
and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly acquired the superiority over all
Greece, they brought the other states into subjection, contrary to the
treaties which subsisted between them. The King of Persia also very often
reduces the Medes and Babylonians when they assume upon their former
power: [1284b] and this is a principle which all governments whatsoever
keep in their eye; even those which are best administered, as well as
those which are not, do it; these for the sake of private utility, the
others for the public good.
The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for a
painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally large,
though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the shipwright make
the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than it ought to be; nor
will the master of the band permit any who sings louder and better than
the rest to sing in concert with them. There is therefore no reason that a
monarch should not act in agreement with free states, to support his own
power, if they do the same thing for the benefit of their respective
communities; upon which account when there is any acknowledged difference
in the power of the citizens, the reason upon which the ostracism is
founded will be politically just; but it is better for the legislator so
to establish his state at the beginning as not to want this remedy: but if
in course of time such an inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to
amend it by some such correction. Not that this was the use it was put to:
for many did not regard the benefit of their respective communities, but
made the ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition.
It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and
useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is not
entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts
about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may have
in strength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is virtue,
what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out and banish
such a one; neither does it seem right to govern him, for that would be
like desiring to share the power with Jupiter and to govern him: nothing
then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is for all persons
quietly to submit to the government of those who are thus eminently
virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate states.
CHAPTER XIV
What has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to
inquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted them
to be one of those species of government which are properly founded. And
here let us consider whether a kingly government is proper for a city or a
country whose principal object is the happiness of the inhabitants, or
rather some other. But let us first determine whether this is of one kind
only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to know that it consists of many
different species, and that the forms of government are not the same in
all: for at Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by the laws;
for it is not supreme in all circumstances; but when the king quits the
territories of the state he is their general in war; and all religious
affairs are entrusted to him: indeed the kingly power with them is chiefly
that of a general who cannot be called to an account for his conduct, and
whose command is for life: for he has not the power of life and death,
except as a general; as they frequently had in their expeditions by
martial law, which we learn from Homer; for when Agamemnon is affronted in
council, he restrains his resentment, but when he is in the field and
armed with this power, he tells the Greeks:
This, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the kingly
power is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary, sometimes
elective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met with among
some of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested with powers nearly
equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects, bound by the laws and the
customs of their country; for as the barbarians are by nature more prone
to slavery than the Greeks, and those in Asia more than those in Europe,
they endure without murmuring a despotic government; for this reason their
governments are tyrannies; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being
customary and according to law. Their guards also are such as are used in
a kingly government, not a despotic one; for the guards of their kings are
his citizens, but a tyrant’s are foreigners. The one commands, in the
manner the law directs, those who willingly obey; the other, arbitrarily,
those who consent not. The one, therefore, is guarded by the citizens, the
other against them.
These, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and another
is that which in ancient Greece they called aesumnetes; which is
nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference from that which
is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in its not being
according to law, but only in its not being according to the ancient
customs of the country. Some persons possessed this power for life, others
only for a particular time or particular purpose, as the people of
Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were headed by
Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we learn from a poem of his; for he
upbraids the Mitylenians for having chosen Pittacus for their tyrant, and
with one [1285b] voice extolling him to the skies who was the ruin of a
rash and devoted people. These sorts of government then are, and ever
were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies; but inasmuch as they
are elective, and over a free people, they are also kingly.
A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the
heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government,
according to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were at
first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by collecting them
into civil society, or procuring them an establishment, became the kings
of a willing people, and established an hereditary monarchy. They were
particularly their generals in war, and presided over their sacrifices,
excepting such only as belonged to the priests: they were also the supreme
judges over the people; and in this case some of them took an oath, others
did not; they did, the form of swearing was by their sceptre held out.
In ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything whatsoever,
both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they relinquished
some of their privileges, and others the people assumed, so that, in some
states, they left their kings only the right of presiding over the
sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while to call by that name
had only the right of being commander-in-chief in their foreign wars.
These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms: the first is that of the
heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its rights
in some particulars marked out; for the king was their general, their
judge, and their high priest. The second, that of the barbarians; which is
an hereditary despotic government regulated by laws: the third is that
which they call aesumnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The fourth is
the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few words, is nothing more than an
hereditary generalship: and in these particulars they differ from each
other. There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is when one
person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in the manner that
every state and every city has over those things which belong to the
public: for as the master of a family is king in his own house, so such a
king is master of a family in his own city or state.
CHAPTER XV
But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say, be
reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last spoken
of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are placed between
these, which are as it were at the extremities, they having less power
than an absolute government, and yet more than the Lacedaemonians; so that
the whole matter in question may be reduced to these two points; the one
is, whether it is advantageous to the citizens to have the office of
general continue in one person for life, and whether it should be confined
to any particular families or whether every one should be eligible: the
other, whether [1286a] it is advantageous for one person to have the
supreme power over everything or not. But to enter into the particulars
concerning the office of a Lacedaemonian general would be rather to frame
laws for a state than to consider the nature and utility of its
constitution, since we know that the appointing of a general is what is
done in every state. Passing over this question then, we will proceed to
consider the other part of their government, which is the polity of the
state; and this it will be necessary to examine particularly into, and to
go through such questions as may arise.
Now the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is this,
whether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good laws? Those
who prefer a kingly government think that laws can only speak a general
language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular circumstances; for
which reason it is absurd in any science to follow written rule; and even
in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which the law
prescribed to him, after the fourth day; but if he did it sooner it was at
his own peril: from whence it is evident, on the very same account, that a
government of written laws is not the best; and yet general reasoning is
necessary to all those who are to govern, and it will be much more perfect
in those who are entirely free from passions than in those to whom they
are natural. But now this is a quality which laws possess; while the other
is natural to the human soul. But some one will say in answer to this,
that man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary,
then, for a king to be a lawgiver, and that his laws should be published,
but that those should have no authority which are absurd, as those which
are not, should. But whether is it better for the community that those
things which cannot possibly come under the cognisance of the law either
at all or properly should be under the government of every worthy citizen,
as the present method is, when the public community, in their general
assemblies, act as judges and counsellors, where all their determinations
are upon particular cases, for one individual, be he who he will, will be
found, upon comparison, inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but
this is what a city is, as a public entertainment is better than one man’s
portion: for this reason the multitude judge of many things better than
any one single person. They are also less liable to corruption from their
numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of an
individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger or any
other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community should
be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they will do
nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those cases which the
law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to propose may not easily
be met with, yet if the majority of the state should happen to be good
men, should they prefer one uncorrupt governor or many equally good, is it
not evident that they should choose the many? But there may be divisions
among [1286b] these which cannot happen when there is but one. In answer
to this it may be replied that all their souls will be as much animated
with virtue as this one man’s.
If then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an
aristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident that
the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this whether
the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike can be met
with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first governments were
generally monarchies; because it was difficult to find a number of persons
eminently virtuous, more particularly as the world was then divided into
small communities; besides, kings were appointed in return for the
benefits they had conferred on mankind; but such actions are peculiar to
good men: but when many persons equal in virtue appeared at the time, they
brooked not a superiority, but sought after an equality and established a
free state; but after this, when they degenerated, they made a property of
the public; which probably gave rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth
meritorious, and the honours of government were reserved for the rich: and
these afterwards turned to tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to
democracies; for the power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on
account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to
frame and establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to
increase, probably it was not easy for them to be under any other
government than a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly government
in a state, what is to be done with the king’s children? Is the family
also to reign? But should they have such children as some persons usually
have, it will be very detrimental. It may be said, that then the king who
has it in his power will never permit such children to succeed to his
kingdom. But it is not easy to trust to that; for it is very hard and
requires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is
also a doubt concerning the power with which a king should be entrusted:
whether he should be allowed force sufficient to compel those who do not
choose to be obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his
government? for if he is to govern according to law and do nothing of his
own will which is contrary thereunto, at the same time it will be
necessary to protect that power with which he guards the law, This matter
however may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to have a
proper power, and such a one is that which will be sufficient to make the
king superior to any one person or even a large part of the community, but
inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed guards for that
person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some one advised the
Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow him such.
CHAPTER XVI
[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just
mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king
governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does
not of himself create any particular species of government, as we have
already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or
democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many
who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is the
government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an absolute
monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state is wholly
subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems to many that
it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule over his
fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature requires
that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take place
amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be hurtful to
the body for those who are of different constitutions to observe the same
regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with respect to the honours
of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal in merit should be
unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much a man’s duty to submit to
command as to assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for
order is law; and it is more proper that law should govern than any one of
the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the
supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be
only guardians, and the servants of the laws, for the supreme power must
be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where all are
equal one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that
man should be able to adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may
be replied, that the law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves
the adjustment and application of particulars to the discretion of the
magistrate; besides, it allows anything to be altered which experience
proves may be better established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme
power in mind, would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man
with it, gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make
him; for passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of
men: for which reason law is reason without desire.
The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to
be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it
would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic; for
these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship but earn
their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the management of
public affairs do many things through hatred or favour. And, as a proof of
what we have advanced, it may be observed, that whenever a sick person
suspects that his physician has been persuaded by his enemies to be guilty
of any foul practice to him in his profession, he then rather chooses to
apply to books for his cure: and not only this [1287b] but even physicians
themselves when they are ill call in other physicians: and those who teach
others the gymnastic exercises, exercise with those of the same
profession, as being incapable from self-partiality to form a proper
judgment of what concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that
those who seek for what is just, seek for a mean; now law is a mean.
Moreover; the moral law is far superior and conversant with far superior
objects than the written law; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be
trusted to than the one, though he is inferior to the other. But as it is
impossible that one person should have an eye to everything himself, it
will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should employ several
subordinate ones under him; why then should not this be done at first,
instead of appointing one person in this manner? Besides, if, according to
what has been already said, the man of worth is on that account fit to
govern, two men of worth are certainly better than one: as, for instance,
in Homer, “Let two together go:” and also Agamemnon’s wish; “Were ten such
faithful counsel mine!” Not but that there are even now some particular
magistrates invested with supreme power to decide, as judges, those things
which the law cannot, as being one of those cases which comes not properly
under its jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since
then laws comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire
and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the best
law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come under the
deliberation of man into a law is impossible.
No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some person
to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of a written
law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one; for though every
one who decides according to the principles of the law decides justly; yet
surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person can see better with two
eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do better with two hands and two
feet, than many can do with many: for we see that absolute monarchs now
furnish themselves with many eyes and ears and hands and feet; for they
entrust those who are friends to them and their government with part of
their power; for if they are not friends to the monarch, they will not do
what he chooses; but if they are friends to him, they are friends also to
his government: but a friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he
thinks that such should govern, he thinks that his equal also should
govern. These are nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly
power.
CHAPTER XVII
Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of others;
for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of a master;
others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free state, just and
useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor the other perverted
forms of government; for they are contrary to it. But it is evident from
what has been said, that among equals it is neither advantageous nor
[1288a] right that one person should be lord over all where there are no
established laws, but his will is the law; or where there are; nor is it
right that one who is good should have it over those who are good; or one
who is not good over those who are not good; nor one who is superior to
the rest in worth, except in a particular manner, which shall be
described, though indeed it has been already mentioned. But let us next
determine what people are best qualified for a kingly government, what for
an aristocratic, and what for a democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and
it should be those who are accustomed by nature to submit the civil
government of themselves to a family eminent for virtue: for an
aristocracy, those who are naturally framed to bear the rule of free men,
whose superior virtue makes them worthy of the management of others: for a
free state, a war-like people, formed by nature both to govern and be
governed by laws which admit the poorest citizen to share the honours of
the commonwealth according to his worth. But whenever a whole family or
any one of another shall happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed all
other persons in the community, then it is right that the kingly power
should be in them, or if it is an individual who does so, that he should
be king and lord of all; for this, as we have just mentioned, is not only
correspondent to that principle of right which all founders of all states,
whether aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard to (for
in placing the supreme power they all think it right to fix it to
excellence, though not the same); but it is also agreeable to what has
been already said; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or
ostracise such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper to let
him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to nature that
what is highest should ever be lowest: but this would be the case should
such a one ever be governed by others. So that there can nothing else be
done but to submit, and permit him continually to enjoy the supreme power.
And thus much with respect to kingly power in different states, and
whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and to what, and in what
manner.
CHAPTER XVIII
Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular governments,
and of these the best must necessarily be that which is administered by
the best men (and this must be that which happens to have one man, or one
family, or a number of persons excelling all the rest in virtue, who are
able to govern and be governed in such a manner as will make life most
agreeable, and we have already shown that the virtue of a good man and of
a citizen in the most perfect government will be the same), it is evident,
that in the same manner, and for those very qualities which would procure
a man the character of good, any one would say, that the government of a
state was a well-established aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be
found to be education and [1288b] morals that are almost the whole which
go to make a good man, and the same qualities will make a good citizen or
good king.
These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider what
sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it is
established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry concerning this.
BOOK IV
CHAPTER I
In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some one
genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art alone to
determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular
exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits it best: for
that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and superior to
others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of what one kind
that must be which will suit the generality; and this is the business of
the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not desire to acquire an
exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that
account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master and
instruct the youth in them should be perfect therein: and we see that this
is what equally befalls the healing, shipbuilding, cloth-making, and
indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art to
find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be most
correspondent to our wish, while it received no molestation from without:
and what particular species of it is adapted to particular persons; for
there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the best form: so
that the legislator, and he who is truly a politician, ought to be
acquainted not only with that which is most perfect imaginable, but also
that which is the best suited to any given circumstances. There is,
moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and he ought, if such a one
should be presented to his consideration, to be able to discern what sort
of one it would be at the beginning; and, when once established, what
would be the proper means to preserve it a long time. I mean, for
instance, if a state should happen not to have the best form of
government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not receive every
advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all this, it is
necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting for all cities:
for most of those writers who have treated this subject, however
speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in describing
the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to perceive what is
best without it is what can be put in practice. It should also be simple,
and easy for all to attain to. But some seek only the most subtile forms
of government. Others again, choosing [1289a] rather to treat of what is
common, censure those under which they live, and extol the excellence of a
particular state, as the Lacedaemonian, or some other: but every
legislator ought to establish such a form of government as from the
present state and disposition of the people who are to receive it they
will most readily submit to and persuade the community to partake of: for
it is not a business of less trouble to correct the mistakes of an
established government than to form a new one; as it is as difficult to
recover what we have forgot as to learn anything afresh. He, therefore,
who aspires to the character of a legislator, ought, besides all we have
already said, to be able to correct the mistakes of a government already
established, as we have before mentioned. But this is impossible to be
done by him who does not know how many different forms of government there
are: some persons think that there is only one species both of democracy
and oligarchy; but this is not true: so that every one should be
acquainted with the difference of these governments, how great they are,
and whence they arise; and should have equal knowledge to perceive what
laws are best, and what are most suitable to each particular government:
for all laws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is
to be governed by them, and not the state to the laws: for government is a
certain ordering in a state which particularly respects the magistrates in
what manner they shall be regulated, and where the supreme power shall be
placed; and what shall be the final object which each community shall have
in view; but the laws are something different from what regulates and
expresses the form of the constitution-it is their office to direct the
conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his office and the
punishment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the founders of
laws should attend both to the number and the different sorts of
government; for it is impossible that the same laws should be calculated
for all sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies, for of both
these governments there are many species, not one only.
CHAPTER II
Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the different
forms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three
sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states, and shown the
three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of becoming
tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free state,
democratical: and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and
kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best is
the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of them
desires to be established upon the principles of virtue: and as, moreover,
we have already determined wherein a kingly power and an aristocracy
differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be governed by a
king, it now remains that we examine into a free state, and also these
other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a [1289b] tyranny; and
it is evident of these three excesses which must be the worst of all, and
which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of the best and most holy
must be the worst; for it must necessarily happen either that the name of
king only will remain, or else that the king will assume more power than
belongs to him, from whence tyranny will arise, the worst excess
imaginable, a government the most contrary possible to a free state. The
excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for an aristocracy differs much from
this sort of government: that which is least so is a democracy. This
subject has been already treated of by one of those writers who have gone
before me, though his sentiments are not the same as mine: for he thought,
that of all excellent constitutions, as a good oligarchy or the like, a
democracy was the worst, but of all bad ones, the best.
Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen into
excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy was
better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this question
we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire how many
different sorts of free states there are; since there are many species of
democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most comprehensive,
and most desirable after the best form of government; or if there is any
other like an aristocracy, well established; and also which of these is
best adapted to most cities, and which of them is preferable for
particular persons: for, probably, some may suit better with an oligarchy
than a democracy, and others better with a democracy than an oligarchy;
and afterwards in what manner any one ought to proceed who desires to
establish either of these states, I mean every species of democracy, and
also of oligarchy. And to conclude, when we shall have briefly gone
through everything that is necessary, we will endeavour to point out the
sources of corruption, and stability, in government, as well those which
are common to all as those which are peculiar to each state, and from what
causes they chiefly arise.
CHAPTER III
The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this,
that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the first
place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and again, of the
multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the middle
station; and that, both of the rich and poor, some will be used to arms,
others not. We see also, that some of the common people are husbandmen,
others attend the market, and others are artificers. There is also a
difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity in which
they live: for instance, in the number of horses they breed; for this
cannot be supported without a large fortune: for which reason, in former
times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse became by that means
oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions against the
neighbouring cities; as the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the Magnetians, who
lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia. Moreover, besides
the difference of fortune, there is that which arises from family and
merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a] which make part of
the city, they have been already mentioned in treating of an aristocracy,
for there we considered how many parts each city must necessarily be
composed of; and sometimes each of these have a share in the government,
sometimes a few, sometimes more.
It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government, differing
from each other in their particular constitution: for the parts of which
they are composed each differ from the other. For government is the
ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these the community share
between themselves, either as they can attain them by force, or according
to some common equality which there is amongst them, as poverty, wealth,
or something which they both partake of. There must therefore necessarily
be as many different forms of governments as there are different ranks in
the society, arising from the superiority of some over others, and their
different situations. And these seem chiefly to be two, as they say, of
the winds: namely, the north and the south; and all the others are
declinations from these. And thus in politics, there is the government of
the many and the government of the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy:
for an aristocracy may be considered as a species of oligarchy, as being
also a government of the few; and what we call a free state may be
considered as a democracy: as in the winds they consider the west as part
of the north, and the east as part of the south: and thus it is in music,
according to some, who say there are only two species of it, the Doric and
the Phrygian, and all other species of composition they call after one of
these names; and many people are accustomed to consider the nature of
government in the same light; but it is both more convenient and more
correspondent to truth to distinguish governments as I have done, into two
species: one, of those which are established upon proper principles; of
which there may be one or two sorts: the other, which includes all the
different excesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of
government to the most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and
despotic to the more violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and
gentle airs.
CHAPTER IV
We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it is
a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for even in
oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should they define
an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the hands of a
few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen hundred, and
that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit the three
hundred poor to have any share in the government, although they were free,
and their equal in everything else; no one would say, that this government
was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when few in number, should
acquire the power over the rich, though more than themselves, no one would
say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when the rest who are rich have
no share in the administration. We should rather say, that a democracy is
when the supreme power is in the [1290b] hands of the freemen; an
oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich: it happens indeed that in
the one case the many will possess it, in the other the few; because there
are many poor and few rich. And if the power of the state was to be
distributed according to the size of the citizens, as they say it is in
Ethiopia, or according to their beauty, it would be an oligarchy: for the
number of those who are large and beautiful is small.
Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient to
describe these states; for since there are many species both of a
democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration; as
we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the supreme
power over the many who are not free, that this government is a democracy:
as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these cities the
honours of the state belong to some few particular families, who first
founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are superior in
numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for there the majority
had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a democracy is a state
where the freemen and the poor, being the majority, are invested with the
power of the state. An oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of
noble families, being few, possess it.
We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have
assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are even
more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the
principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists not
of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend the
different species of animals we should first of all note those parts which
every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also what is necessary
to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; besides certain parts
to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these are the only
parts of an animal and there are differences between them; namely, in
their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and sensoriums: to which we must
add their motive powers; the number of the combinations of all these must
necessarily make up the different species of animals. For it is not
possible that the same kind of animal should have any very great
difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these are collected, who
happen to have these things similar in all, they make up a species of
animals of which there are as many as there are of these general
combinations of necessary parts.
The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not made
of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is
those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called
mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual arts, without which
the city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is
absolutely necessary, others in what contribute to the elegancies and
pleasures of life; the third sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these
your buyers, sellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your
hired labourers or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not less
useful than the other, without you would have the community slaves to
every invader; but what cannot defend itself is unworthy of the name of a
city; for a city is self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when Socrates,
in Plato’s Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed of four
sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and these are,
according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and builders; he then
adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, herdsmen for what cattle
are necessary, and also merchants and victuallers, and these are by way of
appendix to his first list; as if a city was established for necessity,
and not happiness, or as if a shoe-maker and a husbandman were equally
useful. He reckons not the military a part before the increase of
territory and joining to the borders of the neighbouring powers will make
war necessary: and even amongst them who compose his four divisions, or
whoever have any connection with each other, it will be necessary to have
some one to distribute justice, and determine between man and man. If,
then, the mind is a more valuable part of man than the body, every one
would wish to have those things more regarded in his city which tend to
the advantage of these than common matters, such are war and justice; to
which may be added council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor is
it of any consequence whether these different employments are filled by
different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a soldier and
a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are parts of the
city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be so also. The seventh
sort are those who serve the public in expensive employments at their own
charge: these are called the rich. The eighth are those who execute the
different offices of the state, and without these it could not possibly
subsist: it is therefore necessary that there should be some persons
capable of governing and filling the places in the city; and this either
for life or in rotation: the office of senator, and judge, of which we
have already sufficiently treated, are the only ones remaining. If, then,
these things are necessary for a state, that it may be happy and just, it
follows that the citizens who engage in public affairs should be men of
abilities therein. [1291b] Several persons think, that different
employments may be allotted to the same person; as a soldier’s, a
husbandman’s, and an artificer’s; as also that others may be both senators
and judges.
Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and that
he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the same
person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most obvious
division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich; moreover, since
for the generality the one are few, the other many, they seem of all the
parts of a city most contrary to each other; so that as the one or the
other prevail they form different states; and these are the democracy and
the oligarchy.
But that there are many different states, and from what causes they arise,
has been already mentioned: and that there are also different species both
of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though this indeed is
evident from what we have already said: there are also many different
sorts of common people, and also of those who are called gentlemen. Of the
different sorts of the first are husbandmen, artificers, exchange-men, who
are employed in buying and selling, seamen, of which some are engaged in
war, some in traffic, some in carrying goods and passengers from place to
place, others in fishing, and of each of these there are often many, as
fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens,
merchants at AEgina and Chios, those who let ships on freight at Tenedos;
we may add to these those who live by their manual labour and have but
little property; so that they cannot live without some employ: and also
those who are not free-born on both sides, and whatever other sort of
common people there may be. As for gentlemen, they are such as are
distinguished either by their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or
their education, or any such-like excellence which is attributed to them.
The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that
equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state
directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich;
nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but that
both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons suppose,
are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so by every
department of government being alike open to all; but as the people are
the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such a state must
be a democracy. This, then, is one species thereof. Another is, when the
magistrates are elected by a certain census; but this should be but small,
and every one who was included in it should be eligible, but as soon as he
was below it should lose that right. [1292a] Another sort is, in which
every citizen who is not infamous has a share in the government, but where
the government is in the laws. Another, where every citizen without
exception has this right. Another is like these in other particulars, but
there the people govern, and not the law: and this takes place when
everything is determined by a majority of votes, and not by a law; which
happens when the people are influenced by the demagogues: for where a
democracy is governed by stated laws there is no room for them, but men of
worth fill the first offices in the state: but where the power is not
vested in the laws, there demagogues abound: for there the people rule
with kingly power: the whole composing one body; for they are supreme, not
as individuals but in their collective capacity.
Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means this
we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power separately,
is uncertain. When the people possess this power they desire to be
altogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law,
and this is the time when flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there any
difference between such a people and monarchs in a tyranny: for their
manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over better
persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others’ edicts;
their demagogues like the others’ flatterers: but their greatest
resemblance consists in the mutual support they give to each other, the
flatterer to the tyrant, the demagogue to the people: and to them it is
owing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people, and not
in the laws; for they bring everything before them, as their influence is
owing to their being supreme whose opinions they entirely direct; for
these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who accuse the
magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on their conduct
lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as the means of
destroying all their offices.
Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as
being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is not
in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be supreme
over all things; and particular incidents which arise should be determined
by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a democracy is to be
reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such establishment which
centres all power in the votes of the people cannot, properly speaking, be
a democracy: for their decrees cannot be general in their extent. Thus,
then, we may describe the several species of democracies.
CHAPTER V
Of the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the
offices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although the
majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included therein
take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort is, when
[1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who upon any
vacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of the community
at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out of any particular
class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another sort of oligarchy is,
when the power is an hereditary nobility. The fourth is, when the power is
in the same hands as the other, but not under the control of law; and this
sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a tyranny in monarchies, and to
that particular species of democracies which I last mentioned in treating
of that state: this has the particular name of a dynasty. These are the
different sorts of oligarchies and democracies.
It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state, where
the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet in
consequence of the established manners and customs of the people, may be
governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws may
countenance a more democratic form of government, these may make the state
inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when there has been
any alteration in the government; for the people do not easily change, but
love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees only that one
thing takes place of another; so that the ancient laws will remain, while
the power will be in the hands of those who have brought about a
revolution in the state.
CHAPTER VI
It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many different
sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up: for, of
necessity, either all ranks of the people which I have enumerated must
have a share in the government, or some only, and others not; for when the
husbandmen, and those only who possess moderate fortunes, have the supreme
power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get their
livings by their employs, they have but little leisure for public
business: they will therefore establish proper laws, and never call public
assemblies but when there is a necessity for them; and they will readily
let every one partake with them in the administration of public affairs as
soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires for their
qualification: every one, therefore, who is qualified will have his share
in the government: for to exclude any would be to make the government an
oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend without they had a
subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons, therefore, this
government is a species of democracy. Another species is distinguished by
the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every one is eligible, to
whose birth there are no objections, provided he is supposed to have
leisure to attend: for which reason in such a democracy the supreme power
will be vested in the laws, as there will be nothing paid to those who go
to the public assemblies. A third species is where every freeman has a
right to a share in the government, which he will not accept for the cause
already assigned; for which reason here also the supreme power will be in
the law. The fourth species [1293a] of democracy, the last which was
established in order of time, arose when cities were greatly enlarged to
what they were at first, and when the public revenue became something
considerable; for then the populace, on account of their numbers, were
admitted to share in the management of public affairs, for then even the
poorest people were at leisure to attend to them, as they received wages
for so doing; nay, they were more so than others, as they were not
hindered by having anything of their own to mind, as the rich had; for
which reason these last very often did not frequent the public assemblies
and the courts of justice: thus the supreme power was lodged in the poor,
and not in the laws. These are the different sorts of democracies, and
such are the causes which necessarily gave birth to them.
The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state are
men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them leisure
for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body, it
necessarily follows that the supreme power must be in the laws, and not in
men; for as they are far removed from a monarchical government, and have
not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while they are
too many to be supported by the public, they will of course determine to
be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if the men of property
in the state are but few, and their property is large, then an oligarchy
of the second sort will take place; for those who have most power will
think that they have a right to lord it over the others; and, to
accomplish this, they will associate to themselves some who have an
inclination for public affairs, and as they are not powerful enough to
govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if those
few who have large fortunes should acquire still greater power, the
oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort; for they will get
all the offices of the state into their own hands by a law which directs
the son to succeed upon the death of his father; and, after that, when, by
means of their increasing wealth and powerful connections, they extend
still further their oppression, a monarchical dynasty will directly
succeed wherein men will be supreme, and not the law; and this is the
fourth species of an oligarchy correspondent to the last-mentioned class
of democracies.
CHAPTER VII
There are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one of
which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the four sorts;
and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a democracy, and
this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is also a fifth, which
bears a name that is also common to the other four, namely, a state: but
as this is seldom to be met with, it has escaped those who have
endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of governments, which [1293b]
they fix at four only, as does Plato in his Republic.
An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is
rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most
virtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men may
propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is there
only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while in other
states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover, there are
some other states which are called by the same name, that differ both from
oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the rich but also the
virtuous have a share in the administration; and have therefore acquired
the name of aristocracies; for in those governments wherein virtue is not
their common care, there are still men of worth and approved goodness.
Whatever state, then, like the Carthaginians, favours the rich, the
virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort of aristocracy: when only
the two latter are held in esteem, as at Lacedaemon, and the state is
jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous democracy. These are the two
species of aristocracies after the first, which is the best of all
governments. There is also a third, which is, whenever a free state
inclines to the dominion of a few.
CHAPTER VIII
It now remains for us to treat of that government which is particularly
called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the reason for my choosing
to place that free state here is, because this, as well as those
aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not seem excesses, yet,
to speak true, they have all departed from what a perfect government is.
Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other forms, as I said
at the beginning. It is proper to mention a tyranny the last of all
governments, for it is of all others the least like one: but as my
intention is to treat of all governments in general, for this reason that
also, as I have said, will be taken into consideration in its proper
place.
I shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we shall
the better understand its positive nature as we have already described an
oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed nothing more than a
mixture of them, and it has been usual to call those which incline most to
a democracy, a free state; those which incline most to an oligarchy, an
aristocracy, because those who are rich are generally men of family and
education; besides, they enjoy those things which others are often guilty
of crimes to procure: for which reason they are regarded as men of worth
and honour and note.
Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger part
of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that an
oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and honourable:
now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government is in the hands
of the good, there the laws should not be good, but bad; or, on the
contrary, that where the government is in the hands of the bad, there the
laws should be good; nor is a government well constituted because the laws
are, without at the same time care is taken that they are observed; for to
enforce obedience to the laws which it makes is one proof of a good
constitution in the state-another is, to have laws well calculated for
those who are to abide by them; for if they are improper they must be
obeyed: and this may be done two ways, either by their being the best
relative to the particular state, or the best absolutely. An aristocracy
seems most likely to confer the honours of the state on the virtuous; for
virtue is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an oligarchy, and
liberty of a democracy; for what is approved of by the majority will
prevail in all or in each of these three different states; and that which
seems good to most of those who compose the community will prevail: for
what is called a state prevails in many communities, which aim at a
mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for the rich, they are
usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and honourable. As there
are three things which claim an equal rank in the state, freedom, riches,
and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is an attendant on two of the
others, for virtue and riches are the origin of family), it is evident,
that the conjuncture of the rich and the poor make up a free state; but
that all three tend to an aristocracy more than any other, except that
which is truly so, which holds the first rank.
We have already seen that there are governments different from a monarchy,
a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and wherein they differ
from each other; and also aristocracies and states properly so called,
which are derived from them; and it is evident that these are not much
unlike each other.
CHAPTER IX
We shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly
called a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it
ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are the
proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out wherein
they differ from one another, and then from both these compose a state of
such parts of each of them as will show from whence they were taken.
There are three different ways in which two states may be blended and
joined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be adopted
which the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance in the
judicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if they do not
come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid for their
attendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are not fined for
their neglect. Now these things, as being common to both, are fit to be
observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed of both. This, then, is
one way in which they may be joined together. In the second place, a
medium may be taken between the different methods which each state
observes; for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the public
assembly is either confined by no census at all, or limited by a very
small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it but those whose census is high:
therefore, as these two practices are contrary to each other, a census
between each may be established in such a state. In the third place,
different laws of each community may be adopted; as, for instance, as it
seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy, that the magistrates
should be chosen by lot, but an aristocracy by vote, and in the one state
according to a census, but not in the other: let, then, an aristocracy and
a free state copy something from each of them; let them follow an
oligarchy in choosing their magistrates by vote, but a democracy in not
admitting of any census, and thus blend together the different customs of
the two governments. But the best proof of a happy mixture of a democracy
and an oligarchy is this, when a person may properly call the same state a
democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident that those who speak of it in
this manner are induced to it because both these governments are there
well blended together: and indeed this is common to all mediums, that the
extremes of each side should be discerned therein, as at Lacedaemon; for
many affirm that it is a democracy from the many particulars in which it
follows that form of government; as for instance, in the first place, in
the bringing up of their children, for the rich and poor are brought up in
the same manner; and their education is such that the children of the poor
may partake of it; and the same rules are observed when they are youths
and men, there is no distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and
in their public tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also
wear only such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover,
with respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a
right to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori.
Others consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows in
many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by lot; in
there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on capital
causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of two others
ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state ought to have its
means of preservation in itself, and not without; and when I say in
itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance of their
neighbours, for this may happen to a bad government, but to every member
of the community’s not being willing that there should be the least
alteration in their constitution. Such is the method in which a free state
or aristocracy ought to be established.
CHAPTER X
It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much to be
said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since we
enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the beginning
of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly government, and entered
into a particular examination of what was most properly called so, and
whether it was advantageous to a state or not, and what it should be, and
how established; and we divided a tyranny into two pieces when we were
upon this subject, because there is something analogous between this and a
kingly government, for they are both of them established by law; for among
some of the barbarians they elect a monarch with absolute power, and
formerly among the Greeks there were some such, whom they called
sesumnetes. Now these differ from each other; for some possess only kingly
power regulated by law, and rule those who voluntarily submit to their
government; others rule despotically according to their own will. There is
a third species of tyranny, most properly so called, which is the very
opposite to kingly power; for this is the government of one who rules over
his equals and superiors without being accountable for his conduct, and
whose object is his own advantage, and not the advantage of those he
governs; for which reason he rules by compulsion, for no freemen will ever
willingly submit to such a government. These are the different species of
tyrannies, their principles, and their causes.
CHAPTER XI
We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner of life
is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that superior
virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that education which
every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish, nor to those
imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to that mode of life
which the greater part of mankind can attain to, and that government which
most cities may establish: for as to those aristocracies which we have now
mentioned, they are either too perfect for a state to support, or one so
nearly alike to that state we now going to inquire into, that we shall
treat of them both as one.
The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one common
principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is true, a
happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue; and if
virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must certainly be the
happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by every one. The boundaries
of virtue and vice in the state must also necessarily be the same as in a
private person; for the form of government is the life of the city. In
every city the people are divided into three sorts; the very rich, the
very poor, and those who are between them. If this is universally
admitted, that the mean is best, it is evident that even in point of
fortune mediocrity is to be preferred; for that state is most submissive
to reason; for those who are very handsome, or very strong, or very noble,
or very rich; or, on the contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak,
or very mean, with difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and
greatly flagitious, the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each
arising from their different excesses: nor will they go through the
different offices of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those
who excel in strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know
how nor are willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when
they are boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be
accustomed to obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general
and excessive want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too
mean: so that the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as
slaves, the others know not how to submit to any command, nor to command
themselves but with despotic power.
A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and masters,
not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other despise, where there
could be no possibility of friendship or political community: for
community supposes affection; for we do not even on the road associate
with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be composed as much
as possible of equals; which will be most so when the inhabitants are in
the middle state: from whence it follows, that that city must be best
framed which is composed of those whom we say are naturally its proper
members. It is men of this station also who will be best assured of safety
and protection; for they will neither covet what belongs to others, as the
poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs, as the poor do what belongs
to the rich; and thus, without plotting against any one, or having any one
plot against them, they will live free from danger: for which reason
Phocylides wisely wishes for the middle state, as being most productive of
happiness. It is plain, then, that the most perfect political community
must be amongst those who are in the middle rank, and those states are
best instituted wherein these are a larger and more respectable part, if
possible, than both the other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either
of them separate; so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent
either scale from preponderating.
It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to
possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too much,
and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be in the
hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from the
excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong democracy
or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the community are
nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a reason for this
when we come to treat of the alterations which different states are likely
to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as being least liable to
those seditions and insurrections which disturb the community; and for the
same reason extensive governments are least liable to these
inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are very numerous,
whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two extremes, so as hardly
to have any in a medium remaining, but the one half rich, the other poor:
and from the same principle it is that democracies are more firmly
established and of longer continuance than oligarchies; but even in those
when there is a want of a proper number of men of middling fortune, the
poor extend their power too far, abuses arise, and the government is soon
at an end.
We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best
lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom
was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not a
king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will show
us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies, others to
oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle state has been
too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the rich or the poor,
always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the administration of
public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy or an oligarchy.
Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and quarrels with each
other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the
rich, neither of them will establish a free state; but, as the record of
their victory, one which inclines to their own principles, and form either
a democracy or an oligarchy.
Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the
respective forms of government in their own cities, established either
democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the
state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government
has never been established where the supreme power has been placed amongst
those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few, one man
only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded to give the
preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an established
custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an equality, but
either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to submit.
Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be
difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have seen
that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies, to which
we should give the first place, to which the second, and in the same
manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular excellences
and defects of each, after we have first described the best possible; for
that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst which is most
distant from the medium, without any one has a particular plan of his own
which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen, that although one
form of government may be better than another, yet there is no reason to
prevent another from being preferable thereunto in particular
circumstances and for particular purposes.
CHAPTER XII
After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what
particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons;
first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which desires
to support the actual administration of the state ought always to be
superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality
and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family,
and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may happen that quality
may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed, and
quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble may be greater than
the number of those of family, the number of the poor than that of the
rich; but not so that the quantity of the one shall overbalance the
quality of the other; those must be properly adjusted to each other; for
where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned,
there a democracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have more
power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen; and the democracy
will be a particular species according to that class of men which may
happen to be most numerous: thus, should these be the husbandmen, it will
be of these, and the best; if of mechanics and those who hire themselves
out, the worst possible: in the same manner it may be of any other set
between these two. But when the rich and the noble prevail more by their
quality than they are deficient in quantity, there an oligarchy ensues;
and this oligarchy may be of different species, according to the nature of
the prevailing party. Every legislator in framing his constitution ought
to have a particular regard to those in the middle rank of life; and if he
intends an oligarchy, these should be the object of his laws; if a
democracy, to these they should be entrusted; and whenever their number
exceeds that of the two others, or at least one of them, they give [1297a]
stability to the constitution; for there is no fear that the rich and the
poor should agree to conspire together against them, for neither of these
will choose to serve the other. If any one would choose to fix the
administration on the widest basis, he will find none preferable to this;
for to rule by turns is what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on
account of their hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an
arbitrator is the most proper person for both parties to trust to; now
this arbitrator is the middle rank.
Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not only
in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the common
people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must feel a real
evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the state
than those of the poor.
CHAPTER XIII
There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich
craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are their
public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of justice, their
military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With respect to their
public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in fining the rich
only, or others very little, for not attending; with respect to offices,
in permitting the poor to swear off, but not granting this indulgence to
those who are within the census; with respect to their courts of justice,
in fining the rich for non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a
great deal, and these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas.
In some places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the
public assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very
heavy fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might
avoid being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one nor
the other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect to their
bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are excused if
they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method takes place if
they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is no penalty on one,
but there is on the other: the consequence of which is, that the fear of
this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and attend the other, while
the poor do neither. These are the deceitful contrivances of oligarchical
legislators.
The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a
proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give the
rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one would
properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the pay and
the fine to every member of the community, and then every one would share
in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free state ought to
[1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with respect to their census
it is not easy to determine exactly what it ought to be, but the rule that
should direct upon this subject should be to make it as extensive as
possible, so that those who are enrolled in it make up a greater part of
the people than those who are not; for those who are poor, although they
partake not of the offices of the state, are willing to live quiet,
provided that no one disturbs them in their property: but this is not an
easy matter; for it may not always happen, that those who are at the head
of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time of war the poor are
accustomed to show no alacrity without they have provisions found them;
when they have, then indeed they are willing to fight.
In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear arms,
but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the state was
composed of these latter only, for all the officers were soldiers who had
served their time. And the first states in Greece which succeeded those
where kingly power was established, were governed by the military. First
of all the horse, for at that time the strength and excellence of the army
depended on the horse, for as to the heavy-armed foot they were useless
without proper discipline; but the art of tactics was not known to the
ancients, for which reason their strength lay in their horse: but when
cities grew larger, and they depended more on their foot, greater numbers
partook of the freedom of the city; for which reason what we call
republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient governments were
properly oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons in
each state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient
number of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to
subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.
We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others
different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of
democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what are
their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others which is
the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for particular
people.
CHAPTER XIV
We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the governments
next in order, and also to consider each of them in particular; beginning
with those principles which appertain to each: now there are three things
in all states which a careful legislator ought well to consider, which are
of great consequence to all, and which properly attended to the state must
necessarily be happy; and according to the variation of which the one will
differ from the other. The first of these is the [1298a] public assembly;
the second the officers of the state, that is, who they ought to be, and
with what power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should
be appointed; the third, the judicial department.
Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine
concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact laws,
to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to call
the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now these
powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in general, or all of
them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or some to one, and some
to another, or some to all, but others to some: to entrust all to all is
in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at equality. There are
many methods of delegating these powers to the citizens at large, one of
which is to let them execute them by turn, and not altogether, as was done
by Tellecles, the Milesian, in his state. In others the supreme council is
composed of the different magistrates, and they succeed to the offices of
the community by proper divisions of tribes, wards, and other very small
proportions, till every one in his turn goes through them: nor does the
whole community ever meet together, without it is when new laws are
enacted, or some national affair is debated, or to hear what the
magistrates have to propose to them. Another method is for the people to
meet in a collective body, but only for the purpose of holding the
comitia, making laws, determining concerning war or peace, and inquiring
into the conduct of their magistrates, while the remaining part of the
public business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate
departments, and are chosen out of the whole community either by vote or
ballot. Another method is for the people in general to meet for the choice
of the magistrates, and to examine into their conduct; and also to
deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the
magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose particular employments are
such as necessarily require persons well skilled therein. A fourth method
is for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public assembly,
where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, and have only
the privilege of giving their opinions first; and this is the method of
the most pure democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a
dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.
These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in a
democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community only,
it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs; for whenever
the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a moderate
fortune, and these from that circumstance are many, and when they depart
not from that line which the law has laid down, but carefully follow it,
and when all within the census are eligible, certainly it is then an
oligarchy, but founded on true principles of government [1298b] from its
moderation. When the people in general do not partake of the deliberative
power, but certain persons chosen for that purpose, who govern according
to law; this also, like the first, is an oligarchy. When those who have
the deliberative power elect each other, and the son succeeds to the
father, and when they can supersede the laws, such a government is of
necessity a strict oligarchy. When some persons determine on one thing,
and others on another, as war and peace, and when all inquire into the
conduct of their magistrates, and other things are left to different
officers, elected either by vote or lot, then the government is an
aristocracy or a free state. When some are chosen by vote and others by
lot, and these either from the people in general, or from a certain number
elected for that purpose, or if both the votes and the lots are open to
all, such a state is partly an aristocracy, partly a free government
itself. These are the different methods in which the deliberative power is
vested in different states, all of whom follow some regulation here laid
down. It is advantageous to a democracy, in the present sense of the word,
by which I mean a state wherein the people at large have a supreme power,
even over the laws, to hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be
best in this particular to imitate the example of oligarchies in their
courts of justice; for they fine those who are appointed to try causes if
they do not attend, so should they reward the poor for coming to the
public assemblies: and their counsels will be best when all advise with
each other, the citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It
is also advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the
citizens, to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks.
It is also proper, if the common people in the state are very numerous,
either not to pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as
will make them equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot.
In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people to
the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other states,
whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose business
should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact. By this
means the people would have a place in the administration of public
affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in the
government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote in whatever
bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose anything contrary
thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of determining may
be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to follow a contrary
practice to what is established in democracies, for the people should be
allowed the power of pardoning, but not of condemning, for the cause
should be referred back again to the magistrates: whereas the contrary
takes place in republics; for the power of pardoning is with the few, but
not of condemning, which is always referred [1299a] to the people at
large. And thus we determine concerning the deliberative power in any
state, and in whose hands it shall be.
CHAPTER XV
We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch of
public business contains many different Parts, as how many there shall be,
what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how long
each of them shall continue in place; for some make it six months, others
shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or whether they
should be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for the same person
may fill the same office several times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy
it even twice, but only once: and also with respect to the appointment of
magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose them, and in what
manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly to distinguish the
different ways which may be followed; and then to show which of these is
best suited to such and such governments.
Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the name
of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office; but every
one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be reckoned a
magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place; for these are
to be considered as very different from civil magistrates: to these we may
add the choregi and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are elected: there are
some civil employments which belong to the citizens; and these are either
when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as soldiers they obey
their general, or when part of them only are, as in governing the women or
educating the youth; and also some economic, for they often elect
corn-meters: others are servile, and in which, if they are rich, they
employ slaves. But indeed they are most properly called magistrates, who
are members of the deliberative council, or decide causes, or are in some
command, the last more especially, for to command is peculiar to
magistrates. But to speak truth, this question is of no great consequence,
nor is it the province of the judges to decide between those who dispute
about words; it may indeed be an object of speculative inquiry; but to
inquire what officers are necessary in a state, and how many, and what,
though not most necessary, may yet be advantageous in a well-established
government, is a much more useful employment, and this with respect to all
states in general, as well as to small cities.
In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one
person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society,
where some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in
office but once; and indeed everything is better done which has the whole
attention of one person, than when that [1299b] attention is divided
amongst many; but in small states it is necessary that a few of the
citizens should execute many employments; for their numbers are so small
it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the same time;
for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small states will
sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as large ones; but
the one will not want to employ them so often as the other; so that
different charges may be intrusted to the same person without any
inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each other, and for want
of sufficient members in the community it will be necessary. If we could
tell how many magistrates are necessary in every city, and how many,
though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we could then the better
know how many different offices one might assign to one magistrate. It is
also necessary to know what tribunals in different places should have
different things under their jurisdiction, and also what things should
always come under the cognisance of the same magistrate; as, for instance,
decency of manners, shall the clerk of the market take cognisance of that
if the cause arises in the market, and another magistrate in another
place, or the same magistrate everywhere: or shall there be a distinction
made of the fact, or the parties? as, for instance, in decency of manners,
shall it be one cause when it relates to a man, another when it relates to
a woman?
In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same? I
mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a
monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it vary
according to the different formation of the government? as in an
aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are well
educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the
freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities differ? For it
may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes
otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the magistrate have
great powers, in that but small. There are also certain magistrates
peculiar to certain states—as the pre-advisers are not proper in a
democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is necessary, whose
business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare those bills which
shall be brought before the people that they may have leisure to attend to
their own affairs; and when these are few in number the state inclines to
an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed must always be few for they are
peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both these offices in the
same state, the pre-adviser’s is superior to the senator’s, the one having
only a democratical power, the other an oligarchical: and indeed the
[1300a] power of the senate is lost in those democracies, in which the
people, meeting in one public assembly, take all the business into their
own hands; and this is likely to happen either when the community in
general are in easy circumstances, or when they are paid for their
attendance; for they are then at leisure often to meet together and
determine everything for themselves. A magistrate whose business is to
control the manners of the boys, or women, or who takes any department
similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy, not in a democracy; for
who can forbid the wives of the poor from appearing in public? neither is
such a one to be met with in an oligarchy; for the women there are too
delicate to bear control. And thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour
to treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from
first principles. Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from
which, blended together, all the varieties which can be imagined arise.
The first of these differences is in those who appoint the magistrates,
the second consists in those who are appointed, the third in the mode of
appointment; and each of these three differ in three manners; for either
all the citizens may appoint collectively, or some out of their whole
body, or some out of a particular order in it, according to fortune,
family, or virtue, or some other rule (as at Megara, where the right of
election was amongst those who had returned together to their country, and
had reinstated themselves by force of arms) and this either by vote or
lot. Again, these several modes may be differently formed together, as
some magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the
whole; some out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by
lot: and each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision;
for either all may elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they
may either proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain
division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the
whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others
another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot of
all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or some one
way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all, others by
the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods of electing
the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of these there are two
adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the magistrates chosen out of
all the people, either by vote or lot, or both; that is to say, some of
them by lot, some by vote. In a free state the whole community should not
elect at the same time, but some out of the whole, or out of some
particular rank; and this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they should
elect either out of the whole community, or out of some particular persons
in it, and this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to
choose some magistrates out of the whole body of the citizens, some by
vote, some by lot, others by both: by lot is most correspondent to that
form of government. In a free aristocracy, some magistrates [1300b] should
be chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular
rank, or these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the
magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain persons,
and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but to choose them out
of the whole community is not correspondent to the nature of this
government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the whole community to
elect their magistrates out of particular persons, and this by vote. These
then are all the different ways of electing of magistrates; and they have
been allotted according to the nature of the different communities; but
what mode of proceeding is proper for different communities, or how the
offices ought to be established, or with what powers shall be particularly
explained. I mean by the powers of a magistrate, what should be his
particular province, as the management of the finances or the laws of the
state; for different magistrates have different powers, as that of the
general of the army differs from the clerk of the market.
CHAPTER XVI
Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to
consider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same manner as
we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges shall
consist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I mean whether
they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by for what causes I
mean, how many different courts shall be appointed; by how, whether they
shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first determine how many different
courts there ought to be. Now these are eight. The first of these is the
court of inspection over the behaviour of the magistrates when they have
quitted their office; the second is to punish those who have injured the
public; the third is to take cognisance of those causes in which the state
is a party; the fourth is to decide between magistrates and private
persons, who appeal from a fine laid upon them; the fifth is to determine
disputes which may arise concerning contracts of great value; the sixth is
to judge between foreigners, and of murders, of which there are different
species; and these may all be tried by the same judges or by different
ones; for there are murders of malice prepense and of chance-medley; there
is also justifiable homicide, where the fact is admitted, and the legality
of it disputed.
There is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae, which
determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has run away,
to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair happens but
seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to determine causes wherein
strangers are concerned, and this whether they are between stranger and
stranger or between a stranger and a citizen. The eighth and last is for
small actions, from one to five drachma’s, or a little more; for these
ought also to be legally determined, but not to be brought before the
whole body of the judges. But without entering into any particulars
concerning actions for murder, and those wherein strangers are the
parties, let us particularly treat of those courts which have the
jurisdiction of those matters which more particularly relate to the
affairs of the community and which if not well conducted occasion
seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity, either all
persons must have a right to judge of all these different causes,
appointed for that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of all, some of
them by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote, in others by
lot. Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a] will be just
the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the people only;
for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part either by vote
or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in particular
causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which means there
will be the same number of them also as was mentioned. Besides, different
judges may be joined together; I mean those who are chosen out of the
whole people or part of them or both; so that all three may sit together
in the same court, and this either by vote, lot, or both. And thus much
for the different sorts of judges. Of these appointments that which admits
all the community to be judges in all causes is most suitable to a
democracy; the second, which appoints that certain persons shall judge all
causes, to an oligarchy; the third, which appoints the whole community to
be judges in some causes, but particular persons in others, to an
aristocracy or free state.
BOOK V
CHAPTER I
We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it
remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations in
government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the destruction
of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of polity is most
likely to shift into, and what are the means to be used for the general
preservation of governments, as well as what are applicable to any
particular state; and also of the remedies which are to be applied either
to all in general, or to any one considered separately, when they are in a
state of corruption: and here we ought first to lay down this principle,
that there are many governments, all of which approve of what is just and
what is analogically equal; and yet have failed from attaining thereunto,
as we have already mentioned; thus democracies have arisen from supposing
that those who are equal in one thing are so in every other circumstance;
as, because they are equal in liberty, they are equal in everything else;
and oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal in one thing
are unequal in all; that when men are so in point of fortune, that
inequality extends to everything else. Hence it follows, that those who in
some respects are equal with others think it right to endeavour to partake
of an equality with them in everything; and those who are superior to
others endeavour to get still more; and it is this more which is the
inequality: thus most states, though they have some notion of what is
just, yet are almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either
party has not that share in the administration which answers to his
expectations, he becomes seditious: but those who of all others have the
greatest right to be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in
virtue; for they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too,
some persons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain
to be on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who
boast of their ancestors’ merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are
the origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations which
men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they may change
the state already established into some other, as when they propose to
erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a democracy, or free
state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy from these, or those
from that; or else, when they have no objection to the established
government, which they like very well, but choose to have the sole
management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few or one only.
They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in which they would
have the established power; as if, for instance, the government is an
oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same manner if it is a
democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like manner, whatever may
be the nature of the government, either to extend or contract its powers;
or else to make some alterations in some parts of it; as to establish or
abolish a particular magistracy, as some persons say Lysander endeavoured
to abolish the kingly power in Sparta; and Pausanias that of the ephori.
Thus in Epidamnus there was an alteration in one part of the constitution,
for instead of the philarchi they established a senate. It is also
necessary for all the magistrates at Athens; to attend in the court of the
Helisea when any new magistrate is created: the power of the archon also
in that state partakes of the nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always
the occasion of sedition, but not when those who are unequal are treated
in a different manner correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly power
is unequal when exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim after
an equality are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold, either in
number or value. Equality in number is when two things contain the same
parts or the same quantity; equality in value is by proportion as two
exceeds one, and three two by the same number-thus by proportion four
exceeds two, and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of
four that one is of two; that is to say, half. Now, all agree in what is
absolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said they dispute
concerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in one
respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior in
one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all; from whence
chiefly arise two sorts of governments, a democracy and an oligarchy; for
nobility and virtue are to be found only [1302a] amongst a few; the
contrary amongst the many; there being in no place a hundred of the first
to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. But to establish a
government entirely upon either of these equalities is wrong, and this the
example of those so established makes evident, for none of them have been
stable; and for this reason, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong
at the first and in its principles should not at last meet with a bad end:
for which reason in some things an equality of numbers ought to take
place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is safer and
less liable to sedition than an oligarchy; for in this latter it may arise
from two causes, for either the few in power may conspire against each
other or against the people; but in a democracy only one; namely, against
the few who aim at exclusive power; but there is no instance worth
speaking of, of a sedition of the people against themselves. Moreover, a
government composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a
democracy than an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.
CHAPTER II
Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions in
governments, we must begin entirely with the first principles from whence
they arise. Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number; which we
must first distinguish in general from each other, and endeavour to show
in what situation people are who begin a sedition; and for what causes;
and thirdly, what are the beginnings of political troubles and mutual
quarrels with each other. Now that cause which of all others most
universally inclines men to desire to bring about a change in government
is that which I have already mentioned; for those who aim at equality will
be ever ready for sedition, if they see those whom they esteem their
equals possess more than they do, as well as those also who are not
content with equality but aim at superiority, if they think that while
they deserve more than, they have only equal with, or less than, their
inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either just or unjust; just, when
those who are inferior are seditious, that they may be equal; unjust, when
those who are equal are so, that they may be superior. These, then, are
the situations in which men will be seditious: the causes for which they
will be so are profit and honour; and their contrary: for, to avoid
dishonour or loss of fortune by mulcts, either on their own account or
their friends, they will raise a commotion in the state. The original
causes which dispose men to the things which I have mentioned are, taken
in one manner, seven in number, in another they are more; two of which are
the same with those that have been already mentioned: but influencing in a
different manner; for profit and honour sharpen men against each other;
not to get the possession of them for themselves (which was what I just
now supposed), but when they see others, some justly, others [1302b]
unjustly, engrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear,
eminence, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state.
There are also other things which in a different manner will occasion
revolutions in governments; as election intrigues, neglect, want of
numbers, a too great dissimilarity of circumstances.
CHAPTER III
What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how
they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when the
magistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than their
office gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other,
but against the state also who gave them their power; and this their
avarice has two objects, either private property or the property of the
state. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion sedition, is
evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they see
others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things are
done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary to
their deserts, justly when they are according to them. Excessive honours
are also a cause of sedition when one person or more are greater than the
state and the power of the government can permit; for then a monarchy or a
dynasty is usually established: on which account the ostracism was
introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though it is better to
guard against such excesses in the founding of a state, than when they
have been permitted to take place, to correct them afterward. Those who
have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of sedition, through fear of
punishment; as will those also who expect an injury, that they may prevent
it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the nobles conspired against the
people on account of the decrees they expected would pass against them.
Contempt also is a cause of sedition and conspiracies; as in oligarchies,
where there are many who have no share in the administration. The rich
also even in democracies, despising the disorder and anarchy which will
arise, hope to better themselves by the same means which happened at
Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad
administration, the democracy was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where
the power of the people was lost through anarchy and disorder; the same
thing happened at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes
there was the same sedition before the popular government was overthrown.
Revolutions in state will also arise from a disproportionate increase; for
as the body consists of many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably
to preserve its symmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the
foot was to be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms;
it might otherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form,
if it increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in
disposition of parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may
often increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and
free states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum,
a little after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in
a battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned
into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were killed
by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several
husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the
unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was
reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in the
Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in a democracy,
though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or properties increase,
they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments also sometimes alter
without seditions by a combination of the meaner people; as at Hersea: for
which purpose they changed the mode of election from votes to lots, and
thus got themselves chosen: and by negligence, as when the citizens admit
those who are not friends to the constitution into the chief offices of
the state, which happened at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was
put an end to at the election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of
government into a democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by
this, that very often great alterations silently take place in the form of
government from people’s overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where
the census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if
a little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state also
is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till their
differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a city
cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every given
time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto been
originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted their
neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable to
revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians in founding
Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the Traezenians, they
expelled them from the city; from whence came the proverb of Sybarite
wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause happened at Thurium
between the Sybarites and those who had joined with them in building the
city; for they assuming upon these, on account of the country being their
own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new citizens, being detected in
plots against the state, were driven out of the city by force of arms. The
Antisseans also, having taken in those who were banished from Chios,
afterwards did the same thing; and also the Zancleans, after having taken
in the people of Samos. The Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having
admitted their sojourners to the freedom of their city, were troubled with
seditions: and the Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants,
having enrolled [1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens,
quarrelled with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of
Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater part
of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion seditions in
oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not sharing the
honours of the state with their equals, as I have already mentioned; but
in democracies the principal people do the same because they have not more
than an equal share with others who are not equal to them. The situation
of the place will also sometimes occasion disturbances in the state when
the ground is not well adapted for one city; as at Clazomene, where the
people who lived in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with
them who lived in the island, and the Colophonians with the Notians. At
Athens too the disposition of the citizens is not the same, for those who
live in the Piraeus are more attached to a popular government than those
who live in the city properly so called; for as the interposition of a
rivulet, however small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to
fluctuate, so any trifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions;
but they will not so soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement
between virtue and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and
so on in order, one cause having more influence than another; one of which
that I last mentioned.
CHAPTER IV
But seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from them;
for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling quarrels
are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise between
persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the case with the
Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the government was
brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were in office, upon
a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other seduced his
mistress; he in his turn, offended with this, persuaded his friend’s wife
to come and live with him; and upon this the whole city took part either
with the one or the other, and the government was overturned: therefore
every one at the beginning of such disputes ought to take care to avoid
the consequences; and to smother up all quarrels which may happen to arise
amongst those in power, for the mischief lies in the beginning; for the
beginning is said to be half of the business, so that what was then but a
little fault will be found afterwards to bear its full proportion to what
follows. Moreover, disputes between men of note involve the whole city in
their consequences; in Hestiaea, after the Median war: two brothers having
a dispute about their paternal estate; he who was the poorer, from the
other’s having concealed part of the effects, and some money which his
father had found, engaged the popular party on his side, while the other,
who was rich, the men of fashion. And at Delphos, [1304a] a quarrel about
a wedding was the beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose
amongst them; for the bridegroom, being terrified by some unlucky omen
upon waiting upon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her
relations resenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred money into
his pocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious
person. At Mitylene also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right of
heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the Athenians,
in which Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man of fortune, leaving
two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in procuring them in
marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and excited the Athenians to
attack them, being the host of that state. There was also a dispute at
Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance, between Mnasis, the father of
Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of Onomarchus, which brought on the
Phoceans the sacred war. The government too of Epidamnus was changed from
a quarrel that arose from an intended marriage; for a certain man having
contracted his daughter in marriage, the father of the young person to
whom she was contracted, being archon, punishes him, upon which account
he, resenting the affront, associated himself with those who were excluded
from any share in the government, and brought about a revolution. A
government may be changed either into an oligarchy, democracy, or a free
state; when the magistrates, or any part of the city acquire great credit,
or are increased in power, as the court of Areopagus at Athens, having
procured great credit during the Median war, added firmness to their
administration; and, on the other hand, the maritime force, composed of
the commonalty, having gained the victory at Salamis, by their power at
sea, got the lead in the state, and strengthened the popular party: and at
Argos, the nobles, having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea
against the Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. And at
Syracuse, the victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the
common people, they changed their free state into a democracy: and at
Chalcis, the people having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the
nobles, immediately seized the government: and at Ambracia also the
people, having expelled the tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the
supreme power in themselves. And this in general ought to be known, that
whosoever has been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether private
persons, or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part of the
citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the cause of
disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them the honours
they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they, on account of the
dignity they have acquired, will not be content with their former
equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those parts of it
which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an [1304b] equality,
as the rich and the common people; so that the part which is between them
both is either nothing at all, or too little to be noticed; for if one
party is so much more powerful than the other, as to be evidently
stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the danger: for which
reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue will never be the
cause of seditions; for they will be too few for that purpose when
compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the causes of
seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and revolutions
therein are brought about in two ways, either by violence or fraud: if by
violence, either at first by compelling them to submit to the change when
it is made. It may also be brought about by fraud in two different ways,
either when the people, being at first deceived, willingly consent to an
alteration in their government, and are afterwards obliged by force to
abide by it: as, for instance, when the four hundred imposed upon the
people by telling them that the king of Persia would supply them with
money for the war against the Lacedaemonians; and after they had been
guilty of this falsity, they endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme
power; or when they are at first persuaded and afterwards consent to be
governed: and by one of these methods which I have mentioned are all
revolutions in governments brought about.
CHAPTER V
We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these
causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject to
revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by
informing against men of property, they induce them to join together
through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies
unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is
what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island
of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness of the
demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with each other. And
at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes, prevented the people
from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them, who were obliged by the
number of actions they were harassed with to conspire together and destroy
the popular state. The same thing was brought about at Heraclea, soon
after the settlement of the city, by the same persons; for the citizens of
note, being ill treated by them, quitted the city, but afterwards joining
together they returned and overthrew the popular state. Just in the same
manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to
procure money by confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of
those who were banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the
better of the people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like
happened at Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus
destroyed; and whoever considers what has happened in other states may
perceive the same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The
demagogues, to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire
together, either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them
on public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the
fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both
demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and
indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason for
which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues were of
the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their eloquence; but, now
the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers are at present the
demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in a military capacity,
they cannot impose themselves on the people as tyrants, if we except in
one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too, tyrannies were more common
than now, on account of the very extensive powers with which some
magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at Miletus; for they were
supreme in many things of the last consequence; and also because at that
time the cities were not of that very great extent, the people in general
living in the country, and being employed in husbandry, which gave them,
who took the lead in public affairs, an opportunity, if they had a turn
for war, to make themselves tyrants; which they all did when they had
gained the confidence of the people; and this confidence was their hatred
to the rich. This was the case of Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed
the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in Megara, who slaughtered the cattle
belonging to the rich, after he had seized those who kept them by the
riverside. Dionysius also, for accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was
thought worthy of being raised to a tyranny, from the confidence which the
people had of his being a popular man in consequence of these enmities. A
government shall also alter from its ancient and approved democratic form
into one entirely new, if there is no census to regulate the election of
magistrates; for, as the election is with the people, the demagogues who
are desirous of being in office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all
their power to make the people superior even to the laws. To prevent this
entirely, or at least in a great measure, the magistrates should be
elected by the tribes, and not by the people at large. These are nearly
the revolutions to which democracies are liable, and also the causes from
whence they arise.
CHAPTER VI
There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a
revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for then
every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if one of
the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at Naxus, who
was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which arise from
different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes a revolution
is brought about by the rich who have no share in the administration,
which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this happened at Massilia,
Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who had no share in the
government ceased not to raise disputes till they were admitted to it:
first the elder brothers, and then the younger also: for in some places
the father and son are never in office at the same time; in others the
elder and younger brother: and where this is observed the oligarchy
partakes something of a free state. At Ister it was changed into a
democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the hands of a few, it
consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy was destroyed by the
nobles quarrelling with each other, because the government was in the
hands of so few: for there, as we have just mentioned, if the father was
in office, the son could not; or, if there were many brothers, the eldest
only; for the people, taking advantage of their disputes, elected one of
the nobles for their general, and got the victory: for where there are
seditions government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, during the
oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state flourished greatly under
their excellent management, yet because the people were displeased that
the power should be in the hands of so few, they changed the government.
Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who are in office
therein, from the quarrels of the demagogues with each other. The
demagogues are of two sorts; one who flatter the few when they are in
power: for even these have their demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens,
who had great influence over the thirty; and, in the same manner,
Phrynichus over the four hundred. The others are those demagogues who have
a share in the oligarchy, and flatter the people: such were the
state-guardians at Larissa, who flattered the people because they were
elected by them. And this will always happen in every oligarchy where the
magistrates do not elect themselves, but are chosen out of men either of
great fortune or certain ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was
the custom at Abydos. And when the judicial department is not in the hands
of the supreme power, the demagogues, favouring the people in their
causes, overturn the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and
also when some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer
hands; for those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply
to the people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions
when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are
desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves or
to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported Dionysius
of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a colony of
Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with the rich: and at
AEgina a certain person who brought an action against Chares attempted on
that account to alter the government. Sometimes they will try to raise
commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and then quarrel with each
other, or else fight with those who endeavour to detect them; which was
the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the members of an oligarchy agree
among themselves the state is not very easily destroyed without some
external force. Pharsalus is a proof of this, where, though the place is
small, yet the citizens have great power, from the prudent use they make
of it. An oligarchy also will be destroyed when they create another
oligarchy under it; that is, when the management of public affairs is in
the hands of a few, and not equally, but when all of them do not partake
of the supreme power, as happened once at Elis, where the supreme power in
general was in the hands of a very few out of whom a senate was chosen,
consisting but of ninety, who held their places for life; and their mode
of election was calculated to preserve the power amongst each other’s
families, like the senators at Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a
revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, because through a
distrust in the citizens the government is obliged to employ mercenary
troops, and he to whom they give the command of the army will very often
assume the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more
than one general, they will very probably establish a dynasty: and
sometimes, through fear of this, they are forced to let the people in
general have some share in the government, because they are obliged to
employ them. In peace, from their want of confidence in each other, they
will entrust the guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their
general, who will be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master
of both, which happened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the
chief power. The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the
political clubs, of which Iphiades’ was one. Commotions also will happen
in an oligarchy from one party’s overbearing and insulting another, or
from their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their
marriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown: and
in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the same
account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person being
condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man’s being
guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion suffered
at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was that at Thebes
upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them publicly bound in
the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought about in oligarchies
by those who could not brook the despotism which those persons assumed who
were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes also may happen by accident
in what we call a free state and in an oligarchy; wheresoever the
senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen according to a certain
census; for it often happens that the highest census is fixed at first; so
that a few only could have a share in the government, in an oligarchy, or
in a free state those of moderate fortunes only; when the city grows rich,
through peace or some other happy cause, it becomes so little that every
one’s fortune is equal to the census, so that the whole community may
partake of all the honours of government; and this change sometimes
happens by little and little, and insensible approaches, sometimes
quicker. These are the revolutions and seditions that arise in
oligarchies, and the causes to which they are owing: and indeed both
democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into governments of a
contrary form, but into those of the same government; as, for instance,
from having the supreme power in the law to vest it in the ruling party,
or the contrariwise.
CHAPTER VII
Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons in
power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in this
particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both these
states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of a few; not
that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein they chiefly
seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to happen when the
generality of the people are high-spirited and think themselves equal to
each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon, called the Partheniae
(for these were, as well as others, descendants of citizens), who being
detected in a conspiracy against the state, were sent to found Tarentum.
They will happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who have
received higher honours than themselves, to whom they are no ways inferior
in abilities, as Lysander by the kings: or when an ambitious man cannot
get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a
conspiracy against the Spartans: and also when some are too poor and
others too rich, which will most frequently happen in time of war; as at
Lacedaemon during the Messenian war, which is proved by a poem of
Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called “Eunomia;” for some persons being reduced
thereby, desired that the lands might be divided: and also when some
person of very high rank might still be higher if he could rule alone,
which seemed to be Pausanias’s intention at Lacedaemon, when he was their
general in the Median war, and Anno’s at Carthage. But free states and
aristocracies are mostly destroyed from want of a fixed administration of
public affairs; the cause of which evil arises at first from want of a due
mixture of the democratic and the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in
an aristocracy from the same causes, and also from virtue not being
properly joined to power; but chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue
mixture of the democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all
free states endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call
aristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other, and
on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for that
state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy, and
that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on which
account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider the
foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live where
equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank, very
often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole,
whichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party
supporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an
aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change into
a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured, directly take
part with the contrary side) and a free state into an oligarchy. The only
firm state is that where every one enjoys that equality he has a right to
and fully possesses what is his own. And what I have been speaking of
happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates being elected according to a
very high census, it was altered to a lower, and they were subdivided into
more courts, but in consequence of the nobles possessing all the land,
contrary to law; the state was too much of an oligarchy, which gave them
an opportunity of encroaching greatly on the rest of the people; but
these, after they had been well inured to war, so far got the better of
their guards as to expel every one out of the country who possessed more
than he ought. Moreover, as all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the
nobles therein endeavour to have rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon,
where property is now in the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much
liberty to do as they please and make such alliances as they please. Thus
the city of the Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which
state was neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an
aristocracy chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed
by degrees, as we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general;
and this happens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for
whenever anything which in the least regards the state is treated with
contempt, after that something else, and this of a little more
consequence, will be more easily altered, until the whole fabric of
government is entirely subverted, which happened in the government of
Thurium; for the law being that they should continue soldiers for five
years, some young men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem
amongst their officers, despising those who had the management of public
affairs, and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first
endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to
continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that the
people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who are
called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose it but
were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if that law was
not repealed they would permit the management of all other public affairs
to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they endeavoured to
restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they found that they
could do nothing, for the whole form of government was altered into a
dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In short, all
governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or from without;
from without when they have for their neighbour a state whose policy is
contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the same thing will
happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both the Athenians and the
Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one, when conquerors everywhere
destroyed the oligarchies; the other the democracies. These are the chief
causes of revolutions and dissensions in governments.
CHAPTER VIII
We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in
general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first place,
it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned for
their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for
things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are
contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much
care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and
this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence; for
an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in a
family small expenses continually repeated consume a man’s income; for the
understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if every
part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense is true,
in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together are large,
though made up of small parts. The first therefore of anything is what the
state ought to guard against. In the next place, no credit ought to be
given to those who endeavour to deceive the people with false pretences;
for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The different ways in which
they will attempt to do this have been already mentioned. You may often
perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies continuing firm, not from the
stability of their forms of government, but from the wise conduct of the
magistrates, both towards those who have a part in the management of
public affairs, and those also who have not: towards those who have not,
by never injuring them; and also introducing those who are of most
consequence amongst them into office; nor disgracing those who are
desirous of honour; or encroaching on the property of individuals; towards
those who have, by behaving to each other upon an equality; for that
equality which the favourers of a democracy desire to have established in
the state is not only just, but convenient also, amongst those who are of
the same rank: for which reason, if the administration is in the hands of
many, those rules which are established in democracies will be very
useful; as to let no one continue in office longer than six months: that
all those who are of the same rank may have their turn; for between these
there is a sort of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely
to arise up amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this
means both aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be
corrupted into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are
magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a long
time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies and
oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state
establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the
other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments
are sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption
at a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who
are alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state;
for which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of
the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they
may preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting the
state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care ought
also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes of the
nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already engaged in
them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil at its very first
approach is not the lot of every one, but of the politician. To prevent
any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or free state on account of
the census, if that happens to continue the same while the quantity of
money is increased, it will be useful to take a general account of the
whole amount of it in former times, to compare it with the present, and to
do this every year in those cities where the census is yearly, [1308b] in
larger communities once in three or five years; and if the whole should be
found much larger or much less than it was at the time when the census was
first established in the state, let there be a law either to extend or
contract it, doing both these according to its increase or decrease; if it
increases making the census larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this
latter is not done in oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty
arise in the one, an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free
states will be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states
or democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies,
monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a
rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour to
confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short
time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear
prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours which
were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather by
degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the law,
that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his fortune or
friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be contrived that
he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote innovations, that
they may enjoy their own particular manner of living, there ought to be a
particular officer to inspect the manners of every one, and see that these
are not contrary to the genius of the state in which he lives, whether it
may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any other form of government; and,
for the same reason, those should be guarded against who are most
prosperous in the city: the means of doing which is by appointing those
who are otherwise to the business and the offices of the state. I mean, to
oppose men of account to the common people, the poor to the rich, and to
blend both these into one body, and to increase the numbers of those who
are in the middle rank; and this will prevent those seditions which arise
from an inequality of condition. But above all, in every state it is
necessary, both by the laws and every other method possible, to prevent
those who are employed by the public from being venal, and this
particularly in an oligarchy; for then the people will not be so much
displeased from seeing themselves excluded from a share in the government
(nay, they will rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private
affairs) as at suspecting that the officers of the state steal the public
money, then indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because
they are deprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who
enjoy them. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an
aristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both the
rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to a share
in the government is democratical; that the rich should be in office is
aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public employment
whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will not desire to
be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had rather attend to
their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as they want nothing of
the community. Thus the poor will increase their fortunes by being wholly
employed in their own concerns; and the principal part of the people will
not be governed by the lower sort. To prevent the exchequer from being
defrauded, let all public money be delivered out openly in the face of the
whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in the different
wards tribes, and divisions. But, as the magistrates are to execute their
offices without any advantages, the law ought to provide proper honours
for those who execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that
the rich should be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided,
nor even the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably.
It would be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer
to exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments
of plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is
necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public
employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to let
their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own rank;
and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit any
person to have more than one; for by this means property will be more
equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better
circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy to
allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a preference
in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy: but
still all the principal offices in the state to be filled only by those
who are best qualified to discharge them.
CHAPTER IX
There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the first
departments in government; first of all, an affection for the established
constitution; second place, abilities every way completely equal to the
business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice correspondent
to the nature of that particular state they are placed in; for if justice
is not the same in all states, it is evident that there must be different
species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all these qualifications do
not in the same persons, in what manner the choice shall be made; as for
instance, suppose that one person is an accomplished general, but a bad
man and no friend to the [1309b] constitution; another is just and a
friend to it, which shall one prefer? we should then consider of two
qualities, which of them the generality possess in a greater degree, which
in a less; for which reason in the choice of a general we should regard
his courage more than his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there
are fewer capable of conducting an army than there are good men: but, to
protect the state or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be
followed; for these require greater virtue than the generality are
possessed of, but only that knowledge which is common to all. It may be
asked, if a man has abilities equal to his appointment in the state, and
is affectionate to the constitution, what occasion is there for being
virtuous, since these two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be
useful to the public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are
often deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs,
though they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their
serving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws
contain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its
preservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often
insisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it
greater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought not
to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect; namely, to
preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a democracy
destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to an oligarchy
destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue extend it to
excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a little from perfect
straightness, either towards a hook nose or a flat one, may yet be
beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this particularity is extended
beyond measure, first of all the properties of the part is lost, but at
last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at all, on account of the
excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with other parts of the human
body; so also the same thing is true with respect to states; for both an
oligarchy and a democracy may something vary from their most perfect form
and yet be well constituted; but if any one endeavours to extend either of
them too far, at first he will make the government the worse for it, but
at last there will be no government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the
politician therefore should know well what preserves and what destroys a
democracy or an oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly
continue without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of
circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of
another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an
inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in
democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people
superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the rich,
dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak in favour
of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to support those
who are in administration against the people. The oaths also which they
take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they now are; for, at
present, in some places they swear, “I will be adverse to the common
people, and contrive all I can against them;” whereas they ought rather to
suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their oaths, that they
will not injure the people. But of all things which I have mentioned, that
which contributes most to preserve the state is, what is now most
despised, to educate your children for the state; for the most useful
laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of no service if the
citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in the principles of the
constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law established; of an
oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals in one man, there are
in the city. But to educate a child fit for the state, it must not be done
in the manner which would please either those who have the power in an
oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but so as they may be able to
conduct either of these forms of governments. But now the children of the
magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up too delicately, and the
children of the poor hardy with exercise and labour; so that they are both
desirous of and able to promote innovations. In democracies of the purest
form they pursue a method which is contrary to their welfare; the reason
of which is, that they define liberty wrong: now, there are two things
which seem to be the objects of a democracy, that the people in general
should possess the supreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is
just seems to be equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law:
now, their freedom and equality consists in every one’s doing what they
please: that is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; “as
his inclination guides,” in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for
no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government, but
protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in different
states, and the means of their preservation.
CHAPTER X
It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of corruption,
and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same things which have
been said of other governments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a
kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of an
oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it is the worst that man can
submit to, as being composed of two, both of which are bad, and
collectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both these
states. These two species of monarchies arise from principles contrary to
each other: a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort of people
against the multitude, and kings are appointed out of those, who are
chosen either for their superior virtue and actions flowing from virtuous
principles, or else from their noble descent; but a tyrant is chosen out
of the meanest populace; an enemy to the better sort, that the common
people may not be oppressed by them. That this is true experience
convinces us; for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere demagogues,
who gained credit with the people by oppressing the nobles. Some tyrannies
were established in this manner after the cities were considerably
enlarged—others before that time, by kings who exceeded the power
which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing despotically:
others were founded by those who were elected to the superior offices in
the state; for formerly the people appointed officers for life, who came
to be at the head of civil and religious affairs, and these chose one out
of their body in whom the supreme power over all the magistrates was
placed. By all these means it was easy to establish a tyranny, if they
chose it; for their power was ready at hand, either by their being kings,
or else by enjoying the honours of the state; thus Phidon at Argos and
other tyrants enjoyed originally the kingly power; Phalaris and others in
Ionia, the honours of the state. Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at
Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others,
acquired theirs by having been demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said,
partakes much of the nature of an aristocracy, and is bestowed according
to worth, as either virtue, family, beneficent actions, or these joined
with power; for those who have been benefactors to cities and states, or
have it in their powers to be so, have acquired this honour, and those who
have prevented a people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, or
those who have freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of cities, or
settlers of colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and Molossus. A
king desires to be the guardian of his people, that those who have
property may be secure in the possession of it, and that the people in
general meet with no injury; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no
regard to the common good, except for his own advantage; his only object
is pleasure, but a king’s is virtue: what a tyrant therefore is ambitious
of engrossing is wealth, but a king rather honour. The guards too of a
king are citizens, a tyrant’s foreigners.
That a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an
oligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as the
only means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of life;
like that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore deprives
them of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to persecute the
populace, to drive them out of the city and their own habitations. With a
democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and destroys them both publicly and
privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and an impediment to
the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies both amongst those who
desire to govern and those who desire not to be slaves; hence arose
Periander’s advice to Thrasybulus to take off the tallest stalks, hinting
thereby, that it was necessary to make away with the eminent citizens. We
ought then in reason, as has been already said, to account for the changes
which arise in a monarchy from the same causes which produce them in other
states: for, through injustice received, fear, and contempt, many of those
who are under a monarchical government conspire against it; but of all
species of injustice, injurious contempt has most influence on them for
that purpose: sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their
private fortunes. The dissolution too of a kingdom and a tyranny are
generally the same; for monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all
are desirous to obtain. Of plots: some aim at the life of those who
govern, others at their government; the first arises from hatred to their
persons; which hatred may be owing to many causes, either of which will be
sufficient to excite their anger, and the generality of those who are
under the influence of that passion will join in a conspiracy, not for the
sake of their own advancement, but for revenge. Thus the plot against the
children of Pisistratus arose from their injurious treatment of
Harmodius’s sister, and insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the
injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius.
Periander the tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for
some improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was
slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had
received from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for insulting
him on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the Cyprian in
revenge for having taken his son’s wife away from him….
Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have, through
resentment, either killed those who caused them to be inflicted or
conspired against them, even when they had kingly power, as at Mitylene
Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidee, who used to go
about striking those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times, Smendes
killed Penthilus for whipping him and dragging him away from his wife.
Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against Archelaus,
for he urged others on: the occasion of his resentment was his having
delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for Euripides was
greatly offended with him for having said something of the foulness of his
breath. And many others have been killed or conspired against on the same
account. Fear too is a cause which produces the same effects, as well in
monarchies as in other states: thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes
through fear of punishment for having hanged Darius according to his
orders, whom he supposed he intended to pardon, as the order was given at
supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a] dethroned and killed in
consequence of the contempt they were held in by the people; as some one
conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him spinning with his wife, if
what is related of him is true, or if not of him, it may very probably be
true of some one else. Dion also conspired against Dionysius the Younger,
seeing his subjects desirous of a conspiracy, and that he himself was
always drunk: and even a man’s friends will do this if they despise him;
for from the confidence he places in them, they think that they shall not
be found out. Those also who think they shall gain his throne will
conspire against a king through contempt; for as they are powerful
themselves, and despise the danger, on account of their own strength, they
will readily attempt it. Thus a general at the head of his army will
endeavour to dethrone the monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both
his manner of life and his forces; his forces for want of action, his life
for its effeminacy: thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to
Amadocus, conspired against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes
will excite men to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of
gain; as in the instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also
who are of a bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst
kings, will of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for strength
and courage united inspire great bravery: whenever, therefore, these join
in one person, he will be very ready for conspiracies, as he will easily
conquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through love of glory and
honour have a different motive in view from what I have already mentioned;
for, like all others who embrace danger, they have only glory and honour
in view, and think, not as some do, of the wealth and pomp they may
acquire, but engage in this as they would in any other noble action, that
they may be illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a tyrant, not to
succeed in his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt but the number of
those who act upon this principle is small, for we must suppose they
regard their own safety as nothing in case they should not succeed, and
must embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do) when he made war upon
Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said, that let the advantage he
made be ever so little it would satisfy him to have gained it; and that,
should it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in his
country, he should think his death sufficiently glorious. A tyranny also
is exposed to the same destruction as all other states are, from too
powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an opposition of principles
will make them desirous of subverting it; and what they desire, all who
can, do: and there is a principle of opposition in one state to another,
as a democracy against a tyranny, as says Hesiod, “a potter against a
potter;” for the extreme of a democracy is a tyranny; a kingly power
against an aristocracy, from their different forms of government—for
which reason the Lacedaemonians destroyed many tyrannies; as did the
Syracusians during the prosperity of their state. Nor are they only
destroyed from without, but also from within, when those who have no share
in the power bring about a revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to
Dionysius; to the first, by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero,
who nattered Gelon’s son, and induced him to lead a life of pleasure, that
he himself might govern; but the family joined together and endeavoured to
support the tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but those whom they made of
their party seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion
made war against his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people,
first expelled and then killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly
induce men to conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of these,
namely hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is often the
cause of their destruction: for though, for instance, those who raised
themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but those who
received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately all of them
lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they soon grew
despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part of their
hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases this is
their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels them to act
more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater obstinacy
against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under the direction
of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion through contempt; which
occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and many others. But hatred is
more powerful than anger; for anger is accompanied with grief, which
prevents the entrance of reason; but hatred is free from it. In short,
whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction of a pure oligarchy
unmixed with any other government and an extreme democracy, the same may
be applied to a tyranny; for these are divided tyrannies.
Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason they
are generally very stable; but they have many causes of subversion within;
of which two are the principal; one is when those who are in power [1313a]
excite a sedition, the other when they endeavour to establish a tyranny by
assuming greater power than the law gives them. A kingdom, indeed, is not
what we ever see erected in our times, but rather monarchies and
tyrannies; for a kingly government is one that is voluntarily submitted
to, and its supreme power admitted upon great occasions: but where many
are equal, and there are none in any respect so much better than another
as to be qualified for the greatness and dignity of government over them,
then these equals will not willingly submit to be commanded; but if any
one assumes the government, either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny.
To what we have already said we shall add, the causes of revolutions in an
hereditary kingdom. One of these is, that many of those who enjoy it are
naturally proper objects of contempt only: another is, that they are
insolent while their power is not despotic; but they possess kingly
honours only. Such a state is soon destroyed; for a king exists but while
the people are willing to obey, as their submission to him is voluntary,
but to a tyrant involuntary. These and such-like are the causes of the
destruction of monarchies.
CHAPTER XI
Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have
already mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to each
separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power of the
king’s being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the less
extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government
continue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of
condition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the
less.
It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so long;
and the Lacedaemonians from their government’s being from the beginning
divided into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced into the
other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the ephori; for
by taking something from the power he increased the duration of the
kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less, but bigger; as they
say he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not ashamed to deliver
down his kingdom to his children reduced from what he received it from his
ancestors? No, says he, I give it him more lasting. Tyrannies are
preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one of which is when the
power is delegated from one to the other, and in this manner many tyrants
govern in their states. Report says that Periander founded many of these.
There are also many of them to be met with amongst the Persians. What has
been already mentioned is as conducive as anything can be to preserve a
tyranny; namely, to keep down those who are of an aspiring disposition, to
take off those who will not submit, to allow no public meals, no clubs, no
education, nothing at all, but to guard against everything that gives rise
to high spirits or mutual confidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings
of those who are at leisure to hold conversation with each other; and to
endeavour by every means possible to keep all the people strangers to each
other; for knowledge increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all
strangers to appear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all
their actions may be sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves
seldom entertain any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which
the Persians and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support
slavery; and to endeavour to know what every one who is under their power
does and says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women
whom the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out
listeners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people
dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one does,
there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour that the
whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with each other,
friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the rich with each
other. It is also advantageous for a tyranny that all those who are under
it should be oppressed with poverty, that they may not be able to compose
a guard; and that, being employed in procuring their daily bread, they may
have no leisure to conspire against their tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt
are a proof of this, and the votive edifices of the Cyposelidse, and the
temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by the Pisistratidae, and the works of
Polycrates at Samos; for all these produced one end, the keeping the
people poor. It is necessary also to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse; where
Dionysius in the space of five years collected all the private property of
his subjects into his own coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to
engage his subjects in a war, that they may have employment and
continually depend upon their general. A king is preserved by his friends,
but a tyrant is of all persons the man who can place no confidence in
friends, as every one has it in his desire and these chiefly in their
power to destroy him. All these things also which are done in an extreme
democracy should be done in a tyranny, as permitting great licentiousness
to the women in the house, that they may reveal their husbands’ secrets;
and showing great indulgence to slaves also for the same reason; for
slaves and women conspire not against tyrants: but when they are treated
with kindness, both of them are abettors of tyrants, and extreme
democracies also; and the people too in such a state desire to be
despotic. For which reason flatterers are in repute in both these: the
demagogue in the democracy, for he is the proper flatterer of the people;
among tyrants, he who will servilely adapt himself to their humours; for
this is the business of [1314a] flatterers. And for this reason tyrants
always love the worst of wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered,
which no man of a liberal spirit will submit to; for they love the
virtuous, but flatter none. Bad men too are fit for bad purposes; “like to
like,” as the proverb says. A tyrant also should show no favour to a man
of worth or a freeman; for he should think, that no one deserved to be
thought these but himself; for he who supports his dignity, and is a
friend to freedom, encroaches upon the superiority and the despotism of
the tyrant: such men, therefore, they naturally hate, as destructive to
their government. A tyrant also should rather admit strangers to his table
and familiarity than citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others
have no design against him. These and such-like are the supports of a
tyranny, for it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But all these things may
be comprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which a
tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens should be of poor
abject dispositions; for such men never propose to conspire against any
one. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each other; for
while they have not this, the tyrant is safe enough from destruction. For
which reason they are always at enmity with those of merit, as hurtful to
their government; not only as they scorn to be governed despotically, but
also because they can rely upon each other’s fidelity, and others can rely
upon theirs, and because they will not inform against their associates,
nor any one else. The third is, that they shall be totally without the
means of doing anything; for no one undertakes what is impossible for him
to perform: so that without power a tyranny can never be destroyed. These,
then, are the three objects which the inclinations of tyrants desire to
see accomplished; for all their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of
these three ends, that their people may neither have mutual confidence,
power, nor spirit. This, then, is one of the two methods of preserving
tyrannies: the other proceeds in a way quite contrary to what has been
already described, and which may be discerned from considering to what the
destruction of a kingdom is owing; for as one cause of that is, making the
government approach near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists
in making the government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely
power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be obliged
to submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end. This, then,
as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars carefully do
and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a great attention
[1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such profuse presents as
will offend the people; while they are to supply the money out of the hard
labour of their own hands, and see it given in profusion to mistresses,
foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact account both of what you
receive and pay; which is a practice some tyrants do actually follow, by
which means they seem rather fathers of families than tyrants: nor need
you ever fear the want of money while you have the supreme power of the
state in your own hands. It is also much better for those tyrants who quit
their kingdom to do this than to leave behind them money they have hoarded
up; for their regents will be much less desirous of making innovations,
and they are more to be dreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for
such of them as he suspects he takes with him, but these regents must be
left behind. He should also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and
require such services as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever
they are wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take
care that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but
the public’s. His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable,
so that he should inspire those who approach him with veneration and not
fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is despised. If,
therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to
endeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of
himself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also take care not to
appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty, nor to suffer it
in those under him: nor to permit the women of his family to treat others
haughtily; for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many tyrants.
With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly contrary
to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not only
continually indulge themselves in them for many days together, but they
seem also to desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may wonder at
their happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in these, and, if
not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the sober man who is
exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard; not the early
riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should also be contrary to
what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to improve and adorn his
city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant; and, moreover., always to
[1315a] seem particularly attentive to the worship of the gods; for from
persons of such a character men entertain less fears of suffering anything
illegal while they suppose that he who governs them is religious and
reverences the gods; and they will be less inclined to raise insinuations
against such a one, as being peculiarly under their protection: but this
must be so done as to give no occasion for any suspicion of hypocrisy. He
should also take care to show such respect to men of merit in every
particular, that they should not think they could be treated with greater
distinction by their fellow-citizens in a free state. He should also let
all honours flow immediately from himself, but every censure from his
subordinate officers and judges. It is also a common protection of all
monarchies not to make one person too great, or, certainly, not many; for
they will support each other: but, if it is necessary to entrust any large
powers to one person, to take care that it is not one of an ardent spirit;
for this disposition is upon every opportunity most ready for a
revolution: and, if it should seem necessary to deprive any one of his
power, to do it by degrees, and not reduce him all at once. It is also
necessary to abstain from all kinds of insolence; more particularly from
corporal punishment; which you must be most cautious never to exercise
over those who have a delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love
money are touched to the quick when anything affects their property, so
are men of honour and principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore,
either never employ personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in
the manner in which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt;
and, upon the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing
greater honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain
designs against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and
guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so that
they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore of those
who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear to them; for
those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing their own
persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight with an angry
man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at. As all cities
are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the poor, it is
necessary that both these should find equal protection from him who
governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their power to
injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself that party
which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have no occasion
either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of their arms; for
the strength of either of the parties added to his own forces will render
him superior to any conspiracy. It would be superfluous to go through all
particulars; for the rule of conduct which the tyrant ought to pursue is
evident enough, and that is, to affect to appear not the tyrant, but the
king; the guardian of those he governs, not their plunderer, [1315b] but
their protector, and to affect the middle rank in life, not one superior
to all others: he should, therefore, associate his nobles with him and
soothe his people; for his government will not only be necessarily more
honourable and worthy of imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and
not abject wretches who perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be
also more durable. Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be
consentaneous to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may
not be altogether wicked, but only so in part.
CHAPTER XII
Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest
duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is true,
continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that they used
their power with moderation, and were in many particulars obedient to the
laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never fell into contempt,
and by the care he took that in many particulars his government should be
popular. He is reported also to have presented a person with a crown who
adjudged the victory to another; and some say that it is the statue of
that judge which is placed in the forum.
They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court of
the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of the
Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and six
months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander forty-four,
and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the reason for which
was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed without guards.
Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an able general. The
third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it was not continual:
for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that out of thirty-three
years he was only fifteen in power, and his son eighteen; so that the
whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest we shall mention that of
Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not continue long, for both
their reigns were only eighteen years; for Gelo died in the eighth year of
his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth. Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh
month, and many other tyrannies have continued a very short time. We have
now gone through the general cases of corruption and [1316a] means of
preservation both in free states and monarchies. In Plato’s Republic,
Socrates is introduced treating upon the changes which different
governments are liable to: but his discourse is faulty; for he does not
particularly mention what changes the best and first governments are
liable to; for he only assigns the general cause, of nothing being
immutable, but that in time everything will alter [***tr.: text is
unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature will then produce bad
men, who will not submit to education, and in this, probably, he is not
wrong; for it is certain that there are some persons whom it is impossible
by any education to make good men; but why should this change be more
peculiar to what he calls the best-formed government, than to all other
forms, and indeed to all other things that exist? and in respect to his
assigned time, as the cause of the alteration of all things, we find that
those which did not begin to exist at the same time cease to be at the
same time; so that, if anything came into beginning the day before the
solstice, it must alter at the same time. Besides, why should such a form
of government be changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when
governments alter, they alter into the contrary species to what they
before were, and not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds
true of other changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it
changes into an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a
democracy into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as
from a democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With
respect to a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in
it; or if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what
other state it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an
indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to
alter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle
would be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as at
Syria, from Myron’s to Clisthenes’; or into an oligarchy, as was Antileo’s
at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo’s at Syracuse; or into an
aristocracy, as was Charilaus’s at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage. An
oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most of the
ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of Panaetius;
at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus; and the
like in many other cities. It is absurd also to suppose, that a state is
changed into an oligarchy because those who are in power are avaricious
and greedy of money, and not because those who are by far richer than
their fellow citizens think it unfair that those who have nothing should
have an equal share in the rule of the state with themselves, who possess
so much-for in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be employed in
money-getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But in Carthage,
which is a democracy, money-getting is creditable, and yet their form of
government remains unaltered. It is also absurd to say, that in an
oligarchy there are two cities, one of the poor and another of the rich;
for why should this happen to them more than to the Lacedaemonians, or any
other state where all possess not equal property, or where all are not
equally good? for though no one member of the community should be poorer
than he was before, yet a democracy might nevertheless change into an
oligarchy; if the rich should be more powerful than the poor, and the one
too negligent, and the other attentive: and though these changes are owing
to many causes, yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become
poor by luxury, and paying interest-money; as if at first they were all
rich, or the greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of
those who have the principal management of public affairs lose their
fortunes, they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others
do, nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is
there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any other.
Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have spent
their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state, or if
they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise seditions,
and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do as they like;
which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although there are many
oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is treating of the
changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was but one of each
sort.
BOOK VI
CHAPTER I
We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the
state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different
magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and
what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the
destruction and preservation of governments are owing.
As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other states,
it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything which we may
have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot to each
that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for them; and
also to inquire into the combinations of all these different modes of
government which we [1317a] have mentioned; for as these are blended
together the government is altered, as from an aristocracy to be an
oligarchy, and from a free state to be a democracy. Now, I mean by those
combinations of government (which I ought to examine into, but have not
yet done), namely, whether the deliberative department and the election of
magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an oligarchy, or the
judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part only to an oligarchy,
and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy, or whether, in any
other manner, everything is not regulated according to the nature of the
government. But we will first consider what particular sort of democracy
is fitted to a particular city, and also what particular oligarchy to a
particular people; and of other states, what is advantageous to what. It
is also necessary to show clearly, not only which of these governments is
best for a state, but also how it ought to be established there, and other
things we will treat of briefly.
And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same time
show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call an
oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of a
democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the manner
in which these are compounded together different species of democracies
arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of various
natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being so many
democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned; namely,
there being different sorts of people; for in one country the majority are
husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired servants; if the first of
these is added to the second, and the third to both of them, the democracy
will not only differ in the particular of better or worse, but in this,
that it will be no longer the same government; the other is that which we
will now speak of. The different things which are connected with
democracies and seem to make part of these states, do, from their being
joined to them, render them different from others: this attending a few,
that more, and another all. It is necessary that he who would found any
state which he may happen to approve of, or correct one, should be
acquainted with all these particulars. All founders of states endeavour to
comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the same kind with
it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have already described in
treating of the preservation and destruction of governments. I will now
speak of these first principles and manners, and whatever else a
democratical state requires.
CHAPTER II
Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have
been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for
they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one part
of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according to
democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by worth:
and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power should be
vested in the people at large; and that what the majority determine should
be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have more power than
the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one mark of liberty
which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion of that state;
another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they say, is a right
which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not.
This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to
be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any account, any otherwise
than by rotation, and that just as far only as that person is, in his
turn, under his also. This also is conducive to that equality which
liberty demands. These things being premised, and such being the
government, it follows that such rules as the following should be observed
in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out of all the people,
and all to command each, and each in his turn all: that all the
magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those offices only which
required some particular knowledge and skill: that no census, or a very
small one, should be required to qualify a man for any office: that none
should be in the same employment twice, or very few, and very seldom,
except in the army: that all their appointments should be limited to a
very short time, or at least as many as possible: that the whole community
should be qualified to judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be
ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or of ever so high a nature; as at
Athens, where the people at large judge the magistrates when they come out
of office, and decide concerning public affairs as well as private
contracts: that the supreme power should be in the public assembly; and
that no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power but in a few
instances, and of no consequence to public business. Of all magistrates a
senate is best suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not
paid for giving their attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for
then the people will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have
already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if
possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens—who have any share in
the management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly,
judges, and magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the
magistrates, the judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly,
and also those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to
be paid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of
family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a
government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and
mechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be for
life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been long
changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish the
power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then,
appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that principle
of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is, that all
the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality, which seems
chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the people: for it
seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more share in the
government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that all should be
equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the equality and liberty
of the state best preserved.
CHAPTER III
In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.
Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should be
equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power with the
five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this manner? but
divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out of the
five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the power of creating the
magistrates and judges. Is this state then established according to
perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is guided by numbers
only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that is just which the
majority approve of: but the favourers of an oligarchy say, that that is
just which those who have most approve of; and that we ought to be
directed by the value of property. Both the propositions are unjust; for
if we agree with what the few propose we erect a tyranny: for if it should
happen that an individual should have more than the rest who are rich,
according to oligarchical justice, this man alone has a right to the
supreme power; but if superiority of numbers is to prevail, injustice will
then be done by confiscating the property of the rich, who are few, as we
have already said. What then that equality is, which both parties will
admit, must be collected from the definition of right which is common to
them both; for they both say that what the majority of the state approves
of ought to be established. Be it so; but not entirely: but since a city
happens to be made up of two different ranks of people, the rich and the
poor, let that be established which is approved of by both these, or the
greater part: but should there be opposite sentiments, let that be
established which shall be approved of by the greater part: but let this
be according to the census; for instance, if there should be ten of the
rich and twenty of the poor, and six of the first and fifteen of the last
should agree upon any measure, and the remaining four of the rich should
join with the remaining five of the poor in opposing it, that party whose
census when added together should determine which opinion should be law,
and should these happen to be equal, it should be regarded as a case
similar to an assembly or court of justice dividing equally upon any
question that comes before them, who either determine it by lot or some
such method. But although, with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just,
it may be very difficult to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to
do than to persuade those who have it in their power to encroach upon
others to be guided thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and
just, but the powerful pay no regard thereunto.
CHAPTER IV
There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is composed of
those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the most
ancient of any. I call that the first which every one would place so, was
he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the husbandmen. We
see, then, that a democracy may be framed where the majority live by
tillage or pasturage; for, as their property is but small, they will not
be at leisure perpetually to hold public assemblies, but will be
continually employed in following their own business, not having otherwise
the means of living; nor will they be desirous of what another enjoys, but
will rather like to follow their own business than meddle with state
affairs and accept the offices of government, which will be attended with
no great profit; for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of
riches than honour (a proof of this is, that they submitted to the
tyrannies in ancient times, and do now submit to the oligarchies, if no
one hinders them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their
property; for some of them soon get rich, others are removed from
poverty); besides, their having the right of election and calling their
magistrates to account for their conduct when they come out of office,
will satisfy their desire of honours, if any of them entertain that
passion: for in some states, though the commonalty have not the right of
electing the magistrates, yet it is vested in part of that body chosen to
represent them: and it is sufficient for the people at large to possess
the deliberative power: and this ought to be considered as a species of
democracy; such was that formerly at Mantinsea: for which reason it is
proper for the democracy we have been now treating of to have a power (and
it has been usual for them to have it) of censuring their magistrates when
out of office, and sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief
magistrates should be elected, and according to a certain census, which
should vary with the rank of their office, or else not by a census, but
according to their abilities for their respective appointments. A state
thus constituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be
always filled with the best men with the approbation of the people; who
will not envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should be content
with this part in the administration; for they will not be governed by
their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their power with
moderation, as there are others to whom full power is delegated to censure
their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the state to have them
dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever they
choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check to that evil
particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a] necessary and most
for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof should be filled by
the principal persons in it, whose characters are unblemished, and that
the people are not oppressed. It is now evident that this is the best
species of democracy, and on what account; because the people are such and
have such powers as they ought to have. To establish a democracy of
husbandmen some of those laws which were observed in many ancient states
are universally useful; as, for instance, on no account to permit any one
to possess more than a certain quantity of land, or within a certain
distance from the city. Formerly also, in some states, no one was allowed
to sell their original lot of land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus,
which forbade any one to add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to
follow the law of the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this
particular we are now speaking of; for they having but very little ground,
while they were a numerous people, and at the same time were all
husbandmen, did not include all their lands within the census, but divided
them in such a manner that, according to the census, the poor had more
power than the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of
shepherds and herdsmen; for they have many things in common with them,
and, by their way of life, are excellently qualified to make good
soldiers, stout in body, and able to continue in the open air all night.
The generality of the people of whom other democracies are composed are
much worse than these; for their lives are wretched nor have they any
business with virtue in anything they do; these are your mechanics, your
exchange-men, and hired servants; as all these sorts of men frequent the
exchange and the citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly;
whereas the husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so
easily meet together; nor are they equally desirous of doing it with these
others! When a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the
land lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a
good democracy or a free state for the people in general will be obliged
to live in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy,
though there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal
assembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in
what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it
will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b] should
proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the people from the
rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without
distinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few
citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless
well supported by laws and manners. We have already noticed almost every
cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have
taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and
make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they
could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally
born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say,
if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to this
state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. They
ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common people
are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then stop;
for, if they proceed still further, they will make the state disorderly,
and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common people, and be full
of resentment against it; which was the cause of an insurrection at
Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it becomes a great one
it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in such a state to do as
Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of increasing the power of
the people, and as those did who established the democracy in Cyrene; that
is, to institute many tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious
rites of private persons few, and those common; and every means is to be
contrived to associate and blend the people together as much as possible;
and that all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is
practised in a tyranny seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as,
for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the
children; for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state; and also
to overlook every one’s living as they choose; for many will support such
a government: for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control
than as prudence would direct.
CHAPTER V
It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would support
a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or too perfect;
but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be constituted ever
so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a few days: they should
therefore endeavour to procure its safety by all those ways which we have
described in assigning the causes of the preservation and destruction of
governments; avoiding what is hurtful, and by framing such laws, written
and unwritten, as contain those things which chiefly tend to the
preservation of the state; nor to suppose that that is useful either for a
democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of government which contributes
to make them more purely so, but what will contribute to their duration:
but our demagogues at present, to flatter the people, occasion frequent
confiscations in the courts; for which reason those who have the welfare
of the state really at heart should act directly opposite to what they do,
and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being divided amongst the
people or paid into the treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred
uses: for those who are of a bad disposition would not then be the less
cautious, as their punishment would be the same; and the community would
not be so ready to condemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they
were to get nothing by it: they should also take care that the causes
which are brought before the public should be as few as possible, and
punish with the utmost severity those who rashly brought an action against
any one; for it is not the commons but the nobles who are generally
prosecuted: for in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be
affectionate to each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief
power in it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been
lately established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the
common people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for
it, this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the
nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by taxes,
confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice: which
things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then, the
revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public assemblies
and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have very extensive
jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days only, for by this
means the rich would not fear the expense, although they should receive
nothing for their attendance, though the poor did; and judgment also would
be given much better; for the rich will not choose to be long absent from
their own affairs, but will willingly be so for a short time: and, when
there are sufficient revenues, a different conduct ought to be pursued
from what the demagogues at present follow; for now they divide the
surplus of the public money amongst the poor; these receive it and again
want the same supply, while the giving it is like pouring water into a
sieve: but the true patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the
majority of the community are not too poor, for this is the cause of
rapacity in that government; he therefore should endeavour that they may
enjoy perpetual plenty; and as this also is advantageous to the rich, what
can be saved out of the public money should be put by, and then divided at
once amongst the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every
one of them to purchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at
least to give each of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of
trade and husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much
at once, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In
the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be
obliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this was
the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the affections
of the people; for by continually sending some of their community into
colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a sensible and
generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and supplying them with
what is necessary, induce them to work; or to imitate the conduct of the
people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the poor to partake in common of
everything which is needful for them, gain the affections of the
commonalty. They have also two different ways of electing their
magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by lot; by the last, that
the people at large may have some share in the administration; by the
former, that the state may be well governed: the same may be accomplished
if of the same magistrates you choose some by vote, others by lot. And
thus much for the manner in which democracies ought to be established.
CHAPTER VI
What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how an
oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state should
have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of oligarchy
should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some species of
democracy.
The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to what
we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different census, the
one high, the other low: from those who are within the latter the ordinary
officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the former the supreme
magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a part of the
administration who was within the census; which should be so regulated
that the commonalty who are included in it should by means thereof be
superior to those who have no share in the government; for those who are
to have the management of public affairs ought always to be chosen out of
the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner ought that
oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to that which
is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest to a dynasty
and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it requires the
greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of sound and
healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and well found for
sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while a diseased body or
a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support the [1321a] least
shock; so the worst-established governments want most looking after. A
number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy; for these are
opposed to those rights which are founded in rank: on the contrary, the
preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due regulation of the
different orders in the society.
CHAPTER VII
As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of
people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as those
who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the horsemen,
the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the nature
of the country can admit a great number of horse; there a powerful
oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety of the inhabitants
depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support the expense
of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune. Where the troops
are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior in power to the
other, may be established; for the heavy-armed are rather made up of men
of substance than the poor: but the light-armed and the sailors always
contribute to support a democracy: but where the number of these is very
great and a sedition arises, the other parts of the community fight at a
disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is to be learned from skilful
generals, who always mix a proper number of light-armed soldiers with
their horse and heavy-armed: for it is with those that the populace get
the better of the men of fortune in an insurrection; for these being
lighter are easily a match for the horse and the heavy-armed: so that for
an oligarchy to form a body of troops from these is to form it against
itself: but as a city is composed of persons of different ages, some young
and some old, the fathers should teach their sons, while they were very
young, a light and easy exercise; but, when they are grown up, they should
be perfect in every warlike exercise. Now, the admission of the people to
any share in the government should either be (as I said before) regulated
by a census, or else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain
time have ceased from any mechanic employment, or as at Massalia, where
they are chosen according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners.
With respect to the magistrates of the highest rank which it may be
necessary to have in a state, the services they are bound to do the public
should be expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being
desirous of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard
their magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for
their honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon entering
into their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and erect some
public structure, that the people partaking of the entertainment, and
seeing the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public
structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: add to
this also, that the nobles will have their generosity recorded: but now
this is not the conduct which those who are at present at the head of an
oligarchy pursue, but the contrary; for they are not more desirous of
honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more properly
be called little democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on what
principles a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.
CHAPTER VIII
After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the
magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what
purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary magistrates no
state can exist, nor without those which contribute to its dignity and
good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that in small states the
magistrates should be few; in a large one, many: also to know well what
offices may be joined together, and what ought to be separated. The first
thing necessary is to establish proper regulators in the markets; for
which purpose a certain magistrate should be appointed to inspect their
contracts and preserve good order; for of necessity, in almost every city
there must be both buyers and sellers to supply each other’s mutual wants:
and this is what is most productive of the comforts of life; for the sake
of which men seem to have joined together in one community. A second care,
and nearly related to the first, is to have an eye both to the public and
private edifices in the city, that they may be an ornament; and also to
take care of all buildings which are likely to fall: and to see that the
highways are kept in proper repair; and also that the landmarks between
different estates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that
account; and all other business of the same nature. Now, this business may
be divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities
they appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another the
fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the inspectors of the
city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant nearly about
the same objects, only in the country, is to take care of what is done out
of the city. The officers who have this employment we call inspectors of
the lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business of all three of
them is the same. There must also be other officers appointed to receive
the public revenue and to deliver it out to those who are in the different
departments of the state: these are called receivers or quaestors. There
must also be another, before whom all private contracts and sentences of
courts should be enrolled, as well as proceedings and declarations.
Sometimes this employment is divided amongst many, but there is one
supreme over the rest; these are called proctors, notaries, and the like.
Next to these is an officer whose business is of all others the most
necessary, and yet most difficult; namely, to take care that sentence is
executed upon those who are condemned; and that every one pays the fines
laid on him; and also to have the charge of those who are in prison.
[1322a] This office is very disagreeable on account of the odium attending
it, so that no one will engage therein without it is made very profitable,
or, if they do, will they be willing to execute it according to law; but
it is most necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause
without that judgment is carried into execution: for without this human
society could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office
should not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of
the other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which
are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst different
persons. And as different magistrates judge different causes, let the
causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to those which are
already brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and another
see it executed: as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the care
of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of the
markets have passed, and the like in other cases: for by so much the less
odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much the
easier will they be properly put in force: therefore for the same persons
to pass the sentence and to execute it will subject them to general
hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they will be considered as the
enemies of all. Thus one person has often the custody of the prisoner’s
body, while another sees the sentence against him executed, as the eleven
did at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate these offices,
and to give great attention thereunto as equally necessary with anything
we have already mentioned; for it will certainly happen that men of
character will decline accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot
properly be entrusted with it, as having themselves rather an occasion for
a guard than being qualified to guard others. This, therefore, ought by no
means to be a separate office from others; nor should it be continually
allotted to any individuals, but the young men; where there is a
city-guard, the youths ought in turns to take these offices upon them.
These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought to be first
mentioned: next to these are others no less necessary, but of much higher
rank, for they ought to be men of great skill and fidelity. These are they
who have the guard of the city, and provide everything that is necessary
for war; whose business it is, both in war and peace, to defend the walls
and the gates, and to take care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over
all these there are sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in
little cities there is only one whom they call either general or
polemarch; but where there are horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen,
and sailors, they sometimes put distinct commanders over each of these;
who again have others under them, according to their different divisions;
all of which join together to make one military body: and thus much for
this department. Since some of the magistrates, if not all, have business
with the public money, it is necessary that there should be other
officers, whose employment should be nothing else than to take an account
of what they have, and correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all
these magistrates there is one who is supreme over them all, who very
often has in his own power the disposal of the public revenue and taxes;
who presides over the people when the supreme power is in them; for there
must be some magistrate who has a power to summon them together, and to
preside as head of the state. These are sometimes called preadvisers; but
where there are many, more properly a council. These are nearly the civil
magistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other
persons whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and those
who are to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper repair,
or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever else belongs
to public worship. This charge is sometimes entrusted to one person, as in
very small cities: in others it is delegated to many, and these distinct
from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and
officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are those who are appointed
to have the general care of all those public sacrifices to the tutelar god
of the state, which the laws do not entrust to the priests: and these in
different states have different appellations. To enumerate in few words
the different departments of all those magistrates who are necessary:
these are either religion, war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public
buildings, harbours, highways. Belonging to the courts of justice there
are scribes to enroll private contracts; and there must also be guards set
over the prisoners, others to see the law is executed, council on either
side, and also others to watch over the conduct of those who are to decide
the causes. Amongst the magistrates also may finally be reckoned those who
are to give their advice in public affairs. But separate states, who are
peculiarly happy and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars,
and are very attentive to good order, require particular magistrates for
themselves; such as those who have the government of the women; who are to
see the laws are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over
their education. To these may be added those who have the care of their
gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public
spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are not of
general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are obliged to
employ their wives and children in servile offices for want of slaves. As
there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust the supreme power;
namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and senators; guardians of the
laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an oligarchy, and a
senate to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning all magistrates.
BOOK VII
CHAPTER I
He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning what
government is best, ought first to determine what manner of living is most
eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also be equally
uncertain what government is best: for, provided no unexpected accidents
interfere, it is highly probable, that those who enjoy the best government
will live the most happily according to their circumstances; he ought,
therefore, first to know what manner of life is most desirable for all;
and afterwards whether this life is the same to the man and the citizen,
or different. As I imagine that I have already sufficiently shown what
sort of life is best in my popular discourses on that subject, I think I
may very properly repeat the same here; as most certainly no one ever
called in question the propriety of one of the divisions; namely, that as
what is good, relative to man, may be divided into three sorts, what is
external, what appertains to the body, and what to the soul, it is evident
that all these must conspire to make a man happy: for no one would say
that a man was happy who had no fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no
prudence; but was afraid of the flies that flew round him: nor would
abstain from the meanest theft if he was either hungry or dry, or would
murder his dearest friend for a farthing; and also was in every particular
as wanting in his understanding as an infant or an idiot. These truths are
so evident that all must agree to them; though some may dispute about the
quantity and the degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is
sufficient for happiness; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all
such things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds: but to such
we reply, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in
these cases, that these external goods produce not virtue, but virtue
them. As to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue
or both, certain it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose
understandings are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although their
fortune is but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of wealth, are
deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects may easily
convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its boundary, as a
machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either necessarily
hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good quality of
the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful it is, if it
is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well as noble. It
is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject take place of
each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we allow they are
accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if the soul is more
noble than any outward possession, as the body, both in itself and with
respect to us, it must be admitted of course that the best accidents of
each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the sake of the soul
that these things are desirable; and it is on this account that wise men
should desire them, not the soul for them. Let us therefore be well
assured, that every one enjoys as much happiness as he possesses virtue
and wisdom, and acts according to their dictates; since for this we have
the example of GOD Himself, who is completely happy, not from any
external good, but in Himself, and because such is His nature. For good
fortune is something different from happiness, as every good which depends
not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but it is not from fortune
that any one is wise and just: hence it follows, that that city is
happiest which is the best and acts best: for no one can do well who acts
not well; nor can the deeds either of man or city be praiseworthy without
virtue and wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or wise, or prudent in a man,
the same things are just, wise, and prudent in a city.
Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon this
subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation of it, as
it properly belongs to another question: let us at present suppose so
much, that a man’s happiest life, both as an individual and as a citizen,
is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments which virtue
usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not convinced by what I
have said, their doubts shall be answered hereafter, at present we shall
proceed according to our intended method.
CHAPTER II
It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual man
and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for
whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the
happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a
life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the
city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also if
any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy city
the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require
consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life to be
a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or whether to
live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs; and also what
form of government is to be preferred, and what disposition of the state
is best; whether the whole community should be eligible to a share in the
administration, or only the greater part, and some only: as this,
therefore, is a subject of political examination and speculation, and not
what concerns the individual, and the first of these is what we are at
present engaged in, the one of these I am not obliged to speak to, the
other is the proper business of my present design. It is evident that
government must be the best which is so established, that every one
therein may have it in his power to act virtuously and live happily: but
some, who admit that a life of virtue is most eligible, still doubt which
is preferable a public life of active virtue, or one entirely disengaged
from what is without and spent in contemplation; which some say is the
only one worthy of a philosopher; and one of these two different modes of
life both now and formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were
the most virtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of
no little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense
must naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a
citizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is the
greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that still
is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others hold the
quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life is the
only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity of
practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in public
life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their sentiments;
others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of government is the
only happy one; for even amongst some free states the object of their laws
seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so that the generality of
political institutions, wheresoever dispersed, if they have any one common
object in view, have all of them this, to conquer and govern. It is
evident, both from the laws of the Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as
by the manner in which they educated their children, that all which they
had in view was to make them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those
who have power enough and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that
account; as were the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some
there are laws to heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that
at Carthage they allowed every person to wear as many rings for
distinction as he had served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia,
that a man who had not himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a
halter; among the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink
out of the cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among
the Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man’s
tomb as he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things
of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom.
Probably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this
subject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business of
a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern and
tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for how can
that belong either to the politician or legislator which is unlawful? for
that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but unjustly also:
for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing of this in the
arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor the pilot to use
either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to his
passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic government is a
political one, and what they would not allow to be just or proper, if
exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise over others;
for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but think it of no
consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic power is absurd,
except only where nature has framed the one party for dominion, the other
for subordination; and therefore no one ought to assume it over all in
general, but those only which are the proper objects thereof: thus no one
should hunt men either for food or sacrifice, but what is fit for those
purposes, and these are wild animals which are eatable.
Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself
while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be so
situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its
constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then
have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of
war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the
means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine
carefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may
partake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which
results from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from
others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring
states to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what
good offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the
best governments will be considered hereafter.
CHAPTER III
We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue is
most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to both
these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political
governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is
different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:
others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is impossible
for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that virtuous activity
and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in some particulars say
what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that the life of a freeman
is better than the life of a slave is true, for a slave, as a slave, is
employed in nothing honourable; for the common servile employments which
he is commanded to perform have nothing virtuous in them; but, on the
other hand, it is not true that a submission to all sorts of governments
is slavery; for the government of freemen differs not more from the
government of slaves than slavery and freedom differ from each other in
their nature; and how they do has been already mentioned. To prefer doing
of nothing to virtuous activity is also wrong, for happiness consists in
action, and many noble ends are produced by the actions of the just and
wise. From what we have already determined on this subject, some one
probably may think, that supreme power is of all things best, as that will
enable a man to command very many useful services from others; so that he
who can obtain this ought not to give it up to another, but rather to
seize it: and, for this purpose, the father should have no attention or
regard for the son, or the son for the father, or friend for friend; for
what is best is most eligible: but to be a member of the community and be
in felicity is best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if
the supreme good was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to
others: but it is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a
mere supposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable
who thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by nature
as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a master to
a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue can never
return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst equals whatever
is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is equal and right; but
that equals should not partake of what is equal, or like to like, is
contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature is not right;
therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the community in
virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it
is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must be joined to the
other also: and, if we are right in what we have now said, it follows that
happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that both with respect to the
community as well as the individual an active life is the happiest: not
that an active life must necessarily refer to other persons, as some
think, or that those studies alone are practical which are pursued to
teach others what to do; for those are much more so whose final object is
in themselves, and to improve the judgment and understanding of the man;
for virtuous activity has an end, therefore is something practical; nay,
those who contrive the plan which others follow are more particularly said
to act, and are superior to the workmen who execute their designs. But it
is not necessary that states which choose to have no intercourse with
others should remain inactive; for the several members thereof may have
mutual intercourse with each other; for there are many opportunities for
this among the different citizens; the same thing is true of every
individual: for, was it otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the
universe be perfect; to neither of whom can anything external separately
exist. Hence it is evident that that very same life which is happy for
each individual is happy also for the state and every member of it.
CHAPTER IV
As I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and
considered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I
should first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which one
should form according to one’s wish; for no good state can exist without a
moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things therefore ought to
be forethought of as desirable, but none of them such as are impossible: I
mean relative to the number of citizens and the extent of the territory:
for as other artificers, such as the weaver and the shipwright, ought to
have such materials as are fit for their work, since so much the better
they are, by so much [1326a] superior will the work itself necessarily be;
so also ought the legislator and politician endeavour to procure proper
materials for the business they have in hand. Now the first and principal
instrument of the politician is the number of the people; he should
therefore know how many, and what they naturally ought to be: in like
manner the country, how large, and what it is. Most persons think that it
is necessary for a city to be large to be happy: but, should this be true,
they cannot tell what is a large one and what a small one; for according
to the multitude of the inhabitants they estimate the greatness of it; but
they ought rather to consider its strength than its numbers; for a state
has a certain object in view, and from the power which it has in itself of
accomplishing it, its greatness ought to be estimated; as a person might
say, that Hippocrates was a greater physician, though not a greater man,
than one that exceeded him in the size of his body: but if it was proper
to determine the strength of the city from the number of the inhabitants,
it should never be collected from the multitude in general who may happen
to be in it; for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves,
sojourners, and foreigners; but from those who are really part of the city
and properly constitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a
proof of a large city, but in a state where a large number of mechanics
inhabit, and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great; for the
greatness of the city, and the number of men in it, are not the same
thing. This too is evident from fact, that it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to govern properly a very numerous body of men; for of all the
states which appear well governed we find not one where the rights of a
citizen are open to an indiscriminate multitude. And this is also evident
from the nature of the thing; for as law is a certain order, so good law
is of course a certain good order: but too large a multitude are incapable
of this, unless under the government of that DIVINE POWER which
comprehends the universe. Not but that, as quantity and variety are
usually essential to beauty, the perfection of a city consists in the
largeness of it as far as that largeness is consistent with that order
already mentioned: but still there is a determinate size to all cities, as
well as everything else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of
these, if they are neither too little nor too big, have their proper
powers; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly constructed,
as a ship a span long is not properly a ship, nor one of two furlongs
length, but when it is of a fit size; for either from its smallness or
from its largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with a city; one that
is too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of self-defence, but this
is essential to a city: one that is too large is capable of self-defence
in what is necessary; but then it is a nation and not a city: for it will
be very difficult to accommodate a form of government to it: for who would
choose to be the general of such an unwieldy multitude, or who could be
their herald but a stentor? The first thing therefore necessary is, that a
city should consist of such numbers as will be sufficient to enable the
inhabitants to live happily in their political community: and it follows,
that the more the inhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater
will the city be: but this must not be, as we have already said, without
bounds; but what is its proper limit experience will easily show, and this
experience is to be collected from the actions both of the governors and
the governed. Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the inferior
magistrates and to act as judges, it follows that they can neither
determine causes with justice nor issue their orders with propriety
without they know the characters of their fellow-citizens: so that
whenever this happens not to be done in these two particulars, the state
must of necessity be badly managed; for in both of them it is not right to
determine too hastily and without proper knowledge, which must evidently
be the case where the number of the citizens is too many: besides, it is
more easy for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens,
as they will easily escape detection in so great a multitude. It is
evident, then, that the best boundary for a city is that wherein the
numbers are the greatest possible, that they may be the better able to be
sufficient in themselves, while at the same time they are not too large to
be under the eye and government of the magistrates. And thus let us
determine the extent of a city.
CHAPTER V
What we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a country;
for as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will commend it if
it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what will make the
inhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to supply them with
all the necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty, without
any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it should be such as
may enable the inhabitants to live at their ease with freedom and
temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong in fixing this limit to
the territory shall be considered more minutely hereafter, when we come
particularly to inquire into property, and what fortune is requisite for a
man to live on, and how and in what manner they ought to employ it; for
there are many doubts upon this question, while each party insists upon
their own plan of life being carried to an excess, the one of severity,
the other of indulgence. What the situation of the country should be it is
not difficult to determine, in some particulars respecting that we ought
to be advised by those who are skilful in military affairs. It should be
difficult of access to an enemy, but easy to the inhabitants: and as we
said, that the number of [1327a] inhabitants ought to be such as can come
under the eye of the magistrate, so should it be with the country; for
then it is easily defended. As to the position of the city, if one could
place it to one’s wish, it is convenient to fix it on the seaside: with
respect to the country, one situation which it ought to have has been
already mentioned, namely, that it should be so placed as easily to give
assistance to all places, and also to receive the necessaries of life from
all parts, and also wood, or any other materials which may happen to be in
the country.
CHAPTER VI
But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea, there
are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or hurtful to a
well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of persons brought up
under a different system of government is disserviceable to the state, as
well by impeding the laws as by their numbers; for a multitude of
merchants must necessarily arise from their trafficking backward and
forward upon the seas, which will hinder the well-governing of the city:
but if this inconvenience should not arise, it is evident that it is
better, both on account of safety and also for the easier acquisition of
the necessaries of life, that both the city and the country should be near
the sea; for it is necessary that those who are to sustain the attack of
the enemy should be ready with their assistance both by land and by sea,
and to oppose any inroad, both ways if possible but if not, at least where
they are most powerful, which they may do while they possess both. A
maritime situation is also useful for receiving from others what your own
country will not produce, and exporting those necessaries of your own
growth which are more than you have occasion for; but a city ought to
traffic to supply its own wants, and not the wants of others; for those
who themselves furnish an open market for every one, do it for the sake of
gain; which it is not proper for a well-established state to do, neither
should they encourage such a commerce. Now, as we see that many places and
cities have docks and harbours lying very convenient for the city, while
those who frequent them have no communication with the citadel, and yet
they are not too far off, but are surrounded by walls and such-like
fortifications, it is evident, that if any good arises from such an
intercourse the city will receive it, but if anything hurtful, it will be
easy to restrain it by a law declaring and deputing whom the state will
allow to have an intercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval
power, it is by no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a
certain degree; and this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself,
but also because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the
neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as by
land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the state
should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and enables her to
take the lead of other communities, it is necessary that her force should
correspond with her actions. As for that multitude of people which a
maritime power creates, they are by no means necessary to a state, nor
ought they to make a part of the citizens; for the mariners and infantry,
who have the command, are freemen, and upon these depends a naval
engagement: but when there are many servants and husbandmen, there they
will always have a number of sailors, as we now see happens to some
states, as in Heraclea, where they man many triremes, though the extent of
their city is much inferior to some others. And thus we determine
concerning the country, the port, the city, the sea, and a maritime power:
as to the number of the citizens, what that ought to be we have already
said.
CHAPTER VII
We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of the
community ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive who will
cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the most celebrated,
and also the other different nations of this habitable world. Those who
live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are full of courage, but
wanting in understanding and the arts: therefore they are very tenacious
of their liberty; but, not being politicians, they cannot reduce their
neighbours under their power: but the Asiatics, whose understandings are
quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are deficient in courage; and
therefore are always conquered and the slaves of others: but the Grecians,
placed as it were between these two boundaries, so partake of them both as
to be at the same time both courageous and sensible; for which reason
Greece continues free, and governed in the best manner possible, and
capable of commanding the whole world, could they agree upon one system of
policy. Now this is the difference between the Grecians and other nations,
that the latter have but one of these qualities, whereas in the former
they are both happily blended together. Hence it is evident, that those
persons ought to be both sensible and courageous who will readily obey a
legislator, the object of whose laws is virtue. As to what some persons
say, that the military must be mild and tender to those they know, but
severe and cruel to those they know not, it is courage which [1328a] makes
any one lovely; for that is the faculty of the soul which we most admire:
as a proof of this, our resentment rises higher against our friends and
acquaintance than against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus
accusing his friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends
insult me? The spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit who
are of this disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It also
is not right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those you
know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who are
of a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the
wicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already
said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them; which
is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to receive a
favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury done them, they
consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying, “Cruel are the wars
of brothers;” and this, “Those who have greatly loved do greatly hate.”
And thus we have nearly determined how many the inhabitants of a city
ought to be, and what their natural disposition, and also the country how
large, and of what sort is necessary; I say nearly, because it is needless
to endeavour at as great accuracy in those things which are the objects of
the senses as in those which are inquired into by the understanding only.
CHAPTER VIII
As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them
without which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in a
political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be
considered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one whole
is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the community,
whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for instance, food,
land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit of one person,
and another for the benefit of another, in this there is nothing like a
community, excepting that one makes it and the other uses it; as, for
instance, between any instrument employed in making any work, and the
workmen, as there is nothing common between the house and the builder, but
the art of the builder is employed on the house. Thus property is
necessary for states, but property is no part of the state, though many
species of it have life; but a city is a community of equals, for the
purpose of enjoying the best life possible: but the happiest life is the
best which consists in the perfect practice of virtuous energies: as
therefore some persons have great, others little or no opportunity of
being employed in these, it is evident that this is the cause of the
difference there is between the different cities and communities there are
to be found; for while each of these endeavour to acquire what is best by
various and different means, they give [1328b] rise to different modes of
living and different forms of government. We are now to consider what
those things are without which a city cannot possibly exist; for what we
call parts of the city must of necessity inhere in it: and this we shall
plainly understand, if we know the number of things necessary to a city:
first, the inhabitants must have food: secondly, arts, for many
instruments are necessary in life: thirdly, arms, for it is necessary that
the community should have an armed force within themselves, both to
support their government against those of their own body who might refuse
obedience to it, and also to defend it from those who might attempt to
attack it from without: fourthly, a certain revenue, as well for the
internal necessities of the state as for the business of war: fifthly,
which is indeed the chief concern, a religious establishment: sixthly in
order, but first of all in necessity, a court to determine both criminal
and civil causes. These things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in
every state; for a city is a number of people not accidentally met
together, but with a purpose of ensuring to themselves sufficient
independency and self-protection; and if anything necessary for these
purposes is wanting, it is impossible that in such a situation these ends
can be obtained. It is necessary therefore that a city should be capable
of acquiring all these things: for this purpose a proper number of
husbandmen are necessary to procure food, also artificers and soldiers,
and rich men, and priests and judges, to determine what is right and
proper.
CHAPTER IX
Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all these
different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible to continue
the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges, or counsellors; or
shall we appoint different persons to each of those employments which we
have already mentioned; or shall some of them be appropriated to
particulars, and others of course common to all? but this does not take
place in every state, for, as we have already said, it is possible that
all may be common to all, or not, but only common to some; and this is the
difference between one government and another: for in democracies the
whole community partakes of everything, but in oligarchies it is
different.
Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is
admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we have
already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue; it
follows, that in the best-governed states, where the citizens are really
men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should be
permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise, as
being ignoble and destructive to virtue; neither should they be
husband-[1329a] men, that they may be at leisure to improve in virtue and
perform the duty they owe to the state. With respect to the employments of
a soldier, a senator, and a judge, which are evidently necessary to the
community, shall they be allotted to different persons, or shall the same
person execute both? This question, too, is easily answered: for in some
cases the same persons may execute them, in others they should be
different, where the different employments require different abilities, as
when courage is wanting for one, judgment for the other, there they should
be allotted to different persons; but when it is evident, that it is
impossible to oblige those who have arms in their hands, and can insist on
their own terms, to be always under command; there these different
employments should be trusted to one person; for those who have arms in
their hands have it in their option whether they will or will not assume
the supreme power: to these two (namely, those who have courage and
judgment) the government must be entrusted; but not in the same manner,
but as nature directs; what requires courage to the young, what requires
judgment to the old; for with the young is courage, with the old is
wisdom: thus each will be allotted the part they are fit for according to
their different merits. It is also necessary that the landed property
should belong to these men; for it is necessary that the citizens should
be rich, and these are the men proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought
to be admitted to the rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people
whose employment is not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is
evident from the principle we at first set out with; for to be happy it is
necessary to be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while
he considers only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought
to examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed
property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to
have husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There remains of
the different classes of the people whom we have enumerated, the priests,
for these evidently compose a rank by themselves; for neither are they to
be reckoned amongst the husbandmen nor the mechanics; for reverence to the
gods is highly becoming every state: and since the citizens have been
divided into orders, the military and the council, and it is proper to
offer due worship to the gods, and since it is necessary that those who
are employed in their service should have nothing else to do, let the
business of the priesthood be allotted to those who are in years. We have
now shown what is necessary to the existence of a city, and of what parts
it consists, and that husbandmen, mechanic, and mercenary servants are
necessary to a city; but that the parts of it are soldiers and sailors,
and that these are always different from those, but from each other only
occasionally.
CHAPTER X
It seems neither now nor very lately to have been known [1329b] to those
philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city ought to be
divided by families into different orders of men; and that the husbandmen
and soldiers should be kept separate from each other; which custom is even
to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete; also Sesostris having founded
it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common meals seem also to have been an
ancient regulation, and to have been established in Crete during the reign
of Minos, and in a still more remote period in Italy; for those who are
the best judges in that country say that one Italus being king of
AEnotria., from whom the people, changing their names, were called
Italians instead of AEnotrians, and that part of Europe was called Italy
which is bounded by the Scylletic Gulf on the one side and the Lametic on
the other, the distance between which is about half a day’s journey. This
Italus, they relate, made the AEnotrians, who were formerly shepherds,
husbandmen, and gave them different laws from what they had before, and to
have been the first who established common meals, for which reason some of
his descendants still use them, and observe some of his laws. The Opici
inhabit that part which lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are
and formerly were called Ausonians. The Chones inhabited the part toward
Iapigia and the Ionian Sea which is called Syrtis. These Chones were
descended from the AEnotrians. Hence arose the custom of common meals, but
the separation of the citizens into different families from Egypt: for the
reign of Sesostris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we
ought to think that most other things were found out in a long, nay, even
in a boundless time (reason teaching us that want would make us first
invent that which was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then those
things which were requisite for the conveniences and ornament of life), so
should we conclude the same with respect to a political state; now
everything in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote antiquity, for
these people seem to be the most ancient of all others, and to have
acquired laws and political order; we should therefore make a proper use
of what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have
omitted. We have already said, that the landed property ought to belong to
the military and those who partake of the government of the state; and
that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of people; and
how large and of what nature the country ought to be: we will first treat
of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen, how many and of what
sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold that property ought to be
common, as some persons have said, only thus far, in friendship, it
[1330a] should be their custom to let no citizen want subsistence. As to
common meals, it is in general agreed that they are proper in
well-regulated cities; my reasons for approving of them shall be mentioned
hereafter: they are what all the citizens ought to partake of; but it will
not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, to furnish as much as
they are ordered to do, and supply their own house besides. The expense
also of religious worship should be defrayed by the whole state. Of
necessity therefore the land ought to be divided into two parts, one of
which should belong to the community in general, the other to the
individuals separately; and each of these parts should again be subdivided
into two: half of that which belongs to the public should be appropriated
to maintain the worship of the gods, the other half to support the common
meals. Half of that which belongs to the individuals should be at the
extremity of the country, the other half near the city, so that these two
portions being allotted to each person, all would partake of land in both
places, which would be both equal and right; and induce them to act in
concert with greater harmony in any war with their neighbours: for when
the land is not divided in this manner, one party neglects the inroads of
the enemy on the borders, the other makes it a matter of too much
consequence and more than is necessary; for which reason in some places
there is a law which forbids the inhabitants of the borders to have any
vote in the council when they are debating upon a war which is made
against them as their private interest might prevent their voting
impartially. Thus therefore the country ought to be divided and for the
reasons before mentioned. Could one have one’s choice, the husbandmen
should by all means be slaves, not of the same nation, or men of any
spirit; for thus they would be laborious in their business, and safe from
attempting any novelties: next to these barbarian servants are to be
preferred, similar in natural disposition to these we have already
mentioned. Of these, let those who are to cultivate the private property
of the individual belong to that individual, and those who are to
cultivate the public territory belong to the public. In what manner these
slaves ought to be used, and for what reason it is very proper that they
should have the promise of their liberty made them, as a reward for their
services, shall be mentioned hereafter.
CHAPTER XI
We have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country should
communicate both with the sea and the continent as much as possible. There
are these four things which we should be particularly desirous of in the
position of the city with respect to itself: in the first place, health is
to be consulted as the first thing necessary: now a city which fronts the
east and receives the winds which blow from thence is esteemed most
healthful; next to this that which has a northern position is to be
preferred, as best in winter. It should next be contrived that it may have
a proper situation for the business of government and for defence in war:
that in war the citizens may [1330b] have easy access to it; but that it
may be difficult of access to, and hardly to be taken by, the enemy. In
the next place particularly, that there may be plenty of water, and rivers
near at hand: but if those cannot be found, very large cisterns must be
prepared to save rain-water, so that there may be no want of it in case
they should be driven into the town in time of war. And as great care
should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the first thing to be
attended to is, that the city should have a good situation and a good
position; the second is, that they may have good water to drink; and this
not be negligently taken care of; for what we chiefly and most frequently
use for the support of the body must principally influence the health of
it; and this influence is what the air and water naturally have: for which
reason in all wise governments the waters ought to be appropriated to
different purposes, and if they are not equally good, and if there is not
a plenty of necessary water, that which is to drink should be separated
from that which is for other uses. As to fortified places, what is proper
for some governments is not proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty
citadel is proper for a monarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a
plain suits a democracy; neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather
many strong places. As to the form of private houses, those are thought to
be best and most useful for their different purposes which are distinct
and separate from each other, and built in the modern manner, after the
plan of Hippodamus: but for safety in time of war, on the contrary, they
should be built as they formerly were; for they were such that strangers
could not easily find their way out of them, and the method of access to
them such as an enemy could with difficulty find out if he proposed to
besiege them. A city therefore should have both these sorts of buildings,
which may easily be contrived if any one will so regulate them as the
planters do their rows of vines; not that the buildings throughout the
city should be detached from each other, only in some parts of it; thus
elegance and safety will be equally consulted. With respect to walls,
those who say that a courageous people ought not to have any, pay too much
respect to obsolete notions; particularly as we may see those who pride
themselves therein continually confuted by facts. It is indeed
disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so, to the enemy, to
endeavour to take refuge within their walls—but since it very often
happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful for the bravery
and courage of those few who oppose them to resist, if you would not
suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the enemy, it must be
thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety under the shelter
and protection of walls more especially since so many missile weapons and
machines have been most ingeniously invented to besiege cities with.
Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall would be similar to
choosing a country which is easy of access to an enemy, or levelling the
eminences of it; or as if an individual should not have a wall to his
house lest it should be thought that the owner of it was a coward: nor
should this be left unconsidered, that those who have a city surrounded
with walls may act both ways, either as if it had or as if it had not; but
where it has not they cannot do this. If this is true, it is not only
necessary to have walls, but care must be taken that they may be a proper
ornament to the city, as well as a defence in time of war; not only
according to the old methods, but the modern improvements also: for as
those who make offensive war endeavour by every way possible to gain
advantages over their adversaries, so should those who are upon the
defensive employ all the means already known, and such new ones as
philosophy can invent, to defend themselves: for those who are well
prepared are seldom first attacked.
CHAPTER XII
As the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in certain
companies, and it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and
towers in proper places and at proper distances, it is evident that it
will be very necessary to have some of these in the towers; let the
buildings for this purpose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to
temples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of the
chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and contiguous
to each other, except those temples which the law or the oracle orders to
be separate from all other buildings; and let these be in such a
conspicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage of situation, and
in the neighbourhood of that part of the city which is best fortified.
Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large square, like that which
they call in Thessaly The Square of Freedom, in which nothing is permitted
to be bought or sold; into which no mechanic nor husbandman, nor any such
person, should be permitted to enter, unless commanded by the magistrates.
It will also be an ornament to this place if the gymnastic exercises of
the elders are performed in it. It is also proper, that for performing
these exercises the citizens should be divided into distinct classes,
according to their ages, and that the young persons should have proper
officers to be with them, and that the seniors should be with the
magistrates; for having them before their eyes would greatly inspire true
modesty and ingenuous fear. There ought to be another square [1331b]
separate from this for buying and selling, which should be so situated as
to be commodious for the reception of goods both by sea and land. As the
citizens may be divided into magistrates and priests, it is proper that
the public tables of the priests should be in buildings near the temples.
Those of the magistrates who preside over contracts, indictments, and
such-like, and also over the markets, and the public streets near the
square, or some public way, I mean the square where things are bought and
sold; for I intended the other for those who are at leisure, and this for
necessary business. The same order which I have directed here should be
observed also in the country; for there also their magistrates such as the
surveyors of the woods and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily have
their common tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection
against an enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper places,
both to the gods and the heroes; but it is unnecessary to dwell longer and
most minutely on these particulars—for it is by no means difficult
to plan these things, it is rather so to carry them into execution; for
the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical part must depend
upon fortune; for which reason we shall decline saying anything farther
upon these subjects.
CHAPTER XIII
We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a government
ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered. As
there are two particulars on which the excellence and perfection of
everything depend, one of these is, that the object and end proposed
should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish it should be
adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may either agree or
disagree with each other; for the end we propose may be good, but in
taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other times we may have the
right and proper means in our power, but the end may be bad, and sometimes
we may mistake in both; as in the art of medicine the physician does not
sometimes know in what situation the body ought to be, to be healthy; nor
what to do to procure the end he aims at. In every art and science,
therefore, we should be master of this knowledge, namely, the proper end,
and the means to obtain it. Now it is evident that all persons are
desirous to live well and be happy; but that some have the means thereof
in their own power, others not; and this either through nature [1332a] or
fortune; for many ingredients are necessary to a happy life; but fewer to
those who are of a good than to those who are of a bad disposition. There
are others who continually have the means of happiness in their own power,
but do not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what government
is best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that
state is best administered where the people are the happiest, it is
evident that happiness is a thing we should not be unacquainted with. Now,
I have already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make any use
of what I have there shown), that happiness consists in the energy and
perfect practice of virtue; and this not relatively, but simply; I mean by
relatively, what is necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply,
what is good and fair in itself: of the first sort are just punishments,
and restraints in a just cause; for they arise from virtue and are
necessary, and on that account are virtuous; though it is more desirable
that neither any state nor any individual should stand in need of them;
but those actions which are intended either to procure honour or wealth
are simply good; the others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the
contrary, are the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man
indeed will bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a
noble mind; but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have
already determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of worth
who considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is simply good;
it is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be
worthy and simply good): this has led some persons to conclude, that the
cause of happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should
suppose that the playing well upon the lyre was owing to the instrument,
and not to the art. It necessarily follows from what has been said, that
some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the legislator;
for which reason in founding a city we earnestly wish that there may be
plenty of those things which are supposed to be under the dominion of
fortune (for some things we admit her to be mistress over); but for a
state to be worthy and great is not only the work of fortune but of
knowledge and judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is necessary
that those citizens which are in the administration should be worthy also;
but as in our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how this
may be accomplished; for if this is what every one could be, and not some
individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would follow,
that what might be done by one might be done by all. Men are worthy and
good three ways; by nature, by custom, by reason. In the first place, a
man ought to be born a man, and not any other animal; that is to say, he
ought to have both a body and soul; but it avails not to be only born
[1332b] with some things, for custom makes great alterations; for there
are some things in nature capable of alteration either way which are fixed
by custom, either for the better or the worse. Now, other animals live
chiefly a life of nature; and in very few things according to custom; but
man lives according to reason also, which he alone is endowed with;
wherefore he ought to make all these accord with each other; for if men
followed reason, and were persuaded that it was best to obey her, they
would act in many respects contrary to nature and custom. What men ought
naturally to be, to make good members of a community, I have already
determined; the rest of this discourse therefore shall be upon education;
for some things are acquired by habit, others by hearing them.
CHAPTER XIV
As every political community consists of those who govern and of those who
are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of their
lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it is evident
that the mode of education should be adapted to this distinction. Now, if
one man differed from another as much, as we believe, the gods and heroes
differ from men: in the first place, being far their superiors in body;
and, secondly, in the soul: so that the superiority of the governors over
the governed might be evident beyond a doubt, it is certain that it would
be better for the one always to govern, the other always to be governed:
but, as this is not easy to obtain, and kings are not so superior to those
they govern as Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident that for
many reasons it is necessary that all in their turns should both govern
and be governed: for it is just that those who are equal should have
everything alike; and it is difficult for a state to continue which is
founded in injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of
innovation will apply themselves to those who are under the government of
the rest, and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will be
impossible for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that the
governors ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the legislator
therefore ought to consider how this shall be, and how it may be contrived
that all shall have their equal share in the administration. Now, with
respect to this it will be first said, that nature herself has directed us
in our choice, laying down the selfsame thing when she has made some
young, others old: the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter to
command; for no one when he is young is offended at his being under
government, or thinks himself too good for it; more especially when he
considers that he himself shall receive the same honours which he pays
when he shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be
acknowledged that the governors and the governed are the same, in others
they are different; it is therefore necessary that their education should
be in [1333a] some respect the same, in others different: as they say,
that he will be a good governor who has first learnt to obey. Now of
governments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the sake of
him who commands; others for him who obeys: of the first sort is that of
the master over the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over each
other. Now some things which are commanded differ from others; not in the
business, but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many works,
even of a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen to
perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable
or dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end which is
proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since then we have
determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good governor is the
same as of a good man; and that every one before he commands should have
first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator to consider how his
citizens may be good men, what education is necessary to that purpose, and
what is the final object of a good life. The soul of man may be divided
into two parts; that which has reason in itself, and that which hath not,
but is capable of obeying its dictates: and according to the virtues of
these two parts a man is said to be good: but of those virtues which are
the ends, it will not be difficult for those to determine who adopt the
division I have already given; for the inferior is always for the sake of
the superior; and this is equally evident both in the works of art as well
as in those of nature; but that is superior which has reason. Reason
itself also is divided into two parts, in the manner we usually divide it;
the theoretic and the practical; which division therefore seems necessary
for this part also: the same analogy holds good with respect to actions;
of which those which are of a superior nature ought always to be chosen by
those who have it in their power; for that is always most eligible to
every one which will procure the best ends. Now life is divided into
labour and rest, war and peace; and of what we do the objects are partly
necessary and useful, partly noble: and we should give the same preference
to these that we do to the different parts of the soul and its actions, as
war to procure peace; labour, rest; and the useful, the noble. The
politician, therefore, who composes a body of laws ought to extend his
views to everything; the different parts of the soul and their actions;
more particularly to those things which are of a superior nature and ends;
and, in the same manner, to the lives of men and their different actions.
They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b] for
rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but rather
what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the education of the
children ought to tend, and of all the youths who want instruction. All
the Grecian states which now seem best governed, and the legislators who
founded those states, appear not to have framed their polity with a view
to the best end, or to every virtue, in their laws and education; but
eagerly to have attended to what is useful and productive of gain: and
nearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who have written
lately, who, by praising the Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of the
intention of the legislator in making war and victory the end of his
government. But how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by
argument, and has already been proved by facts (but as the generality of
men desire to have an extensive command, that they may have everything
desirable in the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have written
on that state seem to approve of their legislator for having procured them
an extensive command by continually enuring them to all sorts of dangers
and hardships): for it is evident, since the Lacedemonians have now no
hope that the supreme power will be in their own hand, that neither are
they happy nor was their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous, that
while they preserved an obedience to their laws, and no one opposed their
being governed by them, they lost the means of being honourable: but these
people understand not rightly what sort of government it is which ought to
reflect honour on the legislator; for a government of freemen is nobler
than despotic power, and more consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither
should a city be thought happy, nor should a legislator be commended,
because he has so trained the people as to conquer their neighbours; for
in this there is a great inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this
principle every citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme
power in his own city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of,
though he enjoyed such great honours.
Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true: but a
legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which are most
useful for them, both in their public and private capacities. The
rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their inferiors
ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they may not
themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the next place, he
should take care that the object of his government is the safety of those
who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in the third place, that
those only are slaves who are fit to be only so. Reason indeed concurs
with experience in showing that all the attention which the legislator
pays to the business of war, and all other rules which he lays down,
should have for their object rest and peace; since most of those states
(which we usually see) are preserved by war; but, after they have acquired
a supreme power over those around them, are ruined; for during peace, like
a sword, they lose their brightness: the fault of which lies in the
legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest.
CHAPTER XV
As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a citizen,
it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have the same object
in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead to rest are
necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is peace, of labour,
rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and those also whose object
is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for we want a supply
of many necessary things that we may be at rest. A city therefore ought to
be temperate, brave, and patient; for, according to the proverb, “Rest is
not for slaves;” but those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves
of those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary
for labour, philosophy for rest, and temperance and justice in both; but
these chiefly in time of peace and rest; for war obliges men to be just
and temperate; but the enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is
more apt to produce insolence; those indeed who are easy in their
circumstances, and enjoy everything that can make them happy, have great
occasion for the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus if there are, as
the poets tell us, any inhabitants in the happy isles, to these a higher
degree of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they
live at their ease in the full plenty of every sensual pleasure. It is
evident, therefore, that these virtues are necessary in every state that
would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy real
good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear good only by
labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest the meanest of
creatures. For which reason virtue should not be cultivated as the
Lacedaemonians did; for they did not differ from others in their opinion
concerning the supreme good, but in [1334b] imagining this good was to be
procured by a particular virtue; but since there are greater goods than
those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment of those which are valuable
in themselves should be desired, rather than those virtues which are
useful in war; but how and by what means this is to be acquired is now to
be considered. We have already assigned three causes on which it will
depend; nature, custom, and reason, arid shown what sort of men nature
must produce for this purpose; it remains then that we determine which we
shall first begin by in education, reason or custom, for these ought
always to preserve the most entire harmony with each other; for it may
happen that reason may err from the end proposed, and be corrected by
custom. In the first place, it is evident that in this as in other things,
its beginning or production arises from some principle, and its end also
arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us,
reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production, therefore,
and our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In the next place,
as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so also we see that the
soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and not-reasoning, with
their habits which are two in number, one belonging to each, namely
appetite and intelligence; and as the body is in production before the
soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the soul before the reasoning; and
this is evident; for anger, will and desire are to be seen in children
nearly as soon as they are born; but reason and intelligence spring up as
they grow to maturity. The body, therefore, necessarily demands our care
before the soul; next the appetites for the sake of the mind; the body for
the sake of the soul.
CHAPTER XVI
If then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the children
are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be given to
matrimony; at what time and in what situation it is proper that the
citizens should engage in the nuptial contract. Now, with respect to this
alliance, the legislator ought both to consider the parties and their time
of life, that they may grow old at the same part of time, and that their
bodily powers may not be different; that is to say, the man being able to
have children, but the woman too old to bear them; or, on the contrary,
the woman be young enough to produce children, but the man too old to be a
father; for from such a situation discords and disputes continually arise.
In the next place, with respect to the succession of children, there ought
not to be too great an interval of time between them and their parents;
for when there is, the parent can receive no benefit from his child’s
affection, or the child any advantage from his father’s protection;
[1335a] neither should the difference in years be too little, as great
inconveniences may arise from it; as it prevents that proper reverence
being shown to a father by a boy who considers him as nearly his equal in
age, and also from the disputes it occasions in the economy of the family.
But, to return from this digression, care ought to be taken that the
bodies of the children may be such as will answer the expectations of the
legislator; this also will be affected by the same means. Since season for
the production of children is determined (not exactly, but to speak in
general), namely, for the man till seventy years, and the woman till
fifty, the entering into the marriage state, as far as time is concerned,
should be regulated by these periods. It is extremely bad for the children
when the father is too young; for in all animals whatsoever the parts of
the young are imperfect, and are more likely to be productive of females
than males, and diminutive also in size; the same thing of course
necessarily holds true in men; as a proof of this you may see in those
cities where the men and women usually marry very young, the people in
general are very small and ill framed; in child-birth also the women
suffer more, and many of them die. And thus some persons tell us the
oracle of Traezenium should be explained, as if it referred to the many
women who were destroyed by too early marriages, and not their gathering
their fruits too soon. It is also conducive to temperance not to marry too
soon; for women who do so are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the
bodies of men from acquiring their full size if they marry before their
growth is completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents
any further increase; for which reason the proper time for a woman to
marry is eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for when
they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they will also
cease to have children at a proper time; and moreover with respect to the
succession of the children, if they have them at the time which may
reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving into perfection when
their parents are sinking down under the load of seventy years. And thus
much for the time which is proper for marriage; but moreover a proper
season of the year should be observed, as many persons do now, and
appropriate the winter for this business. The married couple ought also to
regard the precepts of physicians and naturalists, each of whom have
treated on these [1335b] subjects. What is the fit disposition of the body
will be better mentioned when we come to speak of the education of the
child; we will just slightly mention a few particulars. Now, there is no
occasion that any one should have the habit of body of a wrestler to be
either a good citizen, or to enjoy a good constitution, or to be the
father of healthy children; neither should he be infirm or too much
dispirited by misfortunes, but between both these. He ought to have a
habit of labour, but not of too violent labour; nor should that be
confined to one object only, as the wrestler’s is; but to such things as
are proper for freemen. These things are equally necessary both for men
and women. Women with child should also take care that their diet is not
too sparing, and that they use sufficient exercise; which it will be easy
for the legislator to effect if he commands them once every day to repair
to the worship of the gods who are supposed to preside over matrimony.
But, contrary to what is proper for the body, the mind ought to be kept as
tranquil as possible; for as plants partake of the nature of the soil, so
does the child receive much of the disposition of the mother. With respect
to the exposing or bringing up of children, let it be a law, that nothing
imperfect or maimed shall be brought up,………. As the proper time has
been pointed out for a man and a woman to enter into the marriage state,
so also let us determine how long it is advantageous for the community
that they should have children; for as the children of those who are too
young are imperfect both in body and mind, so also those whose parents are
too old are weak in both: while therefore the body continues in
perfection, which (as some poets say, who reckon the different periods of
life by sevens) is till fifty years, or four or five more, the children
may be equally perfect; but when the parents are past that age it is
better they should have no more. With respect to any connection between a
man and a woman, or a woman and a man, when either of the parties are
betrothed, let it be held in utter detestation [1336a] on any pretext
whatsoever; but should any one be guilty of such a thing after the
marriage is consummated, let his infamy be as great as his guilt deserves.
CHAPTER XVII
When a child is born it must be supposed that the strength of its body
will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will examine
into the nature of animals, and also observe those people who are very
desirous their children should acquire a warlike habit, will find that
they feed them chiefly with milk, as being best accommodated to their
bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers: those motions also
which are natural to their age are very serviceable; and to prevent any of
their limbs from being crooked, on account of their extreme ductility,
some people even now use particular machines that their bodies may not be
distorted. It is also useful to enure them to the cold when they are very
little; for this is very serviceable for their health; and also to enure
them to the business of war; for which reason it is customary with many of
the barbarians to dip their children in rivers when the water is cold;
with others to clothe them very slightly, as among the Celts; for whatever
it is possible to accustom children to, it is best to accustom them to it
at first, but to do it by degrees: besides, boys have naturally a habit of
loving the cold, on account of the heat. These, then, and such-like things
ought to be the first object of our attention: the next age to this
continues till the child is five years old; during which time it is best
to teach him nothing at all, not even necessary labour, lest it should
hinder his growth; but he should be accustomed to use so much motion as
not to acquire a lazy habit of body; which he will get by various means
and by play also: his play also ought to be neither illiberal nor too
laborious nor lazy. Their governors and preceptors also should take care
what sort of tales and stories it may be proper for them to hear; for all
these ought to pave the way for their future instruction: for which reason
the generality of their play should be imitations of what they are
afterwards to do seriously. They too do wrong who forbid by laws the
disputes between boys and their quarrels, for they contribute to increase
their growth—as they are a sort of exercise to the body: for the
struggles of the heart and the compression of the spirits give strength to
those who labour, which happens to boys in their disputes. The preceptors
also ought to have an eye upon their manner of life, and those with whom
they converse; and to take care that they are never in the company of
slaves. At this time and till they are seven [1336b] years old it is
necessary that they should be educated at home. It is also very proper to
banish, both from their hearing and sight, everything which is illiberal
and the like. Indeed it is as much the business of the legislator as
anything else, to banish every indecent expression out of the state: for
from a permission to speak whatever is shameful, very quickly arises the
doing it, and this particularly with young people: for which reason let
them never speak nor hear any such thing: but if it appears that any
freeman has done or said anything that is forbidden before he is of age to
be thought fit to partake of the common meals, let him be punished by
disgrace and stripes; but if a person above that age does so, let him be
treated as you would a slave, on account of his being infamous. Since we
forbid his speaking everything which is forbidden, it is necessary that he
neither sees obscene stories nor pictures; the magistrates therefore are
to take care that there are no statues or pictures of anything of this
nature, except only to those gods to whom the law permits them, and to
which the law allows persons of a certain age to pay their devotions, for
themselves, their wives, and children. It should also be illegal for young
persons to be present either at iambics or comedies before they are
arrived at that age when they are allowed to partake of the pleasures of
the table: indeed a good education will preserve them from all the evils
which attend on these things. We have at present just touched upon this
subject; it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to it,
to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary, or, if
necessary, in what manner it must be done; at present we have only
mentioned it as necessary. Probably the saying of Theodoras, the tragic
actor, was not a bad one: That he would permit no one, not even the
meanest actor, to go upon the stage before him, that he might first engage
the ear of the audience. The same thing happens both in our connections
with men and things: what we meet with first pleases best; for which
reason children should be kept strangers to everything which is bad, more
particularly whatsoever is loose and offensive to good manners. When five
years are accomplished, the two next may be very properly employed in
being spectators of those exercises they will afterwards have to learn.
There are two periods into which education ought to be divided, according
to the age of the child; the one is from his being seven years of age to
the time of puberty; the other from thence till he is one-and-twenty: for
those who divide ages by the number seven [1337a] are in general wrong: it
is much better to follow the division of nature; for every art and every
instruction is intended to complete what nature has left defective: we
must first consider if any regulation whatsoever is requisite for
children; in the next place, if it is advantageous to make it a common
care, or that every one should act therein as he pleases, which is the
general practice in most cities; in the third place, what it ought to be.
BOOK VIII
CHAPTER I
No one can doubt that the magistrate ought greatly to interest himself in
the care of youth; for where it is neglected it is hurtful to the city,
for every state ought to be governed according to its particular nature;
for the form and manners of each government are peculiar to itself; and
these, as they originally established it, so they usually still preserve
it. For instance, democratic forms and manners a democracy; oligarchic, an
oligarchy: but, universally, the best manners produce the best government.
Besides, as in every business and art there are some things which men are
to learn first and be made accustomed to, which are necessary to perform
their several works; so it is evident that the same thing is necessary in
the practice of virtue. As there is one end in view in every city, it is
evident that education ought to be one and the same in each; and that this
should be a common care, and not the individual’s, as it now is, when
every one takes care of his own children separately; and their
instructions are particular also, each person teaching them as they
please; but what ought to be engaged in ought to be common to all.
Besides, no one ought to think that any citizen belongs to him in
particular, but to the state in general; for each one is a part of the
state, and it is the natural duty of each part to regard the good of the
whole: and for this the Lacedaemonians may be praised; for they give the
greatest attention to education, and make it public. It is evident, then,
that there should be laws concerning education, and that it should be
public.
CHAPTER II
What education is, and how children ought to be instructed, is what should
be well known; for there are doubts concerning the business of it, as all
people do not agree in those things they would have a child taught, both
with respect to their improvement in virtue and a happy life: nor is it
clear whether the object of it should be to improve the reason or rectify
the morals. From the present mode of education we cannot determine with
certainty to which men incline, whether to instruct a child in what will
be useful to him in life; or what tends to virtue, and what is excellent:
for all these things have their separate defenders. As to virtue, there is
no particular [1337b] in which they all agree: for as all do not equally
esteem all virtues, it reasonably follows that they will not cultivate the
same. It is evident that what is necessary ought to be taught to all: but
that which is necessary for one is not necessary for all; for there ought
to be a distinction between the employment of a freeman and a slave. The
first of these should be taught everything useful which will not make
those who know it mean. Every work is to be esteemed mean, and every art
and every discipline which renders the body, the mind, or the
understanding of freemen unfit for the habit and practice of virtue: for
which reason all those arts which tend to deform the body are called mean,
and all those employments which are exercised for gain; for they take off
from the freedom of the mind and render it sordid. There are also some
liberal arts which are not improper for freemen to apply to in a certain
degree; but to endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them is exposed to
the faults I have just mentioned; for there is a great deal of difference
in the reason for which any one does or learns anything: for it is not
illiberal to engage in it for one’s self, one’s friend, or in the cause of
virtue; while, at the same time, to do it for the sake of another may seem
to be acting the part of a servant and a slave. The mode of instruction
which now prevails seems to partake of both parts.
CHAPTER III
There are four things which it is usual to teach children—reading,
gymnastic exercises, and music, to which (in the fourth place) some add
painting. Reading and painting are both of them of singular use in life,
and gymnastic exercises, as productive of courage. As to music, some
persons may doubt, as most persons now use it for the sake of pleasure:
but those who originally made it part of education did it because, as has
been already said, nature requires that we should not only be properly
employed, but to be able to enjoy leisure honourably: for this (to repeat
what I have already said) is of all things the principal. But, though both
labour and rest are necessary, yet the latter is preferable to the first;
and by all means we ought to learn what we should do when at rest: for we
ought not to employ that time at play; for then play would be the
necessary business of our lives. But if this cannot be, play is more
necessary for those who labour than those who are at rest: for he who
labours requires relaxation; which play will supply: for as labour is
attended with pain and continued exertion, it is necessary that play
should be introduced, under proper regulations, as a medicine: for such an
employment of the mind is a relaxation to it, and eases with pleasure.
[1338a] Now rest itself seems to partake of pleasure, of happiness, and an
agreeable life: but this cannot be theirs who labour, but theirs who are
at rest; for he who labours, labours for the sake of some end which he has
not: but happiness is an end which all persons think is attended with
pleasure and not with pain: but all persons do not agree in making this
pleasure consist in the same thing; for each one has his particular
standard, correspondent to his own habits; but the best man proposes the
best pleasure, and that which arises from the noblest actions. But it is
evident, that to live a life of rest there are some things which a man
must learn and be instructed in; and that the object of this learning and
this instruction centres in their acquisition: but the learning and
instruction which is given for labour has for its object other things; for
which reason the ancients made music a part of education; not as a thing
necessary, for it is not of that nature, nor as a thing useful, as
reading, in the common course of life, or for managing of a family, or for
learning anything as useful in public life. Painting also seems useful to
enable a man to judge more accurately of the productions of the finer
arts: nor is it like the gymnastic exercises, which contribute to health
and strength; for neither of these things do we see produced by music;
there remains for it then to be the employment of our rest, which they had
in view who introduced it; and, thinking it a proper employment for
freemen, to them they allotted it; as Homer sings:
and of some others he says:
and, in another place, he makes Ulysses say the happiest part of man’s
life is
It is evident, then, that there is a certain education in which a child
may be instructed, not as useful nor as necessary, but as noble and
liberal: but whether this is one or more than one, and of what sort they
are, and how to be taught, shall be considered hereafter: we are now got
so far on our way as to show that we have the testimony of the ancients in
our favour, by what they have delivered down upon education—for
music makes this plain. Moreover, it is necessary to instruct children in
what is useful, not only on account of its being useful in itself, as, for
instance, to learn to read, but also as the means of acquiring other
different sorts of instruction: thus they should be instructed in
painting, not only to prevent their being mistaken in purchasing pictures,
or in buying or selling of vases, but rather as it makes [1338b] them
judges of the beauties of the human form; for to be always hunting after
the profitable ill agrees with great and freeborn souls. As it is evident
whether a boy should be first taught morals or reasoning, and whether his
body or his understanding should be first cultivated, it is plain that
boys should be first put under the care of the different masters of the
gymnastic arts, both to form their bodies and teach them their exercises.
CHAPTER IV
Now those states which seem to take the greatest care of their children’s
education, bestow their chief attention on wrestling, though it both
prevents the increase of the body and hurts the form of it. This fault the
Lacedaemonians did not fall into, for they made their children fierce by
painful labour, as chiefly useful to inspire them with courage: though, as
we have already often said, this is neither the only thing nor the
principal thing necessary to attend to; and even with respect to this they
may not thus attain their end; for we do not find either in other animals,
or other nations, that courage necessarily attends the most cruel, but
rather the milder, and those who have the dispositions of lions: for there
are many people who are eager both to kill men and to devour human flesh,
as the Achaeans and Heniochi in Pontus, and many others in Asia, some of
whom are as bad, others worse than these, who indeed live by tyranny, but
are men of no courage. Nay, we know that the Lacedaemonians themselves,
while they continued those painful labours, and were superior to all
others (though now they are inferior to many, both in war and gymnastic
exercises), did not acquire their superiority by training their youth to
these exercises, but because those who were disciplined opposed those who
were not disciplined at all. What is fair and honourable ought then to
take place in education of what is fierce and cruel: for it is not a wolf,
nor any other wild beast, which will brave any noble danger, but rather a
good man. So that those who permit boys to engage too earnestly in these
exercises, while they do not take care to instruct them in what is
necessary to do, to speak the real truth, render them mean and vile,
accomplished only in one duty of a citizen, and in every other respect, as
reason evinces, good for nothing. Nor should we form our judgments from
past events, but from what we see at present: for now they have rivals in
their mode of education, whereas formerly they had not. That gymnastic
exercises are useful, and in what manner, is admitted; for during youth it
is very proper to go through a course of those which are most gentle,
omitting that violent diet and those painful exercises which are
prescribed as necessary; that they may not prevent the growth of the body:
and it is no small proof that they have this effect, that amongst the
Olympic candidates we can scarce find two or three who have gained a
victory both when boys and men: because the necessary exercises they went
through when young deprived them of their strength. When they have
allotted three years from the time of puberty to other parts of education,
they are then of a proper age to submit to labour and a regulated diet;
for it is impossible for the mind and body both to labour at the same
time, as they are productive of contrary evils to each other; the labour
of the body preventing the progress of the mind, and the mind of the body.
CHAPTER V
With respect to music we have already spoken a little in a doubtful manner
upon this subject. It will be proper to go over again more particularly
what we then said, which may serve as an introduction to what any other
person may choose to offer thereon; for it is no easy matter to distinctly
point out what power it has, nor on what accounts one should apply it,
whether as an amusement and refreshment, as sleep or wine; as these are
nothing serious, but pleasing, and the killers of care, as Euripides says;
for which reason they class in the same order and use for the same purpose
all these, namely, sleep, wine, and music, to which some add dancing; or
shall we rather suppose that music tends to be productive of virtue,
having a power, as the gymnastic exercises have to form the body in a
certain way, to influence the manners so as to accustom its professors to
rejoice rightly? or shall we say, that it is of any service in the conduct
of life, and an assistant to prudence? for this also is a third property
which has been attributed to it. Now that boys are not to be instructed in
it as play is evident; for those who learn don’t play, for to learn is
rather troublesome; neither is it proper to permit boys at their age to
enjoy perfect leisure; for to cease to improve is by no means fit for what
is as yet imperfect; but it may be thought that the earnest attention of
boys in this art is for the sake of that amusement they will enjoy when
they come to be men and completely formed; but, if this is the case, why
are they themselves to learn it, and not follow the practice of the kings
of the Medes and Persians, who enjoy the pleasure of music by hearing
others play, and being shown its beauties by them; for of necessity those
must be better skilled therein who make this science their particular
study and business, than those who have only spent so much time at it as
was sufficient just to learn the principles of it. But if this is a reason
for a child’s being taught anything, they ought also to learn the art of
cookery, but this is absurd. The same doubt occurs if music has a power of
improving the manners; for why should they on this account themselves
learn it, and not reap every advantage of regulating the passions or
forming a judgment [1339b] on the merits of the performance by hearing
others, as the Lacedaemonians; for they, without having ever learnt music,
are yet able to judge accurately what is good and what is bad; the same
reasoning may be applied if music is supposed to be the amusement of those
who live an elegant and easy life, why should they learn themselves, and
not rather enjoy the benefit of others’ skill. Let us here consider what
is our belief of the immortal gods in this particular. Now we find the
poets never represent Jupiter himself as singing and playing; nay, we
ourselves treat the professors of these arts as mean people, and say that
no one would practise them but a drunkard or a buffoon. But probably we
may consider this subject more at large hereafter. The first question is,
whether music is or is not to make a part of education? and of those three
things which have been assigned as its proper employment, which is the
right? Is it to instruct, to amuse, or to employ the vacant hours of those
who live at rest? or may not all three be properly allotted to it? for it
appears to partake of them all; for play is necessary for relaxation, and
relaxation pleasant, as it is a medicine for that uneasiness which arises
from labour. It is admitted also that a happy life must be an honourable
one, and a pleasant one too, since happiness consists in both these; and
we all agree that music is one of the most pleasing things, whether alone
or accompanied with a voice; as Musseus says, “Music’s the sweetest joy of
man;” for which reason it is justly admitted into every company and every
happy life, as having the power of inspiring joy. So that from this any
one may suppose that it is necessary to instruct young persons in it; for
all those pleasures which are harmless are not only conducive to the final
end of life, but serve also as relaxations; and, as men are but rarely in
the attainment of that final end, they often cease from their labour and
apply to amusement, with no further view than to acquire the pleasure
attending it. It is therefore useful to enjoy such pleasures as these.
There are some persons who make play and amusement their end, and probably
that end has some pleasure annexed to it, but not what should be; but
while men seek the one they accept the other for it; because there is some
likeness in human actions to the end; for the end is pursued for the sake
of nothing else that attends it; but for itself only; and pleasures like
these are sought for, not on account of what follows them, but on account
of what has gone before them, as labour and grief; for which reason they
seek for happiness in these sort of pleasures; and that this is the reason
any one may easily perceive. That music should be pursued, not on this
account only, but also as it is very serviceable during the hours of
relaxation from labour, probably no [1340a] one doubts; we should also
inquire whether besides this use it may not also have another of nobler
nature—and we ought not only to partake of the common pleasure
arising from it (which all have the sensation of, for music naturally
gives pleasure, therefore the use of it is agreeable to all ages and all
dispositions); but also to examine if it tends anything to improve our
manners and our souls. And this will be easily known if we feel our
dispositions any way influenced thereby; and that they are so is evident
from many other instances, as well as the music at the Olympic games; and
this confessedly fills the soul with enthusiasm; but enthusiasm is an
affection of the soul which strongly agitates the disposition. Besides,
all those who hear any imitations sympathise therewith; and this when they
are conveyed even without rhythm or verse. Moreover, as music is one of
those things which are pleasant, and as virtue itself consists in rightly
enjoying, loving, and hating, it is evident that we ought not to learn or
accustom ourselves to anything so much as to judge right and rejoice in
honourable manners and noble actions. But anger and mildness, courage and
modesty, and their contraries, as well as all other dispositions of the
mind, are most naturally imitated by music and poetry; which is plain by
experience, for when we hear these our very soul is altered; and he who is
affected either with joy or grief by the imitation of any objects, is in
very nearly the same situation as if he was affected by the objects
themselves; thus, if any person is pleased with seeing a statue of any one
on no other account but its beauty, it is evident that the sight of the
original from whence it was taken would also be pleasing; now it happens
in the other senses there is no imitation of manners; that is to say, in
the touch and the taste; in the objects of sight, a very little; for these
are merely representations of things, and the perceptions which they
excite are in a manner common to all. Besides, statues and paintings are
not properly imitations of manners, but rather signs and marks which show
the body is affected by some passion. However, the difference is not
great, yet young men ought not to view the paintings of Pauso, but of
Polygnotus, or any other painter or statuary who expresses manners. But in
poetry and music there are imitations of manners; and this is evident, for
different harmonies differ from each other so much by nature, that those
who hear them are differently affected, and are not in the same
disposition of mind when one is performed as when another is; the one, for
instance, occasions grief 13406 and contracts the soul, as the mixed
Lydian: others soften the mind, and as it were dissolve the heart: others
fix it in a firm and settled state, such is the power of the Doric music
only; while the Phrygian fills the soul with enthusiasm, as has been well
described by those who have written philosophically upon this part of
education; for they bring examples of what they advance from the things
themselves. The same holds true with respect to rhythm; some fix the
disposition, others occasion a change in it; some act more violently,
others more liberally. From what has been said it is evident what an
influence music has over the disposition of the mind, and how variously it
can fascinate it: and if it can do this, most certainly it is what youth
ought to be instructed in. And indeed the learning of music is
particularly adapted to their disposition; for at their time of life they
do not willingly attend to anything which is not agreeable; but music is
naturally one of the most agreeable things; and there seems to be a
certain connection between harmony and rhythm; for which reason some wise
men held the soul itself to be harmony; others, that it contains it.
CHAPTER VI
We will now determine whether it is proper that children should be taught
to sing, and play upon any instrument, which we have before made a matter
of doubt. Now, it is well known that it makes a great deal of difference
when you would qualify any one in any art, for the person himself to learn
the practical part of it; for it is a thing very difficult, if not
impossible, for a man to be a good judge of what he himself cannot do. It
is also very necessary that children should have some employment which
will amuse them; for which reason the rattle of Archytas seems well
contrived, which they give children to play with, to prevent their
breaking those things which are about the house; for at their age they
cannot sit still: this therefore is well adapted to infants, as
instruction ought to be their rattle as they grow up; hence it is evident
that they should be so taught music as to be able to practise it. Nor is
it difficult to say what is becoming or unbecoming of their age, or to
answer the objections which some make to this employment as mean and low.
In the first place, it is necessary for them to practise, that they may be
judges of the art: for which reason this should be done when they are
young; but when they are grown older the practical part may be dropped;
while they will still continue judges of what is excellent in the art, and
take a proper pleasure therein, from the knowledge they acquired of it in
their youth. As to the censure which some persons throw upon music, as
something mean and low, it is not difficult to answer that, if we will but
consider how far we propose those who are to be educated so as to become
good citizens should be instructed in this art, [1341a] and what music and
what rhythms they should be acquainted with; and also what instruments
they should play upon; for in these there is probably a difference. Such
then is the proper answer to that censure: for it must be admitted, that
in some cases nothing can prevent music being attended, to a certain
degree, with the bad effects which are ascribed to it; it is therefore
clear that the learning of it should never prevent the business of riper
years; nor render the body effeminate, and unfit for the business of war
or the state; but it should be practised by the young, judged of by the
old. That children may learn music properly, it is necessary that they
should not be employed in those parts of it which are the objects of
dispute between the masters in that science; nor should they perform such
pieces as are wondered at from the difficulty of their execution; and
which, from being first exhibited in the public games, are now become a
part of education; but let them learn so much of it as to be able to
receive proper pleasure from excellent music and rhythms; and not that
only which music must make all animals feel, and also slaves and boys, but
more. It is therefore plain what instruments they should use; thus, they
should never be taught to play upon the flute, or any other instrument
which requires great skill, as the harp or the like, but on such as will
make them good judges of music, or any other instruction: besides, the
flute is not a moral instrument, but rather one that will inflame the
passions, and is therefore rather to be used when the soul is to be
animated than when instruction is intended. Let me add also, that there is
something therein which is quite contrary to what education requires; as
the player on the flute is prevented from speaking: for which reason our
forefathers very properly forbade the use of it to youth and freemen,
though they themselves at first used it; for when their riches procured
them greater leisure, they grew more animated in the cause of virtue; and
both before and after the Median war their noble actions so exalted their
minds that they attended to every part of education; selecting no one in
particular, but endeavouring to collect the whole: for which reason they
introduced the flute also, as one of the instruments they were to learn to
play on. At Lacedaemon the choregus himself played on the flute; and it
was so common at Athens that almost every freeman understood it, as is
evident from the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when he was choregus;
but afterwards they rejected it as dangerous; having become better judges
of what tended to promote virtue and what did not. For the same reason
many of the ancient instruments were thrown aside, as the dulcimer and the
lyre; as also those which were to inspire those who played on them with
pleasure, and which required a nice finger and great skill to play well
on. What the ancients tell us, by way of fable, of the flute is indeed
very rational; namely, that after Minerva had found it, she threw it away:
nor are they wrong who say that the goddess disliked it for deforming the
face of him who played thereon: not but that it is more probable that she
rejected it as the knowledge thereof contributed nothing to the
improvement of the mind. Now, we regard Minerva as the inventress of arts
and sciences. As we disapprove of a child’s being taught to understand
instruments, and to play like a master (which we would have confined to
those who are candidates for the prize in that science; for they play not
to improve themselves in virtue, but to please those who hear them, and
gratify their importunity); therefore we think the practice of it unfit
for freemen; but then it should be confined to those who are paid for
doing it; for it usually gives people sordid notions, for the end they
have in view is bad: for the impertinent spectator is accustomed to make
them change their music; so that the artists who attend to him regulate
their bodies according to his motions.
CHAPTER VII
We are now to enter into an inquiry concerning harmony and rhythm; whether
all sorts of these are to be employed in education, or whether some
peculiar ones are to be selected; and also whether we should give the same
directions to those who are engaged in music as part of education, or
whether there is something different from these two. Now, as all music
consists in melody and rhythm, we ought not to be unacquainted with the
power which each of these has in education; and whether we should rather
choose music in which melody prevails, or rhythm: but when I consider how
many things have been well written upon these subjects, not only by some
musicians of the present age, but also by some philosophers who are
perfectly skilled in that part of music which belongs to education; we
will refer those who desire a very particular knowledge therein to those
writers, and shall only treat of it in general terms, without descending
to particulars. Melody is divided by some philosophers, whose notions we
approve of, into moral, practical, and that which fills the mind with
enthusiasm: they also allot to each of these a particular kind of harmony
which naturally corresponds therewith: and we say that music should not be
applied to one purpose only, but many; both for instruction and purifying
the soul (now I use the word purifying at present without any explanation,
but shall speak more at large of it in my Poetics); and, in the third
place, as an agreeable manner of spending the time and a relaxation from
the uneasiness of the mind. [1342a] It is evident that all harmonies are
to be used; but not for all purposes; but the most moral in education: but
to please the ear, when others play, the most active and enthusiastic; for
that passion which is to be found very strong in some souls is to be met
with also in all; but the difference in different persons consists in its
being in a less or greater degree, as pity, fear, and enthusiasm also;
which latter is so powerful in some as to overpower the soul: and yet we
see those persons, by the application of sacred music to soothe their
mind, rendered as sedate and composed as if they had employed the art of
the physician: and this must necessarily happen to the compassionate, the
fearful, and all those who are subdued by their passions: nay, all
persons, as far as they are affected with those passions, admit of the
same cure, and are restored to tranquillity with pleasure. In the same
manner, all music which has the power of purifying the soul affords a
harmless pleasure to man. Such, therefore, should be the harmony and such
the music which those who contend with each other in the theatre should
exhibit: but as the audience is composed of two sorts of people, the free
and the well-instructed, the rude the mean mechanics, and hired servants,
and a long collection of the like, there must be some music and some
spectacles to please and soothe them; for as their minds are as it were
perverted from their natural habits, so also is there an unnatural
harmony, and overcharged music which is accommodated to their taste: but
what is according to nature gives pleasure to every one, therefore those
who are to contend upon the theatre should be allowed to use this species
of music. But in education ethic melody and ethic harmony should be used,
which is the Doric, as we have already said, or any other which those
philosophers who are skilful in that music which is to be employed in
education shall approve of. But Socrates, in Plato’s Republic, is very
wrong when he [1342b] permits only the Phrygian music to be used as well
as the Doric, particularly as amongst other instruments he banishes the
flute; for the Phrygian music has the same power in harmony as the flute
has amongst the instruments; for they are both pathetic and raise the
mind: and this the practice of the poets proves; for in their bacchanal
songs, or whenever they describe any violent emotions of the mind, the
flute is the instrument they chiefly use: and the Phrygian harmony is most
suitable to these subjects. Now, that the dithyrambic measure is Phrygian
is allowed by general consent; and those who are conversant in studies of
this sort bring many proofs of it; as, for instance, when Philoxenus
endeavoured to compose dithyrambic music for Doric harmony, he naturally
fell back again into Phrygian, as being fittest for that purpose; as every
one indeed agrees, that the Doric music is most serious, and fittest to
inspire courage: and, as we always commend the middle as being between the
two extremes, and the Doric has this relation with respect to other
harmonies, it is evident that is what the youth ought to be instructed in.
There are two things to be taken into consideration, both what is possible
and what is proper; every one then should chiefly endeavour to attain
those things which contain both these qualities: but this is to be
regulated by different times of life; for instance, it is not easy for
those who are advanced in years to sing such pieces of music as require
very high notes, for nature points out to them those which are gentle and
require little strength of voice (for which reason some who are skilful in
music justly find fault with Socrates for forbidding the youth to be
instructed in gentle harmony; as if, like wine, it would make them drunk,
whereas the effect of that is to render men bacchanals, and not make them
languid): these therefore are what should employ those who are grown old.
Moreover, if there is any harmony which is proper for a child’s age, as
being at the same time elegant and instructive, as the Lydian of all
others seems chiefly to be-These then are as it were the three boundaries
of education, moderation, possibility, and decorum.