II
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1954
[ii]
This volume, one of the series UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, is the fifth to be published in the
subseries THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC. All the volumes will be closely
related, and the series will present a comprehensive account of the
activities of the Military Establishment during World War II. A
tentative list of subseries is appended at the end of this volume.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:
53—61979
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D.
C.—Price of this volume, $6.75 (Cloth) [iii]
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor
Advisory Committee
(As of 1 May 1953)
| James P. Baxter | Brig. Gen. Verdi B. Barnes |
| President, Williams College | Army War College |
| John D. Hicks | Brig. Gen. Leonard J. Greeley |
| University of California | Industrial College of the Armed Forces |
| William T. Hutchinson | Brig. Gen. Elwyn D. Post |
| University of Chicago | Army Field Forces |
| S. L. A. Marshall | Col. Thomas D. Stamps |
| Detroit News | United States Military Academy |
| Charles S. Sydnor | Col. C. E. Beauchamp |
| Duke University | Command and General Staff College |
| Charles H. Taylor | |
| Harvard University | |
Office of the Chief of Military
History
Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, Chief1
| Chief Historian | Kent Roberts Greenfield |
| Chief, War Histories Division | Col. G. G. O’Connor |
| Chief, Editorial and Publication Division | Col. B. A. Day |
| Chief, Editorial Branch | Joseph R. Friedman |
| Chief, Cartographic Branch | Wsevolod Aglaimoff |
| Chief, Photographic Branch | Maj. Arthur T. Lawry |
[iv]
The History of
THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC
prepared under the direction of Louis
Morton
- The Fall of the Philippines
- Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
- Victory in Papua
- Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul
- Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
- Campaign in the Marianas
- The Approach to the Philippines
- Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
- Triumph in the Philippines
- Okinawa: The Last Battle
- Strategy, Command, and Administration
[v]
Foreword
With the Leyte Campaign the War in the Pacific
entered a decisive stage. The period of limited offensives, bypassing,
and island hopping was virtually over. American troops in greater
numbers than ever before assembled in the Pacific Theater, supported by
naval and air forces of corresponding size, fought and overcame
Japanese forces of greater magnitude than any previously met.
Though the spotlight is on the front-line fighting, the
reader will find in this volume a faithful description of all arms and
services performing their missions. The account is not exclusively an
infantry story. It covers as well the support of ground fighting on
Leyte by large-scale naval operations and by land-based air power under
the most adverse conditions. In addition, careful attention to
logistical matters, such as the movement of supplies and the evacuation
of the wounded, gives the reader a picture of the less spectacular
activities of an army in battle.
ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C.
30 January 1953 [viii]
The Author
M. Hamlin Cannon received the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in History from the American University of Washington, D.C.
He is already known to American historians for his writings on Mormon
and Civil War history which have appeared in historical journals.
During World War II he served with the Navy in Australia and New
Guinea. [ix]
Preface
The landing of the American forces on Leyte on 20
October 1944 brought to fruition the long-cherished desire of General
Douglas MacArthur to return to the Philippine Islands and avenge the
humiliating reverses suffered in the early days of World War II. The
successful conclusion of the campaign separated the Japanese-held
Philippine Archipelago into two parts, with a strong American force
between them. More important, it completed the severance of the
Japanese mainland from the stolen southern empire in the Netherlands
Indies from which oil, the lifeblood of modern warfare, had come.
The Leyte Campaign, like other campaigns in the Pacific,
was waged on the land, in the air, and on and under the sea. In this
operation all branches of the American armed forces played significant
roles. Therefore, although the emphasis in this volume is placed upon
the deeds of the United States Army ground soldier, the endeavors of
the aviator, the sailor, the marine and the Filipino guerrilla have
been integrated as far as possible into the story in order to make the
campaign understandable in its entirety. At the same time, every effort
has been made to give the Japanese side of the story.
Obviously, to include every exploit of every branch of
the armed forces, of the Filipinos, and of the Japanese would be far
beyond the compass of a single volume. A careful selectivity was
necessary throughout in order to avoid the Scylla of omission while
skirting the Charybdis of oversimplification. Despite these
precautions, because of the nature of the available documentary
evidence, I may have unwittingly fallen into some of the very pitfalls
that I tried to avoid.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to the
many people who have given fully of their time and talents in the
preparation of this volume.
Especial thanks are due to Dr. John Miller, jr., who,
during his tenure as Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief
of Military History, carefully reviewed the final draft of the
manuscript. His sound advice and constructive criticism eliminated many
a roadblock. I wish, also, to thank Dr. Louis Morton, Chief of the
Pacific Section, under whose direction this volume was started; he made
constructive criticism of several of the chapters. Dr. Kent Roberts
Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, devoted much time
and effort to reviewing the manuscript and his many penetrating
comments on the various chapters were invaluable. [x]
Appreciation is due to the people of the Historical
Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant
General, who helped to locate source material and furnished working
space for me and the records. To Mrs. Lois Aldridge, Mrs. Frances
Bowen, Mrs. Clyde Christian, Miss Margaret Emerson, Mrs. Ellen
Garrison, Mr. Robert Greathouse, Miss Matilda Huber, Mrs. Margarite
Kerstetter, Mr. Wilbur Nigh, Miss Sue D. Wallace, and Miss Thelma K.
Yarborough—thanks.
I wish also to thank the members of the U. S. Air Force
Historical Division, Air University, and the Naval History Branch,
Naval Records and History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, for placing at my disposal the pertinent air and naval
records.
Thanks are also due to the members of the historical
sections of the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Air Force and to the many
participating commanders of various branches of the U. S. armed forces
who read all or parts of the manuscript.
The late W. Brooks Phillips started the editing of the
manuscript. He was succeeded by Col. B. A. Day, Chief of the Editorial
and Publication Division, and Mrs. Loretto Stevens. Mrs. Stevens also
prepared the final copy for the printer. Miss Mary Ann Bacon prepared
the index.
Mrs. Martha Willoughby, in addition to accomplishing the
arduous task of interpreting my handwriting, typed many of the drafts
of the manuscript and saw that the subject and predicate agreed. Mrs.
Wynona Hayden, Mrs. Stella Hess, and Mrs. Michael Miller also typed
parts of the manuscript. Miss Elizabeth Armstrong painstakingly typed
the final copy.
Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff and Lt. Col. Robert F.
O’Donnell, as well as other members of the Cartographic Branch,
spent many months in research for and preparation of the maps. At the
time this volume was being prepared for publication, no reliable maps
of Leyte were available. The maps for this volume are based on the
highly inaccurate maps used by the troops during the operation. The
relief in particular, as shown on these maps, has little in common with
the terrain configuration which confronted the troops. Thus, both
military and geographical information as given on the maps in the
volume should be regarded only as an approximation of the actual
situation at the time of the battle.
Major Arthur T. Lawry selected and edited the
photographs used in this volume. Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR) furnished me
the photograph of General Suzuki. Mr. Israel Wice and his capable
assistants in the General Reference Branch were helpful at crucial
stages of the manuscript.
My sincere appreciation and thanks go to Maj. Gen. Harry
A. Maloney, Chief of Military History, and to his successors, Maj. Gen.
Orlando Ward and Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, as well as to members of
their staffs, for their understanding and co-operation.
M. HAMLIN CANNON
Washington, D. C.
15 June 1953 [xi]
Contents
[xiv]
Tables
Maps
[xv]
Illustrations
All illustrations but one are from Department of Defense
files. The photograph of Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki on page 51 was
contributed by Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR).
“It is with the deepest regret that I must
inform you that conditions over which I have no control have
necessitated the surrender of troops under my command.”1
With this message of 20 May 1942, from Lt. Col. Theodore M. Cornell,
U.S. Army, to Bernardo Torres, Governor of Leyte, the control which the
United States had held over the island since 1898 came to an end.
Nearly two and a half years were to elapse before the sound of naval
guns in Leyte Gulf would announce to the world the opening of the Leyte
Campaign, the first phase of the re-entry of American forces into the
Philippine Archipelago. (Map 1—inside back cover)
The primary purpose of the Leyte Campaign was to
establish an air and logistical base in the Leyte area in order to
support operations in the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area and
particularly to nullify Japanese strength in Luzon. Leyte is one of the
Visayan Islands, which constitute the geographical heart of the
Philippines. It was hoped that the fertile Leyte Valley, broad and
flat, could be utilized for major airfields and base sites from which
large-scale operations could be launched against the rest of the
Philippines.
Preliminary Discussion
Behind the decision to go into Leyte lay a series
of strategically significant victories, which had followed a staggering
initial reverse. American prewar plans for the Pacific had originally
been based on the assumption that only the United States and Japan
would be at war and that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be in
existence.2 But the destruction of the fleet at Pearl Harbor
and the entrance of Germany and Italy into the war nullified these
plans. The strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff3 in early
1942, therefore, was concerned chiefly with trying to limit the rapid
advance of the Japanese and with keeping the line of communications to
Australia open. The Pacific Theater was divided into command
areas—the Southwest Pacific Area, with General Douglas MacArthur
as [2]Supreme Commander (he referred to himself, however,
as Commander in Chief), and the Pacific Ocean Area (which included the
Central Pacific), with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as Commander in
Chief.4
In 1942 and 1943 the Allied forces had halted the
Japanese at Papua and Guadalcanal and started to push them back. On 8
May 1943 the Joint Chiefs approved a “Strategic Plan for the
Defeat of Japan,” which was endorsed by the Combined Chiefs in
December. The objective of the plan was to secure the unconditional
surrender of Japan, an objective that might necessitate an invasion of
the Japanese home islands. As such an invasion promised to be a
“vast undertaking,” it would be necessary to secure a large
supply base from which a great aerial offensive could be mounted
against Japan. According to the original plan this base was to be
located in China, but the Mariana Islands were afterward substituted
for China. The plan called for the acquisition of successive island
bases which could be used as “steppingstones,” preferably
those which would shorten the sea route, provide for its security, and
at the same time deny to the Japanese bases from which they might
interfere with the Allied line of communications. The main effort was
to be through the waters of the Pacific Ocean. Nimitz’ operations
were to be conducted west through the Japanese mandated islands while
MacArthur’s proceeded northwest along the New Guinea coast. The
two series of operations were to be mutually supporting.5
Although no specific islands were named in the Strategic
Plan, the Philippine Archipelago, because of its strategic position and
long possession by the United States, naturally loomed large in the
planning. The Philippines lie athwart all sea routes south from Japan
to the economically important Netherlands Indies—rich in rubber,
tin, oil, and rice. The capture of the Philippines would help to sever
this line of communications and would furnish an excellent staging area
for attacks against China, Formosa, or Japan. Aside from strategic
considerations, the liberation of the Islands was important for reasons
of Far Eastern politics and prestige.6 The
obligation of the United States to the subjugated Filipino people could
not be lightly ignored. Furthermore, General MacArthur was imbued with
a burning determination to return to the Philippine Islands and avenge
the humiliating defeats suffered by the American forces in 1941 and
1942.
By the spring of 1944 the operations in the Pacific were
going so well that the successes had exceeded even the most optimistic
hopes of any of the planning officers. On 12 March the Joint Chiefs
ordered General MacArthur to prepare plans for a return to Mindanao,
southernmost island of the Philippines, with a target date of 15
November 1944.7 General MacArthur on 15 June issued a plan
for his future operations. The entrance into the Philippines was to be
accomplished in two phases. The first would be a preliminary operation
on 25 [3]October into the Sarangani Bay area in southern
Mindanao in order to establish land-based air forces to augment the
carrier-based air support for the principal effort. The major effort
was to be an amphibious landing operation with forces mounted from New
Guinea for the seizure on 15 November of airfields and bases on
Leyte.8 The latter was to follow quickly on the heels of
the first operation in order to take full advantage of the surprise
tactics.
Leyte occupies a commanding position in the Philippine
Islands. Because of its central location, its repossession by the
United States would not only divide the Japanese forces in the
Philippines but would also provide an excellent anchorage in Leyte
Gulf, together with sites for bases and airfields from which land-based
aircraft could bomb all parts of the Philippines, the coast of China,
and Formosa. To an even greater extent than Mindanao, Leyte could be
made into an excellent springboard from which to launch subsequent
operations against the Japanese in Formosa or in the rest of the
Philippines.
In his planning, General MacArthur recognized that the
Leyte operation, his most ambitious to date, would require
“massed carrier-based air support” and all of the
“combined amphibious and naval forces available at the
time.”9
By June 1944 General MacArthur’s forces had pushed
up the New Guinea coast to the island of Biak, about nine hundred
nautical miles southeast of Davao, Mindanao, while those of Admiral
Nimitz were poised to strike at Saipan some twelve hundred miles
northeast of Davao. In most of their previous campaigns the Americans
had struck with overwhelming force at weakly held Japanese garrisons.
Since the tide of war was now so favorable to the Allied cause, the
Joint Chiefs thought that the Pacific timetable of pending operations
might be accelerated. On 13 June they had therefore asked MacArthur and
Nimitz their opinions with regard to three ways proposed for speeding
up operations: “(a) By advancing target dates of operations now
scheduled through operations against Formosa; (b) By by-passing
presently selected objectives prior to operations against Formosa; and
(c) By by-passing presently selected objectives and choosing new ones
including the home islands.” Although the Philippine Islands were
not explicitly named as targets that might be bypassed, they were
certainly included by implication.10
On 18 June General MacArthur replied to the query of the
Joint Chiefs,11 and on 4 July Admiral Nimitz made known his
opinions.12 On the advancement of the target dates, both
commanders were in complete agreement—it was impossible unless
certain conditions could be changed. The logistic resources in the
Southwest Pacific were being strained to the limit to meet the fixed
target dates, while the strengthening of Japanese garrisons made it
unlikely that the Central Pacific could make its present scheduled
dates.
With respect to bypassing objectives prior to the
seizure of Formosa, MacArthur thought it would be “unsound”
to bypass the Philippines and launch an attack across the Pacific
directly against Formosa—an attack which would have the benefit
of no appreciable land-based air support and [4]which would
be based upon the Hawaiian Islands, 5,100 miles away. In his opinion it
was essential to occupy Luzon and establish land-based aircraft thereon
before making any move against Formosa.13 Nimitz
stated that in a series of informal discussions between his and
MacArthur’s planning officers, the latter anticipated the seizure
in early September of Morotai Island, 300 statute miles southeast of
Mindanao. This was to be followed in late October by a limited
occupation of the Sarangani Bay area on Mindanao, which was to be used
primarily as a base for short-range aircraft. The major operation was
to be the occupation of Leyte about 15 November. Nimitz thought that
this timing was “optimistic.” He felt that the critical and
decisive nature of the Leyte operation required “practically all
available covering and striking forces, fire support forces, and all
available assault shipping.” If successful, however, the
Americans would achieve air supremacy over the Philippines. Therefore,
since the inclusion of the Leyte operation with that of Mindanao would
expedite subsequent operations, Nimitz considered it
“advisable.”14
As to the feasibility of bypassing present objectives
and choosing new ones, including the Japanese home islands, the two
commanders were not in complete agreement. MacArthur pronounced the
concept “utterly unsound,” since the available shipping was
limited to a seven-division lift and there was insufficient air
support. Nimitz thought that no decision should be made until after
further developments.
The proposals disturbed General MacArthur, who concluded
his message to the Joint Chiefs with the following peroration:
It is my opinion that purely military
considerations demand the reoccupation of the Philippines in order to
cut the enemy’s communications to the south and to secure a base
for our further advance. Even if this were not the case and unless
military factors demanded another line of action it would in my opinion
be necessary to reoccupy the Philippines.
The Philippines is American Territory where our
unsupported forces were destroyed by the enemy. Practically all of the
17,000,000 Filipinos remain loyal to the United States and are
undergoing the greatest privation and suffering because we have not
been able to support or succor them. We have a great national
obligation to discharge.
Moreover, if the United States should deliberately
bypass the Philippines, leaving our prisoners, nationals, and loyal
Filipinos in enemy hands without an effort to retrieve them at earliest
moment, we would incur the gravest psychological reaction. We would
admit the truth of Japanese propaganda to the effect that we had
abandoned the Filipinos and would not shed American blood to redeem
them; we would undoubtedly incur the open hostility of that people; we
would probably suffer such loss of prestige among all the peoples of
the Far East that it would adversely affect the United States for many
years….15
In reply, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff,
cautioned MacArthur to “be careful not to let personal feelings
and Philippine politics” override the great objective, which was
to end the war. He also pointed out that “bypassing” was
not “synonymous with abandonment.”16
Admiral William F. Halsey, the commander of the Third
Fleet, and his staff, when they heard of the proposal, were
enthusiastic about the possibility of bypassing the more immediate
objectives. But in contrast to Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval
Operations, who wished to move directly [5]to Formosa, bypassing the
Philippines, Halsey felt it necessary and profitable to go into the
Philippine Archipelago, which he considered to be “the vulnerable
belly of the Imperial dragon.”17 Halsey
stated that when Rear Adm. Robert B. Carney, his chief of staff, was
asked by King, “Do you want to make a London out of
Manila?” Carney replied, “No, sir. I want to make an
England out of Luzon.”18
CONFERENCE AT PEARL HARBOR brings together
(left to right) General Douglas MacArthur, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Admiral William D. Leahy and Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that none of the
currently selected objectives could be bypassed. They continued,
however, to search for means by which the tempo of the war in the
Pacific might be accelerated.
In the latter days of July, General Marshall invited
General MacArthur to visit Pearl Harbor in order to confer with Admiral
Nimitz on future plans for the war in the Pacific. MacArthur arrived on
26 July. To his surprise, the President of the United States was
present. President Roosevelt invited him and Admirals Halsey and Nimitz
to dinner. After dinner the President drew out a map and, pointing to
Leyte, is reported to have said, “Well, Douglas, where do we go
from here?”19 [6]
Although Mac Arthur had been given no intimation that
strategy was going to be discussed, he launched into a long talk on the
necessity of taking Luzon before moving against Formosa. Nimitz did not
enter into the conversation. The following morning the discussions were
continued. Admiral William D. Leahy, who was present, later declared:
“Both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz felt that they did not
require any additional reinforcements or assistance” for the
scheduled operations.20 This Admiral Leahy considered
most unusual.
Admiral Nimitz reported to Admiral King that the
conferences “were quite satisfactory. The general trend of the
discussion … was along the line of seeing MacArthur into the Central
Philippines….”21
There was no strong disagreement between General
MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Leahy said, “I personally
was convinced that they together were the best qualified officers in
our service for this tremendous task, and that they could work together
in full agreement toward the common end of defeating
Japan.”22
Strong efforts were already under way to accelerate
operations in the Pacific. A shortage of shipping appeared to be the
bottleneck which halted all attempts to speed up the operational target
dates. General MacArthur at Brisbane had been directing the whole of
his planning toward the reoccupation of the Philippine Islands, and on
10 July had issued a plan for all operations into the archipelago.
According to this plan the conquest of the Islands was to be
accomplished in four major phases.
The initial phase envisaged footholds in the southern
and central Philippines for the establishment of bases and airfields
from which subsequent operations could be supported. The first
operation, planned for 1 November 1944, was to be the seizure of the
Sarangani Bay area in southern Mindanao for the purpose of establishing
land-based air forces to augment the carrier-based air support for the
advance into Leyte. The Leyte operation, the main effort of this
series, was to come on 22 November. Major air, naval, and logistic
bases were to be constructed on the shores of Leyte Gulf for the
control of Leyte, Samar, and Surigao Strait, and for the neutralization
of the Japanese aerial strength on Luzon.23 The other
phases covered the occupation of Luzon and the consolidation of the
Philippines.
On 26 July the Joint Chiefs agreed that the primary
purpose of the occupation of the Leyte-Mindanao area was to establish
air forces there in order to reduce the enemy air strength on Luzon.
Some of Admiral Nimitz’ assault craft which were suitable for
shore-to-shore operations were to be transferred to General MacArthur.
The Joint Chiefs, therefore, asked their planners to submit their views
on the possibility of advancing the target date for Leyte to 15
November by compressing the intervals between contemplated operations
or by the elimination of certain scheduled operations.24 [7]
In furtherance of this directive, planning officers from
Washington met with General MacArthur and his staff in Brisbane in the
early part of August and discussed means of accelerating the target
date for Leyte. General MacArthur told them that a substantial interval
between the operations at Sarangani Bay and Leyte was necessary. His
reasons were as follows: (1) the assault shipping that was used for the
Sarangani Bay operation would have time to turn around, reload, and
then be used for the Leyte operation; (2) in the interval six combat
air groups could be installed in the Sarangani Bay area to support the
Leyte operation; and (3) the carriers would have sufficient time to
execute two strikes before the Leyte operation.25
The planners from Washington, however, felt that there
was sufficient assault shipping in the Pacific without using the same
craft for both the Sarangani Bay and the Leyte operations. An
enumeration of the vessels assigned to the Southwest Pacific and the
Central Pacific gave the areas more than a six-division lift. As Brig.
Gen. Frank N. Roberts, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group,
Operations Division, War Department General Staff, in Washington, told
Col. William L. Ritchie, his deputy, who was in Brisbane, “If you
sit down and look at those figures a bit you will see that there should
be sufficient assault lift for Leyte just on playing the numbers
racket, without touching the shipping on Sarangani.”26
Both Washington and Brisbane recognized that the
operations in the Leyte-Surigao area were necessary in order to provide
air bases, depot areas, and a fleet anchorage for any future advance
whether in the Philippines, against Formosa, or by a direct route into
the Japanese homeland. Consequently, the planners never seriously
entertained any idea of bypassing this area, although they continued to
probe for means which would accelerate the target date.
The determination of the target date was dependent upon
the availability of assault shipping and the desire of General
MacArthur to have each successive advance supported by land-based
aircraft. The existing shipping was needed for operations already
scheduled. The planners concluded that additional shipping could be
made available if certain phases of the campaigns of Central Pacific
forces into the Palaus, scheduled to start on 15 September, were
canceled or set ahead of schedule. The alternatives were to modify the
concept of providing land-based air support for subsequent operations
or to execute the Sarangani Bay and Leyte operations
simultaneously.27 There the matter rested. Apparently the
Joint Chiefs had decided that the time was not opportune for an
acceleration of the target dates.
On 27 August General MacArthur furnished General
Marshall a timetable for future operations by his forces. On 15
September a division and a reinforced regiment were to seize Morotai in
order “to protect the western flank” and to provide
land-based aircraft for advances northward. On 15 October a division
less one regimental combat team was to land in the Talaud Islands
northwest of Morotai in order “to neutralize the [Japanese]
western flank,” to establish air bases from which the
neutralization of Mindanao and the western Visayan Islands could be
accomplished, and to set up a base for airborne troops. On 15 November
two divisions were to land in the [8]Sarangani Bay area in order to
construct bases for land-based aircraft that were to support the Leyte
operation. On 7 December a regimental combat team and a parachute
battalion were to drop on Mindanao and establish an airfield for
fighter cover for the aerial neutralization of the western Visayan
Islands and southern Luzon. On 20 December five divisions were to land
on Leyte for the purpose of providing “major air and logistic
bases for operations to the northward.” The plan was predicated
on the assumption that there would be available in the Pacific
sufficient amphibious lift and fleet support.28
Plans Agreed Upon
On 1 September 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
their 171st meeting reviewed the situation in the Pacific. The time had
come when it was necessary to issue a directive for future operations
in that area. After much discussion, the Joint Chiefs left in abeyance
the question of what operation should follow Leyte but “directed
the Joint Staff Planners to prepare, as a matter of urgency, a
directive to the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, to carry out the Leyte
operation.”29
Accordingly, on 8 September, the two commanders were
given the following missions: General MacArthur, after conducting the
necessary preliminary operations, was to take the Leyte-Surigao area on
20 December, with Admiral Nimitz furnishing fleet support and
additional assault shipping. Both commanders were to arrange for
co-ordination of plans and mutual support of operations; to co-ordinate
plans with General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, United
States Army forces, China, Burma and India, in order to get maximum
support from that theater; and to arrange with General Henry H. Arnold,
Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, for supporting
operations.30
Concurrently with the issuance of this directive,
momentous events were taking place in the Pacific. Admiral Halsey was
in command of scheduled operations against the Palau Islands. On 7 and
8 September aircraft from his carriers struck at Yap and the Palau
Islands, against which Admiral Nimitz had scheduled operations, and for
the next two days bombed Mindanao. On the 12th and 14th the bombers hit
the central Philippines in support of the operations against the Palau
Islands and Morotai.
Admiral Halsey advised Admiral Nimitz that, as a result
of the strikes, few serviceable planes in the Philippines were left to
the Japanese, the bulk of the enemy’s oil supplies was destroyed,
there was “no shipping left to sink,” the
“enemy’s non-aggressive attitude [was] unbelievable and
fantastic,” and “the area is wide open.”31 Halsey also told Nimitz that one of his downed
carrier pilots had been told by his Filipino rescuers that there were
no Japanese on Leyte.32 He therefore felt that it was
time to accelerate the operations in the Pacific, and he strongly
recommended that the intermediate operations—Yap, [9]Talaud, and
the Sarangani Bay area on Mindanao—be canceled. Leyte could be
seized immediately and cheaply without any intermediate operations.
Halsey’s fleet could cover the initial landing until land-based
aircraft could be established. The force intended for the occupation of
Yap could be made available to General MacArthur.33
When this message was received, the Combined Chiefs of
Staff were attending a conference in Quebec. The recommendations were
transmitted to Quebec by Admiral Nimitz, who offered to place at
MacArthur’s disposal the III Amphibious Force, including the XXIV
Corps, which was loading at Pearl Harbor for Yap. General Marshall so
informed General MacArthur and asked his opinion on the proposed change
of target date.34
The message reached MacArthur’s headquarters at
Hollandia, on New Guinea, while MacArthur was en route to Morotai and
observing radio silence. His chief of staff advised General Marshall
that although the information from the rescued pilot that there were no
Japanese on Leyte was incorrect, the intermediate operations could be
eliminated. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division
with sufficient service troops were available for the Leyte operation;
adequate air strength could be provided; the logistic support was
practicable; and the XXIV Corps could be used.35
General Marshall received this answer at Quebec on 15
September while he, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and General Arnold
were at a formal dinner given by Canadian officers. The Americans
withdrew from the table for a conference. Within an hour and a half
after the message arrived, the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur and
Nimitz to cancel the three intermediate operations of Yap, Talaud, and
Sarangani, co-ordinate their plans, and invade Leyte on 20
October.36
Later that evening, as he was on his way to his quarters
after the dinner, General Marshall received this message:
“Subject to completion of arrangements with Nimitz, we shall
execute Leyte operation on 20 October…. MacArthur.”37
On 3 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General
MacArthur to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944, the date originally set
for the entrance into Leyte.38 The decision had been made.
General MacArthur was to return to the Philippine Islands in force.
[10]
1
Philippine Municipal Government Reports, Folder 2, App. DD, Guerrilla
File 6910.23 (B), Military Intelligence (MI) Library. ↑
2 Louis
Morton, “American and Allied Strategy in the Far East,”
Military Review, XXIX (December, 1949), 38. ↑
3 The
Joint Chiefs of Staff were General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff,
United States Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S.
Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; General Henry H. Arnold,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief—the President of the
United States. The Joint Chiefs were responsible for the conduct of the
war in the Pacific, subject to the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. The latter were representatives of the United States and the
United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs represented the United
States. ↑
4 Memo,
Gen Marshall and Admiral King for President, 30 Mar 42, no sub, and two
incls, “Directive to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean
Area” and “Directive to Supreme Commander in the Southwest
Pacific,” OPD ABC 323.31 POA (1–29–42),
1-B. ↑
5 JCS
287/1, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 8 May 43; CCS 417,
Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 2 Dec 43. ↑
6 United
States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS], Military Analysis Division,
Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command
(Washington, 1947), p. 32. ↑
7 JCS to
CINCSWPA, CM-IN 5137, 12 Mar 44. CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers used in the
footnotes of this volume refer to numbers on copies of those messages
in General Marshall’s Message Log, on file in the Staff
Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army. ↑
8 GHQ
SWPA, RENO V, 15 Jun 44. ↑
10 Rad,
JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, CM-OUT 50007, 13 Jun 44. ↑
11 Rad,
CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 15058, 18 Jun 44. ↑
12 Rad,
CINCPOA to COMINCH, CM-IN 2926, 4 Jul 44. ↑
16 Rad,
CofS to CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 55718, 24 Jun 44. ↑
17 William
F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York, 1947), pp.
194–99. ↑
19
Information was furnished by Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR, 22
January 1951, who stated that Roosevelt had related the incident to
him. Lt. Gen. Robert G. Richardson, who was not present, states that
MacArthur told him that the President pointed to Mindanao when he made
his remark. Ltr, Gen Richardson to Gen Marshall, 1 Aug 44, Book 21, OPD
Exec 9. ↑
20 Interv
with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH. ↑
21 Memo,
COMINCH for CofS, 9 Aug 44, OPD ABC 384 Pacific
(1–17–43). ↑
22 Interv
with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH. See also, Fleet Admiral William D.
Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), pp. 247–52. In answer
to an inquiry about the conference made to the director of the Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library, the author was informed that “a careful
search of the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in this Library has not
revealed any materials that would be pertinent to the
subject….” Ltr, Herman Kahn to author, 20 Oct 50,
OCMH. ↑
23 GHQ
SWPA, MUSKETEER Plan, 10 Jul 44. ↑
24 Rad,
JPS to Staff Planners of CINCPOA and CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 71483, 27 Jul
44. ↑
25 Tel
conf, Washington and Brisbane, 7 Aug 44, WD-TC 797. ↑
26 Tel
conf, Washington and Brisbane, 10 Aug 44, WD-TC 809. ↑
28 Rad,
CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 24770, 27 Aug 44. ↑
29 Min,
JCS 171st Mtg, 1 Sep 44. ↑
30 Rad,
JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, CM-OUT 27648, 8 Sep 44. ↑
31 Rad,
Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 13120, 14 Sep 44. ↑
32 Rad,
Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CINCSWPA, and COMINCH, CM-IN 12893, 13 Sep
44. ↑
33 Rad,
Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 12893, 14 Sep 44. ↑
34
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army,
July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War
(Washington, 1945), p. 71. ↑
35 Rad,
CINCSWPA to JCS, CINCPOA, and Com3dFlt, CM-IN 12636, 14 Sep
44. ↑
36 Rad,
JCS to CINCSWPA, CINCPOA, and Com3dFlt, 15 Sep 44, OCTAGON 31-A, CofS
CM-OUT Log, 15 Sep 44; Biennial Report, p. 71, cited n. 34;
General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New
York, 1949), pp. 529–30. ↑
CHAPTER II
The Nature of the Target
The Philippine Islands, the largest island group
in the Malay Archipelago, were discovered by Ferdinand Magellan in
1521. They became a Spanish possession in 1565 and remained so until 10
December 1898 when they were ceded to the United States by the Treaty
of Paris as a result of the Spanish-American war. In the spring of 1942
Japan secured military domination over the Islands.
The Philippine Archipelago lay in the geographical heart
of the Far Eastern theater of war. As a pivotal point of control the
Islands were centrally placed in relation to Japan, China, Burma,
French Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies.
Being the most northerly part of the Malay Archipelago, the Philippines
were also close to the vital areas of Japan and the Chinese-held areas
of the Asiatic mainland. Located southeast of the continent, they
occupy much the same position with respect to the mainland of Asia that
the West Indies do with respect to North America.
The Islands are among the remnants of a great continent
that once extended over the space now occupied by the entire East
Indies. There are some 7,100 islands and islets in the Philippine
Archipelago, which has a land area of 114,830 square miles. Of these,
about 460 have an area of one square mile or more and 2,773 are named.
The Philippine Islands are divided into three main groups—Luzon
and adjacent islands in the northern sector; the Visayan Islands in the
central portion, comprising Samar, Leyte, and numerous others; and
finally, in the southern part, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The
Philippines had a prewar population of about 16,000,000, of whom
14,550,000 were Christians, 678,000 were Mohammedans, 626,000 were
pagans, and about 64,000 were Buddhists and Shintoists.1
Geography of Leyte
The northeastern Visayan group, which consists
mainly of Leyte and Samar, was selected as the point of entrance into
the Philippines. Leyte had the higher potential military value. The air
distance from the capital city of Tacloban to Manila is 295 miles.
Leyte is a natural gateway to the rest of the Philippines, and its
possession would greatly facilitate and support further operations to
the north as well as expedite control over the remaining islands in the
Visayan group.2 [11]
Leyte roughly resembles a molar tooth with its crown
toward Samar and its roots pointing to Mindanao. The eighth largest
island in the Philippines, with an area of 2,785 square miles, it runs
generally from north to south, with an approximate length of 115 miles
and a width of 15 to 45 miles. It is situated on one of the principal
submerged shelves of the Philippine Archipelago, and the waters over
the shelf have an average depth of 22 fathoms. (Map 2—inside
back cover)
The Terrain
The island is mainly volcanic in origin. A range
of mountains, the topographical backbone of the island, extends
southeast from Biliran Strait in the north to Cabalian Bay in the south
and separates the Leyte and Ormoc Valleys. All of southern Leyte is
mountainous and, militarily speaking, of little importance. The
northwest coast is also rugged, and except for the port of Palompon has
little tactical significance. The heavily forested central mountain
range is composed of numerous knifelike ridges and spurs and deep
ravines and serves as an effective natural barrier between the
island’s eastern and western coastal areas. It is a major
obstacle to the rapid movement of troops and can be utilized very
effectively in defending the island.
Leyte Valley, a broad and fertile plain, stretches
across the northeastern part of the island from Leyte Gulf to Carigara
Bay. More than twenty-five miles wide along the shore of the gulf, it
is gradually narrowed by the mountain ranges to the north and south to
less than ten miles as it reaches Carigara Bay. Most of the
island’s population live in this valley, and here too are most of
the principal cities and airfields.
The main road net of the island runs through Leyte
Valley, a great number of streams interlacing it. The numerous rice
paddies, centuries old, disrupt the natural drainage of the valley.
Rarely is the water level more than a few inches below the surface.
Even in the drier months, vehicular movement is limited to the existing
roads. In 1944 these were poor, inadequate, and ill suited for heavy
military traffic. The best of them had only a light bituminous surface
and were neither wide enough nor strong enough for two-way military
traffic.3 It was hoped that Leyte Valley could be developed
into a large air and logistical base to support further operations, but
it was not well suited for this purpose.
The shore line of Leyte Valley along Leyte Gulf and San
Pedro Bay affords the best landing beaches on the island. This coast is
dangerous for beach landings during northeast monsoon periods, when
heavy surf, high winds, and torrential rains imperil men, equipment,
and shipping. July, August, and September are the best months for
landing. In general there are good firm sand beaches, onto which
landing craft can go directly. A road parallels the shore line, but
there are few exit roads from the beach to this road and beyond. In
many places close to the shore there are swamps and rice paddies which
prevent rapid egress from the beach. There are other good landing
beaches on the east coast of Ormoc Bay, but they are crossed by
innumerable creeks and streams.
Leyte Gulf is large and open, offering an excellent
anchorage for a considerable number of vessels, including those of
largest size. Carigara Bay, to the north of the island, is [12]twenty
miles wide, but shallow waters, swamps, and the hilly terrain of its
eastern and western sides restrict its value for military operations. A
narrow neck of the central mountain range separates the bay from the
northern end of Ormoc Valley. San Juanico Strait, which separates Leyte
from Samar in the north, connects Carigara Bay and San Pedro Bay, the
latter being a northern extension of Leyte Gulf. The strait is thirteen
and a half miles long with an average width of a quarter to a half
mile. Small landing craft can navigate the channel, but there are
strong tidal currents which cause violent rips and swirls at many
points.
Wedged in between the central mountain range and the
hill mass of the northwest coast of Leyte, the Ormoc Valley, about five
miles wide in its largest part, extends from Ormoc Bay to the north for
fifteen miles where a narrow neck of the central ridge separates it
from Carigara Bay. Through the valley runs a narrow road, its northern
portion marked by steep grades and sharp curves. Halfway along, a
branch road zigzags its course to Port Palompon on the west coast.
Although most of the southern part of the valley is under cultivation,
there are large patches of forest, scrub growth, and cogon grass in the
north.4
The largest city on the island, the provincial capital,
is Tacloban, which lies at the head of San Pedro Bay. As the only
sizable port in the area, it handles most of the outbound shipping,
mainly from Leyte and Samar. Its prewar population was about 31,000.
Other important towns are Carigara and Barugo on the north coast;
Baybay and Ormoc, the leading ports on the west coast; and Palo,
Tanauan, and Abuyog along the east coast. All the more significant
towns are situated on the main road system of the island, and the
larger coastal barrios (villages) have roads of a sort.
The road system is divided into a northern and a
southern coastal road net. The former, which is the better, was
designed for the transportation of agricultural produce from the
northern interior areas to Tacloban. The latter is composed of narrow,
roundabout roads that are constantly in need of repair. The two systems
are joined by a road, scarcely better than a trail, which runs west of
Abuyog and corkscrews its way through heavily forested mountains to
Baybay. Another road, long, narrow, and broken in parts, goes north
from Baybay to Ormoc and thence through the Ormoc Valley to
Carigara.
The Tacloban airstrip, the principal airfield on the
island, was located on the Cataisan Peninsula, which lies just
southeast of Tacloban. The Japanese had constructed another airfield,
known as the Dulag airstrip, two miles west of Dulag; three
others—the Buri, Bayug, and San Pablo airstrips—near
Burauen, five miles west of Dulag; and still another at Valencia in the
Ormoc Valley, eight miles north of Ormoc.
Control of the island of Leyte is dependent upon control
of the Leyte and Ormoc Valleys and their adjacent hills and mountains.
Thus, before a successful movement into Leyte Valley could be assured,
control of the high ground in the vicinity of Palo would be essential.
Continued dominance over the valley is dependent upon control of the
high ground at its northwestern end in the vicinity of Pinamopoan on
Carigara Bay, possession of which would preclude infiltration from
Ormoc Valley. The control of Ormoc Valley and use of the excellent
anchorage and harbor facilities of Ormoc Bay is dependent upon control
of the lowland [13]in the vicinity of Ormoc city and the commanding
hills to the east.
The People
In 1939 the total population of Leyte was 915,853,
of whom more than 912,000 were native Visayans of Malaysian stock. The
largest other group consisted of 3,076 Chinese, half of whom were
engaged in retail trade. There was a sprinkling of other national
groups—40 Spaniards, 20 Germans, 81 from other European
countries, 56 Americans, and 73 Japanese.
Because of their insular position and somewhat primitive
culture, the inhabitants are primarily an agricultural and fishing
people. The principal crops are rice, sugar cane, corn, and copra.
Judged by Occidental standards, the mode of farming is backward and
shows little tendency to progress. The Filipinos who have been exposed
to industrial life, however, have been able to adapt themselves to
employment in the limited trade crafts and manufacturing on the
island.
According to his own standards, the Filipino lives well
enough. His chief foods are rice or corn, fish, camotes (sweet
potatoes), and occasionally chicken or other meat. The men’s
clothing is simple; the average man has several changes of cheap cotton
shirts and pants made of imported cotton cloth or, in the more remote
districts, from homespun material.
Most of the dwelling houses are made of bamboo and
sheathed with palm leaves on roof and sides. The material is gathered
locally and tied with rattan. The houses rarely consist of more than
two rooms, and many are raised on pilings, with space for the family pig
and chickens underneath. In one of the rooms, or outdoors, is an open
fireplace with a mud and stone hearth for cooking. There is little
furniture, and in three out of four families the personal possessions
would not be worth more than ten dollars.
Less than 5 percent of the people have a rising standard
of living. This higher standard is exemplified by a better type of
habitation, which ranges from a three-room house to a dwelling similar
to that of the American middle class. The diet of more prosperous
Filipinos is basically the same as that of the poorer class, but it
offers a greater variety. Clothing follows the Occidental fashion. The
wealthiest people and those with foreign education or contacts, who
make up less than 1 percent of the population, dress and live in the
same manner as Occidentals.
The Japanese, during their occupation, governed through
the old administrative organization of the province. They and their
puppet officials also set up larger governing bodies that exercised
superior jurisdiction. On 6 February 1944 the puppet president of the
Philippine Republic, José Laurel, appointed a commissioner who
held supervisory power over the local governments in the Visayan
Provinces.
The governor of the province of Leyte, who previously
had been an elected official, was appointed by the president. He was
the chief operative and administrative head of the province and on all
provincial administrative matters his decision was final. The treasurer
of the province, who reported directly to the governor, was its chief
financial officer and tax assessor. He collected all taxes and license
fees, national and local, and prepared financial statements for the
governor but he had no say in administrative matters. The law officer
of the province was [14]legal adviser to the governor and to the
municipal authorities. He could advise only on administrative
matters.
The Japanese Military Administration maintained liaison
between the Japanese Army and the civil government. The military police
collected military intelligence and information and disseminated
propaganda. The Japanese allowed only one political party on the
Islands—the Kalibapi—to which all government
officials were required to belong. This party was one of the principal
propaganda agencies, being the prime mover of the pacification programs
in the province, and exercised general supervision over the local
neighborhood associations. The latter helped in maintaining law and
order, assisted the constabulary, and aided in the distribution of
scarce commodities.
It should be emphasized that during most of the
occupation there were few Japanese on Leyte. Southern Leyte in general
maintained the same Filipino institutions and officials as in the
prewar years. The heel of the Japanese conqueror pressed but lightly on
most of the people of Leyte. Beginning in early 1944, however, the
Japanese Army forces on the island were reinforced. From that time
forward the Filipinos had their crops appropriated and in other ways
were subjected to the will of the Japanese. Misery, hunger, and poverty
became commonplace and a resistance movement grew.
The Resistance Movement on Leyte
The Organizing of Guerrilla Bands
A period of uncertainty and confusion followed the
surrender of the American and Filipino forces in the Philippines in the
spring of 1942. Civilians and members of the armed forces who did not
surrender to the Japanese Army fled into the hills. Some went because
they wanted to continue the fight, others because they felt that the
chaotic conditions on the Islands would afford unequaled opportunities
for looting and pillaging.
Once in the hills, the men formed themselves into
guerrilla bands.5 At first all of the bands, because of their
lack of money and supplies, freely raided farms and storehouses for
food and equipment whenever they had the opportunity. Moreover, there
were real bandit groups who frequently and wantonly raped the
countryside. For a time all of the groups were discredited by the
people. Gradually, however, strong men emerged who formed the guerrilla
bands into semi-military organizations. The leader of each band, who
was generally an ex-member of the armed forces, gave himself a
“bamboo commission,” usually considerably higher than the
one he had hitherto possessed.
The following oath of allegiance taken by the members of
one of the bands is probably typical:
I do solemnly swear that I shall obey orders from
my superior officer; that I shall fight the enemy of the Government of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States of America
whosoever and wherever he maybe [sic] in the territory of the
Philippines; that I shall never allow myself nor any arm or ammunition
to be caught by the [15]enemy; that I shall never turn traitor to my
country nor the United States of America; and muchless [sic] reveal to
the enemy any secret of the Army to which I honorably belong; that I
shall never abandon a wounded brother in arms; that I join the United
Forces in the Philippines without personal or party interest, but with
the determination to sacrifice myself and all that is mine for FREEDOM
and DEMOCRACY; that I shall protect the lives and property of all loyal
Filipinos everywhere.
I make this LOYALTY OATH without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.6
For some time the various guerrilla bands on Leyte
operated separately, and there was little or no co-operation between
them. They were united, however, in their hatred of the Japanese.
Jealousy and strife between groups were rampant, but circumstances
gradually compelled the smaller bands to submit to absorption, either
by force or persuasion, into the larger and more powerful groups. The
fact that there were few Japanese on the island enabled the guerrillas
and loyal provincial officials to organize the governments of most of
the barrios.
GUERRILLAS PREPARE FOR INSPECTION AT
CONSUEGRA
All of the guerrillas declared that their primary
purpose was to aid the civilians, maintain peace and order, and keep
the Japanese from abusing the people. They also assumed control over
various phases of public activities—the allotment of food
supplies, the issue of emergency currency, and the punishment of
criminals. The guerrillas in northern Leyte depended upon voluntary
contributions to support them, while those in southern Leyte levied a
loyalty tax. Hard money having been driven out of circulation, the
guerrilla units tried to issue paper, which was acceptable only in
those regions where [16]the particular unit was active. There was no
widespread circulation or acceptance of any of the guerrilla money.
The most important of the guerrilla leaders on Leyte
were Lt. Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon and Brig. Gen. Blas E. Miranda.
Colonel Kangleon had served for twenty-seven years in the Philippine
Army and was a graduate of the Philippine Academy and General Service
School. General Miranda,7 a former member of the
Philippine Constabulary, was very hostile to the Japanese and to anyone
who surrendered to them. He killed many former prisoners, whom the
Japanese had released, on the pretext that they were enemy spies.
Miranda was especially bitter toward Kangleon, a former prisoner of the
enemy.
Official recognition from General MacArthur’s
headquarters was slow in reaching the guerrillas on Leyte, a fact that
brought about misunderstandings. General MacArthur had early
established contact with Col. Macario Peralta on Panay and Col. Wendell
Fertig on Mindanao. In the middle of February 1943 MacArthur sent Lt.
Comdr. Charles Parsons, USNR, to the Islands by submarine. Before his
departure, General Headquarters had established the policies to be
followed. The prewar military districts, as of December 1940, were to
be revived.8 Since General MacArthur had received information
that Colonel Fertig had successfully created an effective guerrilla
organization on Mindanao and Colonel Peralta one on Panay, he
recognized them as commanders of the 10th and 6th Military Districts,
respectively. Radio communication from MacArthur’s headquarters
informed Peralta and Fertig of the appointments on 21 February 1943.
Commander Parsons also carried formal letters, dated 13 February 1943,
making these appointments.
Parsons safely reached the Philippines in early March
and established friendly relations with Colonel Fertig. While on
Mindanao he made several local trips, one to southern Leyte where he
heard of Colonel Kangleon who had escaped from the Butuan prison camp
and returned to his home. Parsons visited Kangleon with the promise
that he would be made commander of the 9th Military District (Leyte and
Samar), and succeeded in persuading him to join the guerrilla movement
on Leyte.9
Until area commanders could be selected for the 7th,
8th, and 9th (Leyte) Districts, Peralta and Fertig had been authorized
by MacArthur’s headquarters, through Parsons, to organize the
guerrillas on neighboring islands, as well as on their own. Each
thought he was to organize the guerrillas on Leyte. Peralta made
contact with General Miranda on northwestern Leyte; Fertig got in touch
with Colonel Kangleon. Both Peralta and Fertig told their contacts to
organize Leyte with the official sanction of General MacArthur’s
headquarters. Consequently, Kangleon and Miranda each thought the other
to be a usurper.10
Miranda was adamant in his refusal to treat with
Kangleon. Colonel Kangleon thought that Miranda should be ordered to
“forget his established kingdom,” but if this failed, he
declared, the 92d Division, [17]commanded by himself, would
“force … Miranda to join us.”11
The situation became extremely tense, since both
Kangleon and Miranda felt much bitterness. In August 1943 Kangleon sent
a force against Miranda and during a clash between the two parties some
of the men were killed. Miranda was routed and many of his followers
joined Kangleon.12 The power of Miranda was broken. Kangleon
incorporated the other guerrillas on the island into the 92d Division,
and Leyte was then unified under his command.
On 21 October 1943 General MacArthur recognized Colonel
Kangleon as the Leyte Area Commander, and in a letter accompanying the
appointment he told Kangleon what he expected of him. “I desire
that you establish and maintain direct communication with this
headquarters at your earliest opportunity and thereafter you keep me
informed of major developments involving enemy movement, dispositions
and other activity within your area and observation.”13
Japanese Punitive Expeditions
In the latter part of 1943 the Japanese military
authorities tried to conciliate the guerrillas, offering, in return for
their surrender, not only freedom from punishment but also jobs and the
opportunity to resume their normal family life. A great many guerrillas
took advantage of this offer of amnesty and surrendered.14 Among the guerrilla units that surrendered to the
Japanese were those of Maj. Marcos G. Soliman and other subordinates of
General Miranda’s command.15 They gave themselves up in
January 1944, but General Miranda himself refused to surrender and left
for either Cebu or Bohol.
After their attempts at pacification, the Japanese
launched more frequent and intensive patrols against the guerrillas.
The garrison troops that had been stationed on Leyte were reinforced.
Southern Leyte, which had known few Japanese, was
“reinvolved” on 8 December 1943. The guerrillas withdrew
and hid in the interior. It was thought that after a month the troops
would leave and be replaced by constabulary officers. But after two
weeks the Japanese turned their attention to the civilians. Some they
arrested and imprisoned for days without food and water, others they
tortured and executed. Houses were broken into, property was looted,
and food was stolen. Spies were brought in from neighboring islands to
locate the guerrilla hideouts.
Since the people begged for action, Colonel Kangleon
held a meeting of his unit commanders on 24 January 1944. With his
officers in unanimous accord, he issued an order to fight, commencing
on 1 February 1944. All officers and enlisted men of his command signed
a loyalty oath that they [18]would not allow either themselves or
their weapons to be captured.
From 1 February until 12 June, according to Colonel
Kangleon, the guerrillas in southern Leyte had only 10 casualties. In a
report dated 18 May 1944, the Japanese casualties were listed as 434
killed, of whom 4 were officers, and 205 wounded.
The Japanese commander in Leyte made quite a different
report. He stated that from 1 January to 31 August his forces had taken
part in 561 engagements with the guerrillas. They had seized 7
vehicles; 7 generators; 37 radios and other items of wireless
equipment; 1,556 weapons, including rifles, bayonets, and homemade
shotguns; and 55,348 rounds of ammunition, as well as sticks of
dynamite. The Japanese declared that they had taken 2,300 prisoners of
war, including 3 Americans; that 6 Americans and 23,077 Filipinos had
surrendered; 1,984 guerrillas had been killed; and that the Japanese
casualties amounted to 7 officers and 208 enlisted men killed, and 11
officers and 147 men wounded.16
In the month of October 1944 General MacArthur’s
Military Intelligence Section estimated that the strength of the
guerrilla 92d Division was as follows: Headquarters, Leyte Area
Command, 23 officers and 107 enlisted men; 94th Regiment, 71 officers
and 1,210 enlisted men; 95th Regiment, 78 officers and 954 enlisted
men; 96th Regiment, 37 officers and 710 enlisted men; total strength,
209 officers and 2,981 enlisted men.17
Colonel Kangleon stated that as a result of guerrilla
activities the Japanese sent out fewer patrols, staying mainly in the
towns. The civilians, he claimed, were therefore able to plant and
harvest their crops. Despite these brave words the guerrillas were
definitely on the defensive, since Japanese intelligence had accurate
information on their movements and strength. Nevertheless, the Japanese
also knew that the guerrillas had established communication with
General MacArthur in Australia and that they were sending important
information to General Headquarters. This service the Japanese were
unable to cut off.
Liaison Between Leyte and Australia
After his arrival in Australia in March 1942,
General MacArthur had maintained radio contact with Corregidor until 6
May, but because of conditions in the Philippines radio communication
with other parts of the Islands was all but impossible.18 Before its fall, Corregidor maintained radio
contact with military commanders on the other islands. Afterward, a few
men escaped and made their way to Australia. The sum of information
they brought was not large, but it included the welcome news that
guerrilla units were in existence all over the Islands. In the summer
of 1942 General Headquarters began to receive messages from the
guerrillas in the Philippines, though at first General MacArthur was
not sure that the messages actually came from the guerrillas.
In August 1942 MacArthur decided to get in touch with
the members of the resistance movement in the Philippines, and for this
purpose he enlisted the services of Maj. [19]Jesus Antonio Villamor,
who had escaped from the Islands and who volunteered to
return.19 From August to December methods were devised and
plans were made for sending an intelligence party to the
Philippines.20 On 27 December 1942 Major Villamor received
orders to return secretly to the Islands by submarine with three other
Filipino officers and two enlisted men.21 They were
instructed to establish an intelligence and secret service network
throughout the Philippines; develop a chain of communications within
the Philippines and to Australia, together with an escape route from
the Islands for the evacuation of important personages; build up an
organization for subversive activities, propaganda, limited resistance,
and sabotage; and make an intelligence survey to obtain information on
Japanese political, military, and civil intentions as well as the
strength and disposition of Japanese military, naval, and air
forces.22
Armed with these instructions, Major Villamor returned
to the Philippine Islands. Slowly but carefully, from December 1942 to
November 1943, he established an intelligence network that covered
Luzon and the Visayan Islands. His story is told in part as
follows:
I established this network principally with the
idea that this net would be entirely independent of all intelligence
nets previously established by the guerrillas, believing that in all
probability you [General MacArthur] could rely more on guerrilla
intelligence activities for the present. I wanted to establish
something that would really be underground and as secret as possible.
For that reason, I took my time about it. I took as much as two months
to train each individual man. I tried to impress on each man that after
he left my place, he would be on his own and that no matter what
happened to me or to the rest of the net, he would carry on. I assured
him that both GHQ and I would have faith in him.23
Kangleon was largely responsible for the Leyte radio
network. This intelligence network did not cover the entire island but
only those positions over which he had control. General MacArthur did
not furnish any considerable supplies for this net until shortly before
his return in October 1944.24 On 3 July 1944 Kangleon
received seventy tons of supplies; an additional shipment of supplies
and men followed on 20 July.25 This allotment was in addition
to money sent him. The funds available to Kangleon consisted of $50,000
in prewar currency (“only a few hundred” of which were
spent by him), $225,000 in “bogus Japanese” currency, and
$479,198 in emergency currency printed in the Islands and used for
“army” purposes.26
Several clandestine radio stations were in operation on
or near Leyte in June 1944. These were primarily contact stations
established originally to integrate more closely the activities of the
various guerrilla units with the directives of Colonel Kangleon’s
headquarters, which was in touch with General Headquarters. After the
Leyte Area Command was recognized by General MacArthur, the first radio
was sent to Leyte, but the Japanese captured it early in 1944 before
[20]it could be put to use. Kangleon received a new
set from Mindanao. There were two coastwatcher stations in
operation—one in southern Leyte and the other on Dinagat Island.
These furnished MacArthur information on the activities of the Japanese
in the area. Colonel Kangleon also used the radio set in southern Leyte
to maintain contact with Colonel Fertig on Mindanao.27
As a result of information received from the
intelligence network, on Leyte and in other areas, together with
information from other sources, General MacArthur’s intelligence
officers were able to piece together a reasonably accurate picture of
the Japanese units on Leyte, their strength, dispositions, and
fortifications.
Kangleon’s network, however, was not as active as
most of the others in the Philippines that were operated by
coastwatchers and guerrillas. From March 1944, when Kangleon’s
network was established, to October 1944, when the American forces
returned, the monthly totals of messages received by General
Headquarters from Leyte were as follows: March, 6; April, 7; May, 7;
June, 12; July, 13; August, 13; September, 17; and October,
26.28
The guerrillas of the Philippine Islands made
far-reaching contributions to the war effort. They were an extremely
valuable source of intelligence; their activities forced the Japanese
to retain in the Philippines comparatively large forces which would
otherwise have been sent south; it is estimated that they killed from
eight thousand to ten thousand Japanese troops; and, finally, they
bolstered the morale, spirit, and loyalty of the Filipino
people.29 They kept alive the hope and belief that the
forces of the United States would return and redeem the Islands.
[21]
1 MI Sec,
WDGS, Survey of the Philippines, 3 vols., 15 Feb 43; Div of Naval
Intel, Office, Chief of Naval Opns, ONI 93, Field Monograph of the
Philippines, Jan 44; Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study
84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44; ASF Manual M365–1, Civil Affairs
Handbook, Philippine Islands, 25 Apr 44. ↑
2 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. Unless otherwise stated the material on
terrain is based upon this report, pages 5–7. ↑
3 S. D.
Sturgis, Jr., Brigadier General, U.S. Army Air Engineer, USAF,
Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, reprinted from The
Military Engineer, November and December, 1947, and January, 1948,
p. 4. ↑
4 Allied
Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug
44, p. 43. ↑
5 Unless
otherwise stated, material on the guerrillas is based upon the
Guerrilla Papers, a collection of disorganized, miscellaneous records
by and about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. It is located in
the Documents Files Section, G-2, Department of the Army.
The records of the Leyte guerrillas are
incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some of the guerrilla bands
had no records, and all that is known of others is from violently
prejudiced sources. Consequently, the full story of the guerrillas can
probably never be told. ↑
6 24th Div
G-2 Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
7
Miranda’s rank is obscure. At various times he is referred to as
lieutenant, major, colonel, and brigadier general. ↑
8 MI Sec,
GHQ AFPAC, Intelligence Series, Vol. II, Intelligence Activities in the
Philippines. During the Japanese Occupation (hereafter
cited as Intelligence Activities in the Philippines), App.
7. ↑
9
Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 56. ↑
11 Memo,
Col Kangleon for K-50-OCTOPUS (probably for MacArthur), 23 May 43,
Guerrilla Papers. ↑
12 The
estimates on the number of deaths vary considerably. In a letter to
President Manuel Quezon by Senator Carlos Garcia, dated 16 October
1943, the deaths are mentioned as “several”; a manuscript
by Mrs. Charlotte Martin, who was on Leyte, says “many lives were
lost”; and 1st Lt. Jack Hawkins, USMC, a guerrilla, stated in
December 1943 that “over three hundred casualties were suffered
by the contesting sides.” Guerrilla Papers. ↑
13 GHQ
FEC, MI Sec, GS, Messages in the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the
Philippines, Kangleon 201 File, DRB AGO. ↑
14 Office
of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Br, Rpt, Guerrilla
Resistance in the Philippines, 21 Jul 44, Guerrilla
Papers. ↑
15 ATIS,
GHQ SWPA, Current Translations, 148, 6 Feb 45. ↑
16 ATIS,
SWPA, Enemy Publications 359, Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines,
2 parts, 28 Apr 45, passim, DRB AGO. Any resemblance between the
Japanese figures and those in Kangleon’s reports is purely
coincidental. ↑
17 MI Sec,
GHQ SWPA, G-2 Info Bull, The Resistance Movement on Leyte Island, 7 Oct
44, Doc Files Sec, G-2, Dept of Army. ↑
18
Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 5. ↑
19 Lt.
Gen. Lewis H. Brereton considered Villamor “the most daring of
the Filipino pilots.” Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton
Diaries (New York, 1946), p. 58. ↑
20 Interv
with Maj Villamor, 12 Oct 50. ↑
21 The
party consisted of Major Villamor, 1st Lt. R. C. Ignacio, 2d Lt. D. C.
Yuhico, 2d Lt. E. F. Quinto, Sgt. P. Jorge, and Sgt. D.
Malie. ↑
22 AIB,
GHQ SWPA, Instructions to Maj Villamor, 27 Dec 42, Guerrilla
Papers. ↑
23
Villamor Rpt on Intel Net in Philippines, Guerrilla
Papers. ↑
24
Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 77. ↑
25
Ibid., App. 2. The number of men and the amount and kinds of
supplies are not given. ↑
28 GHQ
FEC, MI Sec, GS, A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA, and
Affiliated Units, Plate 10, facing p. 32, copy in OCMH. ↑
29 Office,
Chief of Naval Opns, Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, 14 Sep
44, file OP-16 FE. ↑
CHAPTER III
Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied
Estimate of the Enemy Situation
American knowledge of the Japanese forces on Leyte
was derived from many sources.1 The guerrillas on Leyte and
other islands in the archipelago sent information to Australia on the
movements, dispositions, fortifications, and defenses of the Japanese.
Commander Parsons, on his submarine trips to the Islands, brought back
with him important intelligence. Just before the invasion an
intelligence officer from Sixth Army and one from the Seventh Fleet
secretly went ashore from a submarine and gathered material on Japanese
coastal fortifications and defenses in the beach area.
Much effort was expended before the invasion in mapping
the island, but this work was based on prewar maps and the results were
very inaccurate. Since much of the island was under heavy fog for long
periods, the photomaps that were produced had little value. They missed
many important terrain features and misplaced others by thousands of
yards. In general, however, the maps of the beachhead areas were
accurate.
In the spring of 1944 General MacArthur’s
headquarters received information that the Japanese were starting to
reinforce their Philippine garrisons. An early estimate, made in June,
put the number of enemy troops on the island at 20,000, a sharp
increase over the 5,900 of the previous month. The increase resulted
from the movement to Leyte from Samar of the veteran 16th
Division, which had fought at Bataan, and the arrival of 4,000
naval troops from the Palau Islands.2 For the next
month reports flowed in to General Headquarters that the 16th
Division was building coastal defenses and air-raid shelters, and
improving the airfields and garrison defenses of the island.3
In July 1944 the Americans received information that all
was not going well in the Japanese homeland. From a radio interception
they learned that Premier Hideki Tojo and his entire cabinet had
resigned on 18 July. The Japanese message stated: “The situation
is the result of the period of [22]‘sweating blood’ and
we sincerely regret causing anxiety to the Emperor. We thank the people
at home and at the front for co-operating with the
government….”4 The tenor of the announcement
and of subsequent statements made it abundantly clear, however, that
the Japanese were determined to do their utmost toward prosecuting the
war to a successful conclusion.
Meanwhile, all the Japanese garrisons in the Philippines
were reinforced. The senior headquarters in the western Pacific was
transferred from Singapore to Manila, and the brigades in the Islands
were being developed to divisional strength. Of the estimated 180,000
troops, 80,000 were believed to be on Luzon, 50,000 in the Visayan
Islands, and 50,000 on Mindanao. It was also believed that the enemy
air strength on the Islands was being greatly increased. There were 100
to 120 airfields in operation and between 700 and 1,500 aircraft, of
which half were combat planes and the others training
aircraft.5
In September 1944 Sixth Army G-2 estimated that the
Japanese forces on Leyte consisted mainly of 16th Division units
and service troops—a total of 21,700 troops. The 35th Army
had just been activated on Cebu and was to be charged with the defense
of all the Visayan Islands. It was estimated that the Leyte garrison
consisted of the following combat troops: 20th Infantry
Regiment, 3,000; 33d Infantry Regiment, 3,000; 16th Division
Reconnaissance Regiment, 1,000; elements of 102d Division,
1,700; 7th Independent Tank Company, 125; and 16th Division
Headquarters troops, 1,800. The total amounted to 10,625 men. In
addition there were 1,000 base-defense troops and 10,075 service
troops.
It was believed that the Japanese would commit one
division on the day of the landing and the equivalent of another
division, assembled from the tactical reserves on the island, not later
than three days after the landing. For the next ten days, five to eight
regiments might be sent in from neighboring islands. These would
constitute the “maximum numbers of reinforcements predicated upon
the existence of conditions most favorable to the
enemy.”6 The enemy had an undetermined number of tanks
and armored cars. The only artillery known to be available were some
coastal defense guns emplaced along the east coast and some artillery
pieces on the hills overlooking Tacloban.
Sixth Army believed that on Leyte there were five
operational airfields; three probably operational or under
construction; seven nonoperational; and one seaplane base. The two most
important operational airstrips were the one at Tacloban with
forty-five hardstandings and the one at Dulag with twenty
hardstandings. The Tacloban airstrip could accommodate both bombers and
fighters. At the time of the invasion, it was estimated that the
Japanese could oppose the amphibious movement and the landing with 442
fighters and 337 bombers from airfields scattered throughout the
Philippines.
Although the possibility existed that the Japanese
Fleet, which was based in waters near the home islands, might move to
the Philippines, such a move was considered doubtful. It was believed
that the principal and immediate threats consisted of a strong
cruiser-destroyer task force; submarines; and motor torpedo boats and
similar craft. [23]
Sixth Army concluded that the town of Tacloban, with its
important port and airfield, was the key to the Japanese defense of the
island. Consequently, a strong perimeter defense of the town and the
surrounding area was expected. Since it was impossible for the
Japanese, with a limited number of their troops on the island, to
defend all of the east coast, strong forces and emplaced defensive
positions were likely to be concentrated at road junctions and at the
operational airfields. Mobile reserves would almost certainly be held
in readiness at key points in Leyte Valley, ready to be rushed to the
east coast areas under attack. It was assumed that strong defenses were
already established in the Ormoc area and along the northeast coast of
Ormoc Bay, since the port of Ormoc could be used to bring in reserves
from the other islands in the archipelago. A strong garrison was
expected at Carigara to protect the northern approaches to Leyte Valley
and to repel any amphibious landing through Carigara Bay.
The plan for the liberation of Leyte called for more
men, guns, ships, and aircraft than had been required for any previous
operation in the Pacific. For the first time ground troops from the
Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific were to join and fight the foe
under a common commander. General MacArthur, who had left Luzon in a
motor torpedo boat, was to return to the Philippines with a vast
armada—the greatest seen in the Pacific up to that time.
The Tactical Plan
The Southwest Pacific Area was the command
responsibility of General MacArthur. He had under his command Allied
Air Forces, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney commanding; Allied Naval Forces,
Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid commanding; Allied Land Forces, Gen. Sir
Thomas Blamey commanding; United States Army Services of Supply (SWPA),
Maj. Gen. James L. Frink commanding; and Alamo Force, which was
virtually Sixth Army, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger commanding.
On 31 August 1944 General MacArthur issued his first
formal directive covering projected operations in the Philippines. The
Leyte operation was known as King II. The Southwest Pacific forces were
to “seize objectives in the Mindanao, Leyte and Samar areas in
order to establish air, naval and logistic bases to cover subsequent
operations to complete the reoccupation of the Philippines.” The
assigned target dates were as follows: southern Mindanao, 15 November
1944; northwestern Mindanao, 7 December; and Leyte Gulf-Surigao Strait
area, 20 December. The Sixth Army, covered by Admiral Halsey’s
Third Fleet and supported by the Allied Air and Naval Forces, was
directed to carry out the three operations.7 On 15
September General Krueger received word that the Talaud and Mindanao
operations had been canceled and that the target date—designated
as “A Day”—for the Leyte operation had been advanced
to 20 October.8
The American Forces
The immediate task assigned the forces of the
Southwest Pacific, supported by the Third Fleet, was the seizure and
control of the Leyte Gulf-Surigao Strait area in order to establish
air, naval, and logistic bases to support further operations into the
Philippines. Before the invasion, air and naval operations were to be
conducted so as to disorganize [24]Japanese ground and air
defenses. The ground operation was divided into three phases. In the
first phase overwater movement and minor amphibious operations to
secure entrance into Leyte Gulf were to take place. The main effort,
which constituted the second phase, was to involve a major assault to
capture the airfields and base sites in Leyte
Valley and to open up San Juanico and Panaon Straits. In the final
phase, the remaining portions of the island in Japanese hands and the
western part of southern Samar were to be secured, and Surigao Strait
was to be opened.9 The target date had been set for 20 October
1944.
General plans for the operation had long since been
worked out, but not until 20 September did General MacArthur issue his
final plan for the occupation of Leyte. It was based upon the
assumption that American forces were or would be established along the
Marianas-Ulithi-Palaus-Morotai line and that the Japanese land and air
forces in the Philippines and Formosa would have been “seriously
crippled and that the Japanese Fleet would elect to remain in Empire
waters” with only “light forces remaining in the vicinity
of the Philippines.” The Japanese were expected to have one
well-supplied division in the area with only limited ability to
reinforce it from others of the Visayan Islands and with all subsequent
supply deliveries cut off. It was assumed that Japanese defenses would
be concentrated in the vicinity of the airfields in the Leyte Valley
and at Tacloban.
The command organization was as follows: General
MacArthur was Supreme Commander, but during the amphibious movement and
landing Admiral Kinkaid, as commander of the Naval Attack Force, was to
be in command of all amphibious operations. (Chart 1) Army
officers, who took control of their forces ashore, were to continue
under the Commander, Naval Attack Force, until the next senior Army
commander assumed control. Upon his arrival ashore and after
notification to Admiral Kinkaid, General Krueger was to take control of
the ground troops. General Kenney, as commander of the Allied Air
Forces, would report directly to General MacArthur.
Admiral Halsey, as commander of the Third Fleet, was to
co-ordinate his operations with those of General MacArthur but he was
responsible to Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area.
The Third Fleet was composed of Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher’s Fast
Carrier Task Force, together with miscellaneous elements.
Mitscher’s force was divided into four carrier groups.10
The Allied Naval Forces, which consisted principally of
the U. S. Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid, was to transport and
establish ashore the ground assault force. The Central Philippine
Attack Force consisted of three task forces. Task Force 77, commanded
by Admiral Kinkaid, was to furnish direct air and naval support and was
composed of battleships, light and heavy cruisers, destroyers,
destroyer escorts, carriers, escort carriers, gunboat and mortar
flotillas, mine sweepers, auxiliary vessels, and underwater demolition
teams. The transports and cargo ships of the Northern Attack Force,
Task Force 78, under Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, and the Southern
[26]Attack Force, Task Force 79, under Vice Adm.
Theodore S. Wilkinson, were to transport and set ashore the ground
troops. Task Force 79 had been lent to General MacArthur by Admiral
Nimitz for the operation.
Chart 1—Operational
Organization for the Leyte Campaign
The Allied Air Forces, principally the Far East Air
Forces under General Kenney, was to neutralize hostile air and naval
forces within range of the Philippines. The Allied Air Forces consisted
of the Fifth Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ennis P. Whitehead; the
Thirteenth Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett; the
Royal Australian Air Force Command under Air Vice Marshal William D.
Bostock; and miscellaneous elements. On order, the Fifth Air Force was
to be prepared to take over the mission of furnishing direct air
support to the ground troops.
The United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest
Pacific Area, commanded by General Frink, was to furnish logistic
support for the operation. The Eighth U.S. Army, commanded by Lt. Gen.
Robert L. Eichelberger, and the Allied Land Forces, commanded by
General Blamey, were to take over missions previously assigned the
Sixth Army and to assist the latter in training, staging, and mounting
the troops for the Leyte operation.
The ground troops who were to attack Leyte constituted a
field army—the Sixth Army, which had fought its way up the New
Guinea coast since April 1943 as Alamo Force. On 25 September 1944
Alamo Force was dissolved and Sixth Army assumed its tactical missions.
General Krueger was commanding general for all these campaigns. The
principal component parts of Sixth Army were X and XXIV Corps. The
former consisted of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, under
Lt. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, a seasoned commander who had successfully
fought the Japanese on New Guinea at Wakde-Sarmi. The XXIV Corps, under
Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge, who had defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal,
New Georgia, and Bougainville, was composed of the 7th and 96th
Infantry Divisions. In reserve were the 32d and 77th Infantry
Divisions. The Sixth Army Service Command was to perform engineer
functions on the island and give general logistic support.
Approximately 174,000 troops were made available for the
initial assault phase of the operation. About 51,500 of these made up
the XXIV Corps and 53,000 the X Corps. In addition to these troops, the
reserve 32d and 77th Divisions had a strength of about 14,500 and
14,000 troops, respectively. All of the assault divisions were
reinforced with tank battalions, amphibian truck and tractor
battalions, joint assault signal companies, and many attached service
units. A total of about 202,500 ground troops was committed to the
Leyte operation.11
Headquarters, Sixth Army, had never participated as such
in any campaign, but as Headquarters, Alamo
Force, it had directed the operations up the New Guinea coast. Both the
X and XXIV Corps were yet to be battle tested, though all their
divisions with one exception had participated in previous campaigns
against the Japanese. The 1st Cavalry Division had taken part in the
Admiralty Islands campaign; the 7th Division had defeated the Japanese
at Attu and Kwajalein; the 24th Division had fought in the Hollandia
campaign; the 32d Division had won the Papua Campaign and [27]been
victorious at Aitape on New Guinea; and the 77th Division had shared in
the victory at Guam. Only the 96th Division was yet to be combat
tested.12
General MacArthur’s Warning Instructions 5 and
Operations Instructions 70 were used by each of the major commanders as
a basis for his own operations orders. Although each order was derived
from the one next above it, all were planned concurrently. There was
need for constant intertheater, interservice, and intraservice
conferences and discussions on all phases of the plans as they evolved.
Frequently the planning was made easier by using the work done on plans
for other operations. For example, the logistical plan for the canceled
Yap operation was adapted with very little change to the Leyte
operation. The general schemes of maneuver and the employment of
support forces which had been found valuable in previous operations
were also adapted with minor variations to the plans for Leyte.
Air Support
The Navy was to bear the brunt of furnishing air
support in the early stages of the campaign. By arrangement with
Admiral Nimitz, the Carrier Task Force from Admiral Halsey’s
Third Fleet was to strike northern Luzon and Okinawa or Formosa, or
both, from A Day minus 10 to A minus 7. From A minus 4 through A Day,
strikes were to be made on Luzon, the Cebu-Negros area, and the Leyte
area in support of the landings. As soon as the Palau air base
facilities would permit, shore-based air forces from the Central
Pacific were to operate in the Bicol area.13
The Allied Naval Forces was to furnish carrier aircraft
as protection for convoys and naval task forces and, supplemented by
aircraft of the Third Fleet and the Allied Air Forces, to provide
direct air support for the landings. In addition, it was to furnish
protective air support and cover by carrier aircraft prior to A Day for
the preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf and for the mine
sweeping.14
General Mac Arthur assigned air support missions to the
Allied Air Forces. General Kenney’s airmen were (1) to make
aerial reconnaissance; (2) in co-ordination with Third Fleet
carrier-based aircraft, to neutralize hostile naval and air forces
within range of the Philippines from A minus 9 in order to cover the
movement of naval forces, the landing, and subsequent operations; (3)
within capabilities and when requested by Admiral Kinkaid, to protect
convoys and naval forces and provide direct support of the landings and
subsequent operations; and (4) to destroy Japanese shipping and
installations in the Sulu and Arafura Seas and the East
Indies.15
On 24 September General Kenney issued his order for the
Leyte operation and assigned missions to the Allied Air Forces. He
designated General Whitehead’s Fifth Air Force as the Air Assault
Force. It was to support the operation by intensified air activities
against enemy installations, destroy hostile air and surface forces in
the Celebes Sea and assigned areas in the Philippine Archipelago, and
provide air defense for [28]existing bases and forces in transit
to Leyte within range of its capabilities. It was also to be prepared
to establish, on order, land-based air forces on Leyte. The Thirteenth
Air Force was to support the missions of the Fifth Air Force, while the
Royal Australian Air Force Command was to destroy Japanese
installations and sources of raw materials in the Netherlands
Indies.16
Aircraft from other theaters agreed to aid in the
operation. The Fourteenth Air Force from the China-Burma-India Theater
and the Twentieth Air Force from the Central Pacific were to conduct
strikes against Formosa. The Southeast Asia Command was asked to
schedule air offensives against Burma and Malaya just prior to A
Day.17
Naval Support
The Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid was
assigned the following mission: “by a ship to shore amphibious
operation, [to] transport, protect, land and support elements of the
6th Army in order to assist in the seizure, occupation and development
of the Leyte area of the Southern Philippines.”18
(Chart 2)
The Seventh Fleet was designated the Naval Attack Force.
For the operation Admiral Kinkaid organized two attack forces: the
Northern Attack Force (VII Amphibious Force), under Admiral Barbey, and
the Southern Attack Force (III Amphibious Force), under Admiral
Wilkinson. In addition, several subordinate units were created: a
bombardment and fire support group under Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf;
and a close covering group, an escort carrier group, a mine-sweeping
group, and twelve underwater demolition teams. The Northern Attack
Force was to transport and land the X Corps, while the Southern Attack
Force was to do the same for the XXIV Corps.
The task groups of the two attack forces were to sortie
from the mounting areas at Manus in the Admiralties and Hollandia in
Netherlands New Guinea and rendezvous en route to the objective area.
Both were “to land main elements as nearly simultaneously as
practicable at H Hour on 20 October.” Meanwhile, an advance group
on 17 October was to land the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion on the
islands guarding the approaches to Leyte Gulf. The task groups were to
regulate their speed of advance so that they would arrive at the
entrance of the approach channel to Leyte Gulf at specified times. The
mine-sweeping group and certain units of the bombardment and fire
support group which were to render fire support for initial
mine-sweeping operations were to arrive at 0600 on 17 October. They
were to be followed fifteen minutes later by the attack group assigned
to the island approaches. At 1000 on the same day the rest of the
bombardment and fire support group were to arrive. Beginning at 2300 on
19 October the transports and LST’s of the two attack forces were
scheduled to arrive in successive groups. Their time of arrival was
also set so that each group would reach its transport area in
sufficient time to dispatch the assault waves to the beach at the
designated hour.19
Chart 2—Organization of
the Central Philippine Attack Force
On arrival in the objective area, the bombardment and
fire support group was to divide into northern and southern fire
support units, which were then to move to their respective target
areas. The northern fire [30]support unit consisted of 3 old
battleships—the Mississippi, Maryland, and West
Virginia—and 3 destroyers. The southern fire support unit was
composed of 3 battleships—the Tennessee,
California, and Pennsylvania—13 destroyers, 3 light
cruisers, 3 heavy cruisers, and 1 small seaplane tender.
The destroyers in the two target areas were to furnish
protection to the mine sweepers and the underwater demolition teams.
The latter were to cover the northern and southern beaches before A Day
and search out and destroy any obstacles, either Japanese-made or
natural, in the waters surrounding the landing beach areas. The mine
sweepers were to start clearing Leyte Gulf of fixed or floating mines
on 17 October, three days before the main assault. On the following
days, including 20 October, they were to make more intensive sweeps of
the channels and landing beach areas, with the vessels going as close
to shore as possible without endangering gear.20
Admiral Oldendorf was to direct the bombardment and fire
support. The bombardment was to start on 17 October in preparation for
the landings on the island approaches. The gunfire before 20 October
was for the purpose of rendering unserviceable both airfields and
Japanese aircraft on the ground, in addition to destroying guns and
emplacements, fuel storage and ammunition dumps, naval forces and
shipping, beach defenses and strong points, troops, torpedo launching
ramps, and torpedo barges. Close fire support was to be given to the
underwater demolition teams and destructive fire was to be delivered
against enemy forces attempting overwater movements. Finally, night
harassing fire was scheduled to prevent any night attempts of the
Japanese to reconstruct the fortifications and airfields.
On 20 October the naval gunfire support units were to
cover the approach of the transports to the unloading areas and to
furnish necessary counterbattery fire; thoroughly cover the landing
beach areas from the low-water line to approximately 400 yards inland;
and closely support the landings with rockets, 4.2-inch mortars, and
gunfire of all caliber from the ships. After the landings, the naval
gunfire units were to deliver fire on call and prevent the Japanese
from either reinforcing or evacuating the island.21
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed Admiral Nimitz to
support General MacArthur’s operation against Leyte. Admiral
Nimitz ordered Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet to “destroy
enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine
Area.” The Third Fleet was also to protect the air and sea
communications along the Central Philippines axis. If an opportunity to
destroy major portions of the Japanese Fleet should arise or could be
created, such destruction was to be the primary task of all naval
forces from the Central Pacific. Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur
were to arrange the necessary measures for the co-ordination of their
operations.22
In support of the Leyte operation the Third Fleet was to
contain or destroy the Japanese Fleet and to destroy enemy aircraft and
shipping in the Formosa, Luzon, Visayan, and Mindanao areas from 9
October through 17 October, and from A Day for as long as necessary
during the next thirty [31]days, in order to “maintain their
continued neutralization.” From 18 October until such time as the
escort carriers could assume direct support, the Third Fleet was to
destroy enemy ground defenses and installations in Leyte and adjacent
areas. Finally, the Third Fleet was to provide direct support by fast
carrier aircraft for the landing and subsequent operations.23
Submarines from both the Southwest Pacific and Central
Pacific were to support the operations by maintaining an offensive
reconnaissance over the most probable Japanese route of advance,
maintaining observation and lifeguard services and furnishing weather
reports and strategic patrols. Submarines from the Central Pacific were
to patrol in the Formosa, Luzon, Tokyo Bay, and Sasebo areas, while
those from the Seventh Fleet patrolled in the area of Makassar Strait,
the Celebes Sea, and the Sulu Sea. Submarines from both areas were to
maintain a strong patrol in the Hainan—northern Luzon
areas.24
The naval gunfire, the air support, and the artillery
fire were to be carefully co-ordinated. At every level from battalion
to army representatives from each support arm were to co-ordinate the
use of their support arms against targets in their respective zones of
action. Requests for support were to be screened as they passed through
the various echelons for approval. Commanders in the field felt that
the passage of requests through many channels was time consuming and
consequently sometimes nullified what might have been an immediate
advantage. However, requests for support were usually acted upon within
an hour.
The Ground Forces
The ground forces designated for the Leyte
operation came from two different theaters—the X Corps from the
Southwest Pacific and the XXIV Corps from the Central Pacific. The XXIV
Corps, originally intended for the Yap operation, had been substituted
for the XIV Corps, originally intended for Leyte. As the new assignment
of the XXIV Corps placed it under the operational control of General
MacArthur, it was necessary that agreements on the co-ordination of
operations be reached by the commanders in chief of the two areas. The
XXIV Corps, with its original shipping, had been turned over to General
MacArthur. During the combat phase at Leyte, General MacArthur was to
furnish the replacements required by the XXIV Corps, but subsequent
replacements were to be supplied by Admiral Nimitz.25
The initial assault for the island of Leyte was to begin
in the dim half dawn of 17 October, when elements of the 6th Ranger
Infantry Battalion were to land under the protection of naval gunfire
and seize the small islands that guarded the entrance to Leyte Gulf.
(Map 3) Harbor lights were to be placed on
Homonhon Island and the northern tip of Dinagat Island in order to
guide the passage of the convoy into the gulf. Since it was believed
that there were valuable mine charts on Suluan, that island was added
to the objectives of the 6th Rangers.
General Krueger had wanted to use either the reinforced
158th Infantry Regiment or [32]the reinforced 112th Cavalry
Regimental Combat Team to secure the island approaches to Leyte Gulf
and the Panaon Strait area. The 21st Infantry, which was assigned the
mission of securing the Panaon Strait area, then could have remained
with the 24th Division, its parent unit, and the 6th Ranger Battalion
could have been used wherever and whenever needed. In addition, these
missions would have been put in the hands of a general officer who had
an experienced staff to assist him. Neither of the desired regiments,
however, could be made available for the Leyte operation because of
shortage of troops and previous commitments.26
Frost
SIXTH ARMY PLAN
23 September 1944
While the Rangers were seizing the small islands, the
mine sweepers and underwater [33]demolition teams were to start
clearing the gulf of natural and man-made obstacles. The fire support
units were to move in and start softening up the beaches. The
completion of these missions would conclude the first phase of the
operation.
The second phase comprised “a major amphibious
assault to attack and destroy hostile forces in the coastal strip
Tacloban-Dulag inclusive, and to seize airdromes and base sites
therein; a rapid advance through Leyte Valley to seize and occupy the
Capoocan-Carigara-Barugo area; [and finally] open San Juanico and
Panaon Straits….”27
In the very early hours of 20 October the Northern and
Southern Attack Forces were to move to their appointed beach areas and
be prepared to disembark their assault troops. The reinforced 21st
Infantry Regiment was to go ashore at 0930 in the vicinity of Panaon
Strait at the extreme southeast tip of Leyte and secure control of that
entrance to Sogod Bay. To the north at 1000, the X Corps was to land
with two divisions abreast in the Marasbaras and Palo areas. About
fifteen miles farther south, in the Dulag area, the XXIV Corps was to
go ashore simultaneously with two divisions abreast. The two corps
would be so widely separated and their objectives so divergent that
initially they could not be mutually supporting. Even within the zones
of action of the two corps, the missions assigned the divisions would
limit the ability of the divisions to support each other.28
As General Krueger felt that the Japanese would offer
the greatest resistance in the north, the initial objectives of the X
Corps were limited to the seizure of Palo and the capture of Tacloban
and its airfield. The northernmost unit, the 1st Cavalry Division,
actually an infantry square division, was to land with brigades abreast
in the Marasbaras area, advance to the north, and seize Tacloban and
its airstrip, the most important objective for A Day. Thereafter, the
division was to secure control over San Juanico Strait. To the left of
the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Division was to go ashore with
regiments abreast in the Palo area, seize Palo, and then advance
northwest through the Leyte Valley. The two divisions were to converge
on Carigara, at the northern end of Leyte Valley on Carigara
Bay.29
In the XXIV Corps zone, the 96th Division with regiments
abreast was to land in the area between Dulag and San Roque, and to
secure that portion of Highway 1 in its zone, Catmon Hill, and,
finally, the Dagami-Tanauan area. On its left the 7th Division with
regiments abreast was to go ashore in the Dulag area. One element was
to go south and seize the Highway 1 bridge and crossings of the
Daguitan (Marabang) River at Dao while the main force of the division
was to advance along the axis of the Dulag-Burauen road and capture
Burauen. The 7th Division would then be in a position to move north
toward Dagami. All hostile airfields in its zone of action were to be
seized and occupied. The division was to be prepared, on corps order,
to seize Abuyog, to the south, and Baybay, on the west coast,
destroying enemy forces on the west coast and in the southern portion
of Leyte.30
Completion of these missions of the X and XXIV Corps
would bring to an end the second phase of the Leyte operation. By this
time, General Krueger hoped, the back of the Japanese resistance would
be broken. [34]With Leyte Valley and its airfields and base sites
firmly in the hands of the Sixth Army, General Krueger’s forces
would be in a position to apply firmly the pincers on the remaining
Japanese on the island. The X Corps was to drive south down the Ormoc
Valley to Ormoc while the XXIV Corps was to move north from Baybay
along the shores of Ormoc Bay and make juncture with the X Corps. The
remnants of the Japanese forces, driven into the mountains of western
Leyte, would be unable to continue an organized resistance.31
The eastern shores of Leyte were chosen for the initial
landing, since the beaches on this side were the best on the island,
and were the logical entrance to the important airfields, base sites,
and roads in Leyte Valley.
Since the large number of naval vessels required
considerable room for landing the assault troops and for maneuvering,
the landing beach areas of the two corps were widely separated. In
addition, the value of the road net which connected Dulag with the
Burauen airfields formed an important consideration in the
determination of the landing beach sites of the XXIV Corps. “This
latter factor—which took precedence over the potentiality of
strong enemy resistance from Catmon Hill—had determined the
selection of beaches in the Dulag area.”32
Although it was recognized as necessary for elements of
the XXIV Corps to advance south to Abuyog and then overland to Baybay
in order to destroy the enemy forces on the west coast, these maneuvers
would leave great gaps in the battle line if only four divisions were
at first employed. General Krueger therefore asked General Headquarters
of the Southwest Pacific for additional combat troops, and during the
progress of the campaign General MacArthur made them
available.33
The Sixth Army was also troubled about its reserve
force. Although the 32d Division at Morotai and Hollandia and the 77th
Division at Guam had been designated as Sixth Army Reserve, it would be
impossible for these units to arrive at Leyte before the middle of
November. The shortage of amphibious shipping made it necessary to
mount these divisions on the turnaround of assault shipping. Since the
floating reserve would have to come from one of the assault divisions,
it was difficult to determine from which division to take it. It was
decided that the 96th Division, considering its mission, could best
spare such a unit, and the 381st Infantry of that division was
therefore selected.34
To summarize the mission of the Sixth Army: on 17
October, the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion would seize Suluan, Dinagat,
and Homonhon Islands, in the entrance to Leyte Bay. At 0930 on 20
October, the 21st Infantry Regiment was to land in the vicinity of
Panaon Strait and secure control of that entrance to Sogod Bay. At 1000
on the same day the Sixth Army with the X and XXIV Corps abreast would
make a major amphibious landing on Leyte. In the north the X Corps,
with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division abreast,
after moving ashore in the Marasbaras and the Palo areas, would capture
Tacloban, its airfield, and Palo. In the south the XXIV Corps with the
96th and 7th Infantry Divisions abreast would go ashore to secure
control in the Dulag area.35 [35]
The Logistical Plan
Construction
The decision to land on Leyte at the beginning of
the rainy season and to construct a major supply and air base thereon
presented a serious problem to the engineers. The poor soil, inadequate
roads, and heavy rains were obstacles that had to be met and in some
way overcome if the operation was to be a logistical success. General
MacArthur recognized the need for making use of Leyte as a logistical
base by creating for the first time in the Southwest Pacific an army
service command and by detailing his chief engineer, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.
Casey, to be its commander. ASCOM, as it was called, was to provide the
logistical services required for the operation and to build and operate
the Army base facilities until the United States Army Services of
Supply (SWPA) could take over. This transfer was expected to take place
about thirty days after the assault troops first landed on the shores
of Leyte.36
General Mac Arthur directed the Sixth Army to establish
the following air facilities in the Leyte area: by A plus 5, facilities
for two fighter groups, one night fighter squadron, one photo squadron,
one medium bomber group plus one squadron, three patrol bomber
squadrons, and one Marine reconnaissance squadron; by A plus 30,
additional facilities for two light bomber groups, one air-sea rescue
squadron, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one fighter
squadron; additional facilities by A plus 45 for one fighter group, one
patrol bomber squadron, two heavy bomber groups, and one laboratory
squadron; and by A plus 60, further facilities for one photo squadron,
one patrol bomber squadron, two troop carrier groups, and one combat
mapping squadron.37
The final Sixth Army plan for the Leyte operation
directed ASCOM to establish naval facilities in the Leyte area as well
as the aforementioned air facilities; to make topographic and
hydrographic surveys, followed by suitable changes in the plans for the
construction of bases, docks, roads, and airdromes; to unload all
units, supplies, and matériel arriving in the area and to store
and issue supplies to ground and air units; and, in co-operation with
the Philippine Civil Affairs Units, recruit and direct native
labor.38
The construction program as planned for Leyte brought
strong remonstrances from the Sixth Army engineers. On 10 August Col.
William J. Ely, the executive officer, protested against the employment
of Leyte as a major supply and air force base. The reasons for his
objections were prophetic. The operation was to be launched during the
season of heavy rains in an area where high winds and typhoons
occurred. The harbor was so shallow and so obstructed by patches of
coral that the approaches would have to be as much as 800 feet long.
The fact that the flat Leyte Valley was interlaced by many streams and
flooded with rice paddies indicated that the soil was “most
unstable.” The condition of the soil and drainage would require
the hauling, frequently for long distances, of considerable quantities
of rock for the construction of roads. The existing roads and bridges,
in most places so narrow as to permit only one-way traffic, would soon
disintegrate under the constant heavy rains and the pounding of
military vehicles. Colonel Ely forecast [36]that, in the light of
past experience with poor conditions of soil and drainage, the
construction and enlargement of the airstrips would be difficult. The
shortage of engineer troops decreased the possibility of providing
major air and supply bases in sufficient time to properly support
further operations. He concluded that “the construction mission
cannot be satisfactorily accomplished with the engineer troops
available, particularly during the first 90 days.” Colonel Ely
gloomily summarized, “Perhaps we can mud and muddle through again
on a shoestring but the shoestring must be frayed by this time and if
it broke we may lose our shirt as well as our shoe.”
If the strategic plan were fixed, he recommended that
one or more of the following measures be adopted: (1) increase the
number of engineer construction troops; (2) shift the operation to an
area where major air and supply bases could be constructed without
encountering the adverse weather and port conditions existing on Leyte;
(3) “decrease the tempo of the strategic plan”; and finally
(4) decrease the scope of the air and supply requirements. Nothing was
to be gained “by undertaking an overambitious program from the
beginning that cannot be completed on a time schedule that will assure
early and adequate support to future operations.”39
Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Sixth Army Engineer,
forwarded Colonel Ely’s report with a strong concurrence to
General MacArthur’s engineer, but General Headquarters decided to
proceed with the original logistical plans for the operation.40
Supplies
The supplies required for the operation involved
staggering quantities. For an invasion force of 150,000 men, the War
Department figures showed that, for the landing period alone, 1,500,000
tons of general equipment, 235,000 tons of combat vehicles, 200,000
tons of ammunition, and 200,000 tons of medical supplies were required.
Thereafter, 332,000 tons of equipment would be required every thirty
days.41 According to the final plan, issued by General
Krueger on 30 September 1944,42 the units of the Sixth Army, X
Corps, and Sixth Army Service Command, under General Casey, which were
to arrive at Leyte between 20 and 30 October were to take ashore a
minimum of ten days’ supply of all classes (except engineer
supplies, which were to be for at least thirty days), and two units of
fire.43 In this way the strain on ASCOM supply units
would be lessened, and ASCOM, it was hoped, would have time to
establish dumps and make the necessary supply installations. In
addition to supplies accompanying the assault troops, sufficient
quantities were to be brought into Leyte by 30 October to bring the
total supplies for the troops to the following figures, expressed in
days: thirty days of food, clothing, and equipment; fifteen days of
motor transport fuel and distillate; and thirty days of other petroleum
products. There were also to be five units of fire for combat troops
and three for service troops. The original plan had called for a
thirty-day supply of all petroleum products to be brought in by A plus
10, [37]but this quantity was reduced when General Krueger
adopted a plan for the installation by A plus 7 of bulk fuel storage.
The XXIV Corps supply levels were to remain the same as those planned
for the now-canceled Yap operation, since the corps was already loaded
with supplies which were considered adequate for the Leyte
invasion.44
There were certain differences in the loads carried by
the X and the XXIV Corps. The XXIV Corps embarked with a thirty-day
supply of rations and medical supplies, twenty days of clothing,
weapons, vehicles, fuels, lubricants, construction matériel, and
seven units of fire for all artillery and five units for other types of
weapons. Since the type of equipment loaded had been selected for the
Yap operation, amphibian vehicles were favored over wheeled vehicles.
Less than 50 percent of the Table of Equipment allowance of general
purpose vehicles and dump trucks accompanied the units. Furthermore,
many badly needed items of organizational equipment were carried by the
rear echelons, which did not arrive until January 1945, after Leyte had
been secured.45
The supplies which were to accompany the troops during
the initial phases of the Leyte operation were to come from bases in
New Guinea and the Central Pacific. Resupply shipping—to be
called for as needed—was to be loaded at bases in the United
States, Australia, and, if necessary, New Guinea.46 In
addition, ten loaded liberty ships were to be held in floating reserve,
eight at Hollandia and two in the Palaus. Two of these were loaded with
aviation gasoline, two with fuel oil and lubricants, two with
ammunition for the air forces and four with ammunition for the ground
forces. Admiral Nimitz was to furnish two of the four last mentioned.
Except for the LST’s transporting the XXIV Corps, each LST
arriving on 20 October was to carry thirty tons of technical supplies
for the air forces. All LST’s arriving from A plus 1 through A
plus 4 were to carry forty tons of similar supplies.47 General
MacArthur charged the Commanding General, United States Army Services
of Supply (SWPA), with providing the Sixth Army with all supplies,
except air force technical supplies, that would be needed for the
operation.48
An Army garrison force for Yap under Maj. Gen. Roscoe B.
Woodruff had been scheduled to go with the XXIV Corps, and at Admiral
Nimitz’ suggestion this force was designated to accompany the
corps to the new target, Leyte, though the Southwest Pacific Area had
never used an organization of this type.49 It was
hoped that the force might be useful in taking over
“house-keeping” duties and the development of rear areas,
thus relieving the assault commander of those responsibilities.
Incidentally, General Krueger made little use of the garrison force.
Units which furnished logistic support for carrier operations were also
included and were to be assigned to the Seventh Fleet. Admiral Nimitz
was to continue furnishing logistic support to the XXIV Corps until
relieved by General MacArthur.50 [38]
Shipping
On 21 September, Pacific Ocean Areas and Southwest
Pacific Area reached an agreement on resupply of ammunition for the
XXIV Corps. Arrangements were made for loaded ships from San Francisco
to be sent to the Leyte area periodically to alleviate the shipping
shortage.51 It was expected that at least twenty-two cargo
ships would so arrive from San Francisco during the operation.
The change in target dates and the substitution of the
XXIV Corps for the XIV Corps reduced the amount of amphibious shipping
available for the Leyte operation. Consequently representatives of the
Sixth Army, the VII Amphibious Force, and the Fifth Air Force met at
General Krueger’s headquarters to work out the details for a new
shipping schedule. They made minor changes in the dates for the
movement of convoys, and rearranged echelons, eliminating one.52 The shipping for the XXIV Corps and the ten
resupply ships were to remain the same as planned for Yap.53
The amphibious shipping allocated to MacArthur was to be
made available for such turnaround shipping as would be required. The
date of release of the amphibious vessels in order to mount subsequent
operations would be announced later, but none were to be released for
return to Nimitz’ control without permission from MacArthur. An
additional division lift, which was not included, was to return the
77th Division from Guam to Guadalcanal or to a location indicated by
Admiral Nimitz.54
On 25 September Sixth Army submitted to General
Headquarters a schedule of cargo loadings of heavy shipping for the
Leyte operation and made suggestions as to heavy shipping for direct
movement of troops. All troops and supply ships with the assault convoy
which were to depart from Hollandia must arrive in that area not later
than A minus 9.55
The shipping instructions specified that the ships were
to be loaded for selective discharge; all resupply ships transporting
rations, clothing, vehicles, weapons, and ammunition would be duplicate
loaded; loaded floating reserve ships would be provided; medical
supplies would be top loaded to avoid breakage and damage; and
sufficient stevedore gear would be placed aboard each ship to handle
its cargo. On 25 and 26 September General Krueger’s
transportation officer submitted to General Headquarters the heavy
shipping requirements for the overwater movement of cargo and troops,
respectively. It was considered necessary to utilize “all types
of shipping from Navy LSM’s, LST’s, and assault transports
to army controlled merchant ships and troop carriers.”56 Additional shipping was obtained by making use of
that which had carried the 1st Marine Division and the 81st Division to
Peleliu and Angaur in the Palau Islands.57 The
shipping specified above was assembled at Manus and Hollandia
[39]and was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division and
the 24th Division, which were embarking, respectively, at those two
ports. The XXIV Corps, after leaving the Hawaiian Islands, was brought
to Manus where it remained in its original shipping.
On 8 October General Krueger asked the commanding
generals of X Corps, XXIV Corps, and ASCOM, together with the
commanding officers of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion and the 21st
Infantry Regiment, whether they would be able to meet the target date
for Leyte.58 Upon receiving affirmative replies, he
laconically informed General Headquarters: “Sixth Army Forces
designated for KING TWO Operations are ready to meet KING TWO Target
Date.”59 [40]
1 Unless
otherwise stated this section is based upon a report by Col H. V.
White, G-2 Sixth Army, sub: G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44, Sixth Army
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 167–70. ↑
2 GHQ SWPA
Philippine Monthly Combined Sitrep, 15 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 15 Jun
44. ↑
3 GHQ SWPA
Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 4, 11–17 Jun 44, GHQ G-3
Jnl, 17 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 5,
18–24 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser
216, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 13 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of
Enemy Sit 6, 25 Jun–1 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 1 Jul 44; GHQ SWPA
Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 7, 2–8 Jul 44, GHQ G-3
Jnl, 8 Jul 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 225, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul
44. ↑
4 AAF SWPA
Intel Sum, Ser 228, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 25 Jul 44. ↑
5 Notes,
WIDEAWAKE Conference, 20 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jul 44. ↑
6 Sixth
Army G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
170. ↑
7 GHQ SWPA
Warning Instns 5, 31 Aug 44. ↑
8 GHQ SWPA
Warning Instns 5/1, 15 Sep 44. ↑
9 GHQ SWPA
Stf Study, King II, 4th ed., 20 Sep 44. This
study was not a directive but a basis for planning the
operation. ↑
10
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8–44, quoted in Annex A, CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Opns in POA, Oct 44, pp. 56–57, A-16–3/FF12, Ser 00397, 31
May 45. ↑
11 Sixth
Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44, Annexes 6a-6f. ↑
12 Hist
Div, Dept of the Army, Combat Chronicle, An Outline History of U.S.
Army Divisions, passim, OCMH. ↑
13 CTF 77
Opns Plan, Ser 00022A, 26 Sep 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 6 Oct 44;
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8–44, cited n. 10, above. ↑
14 GHQ
SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44. ↑
16 AAF
SWPA Opns Instns 71, 24 Sep 44. ↑
17 FEAF,
History of Far East Air Forces, I, 117, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
18 CANF
SWPA Opns Plan 13–44, 26 Sep 44. ↑
19
Ibid., Apps. 1 and 2 to Annex C. ↑
20
Ibid., App. 3 to Annex E. ↑
21
Ibid., App. 1 to Annex E. ↑
22
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8–44, cited n. 10, above. ↑
23 GHQ
SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44. ↑
24 CANF
SWPA Opns Plan 13–44, 26 Sep 44. ↑
25 Memo,
Rear Adm Forrest P. Sherman, Plans Off POA, and Maj Gen Stephen J.
Chamberlin, ACofS G-3 SWPA, for CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 21 Sep 44, Sixth
Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44. ↑
27 Sixth
Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. ↑
28
Ibid.; Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 23. ↑
29 X Corps
FO 1, 30 Sep 44; 1st Cav Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44; 24th Inf Div FO 1, 1 Oct
44. ↑
30 XXIV
Corps FO 3, 28 Sep 44; 96th Div FO 2, 10 Oct 44; 7th Div FO 9,1 Oct
44. ↑
31 Sixth
Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. ↑
32 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 23. ↑
38 Sixth
Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. ↑
39 Memo,
Col Ely, Exec Off, Sixth Army Engineer, for Col Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr.,
Sixth Army Engineer; Air Evaluation Board SWPA, The Leyte Campaign, pp.
400–403. ↑
40 Interv
with Maj Gen George H. Decker, formerly CofS Sixth Army, 7 Sep
51. ↑
41 MI, GS,
GHQ FEC, History of the United States Army Forces in the Far East
1943–1945, p. 69. ↑
42 Sixth
Army Admin O 14, 30 Sep 44. ↑
43 Sixth
Army Admin O 14, Annex 4, 30 Sep 44. ↑
44 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24. ↑
45 XXIV
Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35. ↑
47 Sixth
Army Admin O 14, 30 Sep 44. ↑
48 GHQ
SWPA Opns Instns 70, Annex 4, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep
44. ↑
50 Rad,
CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 16119, 19 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 19 Sep 44;
Info Rad, CINCSWPA to CINCPOA, CX 18072, 20 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
21 Sep 44. ↑
51 Memo,
Adm Sherman, Plans Off POA, and Gen Chamberlin, ACofS G-3 SWPA, for
CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 22 Sep
44. ↑
52 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19. ↑
53 GHQ
SWPA Opns Instns 70, Annex 4, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep
44. ↑
54 Ltr,
GHQ SWPA to Comdr Allied Naval Forces, 23 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
26 Sep 44. ↑
55 Ltr, Lt
Col James W. Hill, Asst AG Sixth Army to CINCSWPA and CG USASOS, 25 Sep
44, sub: Heavy Shipping Requirements for King
II Operation, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 25 Sep 44. ↑
56 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Rpt of Transportation Off, p. 270. ↑
57 CTF 77
Attack Plan A304–44, 2 Oct 44. ↑
58 Rads,
CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps, CG XXIV Corps, CG ASCOM, CO 21st Inf Regt,
and CO 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 8 Oct 44. ↑
59 Rad, CG
Sixth Army to GHQ SWPA, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 10 Oct 44. ↑
CHAPTER IV
The Return
For more than two years the high command of the
Southwest Pacific had anticipated the promised return to the
Philippines. That objective had governed nearly all of the planning and
most of the earlier invasions. Now the day had arrived. Plans had been
made and troops and cargo were aboard ships. The fleets of the Pacific
Ocean Areas and the Southwest Pacific Area were about to join forces in
a mighty assault against the Philippines.
The Convoy Forms
That part of the VII Amphibious Force which
carried the 24th Infantry Division and the Sixth Army Service Command
assembled at the harbor of Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea. In this
force were over 470 ships, ranging in size from small rocket-launching
craft to 5,000-man troopships, loaded and now waiting for the message
to weigh anchor and head for the Far Shore, as Leyte was designated.
They were scheduled to pick up that part of the force which was
carrying the 1st Cavalry Division from Manus Island and then rendezvous
with the III Amphibious Force.
At 1600 on Friday, the thirteenth of October, the word
was given and the great fleet at Hollandia got under way for the
target—Leyte—1,300 miles distant.1 Minesweeping
task groups had preceded it on 11 and 12 October.2 By sundown
the convoy was formed and the ships were darkened. On 14 October the
ships of the convoy crossed the equator without ceremony. General
quarters (battle drill) and abandon ship drills were held. The part of
the force carrying the 1st Cavalry Division was sighted during the day.
On the following day the two units joined and the convoy proceeded. On
17 October the convoy made visual contact with the tractor groups of
the III Amphibious Force. This force had come from Hawaii with the XXIV
Corps to help in the liberation of Leyte.3
XXIV Corps Afloat
In the early morning hours of 13 September the
headquarters of XXIV Corps at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii, was
awake and active. Breakfast was served at 0330, and all men who had
been informed the day before that they were to embark for an unknown
shore shouldered their barracks bags and carried them to waiting
trucks. By 0700 the men had been loaded on the trucks, which took them
to the narrow-gauge Oahu railroad. In flat cars they traveled some
twenty miles to Honolulu Harbor. The [41]usual seeming delays
followed, but eventually the hot, tired, and perspiring headquarters
men boarded the George F. Clymer and were assigned bunks. The
Clymer was but one unit of a large convoy that stretched toward
the horizon in every direction. At 1115 on 15 September the convoy got
under way for a destination believed to be Yap. As the ships departed,
word was received that the Yap operation had been canceled and that
Leyte was to be their destination. For the men on board, life fell into
the monotonous routine common to all transports. Reading, card and dice
games, eating, sleeping, and interminable “bull sessions”
helped to pass the time.
On the 25th of the month the Clymer anchored at
Eniwetok Island, an anchorage already crowded with hundreds of
transports, warships, and cargo vessels. The men were allowed to go
ashore, where they were given beer and other refreshments. The XXIV
Corps was notified that it would leave for Manus, in the Admiralty
Islands, where further orders would be received and the staging
completed. The LST flotilla left on 26 September and two days later the
transports followed. Maps, terrain studies, and aerial photographs were
distributed and studied en route.4 At the same time the XXIV
Corps issued a tentative field order which was distributed to lower
unit commanders, who then held conferences and issued tentative verbal
field orders.5
Early in October the convoy crossed the equator. On many
of the ships ceremonies were held transforming pollywogs into
shellbacks, with the result that some of the men preferred standing to
sitting for a few days. On 3 October the convoy arrived at
Manus.6 The assault troops of the XXIV Corps were
transferred from AKA’s to LST’s. The 96th Division on 9
October issued a final field order for the Leyte operation. This order
allowed the regimental headquarters less than forty-eight hours to
complete final orders, plans, and maps, and distribute them to the
headquarters of the assault battalions.7
On 11 October the LST transports carrying the assault
battalions filed out of the Manus anchorage, and on 14 October the rest
of the convoy again formed and started on the last stretch of the
journey.8 Its progress was satisfactory, and on 15 October
the President of the United States sent his best wishes for the success
of the operation to President Sergio Osmeña of the Philippine
Commonwealth, who was at sea with the expedition.9 When the III
Amphibious Force rendezvoused with the Seventh Fleet, the largest
convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that time was formed.10
Composition of the Convoy
Thirty-four months had been spent in building and
preparing these combatant and amphibious vessels. Practically none of
them were in existence at the time Corregidor was besieged. Most of the
183 vessels of Task Force 77 were warships, while Task Forces 78 and
79, the amphibious forces, consisted mainly of transports, cargo ships,
and a wide variety of landing ships and craft. Fully 518 ocean-going
vessels were included in Task Forces 78 and 79.11
Of the vessels assigned to participate in the operation,
157 were combatant ships: 6 old battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light
[42]cruisers, 18 escort carriers, 86 destroyers, 25
destroyer escorts, and 11 frigates. There were 420 transport vessels,
including 5 command ships, 40 attack transports, 10 LSD’s, 151
LST’s, 79 LCI’s, 21 LCT’s, and 18 high-speed
transports. The remainder included patrol, mine-sweeping, hydrographic,
and service ships.12
The convoy did not include the combatant ships of
Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet. The main striking force of the
Third Fleet was Task Force 38, composed of four powerful carrier task
groups, under Admiral Mitscher. Each group contained fast carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, and the newest American battleships.13
After forming, the convoy proceeded toward the target.
At this time a disquieting report was received from the meteorologists
on board the ships: a typhoon was headed toward the Leyte Gulf area.
Such a disturbance could be fatal to the expedition. A severe storm did
in fact lash the gulf area from 14 through 17 October, but it gradually
abated and the morning of A Day, 20 October, was clear. This favorable
weather augured well for a successful landing.
Softening the Target
Early Strikes
Allied aircraft had already visited the Philippine
Archipelago. The first aerial strikes since 1942 were made in the early
fall of 1944. On 1 September B-24’s from New Guinea bases
initiated their first large-scale air attack against airdromes in the
Davao area, though bad weather prevented the protective fighter escort
from attacking the target. The airborne defense encountered was
surprisingly light—only three intercepting fighters opposed the
strike. The bombers dropped 100 tons of bombs, destroying 34 planes on
the ground and killing about 100 men.14 Two
American bombers were shot down and six received minor
damages.15 General MacArthur believed that the Japanese were
conserving their air strength in order to concentrate it against
anticipated Allied landings.16
On 4 September the first aerial reconnaissance flights
were made over Leyte. During the period 9–14 September, Admiral
Mitscher launched a large-scale, carrier-based air assault against the
Japanese air defenses in the Philippine Islands in order to protect the
Palau and Morotai landings. On 9 September aircraft from the carriers
attacked airdromes and installations in the Mindanao area, destroying
60 aircraft on the ground and 8 in the air. On 12 September the attack
was directed against the Visayan Islands. Of an estimated air strength
of 225 aircraft in the sector, 125 were destroyed on the ground and 75
in the air. During the night of 12 September the Japanese flew in
reinforcements from Luzon. A Third Fleet strike on 13 September against
the reinforced air strength destroyed an estimated 135 aircraft on the
ground and 81 in the air. On the 14th, the Third Fleet planes
encountered no enemy air opposition but destroyed from 10 to 15
aircraft on the ground. The air strength which the enemy had conserved
for an [43]anticipated American invasion was thus decimated.
About 500, or approximately 57 percent of the 884 aircraft believed to
be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed. This
successful knocking out of the Japanese air strength in the Philippine
Islands was an important factor in the decision to speed up the landing
at Leyte by two months.
On 21 September Central Pacific carrier-based aircraft
directed their attention to the Luzon area. In spite of their vigorous
defense of the Luzon airfields, the Japanese lost an estimated 110
aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground. These included not only
combat aircraft but also reconnaissance, transport, and training
planes. The remaining air strength in the area was estimated to be 350
aircraft, of which 10 percent were in Mindanao, 20 percent in the
Visayan Islands, and 70 percent in Luzon.
At the same time, the carrier-based aircraft made strong
strikes against enemy shipping in the central and southern Philippines.
It was estimated that from 1 September to 15 September 105 merchant
vessels were sunk in those waters by carrier planes, destroyers,
cruisers, and submarines. Although exact information was lacking on the
number of enemy vessels present in the Visayan and Mindanao areas, it
was thought that 50 percent of the Japanese merchant marine in those
areas was eliminated. A successful attrition of the Japanese air and
naval strength in the Philippines had been accomplished.17
The Third Fleet’s carriers then started to
neutralize the approaches to the Philippine Islands. The carrier-based
aircraft launched strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas in the
Ryukyus, of which Okinawa is the largest and most important. As a
result of attacks on 10 October, they destroyed an estimated 23 enemy
planes in the air and 88 on the ground or in the water. Admiral Halsey
reported that his flyers sank 1 subtender, 1 mine sweeper, 1 destroyer
escort, 2 mine-craft, 4 midget submarines, 20 cargo ships, and 45 other
craft. In addition, nearly as many ships, mostly of small size, were
damaged.18 On 11 October the flyers struck at Luzon.
Air and Naval Action in the Formosa Area
The plans of the Third Fleet called for strong
carrier-based strikes against Formosa on 12 and 13 October. The four
task groups of Task Force 38 were assigned targets in the southern
Formosa, northern Formosa, central Formosa, and the Takao areas,
respectively. (Takao is a port city on the southwest coast of Formosa.)
After a fast run on the night of 11–12 October the carriers of
Task Force 38 arrived in position off Formosa in the early morning.
Although the Japanese were aware of the approach of the task force,
they made no attacks against it before dawn. As the first fighters
started sweeps over their respective areas, heavy opposition developed,
but it dropped markedly during the day. From 12 to 14 October the
Japanese lost some 280 aircraft,19 while the Americans lost
76. As a result of the operation, the Japanese lost half of their naval
air strength. This loss gave assurance that [44]the U.
S. forces would have air superiority over the Leyte area on A
Day.20
On the evening of 13 October the American heavy cruiser
Canberra was torpedoed eighty-five miles off Formosa. Admiral
Halsey kept his forces in the area another day in order to afford
protection to the Canberra. Attacks, therefore, continued
against enemy aircraft, airfields, and installations. By this time,
Japanese reinforcements had arrived. On the evening of 14 October an
aerial torpedo hit the heavy cruiser Houston.
Admiral Halsey decided to capitalize on the damage
inflicted on the two cruisers. He ordered two task groups, which
included the battleships, to retire eastward out of sight; he sent
another of the task groups to conduct intermittent air raids against
northern Luzon; and he assigned the remaining task group to protect the
crippled Canberra and Houston. Halsey instructed this
last task group to send out messages in the clear begging piteously for
assistance. He hoped that by this ruse, which he called the “Lure
of the Streamlined Bait,” the Japanese fleet would be led to
believe that this task group was all that remained of the task force
and would therefore sweep down for the kill. The two task groups which
had retired eastward would then appear and engage the enemy. The
Japanese swallowed the bait and dispatched destroyers and cruisers
toward the “crippled” American force. Unfortunately, their
search planes uncovered the two task forces off Formosa, and the
Japanese surface ships hastily withdrew.
The enemy pilots made such greatly exaggerated claims of
success that Imperial General Headquarters decided to order out
the 2d Diversion Attack Force against the Americans. The flying
units of Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 were transferred to
the 2d Air Fleet. These air units proceeded to Formosa on the
12th of October. Carrier Divisions 3 and 4, however,
remained in the Inland Sea until they sortied forth for the Battle of
Leyte Gulf.21 The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force
were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the
American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance
Ministry distributed “celebration sake” to all households
in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the
unfounded claim that “a total of 57 enemy warships including 19
aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by
the Japanese forces … the enemy task forces lost the majority of
their strength and were put to rout….”22 It also
predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the
Philippine Islands by two months.23
Admiral Halsey’s reaction was to report that
“all 3d Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been
salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy.”24
The convoy, as it steamed toward Leyte, received the
news of the United States success with considerable satisfaction. At
this time, however, Admiral Halsey announced that the Third Fleet was
being deployed for action, since he was expecting the Japanese to rise
to his bait. Consequently the Third Fleet, except for the current
strike at Luzon, could not furnish any more carrier support for the
operation.25 The Third Fleet task [45]group
which went to the Luzon area successfully struck at enemy airfields and
shipping. From 17 to 19 October it destroyed an estimated ninety-nine
enemy aircraft on the ground and ninety-five in the air.26
Realignment of Air Support
On the heels of Admiral Halsey’s
announcement that no assistance in connection with the Leyte landings
could be expected from the Third Fleet, Far East Air Forces stated that
the Fifth Air Force would support the Leyte operation as a
“priority mission.”27 At the same time the
Seventh Fleet requested intensive reconnaissance of San Bernardino and
Surigao Straits in the Leyte area. This mission was assigned to the
Fifth Air Force, which was also charged with neutralizing the Visayan
airfields. The Thirteenth Air Force was to expedite the basing on
Morotai of heavy bombers which could be called forward in support when
requested by the Fifth Air Force. From 18 to 19 October the carrier
aircraft of the Seventh Fleet protected the convoy and struck at small
vessels and airfields in northern Mindanao as well as defense and
communications installations and airfields on Leyte.28
Although the missions Admiral Halsey had assigned his
carriers apparently prevented any aircraft of the Third Fleet from
participating in direct support of the landings, Halsey nevertheless
ordered one of the task groups to strike at the Leyte, Samar, Cebu, and
Negros areas on 18–19 October and to provide direct air support
for the Leyte operation on 20 October.29 Moreover,
by 18 October news was received that the Japanese had discovered the
ruse and withdrawn their warships from the Formosa area, thus leaving
Admiral Halsey’s forces free to protect the operation by covering
San Bernardino and Surigao Straits.30
The carrier force of the Seventh Fleet was to bear the
brunt of the tactical air support. By the afternoon and night of 17
October the weather had cleared, and flying conditions were perfect as
the carriers moved into their operation areas the following morning.
The force was divided into three units: one unit operated in the
southern part of Leyte Gulf to protect the landings at Panaon Strait;
another operated near the entrance to the gulf in order to support the
landings of the Southern Attack Force at Dulag; and the last operated
southeast of Samar Island to support the landings of the Northern
Attack Force at Tacloban.
During 18 and 19 October, aircraft from the carriers
struck at enemy airfields on Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands. There was
very little enemy activity from the Japanese airfields in the Leyte
area, since they were still sodden from the recent storms. In the two
days’ strikes, the Seventh Fleet aircraft destroyed an estimated
thirty-six enemy planes and damaged twenty-eight more.31
Japanese Plan of Defense
The air blows on the Philippines served as a
warning that the Americans were ready to return to the Islands—an
event long expected [46]by the Japanese. By the end of June 1944, the
Japanese military situation had considerably worsened. The outer circle
of Japan’s perimeter had been pierced and the impetus of the
American drive showed no signs of slackening. (Map
4)
The Allied nations had hit the Japanese from east and
west and seriously interfered with their seaborne commerce. Japan was
in grave danger of being separated from her stolen southern
area—the source of her raw materials. Units within this area were
also being forcibly isolated from each other. The fall of Saipan had
brought about a “most serious crisis.” Premier Tojo was
removed and Kuniaki Koiso formed a new cabinet.32
In the summer of 1944 Imperial General
Headquarters had started to strengthen the Philippines, the
Ryukyus, the Kurile Islands, and Japan itself—the “first
line of sea defense.” If the Allies landed forces in any of these
areas, the Japanese would concentrate their land, air, and sea forces
and attempt to repel the landing force. These operations were known as
the SHŌ (Victory) Operations. Defense of the
Philippines was SHŌ I.33
The Japanese strategy was simple. Japan wished to remain
in the war, and to do so she must at all costs keep open the lines of
communication to the sources of her raw materials in the Netherlands
Indies.
In the first part of August 1944, the headquarters of
the 14th Area Army, which was to be charged with the defense of
the Philippine Archipelago, was organized under the command of the
Southern Army, while the 35th Army, which was to defend
the Visayan Islands, was established under the command of the 14th
Area Army.34
The Philippine Islands were under the jurisdiction of
the Southern Army, whose command organization was extremely
complex. (Chart 3) The supreme commander was Field Marshal Count
Hisaichi Terauchi. There were four area armies in the Southern
Army: the 2d Area Army occupied Netherlands New Guinea,
thence west to Timor; the 7th Area Army was at Singapore; the
Burma Area Army was at Rangoon; and the 14th Area Army,
commanded by Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, was in the Philippines with its
headquarters at Manila. The Southern Army also had two air
armies and three garrison armies: the 3d Air Army in Singapore;
the 4th Air Army, consisting of two air divisions in the
Philippines and one air division in western New Guinea; and a garrison
army stationed in Thailand, another in French Indochina, and a third in
Borneo. The commander of the 14th Area Army maintained a staff
liaison with the 4th Air Army but otherwise had no control over
it.
The 1st Air Fleet, under the command of the
Southwest Area Fleet, was stationed in the Philippines, with
headquarters at Manila. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander in chief of the
Combined Fleet with headquarters at Tokyo, controlled the entire
naval forces, including the Southwest Area Fleet.35 [47]
Frost
SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC
Mid-October 1944
[48]
Chart 3—Japanese Army
Organization of Major Units for the Leyte Operation
[49]
Plans for the 14th Area Army
The Japanese during the summer of 1944 anticipated
that the United States forces would return to the Philippine Islands,
but when and where were two questions for which not even Tokyo Rose,
the Japanese radio propagandist, had the answers. Consequently, the
Japanese wished to keep their troops sufficiently mobile that
reinforcements might be rushed to the point of contact. The original
plan called for the main defensive effort of the ground forces to be
made on Luzon, since there were too few Japanese troops in the
archipelago to defend all of the Philippines. The Japanese Navy and Air
Forces, however, were to carry out “decisive” actions in
the central and southern Philippines.36
To General Kuroda fell the task of making and executing
plans for the defense of the Philippines by the 14th Area Army.
General Kuroda was essentially a realist. He stated in June 1947 that
in October 1944 he had told Maj. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief of Army
Intelligence, Imperial General Headquarters, that “it
would be best for Japan to negotiate an immediate peace before the
Americans could destroy our nation by air power.”37 Kuroda thought that all available land forces
should be concentrated in the Luzon area in order to counterattack any
American landing within the Luzon perimeter. However, because of their
predominant aerial strength, the Americans in their next attempt could
unless they made “some terrible mistake … land in force and
once ashore, could take the Philippines.”38 General
Kuroda’s plan was never considered. Imperial General
Headquarters’ plan for the defense of the Philippines called
for the employment of ten divisions and five brigades: five divisions
and two brigades in Luzon, four divisions and two brigades in the
southern Philippines, and one division and one brigade in China and
Formosa. The two units last mentioned would be rushed to the
Philippines as soon as the American landing became imminent.39 When the Americans landed, all of these units,
acting in concert, were to participate in fighting a decisive battle
against the American troops. This plan was never carried out in its
entirety.
The Japanese occupation troops of the Philippine Islands
had grown soft and had “no particular will to fight.” In
the spring of 1944, there were only minor units available to set up an
organized defense.
Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern
Army thought that because of the many islands in the archipelago
emphasis should be placed on air power. Air attacks could destroy the
American forces before they arrived at the landing areas or at least
before they could make appreciable gains. The way could then be opened
to turn a defense into an offensive.40 General
Kuroda threw cold water on this plan by bluntly stating:
That concept is good, but you cannot fight with
concept alone. Words alone will not sink American ships and that
becomes clear when you compare our airplanes with theirs. That is why
the major battles have been occurring on land. We can say that the
power of our air force is negligible at this time. No matter
[50]how much the Fourteenth Army devotes their
efforts toward air power, in actuality, should there be a decisive
fight, they must fight on land. The preparation and conduct of an
operation, and the responsibilities thereof cannot be conducted by
airplanes and air units. The land army should initiate its own
preparations. For example, for what purpose were the group of air bases
constructed at Davao and Tacloban? Even though they are built, they
aren’t used. It amounts to construction for the use of the
enemy.41
During the month of August, the Japanese devoted their
main efforts toward strengthening the air force. After the first of
September more emphasis was placed on building up the ground troops
while the air preparations continued to some extent. The Southern
Army in late August ordered about one half of a division to
Sarangani and one division to Davao against the wishes of the 14th
Area Army. This meant a reshuffling of the troops that had been
moving and repairing defenses since the first part of August.
“The order was carried out begrudgingly.”42
Lt Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander of the 35th
Army, thinking that the American Army would land on 1 October,
said: “Contrary to what has been announced by General
Headquarters our air force cannot be prepared and equipped in time,
nor can the Combined Fleet be depended upon. The situation grows
worse and for this reason the land force preparations must be hastened.
Yet, in spite of that, we must not discourage the air forces and should
do as much as possible to prepare aggressive aerial
opposition.”43
In the middle of September, Imperial General
Headquarters decided to replace General Kuroda with General
Tomoyuki Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the
Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he
was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander.44 Lt. Col. Seiichi Yoshie of the Personnel Bureau
of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to
investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the
incident:
Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen.
Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters
than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his
control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and
that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct
among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was
becoming very lax.
On 4 September 1944, I left Tokyo under orders … to
investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the
unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations
of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as
possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita … who was a superb
tactician and excellent leader.45
General Yamashita, who was in Manchuria, received
notification of his appointment on 23 September, and on the 9th of
October he assumed command of the 14th Area Army.46 On his arrival in the Philippines, he found
conditions were “unsatisfactory.” Of the eleven members of
the old staff only five were left and the new staff [51]officers
were unfamiliar with conditions in the Philippine Islands.47 The state of affairs was well exemplified by a
remark of his new chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, who arrived in
the Philippines on 20 October from Sumatra, where he had been in
command of the 2d Imperial Guards Division.48 Upon
being told that the Americans had landed on Leyte, Muto is said to have
replied, “Very interesting, but where is Leyte?”49
GEN. TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA
Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, one of three assistants to
Yamashita, states that the planning for the Leyte campaign was
“very bad.” The supply situation, however, was favorable.
Since Manila was the main depot not only for the Philippines but also
for other places in the south such as Borneo and Singapore, a
sufficient amount of everything needed was at hand.50
LT. GEN. SOSAKU SUZUKI
There were two tactical concepts of defense of the
islands in July and August 1944. One was termed the policy of
“annihilation at the beachhead” and the other the policy of
“resistance in depth.” The respective merits of the two
concepts were bitterly debated by their partisans. The proponents of
resistance in depth thought that the beach defenses, which had been
constructed with a great deal of labor, were useless, since it was
believed they could not withstand naval bombardment. On the other hand,
the friends of annihilation at the beachhead felt that semipermanent
beach fortifications could withstand bombardment. Imperial
[52]General Headquarters, after studying the
battle lessons of the Pacific Campaign and the actual effect of naval
bombardment, decided to adopt the resistance in depth tactics and
instructed the entire army forces to comply. Consequently, the various
group commanders abandoned their beach defenses with regret and began
to build strong fortifications in selected areas of the
interior.51
The control of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao was
vested in the 35th Army, which was the equivalent of an American
army corps. General Suzuki, its commander, compromised between the two
concepts of defense. At a meeting of the 35th Army unit
commanders in the middle of August 1944, he stated that although the
main battle was to be fought away from the beaches some troops should
remain to resist the American landings and “therefore part of the
troops must suffer premature losses.”52
The 16th, 102d, 30th, and the
100th Divisions, which were in Leyte, Panay, and Mindanao, were
placed under the 35th Army, whose headquarters was at
Cebu.53
The Suzu Plan
On 17 August General Suzuki issued the Suzu orders
for the defense of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao by the 35th
Army. The 100th Division was to protect the Davao area on
Mindanao while the 16th Division would defend Leyte. Most of the
30th Division and two infantry battalions were made mobile units
which could be rushed to annihilate the American force wherever it
landed. However, if the Americans landed simultaneously on Davao and
Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division was to be sent to
Davao and the other mobile units would go to Leyte.
In late August, Suzuki received orders to dispose his
troops as follows: a reinforced division in the Davao area, three
battalions in the Sarangani Bay area, three battalions in the vicinity
of Zamboanga, two battalions in the Jolo Islands, a “strong
unit” in the vicinity of Surigao, and one division in the Leyte
Gulf area. The 55th Independent Mixed Brigade was to be assigned
to the 35th Army. Units of the 16th Division which were
in Luzon were sent to the 16th Division on Leyte. These
elements, which consisted of one engineer company, an independent
transportation unit, and a medical unit, were placed under the
commander of the 33d Infantry Regiment.54
Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, commanding the 16th
Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his
efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions
on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast
in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October.
The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the
vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two
others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central
mountain range at Jaro.
The distribution of the other troops at the time of the
American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main
strength of the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban
area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was
less adequately trained [53]than the other regiments, had arrived
on Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with
the terrain and did not fortify their positions.55
On 17 October General Makino, having heard that American
warships had approached Leyte Gulf, alerted the 16th Division
for the impending battle and ordered all units to “shatter the
enemy landing attempts.”56 On 18 October the 14th
Area Army received a report from the 16th Division which
indicated that the latter was not certain the vessels sighted off Leyte
were an enemy attacking force. They might be ships seeking safety from
the storms, or vessels damaged in the naval battle off Formosa.
Consequently, 14th Area Army was not sure that an attack was
imminent at Leyte.57 Plans for the 4th Air
Army
The principal assignment of the 4th Air Army was
to attack American transports and interdict American shipping and, if
given the opportunity, to attack the American combatant vessels. The
4th Air Army was also to give aerial support to the movement of
reinforcements.58
In October the 4th Air Army issued a plan for
anticipated operations. In co-operation with the Army and the Navy, the
4th Air Army would attempt to destroy the American forces when
they struck the Philippines. The Army air force in concert with the
naval air units would try to destroy carrier-based planes and air
bases. In operations against the American fleet, the Army and Navy air
units were to have “a unified and tactful commitment.” If
the naval air units could not co-operate the Army air force was to
venture a surprise attack with a few planes. Dusk, night, and dawn
attacks were to be made against Allied air bases and all means exerted
to foil Allied attempts to establish advance bases in the Philippines.
The main strength of the fighter units was to move into the central and
southern Philippines in order to destroy the principal American landing
force. The mission of the Japanese 4th Air Army, operating from
Mindanao, Celebes, and northern Borneo, would be restricted to checking
the current attempts on the part of the Americans to establish bases on
Halmahera and western New Guinea and the destruction of the planes
there. For this purpose the Japanese air force would use bases in the
southern Philippines.
When the American convoy was sighted moving toward the
Philippines, the heavy bombers were to deploy to the central and
southern Philippines and make preparations for an immediate attack on
the convoy after it had arrived in the harbor. The fighter units were
to attack Allied aircraft and, if the circumstances were propitious,
were also to attack the convoy. If the Americans should attempt
simultaneous landings at various points, the Japanese Army air forces
would “try to annihilate the landing parties one by
one,”59 acting in concert with the Japanese Navy.
Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, the chief of staff to the
commander in chief of the Japanese Third Fleet, was highly
critical of the liaison [54]between the Army and Navy air forces.
“The Army and Navy always quarreled with each other. In theory
they were supposed to cooperate and on the higher levels it would work,
but personalities were the trouble.”60
Japanese Navy Plans
On 21 July 1944 Admiral Toyoda received a
directive which laid down the basic policies for subsequent
“urgent operations.” A great deal of the contracting empire
was abandoned. The Southwest Area, which embraced the region from
Manila to Singapore, was ordered to “maintain security of
resources areas, hold vital sectors for their defense, and place
emphasis on protection for fleet anchorages.” Thus the Japanese
planned to restrict battle “to the homeland and to the island
chain which protected the last links” of the empire with the
south. The forces in the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyu chain,
Formosa, and the Philippine Islands were told to take “all
measures to expedite the establishment of conditions to cope with
decisive battle. In event of enemy attack, summon all strength which
can be concentrated and hold vital sectors, in general intercepting and
destroying the enemy within the operational sphere of planes of our
base air force.”61
The success of Admiral Halsey’s carrier strikes
against Formosa had considerably weakened the strength of Japanese
carrier-based planes, and less than one half of the Army planes
remained. The necessity of sending reinforcements to Formosa also
weakened considerably the Japanese aerial defense of the Philippines.
The enemy became almost completely dependent upon the remaining
land-based planes.62 Within their capabilities the
Japanese had made their plans and readied their forces, as the American
convoy steamed towards Leyte to do battle.
Securing the Channel Approaches
Landings of the 6th Ranger Infantry
Battalion
The forward part of the convoy, which was carrying
the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Henry A.
Mucci, had experienced stormy weather since leaving Hollandia, but by
dawn of the 17th the storm had slackened, though the ocean was still
choppy. The transports carrying the reinforced 6th Ranger Battalion,
preceded by three mine sweepers, entered Leyte Gulf.63
The USS Crosby, carrying Company D, arrived on
schedule off Suluan Island, the outermost of the islands guarding Leyte
Gulf. For twenty minutes the cruiser Denver shelled the island.
Under lowering skies and in a driving rain which rendered impossible
the anticipated air support,64 Company D, under 1st Lt. Leslie
M. Gray, disembarked from the transport and headed for the island in
landing craft. The mission of the unit was to secure mine charts which
were believed to be located in a lighthouse [55]on the
island. At 0805 the boats touched shore.
The landing was unopposed. The men immediately filed
south 500 yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward
the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a
Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued
along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position,
killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack
formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering
the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective
without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by
naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted.65
In searching the documents found in the lighthouse, the
company failed to turn up the hoped-for enemy mine charts.66 It returned to the beachhead area and, finding
that the landing boats had been hopelessly battered and broken up by
the surf, formed a perimeter for the night.
As Company D was moving along the coast of Suluan
Island, naval fire blasted away at the extreme northwest coast of
Dinagat Island. At 0900 the first assault waves of the 6th Rangers,
minus Companies D and B, started for the beach. Although coral reefs
approximately one hundred yards offshore grounded the boats so that the
men had to wade the remainder of the distance, the companies were all
ashore by 1230. No Japanese were on the island and the troops
accomplished their mission, the erection of a navigation light at
Desolation Point to guide the movement of the main portion of the
convoy.
Company B of the 6th Rangers was to have landed on
Homonhon Island at the same time landings were made on Suluan and
Dinagat. Its mission, too, was the emplacement of a navigation light,
but bad weather and choppy seas kept the troops confined to the ship
throughout the 17th.67 On the morning of the 18th, the
ship’s address system clanged out general quarters. The men went
below, put on their gear, and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops
were told to prepare to disembark. They bolted up the ladders and
spilled out over the deck to the davits.68 The boats
were lowered and the first wave started for the beach. At the same time
the guns from the destroyer and frigate which had escorted the
transport concentrated fire against the shore line for twelve minutes.
Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral reef forty yards
from the beach, and the men waded the remaining distance to shore. They
encountered no resistance and at 1038 the company commander, Capt.
Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion commander, “Beachhead
secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No casualties.”69 The company set up a channel light.
By 18 October, steady white lights were beaming from
Dinagat and Homonhon Islands to guide the convoy in to Leyte Island.
The one on Dinagat had a visibility of twelve miles and that on
Homonhon a visibility of ten.70 [56]
PATROL OF COMPANY F, 6TH RANGERS, at
Desolation Point (above), and investigating a native village on Dinagat
Island (below).
[57]
Mine Sweeping
The mine-sweeping plans contemplated that the
mine-sweeping group would arrive on 17 October simultaneously with the
troops that were to storm Suluan, Dinagat, and Homonhon Islands. On 11
October the slow-moving mine sweepers lifted anchor at Manus and
departed for the objective area. They rendezvoused near the Palaus with
the Dinagat force, which had left Hollandia on 12 October. On 15
October they were joined by the carriers and the beach demolition and
bombardment and fire support groups which had sortied from Manus on 12
October. On 14 October information was received from guerrilla sources
that there were no underwater obstacles off the beaches between Abuyog
and Tacloban. Although the northern Surigao Strait was mined, it was
considered doubtful whether the same condition existed at the southern
entrances of Leyte Gulf.71 The mine-sweeping groups that
had left Hollandia on 11 October arrived in Leyte Gulf during the storm
of the evening of 16 October. Some of the mine sweepers had been
delayed by the storm but were able to arrive in time to begin sweeping
the channels.72
In the early dawn of 17 October the mine sweepers began
their work on the channel approaches to Suluan Island.73 By 0630 they had accomplished their task and then
began to sweep the waters of the landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the
storm forced them to suspend operations. At 1259 they resumed sweeping
with great difficulty. Until A Day, intensive area and tactical mine
sweeping continued. The sweepers started at dawn each day and worked
continuously until nightfall. By 19 October it was known that the
Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there
were no mines within the gulf itself. The northern part of the main
channel into the gulf, however, was not considered safe.74 By the same date sweeping had been completed in
the southern half, 186 mines having been destroyed. At about 0135 on 19
October, the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping units which were in
the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from the
area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By
A Day, a total of 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage
approximately six miles wide had been cleared just north of Dinagat
Island. All ships were therefore directed to enter Leyte Gulf through
that portion of the strait.75
As the mine sweepers came close to the land, boats
containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of
liberators. The reception they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral
Oldendorf, the commanding officer of the bombardment and fire support
group, “suspected that some might have come seeking information
so detained them aboard their respective ships…. Directed no further
patriots be taken aboard ship.”76
Underwater Demolition Teams
The naval plans for the amphibious phase of the
operation contemplated the use of seven underwater demolition
teams—three to cover the northern coast beaches and [58]four to
cover the southern beaches. The teams, starting A minus 2 (18 October),
were to locate underwater obstructions and detonate mines. On 18 and 19
October the underwater demolition teams made a reconnaissance of the
landing areas, accompanied by destroyers which bombarded the shores.
The two days’ reconnaissance disclosed no underwater obstacles or
mines in the vicinity of the proposed landing beaches.
The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf
By the evening of 19 October the preliminary
operations were almost completed. The beaches had been surveyed and
found suitable for landing; mines had been cleared from most of the
main approach channel; and the entrances to Leyte Gulf had been
secured.77
All ships were to be prepared to attach paravanes
(mine-cable cutting devices) on signal at any time after noon on 19
October.78 Since the mine sweepers had not sufficiently
cleared the gulf, paravanes were attached preparatory to entering it.
The mine sweepers were to have escorted the convoy into the area, but
since they would not be ready for about two hours, the entry was
ordered to be made without them. The convoy hugged the Dinagat shore
line so closely that the distance from the center of the formation to
the shore was only 3,800 yards.79 Some of the ships did not
see the signal light which had been placed on Dinagat Island by the 6th
Rangers and were delayed on that account.
The convoy advanced without incident toward the target
area. On the 18th Admiral Kinkaid radioed General MacArthur that the
operations were going well, though the storm had somewhat delayed
matters, and the General was made “welcome to our
city.”80 MacArthur in reply said that he was
“glad indeed to be in your domicile and under your flag. It gives
me not only confidence but a sense of inspiration,” and, probably
thinking of the many arduous months of planning and amphibious
operations, he added, “As Ripley says believe it or not we are
almost there.”81
As the convoy came ever closer to the target, the
atmosphere aboard the vessels became more and more tense. By 1800 on 19
October most of the vessels had arrived outside the gulf. The Far Shore
was now near and could be seen vaguely in the distance. On board one of
the vessels Protestant and Catholic evening prayers were broadcast over
the address system. Some of the men felt that it gave them a lift, but
many felt that they were being administered the last rites of their
church.82
All vessels arrived on schedule. Because the mine
barrier in the entrance had not been completely cleared, the ships
entered the gulf somewhat to the south of the center of the entrance,
avoiding the main channel and keeping close to the northern point of
Dinagat Island. Fears that strong ebb tides might impede progress of
the slower vessels through the entrance proved groundless. Paravanes
were retained until arrival in the transport areas, but no mines were
encountered.83 [59]
Naval plans called for bombardment of the enemy-held
shores on A minus 2 (18 October), but because the water areas had not
been completely swept for mines by that time, ships could not reach the
bombardment area. On A minus 1, bombardment was chiefly for the purpose
of providing effective support and coverage for the underwater
demolition teams. However, many of the defenses and installations of
the enemy on or near the landing beaches, including buildings and
supply dumps, were neutralized or destroyed.
By the afternoon of 19 October, when it had become
apparent to the Japanese that the Americans had returned to the
Philippine Islands, General Suzuki put his defense plan into effect. He
ordered the 16th Division to annihilate the American force, and,
failing that, to interfere as much as possible with the use of Leyte
airfields by the American Army. The mobile units, including two
battalions from the 30th Division, were to speed to Leyte as
fast as possible. Finally, the headquarters of the 35th Army was
to move to Ormoc on the west coast of Leyte on the 23d or 24th of
October.84
Through the night of 19–20 October, destroyers
near the shore continued to shell the Japanese forces on land. The
American forces were safely within Leyte Gulf—A Day had arrived.
[60]
1 Opns Rpt
CTF 78 to COMINCH, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. ↑
2 Rpt,
Capt Ray Tarbuck, USN, 3 Nov 44, GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Oct 44.
(Hereafter cited as Tarbuck Rpt.) ↑
3 Opns Rpt
CTF 78 to COMINCH, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. ↑
4 96th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 20. ↑
5 7th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
6 XXIV
Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
7 96th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 25. ↑
8 XXIV
Corps Hist Rpt for 1944, Sec Histories, History of the Adjutant
Generals Section from 8 April to 31 December 1944, pp.
10–11. ↑
11 CTF 77
Opns Rpt, Ser 00302-C, 31 Jan 45. ↑
12 CINCPAC
and CINCPOA Rpt Opns in POA in Oct 44, Ser 002397, 31 May
45. ↑
13 USSBS,
Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command, p.
40. ↑
14
Japanese Studies in World War II, 14, Naval Air Operations in the
Philippine Area, 1942–45, p. 18. (Monograph numbers cited in this
volume are file designations used by OCMH.) ↑
15 GHQ
SWPA Sum of Enemy Sit 894, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 2 Sep 44. ↑
17 GHQ
SWPA, Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 16, 3–9 Sep 44;
905, 13–14 Sep 44; 914, 22–23 Sep 44; 916, 24–25 Sep
44; and 907, 15–16 Sep 44; GHQ G-3 Jnl, 9–25 Sep
44. ↑
18 CINCPAC
and CINCPOA Rpt on Opns in POA in Oct 44, Ser 002397, 31 May
45. ↑
19
Japanese Studies in WW II, 102, Philippine Area Naval Operations,
Oct–Dec 44, Part II, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, pp. 4–11.
(Hereafter cited as Philippine Naval Opns.) ↑
20 USSBS,
Naval Analysis Div, The Campaigns of the Pacific War
(Washington, 1946), p. 283. ↑
21
Philippine Naval Opns, pp. 5, 85–86. ↑
22 AAF
SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 247, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 29 Oct 44. ↑
23 AAF
SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 246, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
24 Rad,
Com3rdFlt to CINCPAC-CINCSWPA, 170352 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct
44. ↑
25 Rad,
Com3rdFlt to CINCPAC and var., H 2692, 0321,15 Oct 44, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
26 Air
Evaluation Bd SWPA Rpt, Leyte Campaign—Philippines, 1944, p.
16. ↑
27 Hist of
FEAF, pp. 261–63, AAF Hist Archives. ↑
28 Air
Evaluation Bd SWPA Rpt, p. 16. ↑
29 Rad,
Com3rd Flt to CTG 38.1, 160216, 16 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct
44. ↑
31 CTG
77.4 Opns Rpt, Ser 00120, 15 Nov 44. ↑
32
Japanese Studies in WW II, 72, Hist of Army Section, Imperial
General Headquarters, 1941–45, p. 131. (Hereafter cited as
Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ.) ↑
34
Japanese Studies in WW II, 6, 14th Area Army Plans, 1944.
(Hereafter cited as 14th Area Army Plans.) ↑
35 The
organization of Japanese forces is discussed in detail in Hist of
Army Sec, Imperial GHQ. ↑
36 Hist of
Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 140–41. ↑
37 Interv,
2d Lt Stanley L. Falk with General Kuroda, at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 13
Jun 47, copy in OCMH. ↑
39 Hist of
Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 132–33, 135, 140, and errata
sheet to above. ↑
40 Maj Gen
Yoshiharu Tomochika, The True Facts of the Leyte Operation, p. 8,
typescript of translation in OCMH. ↑
45
Statement of Lt Col Seiichi Yoshie, Circumstances Leading to the Relief
of General Kuroda, 1 Oct 51, copy in OCMH. ↑
46
United States vs Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of
Yamashita, XXVIII, 3518–19, DRB AGO. ↑
48
Ibid., Testimony of Muto, XXII, 2998. ↑
49 A.
Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago, 1949), pp.
18–19. ↑
50 USSBS
Interrog 418, Interrog of Maj Gen Toshio Nishimura, 19–22 Nov 45,
MS, OCMH. ↑
51
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 6. ↑
54
Japanese Studies in WW II, 11, 35th Army Operations
1944–45, pp. 14–20. (Hereafter cited as 35th Army
Opns.) ↑
55
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 6. ↑
56 16th
Division Order 821, Tacloban, 17 October 1944, translation in App.
C to Annex Y, 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, DRB AGO. ↑
57
Japanese Studies in WW II, 7, 14th Area Army Operations on
Leyte, p. 4 (Hereafter cited as 14th Area Army Opns
Leyte.) ↑
58 USSBS
Interrog 506, Interrog of Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika, Oct–Dec
44, p. 2, typescript copy in OCMH. ↑
59
Japanese Studies in WW II, 5, 4th Air Army Operations,
1944–45, pp. 1–50. (Hereafter cited as 4th Air Army
Opns.) ↑
60 USSBS,
Interrogations, I, 160. ↑
61 James
A. Field, Jr., The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The SHO Operation
(Princeton, N. J., 1947), p. 8. ↑
62 USSBS,
Interrogations, I, 219; II, 500–504. ↑
63 Unless
otherwise noted the account of the activities of the 6th Ranger
Infantry Battalion is taken from the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion
Operations Report Leyte. ↑
64 Rad,
CTG 77.2 to CTF 78, 17 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct 44. ↑
65 Co D,
6th Ranger Inf Bn, Opns Rpt Leyte. ↑
66 Msg,
CTG 78.4 to Tancier, 18 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch
Jnl, 18 Oct 44. ↑
67 Rad,
GHQ to CofS, 17 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 18 Oct 44. ↑
68 Co B,
6th Ranger Inf Bn, Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
70 Rad,
CTG 78.5 to CTF 77, 19 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 19
Oct 44. ↑
71 Rad,
Parsons to CTF 77, 78, and 79, 14 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch
Jnl, 14 Oct 44. ↑
72 CTF 77
to COMINCH, Opns Rpt Leyte, Ser 00302-C, 31 Jan 45, p.
8. ↑
73 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 31. ↑
74 Rad,
CTG 77.5 to CTF 77, 19 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 19
Oct 44. ↑
75 Rpt,
COMINCH, Amph Opns—Invasion of the Philippines, COMINCH P-008,
pp. 1–3. ↑
76 CTG
77.2 to CTF 77, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 19 Oct
44. ↑
77 Rpt,
CTF 77 to COMINCH, Amph Opn P-008, pp. 1–3. ↑
78 CTG
79.1 Movement Order, A173–44, 9 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 16 Oct
44. ↑
79 Opns
Rpt CTG 79.1 to CTF 79, Ser 00454, 26 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 15 Nov
44. ↑
80 Msg,
CTF 77 to CINCSWPA, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct
44. ↑
81 Msg,
CINCSWPA to CTF 77, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct
44. ↑
83 Opns
Rpt CTF 79 to Com7thFlt, Ser 00323, 13 Nov 44, p. 71. ↑
CHAPTER V
A Day: 20 October 1944
Bombardment of the Shores of Leyte
The waters of Leyte Gulf were glassy calm as the
convoys bearing the assault forces steamed into their appointed
positions off the shores of Leyte in the very early morning hours of 20
October 1944.
There were three stages of the naval gunfire support:
the pre-A-Day bombardment, A-Day bombardment, and close supporting
missions to be delivered after H Hour and to continue until 24 October.
A portion of the fire support group in support of the underwater
demolition teams had bombarded the southern landing beaches and the
town of Dulag on 18 October, a process which was repeated on the
following day in support of the underwater demolition teams on the
northern landing beaches.1
At 0600 on A Day, 20 October, the battleships assigned
to the Southern Attack Force opened fire on the beaches. A lone
Japanese plane appeared at 0612 over the northern beaches, circled the
convoy, and despite gunfire from the Maryland and West
Virginia disappeared unscathed.2 At 0700 the battleships of
the Northern Attack Force commenced firing. For two hours the six
battleships, three to each attack force, fired on the beaches. Since no
specific targets could be discerned or determined, the gunfire was
directed at areas. Many enemy supply dumps and minor military
installations were destroyed. An observer reported:
Gray smoke plumes are rising from the shores.
Battleship Mississippi is now working on the northern beaches.
She is joined by the Maryland whose fire has apparently caused a
large shore explosion. Jap ack-ack is fired at spotting planes but the
performance is weak.
Battleships move inshore and renew their constant
thunder. Helldivers and Avengers from our CVE’s are heading
toward the shore….3
At 0900 the battleships ceased their fire and the
cruisers and destroyers moved in closer to the shore to deliver their
scheduled bombardment.4
At 0850 gunfire was suspended in the vicinity of Catmon
Hill, the most prominent coastal terrain feature near Dulag, in order
to allow an air strike against installations in the interior by the
planes from the CVE’s of the amphibious force. During the day a
total of 500 sorties by more than 140 planes were flown in direct
support. Twelve direct support missions were carried out, nine against
selected targets requested by ground troops and three against targets
of opportunity. Dawn and dusk fighter sweeps were made against
airfields.5 The aircraft from [61]the carriers, which were
beyond the range of the guns of enemy coastal defenses, did not attempt
secondary missions upon the completion of a mission in the target
area.6
CONVOY OFF LEYTE at dawn on A Day.
The principal bombing and strafing targets were
revetments, dispersal areas, supply dumps, and bivouac areas, together
with aircraft on islands near Leyte. Grounded planes were strafed and
destroyed. The commander of the escort carriers made the surprising
estimate that aircraft from his carriers had destroyed 125 planes on
the ground and damaged an additional 90 more in the first three days of
this “close support at a distance.”7 Aircraft did
not bomb the shore line, since gunfire from the vessels within the gulf
was considered more effective.
At 0900 the cruisers commenced bombarding the beaches.
They were joined at 0930 by the destroyers. At 0945 the cruisers and
destroyers lifted their fire and directed it at the inland areas, at
the flanks of the landing beaches, and at important roads and
towns.8
At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had
rattled out; LCVP’s were quickly swung over the sides; boats
circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas.9
The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of
the [62]assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes
before H Hour. The LCI’s raced simultaneously to the shores of
Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The
bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats,
flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches;
thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake.
It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the
unbroken roar.10 Over a smooth sea a hot, brilliant, tropical
sun beat down. The American forces were ready to land.
X Corps Goes Ashore
Hours earlier reveille had sounded on board the
transports and the troops had dressed by the red lights in the holds
where they were quartered. There was very little talking. Many of the
men sat on their bunks giving their weapons a final check. Others lay
back and smoked in silence. A few sought the chaplains.11
Missions of Sixth Army Summarized
The Sixth Army had been ordered to seize and
establish beachheads in the Dulag and Tacloban areas and to secure the
airfields in order to provide naval and air bases; and to seize such
objectives in the Panaon Strait area as would permit safe passage of
naval forces through the strait to the Camotes Sea.12 To carry
out the operation General Krueger had assigned the 21st Infantry
Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, to gain control of Panaon Strait; the
XXIV Corps was to secure the Dulag area and its airstrip; and the 1st
Cavalry Division of X Corps was to land in the Marasbaras area and, by
advancing north, capture the Tacloban airdrome, the most important
A-Day objective for the Sixth Army. At the same time, the 24th
Division, less the 21st Infantry, of the X Corps was to seize Palo and
advance rapidly to the northwest.13 The seizure of these areas
would secure the important coastal airstrips for future air operations,
cut off any Japanese attempts at reinforcement from the southern
Philippines through the Mindanao Sea and Sogod Bay, secure the
important eastern entrances into the interior, and enable the American
forces to control San Pedro Bay and San Juanico Strait.
The northernmost unit of X Corps, the 1st Cavalry
Division, was to land in the vicinity of San Jose (also called San
Ricardo and San Jose Ricardo) about three miles north of Palo, on White
Beach. White Beach extended southward 2,000 yards from the Cataisan
Peninsula. There was an interval of 1,500 yards between this beach and
the northern limit of Red Beach, which was also 2,000 yards
long.14 The 24th Division, less the 21st Infantry, was to
land in the vicinity of the town of Palo, on Red Beach. (Map 5)
1st Cavalry Division
White Beach had a fairly good landing surface of
white coral sand, but even at high tide it was suitable only for
shallow-draft landing craft. Its average width was fifteen yards at low
tide, at which time a small irregular bank two to three feet high
appeared at the water’s edge. The underwater gradient was
shallow, extending out half a mile in places. An irregular fringe of
coconut trees ran the length of the beach. In the [63]southern
section this fringe was narrow, with very wet and swampy cleared land
behind it. Highway 1 roughly paralleled the beach about a mile
inland.15
LANDING BEACHES. White Beach is in the
foreground, with Red Beach, bounded by the Palo River, beyond.
The roar of many guns could be heard as the 1st Cavalry
Division prepared to disembark into landing boats, which were to
rendezvous at the line of departure 5,000 yards from shore. A pall of
lazily billowing yellow smoke obscured the shores of Leyte.16
The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Verne
D. Mudge, was to land on White Beach with brigades abreast—the
1st Brigade on the left (south) and the 2d Brigade on the right
(north)—and advance inland. The 1st Brigade, under Brig. Gen.
William C. Chase, was to reconnoiter the hills on the west side of
Tacloban Valley and establish observation posts which would command the
entrances to the valley. The 2d Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Hugh F.
Hoffman, had the most important mission of the day. It was to advance
northwest, capture the Tacloban airdrome and seize the Cataisan
Peninsula, reaching Cataisan Point, the northern extremity of the
peninsula, by 1400. Col. William J. Bradley’s 8th Cavalry
Regiment of the 2d Brigade was held afloat in division reserve and was
to be prepared to reinforce either the 1st or 2d Brigade.17
Frost
X CORPS LANDINGS
20 October 1944
Flanked by rocket and gunboat LCI’s, and preceded
by amphibian tanks, the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments, which formed
the 1st Brigade, and the 7th Cavalry, which with the 8th Cavalry (in
reserve) composed [65]the 2d Brigade, raced for the shores of
Leyte. The escorting rocket ships laid down a heavy barrage which
covered the beach defenses to a depth of 1,800 yards inland and left
the enemy incapable of organized resistance. As the boats neared shore,
only small arms and machine gun fire opposed the landing.18 As planned, the regiments landed abreast, the 7th
Cavalry Regiment on the right (north), the 12th Cavalry Regiment in the
center, and the 5th Cavalry on the left (south).
The 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry was to land north of
the 2d Squadron on the northern end of White Beach, which at this point
coincided with the narrow neck of land connecting the Cataisan
Peninsula to the rest of the island, and then go directly north to
secure the entire peninsula and the airstrip. On its left the 2d
Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was to land on the right flank of White Beach,
push inland, capture San Jose and a bridge across the Burayan River
northwest of the town, and seize a beachhead line a thousand yards west
of Highway 1 and three thousand yards from White Beach. The Cataisan
Peninsula would then be sealed off.
Both squadrons landed on schedule, with only slight
opposition, and immediately began to execute their assignments. The 2d
Squadron, within fifteen minutes after landing, knocked out two
pillboxes on the beach, killing eight Japanese in one and five in the
other. It then organized rapidly and pushed on to secure its first
objective, the town of San Jose. In the town the squadron engaged in a
house-to-house search but found few Japanese. By 1230 twenty-four
Japanese had been killed, San Jose was in American hands, and the
Cataisan Peninsula was sealed off. The 7th Cavalry Regiment established
its command post on the west side of the town at 1245. The troops of
the 2d Squadron then set out in a northwesterly direction astride the
hard-surfaced, narrow San Jose-Tacloban road, but they were slowed down
by swamps and flooded rice paddies on either side.19 At 1400
they crossed the Burayan River on a bridge which the 33d Infantry
Regiment had attempted to destroy but had only damaged. The
engineers strengthened the bridge so that the medium tanks could cross,
and at 1420 the forward movement continued. By 1630 the squadron had
reached its objective—a point 3,000 yards from White
Beach—and immediately set up its night perimeter.
The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, landed in amphibian
tractors on the north end of White Beach a few minutes after initial
assault waves of the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, had cleared the beach.
It moved west off the beach 100 yards, pivoted to the right, and began
to move up the Cataisan Peninsula. The squadron was expected to secure
the peninsula and the airstrip with great speed. Engineer units had
landed just behind it and were waiting to start work on the airstrip as
soon as it was seized. The 1st Squadron met with only light enemy
opposition, the chief obstacles being the swamps, unoccupied
pillboxes—each of which had to be checked—and the numerous
Filipino shacks that afforded possible protection to the enemy. By 1600
the squadron had secured the airstrip and the Cataisan
Peninsula.20 Later in the afternoon the squadron, less Troop
A, was withdrawn from the peninsula. [66]
TROOPS OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION wade
through a swamp to their A-Day objective.
The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments landed on White Beach
without incident at exactly 1000. Immediately beyond the narrow landing
beach was a deep swamp through which the regiments must move to reach
Highway 1. The morass was often waist deep, in places even up to the
armpits, and men of the advancing line of troops cursed heartily as
they floundered toward the highway.21 Under such circumstances
it was impossible for the men to carry all of their personal equipment,
and they had to make three trips in order to complete the crossing of
certain areas. At 1100 a reconnaissance platoon of the 5th Cavalry
Regiment made physical contact with elements of the 34th Infantry, 24th
Division, on its left. By 1500 both cavalry regiments were on Highway
1. They pushed westward immediately toward the next objective—the
foothills west of the highway.22 Col. Royce E. Drake, the
commanding officer of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, went forward with a
patrol from F Troop. At 1900, about three quarters of a mile south of
Caibaan, the patrol made contact with the enemy. In the ensuing fight
ten Japanese and one American were killed and two Americans wounded. At
1915 the 12th Cavalry Regiment closed in on its A-Day objective and
formed its night perimeter.23 The 5th Cavalry Regiment formed
its night perimeter at 2135, a few hundred yards short of the
objective.24 [67]
The first elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2d
Cavalry Brigade, the corps reserve, moved to White Beach at 1040, and
by 1130 the entire reserve regiment was ashore. The regiment continued
in corps reserve throughout the day and spent its first night in the
Philippines on the western edge of San Jose.25
At 1400 General Mudge assumed command ashore of the 1st
Cavalry Division and by 1630 had established the divisional command
post at San Jose.26 Preceded by a ground reconnaissance of the
unit commanders, all of the 1st Cavalry Division artillery landed on
White Beach at 1330 and immediately established a position in the
vicinity of San Jose. Before nightfall all battalions had registered
and were prepared to fire, and beginning at 2115 the 61st Field
Artillery Battalion throughout the night delivered harassing fire on
the hills south of Tacloban.27 By the end of the day the
division had secured the Cataisan Peninsula and the Tacloban airstrip
and, after crossing Highway 1, had made physical contact with the right
flank of the 24th Infantry Division.28
24th Infantry Division29
In the southern part of the X Corps zone, to the left of
the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division (less the 21st
Infantry), under Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, was to land on Red
Beach on the morning of A Day.30 Although there were no
underwater obstacles, mines, or barbed wire along Red Beach, the water
was too shallow to permit vessels the size of LST’s to come in
and make a dry landing. Red Beach was narrow but consisted of firm
sand. Back of it was flat, marshy ground covered with palm trees and
jungle growth, extending inland in a southwesterly direction from the
northern end of the beach. General Makino had converted a small stream
bed in this area into a wide and deep tank trap which paralleled the
beach for 1,500 yards. Several large, well-camouflaged pillboxes,
connected by tunnels and constructed of palm logs and earth, were
scattered throughout the area. Between the swamp and a low range of
hills one and a quarter miles inland were open fields and rice paddies.
The most prominent terrain feature was Hill 522 just north of Palo.
This hill commanded the beach area, the town of Palo, and Highway 2,
leading into the interior. It was partly wooded, and the 33d
Infantry Regiment had interlaced it with tunnels, trenches, and
pillboxes.
From the beach a single deeply rutted and muddy exit
road ran south to the Palo River, where it turned westward to Highway
1. The river was just north of the town of Palo and roughly paralleled
Highway 2, which ran in a northwesterly direction from Palo into the
interior, between the hills dominating this entrance to Leyte
Valley.
The 24th Division was to occupy Palo, advance with
regiments abreast into the interior in a northwesterly
direction,31 occupy the Capoocan-Carigara-Barugo area, and
secure Highway 1 between Palo and Tanauan. The 19th Infantry on the
left (south) was to establish an initial beachhead, advance to the west
and south, seize Hill 522, and move on and capture Palo. The 34th
Infantry on the right (north) was [68]to establish an initial
beachhead, then move westward into the interior and be prepared to
assist the 19th Infantry in the capture of Hill 522.32
The assaulting forces, having been transferred to
landing craft, met at the line of departure 5,000 yards from shore.
After grouping, they dashed for the landing beaches, each regiment in
column of battalions. The division landed at 1000 with regiments
abreast according to plan. The Japanese allowed the first five waves to
land, but when the other waves were 3,000 to 2,000 yards offshore, they
opened strong artillery and mortar fire against them.33 A number
of the landing craft carrying the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, were
hit and four of them sunk. There were numerous casualties: the
commanding officer of Company C was killed; a squad of the Ammunition
and Pioneer Platoon was almost wiped out; and the Cannon Company
suffered the loss of two section leaders, a platoon leader, and part of
its headquarters personnel.
Among the vessels hit by Japanese artillery were four
LST’s, one of which was set on fire. Of the five remaining, two
were driven away and three did not get in until much later. The enemy
fired upon the retiring LST’s, which carried with them the
artillery and most of the tanks. The commanding officer of Headquarters
Company and the division quartermaster, together with the
latter’s executive officer, were wounded. Many of the division
headquarters personnel were killed or wounded.
The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry,
inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were
immediately pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The
commanding officer of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on
the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, “Get the
hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me.”34 Thus urgently prompted, the men followed him into
the wooded area.
Company I was able to advance, but Company K ran into a
defensive position of five pillboxes along a stream about seventy-five
yards from the beach. It successfully stormed these pillboxes with
rifles, BAR’s, and hand grenades. The 3d Battalion then halted
for reorganization. Company L, the reserve company, moved into the line
south of Company K to close the gap between the 19th and 34th Infantry
Regiments, a gap created when part of the 34th landed too far
north.
By 1215 the 34th Infantry had cleared the beach area of
the enemy, and the 3d Battalion was ready to advance across an open
swamp to a line of trees 150 yards away. A preparatory concentration by
81-mm. mortars, tanks, and heavy machine guns was first laid down. At
1230 the 3d Battalion moved in. Although the going was rough and the
mud waist deep, the troops reached the trees at 1300 and waited for the
mortars and machine guns to arrive. The 3d Battalion then pushed on an
additional 250 yards.
The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, passed through the 3d
Battalion, crossed Highway 1 at 1550, and dug in for the night 100
yards west of the highway.35
The 34th Infantry established contact with the 1st
Cavalry Division on the right and the 19th Infantry on the left. The
1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, remained in the beachhead area.
[69]
To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in
the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach.
Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly
behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing
point. The later waves landed at the planned spot.
Company K did not land on schedule, because its command
boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its
officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable
to make contact with the rest of the company until the following
day.
Company L, on the right, met little opposition on
landing, established contact with the 34th Infantry, and reached the
initial phase line 500 yards in from the beach. Company I, on the left,
encountered stiff resistance fifty yards off the beach. The defenses of
the 33d Infantry Regiment in this sector consisted of a tank
ditch and light automatic weapons, mortars, 75-mm. guns, and light and
heavy machine guns in prepared positions. Company I hit a group of
pillboxes and knocked out several of them as well as a 75-mm. gun. In
this action Pfc. Frank B. Robinson played a spectacular role. Crawling
behind a pillbox, he dropped three grenades into it and then reached
down and pulled the machine gun barrel out of line. After a further
advance of 200 yards, when a flame thrower aimed at a pillbox failed to
ignite, he threw a bundle of lighted papers in front of the pillbox.
The operator of the flame thrower then fired through the blaze and the
charge was ignited. By openly exposing himself to fire from a third
pillbox, Robinson enabled tanks to locate its position.36
During the next few hours platoons and squads fought
independently. The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, drove into the interior
about 500 yards, where it reorganized, made contact with adjacent
units, and then established its perimeter on Highway 1.37
The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had come in under
intense fire in which several boats were hit, and numerous casualties
occurred. The battalion landed 300 yards north of its selected area,
moved in 200 yards, and then made a left, oblique turn in order to
reach its predetermined assembly area. Company B suffered several
casualties when it ran into strong rifle and pillbox fire, which pinned
it down. The company was ordered to break off fighting and move to the
northern edge of the Japanese positions. Lt. Col. Frederick R. Zierath,
the commanding officer of the battalion, ordered the self-propelled
guns to be brought up. They successfully neutralized the pillbox and a
supporting position behind it. Company C, landing on the left flank of
the battalion, was immediately pinned down by hostile fire. Zierath
ordered it to disengage and proceed to the designated assembly area.
Company A, which was split by enemy fire, regrouped inland and reached
the assembly area just ahead of Company C.
The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, arrived at the beach
just as the 1st Battalion was bypassing the initial resistance. By noon
its first defense was formed around the beachhead. At 1245 Company E,
with a rocket launcher, silenced a 75-mm. gun which had been firing on
the LST’s. In its advance the company located two more 75-mm.
guns which had been abandoned. Company G relieved Company E and
prepared to move along the beach road southwest toward Palo. As the
point started to move out at 1300 it [70]was attacked by
approximately a platoon from the 33d Infantry Regiment which
attempted to retake the gun positions. The Japanese were repulsed by
rifle fire, leaving eleven dead.
75-MM. M8 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS move in to
support the infantrymen in their advance from the beach.
At 1430 Company G, in resuming its advance, ran at once
into a series of mutually supporting pillboxes about 500 yards inland,
where the beach road turns to meet Highway 1. A stiff rifle fire fight
followed, in which the Americans suffered fifteen casualties. Since
darkness was approaching, the battalion broke off the action and dug in
along the road for the night.
While the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was proceeding
cautiously forward the 1st Battalion was working toward Hill 522. This
hill, which rose directly from the river’s edge north of Palo,
overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and
winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which
would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into
the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives
for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify
it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work.
By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks,
planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed
the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep.
During the preliminary bombardments the Navy had
delivered some of its heaviest blows on the hill, and the bombardment
was continued by Battery B of the 13th Field [71]Artillery Battalion and Battery A of the 63d Field
Artillery Battalion. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry sent
reconnaissance parties to locate a northern route to the hill. The plan
had been to move inland from the extreme south of the beachhead, but
that area was still in Japanese hands. At 1430, when scouts reported
finding a covered route on the northern side of the hill, the 1st
Battalion immediately moved out in a column of companies. The column
had barely started when Company A, in the lead, was held up by enemy
fire from the five pillboxes. The remainder of the battalion moved
north around Company A, and, skirting the woods, attacked Hill 522 from
the northeast, with Company C on the right and Company B on the
left.
MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN C. SIBERT
(left), X Corps commander, confers with
Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, commander of the 24th Division, at a
forward command post.
The men, although tired from the day’s activity
and strain, made steady progress up the slope. As the troops moved
upward, American mortars started to shell the crest of the hill. It was
thought that this was artillery fire and a request was made that it be
lifted. It came, however, from the chemical mortars. After a short
delay the firing ceased. At dusk Company B reached the first crest of
the hill and was halted by fire from two enemy bunkers. The company
thereupon dug in.
At the same time scouts from Company C reached the
central and highest crest of the hill and espied about two platoons of
Japanese coming up the other side. They shouted for the remainder of
the company to hurry. Company C got to the top of the hill barely ahead
of the Japanese, and a sharp engagement took place in which about fifty
Japanese were killed. Company C held the highest crest of the hill.
During this attack, [72]1st Lt. Dallas Dick was struck in the leg and
his carbine was shot from his hands, but he continued to command his
unit until his evacuation forty-eight hours later.
During the night the Japanese made frequent but
unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate the company area and in the
darkness they carried away their dead and wounded. During the action to
secure Hill 522, fourteen men of the 1st Battalion were killed and
ninety-five wounded; thirty of the latter eventually rejoined their
units. General Irving, who had assumed command of the 24th Division
ashore at 1420, later said that if Hill 522 had not been secured when
it was, the Americans might have suffered a thousand casualties in the
assault.
By the end of A Day, the division had crossed Highway 1
and established physical contact with the 1st Cavalry Division on its
right flank. In spite of strong opposition on its left flank, the 24th
Division had secured Hill 522, which dominated the route into the
interior and overlooked the town of Palo, the entrance point into Leyte
Valley. Furthermore, the X Corps had now secured a firm beachhead area
averaging a mile in depth and extending over five miles from the tip of
the Cataisan Peninsula to the vicinity of Palo, and had captured the
important Tacloban airstrip on the Cataisan Peninsula.
XXIV Corps Goes Ashore
While the X Corps was engaged in seizing a
beachhead and capturing the Tacloban airfield, the XXIV Corps was
carrying out its mission more than fourteen miles to the south.
(Map 6) It was to land in the Dulag-San Jose
area and establish a beachhead between Dulag and Tanauan. The Dulag
airstrip was the primary objective. The 7th and 96th
Divisions—the 7th on the left (south) and the 96th on the right
(north)—made the landings. The most prominent terrain feature
near the shore line is a short, finger-like hill range between the
mouth of the Labiranan River and the village of Pikas. Ranging from 400
feet at its southern extremity, known as Labiranan Head, to 1400 feet
at Catmon Hill, southeast of Pikas, this hill mass dominates the
surrounding plain for miles around. (The entire hill mass will
hereafter be referred to as Catmon Hill.)
The 9th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion,
was guarding the Catmon Hill area while the 20th Infantry
Regiment, less one battalion, was defending the Dulag
area.38
Immediately northwest of Dulag and just off the beach
was a swamp,39 and along the coast were coconut groves
interspersed with rice fields. Many streams and rivers cut across the
coastal plain.40 Between Dulag and Labiranan Head was a good
section of firm sand beach, backed by a broad alluvial plain extending
ten miles inland.
96th Infantry Division
In the early morning hours of 20 October the
Southern Attack Force moved to a location off the shores of Leyte near
the town of Dulag. The 96th Division was to land with regiments abreast
in the area between the Calbasag River and the town of San
Jose—the 382d Infantry on the left (south) and the 383d Infantry
on the right (north). The southern half of the division’s
beachhead area was designated Blue Beaches 1 and 2, and the northern
half was known as Orange Beaches 1 and 2. The beaches had [74]an
average length of about 525 yards. The northern extremity of Orange
Beach was about ten miles from the southernmost beach of the 24th
Division in the X Corps sector.
Johnstone
XXIV CORPS LANDINGS
20 October 1944
The order to “land the landing force” of the
96th Division came at 0845, and LVT’s immediately began to spill
out of the LST’s and head for the line of departure. By 0930 the
assault waves, preceded by the amphibian tank wave, had arrived at
their appointed position 4,500 yards offshore.41 At the head
of the column were LCI gunboats which were to give fire support and act
as guides for succeeding waves. The assault waves then headed for Blue
and Orange Beaches.
When the landing craft were within 100 yards of the
shore, the LCI’s fired into the interior and to each side of the
landing beaches. Thereupon the amphibian tanks began to fire directly
beyond the beaches, in front of the advancing assault forces. The 382d
Infantry under Col. Macey L. Dill landed at 0950 on Blue Beach, and the
383d Infantry under Col. Edwin T. May landed ten minutes later on
Orange Beach.
The 383d Infantry landed with two battalions
abreast—the 2d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the
right. By 1045 both battalions had landed all of their assault troops
and had advanced 1,200 yards inland, encountering no resistance except
intermittent mortar fire from the 9th Infantry Regiment in the
vicinity of Catmon Hill.42 Immediately beyond the highway
the two battalions reached an unsuspected swamp. The amphibian tanks
bogged down at 1045 and were unable to catch up with the assault troops
during the rest of the day. Intermittent Japanese fire continued to
fall on the beach area. The 2d Battalion crossed the swamp without
encountering the enemy and established its night perimeter 2,600 yards
inland from the landing beaches.
The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, pushed northwest
through the barrio of San Jose, which was on the beach, and along the
marshy ground and swamps on the south bank of the Labiranan River for
2,200 yards. It crossed the river at 1610. Company C placed a roadblock
at the point where Highway 1 crossed the Labiranan River. After
advancing 400 yards farther northwest the battalion ran into fire from
elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment. At 1900 the battalion,
still under enemy fire, dug in for the night. At the close of the
day’s action it was at the base of Labiranan Head in a position
which would permit an attack to be launched on that terrain feature
from the west.
The 3d Battalion, which had been held afloat in
regimental reserve, came ashore at 1045. It mopped up in the rear of
the 1st and 2d Battalions and established its night perimeter 800 yards
away from the 1st Battalion on the south bank of the Labiranan River.
During the day the 383d Infantry Regiment, slowed by the terrain, had
advanced 2,600 yards inland.43
As heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on the
beach, the 382d Infantry also landed with two battalions
abreast—the 2d Battalion to the right (north) at Blue Beach 2 and
the 3d Battalion to the left (south) at Blue Beach 1. The 2d Battalion,
though momentarily stopped by debris on the shore, was able to advance
quickly and by 1025 had penetrated 300 yards inland. This gain was
increased to 700 yards by 1115. The battalion crossed Highway 1 before
it encountered the first defensive positions of the 9th Infantry
Regiment, a series of zigzag [75]deserted trenches roughly
paralleling the beach. Although the 2d Battalion met no enemy
opposition, the intense heat and the swampy ground made progress slow.
At 1630, when the battalion formed a perimeter for the night, it had
pushed inland approximately 2,500 yards.
BEACH AREA as seen from Hill 120.
The amphibian tractors carrying the 3d Battalion, 382d
Infantry, were held up by the tank barriers of coconut logs and debris
on the beach, and the troops were forced to debark at the water’s
edge. Several hundred yards off the beach this battalion began to
receive heavy fire from Hill 120, which was about 600 yards from the
beach. The hill dominated the regimental beach area44 and was
the A-Day objective for the battalion. The fire pinned down the
battalion, which thereupon called for mortar support and naval gunfire.
The resulting barrage forced the Japanese out of their positions, and
at 1040 the battalion advanced and captured Hill 120.
The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had been in
floating reserve, landed on Blue Beach 1 and moved to the foot of Hill
120 to support the 3d Battalion. Immediately beyond the hill there was
a small meadow rimmed by a deep swamp. The enemy fired upon the hill
throughout the day but could not dislodge the 3d Battalion. This steady
fire and the presence of the swamp limited the A-Day advance of the 3d
Battalion to 1,300 yards inland from the landing beach.
At the end of the day, despite the swampy terrain and
the harassing fire of the Japanese, the 382d Infantry had advanced
approximately 2,500 yards on the northern [76]flank and 1,300 yards on
the southern flank. Contact had been established at 1600 with the 32d
Infantry, 7th Division, on the left flank, and the 383d Infantry, 96th
Division, on the right flank.45
At 1630 the assault forces of the 96th Division
consolidated their positions and set up defense perimeters for the
night. During the day the division had captured the barrio of San Jose,
established control over both sides of the Labiranan River, captured
Hill 120 overlooking the beach area, and progressed well inland.
Although all units of the division fell considerably short of the
objective for A Day, this delay was due fully as much to the swampy and
difficult terrain as it was to enemy resistance. The 381st Infantry
Regiment remained in Sixth Army floating reserve throughout the
day.46
Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley arrived ashore at 1750, and
at 1800 he assumed command of the 96th Infantry Division. The three
light artillery battalions of the division had landed and were in
position by 1800.
7th Infantry Division
Concurrently with the landings of the 96th
Division, the 7th Division, on the left, was establishing a beachhead
in its zone of action just south of the 96th Division. At 0800 the
assault troops of the 7th Division began to clamber down the nets of
their transports into landing boats which were to carry them in the
dash for the shore.47 By 0815 they were boated and at
the line of departure.
The 7th Division was to land on Violet and Yellow
Beaches. Violet Beach extended 785 yards north from the northern edge
of Dulag. The northern half of Yellow Beach, called Yellow Beach 2,
which was south of Violet Beach and contiguous to it, was 400 yards
long. Between the northern and southern halves of Yellow Beach was a
swamp. The southern half of Yellow Beach, Yellow Beach 1, was
approximately 425 yards in length and was located south of Dulag and
north of the Daguitan River mouth.
The 7th Division was to go ashore between the Calbasag
and Daguitan Rivers with regiments abreast—the 32d Infantry on
the right (north) and the 184th Infantry on the left (south); the 17th
Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, was in reserve. The principal A-Day
objectives were the barrio of Dulag and its airstrip. The 3d Battalion,
17th Infantry, was to swing south and secure the bridge and the
crossing of the Daguitan River at Dao and the crossing of the Talisay
River.
The 32d Infantry, under Col. Marc J. Logie, was to land
on the northern and southern portions of Violet Beach, drive into the
interior, and protect the right flank of the division. The 184th
Infantry, commanded by Col. Curtis D. O’Sullivan, was to land on
Yellow Beach 1 and Yellow Beach 2 and then drive inland, directing its
main effort toward an early seizure of the airfield west of Dulag. It
was also to seize and secure the crossings of the Daguitan River.
After the landing waves had formed at the line of
departure, the landing craft started for the beaches, preceded by the
[77]776th Amphibian Tank Battalion. As it got ashore,
the tank battalion received hostile mortar and small arms fire that
came from a tank barrier of coconut palm logs near the water’s
edge. The battalion overcame this opposition fifteen minutes after
landing and advanced a distance of 200 yards inland to positions from
which it could support the infantry.48 According
to plan, the 32d and 184th Infantry Regiments followed abreast. The 32d
Infantry landed with two battalions abreast—the 2d on the right
and the 3d on the left. The regiment encountered minor resistance at
the beach, consisting of light rifle fire and sporadic artillery and
mortar fire. By 1023 the 3d Battalion had landed all its assault troops
and by 1030 seven assault waves of the 2d Battalion had reached the
shore. As the two battalions proceeded inland, they met opposition from
the enemy.
The 2d Battalion landed on the edge of a cemetery in
which were small groups of the enemy very much alive. By 1100 these
were subdued by rifle fire and the battalion was able to advance
without difficulty into the interior. At about 1300 the 2d Platoon of
Company F, after advancing some 600 yards, ran into fire from three
pillboxes concealed in the tall cogon grass on the right flank. Tanks
were brought up to knock out the enemy pillboxes. The advance then
continued. By 1315 the 2d Battalion made physical contact with elements
of the 96th Division on the right. Shortly after 1400 the 2d and 3d
Battalions of the 32d Infantry made contact and reached Highway
1.49
Companies L and K of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry,
landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from
Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of
the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers
emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were
mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and
occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine
guns and antitank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and
was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped
its forward movement. In the space of fifteen minutes two officers and
six men of the 3d Battalion were killed, and one officer and eighteen
men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 1030, three
were sent to support Company L and two to support Company K. The latter
two were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the
pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked
out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With two tanks remaining, it
was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 1345. A
platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the
company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the two
companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The
heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be
finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without
further casualties.
Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were
several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars.
Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the
first barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 1630, since the enemy fire
continued in volume, the 32d Infantry withdrew and established a
defensive position for the night. During the day the 32d Infantry had
reached a [78]general line along Highway 1. The 2d Battalion had
advanced 400 yards beyond the highway and the 3d Battalion 100
yards.50
The 184th Infantry landed at 1000, two battalions
abreast—the 1st on the southern half of Yellow Beach and the 3d
on the northern half. They encountered surprisingly little resistance
on either beach and were able to push inland at a much greater speed
than had been anticipated. The 3d Battalion drove through the town of
Dulag, which lay directly in its path, to the Dulag-Burauen Highway.
The 1st Battalion pushed inland and reached the highway at 1210, just
fifteen minutes after the 3d Battalion. At 1530 the two battalions
established physical contact and maintained it throughout the day as
they continued their advance along the highway. At 1255 the 2d
Battalion, 184th Infantry, landed on Yellow Beach and went into
regimental reserve on the regiment’s southern flank. As the
advance of the 32d Infantry on the right slowed up, Company G, 184th
Infantry, was committed to fill the gap which had developed between the
two regiments. At 1835 the 184th Infantry, although it had failed to
secure the Dulag airstrip, formed its night perimeter along the edge of
the strip.51 At the end of the day the regiment had no battle
casualties, but three men had been overcome by the heat. Eleven
Japanese had been killed in the regiment’s zone.52
The 17th Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, was kept in
7th Division reserve. The 3d Battalion of the 17th had come ashore at
1500 on the southern end of Yellow Beach. The battalion pushed west and
south through light opposition, seizing the bridge over the Daguitan
River at Dao, and by 2100 had established a bridgehead south of the
river and made contact with the 184th Infantry on the right. At the end
of the first day’s fighting the 7th Division had gained
possession of the Leyte shore in its zone and penetrated inland 600
yards on the right and nearly 2,300 yards on the left. It had also
reached the edge of the Dulag airstrip. By nightfall the XXIV Corps had
established a firm beachhead line extending along the coast from San
Jose on the north to just below Dao on the south.
Seventy miles to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment of
the 24th Division, which was detailed to land in the vicinity of Panaon
Strait on 20 October at 0930, half an hour before the launching of the
great offensive, and to secure control of that entrance to Sogod Bay,
successfully accomplished its mission. It encountered no Japanese.
Thus at the end of A Day the Sixth Army had succeeded in
landing assault forces all along the eastern coast of Leyte and was in
control of Panaon Strait. Its casualties amounted to 49 men killed, 192
wounded, and 6 missing in action. There remained a gap of nearly ten
miles between the X and XXIV Corps. The Tacloban airstrip on the
Cataisan Peninsula had been secured and the American forces were on the
edge of the airstrip at Dulag. Nearly as important as the capture of
the airstrip was the seizure of Hill 522, which commanded the entrance
to the broad Leyte Valley at Palo. The advance echelon of General
Headquarters had opened on Leyte Island at 1200.53 On the
following day, when adequate communication facilities had been
established, Generals [80]Krueger, Sibert, and Hodge assumed command
ashore of the Sixth Army, X Corps, and XXIV Corps, respectively.
LT. GEN. WALTER KRUEGER AND COL. RUPERTO K.
KANGLEON of the guerrilla forces head for the beach (above).
Krueger talks with men of the 7th Division on the beach near Dulag
(below).
Most of the 16th Division had withdrawn during
the naval and air bombardment which took place just prior to the
landing. The immediate invasion of the troops after this pounding
enabled the Americans to secure most of the coastal defenses before the
enemy could regroup and return. As a consequence, the only Japanese
forces encountered were those left behind to fight a delaying action.
The meeting with the enemy in force was yet to come.
Bringing in Supplies
While the assault forces were securing the beaches
of Leyte, supplies were being poured in to support the operation.
Within an hour after the first assault wave hit the hostile shores,
rations, equipment, and other supplies were being rushed to the
beaches. Each man going ashore carried a change of clothing in his
pack, two days’ supply of emergency rations, one day’s
supply of D rations, and two filled canteens, in addition to his gas
mask, weapons, and ammunition.
The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and
supplies to the target area. Ships’ companies unloaded the cargo
from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the
beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey
to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first
needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed
haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of
unloading.
As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the
ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and
articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were
piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion
and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort
of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of
the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the
landing beaches.
The LSM’s were used to very good advantage in the
unloading of the APA’s and AKA’s. Vehicles and supplies
could be loaded on them without difficulty, and in addition, two
hatches on the LSM’s could be worked at the same time. On each of
the APA’s, AKA’s, and LST’s which carried troops, a
labor crew was detailed to remain on board to assist in the
unloading.54
At the beach, the Army took over the cargo and moved the
supplies to prearranged dumps. On the northern beaches in the X Corps
sector, the Army shore party was composed of the 532d and 592d Engineer
Boat and Shore Regiments of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. After
landing, these units facilitated the movement of troops, vehicles, and
supplies across the beaches and controlled all unloading
operations.55 The 1122d and 1140th Engineer Combat Groups
supervised the unloading in the XXIV Corps sector. They were assisted
by naval beach parties from the VII Amphibious Force, which brought the
cargo ashore.
UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT DULAG on A Day (above),
and (below) general view of the beach area on 22 October 1944.
The beachhead areas at which the supplies were unloaded
varied in quality and depth. Most of the beaches on which the 7th and
96th Divisions landed were very good,56
[82]as contrasted with those in the X Corps area where
the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division came ashore. The
greatest difficulty was encountered along Red Beach, where the 24th
Division landed. This stretch of coast line was ill adapted to the
unloading of supplies, having poor exits and offering few dispersal
areas ashore.57
LST’s approaching Red Beach were under intense
enemy fire. Four of them received direct hits.58 Nearly all
of the LST’s were grounded 100 to 200 yards from the beach. Only
one of them was able to come within forty to fifty yards of the beach,
and it succeeded in unloading its cargo of heavy equipment only with
considerable difficulty.59 Another put off a bulldozer,
which disappeared in seven feet of water. With difficulty the other
LST’s withdrew and returned to the transport area.60
The shore parties on both Red and White Beaches (X Corps
sector) did not land early enough to effect a proper organization
before the cargo began to come in. Although the parties worked hard,
they were undermanned, and it was necessary to augment them by
“volunteers” in order to unload the large volume of
cargo.61 It had been planned to establish temporary beach
dumps at the point of unloading of each LST, but since at Red Beach the
LST’s could not get ashore, the plans had to be changed. These
craft were diverted to the 1st Cavalry Division’s White Beach
2,000 yards north. The LSM’s and LCM’s were able to
discharge their vehicles in three or four feet of water. Many of these,
being poorly waterproofed, stalled and had to be pulled ashore. Once
there, the heavily loaded vehicles churned up the sand, and many of
them sank so deeply that they had to be pulled out.62
The strong resistance of the Japanese and the difficult
terrain limited the depth of the 24th Division’s beachhead and
prevented the establishment of division dumps beyond the beachhead
areas. As a result, most of the supplies and nearly all supporting and
service troops had to be concentrated on the first three or four
hundred yards of the beachhead. Fortunately there was no bombing or
strafing of the area, and although the development of exit roads was
slow, the congestion on the beach was cleared before trouble
developed.63
The diversion of the 24th Division’s LST’s
to the beaches of the 1st Cavalry Division naturally strained the
facilities of the beach and shore parties on White Beach. The southern
end of White Beach also proved unsuitable for landing LST’s,
which consequently were shifted to the northern end.64 However,
the Army shore parties organized White Beach immediately upon landing.
A two-way road was cleared along the beach with military police
directing traffic. Dump areas were marked off by white ribbons, and
sign posts were erected. The supplies were unloaded from the landing
craft by roller conveyors and “fire brigade methods”
directly onto the waiting trucks and trailers.65 After the
ships had been unloaded [83]the shore parties consolidated all of
the supplies into dumps as rapidly as possible. The rations and
ammunition, which were loaded on fifteen LVT’s, were kept mobile
to the rear of the troops.66
When Leyte was substituted for Yap as the target, it had
been decided that the 96th Division should unload troops and supplies
at Leyte as rapidly as possible. Consequently, supplies were unloaded
with little regard for the order in which items would be needed
ashore.67
There was no general unloading on the beach in the XXIV
Corps area until the late afternoon of A Day, when water, rations, and
ammunition were sent ashore. For about an hour the unloading proceeded
satisfactorily, but the beach soon became congested. The beach parties
brought in the supplies faster than they could be handled by the shore
parties.68 At one time more than eighty loaded boats waited
over five hours before they could be unloaded. The slowness of the
shore parties in unloading the boats was not entirely their fault. Many
of the boats were improperly loaded with mixed cargo, a situation which
caused the boats to ship water. They were forced to come in to the
beach or sink. The shore parties were also handicapped by a lack of
workers. A shore party of 250 men included headquarters personnel,
military police, and communications men, leaving only fifty or sixty
workers. The unloading was further retarded by lack of sufficient
mechanical equipment and failure to make full use of available
transportation.69
Loose cargo piled up on the beaches faster than it could
be taken to the dump sites.70 A deep swamp, 250 yards inland
and parallel to Blue Beach, also limited the extension of dumps in that
area. The congestion was relieved the next day, when the supplies were
taken to selected dump sites nearly as fast as they could be removed
from the boats.
In the Dulag area, the organization of the shore party
and its operations were well co-ordinated.71 In the
initial phase the 7th Division employed the “drugstore
system” whereby DUKW’s carried the supplies directly to the
front-line consumers of the division from specially loaded LST’s
which had been anchored off the landing beaches.72 By using
this method the division was able to deliver critical supplies to the
combat troops within an hour after the request was received. At the
same time, other supplies and equipment could be put ashore without
interruption.
In the wake of the initial assault waves, the engineer
troops landed and began at once to clear the beaches, prepare dump
sites, and build access roads. The men worked around the clock in
six-hour shifts.73
Within four hours the 7th Division’s shore party
was prepared to start full-scale operations, and two hours later began
to issue supplies to the assault forces. Since the cargo came ashore in
nets, it was possible to use cranes and bulldozers to good advantage.
The cargo was initially moved over the [84]landing beaches to
regimental beach dumps 500 yards inland, and as vehicles landed they
were driven to temporary assembly areas or directly to their
organizations.74 Six hours after the first assault wave hit
the beaches the 7th Division abandoned the floating drugstore system,
since by that time sufficient supplies had been brought ashore to fill
requisitions directly from the dumps.75
During the day a total of 107,450 tons of supplies and
equipment were discharged over the beaches of the Sixth Army. Although
the beaches in some instances were extremely congested, steps had been
initiated to relieve the situation.
News of the success of the American forces in
establishing a beachhead on Leyte—the first foothold in the
Philippine Islands—was joyfully received by the American nation.
The President radioed congratulations to General MacArthur and added,
“You have the nation’s gratitude and the nation’s
prayers for success as you and your men fight your way back….”
76 [85]
1 CTF 79
Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, 13 Nov 44. (All naval records cited are in the
Office of Naval Records and Library.) ↑
2
COMBATDIV4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44. ↑
4
COMBATDIV 4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44. ↑
6
Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11 Nov 44. ↑
7 CTG 77.4
(Com Escort Carrier Group), Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, 30 Apr 45, Part 2,
pp. 9, 10. ↑
8 CTF 78
Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. ↑
9 24th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. Unless otherwise stated all records of tactical
units are in DRB AGO. ↑
11 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
12 GHQ
SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44. ↑
13 Sixth
Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. ↑
14 CTF 77
Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. ↑
15 CTF 78
Opns Plan 101–44, 3 Oct 44. ↑
16 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. ↑
17 1st Cav
Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44. ↑
18 Unless
otherwise stated the material on the 1st Cavalry Division is taken from
1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44, and 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
2–4. ↑
19 7th Cav
Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2–4. ↑
21 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. ↑
22 1st Cav
Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
23 12th
Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–2. ↑
24 5th Cav
S-3 Periodic Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑
25 8th Cav
Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
26 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19. ↑
27 1st Cav
Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3, 1st Cav Div Arty Unit Jnl, 20 Oct
44. ↑
28 1st Cav
Div Msgs to X Corps, 20 Oct 44. ↑
29 Unless
otherwise stated information in this subsection is taken from 24th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2–10, and 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct
44. ↑
33 19th
Inf Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
34 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
35 34th
Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑
36 Private
Robinson was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. ↑
37 19th
Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑
39 CTF 79
Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, Encl A, 13 Nov 44. ↑
40 383d
Inf Regt FO 6A, App. A, 30 Sep 44. ↑
41 CTG
79.2 Opns Rpt, Ser 0032, 4 Nov 44. ↑
42 383d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
44 382d
Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑
45 382d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
46 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 33–37. ↑
47 Unless
otherwise stated, the part of this subsection dealing with the 7th
Infantry Division is taken from the following: 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, pp. 3–5; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44; and 7th Inf Div
FO 9, 1 Oct 44. ↑
48 776th
Amph Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
49 32d Inf
Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑
50 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
51 184th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
52 184th
Inf Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑
53 Rad,
GHQ SWPA to CG Sixth Army, Sixth Army G-3 Rear Jnl, 21 Oct
44. ↑
54
Extracted Report of Landing on Leyte in the Philippine Islands by an
Australian Officer Attached to the Northern Assault Force Landing at
Red Beach. Copy in OCMH. ↑
55 2d ESB
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
56 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Engr Rpt, p. 232. ↑
57 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt, p. 218. ↑
58 Ltr, CG
2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and Jnl
File. ↑
59 CTU
78.1.7 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 2. ↑
60 Ltr, CG
2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and Jnl
File. ↑
61 CTU
78.2.1 and 78.2.3 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 3. ↑
62 Lts, CG
2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and Jnl
File. ↑
63 Maj F.
W. Doyle to Brig Gen L. J. Whitlock, Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn,
4 Nov 44, GHQ G-4 Jnl, AGO KCRC. ↑
64 2d ESB
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
65 Maj
Doyle to Gen Whitlock, Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn, 4 Nov 44, GHQ
G-4 Jnl. ↑
66 7th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, Supplementary Annex, p. 3. ↑
67 96th
Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 73. ↑
68 Rpt of
Sup Off to CO Funston, 23 Oct 44, in CO USS Frederick
Funston Opns Rpt, Ser 0101, 31 Oct 44. The boat crews and beach
parties had been fortified with a lunch consisting of turkey salad, ham
and cheese, hot steak sandwiches, ice cream, and cold fruit juices. The
Army assault troops carried K rations. ↑
69
Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11 Nov 44. ↑
70 96th
Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 73–75. ↑
71 CTG
79.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 15. ↑
72 7th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt. ↑
73 CTG
71.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 15. ↑
74 7th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt. ↑
CHAPTER VI
The Japanese Reaction
The Japanese undertook the defense of Leyte with
serene assurance. Their pilots had erroneously reported the naval
battle off Formosa as a great victory and declared that only remnants
of the once strong American Navy remained. The defeatist attitude of
the summer of 1944 vanished.
During the summer there had been disagreement among the
Japanese military leaders. Imperial General Headquarters felt
that the decisive battle should be fought on Luzon and only delaying
actions taken in other areas. To this the 14th Area Army agreed.
The Southern Army, on the other hand, believed that it would be
impossible to wage a successful battle on Luzon if other areas,
especially the Visayan Islands, were allowed to fall into American
hands. Since these islands, if captured, could be used as Allied air
bases, the decisive battle should be fought whenever and wherever the
Americans attacked.1
Confident that the U. S. fleet had suffered grievously
in the battle off Formosa, the Japanese closed ranks and all the
commands agreed that the time was most opportune to deliver the coup
de grâce. The foolhardy Americans would take a severe
drubbing, and Japan, after a long series of humiliating and costly
defeats, would regain the initiative. It was therefore a jubilant
Imperial General Headquarters that ordered its armed forces to
do battle with the Americans.
The essence of the Imperial General Headquarters
plan was simple. The American convoys and carriers were to be given
complete freedom in their journey to the Philippine Islands. When they
were sufficiently close to make retreat difficult, the main strength of
the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Forces would descend upon them and
deliver a knockout blow. If the operation were launched too early, the
Americans could annihilate the inferior Japanese air strength before
the battle could be fought; if too late, the Americans could escape and
the objective would be lost. Imperial General Headquarters,
therefore, was “patiently waiting” for the opportune
moment.2
The Air Forces
On the evening of 17 October the 4th Air
Army, upon receiving word that the U. S. forces were in the
vicinity of Suluan Island, ordered the entire 2d Air Division to
attack the Americans. The main strength of the fighter units was to be
concentrated in the central and southern Philippines areas. Although
bad weather prevented a reconnaissance, the increase in American air
raids on the central and southern Philippines made it imperative for
the Japanese to [86]attack with their main air force. The 2d Air
Division was ordered to move from Clark Field on Luzon to Bacolod
on Negros Island. It was unable to do this because of the bad weather,
and it was therefore unable to forestall the American landings. The
commander of the 4th Air Army decided on 21 October, as a result
of the American landings, to use the entire air force under his
command, employing the 7th Air Division and the 30th Fighter
Group, in addition to the 2d Air Division. The 12th Air
Brigade of the 30th Fighter Group had just arrived in the
Philippines from Japan, via Shanghai, and it was necessary to employ
this brigade immediately because of the impending battle in Leyte
Gulf.
All the various units were to launch an attack against
the American land forces and shipping by the evening of 23 October. On
24 October there was to be a series of aerial attacks, the first early
in the morning with the entire force; the second consisting of two
waves; the third by the entire force in the evening; and during the
night by waves of heavy and light bombers and assault planes.3
The Americans anticipated increased aerial activity over
Leyte, and therefore the number of fighters was increased on 24 October
to 36, on call from 0545 till dark, with an additional 16 fighters
ready for immediate action upon request. Twenty-eight of the 36 were
assigned to the attack force commanders and 8, retained by General
Krueger, patrolled the beachhead area and provided additional fighters
when and where they were needed.
The Leyte area was subjected to a heavy air assault on
the same day, 24 October, when an estimated 150 to 200 enemy planes
(mostly twin-engined bombers) approached northern Leyte. Sixty-six were
definitely shot down and eighteen others were probably shot
down.4 On the American side, forty combat air patrol and
ten direct supporting planes participated in this engagement. Three
American aircraft crash-landed—two on the Tacloban airstrip and
one in the water.5 Only a small percentage of the American air
activity was directed toward the neutralization of the enemy air force,
as most of the available aircraft were attacking the Japanese fleet.
The Japanese were determined to “make Leyte the decisive air
battlefield as well as the decisive ground and naval battlefield of the
Philippines.”6 For the first time since the
Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific had started rolling, the
Japanese, for an extended period, risked aircraft in great numbers in
daylight raids as well as at night. The shipping off Tacloban and Dulag
and the Tacloban airfield were the principal targets, though other air
installations on the island were hit. An example of the enemy’s
dogged determination occurred during the evening and night of 27
October. At twilight, twelve enemy fighters and dive bombers dropped
100-pound bombs in the vicinity of Tacloban and tried repeatedly but
unsuccessfully to strafe the Tacloban airstrip. After a lull, the
Japanese aircraft renewed the aerial assault just before midnight and
continued almost uninterruptedly until dawn. Between 2332 and 0125,
there were nine raids of two to four planes each; between 0340 and
0450, three raids of two to four planes each; and between 0454 and 0555
five additional planes made an attack on the area.7 The
[88]Tacloban airstrip frequently was “well
illuminated” by burning aircraft.8
JAPANESE AIR ATTACKS on shipping (above) and
supply dumps (below) were a constant threat during the early days of
the invasion.
The 2d Air Division assaulted American shipping
from 24 through 28 October, but because of the increasing necessity for
giving air cover to the convoys the main strength of fighters of the
4th Air Army was used to protect the transportation of
reinforcements of the 14th Area Army of Leyte. From 25 October
on, the Bacolod airfield and the air forces protecting the Japanese
convoys going to Leyte were attacked by American bombers and suffered
serious losses. Since it had to participate in every phase of the
action, the losses of the 4th Air Army were heavy.9
After 1 November the Japanese increasingly felt the
American air power through attacks upon their air bases and shipping.
Their fighter units, which had suffered considerable losses in
protecting the convoys, were ordered to counterattack. They were not
successful. At the same time the 4th Air Army received orders to
protect the reinforcement convoys in the Manila area. By this time the
Japanese air forces’ wings had been clipped and “what had
once been a formidable weapon was transformed into a sacrificial army
of guided missiles.”10 The suicidal kamikaze pilot
became the sole hope of the Japanese air forces.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf
Japanese Naval Plans
On 21 July the chief of the naval general staff,
Imperial General Headquarters, issued a directive for subsequent
“urgent operations.”11 The operational policy to
be followed by the Combined Fleet was as follows:
1. Make utmost effort to maintain and make
advantageous use of the strategic status quo; plan to smash the
enemy’s strength; take the initiative in creating favorable
tactical opportunities, or seize the opportunity as it presents itself
to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces.
2. Co-operate in close conjunction with the Army,
maintain the security of sectors vital to national defense, and prepare
for future eventualities.
3. Co-operate closely with related forces to maintain
security of surface routes between Japan and vital southern sources of
materials.12
On 26 July the chief of the naval general staff informed
Admiral Toyoda, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, that the
future “urgent operations” were to be known as the
SHŌ (Victory) Operations. There would be four
SHŌ Operations. The first was to cover the defense of the
Philippine Archipelago.13 It was essentially the last
chance for Japan to remain in the war. Said Admiral Toyoda of the
situation at the time of the battle of Leyte Gulf:
Since without the participation of our Combined
Fleet there was no possibility of the land-based forces in the
Philippines having any chance against your forces at all, it was
decided to send the whole fleet, taking the gamble. If things went
well, we might obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the worst
should happen, there was a chance that we would lose the entire fleet.
But I felt that that chance had to be taken…. Should we lose in the
Philippines operations, even though the fleet should be left, the
shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off, so that the
fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its
fuel [89]supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it
could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no
sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the Philippines.14
Since their carrier force was weak, the Japanese had
developed a plan based upon the main gunnery strength of the fleet and
upon the land-based air forces. Battleships and cruisers from a
southern base were to approach Leyte from the south, fight their way to
the landing beaches, and destroy Allied assault shipping. A decoy force
was to attempt to lure the U.S. carrier task force away from the main
action. Shore-based air forces were to inflict maximum damage on the
American carrier forces whenever and wherever possible, but once the
invasion came they were to conserve their strength until the day of the
landings, when all the Allied assault shipping would be concentrated
off the beaches and when their attacks on the U.S. carriers would
assist the advancing Japanese fleet. The plan was designed to get the
Japanese naval gunnery force into a position where it could do the
greatest damage. Little attention was paid to getting it out.
“The war had reached a point where the Japanese fleet, hopelessly
outnumbered and, as imminent events would prove, even more hopelessly
out-classed, could not risk the fleet action it had previously desired
but was forced to expend itself in suicidal attack upon the United
States transports.”15
Upon receiving information on 17 October that American
vessels were off the shores of Suluan Island, Admiral Toyoda
immediately alerted his forces. On 18 October Toyoda, after
intercepting American messages dealing with the landings on the island
approaches to Leyte Gulf, activated his plan for the defense of the
Philippine Islands. The target date (X Day) for the fleet engagement
was set for 22 October but logistical difficulties caused a series of
delays and on 21 October Admiral Toyoda changed X Day to 25 October.
“From the far corners of the shrinking Empire the whole combatant
strength of the Japanese Navy converged on Leyte Gulf.”16
The Naval Battle17
The strongest Japanese naval force—the 1st
Diversion Attack Force—moved from the south, reached Brunei
Bay in northwest Borneo on 20 October, and after refueling split into
two parts and proceeded on its way two days later. The main strength of
the 1st Diversion Attack Force, under Admiral Kurita, sailed
northeast up the west coast of Palawan (one of the Visayan Islands),
and then turned eastward through the waters of the central Philippines
to San Bernardino Strait, while the smaller unit commanded by Vice Adm.
Shoji Nishimura moved eastward through the Sulu Sea in order to force
an entrance at Surigao Strait. The 2d Diversion Attack Force,
commanded by Vice Adm. Kiyohide Shima, after leaving the Pescadores on
21 October, [90]sailed south, past western Luzon, and after
refueling in the Calamian Islands, just south of Mindoro, proceeded to
follow and support the southern part of the 1st Diversion Attack
Force in forcing Surigao Strait.
The Main Body, consisting chiefly of partially
empty carriers with a destroyer escort, departed on the 20th, and on
the evening of the 22d turned southwest toward Luzon. It was commanded
by Vice Adm. Jisabuto Ozawa. The Main Body was to act as a decoy
to draw off the main American strength. The Japanese submarines off
Formosa were ordered south toward the eastern approaches to the
Philippine Archipelago and the 2d Air Fleet, shortly before 23
October, began to arrive on Luzon.18
There were two American fleets in Philippine
waters—the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid, whose superior
was General MacArthur, and the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey, whose
superior was Admiral Nimitz. The Seventh Fleet, which consisted of 6
old battleships, 16 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light
cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 10 destroyer escorts, had escorted the
convoy to Leyte and now stood by to protect it as it unloaded. The
Third Fleet was composed of Task Force 38 under Admiral Mitscher. It
consisted of four task groups which averaged 23 ships each, divided
about as follows: 2 large carriers, 2 light carriers, 2 new
battleships, 3 cruisers, and 14 destroyers. The task force was to
secure air supremacy over the Philippines, protect the landings, and
apply unremitting pressure on Japan. If the opportunity to destroy the
major portion of the Japanese fleet should arise or could be created,
that destruction was to be its primary task.
The Japanese had 4 carriers, 7 battleships, 19 cruisers,
33 destroyers, and 2 battleship-carriers which carried no aircraft;
there were 108 planes on the carriers and about 335 shore-based planes
in the Luzon area.19
On 23 October two American submarines, the Dace
and the Darter, encountered the 1st Diversion Attack
Force and sank two heavy cruisers, the Atago and
Maya, off the western coast of Palawan. The former was
Kurita’s flagship; its sinking forced the Japanese admiral to
transfer hurriedly to another vessel. The submarines also seriously
damaged another heavy cruiser.
Upon receiving information that the Combined
Fleet was steaming toward the Philippines, Admiral
Oldendorf’s fire support group of the Seventh Fleet moved to the
southern end of Leyte Gulf and formed a battle line across the mouth of
Surigao Strait while motor torpedo boats patrolled within the strait
and about its southern entrance. Halsey’s Third Fleet moved
toward San Bernardino Strait. The escort carriers from Kinkaid’s
Seventh Fleet cruised off Leyte Gulf.20
On the 24th, after receiving a report from the
submarine, the carriers of the Third Fleet sent aircraft to search to
the west and southwest. These aircraft sighted the main part of the
1st Diversion Attack Force south of Mindoro, and sighted and
attacked the smaller force under Admiral Nishimura off Negros, slightly
damaging a battleship and a destroyer. The aircraft of the carriers
from their position off San Bernardino Strait struck repeatedly at
Kurita’s force while the smaller Nishimura force was left to the
battleships in the gulf. One Japanese battleship [91]of the
1st Diversion Attack Force was sunk, one heavy cruiser rendered
impotent, and minor damage was inflicted on other battleships. The
Japanese were forced temporarily “to reverse course to
westward.”21
The aircraft from the Japanese 2d Air Fleet
attempted to aid the naval forces which were moving eastward through
the Philippines. In co-operation with some aircraft from the Main
Body, which was now about 100 miles east of Luzon, they attacked
the northernmost unit of the American carriers. Halsey’s airmen
sighted and reported the sacrificial Japanese Main Body in the
afternoon. Not knowing that this force consisted mainly of empty
carriers and believing that the 1st Diversion Attack Force had
been severely damaged, Admiral Halsey withdrew the battleships and
carriers of his Third Fleet and steamed north to meet the new threat,
leaving San Bernardino Strait wide open. At midnight Kurita’s
1st Diversion Attack Force moved unmolested through San
Bernardino Strait and turned south toward Leyte Gulf. The Japanese
strategy had worked.
In the early morning hours, Admiral Oldendorf’s
warships destroyed the Nishimura force as it sailed into Surigao
Strait. Of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers,
only the cruiser and one destroyer escaped from the strait, and the
cruiser, which had been damaged, was sunk by aircraft from the U. S.
carriers the next morning.22 Admiral Shima’s 2d
Diversion Attack Force, entering the same strait thirty minutes
after Nishimura’s force, suffered damage to a light cruiser that
was hit by American torpedo boats. Shima’s force then made an
abortive attack, during which its flagship was damaged by collision,
and withdrew without having engaged. The Third Fleet far to the north
fell upon the decoy forces, sank all four carriers of the Main
Body and thus “wrote an end to the Japanese carrier air
force.”23
Admiral Kurita’s 1st Diversion Attack Force
“for which so much had been sacrificed”24
encountered Kinkaid’s carriers and destroyers off the coast of
Samar. Admiral Kinkaid was ill prepared to meet the main thrust of the
Japanese Navy, since his carriers were protected only by destroyers and
destroyer escorts. His “handling of the exceedingly difficult
situation” was “superb.”25 The
aircraft from his carriers under Rear Adm. Clifton A. F. Sprague rose
to the occasion and gave a “magnificent
performance,”26 continually attacking the much
stronger 1st Diversion Attack Force. Kurita’s forces sank
one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort but lost three
heavy cruisers and had one crippled. The American fighting strength was
greatly diminished at the very time it was needed to protect the
amphibious shipping that had carried the Sixth Army, and which still
lay near the shores of Leyte Gulf. Just as it appeared inevitable that
Kurita would move in and deliver the coup de grâce, he
suddenly broke off the engagement and retired toward San Bernardino
Strait. After the war he stated in justification of this strange move:
“The conclusion from our [the Japanese] gunfire and anti-aircraft
fire during the day had led me to believe in my uselessness, my
ineffectual position, if I proceeded into Leyte Gulf where I would come
under [92]even heavier aircraft attack. I therefore
concluded to go north and join Admiral Ozawa for coordinated action
against your northern Task Forces.”27
Said Admiral Sprague: “The failure of the enemy
main body and encircling light forces to completely wipe out all
vessels of this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke
screen, our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of enemy by
bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the
definite partiality of Almighty God.”28
The battle for Leyte Gulf was over. It had ended in a
resounding victory for the Americans, whose losses of 1 light carrier,
2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, and 1 destroyer escort were small in
comparison with the Japanese losses of 3 battleships, 1 large carrier,
3 light carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 9
destroyers.29
As the Japanese retreated throughout the 25th and 26th
of October, carrier- and land-based aircraft struck at the enemy
vessels and inflicted fresh injuries upon them.
The Sixth Army summarized its view of the probable
consequences if the battle had gone against the U. S. Navy as
follows:
Had the [Japanese] plan succeeded the effect on
the Allied troops on Leyte in all likelihood would have been
calamitous, for these troops would have been isolated and their
situation would have been precarious indeed. If it had been victorious
in the naval battle, the Japanese fleet could have leisurely and
effectively carried out the destruction of shipping, aircraft, and
supplies that were so vital to Allied operations on Leyte. An enemy
naval victory would have had an adverse effect of incalculable
proportions not only upon the Leyte Operation, but upon the overall
plan for the liberation of the Philippines as well.30
The Sixth Army, however, was depicting the worst of all
possible contingencies. Admiral Halsey’s conclusion is quite
different:
That Kurita’s force could have leisurely and
effectively carried out the destruction of shipping, aircraft, and
supplies in Leyte Gulf was not in the realm of possibilities…. Kurita
would have been limited to a hit-and-run attack in the restricted
waters of Leyte Gulf. He would further have been subjected to the
attack of the cruisers present in Leyte Gulf. He would have been
limited to minor damage…. The statement that an enemy naval victory
would have an effect of incalculable proportions not only on the Leyte
operation, but upon the overall plan for the liberation of the
Philippines as well, can only be premised on the thought that our naval
forces would be almost totally destroyed. The prognostication of such a
condition could be reasoned on none of the facts existing during this
three days’ engagement.31
The Japanese Reinforce the Leyte Garrison
The Japanese felt that the honors of the battle
were evenly divided and consequently continued with their program of
making Leyte the decisive battle of the Philippines. Although the
American fleet had soundly whipped the Japanese Navy, the Japanese were
still able to send reinforcements in great numbers to their Leyte
garrison. Because of the lack of sufficient aerial strength, the
Americans were unable to check the steady flow of troops into the port
of Ormoc. [93]
American Aerial Retaliation
The carrier strikes of the Seventh and Third
Fleets up to and through A Day had been most successful in forestalling
any concentrated effort on the part of the Japanese against the
American shipping in Leyte Gulf and the troops on the coastal strand.
Thereafter, the Japanese unleashed a furious air assault on the
American forces and shipping.32
At the same time, American aircraft from the carriers
struck at the Japanese troops and their installations in close support
of the ground troops. The first called-for air strike was at 0834 on 21
October against bridges over streams that were not fordable along the
road leading from Ormoc to Carigara, in order to prevent enemy movement
along this road.33 A total of 121 missions were flown in
support of ground units during the first four days, of which only 33
had been requested by the air liaison parties. The targets for these
missions included artillery and mortar positions, fuel and supply
dumps, bridges, pillboxes, and other installations, together with
trucks, armored vehicles, and tanks.34
During the initial stages of the campaign, Navy flyers
gave efficient close support to the ground forces.35 The
average time required to carry out each of these support missions was
approximately one hour, though the usual difficulties of locating
friendly troops and pinpointing the target were present. Enthusiastic
reports on the effectiveness of this co-operation from naval air were
made by the 7th Division. Members of this division, which formerly had
been supported by Army and Navy air forces, found Navy air support in
the first days on Leyte far more satisfactory than that which the Army
Air Forces had been able to provide in the past. They believed that
this superiority was due to the system that the Navy had worked out for
directing strikes at close-in targets without endangering friendly
ground forces, and to the Navy’s use of rehearsals with ground
units to establish mutual understanding and confidence.36
The Battle of Leyte Gulf interfered greatly with the
close support rendered by the Navy, since the carrier-based planes had
to be withdrawn. The combat air patrol assignments were also disrupted
because of surface engagements and the repairing of the
CVE’s.37
At this time the Japanese had about 432,000 men in the
Philippines, including air force and construction units. Most of them
believed that they were well prepared to meet the Americans. In fact a
staff officer of the 14th Area Army, upon hearing that the
Americans had landed on Leyte, is reported to have jumped up and
exclaimed: “Good, they have picked the place where our finest
troops are located.”38 It was also thought that the
American troops on Leyte were “having a difficult
time.”39 Nevertheless, General Yamashita, who had
succeeded [94]Kuroda as the commanding general of the 14th
Area Army, sent the 1st Division and other units to Leyte.
The Japanese felt that “if the decisive battle in Leyte results
in failure, it will upset the entire operation in the Philippines and
the decisive battle in Luzon will be lost.”40
By the 25th of October a battalion of the 55th
Independent Mixed Brigade and one of the 57th Independent Mixed
Brigade from Cebu, together with two battalions of the 30th
Division, had arrived on Leyte to reinforce the 16th
Division. Shortly after the Sixth Army landed, the 35th Army
commander, General Suzuki, received orders from General Yamashita to
undertake an all-out offensive against the Americans. All Japanese air,
naval, and land forces were to participate.41
On 22 October the 14th Area Army asked the
35th Army how the 26th Division and 68th Independent
Mixed Brigade were to be utilized if the Japanese decisively won
the pending naval battle. The 35th Army stated that if the
Japanese Navy were victorious, the units were to prevent the landing of
more Americans at Leyte Gulf, but if it were unsuccessful the troops
were to be landed at Carigara Bay. The optimism of the Japanese was
high. Said Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika, Chief of Staff, 35th
Army: “We were determined to take offensive after offensive
and clean up American forces on Leyte Island…. We seriously discussed
demanding the surrender of the entire American Army after seizing
General MacArthur.”42 Then came the Battle of Leyte
Gulf.
Despite the setbacks caused by this disastrous sea
battle, the Japanese continued to send troops to Leyte through Ormoc.
The reinforcement of Leyte consisted of moving five major units, in
nine echelons: the 35th Army moved as many of its units as
possible from Mindanao, Cebu, and Panay; the 1st Division was
sent down from Luzon on 1 November; then the 26th Division, the
68th Independent Mixed Brigade, and one third of the 8th
Division were sent from Luzon in the order given.43
On 27 October the Fifth Air Force took over the mission
of supporting the Sixth Army. As the airstrips were not in serviceable
condition, only a small detachment—the 308th Bombardment
Wing—could be sent in. Aircraft from the carriers continued to
give support. The Fifth Air Force felt that it could best check the
Japanese reinforcement program, and at the same time give more lasting
support to the ground troops, by attacking the Japanese convoys before
they arrived in Leyte. The Fifth Air Force intended also to attack
large movements of land troops, concentrations, and supply areas. Army
Air Forces doctrine assigned close support as the third priority
mission of tactical air forces.44 Since there were always
insufficient aircraft for the missions assigned to the air forces,
close support of ground troops suffered.
AIR STRIKES AGAINST JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS
included on Bacolod Airfield, Negros Island (above), and on shipping
in Zamboanga harbor, Mindanao (below).
The Allied Air Forces, which had been given the mission
of supporting the Leyte operation, directed its main efforts against
airfields in bypassed areas. Two fighter groups were on Morotai, one
heavy bomber group was on Noemfoor, off the north coast of New Guinea,
and two heavy bomber [96]groups were on Biak; they completed 175
sorties in strikes against airfields on Mindanao and the Visayan area.
The main targets of attack were on Mindanao and Cebu and in the Negros
area.45 The XIII Bomber Command, which carried the burden
of this assault, was to neutralize targets previously hit and protect
the southwestern flank of the American forces in the Philippines. The
42d Bombardment Group (medium bombers) in October flew the greatest
number of sorties in the history of the group up to that time.46
The heavy bombers (B-24’s) of the 868th
Bombardment Squadron, operating from Noemfoor, had as their main target
enemy shipping in the Makassar Strait. At the same time, the
B-24’s that were within range of the Sulu Sea struck at the
Japanese Southern Fleet as it retreated after its engagement
with the Seventh Fleet. The fighters and medium bombers, which had been
used to strike at targets on Mindanao, were alerted to strike any enemy
naval vessels that came within range.47
While protecting the southwestern flank of the American
forces in the Philippines, the XIII Bomber Command was extraordinarily
busy on 26 October. Part of the Japanese naval task force, consisting
of three battleships, five cruisers, and four destroyers, had withdrawn
from the Leyte area and was in the Sulu Sea when sighted by the 307th
Bombardment Group. Twenty-eight B-24’s of the bombardment group
made their principal targets two of the battleships—one of the
Kongo class and the other of the Yamato class. Three of
the planes were shot down as the Japanese skillfully and evasively
maneuvered their vessels so that none was sunk. At the same time
B-24’s from the 5th Bombardment Squadron sighted and sank an
enemy light cruiser at a different location in the Sulu Sea.48
General MacArthur had originally allocated the attack of
all land targets in the Philippines to the Allied Air Forces,49 and although subsequent events occasioned a
modification of this order the Fifth Air Force officially established
its advance units on Leyte at 1600 on 27 October and assumed
operational control of land-based aircraft.50 The 308th
Bombardment Wing, the advance echelon of the Fifth Air Force, had two
major duties included in its mission. It was to obtain air superiority
over the Philippines and to isolate the Japanese forces on the
battlefield of Leyte. In addition to these two principal tasks it was
to render maximum close support to the ground forces, establish night
fighter patrols and a system of courier aircraft, and provide maximum
protection to Allied naval vessels.51 Among the Army flyers of
the 49th Fighter Group, an advance party of the Fifth Air Force that
arrived on 27 October, was Maj. Richard I. Bong, of the 9th Fighter
Squadron, the leading ace of the Army Air Forces. He celebrated his
arrival by shooting down an enemy plane.52
[97]On 28 October the Army flyers of the 7th Fighter
Squadron got their first enemy airplane on Leyte. Since there were
“only” three enemy air raids during the night, the men were
able to get some much needed sleep.53
ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN in action at Tacloban
airstrip, 27 October 1944.
The 29th of October, however, was a day of heavy action
for the Army flyers, as described in a report of the 7th Fighter
Squadron:
The 29th was a day that will be long
remembered…. Two more Nips were added to the unit’s score;…
the 49th Group’s 500th victory. But more important at that time
was the fact … [that] the … road between the strip and the camp
collapsed under army traffic…. The already long hours were lengthened
still more as pilots and men were forced to arise between three and
four o’clock in the morning, make their way to the barge at
Tacloban, cross to the strip by water and then sweat out the pre-dawn
raids. At night, the planes landing at dusk had hardly hit the runway
before … BOFORS [40-mm. antiaircraft guns] went off and the lights
went out. Then down to the end of the strip near the gas dumps, and
another session of sweating beneath A/A [antiaircraft] awaiting the
barge for the trip back to Tacloban and then to camp. Supper was served
as late as 10 o’clock … a few brave individuals tried an
alternate road to the south, swinging out east to White Beach above
Dulag and then north along the beach to Tacloban Strip. Japanese
snipers soon put a stop to this travel during the hours of
darkness.
To add to the “big day”—29
October—the weather observers reported a 50 knot gale on the way.
Working after dark, pilots and linemen minus the regular tie downs and
using tent ropes and anything available secured the airplanes to jeeps,
trucks, trailers and tractors. At night, in camp, the small
[98]typhoon hit and with it went three or four tents,
occupants of which awoke to find themselves thoroughly drenched and at
odds with the world, Leyte in particular.54
LOCKHEED P-38 after Japanese raid on Tacloban
airstrip.
Although 29 October was the most difficult day on Leyte
for the men of the 7th Fighter Squadron, they were again disheartened
the following day, when one of the squadron’s pilots was shot
down by friendly antiaircraft.55
During the first week of November, offensive operations
by the Fifth Air Force were primarily against targets in Ormoc Valley
and enemy shipping in Ormoc Bay. The barrios of Ormoc, Valencia, and
Palompon were the first land targets. Most of the strikes, however,
were against Japanese shipping in Ormoc Bay and in the vicinity of the
Camotes Islands.56
By 4 November a number of P-38’s had been
destroyed by bombs and strafing, some of which were completely burned
up. To cut down the aircraft losses, it was decided to have planes of
some of the squadrons use the Bayug airstrip in the Dulag area. But
since this was a poor airfield which soon became overcrowded and
subject to Japanese air attacks, it was finally abandoned.57
On 3 November fifteen P-38’s of the 49th Bomber
Group struck “one of the most lucrative strafing targets of their
history.”58 [99]In an early morning search for enemy
shipping in Ormoc Bay the bombers found nothing, but on their return
they sighted a ten-mile-long convoy of trucks, artillery, and tanks
extending from Ormoc to Valencia. The convoy was strafed and dispersed,
leaving twenty to thirty-five trucks destroyed and many other vehicles,
including two tanks, in flames.59 However, two American
planes were shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire, four came in on
single engines, and all showed many bullet holes. The bombers made no
further strikes against the convoy, “as all aircraft received
extremely heavy and accurate ground fire.”60
The airmen of the Fifth Air Force continued to hit
shipping in Ormoc Bay and in the Camotes Islands, and they also
achieved success against bridges, airfields, troops, camp areas, and
transportation.61 Although the number of Japanese air raids
had diminished by 6 November, the Americans could not yet feel that
they were “out of the rough.”62 There was
insufficient direct air support for the ground troops throughout the
operation and the Japanese continued to send troops into Ormoc. The
constant stream of Japanese reinforcements coming into Leyte augured
ill for the success of the operation.
The TA Operation
The TA Operation, by which name the
Japanese program for the reinforcement of Leyte was known, continued
from 23 October through 11 December. The numerical weakness of the U.
S. land-based aircraft enabled the Japanese to land many thousands of
troops and tons of supplies on Leyte. Nine convoys in all were sent to
the port of Ormoc, on the west coast.63 As a whole,
however, the operation was “literally gruesome” to the
Japanese, since their transports and escort vessels were struck again
and again by American aircraft.
The first Japanese convoy had three echelons. The first
consisted of a landing barge and an auxiliary sailing vessel carrying
about 300 troops of the 102d Division. The second echelon, whose
composition was identical with the first, carried about 150 troops of
the same division. Both safely discharged their troops on 23 and 25
October, respectively. The third echelon was made up of 2 destroyers,
together with 4 transports carrying about 2,000 men of the 30th
Division. The transports safely unloaded their passengers on 26
October, but American airmen later sank the destroyers and all but one
of the transports. The remaining vessel was damaged.
The second convoy consisted of three echelons, composed
of 3, 1, and 4 transports respectively. The escorting vessels of the
third echelon, the only one that had an escort, consisted of 6
destroyers and 4 coast defense vessels. The escort vessels carried the
troops of the 1st Division: the first wave about 1,000 men, the
second about 100 headquarters men, and the third approximately 10,000
troops and about 9,000 ship tons of provisions and ammunition. All
vessels safely debarked their troops on 1 and 2 November.
JAPANESE CONVOY UNDER ATTACK in Ormoc Bay.
A destroyer escort is blown apart by a direct hit (above), and a
large transport is straddled by bomb bursts (below).
The 5 transports of the third convoy carried about 2,000
troops of the 26th Division and approximately 6,600 tons of
supplies. [101]The convoy sailed from Manila on 9 November and
was escorted by 1 submarine chaser, 1 torpedo boat squadron, and 4
destroyers. On 10 November, when the convoy reached the mouth of Ormoc
Bay, American airmen destroyed all of the escort vessels and transports
before they could unload their troops and cargo.
Each of the two echelons of the fourth convoy had 3
transports, but only the first one had an escort—6 destroyers and
4 coast defense vessels. The first echelon carried approximately 10,000
troops of the 26th Division and about 3,500 tons of supplies,
including provisions, ammunition, and four long-range guns. The second
echelon carried about 1,000 men of the 1st Division. Both
discharged their troops safely on 9 November, a day earlier than the
anticipated arrival of the third convoy, but because of American air
action, they were able to get only a limited part of the supplies
ashore.
The fifth convoy was organized on the same pattern as
its predecessor, but the first wave had a submarine chaser as an escort
while the second had a destroyer. This convoy, which left Manila
between 11 and 25 November with an unknown number of troops and
quantity of supplies, was completely destroyed en route to Leyte.
The sixth convoy, composed of 2 transports, 2 submarine
chasers, and 1 patrol boat, carried approximately 2,500 tons of
provisions and ammunition. It entered Ormoc harbor on 28 November and
had completed most of its unloading when the vessels were either sunk
or set afire by U.S. aircraft and motor torpedo boats.
There were four echelons in the seventh convoy. The
composition of the first two is unknown, but it is known that the first
echelon completed unloading at Ipil just south of Ormoc on 30 November.
The third and fourth echelons, consisting altogether of 3 transports
and 2 destroyers, also carried an unknown number of troops and quantity
of supplies. As they were unloading at Ormoc on 2 December, the vessels
were attacked by American airmen who sank one of the destroyers and
damaged the other. The transports and the damaged destroyer returned to
Manila.
The 4 transports of the eighth convoy, escorted by 3
destroyers and 2 submarine chasers, carried about 4,000
troops—the main body of the 68th Independent
Brigade—and an unknown quantity of provisions and ammunition.
It unloaded some of its troops and a part of the cargo at San Isidro on
the west coast of Leyte on 7 December; but immediately thereafter,
American aircraft sank the transports and heavily damaged the
destroyers.
There were two echelons in the ninth convoy. The first
echelon, which consisted of 5 transports, 3 destroyers, and 2 submarine
chasers, carried approximately 3,000 troops of the 5th Infantry
Regiment, 8th Division, and about 900 tons of provisions and
ammunition. In unloading at Ormoc on 11 December, 1 destroyer was sunk
and 1 destroyer and 1 transport were damaged. The remaining vessels
then moved to Port Palompon on the west coast of Leyte and completed
unloading. The second echelon consisted of only one transport and
carried an unknown number of troops and quantity of supplies. It was
able on 11 December to elude the American airmen and complete its
unloading.64
After the war, General Nishimura, who had been on the
staff of the 14th Area Army, made the amazing statement that
nearly 80 percent of the vessels sent to Ormoc were [102]sunk
en route. Although most of the vessels went down close enough to the
Leyte shore for the troops to swim ashore, the equipment lost could not
be replaced.65 It is estimated that the Japanese landed
more than 45,000 troops and something over 10,000 tons of
matériel.66
Even though the Japanese had not succeeded completely in
their reinforcement program, General Krueger was faced with a far
stronger foe than had been anticipated. The Leyte Campaign was to be
long and costly and was to upset the timetable for the impending Luzon
operation. At the end of A Day the American assault forces had firmly
established themselves on the shores of Leyte, but the battle for the
island was yet to come. [103]
1 Japanese
Studies in WW II, 21, Hist of Southern Army, 1941–45,
OCMH. ↑
2 Hist of
Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 139. ↑
3 4th
Air Army Opns, pp. 38–43. ↑
4 Sixth
Army G-3 Jnl, 24 Oct 44. ↑
5 Sixth
Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct 44. ↑
6 Hist of
V Bomber Command, Ch. 4, Jul-Dec 44, p. 73, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
8 Hist of
7th Fighter Sq, 49th Fighter Gp, 86th Fighter Wing, V Fighter Comd,
Fifth Air Force, Nov 44, p. 1, AAF Hist Archives. ↑
9 USBSS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 285. ↑
14 USSBS,
Interrogations, II, 317. ↑
15 USBSS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 281. ↑
17 It is
not within the scope of this history to deal with the ensuing battle
between the Japanese and American Navies. A full discussion of the
“greatest naval battle of the Second World War and the largest
engagement ever fought on the high seas” would require a volume.
Such a study is being prepared by Samuel Eliot Morison in his series of
studies on the U.S. Navy’s part in the war. Two excellent
accounts—James Field’s The Japanese at Leyte Gulf,
and C. Vann Woodward’s The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New
York, 1947)—have already appeared. The present volume attempts to
present only those facts needed to understand the effect of the battle
on land operations. (Quotation is from Woodward, Battle for Leyte
Gulf, p. 1.) ↑
18 USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 284. ↑
19 Admiral
Frederick C. Sherman, Combat Command: The American Aircraft Carriers
in the Pacific War (New York, 1950), p. 286. ↑
20 Field,
Japanese at Leyte Gulf, pp, 81–82. ↑
21 USBSS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 285. ↑
25 Ltr,
Gen Krueger to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 12 Sep 51, OCMH. ↑
27 USBSS,
Interrogations, I, 44. ↑
28 CTU
77.4.3 Opns Rpt, Ser 00100, 29 Oct 44, Incl B, p. 2. ↑
29
Woodward, Battle for Leyte Gulf, p. 229. ↑
30 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 43. ↑
31 Ltr,
Adm Halsey to Gen Ward, 6 Jul 51, OCMH. ↑
32 Hist of
V Fighter Comd, Ch. 4, Jul-Dec 44, p. 73, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
33 Sixth
Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
34 Opns
Rpt, CSA Seventh Flt to Comdr Seventh Flt, no ser, 2 Nov
44. ↑
35 AAF
Evaluation Bd POA Rpt 3, The Occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands,
pp. 27 and 15. This report was prepared by Brig. Gen. Martin F.
Scanlon, who accompanied the XXIV Corps to Leyte as an air observer for
the Army Air Forces in the Central Pacific. By close support is meant
operating to the immediate front of the first-line
troops. ↑
37 Opns
Rpt, CSA Seventh Flt to Comdr Seventh Flt, no serial, 2 Nov
44. ↑
38 USSBS
Interrog 418, Interrog of Maj Gen Toshio Nishimura, 19–22 Nov 45,
p. 6, OCMH. ↑
39 14th
Area Army Opns Leyte, pp. 2–3. ↑
41 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of the Japanese 35th Army on
Leyte, Part I, pp. 3–4, copy in OCMH. ↑
42
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 13. ↑
43 14th
Area Army Opns Leyte, pp. 17–18, 37, 52, 59, 93, 94, and
99. ↑
44 FM
100–20, 21 Jul 43, Command and Employment of Air Power, p.
16. ↑
45 AAF
Evaluation Bd, SWPA Rpt, Leyte Campaign, p. 32, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
46 Hist of
XIII Bomber Comd, Oct 44, p. 5, AAF Hist Archives. ↑
48
Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1947–48 (New York), pp.
473–78; Hist of XIII Bomber Comd, Oct 44, p. 4, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
49 Rad,
GHQ to CG Sixth Army et al., Sixth Army G-3 Rear Jnl, 28 Oct
44. ↑
50 Rad, CG
Allied Air Forces to CG Fifth Air Force, 27 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
1 Nov 44. ↑
51 Hist of
308th Bombardment Wing, Ch. 3, p. 4, AAF Hist Archives. ↑
52 Hist of
9th Fighter Sq, Oct 44, AAF Hist Archives. ↑
53 Hist of
7th Fighter Sq, Oct 44, pp., 5–6, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
56 Hist of
Fifth Air Force, Ch. V, pp. 42–43, AAF Hist Archives; Rad, Sixth
Army to GHQ, 3 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44. ↑
58 Hist of
V Fighter Comd, Jul-Dec 44, Ch. 4, p. 64, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
59 Rad,
COMAF5 to Sixth Army, 4 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov
44. ↑
60 Msg,
308th Bomb Wing to G-2 Sixth Army, 3 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov
44. ↑
61 Hist of
Fifth Air Force, Ch. 5, pp. 42–45, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
62 OPD
319.1, Sec VII, Case 248, DRB AGO. ↑
63
Activities of the Japanese Navy During the Leyte Operation, p. 94, A715
SWPA, Doc 2543. ↑
64 Trans
of Data on Reinforcement and Support of the Leyte Island Campaign, ATIS
Doc 16946. ↑
65 USSBS
Interrog 506, Interrog of Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochica et al.,
MS, OCMH. ↑
CHAPTER VII
Southern Leyte Valley: Part One
The SHŌ Operations
In their preliminary planning, the Japanese
considered that the defense of Leyte would be only a delaying action.
The defenders were to inflict as many casualties as possible upon the
invaders and also to prevent them from using the Leyte airfields, but
the decisive battle for the Philippines would be fought on Luzon. As
late as 10 October the chief of staff of the 35th Army received
the following order from Manila: “Depending on conditions the
35th Army will prepare to dispatch as large a force to LUZON
ISLAND as possible.”1
On 21 October, after receiving news of the American
landings, General Yamashita activated SHŌ ICHI GO (Victory
Operation Number One). He made it clear that the Japanese Army, in
co-operation with “the total force of the Air Force and
Navy,” was to make a major effort on Leyte and destroy the
American forces on the island. The 35th Army was to concentrate
its forces there. The 1st and 26th Divisions, the 68th
Brigade, and an artillery unit from the 14th Area Army would
be sent to augment the 35th Army troops. At the same time
General Suzuki received information that the Japanese Air Force and
Navy would engage in “decisive” battles in support.
“The morale of the 35th Army rose as a result.”
The Japanese thought that only two American divisions
had landed on Leyte, and that if the 1st, 16th,
30th, and 102d Divisions engaged the Americans, a
decisive victory would be theirs. General Suzuki decided to send
forward the following reinforcements to Leyte: the main force of the
30th Division, only three battalions of which would remain in
Mindanao; three infantry battalions of the 102d Division; and
one independent infantry battalion each from the 55th and
57th Independent Mixed Brigades. These forces were in addition
to the two battalions previously sent on 23 October.
General Suzuki believed that the Americans would attempt
to join and strengthen their beachheads in the vicinity of Tacloban and
Dulag before they tried to penetrate inland. At the same time, since
Catmon Hill and the high ground west of Tacloban Valley were in
Japanese hands, the 16th Division should be able to contain the
Americans until reinforcements arrived.
He therefore issued orders based upon these assumptions
and also upon the assumption that the Japanese air and naval forces
would be victorious. The 35th Army was to concentrate its
reinforcements in the Carigara area. The principal elements of the
16th Division were to occupy Burauen and Dagami, and the rest of
the division would [104]occupy Catmon Hill and the western plateau
of Tacloban. The 16th Division was to protect the concentration
of the main force of the 35th Army. The 102d Division was
to occupy the Jaro area and give direct protection to the 1st
and 26th Divisions and the 68th Brigade. The 30th
Division was to land at Ormoc Bay in the Albuera area and then
advance to the Burauen area in coordination with the 16th
Division and assist the main force of the 35th Army. The
1st Division was to land at Ormoc, the 26th Division and
68th Brigade were to land at Carigara. If the situation were
favorable, however, the 68th Brigade was to land in the vicinity
of Catmon Hill. After the main elements of the 35th Army had
assembled at Carigara and the area southeast of it, they were to move
down Leyte Valley and annihilate the American forces in the Tacloban
area. All the important airfields, bases, and roads were also in the
valley.
The part of Leyte Valley where the Americans hoped air
and supply bases could be developed is a broad and level plain inside a
quadrangle formed by the main roads linking Tanauan, Dulag, Burauen and
Dagami. (Map 7) The region extending ten
miles westward from the stretch of coast between Dulag and Tanauan to
the foothills of the central range is an alluvial plain, interlaced by
many streams, in which swamps and rice paddies predominate. Catmon
Hill, about half way between Tanauan and Dulag, was the most prominent
terrain feature near the shore line.
Catmon Hill is actually a series of hills with many
spurs. This hill mass starts at the mouth of the Labiranan River above
San Jose where Labiranan Head meets Highway 1, the coastal road, and
extends in a general northwest direction to the vicinity of San Vicente
and Pikas where it drops abruptly into the coastal plain. It is covered
with cogon grass about six feet high, in the midst of which are found a
few trees. The beach areas between the Calbasag River on the south and
Tolosa on the north, together with much of southern Leyte Valley, are
dominated by this hill mass.2
The 16th Division made use of the caves on Catmon
Hill for shelters, artillery positions, and supply dumps, and
established well-concealed coconut log pillboxes and observation posts
at numerous vantage points on the hills. Some of these pillboxes, with
good fields of fire and spider holes, were emplaced in positions to
cover the roads.3 A spider hole was dug about five feet deep,
sometimes camouflaged with a removable cover, and was large enough to
contain a man and his weapon.
The American prelanding naval bombardment destroyed a
number of field pieces of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment,
which was deployed in position along the first line of defense. The
gunfire also disrupted the regiment’s radio service, and direct
communication with the 35th Army and the 14th Area Army
headquarters was temporarily broken.4
Johnstone
96TH DIVISION ADVANCE
21–30 October 1944
After the heavy naval bombardment on A Day and the
subsequent landings by American forces in the Dulag area, General
Makino moved the command post of the 16th Division to Dagami, a
step which made communications very difficult and inadequate. The
troops of the division were then disposed as follows: the 20th
Infantry Regiment, though considerably diminished in number, was
holding Julita, and one of its [107]platoons patrolled the
Daguitan River banks; the main part of the 9th Infantry Regiment
was at Catmon Hill, while one of its battalions occupied
Tabontabon.5
LANDING AREAS AND LEYTE VALLEY as seen from a
captured Japanese observation post on Catmon Hill.
At the end of 20 October the Sixth Army was established
on the shores of Leyte Gulf. The X Corps was in the north near Palo and
Tacloban, and the XXIV Corps was in the vicinity of Dulag, poised for a
drive into southern Leyte Valley. General Krueger planned to push
rapidly through Leyte Valley and secure its important roads, airfields,
and base sites before General Makino could regroup the 16th
Division and offer a firm line of resistance.
Enlarging the 96th Division Beachhead
General Krueger had assigned the mission of
seizing southern Leyte Valley to the XXIV Corps. The 96th Division was
to seize Catmon Hill and its surrounding area, together with the
Dagami-Tanauan road. The 7th Division was to proceed along the
Dulag-Burauen road, seize the airfields in that area, and then proceed
north to Dagami.
General Bradley’s scheme of maneuver for the 96th
Division specified a movement into the interior from the beachhead area
in a northwesterly direction with regiments abreast—the 383d
Infantry on the right (north) and the 382d Infantry on the left
(south). The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, was to capture Labiranan
Head and secure Highway 1 as far north as San Roque. The rest of the
regiment was to proceed inland, bypass Catmon Hill at first, and then,
after artillery, naval bombardment, and air strikes had neutralized it,
to capture Catmon Hill and the adjacent high ground.
The 382d Infantry was to proceed inland in a
northwesterly direction and seize Anibung, which was erroneously
believed to have an airfield. The regiment was then to be ready to
advance either to the north or to the west.6
At the end of A Day the assault troops of the 383d
Infantry, commanded by Colonel May, were approximately 2,500 yards
inland. The forward positions of the 1st Battalion were 400 yards up
the sides of the ridge running north from where the troops had crossed
the Labiranan River. The 3d Platoon of Company C had established a
roadblock at the highway crossing; the 2d Battalion, protecting the
regimental southern boundary, had advanced 2,600 yards inland from
Orange Beach 1; and the 3d Battalion had established a night perimeter
800 yards southwest of the 1st Battalion on the southern bank of the
Labiranan River.7
The 382d Infantry, under Colonel Dill, had made a
successful landing on A Day. The 2d Battalion, on the right, had pushed
inland 2,700 yards, while the 3d Battalion, on the left, had gained
1,300 yards; the 1st Battalion was in reserve. Contact had been
established with the 32d Infantry, 7th Division, on the 382d
Infantry’s left, and with the 383d Infantry on its
right.8
Labiranan Head
During the night of 20–21 October the 361st
Field Artillery Battalion fired upon Labiranan Head in support of the
1st Battalion, 383d Infantry.9 In addition naval guns,
supporting the 96th Division, fired harassing and interdicting missions
against [108]possible enemy positions and lines of
communication.10 At 0810 on 21 October an air strike was
registered on Labiranan Head, followed by a three-hour naval and
artillery barrage.
The 382d Infantry was to move inland, maintain contact
with the 7th Division, and forestall any Japanese attempt to reach the
beaches. Concurrently, the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, would advance
on Catmon Hill from Labiranan Head while the 2d and 3d Battalions of
the regiment would swing around the northwest end of Catmon Hill and
squeeze the Japanese in a pincers.
At 1130 an assault force commanded by Capt. Hugh D.
Young of the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, attacked the Japanese
position on Labiranan Head. This assault force, a composite company,
consisted of a platoon each from A, B, and C Companies, together with
the weapons platoon from C Company. The troops moved up the ridge and
within ten minutes after starting destroyed one machine gun and drove
off the crew of another. Under cover of mortar fire, the Japanese
retired to the next ridge.
In co-operation with the advance of Captain
Young’s force, the 3d Platoon of Company C, which had established
the roadblock at the Highway 1 crossing of Labiranan River on A Day,
moved out just below Labiranan Head and hit the Japanese flank. The
platoon met a strongly entrenched enemy position which consisted of
seven pillboxes guarding ten 75-mm. guns. There were also six coastal
guns but only two of these had been even partially assembled. When the
men of the platoon got within twenty feet of the enemy position, they
received fire from the two flanks and the front. After knocking out a
machine gun nest the platoon withdrew.
Lt. Col. Edwin O. List, the commanding officer of the
1st Battalion, then ordered Captain Young to advance northward up a
covered draw and secure a small hill in the rear of the enemy force. As
the troops advanced up the hill, they observed smoke coming from
Labiranan Head. Company D thereupon placed mortar fire on the position
which contained the ten 75-mm. guns. At 1430 Captain Young requested
that the fire be lifted; this was done, and the advance
continued.11
At 1600 Captain Young reported that his troops had
secured Labiranan Head. At the same time, friendly naval gunfire
shelled Young’s troops.12 This gunfire was not stopped,
since there were known Japanese positions in the vicinity and it was
believed to be of more lasting importance to knock them out than to
hold this one position. Captain Young evacuated Labiranan Head and
withdrew his troops, who swam across the Labiranan River and formed a
night perimeter on the south bank. At the end of the day the front
lines of the rest of the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, were along the
northern banks of the Labiranan River and on the high ground 800 yards
west of Labiranan Head.13
CREW OF A LIGHT ARMORED CAR M8 prepares to
fire on enemy positions in the Labiranan Head sector.
During the night the 361st, 363d, and 921st Field
Artillery Battalions delivered harassing fires on the positions of the
9th Infantry Regiment on Labiranan Head.14 The
following morning, Captain Young’s force rejoined the 1st
Battalion, 383d Infantry. The 921st Field Artillery Battalion continued
to pound the enemy emplacements until 1200 and then supported the
attack as the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, [109]with
Companies A and C as lead companies, moved up the slopes of Labiranan
Head. The antitank platoon of the 1st Battalion set up its 37-mm. guns
in a position from which it could rake the south side of Labiranan Head
from the river and support the advance of Company C on the left. The
platoon knocked out four pillboxes and two machine guns and then
directed fire on the enemy 75-mm. guns. Companies A and C pushed aside
the Japanese and at 1630 reached the crest of the hill, their
objective. They immediately dug in, consolidated the position, and then
formed a night perimeter from which the entire beach area from San
Roque to Dulag could be observed.15
At 1930 the Japanese centered a counterattack on Company
A on the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry. A combined
concentration from the 921st, 361st, and 363d Field Artillery
Battalions repelled this assault.16 While Labiranan Hill was
being secured, a force consisting of the 3d Platoon, Company C, the 1st
Platoon, Company D, 763d Tank Battalion, the 1st Platoon, Cannon
Company, and the battalion Antitank Platoon pushed along Highway 1,
secured San Roque, and set up a roadblock.17 From the
23d to the 26th of October the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, patrolled
the Labiranan Hill—San Roque area and protected the right flank
of the 96th Division as the rest of the division slogged through swamps
and rice paddies to the south. [110]
Battling the Swamps
At 0840 on 21 October the 2d and 3d Battalions,
383d Infantry, which were to go in a northwesterly direction around
Catmon Hill and isolate the Japanese force on the hill, moved out
westward. They advanced through swamps and rice paddies but met no
Japanese during the day. At 1640, when they established a night
perimeter, the 2d Battalion was 300 yards north of Tigbao and the 3d
Battalion with the regimental command group was 1,100 yards northeast
of the barrio and south of Catmon Hill.18
The 382d Infantry, while protecting the left flank of
the 96th Division, was to advance rapidly into the interior and seize
Tigbao.19 During the night of 20–21 October artillery
fire from an unknown source fell in the sector of the 2d Battalion,
killing three men and wounding eight others. At 0800, on 21 October,
the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, moved out, followed at 0812 by the 3d
Battalion. These troops, like the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 383d
Infantry, were confronted with waist-deep swamps which made the going
slow and arduous. The 3d Battalion, 382d Infantry, immediately after
moving out, ran into enemy pillboxes constructed of coconut logs and
defended by machine guns and riflemen. At first the troops bypassed the
pillboxes but at 1030 Company K went back and wiped them out. In
addition to the morass through which the troops were moving, numerous
empty pillboxes slowed up the advance, since each of them had to be
checked.20 At 1430, because there was a gap between the 2d
and 3d Battalions, Colonel Dill committed the 1st Battalion to close
the line. The battalions then advanced abreast and kept lateral contact
with the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 383d Infantry on their right. At
1630, when the battalions established their night perimeters, they were
far short of their objective.21
At 1745 Colonel Dill directed all of the battalions of
the 382d Infantry to move out at 0800 on 22 October—the 1st
Battalion was to capture Tigbao and Bolongtohan and then push on to
Hindang; the 2d Battalion was to proceed toward Anibung; and the 3d
Battalion, on the right of the 1st Battalion, was to proceed to the
northwestern edge of Bolongtohan.22
Since it was known that the Japanese were strongly
entrenched on Catmon Hill, General Bradley had decided to bypass the
hill temporarily. His plan called for the 2d and 3d Battalions of the
383d Infantry to envelop Catmon Hill from the south and then move north
to make contact with the 24th Division at Tanauan.23 On the
morning of 22 October, Colonel May of the 383d Infantry asked General
Bradley for permission to attack Catmon Hill from the south with his 2d
and 3d Battalions. General Bradley refused the request and ordered
Colonel May to continue the enveloping movement he had started on 21
October.24 Later on that morning, therefore, the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 383d Infantry, moved out north-northwest. Encountering a
deep swamp at 1130, the troops turned northwest. This move did not
materially help the situation, since they found that they had exchanged
the swamp for rice paddies. The advance units reached Anibung at 1630
[111]without encountering any Japanese. By 1800 all
units had closed in on the vicinity of Anibung and set up a night
perimeter 400 yards north of the barrio.
Few supplies had been brought forward because the
vehicles of the battalions had advanced only 200 yards when they bogged
down. The troops hand-carried their weapons and communications
equipment, while civilians with about eight carabaos25 helped
carry the supplies. In the transportation of supplies forward,
ammunition was given priority over rations and water, even though the
supply of the latter items, which had been issued to the troops before
landing, was nearly exhausted. The men made free use of coconuts for
food and drink.26
At 0800 on 22 October the three battalions of the 382d
Infantry moved out. By 0900 the 1st and 2d Battalions had pushed
through Tigbao, whereupon the regimental commander changed the orders
for the day. He ordered the 2d Battalion to take Bolongtohan, the 1st
Battalion to seize Canmangui, and the 3d Battalion to go into
reserve.27
The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 382d Infantry made
contact with each other at 1152. When patrols from the 1st Battalion
did not find any Japanese at Canmangui, the battalion proceeded toward
Bolongtohan. Upon nearing Mati, the 1st Battalion encountered an
entrenched position of the enemy and by outflanking the position was
able to knock it out. The Japanese fought a delaying action and
withdrew during the afternoon. At 2000 the battalion formed its night
perimeter at Mati. The other battalions of the regiment encountered no
Japanese during the day’s progress inland, and formed their night
perimeters at 1800—the 2d Battalion 800 yards east of Bolongtohan
and the 3d Battalion 500 yards southeast of Tigbao. During the day the
382d Infantry had pushed forward approximately 2,000 yards.28
At 2300 on 22 October General Makino issued an order for
the defense of the island by the Japanese 16th Division. He
organized his troops into the Northern and Southern Leyte
Defense Forces. The Southern Defense Force was to protect
the Dulag-Burauen road and the airfields in the vicinity of Burauen. It
was in the zone of action of the 7th Division. The Northern Leyte
Defense Force29 was to remain on Catmon Hill, the high
ground south of Tanauan, and the high ground south of Palo. Elements
were to be in the vicinity of Tabontabon and Kansamada, and a unit was
to protect the artillery positions north of Catmon Hill. The 16th
Engineer Regiment (less three platoons) was to be prepared to
demolish the roads connecting Dagami and Burauen and those connecting
Dagami and Tanauan, in order to check the advance of American tanks.
Simultaneously, the main force of the unit was to secure the road
running northwest from Dagami to Tingib. The division reserve and
command post were to be in the vicinity of Dagami.30
At 0900 on 23 October the 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry,
sent a patrol to investigate the enemy situation west of Pikas and near
the Guinarona River. At 1130 the patrol reported that there were a few
Japanese on a [112]hill near Pikas. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 383d
Infantry, moved out at 1200 with the 2d Battalion in the lead. At 1430
Company G, the leading company, surprised some Japanese who were
swimming in the Guinarona River. They were “literally caught with
their pants down.”31 The leading companies were able
to rout the enemy and continue the advance despite small forays which
were broken up; about fifty of the enemy were killed. At 1810 the 2d
Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached the high ground on the north bank of
the Guinarona River, 600 yards west of Pikas. A force of approximately
100 Japanese attacked the battalion as it was establishing a night
perimeter. Fortunately the Americans, just fifteen minutes before, had
put their machine guns and mortars in position and were thus able to
fire their weapons immediately and repulse the attack. The 3d
Battalion, 383d Infantry, closed in on the area at 1900 and each
battalion set up a perimeter for the night.32
During the day the regiment received a small quantity of
supplies by Filipino and carabao trains and by airdrop from Navy
planes. The amount of food came to about one-half ration for each man.
On the following day Colonel May ordered the 1st Battalion, 383d
Infantry, to remain in position until a supply route could be
established.33
Early on 24 October General Bradley told Colonel May to
hold his present positions and sent out patrols to find roads, trails,
and solid ground that could be used as or converted into supply routes
to the rear.34 The communications between the regiment and
the 96th Division were very hard to maintain, since the only radios the
troops could move inland were hand-carried sets of short range.
In the early morning hours of 25 October a division
reconnaissance patrol, with light tanks and a motorized engineer
platoon, went along Highway 1 with the mission of reconnoitering the
highway as far north as the Binahaan River and making contact with the
X Corps. By 1300 the patrol reached the river near Tanauan and found a
damaged bridge. By 1600 the bridge had been repaired and the patrol
pushed through Tanauan and made contact with Company K of the 19th
Infantry, 24th Division, the first between the X and XXIV Corps since
the landing.
The 382d Infantry spent 23 October patrolling. Contact
was established and maintained between all of the battalions of the
regiment during the day. Although the forward movement was slowed to
allow much-needed supplies to come up, an advance of 600 yards was
made. As the regiment advanced farther inland it became apparent that
the entire area was composed of swamps and rice paddies. The roads were
only muddy trails and were impassable for wheeled vehicles. The M29
cargo carriers and LVT’s were pressed into service to carry
supplies, but the numerous streams and waist-deep swamps soon halted
all vehicular traffic. The task of supply and of evacuation of wounded
soon assumed staggering proportions. For days the troops had had little
food since priority had been given to the indispensable ammunition.
Filipino and soldier carrying details were the only means by which the
front lines could be supplied.35 [113]
FILIPINO CIVILIAN GUIDES U.S. TANK to Japanese
positions in Julita.
On the morning of 24 October General Bradley ordered the
382d Infantry to have its 2d Battalion close in on Anibung. The 3d
Battalion was to occupy Hindang and the 1st Battalion was to proceed
through Hindang to a position about 500 yards farther north.36
At 0830 the 1st and 3d Battalions, 382d Infantry, moved
astride the narrow trail that led to Tabontabon, with the 3d Battalion
echeloned to the right rear. The 1st Battalion passed through
Bolongtohan at 0930 and moved on in a northwesterly direction toward
Hindang. At 1105, as the 1st Battalion was pushing through Hindang, it
came under enemy rifle fire. The Japanese had dug spider holes under
the huts, and a trench extended along the western end of the barrio.
The 1st Battalion, assisted by troops from Company B, 763d Tank
Battalion, moved through the town, leaving the 3d Battalion the job of
mopping up. The 3d Battalion reached Hindang at 1530 and immediately
attacked the enemy force there. The Japanese offered only slight
resistance and then fled, abandoning thirty-six well-constructed
defensive positions. At 1610 the barrio was secured.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, after driving through
Hindang with Companies A and G abreast, came upon a strong enemy
position some 200 yards beyond the town on the left flank of Company A.
A platoon of the Cannon Company and some light tanks had managed to get
forward. The tanks and flame throwers flushed the Japanese into the
open where they were met by the fire of American riflemen who were
waiting for them. By 1600 the enemy strong [114]point was secured and the battalion moved
northwest and formed a night perimeter at 1700.
The 2d Battalion reached Anibung without incident. The
airfield believed to be in the vicinity of the barrio proved
nonexistent. At the end of the day the regiment had advanced
approximately 2,200 yards. The 2d Battalion was at Anibung, the 3d
Battalion was just beyond Hindang, and the 1st Battalion was in a
position to move northwest against Aslom.37
On the morning of 25 October the 1st and 3d Battalions,
382d Infantry, moved out in a northwesterly direction toward Aslom,
with the 3d Battalion on the right, while the 2d Battalion moved out in
a northwesterly direction toward Kanmonhag. The Japanese had withdrawn
during the night, leaving only scattered riflemen to oppose the
advance.
In their advance, the battalions were supported by
elements of the 763d Tank Battalion. At Aslom the two battalions
encountered a strongly fortified position of five gun emplacements and
four pillboxes, which the tanks were able to knock out.38 The 1st Battalion formed its night perimeter near
Aslom while the 3d Battalion pushed north 1,500 yards and formed its
perimeter.
The 2d Battalion encountered only abandoned pillboxes on
its front and left flank during its advance. At 1200 a patrol which
reconnoitered Kanmonhag found no resistance, and the battalion pushed
on to form its night perimeter on line with the 3d Battalion.39
During the first six days of the operation, the
casualties of the 96th Division amounted to 5 officers and 89 enlisted
men killed, 17 officers and 416 enlisted men wounded, and 13 enlisted
men missing in action.40 In the same period the division
had killed an estimated 531 Japanese and had taken one
prisoner.41
Catmon Hill Area
By the end of 25 October the 1st Battalion of the
383d Infantry was in position to attack Labir Hill, while the 2d and 3d
Battalions, remaining in position near Pikas, had sent vigorous patrols
into Tabontabon, San Victor, and San Vicente. The 2d and 3d Battalions
of the 382d Infantry were beyond Aslom while the 1st Battalion was
still at that point. By this time the supply line had been opened up
and the main swamps had been traversed. The 96th Division was deep in
southern Leyte Valley and had isolated a strong enemy force on Catmon
Hill. The way was now open for the division to launch an attack against
Tabontabon, bypass the positions of the 9th Infantry Regiment on
Catmon Hill, and secure the remainder of its beachhead area.
Taking Tabontabon
By 23 October the 383d Infantry, less the 1st
Battalion, had crossed the Guinarona River and established a position
west of Pikas. Having been ordered by General Bradley to hold this
position, the regiment limited its activities to patrolling. While
awaiting orders to advance, Colonel May decided to give battle training
to [115]various units by sending them out on patrolling
missions to observe the enemy.42 Tabontabon and San Victor
were assigned to the 3d Battalion commander as a training mission for
one of his companies, while San Vicente Hill was assigned to the 2d
Battalion commander for the same purpose. Tabontabon was a key point,
since it was one of the main 16th Division supply centers.
Company K, which had been selected by the 3d Battalion
commander for the first mission, sent patrols into the
Tabontabon—San Victor area on the afternoon of 24 October. The
patrol sent to Tabontabon found that the 9th Infantry Regiment
had extensively fortified the barrio. There were deep foxholes and
machine gun emplacements dug in under the houses. None of the positions
appeared to be occupied, but at the end of the town the patrol saw
approximately twenty-five Japanese preparing their evening meal.
Tabontabon was a fairly large barrio on the Guinarona River, with
several blocks of shops and houses, including a church and several
two-story buildings, the axis of the town running east and west.
On the basis of information brought by the patrol, it
was decided to have Company K move out the following morning to seize
Tabontabon. At 0645 on 25 October Company K, reinforced, advanced and
at 0730 took covered positions 200 yards east of the barrio. Under the
plan for attack the 1st Platoon was to approach the northeastern edge
of the village by a covered route, and await the completion of an
artillery concentration scheduled for 0800. After the artillery
preparation a squad from the platoon was to enter and reconnoiter for
possible enemy positions. At the same time, the 2d Platoon, with a
similar mission, was to enter Tabontabon from the southeast side. The
3d Platoon was to be prepared to support the action of either the 1st
or the 2d. Machine guns and mortars were placed in such a way as to
give direct support to both platoons.
Because of unexplained communication difficulties, the
artillery did not deliver its scheduled fire at 0800. Each platoon,
however, sent a squad into Tabontabon. As soon as advance elements of
both platoons entered the town they came under intense rifle and mortar
fire from enemy positions under the houses. It was obvious that the
Japanese had heavily reinforced the barrio during the night. The
reinforcements consisted of a battalion from the 9th Infantry
Regiment.43
The rest of the 1st and 2d Platoons came up and a fire
fight ensued. The 3d Platoon was sent in at 1000 to support the 1st
Platoon, and in response to a request for reinforcements, a rifle
platoon from Company I was brought up at 1040. The commanding officer
of Company K advised the 3d Battalion by radio that he could take
Tabontabon with an additional rifle company but could not do so with
his present force without suffering heavy casualties. The battalion
commander ordered him to withdraw. The withdrawal, under supporting
fire from the 3d Platoon, Company K, the platoon from Company I, and
mortar and machine gun fire from the weapons company, was successfully
accomplished at 1155. At 1240 Company K rejoined the battalion.
[116]
General Bradley ordered the 383d Infantry to direct the
patrols of the 3d Battalion elsewhere, since the 382d Infantry had been
assigned the mission of securing Tabontabon. During the forthcoming
attack the 383d Infantry was to protect the flank of the 382d, whose 2d
and 3d Battalions were to launch a co-ordinated attack on the town. On
26 October the 2d Battalion of the 382d Infantry moved west and
established contact with the 3d at 1200. After an artillery
concentration had been placed on the town the two battalions moved
out.
By 1600 they had forded the shoulder-deep Guinarona
River under heavy enemy fire and had reached the edge of Tabontabon. As
the battalions slowly pushed their way to the outskirts of the barrio,
they came under heavy fire. Elements of the 9th Infantry
Regiment had dug in under the houses, and connecting trenches
honeycombed the streets from one strong point to another. At twilight,
after heavy artillery fire, the enemy launched a strong counterattack
which forced the battalions to withdraw to the river bank, where they
established perimeters for the night.44 Until
midnight, mortar fire from the 9th Infantry Regiment fell in the
2d and 3d Battalion areas.
At 2100 the 96th Division artillery commenced firing on
the town and continued to fire throughout the night. The 1st Battalion,
less Company B which had been left at Aslom to guard supplies, had by
now joined the rest of the regiment. At 1000 on 27 October the 382d
Infantry launched a co-ordinated attack against Tabontabon with the 2d
and 3d Battalions. As Companies I and K of the 3d Battalion started to
wade the Guinarona River, Colonel Dill, the regimental commander,
called to the men to follow him and then dashed across the bridge,
which was swept by enemy rifle fire. The 3d Battalion followed him over
the bridge and to the southeast corner of the barrio.45 The
troops met considerable opposition from elements of the 9th Infantry
Regiment who were hidden in the tall cogon grass. After a short
fire fight the two battalions worked their way slowly through the
western portion of the town and then advanced northwest. Although they
met fire from several pillboxes, there was no organized resistance.
Night perimeters were set up about a mile northwest of Tabontabon with
the 3d Battalion on the left side of the road and the 1st Battalion on
the right.46
The 2d Battalion, which had hit the center of the town,
encountered stiff and determined opposition. Company F proceeded
cautiously down one street as Company G went through the middle of the
second block on its right. The Japanese had riflemen and machine guns
under the houses and on the second floors of the large buildings. By
noon the two companies had worked their way through to the northern
edge of the town, where they encountered the enemy entrenched in
force.
The Japanese had placed machine guns to cover the exits
from the barrio. The guns were aimed down each street and so placed
that each gun was protected by another. Since in Company G men were
dropping from heat exhaustion, Company E was sent in to relieve Company
G. At the same time, the 2d Platoon of the Cannon Company moved
forward, but its howitzers were unable to direct their fire
effectively. Late in the afternoon, since it had become apparent
[117]that the 2d Battalion would not be able to
secure the town before nightfall, the troops were called back to the
center of the town, where the 2d Battalion set up its night
perimeter.47
During the night the Japanese counterattacked, but
American artillery and mortar fire broke up the assault.48 At 0800 on 28 October the 2d Battalion continued
the attack and succeeded in knocking out the enemy resistance northeast
of the town, an action which enabled the battalion to move out north of
Tabontabon at 1200. Leaving Company G to clear the area immediately
outside the town, the 2d Battalion proceeded along the road toward the
road junction at Kiling.49 In spite of determined
opposition, the Japanese supply center of Tabontabon had at last been
taken and approximately 350 Japanese killed in the area. During the
three days of fighting, the 2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and
eighty wounded.
Capture of Catmon Hill
The capture of Catmon Hill falls into two separate
and distinct actions—the operations of the 383d Infantry in the
San Vicente sector and the assault of the 381st Infantry against Catmon
Hill.
On 24 October a Japanese prisoner stated that the
fortifications on San Vicente Hill, the northern tip of Catmon Hill,
were guarded by elements of the 9th Infantry and 20th
Infantry Regiments of the Japanese 16th Division.50 On the morning of 26 October the regimental
commander ordered Company E, 383d Infantry, under Capt. Jesse R.
Thomas, to make a reconnaissance in force of San Vicente Hill.51 Upon receiving his orders, Captain Thomas made
his plans. The 1st Platoon was to move forward and take the left nose
of the hill, operating on the right of the 2d Platoon. The 3d Platoon
was to move into an assembly area fifty yards behind the line of
departure.
On the morning of 26 October the 155-mm. howitzers of
the 363d Field Artillery Battalion laid a ten-minute concentration on
the crest of the hill. This fire was ineffective, since it was too far
ahead of the troops. At 1000 the platoons of Company E moved through
the tall cogon grass to the edge of an open field approximately 200
yards from the base of the hill. The men were under orders not to fire
until fired upon. As the leading elements of the two platoons entered
the field, the 9th Infantry Regiment opened fire with rifles and
mortars. The 3d Platoon then moved up into position along the line of
departure, prepared to support the attack. Since the 2d Platoon was not
under heavy fire, it was ordered to move to the foot of the hill and
take a position from which it could support by fire the advance of the
1st Platoon. Enemy mortars were dropping shells around the center of
the area, but American mortars silenced them.
The 2d Platoon reported that it was 100 yards from the
base of the hill. The 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Col. James O. McCray,
moved into the company command post, about seventy-five yards behind
the attacking platoons at the edge of the open field. This sector began
to receive [118]heavy fire from the right side of the hill and
several men on the edge of the field were hit. Colonel McCray crawled
up and started to help drag the wounded men to cover. At the same time
he ordered the battalion to open fire against the hill with all weapons
except artillery, but an undetermined number of enemy riflemen in the
rear of the command post and on the left flank of the company started
firing into the command post.
SAN VICENTE HILL
Colonel McCray continued to bring back wounded men. At
this time Captain Thomas was overcome by the heat, and the executive
officer of Company E, 2d Lt. Owen R. O’Neill, took over. He
ordered the withdrawal of the force. It was now 1335 and the company,
under continuous fire since 1000, had been unable to advance. Captain
Thomas revived and again assumed command, directing the withdrawal and
the bringing back of the wounded. The body of Colonel McCray, who had
sacrificed his life while dragging the wounded from the hill, was found
about twenty yards from the command post. The withdrawal was
completed.
From 27 to 29 October, the actions of the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 383d Infantry, were limited to reconnaissance patrols in
the vicinity of the town of San Vicente and San Vicente Hill in
attempts to find the strong positions of the enemy on the hill. At 0930
on 30 October Colonel May ordered the battalions to renew the attack
from positions near the Guinarona River. The two units jumped off at
1300. The 3d Battalion advanced along the north bank of the Guinarona
River, one company going through Pikas and the rest of the battalion
[119]making a wide swing through a coconut palm grove
and open fields. The 2d Battalion moved along the south bank of the
Guinarona River, one company following a trail from Pikas to San
Vicente and the rest of the battalion going directly to San Vicente
Hill, which was taken without opposition since the enemy force had
withdrawn. The 3d Battalion went through the barrio of San Vicente
without difficulty but encountered some small arms fire along the river
300 yards north of the village. Both battalions formed their night
perimeters near the river.
At the same time, the eastern slopes of Catmon Hill were
being assaulted by elements of the 381st Infantry, which had been in
Sixth Army reserve through 26 October. On 27 October Sixth Army had
released the 381st Infantry to XXIV Corps control. At 1330 on the same
day General Bradley ordered the regiment to relieve on the following
day the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, which had been on Labiranan Head
since 22 October. It was then to attack and capture Catmon Hill.
Catmon Hill had been under steady naval and artillery
fire since A Day—20 October. The 96th Division artillery had
constantly fired on targets of opportunity by day and harassed enemy
positions in the area during the night. Starting at 2100 on 27 October,
the 105-mm. howitzers of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion, the
155-mm. howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of
155-mm. howitzers from the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the
75-mm. howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to
deliver harassing fires on the hill until 1030 the following day. At
that time all of the artillery units were to commence firing successive
concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill and working to the
top in fifty-yard bounds. After the 381st Infantry, less the 3d
Battalion, attacked at 1200 on 28 October, the artillery was to fire
concentrations in front of the troops as they advanced.52
In making his plans for the capture of Catmon Hill, Col.
Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Infantry, decided to have
the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while
the 2d Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion,
383d Infantry, from its position on Labiranan Head, would support the
attack by fire. On the morning of 28 October the 381st Infantry, less
the 3d Battalion, moved into position for the attack. After a
thirty-minute preparation by the artillery, the 381st Infantry jumped
off to the attack at 1200.
The 1st Battalion, 381st Infantry, moved to the foot of
the hill, where it received “a bloody nose” from fire
coming out of well-entrenched positions. It withdrew under cover of
smoke and established a night perimeter in the vicinity of its line of
departure. The 2d Battalion, however, met no enemy resistance and
advanced rapidly. At the close of the day the battalion was just short
of Labir Hill.53 During the night the Americans expended
3,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on Catmon Hill, chiefly in front
of the 2d Battalion sector. The plans for 29 October called for a
morning attack by the 2d Battalion, supported by fire from the 1st
Battalion, 383d Infantry, which had not yet been relieved; the 1st
Battalion, [120]381st Infantry, was to seek a new lane of
approach and attack at noon.
105-MM. SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER M7 FIRING on
Japanese positions on Catmon Hill.
After a thirty-minute artillery preparation, the 2d
Battalion, 381st Infantry, moved out at 0830. With the support of a
platoon of light tanks, the battalion easily secured both Labir and
Catmon Hills. By 1300 the position had been consolidated. The 1st
Battalion, 381st Infantry, supported by the massed fire of forty-five
tanks and the Regimental Cannon Company, jumped off at 1200. The troops
moved through a heavily fortified area, and at 1600 they established
physical contact with the regiment’s 2d Battalion.
During the heavy pounding of Catmon Hill, the main body
of Japanese troops, the 9th Infantry Regiment, had withdrawn
from the hill on 26 October, unknown to the Americans, and rejoined the
main force of the 16th Division in the Dagami area.54
At last Catmon Hill had been secured. The 1st Battalion,
383d Infantry, was relieved and passed to the Sixth Army reserve. The
381st Infantry’s command post was moved north of San Roque, and
at 1800 its 3d Battalion rejoined the regiment south of this position.
During 30 and 31 October the entire Catmon Hill area was mopped
up—fifty-three pillboxes, seventeen caves, and numerous smaller
emplaced positions were destroyed by demolition charges. The last enemy
stronghold threatening the landing beaches had been removed.
[121]
Convergence on Kiling
Since the main force of the 96th Division was
centered in the vicinity of Catmon Hill, General Bradley had decided to
secure the northern limits of the corps beachhead line—the road
running from Tanauan to Dagami—concurrently with the assault on
Catmon Hill. On 25 October Colonel Halloran had ordered the 3d
Battalion of the 381st Infantry to move north along Highway 1 to
Tanauan and thence southwestward along the Tanauan-Dagami road to
Dagami. At the same time the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, was advancing
north toward Dagami on the Burauen-Dagami road. At 0830 on 26 October
the reinforced 3d Battalion of the 381st Infantry moved out.55 The forward movement was halted by a bridge that
had been mined and partially blown out. The battalion forded the river
and the advance continued without tanks or vehicles, while engineers
from the 321st Engineer Battalion deactivated the mines and repaired
the bridge. The tanks and vehicles then rejoined the battalion. Two
platoons supported by tanks were sent forward to guard the two bridges
south and east of Tanauan. En route, the platoons received some machine
gun and rifle fire from a hill between Vigia Point and Tanauan. During
the night the enemy made his presence known by three rounds of mortar
fire and by sporadic rifle fire on the bridge guards.
At 0800 on 27 October the march was renewed. The troops
again came under fire from the hill between Vigia Point and Tanauan.
After a delay of two hours, in which artillery fire was placed on the
hill, the advance continued and the entrance into Tanauan at 1145 was
unopposed. The battalion then turned southwestward along the
Tanauan-Dagami road toward Kiling, which is about midway between
Tanauan and Dagami. The 3d Battalion had gone about two miles along the
road when it came under fire from 75-mm. guns, mortars, and machine
guns. Two hours were required for Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, and
two flame-thrower tanks to reduce this resistance.56 Seven
pillboxes and three 75-mm. guns were destroyed and a command post was
captured. A night perimeter was established on the road, at 1700, and
only sporadic rifle fire occurred during the night.
At 0800 the following day the 3d Battalion, 381st
Infantry, moved out and about 1500 the advance element entered Kiling.
An attack supported by Battery C, 361st Field Artillery Battalion, was
launched against the enemy about 1630. The Japanese countered with
heavy machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. The attack continued without
success until 1800, when the 3d Battalion withdrew under a smoke screen
and established a night perimeter about 1,000 yards east of Kiling.
Battery C, 361st Field Artillery, fired intermittently during the night
to prevent any Japanese attack against the perimeter.57
At 0800 the following morning—29 October—the
3d Battalion, supported by tanks and artillery, moved out against
Kiling. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and
determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine guns, mortars,
and rifles, fought “to the last man.” The resistance was
overcome, and by 1500 the Americans occupied the town, [122]which was honeycombed with emplacements and
entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved
by the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had come up from Tabontabon
by truck. At 1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck
to the area north of San Roque.58
From Tabontabon two important roads lead to the
Tanauan-Dagami road. One of these runs in a northeasterly direction and
meets the Tanauan-Dagami road at Kiling; the other goes in a
northwesterly direction and meets the road at Digahongan about one and
a half miles east of Dagami. Colonel Dill ordered the 1st and 3d
Battalions, 382d Infantry, to pass through Tabontabon on 27 October and
then to proceed northwest along the latter road to Digahongan. They
were then to go northeastward along the Tanauan-Dagami road and at
Kiling join the 2d Battalion, which was to proceed northeast along the
road from Tabontabon to Kiling.
The 1st and 3d Battalions, with the 3d Battalion in the
lead, moved out of Tabontabon and advanced about three quarters of a
mile to Kapahuan where they established night perimeters. During the
night the Japanese charged the perimeter of the 1st Battalion. The
attack was repulsed with only three casualties to the battalion, while
about one hundred of the enemy were killed.
At 0830 on the 28th the 1st and 3d Battalions jumped off
abreast along both sides of the narrow road for Digahongan—the
1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left. At 1200,
when the battalions were about two miles northwest of Tabontabon, they
encountered a strongly fortified position. The 16th Division had
built coconut pillboxes and many spider holes, which were supported by
two 70-mm. howitzers and a number of 50-mm. mortars. Flame throwers and
demolition teams, supported by the artillery, knocked out this
fortified area. Taking their dead and wounded, the enemy withdrew. The
American troops then advanced under protection of artillery fire toward
the road junction at Digahongan, which they reached at 1500. During the
day the battalions had been harassed by numerous hidden riflemen,
mines, and booby traps.
The 1st Battalion was to move east toward Kiling. The 3d
received orders to stay and guard the road junction at Digahongan,
nicknamed Foxhole Corners, where it went into night perimeter. At 1600
the battalion successfully repulsed a counterattack by about 200
Japanese. In the meantime the 1st Battalion moved as far east on the
Digahongan-Kiling road as Kansamada, where it established a night
perimeter. During the night several small enemy groups of six to eight
men each tried to enter the battalion lines but were driven
off.59
The 3d Battalion spent 29 October in patrolling the area
around Digahongan and guarding the road junction. It broke up one enemy
attack by about thirty men. At 0800 the 1st Battalion moved out from
Kansamada toward Kiling against scattered enemy fire but at 1130 the
troops were stopped by heavy automatic fire which came from pillboxes
astride the road. Shortly afterward the enemy artillery opened up and
the 1st Battalion was forced to withdraw about a thousand yards to a
point where it established a perimeter.60 During the
fight Lt. Col. Jesse W. Mecham, the commanding [123]officer of the battalion, was mortally wounded.
His last order to the battalion was that the troops should not risk
their lives to get his body out.61 That night, however, Maj.
Joseph R. Lewis, who had assumed command of the battalion, led a small
party forward and recovered the body of Colonel Mecham.
During the night the 9th Infantry Regiment
withdrew. On 30 October the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, found no
opposition during its advance forward to Kiling and at 1030 established
contact with the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry. The 2d Battalion, less
Company G, had moved out of Tabontabon on the northeast road to Kiling
on 28 October, spending the night on the outskirts of the town.
The units of the 96th Division spent the next three days
in patrolling and mopping up. The division had secured the beachhead
area of the XXIV Corps in its zone of action. Its units had seized the
Catmon Hill mass, which dominated the landing beaches, had traversed
and cleaned out the inland swamps, and had secured the important
communications center and supply dump of Tabontabon and the main
portion of the significant Tanauan-Dagami road. Since landing they had
killed an estimated 2,769 Japanese and taken 6 prisoners in their zone
of action.62 The cost had not been light. Casualties of the
96th Division since 25 October had been 13 officers and 132 enlisted
men killed, 30 officers and 534 enlisted men wounded, and 2 officers
and 88 enlisted men missing in action.63
[124]
1 35th
Army Opns, p. 30. Unless otherwise indicated, the following is
based upon this study, pp. 30–34. ↑
2 Allied
Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA Terrain Handbook 34, Tacloban, 25 Sep 44, p.
10. ↑
3 96th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 88. ↑
4 10th
I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army on
Leyte, pp. 2–3. ↑
5 35th
Army Opns, pp. 22–23. ↑
7 383d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
8 382d Inf
Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑
9 361st FA
Bn Opns Rpt Leyte. ↑
10 96th
Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
11 382d
Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
12 96th
Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
13 383d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. ↑
14 921st
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
15 383d
Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
16 921st
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
17 383d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10. ↑
19 382d
Inf FO 2, 21 Oct 44. ↑
20 382d
Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
21 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44. ↑
22 382d
Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
23 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. ↑
24 96th
Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
25 A
carabao is a domesticated native water buffalo that is used extensively
in the Philippines as a beast of burden. ↑
26 383d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
27 382d
Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
28 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. ↑
29 This
unit consisted of the 9th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d
Battalion) and two batteries of the 22d Field Artillery
Regiment. ↑
30 96th
Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex C, Part III, Trans, KAKI
Operational Order A-387, 22 Oct 44. ↑
31 Orlando
R. Davidson, J. Carl Willems, and Joseph A. Kahl, The Deadeyes, The
Story of the 96th Infantry Division (Washington, 1947), p.
23. ↑
32 383d
Inf Unit Rpt 4, 23 Oct 44. ↑
33 96th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 24 Oct 44. ↑
34 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 41. ↑
35 382d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
36 96th
Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Oct 44. ↑
37 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 5, 24 Oct 44. ↑
38 763d
Tank Bn Unit Rpt 1, 25 Oct 44. ↑
39 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 6, 25 Oct 44. ↑
40 96th
Div G-l Daily Strength Rpts, 20–25 Oct 44. ↑
41 96th
Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5, 25 Oct 44. ↑
42 Unless
otherwise stated the account of the patrol to Tabontabon is taken from
383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Patrol to Tabontabon, 25 Oct 44, Incl
1. ↑
44 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 7, 26 Oct 44. ↑
45
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 37. ↑
46 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 8, 27 Oct 44. ↑
47
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 38. ↑
48 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 9, 28 Oct 44. ↑
51 The
operations report of the 383d Infantry for the Leyte Campaign has an
“Account of Eyewitnesses Made Immediately Following the
Action,” which is Inclosure 2 to the report. Unless otherwise
stated these statements are the basis for this account of the action on
San Vicente Hill. ↑
52 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 45. Unless otherwise stated the section dealing
with the capture of Catmon Hill is based on 381st Inf Opns Rpt Leyte,
pp. 3–3c. ↑
53 381st
Inf Unit Rpt 4, 28 Oct 44; 381st Inf Unit Jnl, 29 Oct
44. ↑
55 The
reinforcements consisted of a platoon from the Cannon Company, 381st
Infantry; one platoon from Company A, 321st Engineers; Company A, 763d
Tank Battalion; one platoon from Company A, 321st Medical Battalion;
and Battery C, 361st Field Artillery Battalion. ↑
56 763d
Tank Bn S-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 27 Oct 44. ↑
57 381st
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3–3a. ↑
59 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 9, 28 Oct 44. ↑
60 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 10, 29 Oct 44. ↑
61
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 41. ↑
62 96th
Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 13, 2 Nov 44. ↑
63
Compiled from 96th Div G-1 Daily Strength Rpts, 26 Oct–2 Nov
44. ↑
CHAPTER VIII
Southern Leyte Valley: Part Two
Before the invasion, the Japanese had reached the
conclusion that if and when the Americans landed on Leyte it would be
in the Dulag area, and their greatest efforts had therefore been
directed toward making that area impregnable. General Makino,
commanding general of the 16th Division, had stationed the
following units in the Dulag sector: the 20th Infantry Regiment,
commanded by Col. Keijiro Hokoda; elements of the 22d Field
Artillery Regiment; the 54th Air Field Company, commanded by
Comdr. Kazumasa Kumazawa; and the 7th Independent Tank
Company.1 At 0300 on 21 October, General Makino
withdrew from the Dulag area to Dagami and established his command post
in that sector.2 The effective fire of the preliminary naval
bombardment had driven the Japanese from the landing beaches.
The Dulag-Burauen Road
The beachhead quadrangle of the XXIV Corps was
bounded, generally, by the Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan road. The
sections of the road bordering the northern edge of the quadrangle
(Dagami to Tanauan) and the eastern edge (Tanauan to Dulag) were, in
general, in the 96th Division zone of action. The southern and western
sides of the quadrangle were assigned to the 7th Division. The road
that ran along the coast between Dulag and Tanauan was a one-way
thoroughfare which soon disintegrated under the heavy rainfall and
military traffic. (Map 8)
Besides the Dulag airstrip, which was approximately one
mile west of the town, there were three other airfields in the zone of
action of the 7th Infantry Division. The San Pablo airstrip was
approximately five miles west of Dulag and two miles east of Burauen.
Its runway extended generally east to west with a width of 164 feet and
a length of 4,920 feet. The field was overgrown with weeds and had not
been occupied by the Japanese. The Bayug airstrip was just north of the
highway and a half mile east of Burauen. It had a runway approximately
5,000 feet long. The Buri airstrip, the most important one in the 7th
Division zone, was about one mile northeast of Burauen, ran in a
general east-west direction, and was also 5,000 feet long.3
Johnstone
7TH DIVISION ADVANCE TO DAGAMI
21–30 October 1944
DULAG AND BAYUG AIRSTRIPS as they appeared in
1946. Dulag is above.
Halfway to Burauen
General Hodge ordered the 7th Division to capture
the Dulag airfield and then drive west along the Dulag-Burauen road to
seize Burauen and its airfields. After this was [127]done, the division was to turn north along the
Burauen-Dagami road and capture Dagami.4 The 32d
Infantry was to protect the division’s right (north), maintain
contact with the 96th Division, and, if necessary, help the 184th
Infantry on its left to secure the Dulag airstrip west of the town of
Dulag. Securing the airstrip was to be the main effort of the 184th
Infantry.5
MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. HODGE, XXIV Corps commander,
outlines plans to his staff at corps headquarters in Dulag.
At the end of A Day (20 October), all the assault
battalions of the 32d and 184th Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division
were ashore. The 32d Infantry was on the right (north) flank and the
184th Infantry on the left (south) flank. The 32d Infantry had advanced
just beyond Highway 1 in the area northwest of Dulag.6 The 3d
Battalion, 184th Infantry, was on the southern edge of the Dulag
airstrip, while the 1st Battalion of the regiment was directly left of
the 3d, and the 2d Battalion was in reserve.7 The 3d
Battalion, 17th Infantry, protecting the left flank of the XXIV Corps,
was across the Daguitan River at Dao;8 the 1st and
2d Battalions of the same regiment were to remain in division
reserve.
The 7th Division had scarcely established itself for the
night of 20 October when the Japanese launched two small-scale tank
attacks against the perimeter of the division. Since a gap existed
between the 184th and [128]32d Infantry Regiments, Company G
of the 184th was committed to fill the space. As the men of the company
were digging in for the night, three tanks from the 7th Independent
Tank Company came down the road and sprayed the area with machine
gun fire, but the fire was high and there were no casualties. Though
the company fired rifles, bazookas, and mortars against them, the tanks
escaped without injury. An hour later, when one of the tanks returned,
it was knocked out and its crew were killed by a rifle grenade. An
enemy scout car then dashed down the road, and its occupants killed two
men and wounded three others.
The 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had established its
night perimeter on the edge of the Dulag airfield, with its right flank
on the Dulag-Burauen road. At 0130 three Japanese medium tanks moved
along this road. Pfc. George W. Tilk of Company M stopped one of these,
as it came into range, with one shot from his bazooka. The other two
tanks continued down the road but on their return trip they were
destroyed—one by the battalion supply detail and the other by
Pfc. Johnnie Johnson with his bazooka.9
The uneasy repose of the 7th Division was again broken
at 0400 on 21 October when six enemy tanks attacked the sector of the
3d Battalion, 184th Infantry. Within thirty minutes the battalion
knocked out two of the tanks and forced the others to retreat.10 The next disturbance was at 0530 when about fifty
Japanese launched a limited counterattack against the night perimeter
of Company K, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, with light machine gun and
rifle fire. The Americans broke up the attack with machine guns,
mortars, and artillery.11 Daylight revealed thirty-five
enemy dead in front of the company perimeter, and there was evidence
that others had been dragged away.
Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, commander, ordered the
184th and 32d Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division to move west
toward the Burauen airstrips abreast. Since a gap of several hundred
yards existed between the two regiments, the battalions of the 184th
Infantry were ordered to veer to the right. At 0800 the 7th Division
attacked, the 184th Infantry on the left and the 32d Infantry on the
right. There were four battalions in the assault, from left to right:
1st Battalion, 184th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry; 3d
Battalion, 32d Infantry; and 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry.12
As the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved forward, it
encountered Japanese entrenched in positions along the hedgerows.
Knocking out these positions from hedgerow to hedgerow greatly retarded
the advance. The 3d Battalion on the left faced an impassable swamp. In
order to establish contact with the 184th Infantry and cover the area,
Company I moved around the left side of the swamp, and Company L went
around the right; Company K was to cover the gap between the 2d and 3d
Battalions until the 2d Battalion could close it.
There was an enemy strong point between the 2d and 3d
Battalions of the 32d Infantry, but since Colonel Logie was anxious to
[129]continue the advance of the regiment and
straighten the line between the battalions, he ordered the battalions
to bypass the strong point, while the 1st Battalion under Maj. Leigh H.
Mathias was ordered to move from its assembly area and reduce it. The
lines were straightened somewhat, but the swamps and the heavy foliage
made contact very difficult.
The 2d and 3d Battalions came under fire from 75-mm.
guns emplaced in bunkers; tanks reduced these bunkers and the advance
continued. A report of the 32d Infantry boasts that “the
reduction of pillboxes was right down our alley.”13 By 1520 the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, had
reached the regimental beachhead line; shortly thereafter the 2d
Battalion came abreast of the 3d.
The 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, however,
experienced difficulty in reducing the bypassed strong point, which it
reached in the middle of the afternoon. The Japanese defenses consisted
of one 75-mm. and one antitank gun emplaced in bunkers and four machine
guns in pillboxes; these were completely surrounded by an elaborate
system of trenches and foxholes and were occupied by approximately two
platoons of riflemen.14 When the battalion reached the
position, Companies A and B, with Company A on the right, were on a
line behind five medium tanks and one M8 self-propelled 75-mm. howitzer
from the Cannon Company. As the troops moved across an open field
toward a hedgerow, the Japanese opened fire upon Company A. Company B
also received fire as it moved beyond the hedgerow. After several men
had been killed and others wounded, Company B halted until the Japanese
positions could be neutralized by the tanks and the howitzer.
As the tanks emerged from the hedgerow they came under
heavy fire from the Japanese antitank gun. Although some of the tanks
were hit, no serious damage was done; but the howitzer received a
direct hit that set it ablaze and exploded its ammunition.15 The crew abandoned the burning vehicle. Pfc.
Fedele A. Grammatico crawled up under enemy fire, removed the machine
guns, which were intact, and brought them safely back behind the lines.
In the meantime, Company A tried to advance and knock out the enemy
antitank gun but the Japanese stopped the company with direct fire.
Both companies were halted. The struggle resolved itself
into a battle between the tanks and the Japanese in entrenched
positions. The tanks finally silenced the enemy, and the infantrymen
moved in with rifles and bazookas and cleared out the foxholes. After
the reduction of this strong point, the 1st Battalion tried to overtake
the 2d and 3d Battalions. This was not possible, and at 1800 the 1st
Battalion formed its own perimeter.
The 184th Infantry found little opposition in its area,
but excessive heat and the difficulty of maintaining communication in
the high cogon grass rendered its progress difficult. At 0900 the
regiment secured the Dulag airstrip and continued its forward movement
against sporadic rifle and machine gun fire. Contact had been broken
with the 32d Infantry, and at 1245 a gap of 3,000 yards existed between
the regiments. At 1515 the 184th Infantry was ordered to hold up its
advance and establish contact with the 32d.16 It had
advanced [130]approximately 1,000 yards beyond the division
beachhead line.
On 21 October an unidentified Japanese soldier wrote in
his diary:
Finally the enemy’s gunfire and bombardment
has reached our field and road area (except the runway). Gunfire seems
to fade to Dulag area during the night. It seems that enemy tanks are
approaching San Pablo vicinity. We are preparing for them…. Barracks
and fuel dumps are to be burned. I am awaiting the opportune
moment….
I feel alive during the night and dead during the day.
Though life and death are separated by a thin sheet of paper I will not
die until I see a face of a Yankee.17
During the night of 21–22 October all field
artillery battalions delivered harassing fires, and just before the
assault they fired a fifteen-minute barrage.
At 0800 the 32d Infantry moved out to the attack. The 2d
Battalion on the right faced difficult and swampy terrain lying along
the winding, steep-banked Calbasag River, which the troops had to cross
twelve times during the day’s advance. In the afternoon a platoon
of amphibian tractors and another of amphibian tanks were sent to the
aid of the battalion, and engineers from the 13th Engineer Battalion
constructed temporary bridges over the river when necessary.18 The 3d Battalion of the regiment paced its speed
of advance with that of the 2d.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion overtook the others
and at 1000 moved to the right of the 3d Battalion, bringing the three
units into line. Earlier, at 0925, the 3d Battalion was advancing just
to the right of the Dulag-Burauen road when it received enemy artillery
fire, which came from four 75-mm. field pieces to the rear of a
hedgerow 600 to 700 yards ahead. When the companies reached the
hedgerow, Company L received heavy fire from four machine guns which
had been emplaced to protect the field pieces.
Light machine guns and mortars were brought up, and the
31st Field Artillery Battalion placed a five-minute concentration on
the enemy strong point. Three tanks from Company C, 767th Tank
Battalion, were poised for an assault. As soon as the artillery lifted
its fire, the tanks dashed forward and destroyed one machine gun and
one 75-mm. field piece immediately. The tanks then covered the rest of
the area with machine gun fire until Company L moved up and destroyed
the remaining gun positions with rifles and grenades. The action ended
at 1240.
As the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was destroying the
artillery position, Company G of the 2d Battalion received heavy enemy
machine gun and rifle fire near the banks of the Calbasag River. The 3d
Platoon of Company G walked into an ambush of machine guns, which fired
from two pillboxes under native shacks. The platoon was pinned down,
having suffered ten casualties from the first burst of fire. To keep
the advance moving, Company G remained behind to knock out the bunkers
while Company F went forward to continue the advance with Company E.
Since the swamps prohibited the use of tanks, and the mutually
supported pillboxes prevented envelopment, and since the nearness of
friendly troops made the use of artillery dangerous, all of Company G
was held up. The 3d Platoon hugged the ground until darkness enabled it
to withdraw.
At 0900 on 22 October, planes from the Seventh Fleet
bombed the Japanese fortifications in front of the 184th Infantry. As
[131]on the previous day, the heat, tangled foliage,
and deep swamps, rather than enemy action, slowed the advance of the
regiment. Since the 184th Infantry’s rate of advance was more
rapid than that of the 32d Infantry, orders were issued to the 184th
after it had moved forward an additional 2,800 yards to hold its
position until the 32d Infantry could close the gap.19 The
184th maintained contact with the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, by means
of patrols.
The 184th Infantry waited most of the day for the 32d to
come abreast. By 1800 the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry had
advanced approximately half the distance to Burauen. The 3d Battalion,
17th Infantry, on the southern flank of the division, sent out
reconnaissance patrols, which encountered small groups of the enemy
1,000 to 1,200 yards south. The rest of the 17th Infantry moved into an
assembly area in the vicinity of the Dulag airfield.20
Changes in Plans
On the evening of 22 October both General Makino,
commander of the 16th Division on Leyte, and General Arnold,
commander of the 7th Division, made changes in their plans.
The 16th Division was divided into the
Northern and Southern Leyte Defense Forces. The
Northern Leyte Defense Force, consisting of the 9th Infantry
Regiment reinforced by elements of the 22d Field Artillery
Regiment, would defend the Catmon Hill area against the 96th
Division. The Southern Leyte Defense Force, which opposed the
7th Division, was composed of the 20th Infantry Regiment, less
one battalion, the 2d Battalion of the 33d Infantry
Regiment, the 7th Independent Tank Company, and two platoons
of the 16th Engineer Regiment. Some troops were to occupy the
area in the vicinity of San Pablo and the Calbasag River. The main
force was to be centralized in a prepared position near Hindang.
Another group was to occupy Julita, from which it would make small
night raids. At the same time part of this force was to operate along
the right bank of the Daguitan River, protecting the 16th
Division’s right flank. Another unit of approximately 600
troops was composed of the 98th Airfield Battalion, the 54th
Airfield Company, and air-ground service units. It was to occupy
the key positions—the high ground west of Burauen, the south end
of Burauen, and the Buri airfield—and thus prevent the Americans
from using the airfield and stop the advance of American tanks along
the road. The main strength of the artillery (22d Field Artillery
Regiment, less the 6th Battery) would support the
Southern Leyte Defense Force. The engineers were to be prepared
to demolish the road between Dagami and Burauen and between Dagami and
Tanauan. The main force of the engineers was to secure the road
connecting Dagami, Hiabangan, Rizal, and Tingib. A naval unit was to
protect a supply dump east of Dagami, and all remaining units, together
with the 16th Division command post, would occupy positions in
the vicinity of Dagami.21
Three of the four airfields in the zone of the XXIV
Corps were in the vicinity of Burauen. General Arnold wished to seize
them as soon as possible, and at the same time he was anxious to
advance so rapidly that the Japanese would not have time to
[132]construct additional fortified positions near
the airfields. He accordingly rearranged the assault troops. The 17th
Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, with the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,
attached, was ordered to pass through the 184th and 32d Infantry
Regiments at 0830 on 23 October, attack west astride the Dulag-Burauen
road, and capture the San Pablo airfield. The 767th Tank Battalion, in
support of the regiment, was either to precede the 17th Infantry or to
operate with it, as the terrain permitted. It was to jump off from the
vicinity of the Dulag airfield thirty minutes earlier than the assault
units of the 17th Infantry. The 32d and 184th Infantry Regiments were
to follow 1,000 yards behind the 17th.22 It was
hoped that this “flying wedge” formation would catch the
Japanese off balance and that the rear elements of the wedge would be
able to take care of any disorganized enemy units that had been
bypassed.
DISABLED M4 TANK on the Dulag-Burauen
road.
On to Burauen
The flying wedge was very successful. The tanks of
the 767th Tank Battalion moved out at 0730 on the morning of 23
October. Though one of the tanks was knocked out about 3,000 yards west
of Julita at 1000, the others reached the western edge of Burauen at
1712 and scattered the enemy forces in that area. At 0800 the assault
units of the 17th Infantry jumped off, 400 yards to the rear of the
tank battalion. [133]Because of the narrow front the column of
troops was elongated, and it was not until shortly after 0900 that the
1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, was able to move forward. Because of the
difficult terrain and the blazing heat, the infantrymen experienced
difficulty in keeping up with the tanks. The troops encountered
sporadic opposition during the day, passed rapidly through the barrios
of Julita and San Pablo, and secured San Pablo airfield. At 1115
General Arnold notified Colonel Logie that the 32d Infantry was to be
responsible for the right flank of the 7th Division’s zone of
action, less the 200-yard front covered by the 17th Infantry.
At 1700 the units prepared their night perimeters, the
1st Battalion of the 32d, 400 yards south of the San Pablo airstrip;
the 3d Battalion, 1,500 yards north of Julita; and the 2d Battalion in
division reserve, 500 yards southeast of Julita.23 At the same
time the 17th Infantry was on the west end of the San Pablo
airfield.24 The 184th Infantry, minus the 2d Battalion, was
south of the highway between San Pablo and Julita. During the
day’s action, the commanding officer of the Japanese 20th
Infantry Regiment was killed.25 The action for the next
few days resolved itself into two separate engagements—the
seizure of the Buri airstrip and the battle for Dagami.
Securing the XXIV Corps Beachhead Line
Burauen
The 7th Division attacked at 0830 on 24 October,
using the same formation employed on the previous day except that the
1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, reverted to regimental reserve. The 1st
and 2d Battalions, 17th Infantry, continued along the road to Burauen;
the 32d Infantry crossed San Pablo airfield and then went to the right
in a north-northwest direction toward the Buri airstrip. The 2d
Battalion, 17th Infantry, fought its way through the northeastern part
of the town of Burauen and managed to reach the road to Dagami. As the
main part of Burauen is south and west of the road, the barrio was in
the zone of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, which was advancing along
the left side of the road.
The 17th Infantry reached the edge of Burauen at 1030.
As the troops explored the situation, they found that though there was
no organized resistance in the town, scattered throughout Burauen were
elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment, dug in under the
buildings in spider holes and armed with satchel charges, Bangalore
torpedoes made of bamboo, and antitank mines.26
As the American tanks moved through the barrio, some of
the Japanese jumped out of their spider holes and held explosive
charges against the tanks in an attempt to destroy them at the cost of
their own lives. The assault forces of the 17th Infantry, despite the
difficulty of flushing the enemy from the spider holes under the
buildings, made steady progress and by 1400 had mopped up and secured
the town. The battalions re-formed and were ready to go north to
Dagami.
The Buri Airstrip
At 0800 on 24 October, Colonel Logie was
transferred to the headquarters of the 7th Division and Lt. Col. John
M. Finn [134]assumed command of the 32d Infantry. Colonel
Finn ordered the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, to advance to positions
across the San Pablo airfield and then continue the attack northwest
toward the Buri airstrip. The 2d Battalion remained in division
reserve.
BURAUEN is searched for the enemy by troops of
the 17th Infantry.
The Buri airfield was northeast of Burauen, with a
heavily wooded area on its northern edge. On the northern and western
edges the Japanese had constructed pillboxes in the high grass and
heavy brush, together with mutually supporting machine gun pillboxes
interlaced with extensive trench systems. On the southern side of the
airstrip the enemy had twenty strong field fortifications.
Approximately 1,000 enemy troops were defending the
sector—elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment, the 98th
Airfield Battalion, and the 54th Airfield Company. The
airfield had been extensively mined with 100-pound aerial bombs buried
nose up in the runway and scattered throughout the dispersal area. Some
of these bombs had electric fuzes and could be detonated by enemy
troops hidden in foxholes a short distance away.27
The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, met no resistance as it
moved out from the vicinity of the San Pablo airstrip at 1123, but when
the battalion was 1,000 yards northwest of the airfield it ran into
well-camouflaged enemy positions. About 1400 the battalion attacked the
emplacements with Company A on the right, Company C on the left, and
Company B in reserve on the right rear of Company A. In the face of
intense enemy resistance, Company A moved forward and [135]placed heavy rifle and machine gun fire on the
Japanese positions, which crumpled under the attack.28
Although Company C fought valiantly to keep abreast of
Company A, the bulk of the enemy strength was in front of it. Heavy
machine gun fire on its left flank and in front pinned the company down
and kept it from moving forward. This delay created a gap between the
two companies which a platoon from Company B was ordered to fill.
When he found that Company C could not move, Major
Mathias, commander of the 1st Battalion, started out to locate Company
A but was wounded before he could reach it. Maj. Robert C. Foulston,
Jr., the battalion’s executive officer, assumed command of the
battalion as Major Mathias was evacuated.
Intense enemy rifle and machine gun fire hit both of the
flanks and the front of Company C and forced the company to start a
confused withdrawal. The 2d Platoon pulled back, but four of its men
were cut off from the others and went the wrong way. These men, picking
up another who was seriously wounded, proceeded three quarters of a
mile behind the Japanese lines before they discovered their mistake. To
cover the withdrawal of the rest of the company a holding force,
consisting of one platoon from Company C and one platoon from Company
B, together with a section of heavy machine guns, was set up about 500
yards to the rear of Company C.
As Company C started its withdrawal, the enemy moved
forward. Keeping well concealed, the Japanese edged forward and laid
down a heavy volume of rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire on the
troops, but the holding force stopped the advance. An intense fire
fight broke out in which both sides suffered many casualties. The
Americans held on grimly.
At 1530 Colonel Finn ordered the 3d Battalion, 32d
Infantry, to move to the left of the 1st Battalion, but the swamps and
heavy foliage made progress slow. By 1630 the 3d Battalion was 600
yards to the left rear of the 1st Battalion.
During the fight Colonel Finn went forward. Grasping the
seriousness of the situation, he ordered the 1st Battalion to withdraw
to San Pablo airstrip and sent one platoon of the 3d Battalion to
assist the 1st Battalion in its withdrawal. The rest of the 3d
Battalion was to protect the withdrawal of the 1st. The troops rapidly
carried out the orders and withdrew to the airstrip. The 2d Battalion,
released from division reserve that evening, moved up on line with the
3d Battalion. The 32d Infantry formed a defensive perimeter for the
night.29
During the day the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, captured
a Japanese private, Isamu Nakamaru, who had been a mechanic with the
7th Independent Tank Company. He informed his captors that his
company originally had eleven tanks. Eight of these were lost in the
action near Julita; the others were at Buri but were out of commission.
All the tanks were obsolete and had been used mainly to clear and roll
the airstrips.30
On the morning of 25 October the 49th Field Artillery
Battalion fired concentrations from 0800 to 0830 in front of the 32d
Infantry and covered an area of 400 yards on each side of the Buri
airstrip.31 At 0700 the 3d Battalion moved to the right and
in front of the 1st. The 32d Infantry was to [136]move
out at 0830 with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, each battalion to be
preceded by a platoon of tanks.
At 0830 the battalions attacked, both advancing 1,500
yards before they encountered any serious obstacle. The 2d Battalion on
the right ran into the system of bunkers that protected the Buri
airstrip. The 3d Battalion halted and waited for the 2d to overcome the
bunkers and move forward. Though an antitank gun was brought up to fire
on the bunkers, two futile attacks were launched against them and it
became apparent that the 2d Battalion would be considerably delayed.
Colonel Finn therefore ordered the 3d Battalion to advance and secure
the edge of the Buri airstrip, and, with its reserve company, to close
the gap thus created.
Colonel Finn also ordered the 1st Battalion to move
closer to the right flank of the 3d and prevent an enemy envelopment.
Meanwhile, strong patrols which the 3d Battalion had sent to within 300
yards of the airstrip reported that they had encountered only one
strong point in the 3d Battalion’s zone of advance. In order that
the 3d Battalion could be certain it was moving in the direction of the
airstrip, Colonel Finn requested an artillery liaison plane to drop a
flare over the southwest edge of the airfield. After this was done the
battalion resumed its attack and at 1700 reached the edge of the
airstrip. Fortunately the battalion immediately went into a defensive
position, for at 1715 a sharp enemy assault had to be repulsed with
machine gun and rifle fire.32
Meanwhile the 2d Battalion probed at the bunkers located
at the edge of the heavy woods on the northern fringe of the Buri
airfield. These defenses consisted of three bunkers connected by an
elaborate system of trenches and spider holes. Both flanks of the 2d
Battalion received machine gun fire, which became heavier upon any
attempt to carry out an enveloping movement. Under cover of fire from
American heavy machine guns, the 2d Battalion withdrew its wounded. It
then formed a night perimeter and waited for heavier supporting weapons
to be brought up.
On the following day the 2d Battalion was to move from
its night perimeter on a 400-yard front and secure the western end of
the airstrip. The 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was to follow the 1st
Battalion and protect the regiment from an attack from the north. Each
of the assault battalions was to have attached a platoon of medium
tanks and a platoon from the Cannon Company.33
On the morning of 26 October, the 49th Field Artillery
Battalion for ten minutes concentrated its fire for 500 yards on each
side of the airstrip. At 0800 the 32d Infantry attacked. The artillery
fire had been effective, and the 2d Battalion knocked out the pillboxes
that had stopped its advance the previous day. Aided by tanks, the
battalion was able to advance 700 yards along the south side of the
airstrip by 1700.
The 1st battalion, on the right, passed through the 3d
and attacked west on the north side of the airstrip on a 400-yard front
toward the other end of the airstrip. The 1st Battalion immediately
encountered a highly intricate system of pillboxes and bunkers, which
slowed the attack until the tanks arrived. From that time on, a
fiercely contested struggle continued throughout the afternoon. The
battalion employed tanks, [137]antitank guns, artillery, and
mortars to cover its advance, and destroyed many bunkers with grenades,
demolition charges, and automatic rifles.34
Company B bore the brunt of the assault and, fighting
tenaciously, had battled through 900 yards of the fortified area by
1700. The 1st and 2d Battalions made contact on the edge of the
airstrip and formed their night perimeters; the 3d Battalion protected
the rear. During the night the 32d Infantry repulsed several light
counterattacks.
On the following day, 27 October, the time for the
attack was set an hour earlier in the hope that the Japanese would be
caught off guard. At 0700 the 32d Infantry moved out, with the assault
battalions in the same formation as on the previous day.35 To their happy surprise the troops encountered
little opposition as they readily secured bunker after bunker. The
20th Infantry Regiment had spent its strength. The American
troops found enemy dead “in every bunker, trench, foxhole and
bush,” and wreckage of enemy 75’s, machine guns, grenade
launchers, and rifles was scattered about. More than 400 Japanese dead
were found in the sector of the 1st Battalion.36 The
infantrymen encountered only an occasional rifleman while mopping up.
By 1130 the Buri airstrip was secured.
On 28 October the 2d Battalion was alerted to move to
Abuyog at 0400 on the following day. The 3d Battalion was ordered to
move to Guinarona for possible attachment to the 17th Infantry, which
had committed all three of its battalions in the fight north along the
Burauen-Dagami road.
On to Dagami
After securing the barrio of Burauen at 1300 on 24
October, the 17th Infantry had rested for an hour before attacking
along the Burauen-Dagami road.37 The 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, remained attached to the 17th. As the 17th Infantry started
north, a patrol of four jeeps was sent ahead to reconnoiter. It
encountered a strong force of the enemy on a road that forked off to
the Buri airfield, and after a short but determined fire fight the
enemy withdrew north. On its return the patrol reported that the road
to Dagami had been mined with aircraft bombs that were buried nose up
in the road and covered with palm fronds and other vegetation. A
platoon from Company A, 13th Engineer Battalion, removed the mines and
the column continued forward.
About 1530 the right flank of the 17th Infantry came
under mortar and machine gun fire which came from a ridge north of
Burauen and east of the road to Dagami. The ridge was about 700 yards
long, 50 feet high, heavily wooded, and covered with dense undergrowth.
Most of the fire seemed to be coming from an eastern spur that
overlooked the Bayug and Buri airfields. On the left (west) of the road
the terrain was flat and marshy.
At 1630 the 17th Infantry began to form its night
perimeter on the southern edge of the ridge. The 1st Battalion
protected the left (west) flank and tied in at the road with the
regiment’s 2d Battalion. The lines of the 2d Battalion, 17th
Infantry, covered the forward line of the ridge that extended
[138]to the rear where the 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, held the entrance to the eastern finger. The perimeter of the
2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, extended south to tie in with the 1st
Battalion, 17th Infantry.
Only the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, was able to set
up its night perimeter without incident. The 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, ran into determined resistance but was able to establish a
firm bivouac for itself, using the vacated enemy positions. The 2d
Battalion, 17th Infantry, received scattered rifle fire but did not
encounter any of the enemy. During the night the 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, were harassed by patrols
of ten to twenty Japanese each, probing for a break in the lines.
Shortly after nightfall there were two abortive charges
against the American lines. As soon as the troops heard the enemy, they
called for protective fire, which prevented any of the Japanese from
entering the lines. The enemy, however, continually fired into the area
throughout the night. Earlier in the day an American tank had bogged
down in a swamp to the left of the road, and the crew was forced to
abandon it under fire, leaving the guns intact. During the night the
Japanese captured the tank and sprayed the areas of the 1st Battalion,
17th Infantry, and the regimental command post with the tank’s
37-mm. and machine guns, and with four of their own machine guns.
Fortunately the bullets passed harmlessly over the heads of the
troops.
During the night Lt. Col. Francis T. Pachler discussed
plans for the following day, 25 October, with his battalion commanders.
He was faced with a choice between two courses of action. On the one
hand, he could take advantage of the tactical surprise occasioned by
his rapid advance, attempt to bypass the Japanese forces on the
ridge, and make a dash along the Burauen-Dagami road, disregarding
losses that might be inflicted on his flank; or, on the other hand, he
could destroy the enemy forces on the ridge before advancing to Dagami.
The first alternative must allow for a strong possibility that fire
from the 32d Infantry, which was pushing west, might fall upon the 17th
Infantry if it continued its advance before the Buri airfield was
secured. After prolonged discussion, Pachler decided to destroy the
enemy forces on the ridge before proceeding to Dagami.
Colonel Pachler therefore ordered the 1st Battalion,
17th Infantry, to remain in its present position until the 2d
Battalion, echeloned to its right rear, could swing up on line facing
north. While waiting for the 2d Battalion to move up, the 1st Battalion
would send a strong reconnaissance patrol along the road north to the
barrio of Buri to determine Japanese strength, and the condition of the
road and terrain. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, would attack and
destroy the enemy force on the finger of the ridge and then come up,
also facing north.
The patrol moved out at 0730 on 25 October. A rifle
platoon mounted the tops and sides of five tanks and headed north
towards Buri. On its way, the platoon encountered and killed Japanese
troops who were emplaced in spider holes and coconut log pillboxes
under buildings, but a destroyed bridge at the edge of Buri prevented
any further advance. The platoon returned at nightfall with the report
that the road to Buri was clear and that it had killed forty-nine of
the enemy.
The 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, made its move without
incident. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, advancing from its position
on the heavily wooded eastern finger of the [139]ridge, was forced to meet and destroy the enemy
force with bayonets and grenades. Its progress was slow until a platoon
of the Cannon Company and a platoon of medium tanks made a wide
encircling movement through the Bayug airstrip and were able to bring
fire to bear on the Japanese. By 1300 the enemy threat was removed and
the battalion commenced its swing to the north to join the other two
battalions. At dusk the three units were in line; the combat teams had
advanced 400 yards and formed their night perimeters.
At 1700 Colonel Pachler rearranged his troops and made
plans for the following day. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, was
detached to guard the ridge. The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, which had
been guarding the divisional left flank south of Dao since A Day, was
brought forward by truck to rejoin the regiment. The 17th Infantry
would move out along the highway in a column of battalions—the
1st, 2d, and 3d.38
The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out at 0700,
Company A on the left (west) and Company C on the right (east). Since
the tanks were forced to remain on the road because of swamps on either
side, tank support was reduced to a platoon. After having moved about
300 yards beyond the line of departure, Company C ran into a small
pocket of enemy resistance which it soon destroyed with hand grenades
and small arms fire; twenty-one of the enemy were killed and one was
captured. Company A also met and overcame some resistance from enemy in
foxholes in its zone, but was not held up. At 1000 the 1st Battalion
received machine gun fire to its front and observed a movement in the
marsh on its right flank. When the heavy machine guns and 81-mm.
mortars were brought to bear upon the marsh, approximately sixty
Japanese began to run across the open fields. The 4.2-inch mortars of
the 91st Chemical Company also fired on the fleeing enemy.
When the forward elements were about 1,100 yards south
of Ginogusan, Company A encountered a rice paddy to its front. One
platoon of the company went left to move around the rice field, and the
support platoon was committed to close the gap thus created. As the
leading elements got past the field, an enemy force, which was
entrenched just beyond it, started firing. The rear elements of the 1st
Battalion immediately closed in and killed fifteen of the enemy with
grenades and small arms fire. In the meantime, Company C encountered
about twenty-five Japanese who had dug in under native shacks. Two
tanks were called up, and after they had knocked over the shacks the
infantrymen closed in and destroyed the enemy.
During this action the 3d Platoon of Company F, 2d
Battalion, 17th Infantry, reinforced by one squad of the antitank
platoon of the battalion Headquarters Company, established a roadblock
on one of the roads that led to the Buri airfield. The troops came
under rifle and machine gun fire from their front. Within a few minutes
the platoon leader and two other men were killed and another man was
wounded. The platoon withdrew about one hundred yards and called for an
81-mm. mortar concentration on the area. The rest of Company F was
committed against the Japanese south flank.
In the face of heavy fire Company F pushed through the
difficult terrain and forced the enemy to withdraw. However, four
Japanese machine guns remained in [140]position and fired into the
company. The leader of the antitank squad, though wounded in both legs,
ran back to the battalion command post and asked for tanks in support.
A cannon platoon which was sent up silenced the enemy guns. While
continuing the fight during the enemy withdrawal, the company evacuated
its wounded on improvised bamboo litters.
ENGINEER TROOPS of the 13th Engineer Battalion
rebuild a bridge near Burauen.
Company F was then relieved by the 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, which established a roadblock nearer the main highway.
Company F rejoined its battalion and the regiment formed its night
perimeter about 600 yards south of Guinarona. The night was
comparatively peaceful except for a minor bombing in the 2d Battalion
area. The troops of the 17th Infantry were ordered to move out on 27
October in a column of battalions in the following order: 3d, 2d, and
1st, with a distance of 500 yards between battalions.39 Since
aerial photographs showed that all the bridges had been blown, a
platoon of the 13th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 3d
Battalion.
At 0700 the regiment moved out, with the 3d Battalion in
the lead, on a 100-yard front on both sides of the highway. The tanks
were forced to stay on the road. The 3d Battalion was able to cross a
small stream south of Guinarona, although the bridge had been damaged.
When it reached the northern bank of the stream the battalion ran into
the enemy. Approximately twenty Japanese were dug in around a
schoolhouse, with two machine guns mounted in the building. Company K,
the lead company, under cover of machine gun and [141]mortar fire, successfully stormed the
schoolhouse and killed seventeen of its defenders. The engineer troops
from the 13th Engineer Battalion advanced and quickly repaired the
bridge, after which the rest of the 17th Infantry moved forward. Since
the bridge north of Guinarona was also damaged, the same tactics were
used. The infantrymen of the lead company crossed the stream and stood
guard while the engineers repaired the bridge. For 2,500 yards the
advance continued, unopposed except for small groups of Japanese. The
heavy machine guns of the regiment fired from the flanks of the
American forces and covered the swamps on both sides of the road. The
17th Infantry went into night perimeter about 2,200 yards south of
Dagami and about 200 yards south of a demolished stone bridge. As the
regiment started to dig in, enemy rifle and machine gun fire fell on
the front of the 3d Battalion but mortars returned the fire and
silenced the enemy. Although there was sporadic air and ground activity
during the night, no attempt was made to penetrate the lines of the
regiment.
Entrance Into Dagami
The 17th Infantry learned from Japanese prisoners
that in addition to elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment in
the Dagami sector, the following units were present: the 2d
Battalion, 33d Infantry Regiment (about 200 men), together
with scattered elements of the 16th Engineer Regiment and the
9th Infantry Regiment.40
The Japanese had firmly established themselves in
positions in depth about 1,000 yards south of Dagami. These defenses
consisted of mutually supporting pillboxes made of logs and sandbags,
from which the Japanese could deliver interlocking bands of machine gun
fire. They were situated on higher ground and could be approached only
across open rice paddies.41
As the American forces came close to Dagami, the 17th
Infantry was moving north along the Burauen-Dagami road, and the 382d
Infantry, 96th Division, was approaching the road between Dagami and
Tanauan.
Lt. Col. Kakuda, the commander of the Japanese
Central Area Unit of the 20th Infantry Regiment, issued a
series of operational orders. At 1800 on 27 October he ordered the
20th Infantry Regiment to take a position southwest of Dagami
and annihilate the Americans.42
The 17th Infantry estimated that there were from 1,500
to 2,500 Japanese in the vicinity to oppose the regiment’s
advance and that about 500 of these withdrew from Dagami in orderly
fashion.43 The commander of the 17th Infantry prescribed a
column of battalions for the attack of 28 October. The 2d Battalion
would pass through the 3d Battalion, and the attack north would be in
the order of 2d, 1st, and 3d. All of the supporting arms were attached
to the 2d Battalion for its attack.44
At 0730 the 2d Battalion attacked and immediately met
very strong opposition. The stone bridge and road were in the
[142]middle of a strip of waist-deep swamp 100 yards
wide, which funneled out to form a larger swamp. A crescent-shaped
coconut grove lay beyond the swamp, one end in front of the road and
the other bent to the south about 800 yards west of the road. The road
and the curve in the coconut grove divided the swamp into three
segments—one on each side of the road, and the third west of and
parallel to the road. In the face of intense rifle, machine gun, and
mortar fire coming from an unknown number of Japanese, Company F and
three tanks managed to cross the creek. The tanks continued north up
the road. As Company F waded through the waist-deep swamp, it pushed
through direct enemy fire and past a large tank trap and found a line
of pillboxes to its front and left flank.
The company commander ordered his unit to hold its
position and then returned south of the bridge to bring up more tanks.
The 1st Platoon of Company F moved to the left rear to protect that
flank, which was receiving considerable enemy fire. As the company
commander rushed back to get the tanks, about twenty Japanese attacked
the 1st Platoon in an attempt to envelop the left flank of the company.
The platoon leader ordered his men to hold their fire until the enemy
was only five yards away, and nearly all of the Japanese were killed in
the initial volley. The platoon held its ground to prevent any further
enveloping attempts by the Japanese. Meanwhile, Company F’s
commanding officer found that no tanks were available, since they could
not cross the weakened bridge. He returned to Company F and ordered it
to retire to the tank trap, reorganize, and evacuate the wounded.
In the meantime, in order to relieve the pressure on
Company G (on the right), which had run into somewhat the same
situation, Lt. Col. William B. Moore, the battalion commander,
committed Company E to the right (east) flank. Company E initially
encountered determined opposition but managed to flank the enemy and
assist Company G in its sector. At the same time the engineer troops of
the 13th Engineer Battalion, working feverishly under heavy fire, tried
to repair the damaged bridge. One of the armored bulldozers lost three
drivers, successively, to enemy fire.
Under the close supervision of Colonel Moore, who was in
the front lines, the 2d Battalion pressed the attack. Two M8 armored
cars were brought wide around the right flank in order to avoid the
swamp. With their aid, Companies E and G rolled up the east flank of
the 20th Infantry Regiment and broke through the pillboxes in
their own area.
Company C was committed to the left of Company F in
order to aid it. Although this move was partially successful, Company C
found itself pinned down by an enemy force entrenched in pillboxes and
zigzag trenches. Since the Japanese defense line extended beyond the
regiment’s left (west) flank and around it to the south, Company
B was committed further left to hit the southern flank of the enemy.
Although Company B could not break through the line, it was able to
locate the enemy right flank and neutralize the fire on that flank.
One of the three tanks that had gone north in the
morning returned at 1400 and was guided into the sector of Company F.
With all of its guns blazing, the tank broke through the enemy
fortifications, and Companies C and F were then able to move in and mop
up the enemy. The other two tanks had gone up the road some 250 yards
when [143]they met antitank fire which completely
destroyed one and immobilized the other, trapping its crew. As soon as
the bridge was made passable, two M8’s, a medium tank, and a
squad from Company F were sent to rescue the trapped crew. While the
medium tank and the infantry covered the damaged tank, the M8’s
drew up to it and allowed its crew to escape into their open turrets.
The detail withdrew, having suffered no casualties, and the immobilized
tank was then destroyed.
At dusk the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, and the
committed companies from the 1st Battalion pushed some 300 yards beyond
the enemy strong point and formed a perimeter defense for the
night.45 Company B on the far left flank was withdrawn and
closed into the perimeter. Although machine gun and mortar fire came
from the left line of fortifications, there was no major action on the
part of the Japanese. A few of the enemy, attempting to crawl through a
trench into the position of Company F, became ensnarled in the
concertina wire and were then destroyed by grenades.
Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the
fighting on 28 October and had suffered numerous casualties, the
regimental commander decided to have the battalion drop back into
reserve. Although the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south
line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be
ignored. At 0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be
reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would
pass through the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental
reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8’s would attack the flank
and rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes.
At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration
from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions,
17th Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion without incident.
Company B, reinforced by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out
to destroy the enemy force on the regiment’s left flank. The
company fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy
on his flanks and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with
time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely
demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried
unsuccessfully to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the
area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without
encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from
the hills west of the town.
The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column
of companies in the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition
until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven
to ten feet high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the
cemetery was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved
into the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to
come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L
passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position without
incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve platoon,
crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open grave four
Japanese opened fire [144]with an American Browning automatic rifle
and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no effect
and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to burn the
enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from other open
graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By punching
holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual foxholes.
The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the cemetery,
destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located.
Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons
abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the
cemetery path a Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his
saber and wounded one man before he could be brought down. Since the
platoons were also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander
of Company K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized.
Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched
shoulder to shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy.
About 1900 the regiment completed the action and formed its night
perimeter.
During the fighting, the regimental operations officer,
hearing the heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d
Battalion headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the
Japanese had broken through the American lines. “Hell no,”
was the reported reply, “we’re breaking through theirs and
fighting for our bivouac.”46 During the night small
infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully to penetrate the
regiment’s defenses, and sporadic artillery fire was received
from the hills west of Dagami.
By 1040 on 30 October Dagami was securely in American
hands, and the 17th Infantry continued to mop up for the rest of the
day. The 19th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division, X Corps, across
the Binahaan River north of Dagami, was reached by an airdrop message
from the artillery spotter plane, and patrols reached the 382d Infantry
of the 96th Division on the east. The mission of the 17th Infantry
Regiment—securing the town of Dagami and effecting junction with
the X Corps and the 96th Division—was completed. The regiment
spent the next two days in mopping up and patrolling the area around
Dagami.
The 7th Division had secured the limits of its beachhead
line, but the southern approaches to the line had not yet been secured.
The road farther south, running across the island from Abuyog on the
east coast to Baybay on the west coast, offered a potential route along
which the Japanese might pour in reinforcements.
At 0530 on 29 October the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry,
left Burauen for Abuyog via Dao and the coastal road, Highway 1. Its
progress was impeded by muddy roads and the previous destruction of the
bridge over the Bito River. The battalion, less one company, crossed
the river by DUKW’s at 0940 and by 1000 was in Abuyog, having
encountered no Japanese. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, acting
as an advance guard for the battalion, pushed west from Abuyog inland
four miles on the road toward Baybay.
On 30 and 31 October the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry,
remained at Abuyog, but on the latter day it sent Company G,
reinforced, toward Baybay on the Abuyog-Baybay road, which corkscrewed
through the mountains for about twenty-seven miles between [145]the
east and west coasts. The company encountered no Japanese. On 1
November no forward progress was made, but all elements of the 2d
Battalion, 32d Infantry, patrolled. On 2 November Company G moved along
the road and closed in on Baybay at 2200.
Far to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th
Division, had been engaged since A Day in extensive patrolling of the
Panaon Strait area. On 31 October the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, left
the Bayug airfield for Dulag and at 2200 sailed from Dulag to relieve
the 21st Infantry. The battalion arrived at Panaon Island at 0700 on 1
November and during the day effected the relief of the 21st Infantry,
which then moved north to rejoin the 24th Division.47
The initial mission of the 7th Infantry
Division—to land between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers,
advance rapidly inland along the axis of the Dulag-Burauen road, seize
hostile airstrips in its zone of action, secure the Burauen-Dagami
road, and protect the XXIV Corps’ left (south) flank—had
been accomplished.
Since landing, the 7th Division had killed an estimated
4,211 Japanese and had taken 19 prisoners.48 Up to 1000
on 1 November, 32 officers and 290 enlisted men of the division had
been killed; 48 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 777 enlisted men
wounded; 15 officers and 223 enlisted men injured; and 21 enlisted men
were missing in action.49
By 2 November, General Hodge’s XXIV Corps had
finished its assigned role for the second phase of General
Krueger’s plan for the capture of the island of Leyte. It had
seized the southern part of Leyte Valley with its important roads,
airfields, and potential base sites. An element of the corps had pushed
to the west coast of the island, and was preparing for the move toward
the important port of Ormoc as part of the third phase of the plan.
General Makino had been forced to give up his Dagami headquarters and
other positions on the heights overlooking the town. Far to the north,
the X Corps was engaged in securing the northern part of Leyte Valley.
[146]
1 7th Inf
Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44, and Rpt 4, 23 Oct 44. ↑
3 Fifth
Air Force Opns Instns 6, Engr Annex, 28 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 30
Sep 44. ↑
4 XXIV
Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
5 7th Inf
Div FO 9, 1 Oct 44. ↑
6 32d Inf
Regt Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑
7 184th
Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. ↑
8 17th Inf
Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. ↑
9 Lt
Russell A. Gugeler, Battle for Dagami, pp. 10–11, MS in OCMH. The
author, a combat historian attached to the 7th Division after the
operation, knew many of the participants and has been able to give
details that do not appear in the official records. Much of the
material in this chapter is based on his manuscript. ↑
10 184th
Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
11 32d Inf
Regt Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
12 7th
Div, Detailed Division Narrative, King II, p. 4, DRB
AGO. ↑
13 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
16 184th
Inf Regt Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
17 7th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, App. C to Annex 2. ↑
18 13th
Engr Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
19 7th Div
G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. ↑
21 96th
Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex C, Part III, Trans, KAKI
Operational Order A-837, 22 Oct 44. ↑
22 7th Div
FO 11, 22 Oct 44. ↑
23 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
24 7th Div
G-3 Periodic Rpt 4, 23 Oct 44. ↑
26 17th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, The Battle for Dagami, Annex A, p.
1. ↑
27 7th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
28 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
30
Attachment to 7th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5, 24 Oct 44. ↑
31 49th FA
Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
32 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8. ↑
34 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. ↑
36 32d Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. ↑
37 Unless
otherwise stated the material on the drive to Dagami is based on 17th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex A, The Battle for Dagami, pp.
1–9. ↑
38 17th
Inf FO 3, 25 Oct 44. ↑
39 17th
Inf FO 4, 26 Oct 44. ↑
40 7th Inf
Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 9, 28 Oct 44. Unless otherwise stated the entrance
into Dagami is based upon 17th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex A, The Battle
for Dagami, pp. 1–9. ↑
41 7th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. ↑
42
Central Area Unit Opns Order 2, 27 Oct 44, trans in App. C to
Annex 2, 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte. ↑
43 17th
Inf FO 5, 27 Oct 44. ↑
44 These
were the Cannon Company, a platoon of the Antitank Company, a platoon
of the 13th Engineer Battalion, 767th Tank Battalion, and the 91st
Chemical Company minus the 1st and 3d Platoons. ↑
45 During
the day’s action, Pfc. Leonard C. Brostrom of Company F and Pfc.
John F. Thorson of Company G so distinguished themselves that they were
awarded the Medal of Honor. Private Brostrom singlehandedly destroyed a
pillbox and killed six Japanese before collapsing from his wounds.
Private Thorson sacrificed his life to save his comrades by throwing
himself upon an enemy grenade that landed in his platoon’s
defensive position. ↑
46 17th
Inf Opns Rpt, Battle for Dagami, App., p. 9. ↑
47 7th Div
G-3 Periodic Rpts 10–14, 29 Oct-2 Nov 44. ↑
48 7th Div
G-2 Periodic Rpt 13, 2 Nov 44. ↑
49 7th Div
G-1 Weekly Rpt 2, 31 Oct 44, Incl 2, Part 2, 1 Nov 44; 7th Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, G-1 Rpt. ↑
CHAPTER IX
Northern Leyte Valley: Part One
By the evening of 20 October the Tacloban airfield
and Hill 522, overlooking the town of Palo at the northern entrance to
Leyte Valley, were in the hands of the X Corps. The night of
20–21 October was free from enemy activity in the sector of the
1st Cavalry Division, and the exhausted troops were able to obtain an
unquiet rest during their first night in the Philippines. Having
secured the Tacloban airfield they were in position to march on
Tacloban, the capital of Leyte, the following morning. Tacloban is
situated on a peninsula at the head of San Pedro Bay. A string of low
hills, stretching from Anibong Point along the base of the peninsula to
the southeast, commands the approaches to the town.1
Throughout the night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion delivered
harassing fires on the hills south of the town.2 (Map 9)
San Juanico Strait
Drive Toward Caibaan
General Krueger wished to push rapidly through
Leyte Valley and secure its important roads and airfields before the
Japanese could regroup and offer a firm line of resistance. In the
north, securing San Juanico Strait would prevent any of the enemy from
crossing over from Samar. Control of the road that led through the
interior of northern Leyte Valley would give the possessor a firm hold
on the northern part of the valley. With a successful two-pronged
attack—elements of the 1st Cavalry Division driving north along
San Juanico Strait and units of the 24th Infantry Division pushing
along Highway 2—the X Corps would arrive at Carigara Bay. At that
point the corps would be in position to contest any Japanese amphibious
movement through Carigara Bay, and at the same time elements of the
corps could drive south through Ormoc Valley and secure the important
port of Ormoc.
Preceded by a naval and air bombardment and a
preparation by the 61st Field Artillery Battalion,3 the 1st
Cavalry Division at 0800 on 21 October resumed the assault against the
Japanese.4 The division was to capture Tacloban and then
secure control over San Juanico Strait.5 The 7th
Cavalry, 2d Brigade, had been assigned the mission of seizing
Tacloban,6 which was defended by elements of the Japanese
33d Infantry Regiment.7
Frost
SECURING THE TACLOBAN AREA
21–23 October 1944
On the morning of 21 October the 1st Squadron, 7th
Cavalry, joined the regiment’s [148]2d Squadron in a
drive on Tacloban. At 0800 the 7th Cavalry moved with squadrons
abreast, the 1st Squadron on the right and the 2d Squadron on the left,
astride the highway leading to Tacloban. Although the squadrons found
the terrain extremely swampy and movement difficult, by 1400 the 1st
Squadron was on the outskirts of the town and the 2d was halted at the
foot of a hill overlooking Tacloban. The Japanese had dug into the
hills overlooking the capital. The division artillery then shelled the
hill and the high ground to the north.8 At 1500 the
fire was lifted and the forward movement proceeded.
The men of the 1st Squadron entered Tacloban to conduct
a house-to-house search for concealed Japanese. They received a
tumultuous welcome from the Filipinos who lined the sides of the narrow
streets, waving American flags and urging gifts of eggs and fruit upon
the troopers.9 They were also welcomed by the governor of
the province. The 2d Squadron, on the other hand, was held up by an
estimated 200 Japanese who were entrenched in pillboxes and foxholes
and behind the dense vegetation that covered the hilly area. As heavy
fire from the enemy pinned down the troops, Col. Walter H. Finnegan,
the regiment’s commanding officer, sent the Antitank Platoon and
elements of the Regimental Weapons Troop in support of the 2d Squadron,
where that unit faced the southern end of the hill mass.10
The Weapons Troop was ordered to lay aside its automatic
weapons and assault the hill with rifles, but it was pinned down by
intense fire from an enemy bunker to the immediate front. Pfc. Kenneth
W. Grove, an ammunition carrier, volunteered to clear the Japanese from
the position. He worked his way through the underbrush to the flank of
the bunker, then charged in the open against its front and killed the
gun crew.11 The advance then continued.
The movements of the Weapons Troop and the Antitank
Platoon were successful, and by 1800 the southern half of the hill and
the town of Tacloban were in American hands. Shortly after the seizure
of the capital, General Mudge, the division commander, inspected the
town from a medium tank. At one point, where the Japanese had turned
over a truck to form a roadblock, the general personally received the
surrender of forty Formosan laborers.12 The
regimental command post was established in the building that had housed
the Leyte Intermediate School for Girls.
The following day, after an intensive mortar, artillery,
and air bombardment on a hill southwest of Tacloban, the 2d Squadron of
the 7th Cavalry moved out against the hill at 0820. Although the
terrain was rugged, the position was overrun by 1100. The 1st Squadron
spent the day mopping up the town in search of the enemy. At 1108
General Mudge released the 8th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Bradley,
to 2d Brigade control.
By the end of 22 October the capital of Leyte and its
hill defenses were securely in American hands. The 7th Cavalry was one
day ahead of schedule, a fact partly explained by the unexpectedly
light resistance of the Japanese and partly by the vigor of the 7th
Cavalry’s advance.13
A PATROL FROM THE 7TH CAVALRY moves along
Avenida Rizal in Tacloban (above). Flag-waving Filipinos greet
the American troops (below).
On the morning of 22 October the 8th Cavalry made a
“victory” march through [150]liberated Tacloban
and went into perimeter to the west of the 7th Cavalry on the hills
overlooking the town. Troop C went to Anibong Point in order to guard
the brigade flank from a suspected Japanese barge landing through San
Juanico Strait.
MAJ. GEN. VERNE D. MUDGE (in tank) confers
with Brig. Gen. William C. Chase in Tacloban.
Shortly after the command post was opened at 1830, the
8th Cavalry received orders for the 1st Squadron to depart at 0700 on
the following day. It was to pass through the 7th Cavalry and secure
the bridge crossing the Diit River so as to protect the 2d Squadron,
8th Cavalry. The latter was directed to move northwest across the
mountains, seize Santa Cruz, which was on Carigara Bay about sixteen
miles northwest of Tacloban, and locate the remnants of the Japanese
who had opposed the 7th Cavalry in its advance through the city.
The 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, passed through the 7th
Cavalry at 0900 on the morning of 23 October. By nightfall the squadron
had crossed and secured the Diit River bridge and routed small groups
of the enemy. The 2d Squadron experienced difficulty in securing
Filipino carriers for the trip up the Diit River and across the
unmapped and unknown mountains to Santa Cruz. It resolved the situation
by driving a truck through the streets and seizing every able-bodied
Filipino in sight. These “volunteers” were sufficient to
get the squadron to its night bivouac on the Diit River. The
“indignant carriers [then] dissolved into the [151]jungle.”14 The 2d
Squadron established its perimeter near the village of Diit.
8-INCH HOWITZERS READIED FOR ACTION against an
enemy strong point southwest of Tacloban.
Meanwhile, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division
had been ordered to move west on 21 October. This maneuver was designed
to protect the southern flank of the 2d Brigade and to prevent the
Japanese from reinforcing their troops in Tacloban. The 1st Brigade
moved out at 0800 toward Caibaan, the 12th Cavalry on the right and the
5th Cavalry on the left.15 Troop B of the 12th Cavalry
advanced toward the barrio of Utap, and though it ran into enemy
opposition it was able to secure the town after being reinforced by the
regimental and brigade reconnaissance platoons. Swampy ground made the
going very difficult. The troops captured a large Japanese supply dump
which contained quantities of foodstuffs, vehicles, and equipment, and
valuable documents.16
The 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 5th Cavalry advanced
abreast toward Caibaan and the high ground beyond the town. They
encountered only sporadic rifle fire in Caibaan but at the foot of one
of the hills they met determined opposition from about half a company
of Japanese. After an exchange [152]of fire, the Japanese
signified they wished to surrender by waving a white flag. The heavy
machine guns were brought into position and the American soldiers
signalled for the Japanese to disrobe in order to forestall their using
concealed grenades or other weapons. The Japanese opened fire and
wounded five men. The automatic weapons then returned the fire, killing
thirteen of the enemy. The remaining Japanese withdrew over the hill,
and contact was lost.
There was no enemy activity in the 5th Cavalry’s
sector during the night of 21–22 October, and at 0645 the advance
elements of the 1st Squadron began to move up the steep east slope of a
hill west of Caibaan. The squadron continued its advance, and at 1200
engaged in a short skirmish between the hill and Caibaan, killing ten
Japanese. The difficult terrain, rather than the Japanese, slowed the
advance. Hampered by tall cogon grass, which cut off every breeze, the
troops struggled up steep slopes and sharp ridges. Exposed to the hot
sun and burdened with equipment and ammunition, they were soon
exhausted. At 1447 the 5th Cavalry received orders to halt all forward
movement until further notice. The 1st Squadron was in bad condition
physically, since it had been steadily on the move for a day and a half
and had consumed all its rations and water. At the end of the day, 22
October, the squadron was still at the base of the hill, but the rest
of the regiment had reached Caibaan.17 On the
following day elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban to act
as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The other units remained in
position.18
Restoration of Civil Government
The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John
Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban
later on 23 October. President Osmeña of the Philippine
Commonwealth was also present, having come ashore for the
occasion.19 A simple but impressive ceremony was held in
front of the municipal building of Tacloban, though the interior of the
edifice was a shambles of broken furniture and scattered papers. A
guard of honor of “dirty and tired but efficient-looking
soldiers”20 was drawn up in front of the government
building. General MacArthur broadcast an address announcing the
establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President
Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the
official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of
American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel the
enemy. “To the Color” was sounded on the bugle, and the
national flags of the United States and the Philippines were
simultaneously hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon
of the guerrilla forces was then decorated with the Distinguished
Service Cross.
Few Filipinos except representatives of the local
government were present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants
had not heard of it, or did not know that they were permitted to
attend. Information quickly spread, however, that the civil government
had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town
the civil population cheered them.21 [153]
GENERAL MacARTHUR
announces the establishment of the Philippine Civil
Government.
Seen in the front row, left to right, are: Lt.
Gen. George C. Kenney, Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, Lt. Gen. Walter
Krueger, Lt Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, General MacArthur and President
Sergio Osmeña.
Drive up the Strait
Though the 1st Cavalry Division had secured
Tacloban and the region surrounding it, there remained the important
task of seizing San Juanico Strait to prevent the Japanese from
bringing in reinforcements from Samar. (See Map 2.)22 San Juanico Strait, connecting the Leyte Gulf
with Samar Sea, forms a narrow passage between Leyte and Samar Islands.
Highway 1 ends on its western shore, some fourteen miles north of
Tacloban at Guintiguian, a small barrio (not shown on the map) two
miles north of San Isidro. A ferry between Guintiguian and La Paz, just
across the strait on Samar, links the road networks of the two islands.
The 2d Brigade’s mission was to seize Guintiguian on Leyte; La
Paz on Samar (including the establishment of a bridgehead on the north
bank of the Silaga River, three miles northeast of La Paz); and
Babatngon on the north coast of Leyte. By shore-to-shore operations it
was also to seize Basey on the island of Samar and the area north and
west of it.23
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
PROCLAMATION
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES:
I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God
our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the
blood of our two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed, to the
task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily
lives, and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength,
the liberties of your people.
At my side is your President, Sergio
Osmeña, worthy successor of that great
patriot, Manuel Quezon, with members of his cabinet. The seat of your
government is now therefore firmly re-established on Philippine
soil.
The hour of your redemption is here. Your
patriots have demonstrated an unswerving and resolute devotion to the
principles of freedom that challenges the best that is written on the
pages of human history. I now call upon your supreme effort that the
enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people within
that he has a force there to contend with no less violent than is the
force committed from without.
Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of
Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to
bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike. Strike at
every favorable opportunity. For your homes and hearths, strike! For
future generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of
your sacred dead, strike! Let no heart be faint. Let every arm be
steeled. The guidance of divine God points the way. Follow in His Name
to the Holy Grail of righteous victory!
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR.
General Hoffman had been warned that his 2d Brigade
would be assigned the mission of securing San Juanico Strait and
possibly landing on Samar; he therefore directed an overwater
reconnaissance of the [155]sector. Consequently, on 23
October the staff officers of the 8th Cavalry and of the 1st Squadron
of the regiment boarded an LCI at the Tacloban dock. The landing craft
made the trip through San Juanico Strait to the barrio of Babatngon on
Janabatas Channel without incident. On the return trip, the officers
observed some Japanese positions which overlooked the ferry crossing at
the Guintiguian landing on Leyte. The party made a brief reconnaissance
of the Guintiguian side of the ferry landing and of La Paz on the Samar
side. There was no enemy contact.24
As a consequence General Hoffman, in issuing his orders
for the next day, assigned the following missions: the 1st Squadron,
7th Cavalry, under Maj. Leonard E. Smith would embark at 0630 on 24
October, and move overwater to seize the town of Babatngon. This
operation would seal off the western entrance into San Juanico Strait.
Troop C, reinforced, of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, under Maj. F.
Raymond King, was also to embark at 0630 from Tacloban and move north
to seize the ferry crossing between Guintiguian and La Paz. At the same
time the rest of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, under Lt. Col. Mayers
Shore, would drive north along the highway and effect a juncture with C
Troop at Guintiguian.25
The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, sailed for Babatngon at
1030 on 24 October. The trip was uneventful, and at 1330 the squadron
arrived at Babatngon, sent out security patrols, and established a
perimeter defense. On 25 October the Japanese launched an air attack,
hitting an LCI in the Babatngon harbor. Eight men were killed and
seventeen wounded, all of them Navy personnel.26 For the
next few days the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, made a series of overwater
movements through Carigara Bay and exploited the lack of any strong
Japanese resistance along the northeast coast of the Leyte
Valley.27
Reinforced Troop C of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, was
ready to sail by 0630 on 24 October but was delayed by a Japanese air
attack on the shipping in Tacloban harbor and San Pedro Bay, made by
about fifty medium bombers and Army fighters. Before they could reach
the beachhead area, many of the Japanese planes were shot down by Navy
combat air patrol fliers, who also beat off another wave of about
thirty more planes. Two of the American planes crash-landed on the
Tacloban airfield, while a third landed in the water.28 There
was minor damage to American shipping.
One of the Japanese planes crashed less than 200 yards
from elements of Troop C but the force got under way. The troopers,
after running down and killing five Japanese in a canoe, arrived at La
Paz, Samar, their destination, without further excitement and
established a roadblock on the road leading to Basey.
TACLOBAN from the air (above). Close-up
of the dock area (below), showing San Juanico Strait and the island of
Samar in the background.
The 1st Squadron of the 8th Cavalry, which was to travel
overland by Highway 1 to make junction with Troop C at the ferry
crossing, broke camp at 0700 on the morning of the 24th. The squadron
was accompanied by a platoon of light tanks and weapons carriers with
rations and ammunition. Since the passage was through enemy-held
territory and over unfamiliar terrain, [157]and since the
strength of the Japanese forces was unknown, it was estimated that it
would take the squadron a minimum of two days to cover the sixteen and
a quarter miles between the two forces. The commanding officer of the
squadron, however, by utilizing stream-crossing expedients to the
utmost in snaking tanks and vehicles across the many intersecting
streams and by driving the troops, was able to complete the difficult
march to Guintiguian and go into perimeter with all his men except a
rear guard at 2130 on the same day. At the end of 24 October, the 8th
Cavalry, less the 2d Squadron, was in a position from which it could
defend its beachhead on Samar.29
At 2300 an estimated hundred Japanese from the 2d
Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, attacked the roadblock which had
been established on the road leading to Basey. The Japanese opened up
with machine gun fire and tossed several grenades against the position.
The defenders repelled the attack with machine gun and mortar fire, but
for the remainder of the night “confusion reigned supreme and the
odds and ends were not rounded up until the next
morning.”30 During the next three days the 8th Cavalry
consolidated its position and extended its perimeter to include a
bridgehead on the Silaga River.
By the end of 27 October the 1st Cavalry Division had
seized Tacloban and gained control of San Juanico Strait. Because of
supply difficulties the 2d Brigade on 25 October had ordered the 2d
Squadron, 8th Cavalry, to discontinue its movement toward Santa Cruz,
to remain in bivouac along the upper reaches of the Diit River and
patrol that area. At this time the casualties of the 1st Cavalry
Division amounted to 4 officers and 36 enlisted men killed, 14 officers
and 185 enlisted men wounded, and 8 enlisted men missing in
action.31 During the same period, the division reported it had
killed 739 of the enemy and had taken prisoner 7 Japanese, 1 Formosan,
and 1 Chinese.32
The opposition had been light—much lighter than
had been expected. Elements of the division had therefore been sent
south to reinforce the 24th Division, which had borne the brunt of the
Japanese opposition in the X Corps sector in its drive through northern
Leyte Valley toward Carigara Bay.
Leyte Valley Entrance
Defense at Pawing
At the end of 20 October the 24th Division had
established a firm beachhead near Palo, averaging a mile in depth, and
had secured Hill 522 which overlooked Palo.33
(Map 10) The 24th Division was to seize Palo
and drive astride the road that ran northwest through the Leyte Valley
to Carigara. The 34th Infantry, in the vicinity of Pawing, had its 2d
Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James F. Pearsall, Jr., 100 yards west
of Highway 1, with the northern elements of the battalion in contact
with the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division on the right. The 3d
Battalion, 34th Infantry, was just short of the highway. The leading
elements of the 19th Infantry were on Hill 522.34
[158]
Frost
FIGHT FOR ENTRANCE TO NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY
21–25 October 1944
At 0100 on 21 October three companies of
Japanese,35 part of the 33d Infantry
Regiment,36 under cover of darkness and aided by heavy
machine gun and mortar fire, struck from the south along Highway 1. The
leading elements made a double envelopment of the American flanks while
the main force came down the road and attacked the perimeter of the 2d
Platoon of Company G. By 0200 the enemy, still employing machine gun
and mortar fire, had pushed to within a few yards of the American
positions and had killed or wounded everyone but Pvt. Harold H. Moon,
Jr., in the first two positions.
The Japanese then centered their fire upon Private Moon,
who, although wounded by this fire, replied with his submachine
[159]gun. An enemy officer attempted to throw
grenades at Moon’s position and was killed. The Japanese then
brought up a light machine gun to within twenty yards of his position.
Moon called back the range correction to friendly mortars which knocked
out the machine gun. For over four hours he held back the enemy. At
dawn an entire platoon with fixed bayonets charged toward him. From a
sitting position he fired into the Japanese, killed eighteen, and
repulsed the attack. He then stood up and threw a grenade at a machine
gun that had opened up on his right. He was hit and instantly
killed.37 The Japanese then resumed their attack, but the
remnants of Moon’s platoon fixed bayonets, charged, and succeeded
in breaking through the enemy line.
In the meantime the enemy hit the perimeter of Company
L. For several hours the Japanese felt out the company positions, and
then, covered by three machine guns, they charged in platoon strength
on the east side of the company’s perimeter. The company,
supported by mortar fire, retaliated and assaulted the Japanese in
front of the perimeter. Attempted movements around both the enemy
flanks failed. A frontal assault, protected by fire from both flanks,
was then successfully made by the company, and the Japanese force was
routed. There were 105 enemy dead in the immediate area of the
company.
By this time it was dawn, and Pearsall’s men began
extensive countermeasures. Concentrated mortar fire was laid down, and,
since Japanese artillery was shelling the American positions, artillery
and air strikes were requested. At 0900 Battery A of the 63d Field
Artillery Battalion fired 150 rounds on the Japanese.38
At a point 1,500 yards south of Pawing naval flyers from
the Seventh Fleet strafed the enemy and, in co-operation with the
artillery fire, successfully broke the back of the offensive. The enemy
scattered into the rice paddies. Members of the 2d Battalion were then
able to go down the road and mop up. More than 600 Japanese were killed
during the engagement.39 Company G, which had borne the
brunt of the attack, lost fourteen men killed and had twelve
wounded.
The battalion had scarcely finished breakfast when at
1000 it was given the mission of seizing a hill mass immediately west
of its position at Pawing. After artillery and naval gunfire had been
placed upon the hill for fifteen minutes,40 E Company
was to take the northern knoll of the hill mass and F Company to take
the southern knoll. It was not until 1400, however, that the attack
jumped off. Company E met no opposition, and within twenty-five minutes
was able to occupy its objective.
Company F, commanded by Capt. Paul Austin, had more
difficulty. Its objective was a steep hill, heavily covered with cogon
grass ten to twelve feet high, which limited visibility to a few feet.
A trail ran west from a small clump of trees to the top of the hill,
and then south along the crest of the ridge where the grass was only
six inches high. The company proceeded west in a column of platoons and
at 1430 reached the foot of [160]the hill. At the western edge of
the group of trees, the 1st and 3d Platoons turned left and advanced
directly toward the highest point of the hill. The 2d Platoon, with
machine guns, continued up the path.
TANK-SUPPORTED INFANTRYMEN OF THE 34TH REGIMENT
attack a hill near Pawing.
As the 2d Squad of the 1st Platoon reached the crest and
as the 1st Squad had nearly done so, an estimated 200 Japanese from the
33d Infantry Regiment opened fire upon the troops with rifles
and two machine guns that were emplaced upon a knoll overlooking the
trail. Enemy riflemen also rolled grenades down upon the 1st Squad.
These actions pinned down both of the squads.
Protected by the machine gun fire, other enemy riflemen
worked north along the reverse slope of the ridge and began to throw
grenades down upon the 2d Platoon. The Japanese possessed a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of grenades, which they rolled down upon the
Americans with telling effect. Company F was unable to advance. By 1500
the 1st and 2d Squads of the 1st Platoon were forced off the forward
slope. The 2d Platoon also had been unable to go ahead, and the company
had suffered fourteen casualties. Captain Austin ordered his company to
disengage for reorganization. Since the American mortars could not fire
directly upon the Japanese for fear of hitting friendly troops, they
were forced to fire over the enemy and gradually shorten the range as
the American troops disengaged. Consequently the fire at first was not
too effective. By 1600 [161]the reorganization was complete,
but Colonel Pearsall decided to delay the attack until artillery
support could be obtained. Company F formed its night perimeter 500
yards from Pawing.
The following morning arrangements were made for an air
strike by Navy flyers on the positions of the 33d Infantry
Regiment on the hill. It was not until afternoon, however, that the
strike could be effected. At 1345 the 63d Field Artillery Battalion
marked with smoke the right and left limits for the air
strike.41 At 1410 naval dive bombers bombed and strafed the
hill for ten minutes with very good results, and the Japanese power to
resist was broken.42 Captain Austin’s Company
F, accompanied by Colonel Newman, the regimental commander, then moved
out. Supported by artillery fire, Company F captured the entire ridge
by 1515 without a single casualty. The Pawing area was now securely in
American hands. Farther south the 19th Infantry was engaged in
fulfilling its mission of capturing the town of Palo.
Capture of Palo
At the end of the first day’s fighting, C
Company of the 19th Infantry had just secured the top of Hill 522 and
Company B at dusk had been pinned down at the southern crest. The
following morning artillery fire effectively knocked out some enemy
pillboxes on the north crest. Both companies then simultaneously
launched an attack down the far slope of the hill. In the sharp fight
that followed fifty Japanese from the 33d Infantry Regiment were
killed and the hill was secured.43 It was not until late in
the day, however, that supplies could be brought to the troops and the
wounded be evacuated. The 1st Battalion spent the next few days mopping
up the area and sealing off the tunnels with grenades.
On the beach the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on the
morning of 21 October waited for naval gunfire to knock out positions
that blocked the beach road to Palo. These defenses consisted of
mutually supporting well-constructed pillboxes reinforced with logs and
earth, with intercommunicating trenches and foxholes. They were
designed to be used in resisting attacks from the beach and from the
north. After an all-night mortar concentration, naval gunfire was
directed against the positions, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion attacked.
When within 200 yards of a road bend, Company I and elements of the
Antitank Company, leading the main assault, met strong resistance,
which forced the company to dig in. The other companies occupied the
same positions they had held the previous day.44 During the
night Company C of the 85th Chemical Battalion, expending 500 rounds of
ammunition, laid intermittent fire from the 4.2-inch mortars on the
Japanese positions.45
At 0900 on 22 October the 3d Battalion, with Company I
in the lead, attacked with the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had
been released from division reserve, on its left flank. This
co-ordinated advance pushed past the defensive positions of the 33d
Infantry Regiment, many of which had been abandoned. The positions
of the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, were taken over by the 1st
Battalion, 34th Infantry. The latter battalion patrolled the road and
eliminated [163]scattered Japanese pockets of resistance south
to the Palo River.
PALO, with the Palo River and the slopes of
Hill 522 in the background (above), and the junction of Highways 1 and
2 (below).
The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to secure Palo,
which is situated about one mile inland on the south side of the Palo
River. The town is an important road junction, the meeting point of the
Leyte Valley and east coast road systems. The coastal road, Highway 1,
which goes through Palo, crosses a steel bridge over the Palo River on
the edge of the town. Highway 2, a one-lane all-weather road for most
of its length, extends west to Barugo and Carigara.46 Just
outside Palo are two hills, one on each side of the highway, which
guard the entrance into the interior. The Americans termed them Hills B
and C. Elements of the 33d Infantry Regiment were guarding
Palo.47
Early in the morning of 21 October, the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, moved west through enemy machine gun and rifle fire and
bypassed the enemy defensive position that had held it up the previous
day. At 1155 the battalion reached the junction of the beach road and
Highway 1. During the movement two men were killed and two wounded. At
the road junction, the battalion dispersed with machine gun fire a
column of about thirty-five Japanese moving south on Highway 1.
Artillery fire was then laid on a grove of trees, west of the road, to
which the enemy had fled. As the battalion proceeded south along the
highway between the road junction and the bridge, it came under
artillery fire from an undetermined source. The tempo of the march into
Palo was accelerated—“the troops wanted to move as rapidly
as possible from that vicinity. They double timed across the
bridge.”48 At 1500 they entered Palo without further
opposition.49
The residents of the town were crowded into the church.
As the Americans entered, the church bell rang and the Filipinos came
out and greeted the troops. After the first exuberant welcome had
subsided, the soldiers ordered the civilians back into the church until
they could secure the town. In the house-to-house search, the troops
found some booby traps made from coconuts50 and
encountered Japanese entrenched under and between houses in the western
sector of the town. Although the battalion had expected to outpost the
entire town, the menace of the Japanese appeared so threatening that a
night perimeter was established around the town square.
Defense of Palo
During the early part of the night there was
continuous rifle fire from individual Japanese. The 13th Field
Artillery Battalion had arrived and began to fire on the roads leading
into the town, expending some 300 rounds of ammunition. At midnight
some Japanese ammunition stored in a house exploded, and the ensuing
fire lasted for three hours. At 0400 on 22 October elements of the
33d Infantry Regiment counterattacked along Highway 251 but were repulsed by fire from the outposts. The
enemy then struck at the juncture of the left flank of Company F and
the right flank of Company G. The 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Battalion
fired on this point, expending all their ammunition. In the meantime
Battery B of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion [164]and
elements of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion moved up to within a
hundred yards of the front outposts and fired. The enemy stubbornly
continued to fight, throwing “everything he had into the
attack.”52 At the same time nearly a platoon of the
enemy came out at the curve of the beach road and started toward the
bridge on Highway 1 at Palo, but these troops were dispersed by light
machine gun fire. Artillery fire forced the Japanese to withdraw, and
they were thrown back on all fronts.53 Though the
battalion had lost 16 men killed and 44 wounded, it had killed 91
Japanese. After the engagement, the battalion requested additional
ammunition, supplies, and equipment, and transportation for the
wounded.54 The requests were complied with, though not
without danger since the Japanese had mined the road.
At 1330 the regimental headquarters of the 19th Infantry
moved into Palo. The regiment’s 3d Battalion relieved the 2d
Battalion at the same time, thus enabling the latter to attack Hill B
at 1425.55 The 3d Battalion spent the rest of the day and
the following day mopping up in Palo and sending probing patrols
southward in order to make contact with the XXIV Corps.56 A patrol in Palo killed seven Japanese dressed in
civilian clothing, one of whom, a lieutenant, had his insignia pinned
inside his clothes.57
On the night of 23 October Col. Tatsunosuke Suzuki, the
commanding officer of the 33d Infantry Regiment, led a raiding
detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo
from the southwest.58 Using Filipino civilians in
front of them, the men of the detachment tricked the guards at the
outpost into believing that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were
thus able to capture two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated
to the town square and charged, throwing explosives into houses,
trucks, and a tank, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they
killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the
captured machine guns on it,59 firing until their ammunition
was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the
other side of the bridge, however, were able to fire upon the bridge
and its approaches so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese,
according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely
broken up, and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed.
The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty wounded.
The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had sent Company K to
reconnoiter to the south and if possible make contact with the XXIV
Corps. On the morning of the 24th the company entered San Joaquin to
the south of Palo. By 1600 the town had been secured and the company
was prepared to defend it. Engineers began to repair the damaged bridge
so that armored units could proceed southward along Highway 1. On the
morning of 25 October Company K advanced south from San Joaquin and by
1200 had secured positions on the north bank of the Binahaan River,
from which patrols were sent into Tanauan. At 1430 the patrols met a
motorized unit of the 96th Division, establishing contact for the first
time between the X and XXIV Corps. The rest of the [165]battalion moved out of Palo the same morning and
was able to advance rapidly with little opposition and set up a
perimeter at Castilla, 8,000 yards southwest of Palo.
Thus the northern and southern approaches to Palo and
the beachhead area east of the town had now been secured. But on the
western edge of Palo were the two hills athwart Highway 2 and blocking
passage into Leyte Valley. Hill B on the southern side of the highway
and Hill C on the northern side would have to be secured before the
Americans could advance. Preliminary reconnaissance had revealed that
these hills were strongly held, and since the 24th Division, contrary
to expectations, had encountered considerably stronger opposition than
the 1st Cavalry Division, General Sibert decided to detach the 1st
Brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division and place it under X Corps
control. The 2d Squadron of the 5th Cavalry remained in position on the
high ground west of Tacloban, while the regiment’s 1st Squadron
moved into position in Pawing, to relieve the 2d Battalion, 34th
Infantry. The 12th Cavalry assembled in the vicinity of Marasbaras in X
Corps reserve.60
Capture of Hill C
At 0800 on 23 October the 1st Battalion, 34th
Infantry, commanded by Maj. Edwin N. Edris, and the 1st Platoon, 603d
Tank Company, assembled 500 yards north of Hill 522 preparatory to
launching an attack on Hill C.61 It was reported that 300
Japanese were in a strong defensive position between Hills C and 331,
the latter located west of Pawing. Consequently, an air strike was
called for and delivered on the area, after which the battalion started
for Hill C. The first obstacle encountered was a small ridge known as
Hill Nan, and just beyond this ridge was another hill mass known as
Hill Mike. Company B advanced up Hill Nan in a skirmish line. When the
company neared the crest of the ridge, a machine gun 200 yards to its
front opened up, and at the same time the Japanese from dug-in
positions on the reverse slope began to throw grenades over the crest.
The company was halted. Three times during the afternoon it reached the
crest, only to be driven back by enemy fire. Several counterattacks
were repulsed, but the machine gun was not silenced.
At 1800 the company received orders to disengage so that
artillery fire might be laid upon the enemy positions. The Japanese
immediately counterattacked. An American lieutenant and a sergeant of
the company rushed to the crest with grenades which they threw upon the
advancing Japanese. This action enabled the company to disengage and
return to the assembly area with only a few casualties.
During the night artillery and 4.2-inch mortar fires
were placed on the ridge. As a result, on the following day, 24
October, the 1st Battalion secured it without meeting any resistance.
With this ridge in American hands, the 3d Battalion was able to pass
through the 1st Battalion and secure without opposition Hill Mike, the
last remaining obstacle before Hill C. During the night artillery
pounded Hill C.
On the morning of 25 October the 3d Battalion, 34th
Infantry, moved out to attack Hill C, with Companies I and K
abreast.62 Although the troops found the hill difficult to
climb, elements of Company [166]K reached its crest without
opposition. The enemy started his usual tactics of throwing grenades
over the crest of the hill at Company I as it neared the top. Since the
company had suffered many casualties, a platoon from Company K was sent
to reinforce Company I. Finally, at 1700, the company took the crest of
the hill and dug in for the night.
The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been relieved
by the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, moved out of Pawing at 0700 on 24
October. At 1030 it received orders to seize a small hill southeast of
Hill C. With Company E in the lead, the battalion proceeded in single
file up the hill, which was covered with cogon grass. As it had
hitherto been the practice of the Japanese to withhold their main fire
until the Americans neared the top of a hill, the troops expected
little opposition before reaching the crest. But while the company was
still a considerable distance from the top, elements of the 33d
Infantry Regiment opened up with rifles, machine guns, and
grenades. This fire pinned the company down, and the men immediately
sought concealment in the cogon grass. Light machine guns were brought
up, but, because of the steepness of the slope, they were ineffective.
Artillery and mortars fired for two hours against the entrenched
Japanese positions. At 1610 Company E renewed the attack and this time
secured the hill with little opposition. The 34th Infantry now occupied
the hills on the north side of Highway 2.
Seizure of Hill B
On 22 October the 3d Battalion of the 19th
Infantry had relieved the 2d Battalion of the regiment at Palo, and the
regimental commander ordered the 2d Battalion to proceed against Hill
B.63 Earlier, the 2d Battalion had sent patrols out
preparatory to attacking the hill. The 13th Field Artillery Battalion
laid maximum supporting fires on Hill B as naval bombers strafed
it.64 The 2d Battalion moved out to the attack at 1425,
and the concentrated artillery fire enabled it to secure without
resistance a ridge east of Hill B and then push on down the road toward
the hill. But as Company E, the lead company, reached the foot of Hill
B, it was met by a large group from the 33d Infantry Regiment
coming east down the road and around the hill. The Japanese had left
riflemen dug in on the steep banks of the road and had posted others in
the trees along the road. Some of these riflemen allowed part of the
American troops to pass and then opened fire. A sharp fire fight broke
out in which Company E killed an estimated hundred of the enemy before
being forced to withdraw to the ridge, where the 2d Battalion dug in
for the night. During the night the 13th Field Artillery fired on Hill
B. At 0730 the following day the 2d Battalion sent out two patrols to
scout the enemy positions. The patrol on the right flank was stopped by
machine gun fire at a point 200 yards west of the ridge and was forced
to return. Mortar fire was placed on the enemy machine guns, after
which the 2d Battalion advanced, reaching what was believed to be the
crest of Hill B at 1530.65
As the forward progress was more difficult than had been
expected, the 2d Squadron of the 12th Cavalry was sent to relieve the
1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, which had been engaged in mopping up Hill
522.66 This [167]relieved battalion was given the
mission of attacking Hill 85, to the south of Palo, where the 24th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop had located a strong enemy position.
During the night the artillery placed concentrated fire upon Hill
85.
At 0800 on 24 October the men of the 2d Battalion moved
out, attempting to complete the capture of Hill B.67 They
were held up by well-emplaced pillboxes and foxholes on the highest
crest of the ridge, having discovered that the crest they had first
occupied was not the true crest. Since the 33d Infantry Regiment
seemed to be well emplaced on the hill, Lt. Col. Robert B. Spragins had
his battalion move to the right. It took up a position overlooking a
narrow asphalt road that ran from Highway 2 to a Japanese supply dump
to the south. Colonel Spragins decided to attack Hill B from this
position on the following morning.
The 13th Field Artillery Battalion again pounded the
enemy positions on the hill during the night. On the morning of 25
October the 2d Battalion attacked with Companies G and E abreast. The
troops moved down the slope, across the road, and up the hill, with no
opposition. On reaching the crest, they were met by heavy fire that
came from well-constructed emplacements. Some of these positions were
six feet deep and five feet wide. Very heavy fighting broke out in
which the companies were barely able to hold their positions. The 11th
and 52d Field Artillery Battalions fired in front of Hill B,68 and the enemy fire was silenced. Company E was
forced back, but Company G held on.
Although the hill was in American hands, the hold was
very precarious. Colonel Spragins therefore moved the rest of the
battalion up to Company G and ordered the latter to move out to a far
ridge in order to secure the hill firmly. This move was accomplished at
twilight. The rest of the battalion moved out to join Company G.
Starting in the dark, the battalion lost its way. At
midnight the troops came to the true crest of the ridge where the enemy
had an observation post surrounded by prepared positions. All were
empty. The Japanese had formed the habit of going to the villages for
the night and returning in the morning to man their posts. The night
movement of the battalion “literally caught them napping away
from their defenses.”69 The battalion had not reached
Company G, but it set up a defensive perimeter for the night. The hills
guarding Leyte Valley were now in American hands.
During the day the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, secured
complete control of Hill 85 without opposition. The battalion found an
abandoned position, mortar ammunition, and six dead Japanese.
By the end of 25 October the X Corps had made
substantial progress toward securing northern Leyte Valley. After
capturing Tacloban, the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed north and
secured control over San Juanico Strait. The 24th Division had secured
Palo and the hill fortresses that blocked the entrance into northern
Leyte Valley. The corps was now in a position to launch a drive into
the interior of the valley. [168]
1 7th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, Part II, Annex 2, Terrain Study of Operational Areas,
pp. 1–3. ↑
2 1st Cav
Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
4 1st Cav
Div Msgs to X Corps, 21 Oct 44. ↑
5 1st Cav
Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44. ↑
6 7th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
8 1st Cav
Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
9 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 19–20. ↑
10 7th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
11 He was
awarded the Silver Star. ↑
12 X Corps
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. ↑
13 2d Cav
Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3–4. ↑
14 8th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6–7. ↑
15 At 0500
on 21 October Colonel Drake, the commanding officer of the 5th Cavalry,
was killed while inspecting the regimental perimeter defenses in the
vicinity of Caibaan. 5th Cavalry Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
16 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44. ↑
17 5th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2–3. ↑
18 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 4, 25 Oct 44. ↑
19 5th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
20 Rpt,
Capt Ray Tarbuck, USN, Observers Rpt of King II Opn, 3 Nov 44, GHQ G-3
Jnl, 30 Oct 44. ↑
22 As
already indicated the maps of the Leyte area are often inaccurate. Map
2 is no exception. ↑
23 2d Cav
Brig FO, 22 Oct 44. ↑
24 8th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
25 2d Cav
Brig FO 3, 23 Oct 44. ↑
26 7th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6–7. ↑
27 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 24–25. ↑
28 Rad, CG
Sixth Army to G-2 Sixth Army, Sixth Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct
44. ↑
29 8th Cav
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7–9. ↑
31 1st Cav
Div G-1 Daily Strength Rpts, 20–27 Oct 44; 8th Army Opns Rpt, p.
14. ↑
32 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 8, 27 Oct 44. ↑
33 Unless
otherwise stated the subsection is based upon the 24th Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, pp. 1–39. ↑
34 34th
Inf Unit Rpt 1, 21 Oct 44, 34th Inf Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
35 34th
Inf Unit Rpt 2, 34th Inf Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
37 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 12. Private Moon was posthumously awarded the
Medal of Honor. ↑
38 63d FA
Bn Unit Rpt 1, 21 Oct 44, 63d FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte. ↑
39 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. This casualty figure from the 24th Division
Operations Report seems excessive. ↑
40 34th
Inf FO 4, 21 Oct 44, 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
41 63d FA
Bn Unit Rpt 2, 22 Oct 44. ↑
42 24th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. ↑
43 19th
Inf Unit Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44. ↑
45 85th
Chemical Mortar Bn Hist 1943–44, p. 28. ↑
46 Allied
Geographical Sec, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug
44. ↑
48 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 16. ↑
49
Ibid.; 19th Inf Unit Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44. ↑
50 24th
Div G-2 Jnl, 21 Oct 44. ↑
51 24th
Div G-2 Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
52 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. ↑
53 19th
Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
57 19th
Inf Unit Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. ↑
59 GHQ
Observer to G-2 Sixth Army, Sixth Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct
44. ↑
60 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 24 Oct 44. ↑
61 34th
Inf FO 5, 22 Oct 44, 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 23 Oct 44. ↑
62
Fragmentary FO, 34th Inf Jnl, 25 Oct 44. ↑
63 19th
Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44. ↑
65 19th
Inf Unit Rpt 4, 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 23 Oct 44. ↑
66 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 24 Oct 44. ↑
67 19th
Inf Unit Jnl, 24 Oct 44. ↑
CHAPTER X
Northern Leyte Valley: Part Two
General Krueger had expected stronger Japanese
resistance in the zone of action of the 1st Cavalry Division than in
that of the 24th Division. He had therefore thought it safe to release
the 21st Infantry for the landings at Panaon Strait. When events proved
otherwise, a portion of the strength of the 1st Cavalry Division was
shifted into the zone of the 24th Division to enable the latter to free
itself of responsibility for rear areas and direct its effort to the
advance into Leyte Valley.1 (Map
11)
Drive up Leyte Valley
The Japanese planned to fall back into the
mountains if the Americans were successful in seizing the Tacloban
airfield. They expected to take with them “munition sufficient
for one and one-half units of fire for one division … and food for
20,000 men for six month[s].”2 The rapid advance of the
Americans, however, prevented the execution of this plan. After 25
October the remaining elements of the 33d Infantry Regiment
withdrew to a position about three and three-fourths miles northeast of
Jaro.3 When the American forces had taken the hills
dominating the entrance into Leyte Valley and overlooking Highway 2,
Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander of the 35th Army,
concentrated his forces around Jaro on the southern edge of Leyte
Valley. The 41st Regiment of the 30th Division and the
169th Independent Battalion of the 102d Division, both of
which had but recently arrived on Leyte as reinforcements to the
16th Division, on 26 October were ordered to proceed from
Carigara to Jaro. On the same day the 17th Independent Battalion,
102d Division, moved toward Jaro.4
The 34th Infantry Advances Into the Valley
After the successful capture of Hills B and C, the
24th Division resumed its attack west. With the 1st Cavalry Division
protecting the 24th Division’s northern flank, the 34th Infantry
was to proceed westward into the interior along Highway 2. The 19th
Infantry, as the 24th Division’s southern prong, was to follow an
almost parallel route to Pastrana.5 The 1st Cavalry Brigade was
to relieve the combat troops of the 24th Division in the rear areas in
order to enable the division to continue its advance into the
interior.
Highway 2 was a one-lane all-weather road, twelve feet
wide with four-foot shoulders. It had a crushed rock and gravel
[169]surface. In general it ran through level ground,
with occasional groves of light timber, bamboo, and abaca. Much of the
area was under cultivation. At Santa Fe a one-lane all-weather branch
road ran four miles south to Pastrana, at which point a seasonal
one-lane road ran southward for about five miles to Dagami and another
northwest for about eight and a half miles to Jaro.
Damon
DRIVE TO JARO
26–29 October 1944
At 1000 on 26 October the 2d Battalion of the 34th
Infantry, commanded by Colonel Pearsall, moved out of its assembly area
at Malirong in a column of companies and pushed westward on Highway 2.
The battalion met slight resistance at the Malirong River bridge, but
mortar fire knocked out the enemy opposition, and the advance
continued. Since the battalion encountered few Japanese, the flank
protection, which had to traverse difficult terrain, was called in, and
the advance then proceeded at a much more rapid pace. The 2d Battalion
met, and killed or routed, small groups of the enemy. It crossed
streams where the bridges had been destroyed. The 3d Engineer Battalion
put temporary structures in for two of these bridges in order that the
first elements might proceed, and it placed a Bailey bridge over a
third stream. The 1st Battalion, which followed the 2d, used Japanese
handcarts to transport supplies between the destroyed bridges and the
forward troops.6 By 1730 Colonel Pearsall had all of his
battalion in Sante Fe. The following day, Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford,
Jr., who had become [170]the commanding officer of the 1st
Battalion, pushed his unit through the 2d Battalion and advanced 7,000
yards without opposition to the Mudburon River, where the troops
established their night perimeter at 1545.7
Mainit River Bridge
On the morning of 28 October Colonel Clifford
ordered the 1st Battalion to move out in a column of companies along
Highway 2 toward the town of Alangalang about a mile and a quarter
northwest. At 0900 the battalion moved out. Company A, the lead
company, entered Alangalang without incident, set up local security,
and then fell to the rear of the battalion, which passed through
Alangalang8 without pausing and moved toward the Mainit River
about one and a half miles farther on.
As Company C reached the Mainit River it made contact
with the enemy, who had dug in on both steeply sloping banks of the
river at the steel bridge crossing. The company suffered five
casualties. It was opposed by the remaining elements of the 33d
Infantry, which had been considerably mauled by the
Americans.9 Company C withdrew 300 yards as Companies B and A
pressed forward on the left side of the road under continuous rifle
fire. Colonel Pearsall’s 2d Battalion had followed the 1st
Battalion, and both units were to make an assault against the 41st
Infantry Regiment, which had arrived in the area. Three batteries
of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion shelled the enemy positions for a
depth of 300 yards on the eastern side of the river and 100 yards on
the western side.
After the artillery concentration was over, the two
battalions were to move out to the attack—the 1st on the left and
the 2d on the right. The regimental commander ordered the 1st Battalion
to attack, destroy the enemy resistance, and secure the eastern bank of
the river. Five tanks were to follow in the rear of the assault
companies and fire at targets of opportunity. Five hundred yards away,
to the right of the 1st Battalion, Companies E and F of
Pearsall’s battalion were to cross the river, destroy enemy
resistance on the western side, and then go south on Highway 2 to
contact the enemy at the bridge.10
The 1st Battalion moved to the water’s edge, where
it was pinned down by enemy fire. Companies E and F of the 2d
Battalion, however, were able to push north 500 yards through the heavy
brush, and amid a driving rain they managed to ford the river
unobserved. Once on the other side they charged the entrenchments of
the 41st Infantry Regiment on the river, with Company F in the
lead. As Company F neared the bridge it overran three mortar positions
without stopping but was finally halted by heavy machine gun fire.
After the company’s 60-mm. mortar had knocked out the machine
gun, the unit continued to advance and passed the bridgehead before it
ran out of ammunition. Company E then relieved Company F, while the
latter set up heavy machine guns to silence enemy machine guns in the
woods to the west. By 1500 the bridge was in American hands. The
Japanese had placed a demolition [171]charge on the bridge, but the
American advance had been so swift that the enemy never had an
opportunity to set off the charge.
The 3d Battalion had meanwhile moved up to the rear of
the other two battalions and established contact south of Santa Fe with
the 19th Infantry, which was protecting the southern flank of the
division.
Seizure of Pastrana
On 25 October the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
advancing toward Pastrana, had pushed against slight opposition into
Castilla and established a perimeter there.11 On the
morning of the same day, Maj. Elmer C. Howard, the battalion commander,
told Lt. Col. George H. Chapman, Jr., of the 19th Infantry that he had
learned from the Filipinos that there was no organized resistance along
the three miles from Castilla to Pastrana. He therefore asked
permission to go to Pastrana and establish a roadblock. Colonel Chapman
told Major Howard to stay out of Pastrana but to send patrols to locate
defenses around the town.12 Colonel Chapman later rescinded
this order, and at 1300 on 26 October Major Howard moved his battalion
out from Castilla to attack Pastrana, which was 5,000 yards southwest
of Santa Fe. Company I, the lead company, proceeded over a trail that
was too narrow to accommodate vehicles. At 1600 the point of Company I
reached the outskirts of Pastrana but came under heavy enemy fire. The
battalion pulled back and then attacked with Companies I and K abreast.
The companies were stopped by fire that came from an unusual
fortification—a star-shaped fort, with a tin roof, which looked
like three or four native shacks in a cluster. The sides were banked
with earth, over which grass had been allowed to grow—a feature
so exceptional that it aroused suspicion and gave away the nature of
the installation. Pillboxes flanked the fortification, which was backed
by a system of trenches. Colonel Chapman ordered another attack at
1630, but casualties were so heavy that the troops dug in after getting
within 100 yards of the fortress.
At 1750 Battery C, 11th Field Artillery Battalion,
placed fire on the fortification, but after forty-two rounds of
ammunition had been expended, the battery reported that the muddy
ground “caused [the] guns to go out of action.”13 From 1850 to 1905, Battery A of the 14th Field
Artillery delivered harassing fire on Pastrana,14 and from
2200 to 2400 the 13th Field Artillery Battalion took over the task of
placing fire on the sector around the town.15 With the
coming of daylight, the 4.2-inch and 81-mm. mortars took up the
shelling. The night-long pounding of the Japanese positions around
Pastrana was so effective that on the morning of 27 October Company K
of the 3d Battalion was able to move around the town and establish a
roadblock at a demolished bridge a few hundred yards southwest. The
rest of the day the 3d Battalion, assisted by Colonel Zierath’s
1st Battalion, which had followed the 3d Battalion, mopped up in the
town and sent out patrols to investigate the terrain and enemy
dispositions west and south of the town.
The 19th Infantry was to continue to protect the
southern flank of the 24th Division, [172]which was driving
toward Carigara, by moving toward Jaro—the proposed assembly
point of the 35th Army. On the morning of 28 October, Colonel
Zierath had the 1st Battalion establish a roadblock north of the
Binahaan River in the vicinity of Macalpe. The 2d Battalion pushed
forward to Tingib and established a perimeter there. For the next two
days the 19th Infantry sent out patrols in all directions; they met
only scattered resistance from the Japanese. On 29 October Company K
left Pastrana and established a roadblock at Ypad. On the following day
it moved south from Ypad to Lapdok, where it established contact with
elements of the XXIV Corps. On the 30th two platoons from Company C
encountered about 100 Japanese at Rizal. The enemy fought aggressively,
but resistance ceased after artillery fire had been placed on the town.
It was estimated that the majority of the enemy force was killed. As a
result of the skirmishes and patrols, General Makino was unable to
establish contact between elements of the 16th Division at
Dagami and those at Jaro.16
PASTRANA was left a mass of smoldering ruins
after the shelling of 26–27 October.
Fall of Jaro
At the crossing of the Mainit River, a one-lane
all-weather branch road runs southwest for about three and a half miles
to Jaro, and then northwest along the western edge of Leyte Valley for
about ten and a half miles to Carigara on the north coast. At Jaro many
dirt roads and trails branch out in all directions.
The drive of the 24th Division toward Carigara was
continued as the 34th Infantry, [173]protected by the 19th
Infantry on its flank, moved toward Jaro. After the seizure of the
Mainit River bridge, two tanks of the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company,
attached to the 34th Infantry, scouted north and made contact with
forward elements of the 2d Squadron of the 8th Cavalry, which had
arrived in the San Miguel area.
On the evening of 28 October Colonel Newman issued
orders to the 34th Infantry for the following day. The 3d Battalion,
under Lt. Col. Edward M. Postlethwait, was to pass through Colonel
Clifford’s 1st Battalion and Colonel Pearsall’s 2d
Battalion and resume the offensive with Company L in the lead. From
Cavite the battalion would move southwest along the road to capture
Jaro. Company L would be sufficiently in advance to make reconnaissance
of the route before the rest of the battalion arrived.17
At 0900 on 29 October, Company L moved out from Cavite,
meeting no resistance until an hour later when it ran into some of the
enemy at a point about 100 yards from Galotan.18 The leading
scout spied a man, whom he thought to be a Filipino, dashing into a
shack. When he shouted for the man to come out, the scout was shot in
the head. The company came on and killed the man. It then came under
machine gun fire. Platoons attacked from both flanks against Galotan.
Since the enemy troops had dug in under the shacks, it was slow, bloody
work digging them out with rifles and grenades. The 3d Platoon, which
had been in reserve, closed in when the center of the town was reached
and helped finish the job. In the meantime another unit of the company,
which had been sent to the right on a wide enveloping movement, came
under fire from a wooded knoll. Artillery and mortar fire soon drove
the Japanese off. Unable to retreat westward, the enemy moved northward
down a stream bed and set up a defensive position 500 yards west of the
road and opposite the center of the advancing column of the 3d
Battalion. Fortunately, since the Antitank Platoon had displaced
forward by sections, one section was in position at this point and was
able to quickly eliminate the enemy threat. The 3d Battalion resumed
its march and secured Jaro at 1700 without further difficulty.
By this time the 19th Infantry had gained control of the
area south and east of Jaro. Junction between the 34th Infantry and
19th Infantry was accomplished on 31 October when the 1st Battalion,
19th Infantry, moved into Jaro. Other elements of the 19th Infantry
were engaged in mopping up in the Pastrana sector. The 19th and 34th
Infantry Regiments had been able to advance rapidly in their drives
through Leyte Valley, had maintained contact with the 1st Cavalry
Division, and had arrived within ten miles of Carigara Bay.
By 28 October the XXIV Corps had nearly secured the
southern portion of Leyte Valley. General Sibert was anxious to have
the X Corps advance rapidly to the shore of Carigara Bay and thus bring
all of the valley under control of the Sixth Army. The 24th Division
was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division of responsibility for
protecting the rear areas from Santa Fe to Cavite. The 24th Division,
thus freed, was to continue pressing the attack to its front with the
utmost vigor.19
The American advance had been so rapid that General
Suzuki did not have sufficient time to put into effect his plan
[174]for making Jaro the assembly ground for the
35th Army. He was forced to use the Carigara area as the new
point of rendezvous for his troops. On the evening of 28 October
Colonel Newman planned his attack for the remaining distance to
Carigara. He hoped that the troops would make a swift passage, but
later events proved that the Japanese intended to contest the advance
bitterly.
U.S. ANTITANK PLATOON under enemy fire at
Jaro. Soldier in foreground is taking cover behind a 37-mm. antitank
gun M3.
Drive From the North
At the close of 27 October the 7th Cavalry, less
the 1st Squadron, was in reserve, while the 1st Squadron was at
Babatngon sending patrols along the north coast of Leyte and the
southwest coast of Samar. The 1st Squadron of the 8th Cavalry was
patrolling Samar in the La Paz area and the 2d Squadron of the regiment
was patrolling from its bivouac area in the upper reaches of the Diit
River. In order to protect the rear of the 24th Division in its forward
advance, the 1st Squadron of the 12th Cavalry, which had been in
reserve, was ordered to Castilla. The squadron closed on Castilla at
1200 on 28 October.20
In accordance with orders from General Sibert, General
Mudge reassigned the various elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. On
28 October General Hoffman issued orders for his 2d Cavalry Brigade to
move toward Carigara. The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, was to establish a
base at San Miguel, secure Cavite with one troop, patrol and mop up the
north and northwest [175]area up to and including the Barugo road,
and maintain contact with patrols of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry,
that would be operating southeast from Barugo. The 1st Squadron, 7th
Cavalry, while maintaining a platoon at Santa Cruz and a troop at
Babatngon, was to move to the Barugo-Carigara area and mop up and
patrol the area to the south and southeast.21
In accordance with this plan. Troop C of the 7th Cavalry
was to proceed by water from Babatngon to Barugo and then overland to
feel out the enemy position in Carigara. Troop C, under 1st Lt. Tower
W. Greenbowe, on 28 October made the overwater and overland movements
without incident. The troop entered the eastern end of Carigara without
opposition, but as it neared the main intersection it received fire
from several buildings. In anticipation of this contingency, the men of
Troop C had been well deployed when they entered the town, and were
able to return the fire immediately. As the fight progressed, the
Japanese transported their dead and wounded to five trucks near the
beach road. The fire fight continued until late in the afternoon when
Lieutenant Greenbowe withdrew his force to Barugo, and evacuated his
dead and wounded with him. The enemy had suffered an estimated 75
casualties; Greenbowe’s force had 3 men killed, 9 wounded, and 1
missing. The mutilated body of the missing man was found
later.22
Since intelligence reports stated that as many as 5,000
Japanese were in Carigara, General Sibert decided that the attack on
the town should be a two-division operation. While the 24th Division
was fighting its way up the road from Jaro to Carigara, additional 2d
Cavalry Brigade units assembled in the Barugo area. The 1st Squadron of
the 7th Cavalry joined its C Troop at Barugo on 29 October; the 2d
Squadron, 8th Cavalry, moved from San Miguel to Barugo on 31 October;
and the advance headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the 2d
Cavalry Brigade arrived at Barugo on 31 October and 1 November,
respectively. Attached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment was the 2d Squadron,
5th Cavalry, which closed into the Barugo area on 1 November via Cavite
and San Miguel.23
Drive to Tunga
On 29 October the Japanese had prepared new plans
for the defense of Leyte. (See Map 2) In order to simplify
planning, the 35th Army headquarters was relieved of command
responsibility for Samar by the 14th Area Army. Almost
simultaneously, the 35th Army received the erroneous report that
the Japanese naval forces had destroyed a large part of the U. S. Navy
on 24 and 25 October in engagements off Leyte and that the losses would
prevent the Americans from continuing the operation. On the contrary,
the American naval forces had secured a decisive victory. The Japanese
reverse seriously affected General Suzuki’s attempt to put his
new plans for the 35th Army into effect.
The plans provided for the calling up of the 102d
Division from Panay and the 1st and 26th Divisions
from Luzon. These divisions were to land at Ormoc and then proceed
[176]in three columns northward along Highway 2
through Ormoc Valley to the shores of Carigara Bay. They were then to
advance eastward and destroy the American forces in the area between
Tacloban and Tanauan. Since it was assumed that Carigara would remain
in Japanese hands, the 68th Brigade, serving as 35th Army
reserve, was expected to land in the north in the vicinity of Carigara.
At the same time the 30th Division was to land at Albuera on the
west coast and drive overland to Burauen, in order to support the
operations of the main body of the 35th Army.24
Although the American naval victory and rapid advance of
land forces prevented the Japanese from bringing this plan to full
fruition, sizable enemy forces opposed the drive of U.S. troops toward
Carigara. About 28 October the 41st Infantry Regiment moved from
Carigara to the southeast section of Jaro. The 169th Independent
Infantry Battalion of the 102d Division, together with a
battalion (Tempei Battalion) of the 57th Independent Mixed
Brigade, was in the Carigara area. The advance elements first
engaged the Americans about 30 October.25 These
units, however, continued out past Jaro and took up positions in the
mountains.
On the night of 29 October the 34th Infantry had
captured Jaro and was about ten miles from Carigara along the
Jaro-Carigara highway. (Map 12) At 0800 on 30
October Colonel Newman ordered the 3d Battalion of the 34th Infantry to
start for Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the
outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from
Japanese who were dug in under shacks along the road. Upon a call from
the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks came up in a column,
fired under the shacks, and then retired. The leading platoon was drawn
back so that artillery fire might be placed on the Japanese, but the
enemy could not be located precisely enough to use the artillery.
Colonel Newman then ordered a cautious movement forward without
artillery support, a squad placed on each side of the road and two
tanks in the center. The squads had advanced only fifty yards when
Japanese fire again pinned them down.
When Colonel Newman came forward and discovered why the
advance was held up he declared, “I’ll get the men going
okay.”26 Upon hearing that the regimental commander
was to lead them, the men started to move forward. The Japanese at once
opened fire with artillery and mortars, and Colonel Newman was hit in
the stomach. Although badly wounded he tried to devise some means of
clearing the situation. After sending a runner back with orders to have
Colonel Postlethwait fire on the Japanese position, he said,
“Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy
position.”27 As soon as possible Colonel Newman was put
on a poncho and dragged back to safety.28
Meanwhile the troops, unable to move forward, broke
contact with the Japanese in an orderly fashion. Lt. Col. Chester A.
Dahlen, the regimental executive officer, assumed command and at 1209
ordered that the attack be resumed.29 The 3d Battalion was to
move northwest along the road to Carigara for 3,000 yards and then set
up a night perimeter. The 2d Battalion, in support [177]astride the highway, was to secure the high
ground 500 yards northwest of Jaro, while the 1st Battalion was to move
to the town of Jaro from its position at the Mainit River bridge.
Damon
ADVANCE TO CARIGARA
30 October–2 November 1944
The artillery concentrated its fire on the area to the
front, and at 1230 the 3d Battalion renewed the attack with Company K
on the left of the road and Company I on the right. After the troops
had proceeded about 200 yards, heavy artillery, machine gun, mortar,
and rifle fire pinned them down. Company L in the rear thereupon
attempted a flanking movement to the left across an open field but came
under heavy fire from a ridge that commanded the road. All the
companies were forced to pull back. At the end of the day’s
action, the forward elements were still on the outskirts of Jaro.
During the night, the 11th, 52d, and 63d Field Artillery
Battalions fired continuously in support of the 34th Infantry. The
corps artillery placed harassing and interdiction fire along the
Jaro-Carigara road.30
On the morning of 31 October Colonel Dahlen ordered the
3d Battalion to move toward Tunga along the Jaro-Carigara road. The 2d
Battalion was to pass through [178]the 3d along the highway, and
the 1st Battalion was to be prepared to follow the 2d.31 The 19th Infantry was to protect the rear of the
34th Infantry and forestall any attempt by the Japanese to send
reinforcements from north of the Binahaan River. The 1st Battalion,
19th Infantry, was to move to Jaro via Tingib and Macanip to assist the
34th Infantry.32
At 0820 the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, supported by
the 2d Battalion, attacked along the Jaro-Carigara highway. Company L
went down the highway and then to the rear of the hill from which it
had been repulsed the previous day; Company I moved forward astride the
road; and Company K was in reserve. As advanced elements of Company I
reached a stream, they came under intense fire but moved to a position
from which they could attack the reverse slope of the hill. Other
elements of the company moved off the road to the top of the hill. When
they pushed westward along the crest they discovered another hill
behind it.
In the meantime the troops that had attacked the reverse
slope came under intense fire from the second hill. Concentrated fire
was laid on the second hill and a heavy machine gun was sent to the top
of the first. Company I, protected by the fire, was thus able to
assault and take the first hill. Company K, the reserve company,
thereupon occupied the hill. These assaults drove the enemy into
Company L, which was at the foot of the hill. A determined three-hour
fight followed, and, although at one time elements of the company were
driven across the highway, the company retaliated and eventually
cleared the area of Japanese.
While this fight was going on the 2d Battalion, with
Company E as the point, moved along the highway toward Tunga. At 1130
the Japanese opened fire on Company E at the Ginagan River. Tanks,
which had been brought up, fired with machine guns at the enemy
positions on the left of the road. The Japanese retaliated with mortar
and artillery fire, pinning down an antitank gun crew and Company
E’s mortar section. The artillery fired a concentration on the
Japanese positions and the advance was able to continue.
At 1430 the enemy reopened fire on the 2d Battalion at
the Yapan River. Company G was in the lead, with the 2d Platoon on the
left of the road and the 3d Platoon on the right. Company E was on
Company G’s left flank. With all the troops in a skirmish line,
the 2d Battalion, with tanks, moved down the road to attack. When
Company G came under fire the tanks went to its assistance, and the
Japanese then concentrated their fire on the armor.
Meanwhile Company E pushed down the left side of the
road but was halted by fire from an enemy pillbox on a knoll. A
self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer was brought up, and fire from this
weapon completely disorganized the Japanese and forced them to desert
their position. When the howitzer had exhausted its ammunition, another
was brought up to replace it. By this time, however, the enemy’s
artillery was registering on the spot and the second was disabled
before it could fire a shot.
Elements of the 41st Infantry Regiment, protected
by artillery, gathered in front of Company E and emplaced machine guns
in a position from which they could enfilade the company. Thereupon
Company E committed its reserve platoon to its left flank but shortly
afterward received orders to protect [179]the disabled howitzer
and dig in for the night. A tank was sent up to cover the establishment
of the night perimeter. Company G received orders to fall back and dig
in for the night, and upon its withdrawal the Japanese concentrated
their fire on Company E. Although badly shaken, Company E held on and
protected the howitzer. A tank was sent forward to tow the weapon, but
since it was untowable because of broken treads the crew sent a shell
through it to prevent its use by the enemy. Company E then disengaged
and fell back through Company F, as Company G had done.
Under the protective cover of night, the 41st
Infantry Regiment retreated.
During the day the 19th Infantry had followed closely,
protecting the rear of the 34th Infantry and the southern flank of the
24th Division and blocking off the enemy escape routes. That night
General Irving gave the plan of action for the following day—1
November—for the 24th Division. The 19th Infantry was to continue
to block the enemy escape routes and protect the southern flank of the
division along the Binahaan River east from Tingib to Yapad, move a
battalion into Jaro, establish a roadblock in the vicinity of Jaro, and
protect the line of communications behind the advance of the 34th
Infantry as far as Gibucauan. The 34th Infantry was to continue
advancing along the Jaro-Carigara highway, seizing every opportunity to
make a wide envelopment, especially from the northeast.33
In accordance with this order, Companies A and B, 34th
Infantry, were sent at 0820 to make a wide flanking movement eastward
to Tuba and then strike at Tunga from the northeast. At 0900, after
patrols had reported no enemy contact, the 2d Battalion moved on down
the Jaro-Carigara highway.
Both battalions proceeded rapidly. At 0900 the 1st
Battalion was in Tuba, and at 1100 the 2d had passed through the scene
of the previous day’s fighting and was in Giagsam. The troops
found much matériel, including two 37-mm. guns and numerous
range finders, machine guns, rifles, packs, and helmets, which the
enemy had left in his precipitous flight. Both battalions closed on
Tunga. They paused for rest and then moved on down the highway toward
Carigara. At 1600 when the 34th Infantry formed its perimeter for the
night, its advance unit, the 1st Battalion, was 1,000 yards from
Sagkanan, and its rearmost unit, the 3d Battalion, was at
Tunga.34
On the previous day the regimental headquarters had
moved into Jaro. It had been a bloody road to Carigara, but the 24th
Division was knocking at the back door for admittance as the 1st
Cavalry Division on the north was demanding entrance at the front
door.
Capture of Carigara
By 31 October it became evident to the Americans
that there was unusual activity on the part of the Japanese, who were
apparently building strong defensive positions around Carigara and
pouring reinforcements into the town. Statements by reconnaissance
parties and reports from guerrillas led to the belief that 2,000 to
3,000 Japanese were in the town and its environs.35 The enemy
was capable of bringing up a considerable number of reinforcements
along the Ormoc road, or of attacking the [180]American left flank
from the south.36 The situation remained unchanged on 1
November.
155-MM. GUNS FIRING ON CARIGARA
Plans of X Corps
In view of the apparent strength of the Japanese
defenders, General Sibert felt that no means should be left untried to
insure the successful reduction of the strong point. Both the corps and
division artillery were to fire on the town, with a heavy 15-minute
preparation from 0745 to 0800 on the front of the 24th Infantry
Division to a depth of 1,000 yards. Immediately thereafter a series of
concentrations covering 1,000 yards in depth would be fired from 0800
to 0840, advancing at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes. All
available artillery except one light battalion of the 24th Infantry
Division would then fire in front of the 1st Cavalry Division to a
depth of 1,000 yards from 0845 to 0900. Thereafter the artillery of
each division would support its own division.37
The 2d Brigade, reinforced, was to seize Carigara from
Barugo,38 while the 34th Infantry would attack along the
Jaro-Carigara highway. General Hoffman of the 2d Cavalry Brigade
commanded the attack against Carigara. In preparation for the combined
assault, the forces of the 1st Cavalry Division had been gathering in
the Barugo area.
On 1 November General Hoffman arrived at Barugo,
examined the troops, and made last-minute arrangements. The assault
from the north was to be in a column of [181]squadrons: 1st
Squadron, 7th Cavalry; 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry; and the 2d Squadron,
5th Cavalry, in reserve. The squadron last mentioned was to establish
and maintain communication with the 34th Infantry, which was to move
out in a column of battalions, wait on the outskirts of Carigara until
the town had been secured by the 2d Cavalry Brigade, and then flank the
town and move on to Capoocan.39
During the day of 1 November and the night following,
General Suzuki withdrew his troops from Carigara and established very
strong positions in the mountains southwest of the town in the vicinity
of Limon. By “clever deception as to his strength and
intentions,” the enemy completely deluded the Americans into
believing that his major force was still in Carigara.40
Seizure of Carigara
Unaware of the Japanese withdrawal, the Americans
proceeded with the execution of their plans. During the American
artillery fire on the morning of 2 November some of the shells landed
in the sector of the 7th Cavalry, an accident which delayed the attack
until 0935. At that hour the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the
2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, jumped off. Since the bridge over the
Canomontag River had been destroyed by the enemy and the river was not
fordable, it was necessary to utilize native canoes, only two of which
were available. This procedure consumed much time, but by 1130 the
troops completed the crossing. Troop E, 5th Cavalry, made contact with
the 34th Infantry at 1100. Since the troops encountered no resistance,
the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron, 8th
Cavalry, entered the town at 1200 and established a perimeter. General
Mudge, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, entered the town with
the assault cavalry troops.41 The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry,
outposted the western and southern sections of the town. Patrols from
the 34th Infantry were already in Carigara.
At 0800 on 2 November the 34th Infantry moved out, the
1st Battalion leaving its bivouac area 1,000 yards southeast of
Sagkanan and going down the highway, followed by the 2d Battalion, less
Company G, and the 3d Battalion. Company G of the 2d Battalion was to
reconnoiter the western side of Carigara in case an enveloping movement
became necessary.42
By 0900 the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, reached a
small bridge at the outskirts of Carigara and awaited word from the 1st
Cavalry Division. After a wait of one and a half hours, patrols were
sent into the western portion of Carigara, but they reported no enemy
contact. All was quiet and the town deserted. The battalion then
skirted Carigara and proceeded along the coast toward Capoocan. It
encountered difficulty in crossing the Carigara River, since the bridge
had been destroyed, but was able to get as far as Balud, where it set
up a night perimeter after being halted by enemy fire. The 2d Battalion
moved to the Carigara River, where it dug in for the night and was
rejoined there by G Company. The 3d Battalion set up its perimeter just
behind the 2d, and the regimental headquarters of the 34th Infantry was
set up in Carigara.
U.S. PATROL CROSSING THE CANOMONTAG RIVER
(above). Engineer troops replacing a Capoocan River bridge
blown up by retreating Japanese.
In the advance through northern Leyte Valley the 24th
Division had lost 210 killed, [183]859 wounded, and 6 missing in
action, but it had killed an estimated 2,970 Japanese and taken 13
prisoners.
With the capture of Carigara, the second phase of
General Krueger’s plan for the liberation of Leyte was completed.
Panaon and San Juanico Straits, respectively south and north of the
island, had been seized. Elements of the Sixth Army were on the west
coast in the vicinity of Baybay on the shores of Ormoc Bay, and others
were at Carigara near the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley. The two
forces were poised for a co-ordinated drive toward Ormoc
Valley—the last important Japanese stronghold on the island.
Nearly all the tactically significant airfields and ports, together
with Leyte Valley, were in the hands of the Sixth Army. Victory
appeared to be in sight—but continued reinforcement of the island
by the Japanese and delay in the construction program for building
Leyte Valley into a major air and supply base were matters of grave
concern. [184]
1 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. ↑
2 14th
Area Army Opns Leyte, pp. 2–3. ↑
4 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army, Staff Study Opns of Japanese 35th Army on
Leyte, Interrog of Maj Gen Yoshiharu Tomochika, CofS 35th Army,
Pt. I, p. 2. ↑
5 24th Div
FO 3, 0700, 25 Oct 44. ↑
6 34th Inf
Unit Jnl, 26 Oct 44. ↑
7 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 27 Oct 44. ↑
8 There is
an interesting anecdote about the town: “Sergeant [Charles W.]
Capps and Pvt. [Harold O.] Mottlet of G-3 got some help from a Jap
sniper when they were hunting for Alangalang on a situation map. There
was a ‘ping’ and they hit the dirt. When they resumed work
they found a bullet puncture practically through Alangalang on the
map.” 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 78. ↑
9
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 15. ↑
10 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 28 Oct 44. ↑
11 19th
Inf Unit Rpt 6, 25 Oct 44, 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 25 Oct 44. ↑
12 19th
Inf Unit Jnl, 25 Oct 44. ↑
13 11th FA
Bn Unit Rpt 6, 28 Oct 44. There was no report for 27
October. ↑
15 13th FA
Bn Unit Rpt 7, 27 Oct 44. ↑
17 34th
Inf Unit Jnl, 28 Oct 44. ↑
18 The
battalion journal laconically notes that Company L “meets slight
resistance—kill appx. 50 Japs and continues.” 3d Bn, 34th
Inf, Unit Jnl, 29 Oct 44. ↑
20 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 8, 28 Oct 44. ↑
21 2d Cav
Brig FO 6, 28 Oct 44. ↑
22 2d Cav
Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
23 The 5th
Cavalry Regiment had moved behind the 34th Infantry on its advance
along Highway 2 to the Mainit River bridge. When the 34th Infantry
moved south to Jaro the 5th Cavalry took over the Cavite area and,
during the Carigara attack, the regiment (less its 2d Squadron) was
responsible for the protection of the line of communication from Cavite
to Barugo. 5th Cav Opns Rpt, p. 5; 1st Cav Div FO 6, 1 Nov
44. ↑
24 10th
I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army on
Leyte, Part I, p. 5; Part IV, p. 3, OCMH. ↑
25 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Japanese 102d Division on
Leyte and Cebu, passim, OCMH. ↑
26 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 33. ↑
28 Colonel
Newman was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. ↑
29 34th
Inf Unit Jnl, 30 Oct 44. ↑
30 24th
Div Arty Unit Rpt 8, 31 Oct 44. ↑
31 34th
Inf Unit Jnl, 31 Oct 44. ↑
32 19th
Inf Unit Jnl, 31 Oct 44. ↑
33 34th
Inf Unit Jnl, 31 Oct 44. ↑
34 34th
Inf Unit Rpt 13, 34th Inf Jnl, 1 Nov 44. ↑
35 One
guerrilla unit estimated the number of Japanese as high as
5,000. ↑
36 X Corps
G-2 Periodic Rpt 10, 31 Oct 44. ↑
38 1st Cav
Div FO 6, 1 Nov 44. ↑
40 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. ↑
CHAPTER XI
Logistics and Civil Affairs
The old saw that for want of a horseshoe nail the
kingdom was lost is applicable in some degree to the story of logistics
on the island of Leyte. Fortunately the outcome in Leyte was less
serious than that recounted in the proverb. But the cumulative effect
of many unfavorable conditions, each capable of being overcome in
itself but each entangled with the others, resulted in a protraction of
the campaign and a slowing of the schedule for future operations in the
Pacific.
Despite the forebodings of Sixth Army engineers with
regard to developing major logistical and air bases in Leyte Valley,
General MacArthur had assigned logistical missions to the Sixth Army
which, even under the best of circumstances, would have taxed its
facilities to the utmost. General Krueger thought that in the planning
stages greater emphasis should have been placed on an appreciation of
terrain when selecting landing beaches and their exits, as well as
sites for base development, airdrome construction, and headquarters
installations. Terrain information should have been carefully analyzed
by competent personnel in order that tactical and development plans
could be based on the utilization of suitable terrain. The target dates
and phase lines should have been flexible enough to allow for
unsatisfactory terrain features. “Airdromes cannot be built
speedily across rice paddies and swamps; bivouac areas, depots and
dumps cannot properly be established in swamps and rice
paddies.”1
Logistics
Scarcely had the assault troops landed when the
gloomy predictions of Colonel Ely that conditions of soil and weather
on the island would make it unfit for the establishment of major bases
began to be realized. Nevertheless, the necessity for early
establishment of land-based air forces to support the operation made it
imperative that the engineers start work immediately on rehabilitation
of existing airfields. Before this task could be carried out, however,
it would be necessary to strengthen and widen the roads in order to
move heavy construction equipment to the airfields. A breakdown of the
transportation system for even a few days could affect adversely all
aspects of the Leyte operation. Because of the shortage of engineer
troops, the lack of road metal, and the continuous traffic, the
construction and maintenance of roads presented a critical and
continuing problem.
Road Construction
The troops found their progress greatly hampered
by the poor quality of roads leading to the interior of the island. The
type of soil made it difficult to provide sufficient approach
[185]roads and to maintain all-weather roads. Drivers
did not dare come too near the edge of the pavement in passing, even on
the major two-lane roads, since their vehicles would probably become
mired on the shoulder. The edges of hard-surfaced roads broke down
under the constant wear until the roads were no longer wide enough for
two-way traffic. Vehicles would often sink to their axles on the
shoulders of the highway and on the many access roads, and frequently
the roads into camp areas became unsuitable for traffic of any
sort.2
In the 24th Division zone the engineers undertook to
build an ancillary road, from the beachhead area to the existing
coastal road, over the deep swamps and flooded rice paddies. After
twenty-four hours’ labor they abandoned the project as not
feasible and in a few days rebuilt a trail that skirted the swamp along
higher ground. This new thoroughfare was pronounced an
“excellent” three-lane egress road.3
By utilizing a narrow road leading inland to Highway 1,
egress from the 1st Cavalry Division beachhead area was accomplished.
Since the road forked near the beach and ran north to Cataisan Point it
became an access road to the Tacloban airfield. All supplies were
routed along Highway 1 into the interior. When this road went to pieces
under the heavy rains of 25 October, no means remained of getting
overland from the area of the 24th Division to that of the 1st Cavalry
Division. The open country back of the Dulag area made the road
problems of the XXIV Corps zone a little more manageable than those in
the X Corps area. Dulag itself offered graveled streets for traffic,
but unfortunately only one very narrow road, with deep ditches on both
sides, led west toward the mountains. With the coming of heavy rains,
this road was chewed to bits by heavy traffic.
In order to preserve the roads as far as possible, the
transportation officer of the Sixth Army decided to allow their use
only to vehicles having the highest priority and to hold the
transportation of civilians to a minimum. He forbade the use of trucks
and other heavy vehicles for carrying personnel when lighter
transportation was available.4 Throughout the Leyte operation,
though the engineering troops worked unceasingly, the condition of the
roads remained a tremendous unsolved problem. A rainfall of 23.5 inches
during the month of November forced a continuous contest with the mud,
and men and equipment employed on the airstrips had to be diverted to
the roads, some of which were closed for days at a time while under
repair. Traffic censuses were made as a basis for many corrective
measures that were introduced to control, reduce, and equalize the flow
of traffic. Supplies were issued at night to avoid congestion at peak
periods. ASCOM made strong efforts to keep the road construction
equipment in use and in workable condition, and placed stress upon
provision for proper drainage. Filipino pick-and-shovel crews were used
as much as possible. In spite of these measures, at the end of November
the condition of the roads was “a major hindrance to base
development and operations.”5
Airfields
The condition of the airstrips produced an even
more perplexing problem than the [187]roads. Immediately upon their
arrival, engineer reconnaissance parties followed the assault infantry
and examined the various sites which had been selected during the
planning for airfields. By 22 October they reported that all the
proposed airdrome sites except Tacloban were unfit for use during the
rainy season.
ACCESS ROAD FROM WHITE BEACH under repair
(above). Filipino road workers on Route 2 (below).
Elements of the Sixth Army had captured both the Dulag
and Tacloban airstrips within twenty-four hours after landing, but the
Dulag airstrip was found to be out of use and unserviceable.6
Since the Tacloban field was shorter than had been estimated and was in
need of resurfacing, it was necessary to construct practically a new
airfield. Although Japanese air resistance was moderate for the first
few days and the weather temperate, progress was slow because of the
condition of the roads and congestion of traffic. Trucks bearing gravel
moved at a snail’s pace.
On 25 October the 7th and 8th Fighter Squadrons of the
49th Fighter Group assisted in the work on the Tacloban strip. The 8th
Squadron was dismayed. The entire Cataisan Peninsula, on which the
airstrip was located, was an “unadulterated bog” and the
“confusion was awe inspiring.” Labor details were called to
work and then dismissed. Upon returning to their bivouac area, they
would be recalled, and the process repeated.7 On 25 and 26
October the Japanese air force came over the airfield in great waves.
Many times the men were forced to drop their tools and sprawl into
gullies and slit trenches as the Japanese “returned for more
blood.”8
With the naval battle of Leyte Gulf under way,
activities on the airfield were further hampered. Construction crews
attempted to lay a base of coral on the airfield for the steel matting
at the same time that Navy planes used the field for emergency
landings. About a hundred aircraft used the field on 25 October, and
twenty-five of these were destroyed in crash landings, one of which set
the fuel dump afire at night.9 In spite of enemy air raids, the
landing of naval aircraft and the wrecked planes littering the
airstrip, construction continued. By 30 October some aircraft were
arriving and making satisfactory landings on the runway, which at that
time had nearly 4,000 feet of matting.10
On 27 October the Fifth Air Force took over the mission
of supplying air support. Because of the poor condition of the
airstrips and the scarcity of available aircraft, however, it was
announced on 31 October that only “sporadic bomb support by the
heavy bombers” and strafing could be accomplished. Work on the
airstrips had barely got under way at the end of October.11
At the same time General Casey, commanding the Army
Service Command, painted a dark picture of the future. He stated that
the construction of airfields in the Dulag area would require more
effort than had been anticipated during the planning phase, since the
Japanese, contrary to expectations, had placed little or no surfacing
material on the runways and since soil conditions were such that an
eight-inch sand and gravel base covered with steel mat would be
[188]required to support bomber traffic.12 Furthermore, the labor crews that were to have
been used in airfield construction were being diverted to road
building, still further reducing “the already insufficient amount
of engineer effort available for drome construction.”13 Aside from labor shortages, the chief causes for
the disappointing delay in airfield construction were poor soil
conditions, enemy air raids, and rain.14 Under such
inauspicious circumstances, the Allied Air Forces undertook the mission
of furnishing air support on Leyte. Because of the poor condition of
the airfields, only a token force from the Fifth Air Force was able to
come in.
Much ingenuity was exercised by the engineers in
overcoming difficulties. In enlarging the Tacloban airstrip, one of the
greatest impediments to progress was the limited supply of coral for
surfacing the runways. The engineers conceived the idea of having the
dredge Raymond, which had been brought forward to dredge the
navigational channel, used to pump coral from the channel bottom onto
the runways. The 2,800-horsepower pumps could transport solid matter
one mile through pipes that extended across the bay and onto the land,
and they could also raise the dredged matter as much as 300 feet above
sea level. The engineers found that this pipeline was the quickest way
to transport material to the Tacloban airstrip, though mechanical
difficulties sometimes developed.15
Despite constant work on the morasses that constituted
the San Pablo and Buri airfields, these strips continued to be in a
generally unusable condition. Finally, on 25 November, ASCOM dropped
all construction work on them. The Fifth Air Force, however, felt that
it was necessary to continue using the Bayug airfield, and at least one
aviation battalion remained at work on that strip.
When work on the airstrips at Buri and San Pablo was
abandoned, the Sixth Army units thus released began the construction of
a new airfield on the coast at Tanauan, midway between Tacloban and
Dulag. This field became operational on 16 December 1944.16 The fact that the main part of the Fifth Air
Force was unable to displace forward to Leyte made it possible for the
Japanese to reinforce their Leyte garrison and thus prolong the
campaign.
Although his engineers, before the opening of the
campaign, had protested vigorously to General Headquarters against the
establishment of a major base upon Leyte, General Krueger felt
constrained to take the responsibility. Said he:
There is no doubt that if I could have made
adequate airdromes available on Leyte as scheduled we would have had
ample air forces on hand to stop all Jap reinforcements from coming in.
But this proved to be impossible, because of terrific rains that
flooded all level areas on the island. In consequence, we lacked the
air support necessary adequately to support the operation. This was not
the fault of the Allied Air Force, however, but mine.17
Base Construction
After the assault troops had cleared the beach
areas, a perplexing problem came to the fore. In the plans for the
Leyte operation [189]General Krueger had assigned to the various
commands areas for such facilities as their supply dumps and hospitals.
Upon arrival on Leyte, the Army Service Command discovered that many of
the sites were swamps; the tactical situation delayed reconnaissance
for others.
TANAUAN AIRSTRIP built to replace San Pablo
and Buri airfields.
Throughout November the allocation of areas to the units
continued to present difficulties. On 12 November General Krueger
formed the Area Allocation Group, which consisted of representatives
from MacArthur’s General Headquarters, the Sixth Army, the Air
Forces, the Navy, and the Army Service Command. The various units
submitted requests for particular areas to this group, which accepted
or rejected the requests, or allocated different sites. Since many of
the applicants wished to be in the Tacloban area, some of the requests
could not be granted because of insufficient space. Many of the sites
best suited for hospitals or storage were occupied by MacArthur’s
advance headquarters and other headquarters. The search of ASCOM for
suitable storage areas continued throughout the month.18 On 28 November General Krueger moved the Sixth
Army command post from Tanauan to Tolosa so that an airstrip could be
constructed in the Tanauan area.19
By 20 November General Krueger’s program for
hospital construction was far behind schedule. Of the eight hospitals
planned for the area only one was as much as 34 percent complete, and
one was only 5 percent complete.20 The lack of hospital
facilities, which continued throughout December, [190]was
somewhat offset by the rate of evacuation and the use of hospital ships
and LST’s operating under naval medical procedure. Next to
airfields and roads the construction of hospitals was given priority.
But “an adequate number of engineer battalions … to do justice
to the original requirements” was not available. At the same time
General Krueger ordered that the hospitals be given first priority on
structural materials and on portable buildings. No lumber, including
ship dunnage, could be used in constructing quarters for either
officers or enlisted men until the hospitals were completed.21 All units that could be spared from airdrome and
road construction were used to build either hospitals or port and POL
(petrol, oil, and lubricants) installations.
As for port facilities, the Japanese failed to destroy
two existing deepwater berths at Tacloban. Despite numerous enemy
aerial attacks on these docks and on shipping, no material damage
resulted. By 1 December ASCOM had constructed an additional dock and
several lighterage wharves. During November the Army Service Command
established, in addition to the main supply base at Tacloban, a subbase
at Dulag for the southern areas and a supply point at Carigara for the
troops of X Corps.22
Supplies
Since the assault troops had brought with them
only limited supplies and ammunition and since they were deep inside
Japanese territory and 1,500 miles from their nearest supply base, at
Hollandia, the need for immediate establishment and stocking of supply
bases was especially urgent.23
Because some of the LST’s offshore in the vicinity
of Hill 522 and Palo were heavily shelled by the Japanese on A Day, the
remaining LST’s were directed to the Cataisan Peninsula, where
many of them discharged their loads on the Tacloban airfield, over
which the supplies were scattered. The proposed runway and dispersal
areas were strewn with hundreds of vehicles, together with thousands of
tons of ammunition, rations, and petroleum products. Since there was
only one egress road, the airstrip became tremendously
congested.24
Another important cause of the congestion was the dictum
of General Headquarters that certain airfields were to be operational
by an early date. The Air Forces had therefore loaded the vessels with
a considerable number of service troops and a quantity of equipment
which could not be used until the airfields were in operation. When
construction of the airfields was delayed, these troops and equipment
were unemployed for many days, thus cluttering the beaches and adding
to the congestion. Ironically, because of limited shipping space, they
had displaced “engineers and other service troops which would
have been of great value.”25
On 8 November an estimated 120,000 American troops were
on Leyte. The rations of some of these were on board the vessels that
had brought them to the island, and cargo was not being discharged at a
satisfactory [191]rate. Col. William N. Leaf, the supply officer
of the Sixth Army, did not believe that more than sufficient rations,
clothing, and construction equipment to meet minimum requirements could
be unloaded unless the discharge capacity of the ports was
substantially increased. While this condition was not entirely
satisfactory, it was not as bad as appeared, since incoming units
brought and discharged thirty days’ supply for
themselves.26 General Krueger set up a committee to determine
the priority of discharge for the various classes of cargo. On 9
November the committee gave top priority to the following items, in
order of preference: ammunition, 1,400 tons a day; rations, 1,000 tons
a day; bridge timber, no specified amount; landing field mats, 500 tons
a day; and aviation gasoline, 1,000 drums a day.27
LST’S UNLOADING AT TACLOBAN AIRFIELD.
The causeways leading from the beach to the ships were built by
bulldozers scraping sand and earth to each ship as it landed.
On 27 November the priorities committee reviewed the
status of shipping in the harbors and established new priorities for
the unloading of cargo. In order of priority, the following commodities
were given preference: rations, ammunition, landing mats, and aviation
gasoline.28 Not all the vessels followed the priorities that
had been set up for the discharge of cargo. General Krueger ordered
that “appropriate disciplinary action” [192]be
taken against any Army personnel who were responsible.29
Since successive resupply convoys arrived at Leyte
before vessels of the preceding echelon had been unloaded, thus
congesting the harbor, and since the Japanese were bombing the vessels,
the assistant G-4 of Sixth Army suggested on 2 December that the number
of vessels to be called forward from the rear area to be kept to an
absolute minimum.30 The time allocated for the discharge of
cargo was steadily increased: from 20 October to 3 November it was
twelve hours a day, from 4 November to 8 November eighteen hours a day,
and from 9 November until Christmas, twenty-four hours a day.31
During the first thirty days the supplies in tons,
stockpiled on Leyte or available on board ship for discharge, over and
above current needs, increased as follows: 20 October, 30,313; 21
October through 30 October, 128,051; 31 October through 9 November,
193,838; and from 10 November through 19 November, 319,418.32
After the supplies were ashore and stored, the problem
of getting them to the divisions and thence to the front-line troops
presented tremendous difficulties. Nearly all types of transportation
were utilized. As the roads disintegrated, more and more dependence was
placed upon water transportation. Naval vessels and amphibian vehicles
were used to carry the supplies as close as possible to the front-line
troops, and motor vehicles transported them for the remaining distance
whenever feasible. At other times the troops and Filipino civilians
often had to hand-carry supplies to the assault forces. In addition
there were many airdrops to troops who were otherwise completely cut
off from the rest of the Sixth Army.
Medical Support
As the assault forces moved across the beaches,
medical units accompanied them. The 110th Portable Surgical Hospital
supported the operations of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion in the
islands of Leyte Gulf. In the northern part of Leyte the 19th and 27th
Portable Surgical Hospitals went ashore with the 1st Cavalry Division
in the Tacloban area, while the 16th Portable Surgical Hospital
supported the 24th Infantry Division in the Palo area. The 38th and
58th Evacuation Hospitals also landed on A Day in the X Corps zone but
did not establish themselves in positions to receive patients. In the
zone of action of XXIV Corps in the vicinity of Dulag, the 7th and 96th
Infantry Divisions were accompanied by the 51st and 52d Portable
Surgical Hospitals, the 394th Medical Clearing Company, and the 644th
and 645th Medical Collecting Companies. Later in the day a platoon from
the 69th Field Hospital landed and before nightfall was ready to
receive patients. Earlier on the same day the 7th Portable Surgical
Hospital had accompanied the 21st Infantry Regiment to Panaon
Strait.33
Evacuation of Casualties
General Bradley attached to each assault battalion
a platoon from one of the collecting companies of the 96th Division
Medical [194]Battalion. These platoons landed with the
assault waves, collected the casualties on the beach, gave them the
necessary treatment, and then evacuated them to designated ships by
landing craft. After the Navy beach parties had established aid
stations the medical units cleared casualties through them.34
ROAD CONDITIONS. Disintegration of the roads
greatly increased the supply problem. Filipino carriers unload an
amphibious LVT(4) (above); carriers for the 1st Cavalry Division near
Carigara (below).
As the battle moved on beyond the beaches, the remaining
medical units came ashore and hospitals were put into operation. For
the first few days, however, the medical units evacuated all casualties
to naval vessels in the harbor, whereupon the vessels sailed for a rear
area base. It frequently happened that a man with a minor wound or
illness, or a nonbattle injury, would be well and fit for further duty
by the time the vessel reached the rear area.35
After the campaign had progressed beyond the beaches,
both the corps evacuated to rear areas only those casualties who
required prolonged hospitalization. The Filipino civilian employees of
the Army and members of the Filipino armed forces received treatment
but were not evacuated from the island without approval from Sixth Army
headquarters. Wounded or sick Japanese prisoners were segregated in the
hospitals but, otherwise, they received the same treatment as other
patients.36 Within three days after landing, the XXIV Corps
set up a field hospital which was ready to receive patients on the
following day. Consequently, all casualties who had already been
evacuated to the ships but who required hospitalization for less than
fifteen days were brought ashore and held in the shore party medical
section or admitted to the hospital.37
Co-operation between the medical services of the Sixth
Army and those of the Seventh Fleet was excellent. Col. William A.
Hagins, Sixth Army Surgeon, praised the medical service of the Seventh
Fleet in unstinting terms: “The LST’s equipped to provide
surgical service conformed to the highest professional standards and
they, together with the APH’s (transports for wounded) and the
small PCE(R)’s (patrol craft, escort (rescue)) formed a floating
hospital reserve that varied between 3,000 and 5,000 beds. Without this
service, which relieved the hard pressed hospitals of many cases, the
level of medical and surgical care on Leyte would certainly have been
sub-standard.”38
After the action had progressed beyond the beaches, the
evacuation of troops became more difficult. Each medical collecting
company of the 96th Division was furnished nine ¼-ton trucks and
three other cargo carriers. The swamps and steep hills precluded the
use of trucks, however, and the number of cargo carriers was
insufficient for the task. The latter were most useful in evacuating
casualties across swamps and rice paddies. It was necessary to use
litter bearers in the mountains, but the narrow trails permitted the
use of only two men to carry each litter. For some unexplained reason,
attempts to use Filipinos as litter bearers were not
successful.39 The 24th Division, unlike the 96th, found the
Filipinos to be excellent litter bearers and recommended their use
whenever possible, since they were willing workers who conserved the
efficiency of a combat unit by replacing the combat soldiers.40 [195]
Medical Treatment
With very few exceptions, all casualties were
treated within one hour after the wound had been inflicted. At the
forward aid stations the wounded soldier received only initial
treatment necessary before evacuation to the collecting station. When
the casualty arrived at that point, he was bathed and prepared for
further evacuation to a clearing station. There the necessary surgery
was performed to make the patient safe for further evacuation, and he
was then taken to a rear area. Because of the swamps and steep hills in
the 96th Division sector, the time lag in evacuation from the forward
aid station to the clearing station varied from one hour to thirty
hours.41 In the 24th Division zone, the clearing stations
remained mobile. Only in rare instances, where it was impossible to
remove patients because of heavy fighting, was a casualty more than
four hours in reaching the clearing station.42
Initial measures at the aid stations consisted of
treatment for shock, stopping hemorrhage, administering plasma,
applying splints, and dressing wounds. At the clearing stations and
portable surgical hospitals, the initial surgical care consisted mainly
of débridements, emergency laparotomies, and amputations.
The medical officer performed surgical operations in these forward
medical facilities only when it was thought that the wounded soldier
could not stand the arduous trip to the rear or when his condition
would not permit the delay necessary for evacuation.43
A great many chest wounds and compound fractures were
treated. The fractures were cleansed, injured tissue was removed, and a
splint or cast applied. The biggest problem in fractures was the
immobilization of the humerus. If the nerves could be readily found
they were anchored. Plasma was extensively used, and whole blood,
considered indispensable by the surgeons, was generally
available.44
In the first days of the Leyte Campaign, because of the
prelanding bombardment, more civilians than soldiers required treatment
by medical units. In the 7th Division sector for the first two days, 75
percent of the medical facilities of the only clearing company in
operation were used in caring for civilian casualties. On 24 October
the Army established a separate hospital on Leyte for
civilians.45
The Sixth Army made a survey of 519 patients who died
from injuries suffered in battle. Of these 1 died of bayonet wounds, 2
of blast concussion, 249 of gunshot wounds, 170 of fragment wounds, and
97 of unclassified injuries, many of which were believed to have been
inflicted by bomb or shell fragments. The location of the gunshot
wounds was as follows: 66 in the abdomen, 21 in the back, 7 in the
buttocks, 67 in the chest, 49 in the head, 18 in the lower extremities,
9 in the upper extremities, 3 of multiple character, and 9 of
unclassified location. Of the fragment wounds 25 were in the abdomen, 7
in the back, 6 in the buttocks, 30 in the chest, 33 in the head, 37 in
the lower extremities, 11 in the upper extremities, 12 multiple, and 9
unclassified.46
Medical Supply
The Sixth Army plan called for the assault troops
to go in with five days’ medical [198]supplies. The other
units would go in with thirty days’ supply. The original plan
provided for 300,000 troops over a sixty-day period only. Thereafter,
it was expected that Sixth Army would depend upon resupply shipping and
the diversion to Leyte of shipments intended to fill theater
requirements of the Southwest Pacific area. The resupply shipping
consisted of medical maintenance units. Since the average medical
maintenance unit contained less than 700 items as compared to the 3,000
to 3,500 items eventually needed for a balanced supply, the medical
plan of the X Corps called for loading three days’ supply on
their organic transports and on their personnel. The rest of the
supplies were bulk loaded. The X Corps also had an emergency resupply
of two medical maintenance units, one of which was never unloaded
because of damage to the ship on which it was carried.47
A LITTER SQUAD EVACUATES A CASUALTY in
mountainous terrain.
A CASUALTY RECEIVES TREATMENT at a forward aid
station.
AN OPERATING ROOM AT THE STATION HOSPITAL,
TANAUAN
A CASUALTY IS EVACUATED BY SHIP TO A REAR
AREA
When the XXIV Corps was ordered to prepare for the Yap
operation, the 7th Division began to make its medical plans. After
receiving permission to take a thirty-day supply for 22,000 men on its
assault shipping, the division separated the stock into two sections,
consisting of a ten-day supply and a twenty-day supply. The former was
packed in ten identical units with one unit to a pallet, each weighing
1,840 pounds and having a volume of seventy-two cubic feet. One of
these units was allotted to each battalion of the division and one to
the division headquarters. The twenty days’ supply was packed in
three identical units, each weighing about 21,648 pounds and having a
volume of about 864 cubic feet.48
The 24th Division drew approximately thirty tons of
medical supplies from the base medical supply. The division then
mobile-loaded twenty of these tons on five 2½-ton trucks and
assigned a truck to each collecting company. The remaining medical
supplies were bulk loaded. Each medical unit also carried a five-day
supply for immediate use upon commitment.49
When put into practice, however, this system of the 24th
Division was not entirely satisfactory. Because of the rapid advance of
the assault troops and the lack of transportation, the system of supply
became an acute problem. Resupply became co-ordinated with the chain of
evacuation. Forward units would submit informal requisitions to the
clearing companies at the second echelon of evacuation, whereupon the
supplies would be issued and brought forward by ambulances on their
return to the front. The clearing companies would submit requisitions
to the main dump. The difficulty of resupply can be appreciated when
considerations of time and distance are understood. For instance, the
round trip from Carigara to Tacloban, where the main dump was located,
amounted to about seventy miles.50 As greater and greater
dependence was placed upon human carriers to bring out the wounded and
bring in supplies, it proved indeed fortunate that the Sixth Army had
established amicable relations with the Filipino civilians.
Civil Affairs
Although the United States Government had
interested itself in the civil affairs of the Philippines as early as
13 January 1944, it was not until 10 November, after the Leyte Campaign
had been launched, that General [199]MacArthur received his first
directive on civil affairs. Between the two dates strong disagreements
developed between the War and Interior Departments as to who should
administer civil affairs in the Islands. The Interior Department
insisted that a civil representative of the High Commissioner of the
Philippines should accompany the assault troops, and General MacArthur
was equally insistent that he should not. The President finally
resolved the question in favor of MacArthur.51 Lacking a
directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur devised his
own policy for civil affairs during the reoccupation of the
Philippines.
The formulation of this policy may be said to have
started on 22 July 1944 with a memorandum from Brig. Gen. Bonner F.
Fellers, personnel officer of General Headquarters, to General
MacArthur. He stated that although President Manuel Quezon had
established a Division of Civil Affairs in the Philippine Army, the
actual work would have to be done by the United States Army. General
Fellers, therefore, recommended that General Headquarters immediately
assume full responsibility for civil administration during the
reoccupation. Administration in the occupied areas should be done,
however, in the name of the Philippine Commonwealth and in complete
co-operation with its official representatives.52
On 30 August General MacArthur issued a directive
creating a civil affairs unit in his headquarters and outlining the
broad policies that were to be followed in the Philippines.53 This directive was subsequently expanded on 28
September54 but it was not until 9 October, eleven days
before the landing on Leyte, that MacArthur issued detailed
instructions on the procedures to be followed.55
During the combat stage General Krueger, the senior
tactical commander, was to be responsible for such civil administration
and relief as would be possible under the existing tactical situation.
General MacArthur would delegate the administration of civil affairs
and relief in the liberated areas as promptly as possible to the
authorized representatives of the Commonwealth Government. The only
restrictions placed upon the Filipino people were to be those required
by military necessity. By arrangement with General MacArthur the
Philippine Commonwealth was, in general, to determine the guilt or
innocence of suspected collaborationists, though the U. S. Army
commanders were to retain complete authority to deal with the suspects
if necessary.
General MacArthur also established the financial
policies to be followed. A new series of Philippine Treasury
certificates called “Victory Pesos” would be introduced in
the liberated areas. The exchange rate would be two for an American
dollar. All prewar currency and all emergency currency officially
determined to be bona fide would be accepted at face value. All other
Philippine or enemy currency would be worthless. Wage rates to be paid
Filipino labor were established and ceiling prices consistent with the
approved wage scale were set.
General Krueger delegated authority for civil
administration and relief to Generals Hodge and Sibert for their
respective corps areas. The commanding general of the [200]Army
Service Command was responsible for the recruitment and maintenance of
civilian labor. General MacArthur attached to the Sixth Army eight
Philippine civil affairs units, which were to assist the field
commanders in the administration of civil affairs and relief. Two of
these were retained by Sixth Army, two were attached to each of the
corps, and two to the Army Service Command.56
AN OFFICER OF A CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT pays off
civilian workers with the new “Victory Pesos.”
As soon as the conflict had passed by an area, a civil
affairs unit of the Sixth Army stepped in and started to restore the
normal community life. Temporary appointments of Filipino officials
were made, such appointments going to men who had been screened by the
Counter Intelligence Corps or who were sponsored by Filipinos whose
loyalty was unquestioned. In nearly every case the Philippine
Commonwealth ratified these appointments. In every area reached by the
Sixth Army, civil officials were appointed as soon as the tide of
battle passed, and without exception cordial relations were
established. The civil affairs officers of the Sixth Army did not
attempt to interfere with civil operations unless requested to do so,
or unless the military situation made it necessary.
Relations With Filipino Refugees
While the American assault forces were hitting the
shores of Leyte, a delegation of Filipinos boarded the Blue
Ridge and gave General Irving of the 24th Division information
[201]regarding conditions on the island. They
received a cordial welcome, the Filipino steward’s mates giving
them much of their spare clothing.57
Many refugees who had been driven from their homes by
the naval bombardment came into the American lines on the beaches
seeking comfort and aid. These Filipinos had been without food or water
for a considerable time, some of them for as long as twenty-four hours.
Many of those who had remained in foxholes during the naval shelling
were badly shaken up.
Palo Sector
In the area around Palo58 fifty to
seventy-five civilians had arrived by nightfall on A Day, 20 October.
The Army gave them food and drink and then quartered them in two houses
on the beach. By the following morning the influx of Filipinos had
become very great and the arrival of many more was expected. The civil
affairs officers therefore secured two more dwellings, had latrines
dug, and maintained constant policing of the area, which was finally
encircled by wire enclosures. The Army set up an evacuation hospital
unit in the bivouac area to take care of the wounded and sick. A baby
was delivered in an emergency obstetrical tent, “both mother and
child faring well.”
Wells were dug to provide water for washing. During 21
October between 1,500 and 2,000 refugees crowded into the area. By 22
October the congestion had become so great that a larger site was
imperative. General Sibert decided to move the civilians to Palo, even
though the town had not yet been cleared of Japanese. After an Army
chaplain had said Mass, the refugees proceeded on foot, in single file,
to Palo. The Army adopted this mode of advance in order to minimize
interference with troops, supplies, and equipment and also to protect
the refugees from mines and booby traps which the Japanese had placed
on the shoulders of the road. Many of the civilians carried all of
their effects with them; children, as young as three or four years,
were impressed into carrying their share of the family’s meager
possessions.
Because of the inpouring of refugees from surrounding
districts, Palo suddenly grew from a normal population of about 6,000
to one estimated at 12,000 to 15,000. Nearly 5,000 people with their
animals crowded into a church and its adjacent compound. Sanitary
conditions were very bad.
The Army fed these refugees from captured stocks of rice
and appointed a force of civilian police. After a survey of the area,
the Army instituted sanitary measures for cleaning up the church and
its compound, with removal and burial of the dead animals. Civilian
laborers who had been checked for their loyalty undertook the burial of
American and Japanese dead and the unloading of ships in the harbor.
The Army disarmed all Filipinos except guerrillas and enforced security
regulations, which prohibited civilians from appearing on the streets
after dark. As more military units entered the town, 5,000 of the
refugees were moved to its outskirts. The Army set up a hospital in the
compound and surgeries in the schoolhouses, with separate wards for men
and women. Teachers and other qualified women assisted as practical
nurses. Within one week the Army had organized the town and begun work
toward rehabilitation. [202]
REFUGEE AREA ON ORANGE BEACH NEAR DULAG
Dulag Sector
On the beaches of XXIV Corps a naval civil affairs
unit controlled the Philippine civilians.59 This unit
arrived ashore at 0700 on 21 October. The area which had been
previously allocated for a civilian compound was found to be a swamp.
Approximately 1,500 refugees were scattered around the landing beaches.
The Army assembled these and moved them to a new site in the town of
Dulag, but the location had undergone a three-day naval bombardment
which had reduced it to smoldering rubble. The Army recruited laborers
to clean the area.
The military police assisted in control of the civilian
population and procured and distributed food and water. A medical
officer and several enlisted men from the 7th Division gave medical aid
to large numbers of civilians who were treated for minor wounds,
injuries, tropical ulcers, and other ailments. By 22 October the
medical officer had referred at least 100 of the more serious cases to
an Army field hospital near by. Fifteen unclaimed and unidentified
civilian dead were buried in the Filipino cemetery.
By the morning of 22 October, since the civilian
population of Dulag had grown to approximately 10,000, General Hodge
issued orders to move the refugees to a new location. By 23 October,
when a suitable place had been found, the number of refugees had risen
to approximately 30,000. The mass migration to the new location, which
was two miles from Dulag, was most [203]difficult, and not until the
civil affairs officers had sent food and water to the new site could
civilians be persuaded to move. The selected area measured about 1,000
by 600 yards and consisted of a coconut grove and a beach. Except for
its inadequate size and its infringement upon military installations,
it was completely satisfactory. After 24 October the civilians were
removed from camp and sent back to their home villages as soon as the
latter were declared secure.
Issuing of Supplies
By the morning of 24 October the Sixth Army was
taking care of some 45,000 people, most of the population of about
fifty-six communities. Although at first there was a shortage of food
and water, by 24 October there was an adequate supply. Before that time
the Army supplied the civilians with C and K rations, since it could
not locate an appreciable quantity of the civilian food supplies.
Seventy percent of these supplies, consisting of fish, rice, and meat,
were later found and distributed by the civil affairs officers.
The Army originally distributed food to individuals but
later made distribution through leaders in the barrios until it could
establish a general store. The civil affairs officers distributed
28,700 full rations, fifty cases of condensed milk for infant use, and
five tons of captured Japanese rice. About 5,000 full rations were
stolen or not accounted for. An Army purification unit set up a
3,000-gallon canvas water tank and furnished water to the area.
A general store was in operation by 26 October for the
sale of necessities. Clothing, rice, biscuits, salmon, and candles were
the items most in demand. Some articles were ill adapted to the use or
customs of the Filipinos. “The people would not buy or use the
4,000 rat traps or the rolls of toilet paper furnished nor would they
buy or use canned or powdered milk.”60 Prices were
fixed at prewar levels.
The civil affairs units of the Sixth Army opened about
500 schools in the principal barrios, those in Tacloban being the first
to open. Many school buildings were either rebuilt or repaired under
the direction of civil affairs officers and with funds furnished by
them. Since there were no primary textbooks, in one instance the civil
affairs units mimeographed a series of three schoolbooks which were
illustrated by an Army artist. The teachers of Leyte not only provided
excellent service in school work but also acted as relief workers,
sanitarians, and assistants in the dispensaries and hospitals.
At first, a number of improvised hospitals were opened
up. When the civilian hospital supplies arrived, however, modern
hospitals were established at Tacloban, Baybay, and Carigara. These
were staffed by local doctors and nurses, but the civil affairs unit
continued to furnish food and supervision. Twenty-seven permanent
dispensaries were also established. These were greatly needed, since
the Japanese had not given the people any medical aid and had stopped
all preventive medical measures. Dental treatment was given to more
than 2,000 Filipinos, and smallpox inoculations were administered to
more than 8,000. Also, when they seemed to be required, inoculations
were given for typhoid, typhus, and cholera.
The prescribed amount of civilian medical supplies
proved to be inadequate, a situation which placed an undue burden upon
[204]the medical units and facilities of all echelons
of the Sixth Army. The food supplies, however, were more than adequate.
The sizes of clothing and shoes were often too large and there was not
a sufficient supply of women’s and children’s garments. On
the island 10,000 tons of civilian supplies were landed, of which 6,830
tons were distributed. About 1,102 tons of rice were sold or given
away, a figure which does not include captured Japanese stocks of rice.
More than 400,000 refugees were fed and 287,000 relief clients were
cared for.61 By 25 December the relief rolls included only the
aged, sick, and infirm, and members of families without a
breadwinner.
Recruitment of Filipinos
“Hundreds of self appointed guerrillas whose
only claim to participation in the guerrilla organization was a
recently realized ambition to be of service to their country and to
their allies” confronted the assault forces on the beachheads.
These individuals caused endless confusion, since it was practically
impossible for the Americans to distinguish between the genuine
guerrilla and his opportunistic counterfeit. After the first few days,
however, the Army made contact with guerrilla headquarters and
established liaison with the bona fide guerrillas.62
General Krueger made the guerrillas a part of his armed
forces, and they became a source of additional strength to the Sixth
Army. These men frequently operated and patrolled in enemy-held
territory and brought the Americans valuable information on Japanese
movements and dispositions; the unit commanders of Sixth Army, however,
tended to discount reports from such sources with regard to the size of
Japanese forces. The guerrillas also guarded supply dumps and depots,
bridges, and other installations in the rear areas.
The generosity of the American soldier in giving away
supplies made it difficult to recruit civilian labor. Since gifts of
food to prospective laborers diminished their incentive to work, the
Sixth Army issued an order prohibiting such gifts. As early as 21
October the Army got in touch with political and labor leaders to serve
as advisers and assistants, telling them from day to day how many
laborers would be needed. The Filipino leaders were very co-operative
and made arrangements to secure the necessary labor. Good results were
obtained by enlisting the support of local leaders, especially the
parish priests. General Krueger declared: “In all reported
instances, the priests lent willing assistance and their information on
individuals and conditions was found reliable and outstandingly
impartial.”63 As the fighting reached past Carigara and
Dagami and into the central mountain range the Filipinos acted as
supply carriers for the troops and worked on the roads and trails. At
one time there were as many as 8,000 Filipinos engaged in this labor.
Army furnished transportation to the site of the work and paid wages
according to the Commonwealth Government wage scales.
Throughout November the logistical situation on Leyte
remained bad. Work on roads, together with that on airfields and other
installations, consisted largely of temporary expedients. The difficult
problem of getting supplies ashore and to the troops had [205]not
been completely solved, a situation which hampered the progress of the
tactical troops. The lag in construction of airdromes made it
impossible for land-based air forces to give adequate close air support
to the ground forces. This lack of support was another handicap to
General Krueger’s men as they fought their way into the
mountains. [206]
1 Ltr, CG
Sixth Army to CG X Corps et al., 25 Nov 44, p.
24. ↑
2 Hist of
Fifth Air Force, Ch. 5, pp. 34–35, AAF Archives. ↑
3 Sturgis,
Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, p. 6. Unless
otherwise cited, the material on construction is taken from this
study. ↑
4 Draft of
Memo, 30 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 30 Oct 44. ↑
5 ASCOM
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 8–9. ↑
6 RAD, CTF
78 to CG Sixth Army, MC 1280, 22 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch
Jnl, 23 Oct 44. ↑
7 Hist 8th
Fighter Squadron, October 1944, p. 7, AAF Archives. ↑
8 Hist 7th
Fighter Squadron, October 1944, pp. 4–5, AAF
Archives. ↑
9 Opns
Rpt, Comdr Support Aircraft to Comdr Seventh Fleet, no serial, 2 Nov
44. ↑
10 Hist
8th Fighter Squadron, 49th Fighter Group, 86th Wing, V Fighter Command,
Fifth Air Force, October 1944, p. 7, AAF Archives. ↑
11 Rad,
Col Quinn to the 6, 8, and 9 Air Liaison Parties, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
31 Oct 44. ↑
12 Ltr,
Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey, CG ASCOM, to Gen Krueger, CG Sixth Army, 31 Oct
44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. ↑
14 Hist
Fifth Air Force, Ch. 5, p. 33, AAF Archives. ↑
15 Hist of
Engineer Corps in the Pacific, Ch. VI, Philippine Campaign, pp.
327–29. Copy in OCMH. ↑
16 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 69. ↑
17 Ltr,
Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 13 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
18 Army
Service Comd Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6, 9. ↑
19 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 69. ↑
20 5201st
Engr Const Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
21
Sturgis, Engineer Opns in Leyte Campaign, p. 15. ↑
22 Army
Service Comd Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9; Memo, G-4 Sixth Army for DG ASCOM,
11 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 11 Nov 44. ↑
23
Sturgis, Engineer Opns in Leyte Campaign, p. 5. ↑
25 Ltr,
Gen Decker, formerly CS Sixth Army, to Gen Ward, 9 Jul 51, copy in
OCMH. ↑
26 Memo,
G-4 Sixth Army for Transportation Sec Sixth Army, 8 Nov 44, Sixth Army
G-4 Jnl, 8 Nov 44. ↑
27 Rpt of
Conference on Establishment of Priorities, 9 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4
Jnl, 30 Nov 44. ↑
28 Rpt of
Conference on 27 Nov for the Establishment of Unloading Priorities, 28
Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 30 Nov 44. ↑
29 Ltr, CG
Sixth Army to CG ASCOM, 30 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 1 Dec
44. ↑
30 Memo,
Asst G-4 Sixth Army to QM et al. Sixth Army, 2 Dec 44, Sixth
Army G-4 Jnl, 2 Dec 44. ↑
31 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 218. ↑
32 Memo,
G-4 Sixth Army to Transportation Off, 27 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 27
Nov 44. ↑
33 Rpt of
Surgeon, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 262. ↑
34 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 95. ↑
35 Rpt of
Surgeon, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 262. ↑
36 X Corps
Rpt of Medical Service Leyte Campaign, pp. 3–4. ↑
37 XXIV
Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. ↑
38 Rpt of
Surgeon, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 263. ↑
39 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 95–96. ↑
40 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 197. ↑
41 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 96. ↑
42 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 134. ↑
45 7th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, Medical Rpt, App. C to G-4 Rpt, p. 5. ↑
46 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 263. ↑
47 Army
Service Forces Monthly Rpt, Sec 7, Health, Jun 45, p.
10. ↑
48 7th Div
Medical Rpt, App. C to G-4 Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
49 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 135–36. ↑
51 History
of Civil Affairs Div, WD Special Staff, Philippines, pp. 1–17,
typescript in OCMH. ↑
52 Memo,
Gen Fellers for CINCSWPA, 23 Jul 44, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, Report
on Civil Affairs (2 vols), II, 1. ↑
53 GHQ
SWPA Staff Memo 35, 30 Aug 44; Rpt cited n. 52, pp.
6–9. ↑
54 GHQ
SWPA Staff Memo 40; Ibid., 28 Sep 44, pp.
12–15. ↑
55 GHQ
SWPA, Standing Operating Procedure Instns 26, 9 Oct 44; Ibid.,
pp. 22–42. ↑
56 Sixth
Army Admin O 14, Annex 8, Civil affairs Plan, 30 Sep 44. ↑
58 The
material on refugees in the Palo area is taken from 24th Inf Div Opns
Rpt Leyte, Annex 13, pp. 146–48. ↑
59
Material on refugees in the Dulag area is based on the Report of Naval
Civil Affairs Unit, 7 Dec 44, 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Incl 1, App.
G to Annex 1. ↑
60 Civil
Affairs, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 279. ↑
62 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 22–23. ↑
63 Ltr, CG
Sixth Army to CG X Corps and others, 25 Nov 44. ↑
CHAPTER XII
The Mountain Barrier: Part One
The successful completion of the campaign for the
entire Leyte Valley on 2 November enabled General Krueger to embark on
the next phase of his plan for the liberation of Leyte.
This action was to consist of two drives converging on
Ormoc: one south through Ormoc Valley by X Corps and the other north
from Baybay by XXIV Corps. The remaining Japanese on the island would
thus be forced into the mountains west of Ormoc Valley where they could
not offer effective organized resistance. At first, while some elements
of the XXIV Corps continued to push west to reinforce the troops on the
shores of Ormoc Bay and mopped up in southern Leyte Valley, the X Corps
was to secure control of the coast of Carigara Bay from Carigara to
Pinamopoan. With the completion of this assignment, the northern
elements of the Sixth Army would be in a position to drive south along
Highway 2 which twisted and turned through the northern mountains and
central plains of Ormoc Valley to the port of Ormoc.1
(Map 13)
Johnstone
BATTLE FOR NORTHERN ENTRANCE TO ORMOC VALLEY
3–15 November 1944
General Sibert ordered elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division to occupy Carigara while the 24th Division secured the coastal
corridor that ran from Carigara to Pinamopoan and then drove south
along Highway 2 and occupied Ormoc. A battalion from the 24th Division
was to move to the Jaro area and protect the 155-mm. howitzers of the
947th Field Artillery Battalion which was to assist the advance south
by covering a trail that ran from Jaro to Ormoc.2
Since the 21st Infantry had encountered virtually no
opposition in the vicinity of Panaon Strait and since it was desirable
that the regiment rejoin the 24th Division, General Krueger on 30
October had directed General Hodge to relieve the 21st Infantry with
one battalion of the 32d Infantry.3 General Irving ordered the
34th Infantry to continue its attack and secure Capoocan. When the town
was captured the 19th Infantry was to move into it on 4 November while
the 34th Infantry continued the drive west and secured
Pinamopoan.4
The Coastal Corridor
Capoocan and Pinamopoan
At 0700 on 3 November the 34th Infantry moved west
from its perimeter at Balaud in a column of battalions, with the 1st
Battalion, under Colonel Clifford, in the lead. The 1st Battalion
entered Capoocan at 0755 and within ten minutes had secured the
town.5
At 0830 the battalion moved out and continued west along
the coastal road to Pinamopoan. [207]After an advance of about
1,000 yards, Company B, the point, encountered an enemy force,
estimated at about 100 men, entrenched on the west bank of a stream.
The column halted and placed mortar fire on the Japanese but failed to
dislodge them. The company then withdrew while the howitzers of the 63d
Field Artillery Battalion pounded the enemy position.
In the meantime a platoon of Company B moved south to
secure a ridge which paralleled the road. When the platoon located some
Japanese dug in on the reverse slope Colonel Clifford sent Company A to
its assistance. The guides took Company A over the wrong trail and the
troops ran into the strong enemy entrenchments well concealed by
underbrush on the western bank of the stream. Company A launched a
frontal assault, but after the first platoon had passed the hidden
positions the Japanese opened fire and forced the company to withdraw.
Colonel Clifford rushed Company C to the assistance of Company A,
ordering it to deploy around the left flank of Company A and onto the
next ridge. The platoon from Company B returned to its morning
position.
Companies A and C then started against the Japanese
emplacements on the opposite bank of the stream.6 The leader
of the advance squad of Company A was killed and Sgt. Charles E. Mower
assumed command. As he started to lead his men across the stream,
Sergeant Mower was severely wounded. From his exposed position in the
middle of the stream he directed his squad in the destruction of two
enemy machine guns and numerous riflemen, but he was killed when the
Japanese turned their fire against him. Sergeant Mower was posthumously
awarded the Medal of Honor.
At 1530 Colonel Clifford withdrew Company A. After the
63d Field Artillery Battalion had blasted the ridge parallel to the
road, Company B attacked, while Company C made its envelopment around
the south flank and destroyed the Japanese pocket of resistance. At
1800 the 1st Battalion formed its night perimeter.7
Earlier, at 1430, Company K had made a reconnaissance in
amphibian tractors from Capoocan to a point just west of Pinamopoan.
Since it encountered heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and
returned to Capoocan.8
During the night the 11th and 63d Field Artillery
Battalions massed their fires and laid interdiction fire up and down
the highway. Under cover of darkness, the Japanese force opposing the
1st Battalion withdrew. On the following morning patrols sent out by
the 1st Battalion scouted 1,000 yards to the front but encountered no
enemy. The battalion therefore moved out at 0730 to Colasian where it
set up a defensive position. The 2d and 3d Battalions then passed
through the 1st. The 2d Battalion entered Pinamopoan and dug in, while
the 3d passed through the town and continued west along the highway
1,700 yards. There it set up a defensive position just short of a ridge
of hills that was later to be known as Breakneck Ridge.9
Between Capoocan and Pinamopoan the Japanese had abandoned three
75-mm., one 40-mm., and five 37-mm. guns, together with ammunition
dumps, signal equipment, and many documents. The 34th Infantry found
some land mines on the road and destroyed them. Since the regiment had
quickly secured the coastal [208]corridor and had started to move
down Highway 2, the X Corps was now in a position from which it could
drive south.
Defense of the Coastal Corridor
Some elements of the 26th Division had
arrived on Leyte during the naval battle, and on 1 November most of the
1st Division and the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment
of the 26th Division landed at Ormoc. The 1st Division,
which had been activated in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during the
“China Incident” and had been transferred to Shanghai in
August 1944. Though it had no combat experience, this division was
considered by General Tomochika to be the best equipped division of the
Japanese Army. Under the command of Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, it had
been held in reserve by Imperial General Headquarters for the
decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila with great
expectations.10
The arrival of these troops was in accord with a plan
devised after the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The 102d Division,
coming from Panay, and the 1st and 26th Divisions,
sailing from Luzon, were to land at Ormoc. General Suzuki planned to
have these troops move north along the Ormoc-Limon road (Highway 2)
through Ormoc Valley, from which they were to diverge in three columns
and capture the Carigara-Jaro road. After seizing the road, the
Japanese troops were to advance east and destroy the American forces in
the area between Tacloban and Tanauan. After the 1st Division
had secured Carigara, the 68th Brigade was to land in the north
as 35th Army reserve. At the same time the 30th Division
was to land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and advance over mountainous trails
to Burauen and later neutralize all resistance in the Dulag
area.11
When General Suzuki received information that the
Americans had secured Carigara, he realized that it would be impossible
to drive toward San Pedro Bay with the Americans on his left flank. He
believed, however, that the reinforced 1st Division could easily
wipe out the American forces in the Carigara area. On 3 November he
ordered the 1st Division to speed up its passage through Ormoc
Valley and the 102d Division to consolidate its forces with
those of the 1st Division for an all-out attack to annihilate
the American troops near Carigara. The 26th Division was to
advance on Jaro.12 No alternative to this plan had been
prepared in case the projected operations were not successful.13 On 3 November, American aircraft struck at the
1st Division as it moved up Ormoc Valley in a ten-mile-long
convoy of trucks, tanks, and artillery. They destroyed about thirty
trucks and left two tanks burning. The aircraft received heavy and
accurate ground antiaircraft fire, and two of the planes were shot down
by the Japanese.14 [209]
The lack of defense at Carigara had come as a surprise
to General Krueger, since the Americans had observed the Japanese
reinforcing the area. General Suzuki had cleverly concealed from the
Americans his strength and intentions and thus had gained time for a
withdrawal by a “very successful” delaying action.15 At the same time, the 57th Infantry
Regiment of the 1st Division had been able to move north
through Ormoc Valley and establish itself in the northern mountains
surrounding Highway 2.
The bringing in of reinforcements by the Japanese
brought into sharp focus the lack of American aerial strength on Leyte.
Although the Fifth Air Force had numerous aircraft in the rear areas,
these could not be brought forward because of the very poor condition
of the available airstrips. The few aircraft based on Leyte could not
prevent the flow of additional enemy forces into the island or give
direct support to the ground troops of Sixth Army.
Since the Japanese had been able to send without
difficulty about 13,500 troops into the Ormoc area, General Krueger
recognized that they were capable also of landing troops on the shores
of Carigara Bay. This landing, if successful, would isolate the
American forces in the Carigara area. To meet this threat, several
courses of action were open to General Krueger: he could devote the
full energy of the X Corps to preparing a defense against a sea force
attack; he could disregard the threat and have the X Corps push
vigorously south and secure a position on ground south of Limon, which
was about two and a half miles southwest of Pinamopoan, before the
Japanese could build defensive positions; or, finally, he could advance
south with some elements, leaving others to guard the Carigara
area.
If the Japanese Navy and amphibious assault forces
entered Carigara Bay, the possibilities for effective countermeasures
were not very promising. The escort carriers of the Seventh Fleet,
greatly weakened by the Battle of Leyte Gulf, could not give support,
and it was quite possible that any assistance that could be furnished
by the Third Fleet might not arrive in time.
Ranking officers of the Seventh Fleet, however, did not
believe it likely that the Japanese would launch an amphibious assault
through Carigara Bay. The reasons given were as follows: The Japanese
had never made an assault landing against defended beaches in the past;
they were short of equipment to make a sustained amphibious assault;
and they would be landing in the face of the combined fire of the X
Corps artillery which would cover the beachhead area from positions
well behind the beaches.16
Although General Krueger realized that the high ground
in the Limon area was the key to operations farther south, he decided
that the threat to the Carigara area could not be ignored. Since he had
insufficient forces to drive south and at the same time to prepare the
Carigara area for defense, on 4 November he directed General Sibert to
protect the Carigara area from a seaborne attack before the advance to
the south was continued. At the same time the X Corps was to send out
units to explore for trails that led from Daro, about three miles
southwest of Jaro, to Ormoc with the view of emplacing an artillery
battalion of 155-mm. guns within effective firing range of
Ormoc.17 [210]
General Sibert immediately told General Irving to defer
until further orders the advance south by the 24th Division. At the
same time he directed Generals Irving and Mudge to have their divisions
prepare defenses to ward off a seaborne attack against the
Barugo-Carigara-Capoocan area. Patrols of the 24th Infantry Division
and the 1st Cavalry Division were to maintain contact at the Carigara
River.18
General Mudge thereupon ordered the 1st Cavalry Brigade
to patrol the Carigara-Jaro road and to protect the movement of
supplies and troops along the road. The 2d Cavalry Brigade was to
establish two squadrons in the Carigara-Barugo area to protect the
seaward approaches to the area, guard the bridge between Barugo and
Carigara, and maintain the security of San Juanico Strait. The brigade
was to be prepared to reinforce the 24th Division.19
General Irving, also, redisposed his forces. All the
field artillery battalions had been at Carigara but, with the issuance
of the order to protect the coast of Carigara Bay, the 13th and 52d
Field Artillery Battalions moved to Colasion Point on 4 November, while
the 63d and 11th took positions east and west of Capoocan.20
On 5 November General Sibert returned the 21st Infantry
to the 24th Division and recommended that General Irving send the
regiment to Pinamopoan to relieve the battle-weary 34th
Infantry.21 By the end of the day the 1st and 3d Battalions,
21st Infantry, had relieved the 34th Infantry and were on the edge of
Breakneck Ridge west of Pinamopoan.22
The American aircraft made two strikes at the convoy of
the 1st Division as it moved north up Highway 2. The first one
at about 1430 destroyed about thirty trucks, several tanks, and an
ammunition dump and killed fifty to seventy-five men and thirty to
forty horses. The second strike at about 1745 hit trucks loaded with
Japanese soldiers who scattered when attacked. All the vehicles were
camouflaged with palm leaves.23
By 6 November, since the X Corps had disposed its force
to protect the seaward approaches and since the Navy had given
assurance that an amphibious assault was unlikely, General Krueger felt
that the attack south could be continued. He was anxious to have the
Sixth Army drive rapidly down Highway 2 and secure the port of Ormoc,
through which the Japanese had reinforced the Leyte garrison. He also
wished to guard against the possibility that the Japanese, as more and
more of their troops moved up Ormoc Valley, would attempt to debouch
into northern Leyte Valley. He therefore directed General Sibert to
expend his main effort in the drive south but also to send elements of
his force into the mountains east of Ormoc Valley. These units were to
seize the mountain passes and secure positions in the Daro area from
which the artillery could deliver long-range fire upon Ormoc in support
of the advance south. At the same time, elements of the XXIV Corps were
to guard the mountain passages into southern Leyte Valley.24 [211]
Battle of Breakneck Ridge
The Battle Begins
On 5 November General Sibert instructed the 24th
Division to complete the relief of the 34th Infantry and at the same
time to push strong, aggressive patrols to the south. The 1st
Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to protect a battalion of 155-mm. guns,
which was to deliver long-range fire on Ormoc, about fourteen miles to
the southwest. The attack south was to begin on 7 November.25
Accordingly, General Irving ordered the 21st Infantry,
after the completion of its relief of the 34th Infantry, to reconnoiter
Breakneck Ridge to its front on 6 November and on the following day to
launch its drive south. A battalion of the 19th Infantry was to move to
Pinamopoan and protect the line of communications of the 21st Infantry
as the attack progressed. The rest of the 19th Infantry was to move to
the mountains in the vicinity of Daro and Jaro to protect the 226th
Field Artillery Battalion and secure the mountain passes that led into
Leyte Valley.26
The 21st Infantry relieved the 34th Infantry in the
vicinity of Pinamopoan without difficulty and sent out strong patrols
to Breakneck Ridge. One of these patrols was led by Lt. Col. Frederick
R. Weber, the regimental commander.
Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its
way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7,200 yards, was actually a
hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped
crest line toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the
Leyte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on
the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily
forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st
Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the
innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The
Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other
defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes.
Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the
crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider
hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was
left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire.
The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and,
more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered
movements of the enemy at night.27
On 5 November, before the relief of the 34th Infantry,
Maj. Kemuel K. Blacker, leading an artillery forward observer’s
party from the 52d Field Artillery Battalion and a patrol from the 34th
Infantry, had reconnoitered far forward on Breakneck Ridge to the top
of a knoll, later called OP Hill, which was some 2,500 yards west of
Pinamopoan, and was directing fire from that point.28 The
party was attacked by a group of about platoon strength from the
57th Infantry Regiment and took refuge in an abandoned position.
At 1230 Colonel Weber ordered the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, to move
out to the party’s assistance. Company K, on the right side of
the highway, was able to secure the northern approaches [212]to
the hill and rescue the observation party, though it ran into heavy
machine gun and rifle fire. In the meantime Company I moved to the left
and against stiff resistance secured a ridge later known as Corkscrew
Ridge, which was about 1,200 yards southeast of OP Hill and which
formed the southeastern spur of Breakneck Ridge. Since both companies
needed more ammunition, vehicles with the required supply were sent up
along the road. After hidden Japanese riflemen had punctured the tires,
the vehicles withdrew and the ammunition was carried up by hand. A
platoon of riflemen from Company I cleared out the enemy position but
received mortar fire from an unknown source.29
Both companies were so far in advance of the rest of the
21st Infantry that only limited supplies of ammunition and rations
could reach them. As the afternoon hours wore on, the pressure from the
57th Infantry increased but the companies dug in and held their
positions. During the night they repulsed three counterattacks of about
fifty men each.30 On the following morning the 57th
Infantry placed mortar fire upon the companies,31
augmented at first by fire from one artillery piece and later by fire
from a four-gun battery.32 The intensity of this fire
forced the companies to withdraw from their position and rejoin the
rest of the 3d Battalion on the beach near Colasion.33
During the day the 1st Battalion tried unsuccessfully to
secure positions to support the attack through Breakneck Ridge. At the
close of 6 November the 57th Infantry of the 1st Division
securely occupied Breakneck Ridge and its northern approaches. For the
assault the following day, General Irving attached the 3d Battalion,
19th Infantry, to the 21st Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry,
had reorganized about 2,000 yards east of Pinamopoan. The 1st Battalion
was on the regiment’s right, the 2d Battalion was in the center
astride the highway, and the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was on the
21st Infantry’s left.34
The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was the object of a
night attack that started at 2000 and lasted for two hours. The enemy
used mortars and grenades against the battalion but was unable to
penetrate its perimeter.35 Colonel Weber ordered the 21st
Infantry to be prepared to move out at 0800 on 7 November. The assault
was to be made in column of battalions, the 2d Battalion in the lead,
with a spur of Breakneck Ridge as the initial objective. This spur or
branch ridge extended east and west across the road 400 yards south of
the front line. General Irving ordered the 52d Field Artillery
Battalion to mass its fire immediately in front of the troops for
fifteen minutes just before they jumped off and then to shift its fire
to the ridge. Attached to the 2d Battalion for support were a platoon
from the 44th Tank Company, a company from the 85th Chemical Battalion,
and a company from the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion.36
At 0940 the 308th Bombardment Wing bombed the
headquarters of General Suzuki at Ormoc and strafed the highway near
by. Ormoc had also been under constant fire from the battalion of
155-mm. guns in Jaro, at a range of 25,000 yards. Only a [213]few
houses were left standing after the bombardment was completed.37
The troops moved out as scheduled. Company E, on the
west of the road, reached the branch ridge at 0915 and came under fire
from enemy automatic weapons on the right. Company G ran into about 200
men from the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry Regiment. They were
well entrenched at a bend of the road on the forward slope of the high
ground, and Colonel Weber had the self-propelled guns of the tank
destroyer battalion brought forward. These fired into the pocket, and
although they killed the commander of the 3d Battalion the unit
held fast.38 Weber then called two tanks forward, but as they
moved along the road a Japanese soldier jumped out of the high cogon
grass and disabled one of the tanks by planting a magnetic mine against
it. The other tank then withdrew.39
General Sibert was dissatisfied with the progress of the
21st Infantry and felt that Colonel Weber was not sufficiently
aggressive. Accompanied by his G-2, Col. William J. Verbeck, he visited
the command post of Colonel Weber at noon. Dispensing with the usual
command channels and in the presence of General Irving, he relieved
Colonel Weber and made Colonel Verbeck the commanding officer of the
21st Infantry. Colonel Weber was retained in the regiment as its
executive officer.40
Colonel Verbeck ordered Company L, in support of the 2d
Battalion, to make a wide flanking movement to the east and secure the
ridge which had been denied to Company G. The company moved out at 1630
but was unsuccessful. As it withdrew it made contact with Company F
which had successfully pushed forward but because of an unexplained
misunderstanding of orders had withdrawn.41 Night
perimeters were established on the edge of Breakneck Ridge.
On the same day Colonel Chapman, commander of the 19th
Infantry, ordered his 2d Battalion to send a reinforced rifle company
to Hill 1525 about 2,600 yards southeast of Limon, seize this ground,
and, in support of the advance south by the 21st Infantry, direct
artillery fire on Highway 2. Company G, 19th Infantry, moved out on
this mission with only two thirds of a ration per man, since its
kitchens were still in the Jaro area. The guides with Company G lost
their way, and the company set up a night perimeter after a patrol had
located a strong enemy position on a ridge west of its course. The
company position was thought to be in the vicinity of Hill 1525, but it
was actually far east of the hill.42
As the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had failed to secure
the ridge 400 yards to its front, Colonel Verbeck that night ordered
the battalion, with Company L attached, to continue the attack toward
the ridge after an artillery barrage on the following morning. The 1st
Battalion was to secure Hill 1525, establish contact with the 2d
Battalion, 19th Infantry, and from the hill envelop the southern flank
of the 1st Division.43
On the morning of 8 November a typhoon, moving in from
the west, swept [214]over the entire island. Jan Valtin, a
member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: “From the
angry immensity of the heavens floods raced in almost horizontal
sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like
streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse of …
[cogon] grass the howling of the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint
of the unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On
Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the
… seas. Planes were grounded and ships became haunted things looking
for refuge. Massed artillery … barrages to the summit of Breakneck
Ridge sounded dim and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by
the rain. The sky was black.”44 In the midst of the storm,
the infantry attacked.
ENGINEERS REMOVE LAND MINES from a bridge on
Breakneck Ridge.
The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, effectively used flame
throwers to drive the enemy troops out of spider holes and
caves.45 Although shelled by sporadic artillery fire, the
battalion continued to advance. Strong elements of the 57th
Infantry hotly contested the American assault. Meanwhile Company E
pushed farther along the road until it was halted at the site of a
bridge which had been destroyed by the enemy. The Japanese had flanked
the site with emplacements from which rifle, automatic weapons, and
mortar fire resisted the frontal attack of [215]the
company.46 At nightfall Company E fell back to its morning
position. The 57th Infantry continued to make a determined stand
against the 2d Battalion. Concealed Japanese riflemen fired
continuously on the front, flanks, and rear of all positions and small
enemy detachments infiltrated through the lines. In concert with the
attack of the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion had moved out that
morning toward Hill 1525. Since the maps were grossly inaccurate, the
precise location of the hill was unknown, but the battalion reported
that it had reached the southern slope of the hill at 1600 and was
digging in under automatic weapons fire. At 0700 the 2d Battalion, 19th
Infantry, under Colonel Spragins, moved out through a driving rain and
over precipitous trails to join the battalion’s Company G. During
the day Company G drove the enemy off the ridge where the
company’s advance had been halted the previous afternoon. In
their flight the Japanese abandoned much equipment, most of which was
new. Of more importance, a significant field order of the 1st
Division was found on the body of a Japanese officer.
When the consolidation of the battalion was made,
Colonel Spragins determined that he was east of Hill 1525 as shown on
the maps. Although the battalion was in a position to observe Leyte
Valley, it would have to move westward in order to get a view of Ormoc
Valley. At 1530 Colonel Spragins therefore sent Company E to occupy a
ridge 1,000 yards to the west. The battalion then dug in for the
night.47 On the following morning General Irving placed
the battalion under the operational control of the 21st Infantry.
Immediately in front of the 21st Infantry was a Japanese
force estimated to be of battalion strength. To the east was an
undetermined number of enemy machine guns. In front of Company E a
bridge was out and tanks could not pass. On the steep sides of the
gulch around this bridge site, elements of the 57th Infantry
with rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars stopped all attempts of
Company E to move forward.48
Through the night torrential rains fell. At dawn of 9
November two begrimed, soaked, and weary battalions of the 21st
Infantry jumped off to the attack, the 2d Battalion, less Company F, on
the west side of the road and the 3d Battalion on the east. Heavy
artillery preparations had already pounded the Japanese front lines. As
the attack progressed, mortars and artillery placed fires on targets of
opportunity. In destroying pockets of resistance in the gulch,
grenades, rifles, and flame throwers were used, together with heavy
machine guns.
At 0930 Company I, 21st Infantry, reached the crest of
the intermediate ridge on the east side of the road which ran southward
toward the center of Breakneck Ridge. An hour later Company E, 21st
Infantry, moved out from the perimeter it had held for two days. Its
mission was to cut west of the road and secure the commanding high
ground in the rear of the emplaced Japanese at the bridge site where
the advance of the company had been stopped on the previous day. At the
same time Company L, 21st Infantry, passed through Company I and
attacked the center of Breakneck Ridge as Company G started a wide
envelopment to the west from Company E’s position to assault OP
Hill from the west. Artillery forward observer parties went with the
companies [216]and called artillery fires on targets of
opportunity.
At 1150 Company L encountered determined opposition from
enemy rifle and mortar fire but doggedly pushed ahead for several hours
and secured the top of the ridge. Company G reached its objective, but
upon receiving intense enemy fire was forced to retire to the eastern
slopes of a ridge 300 yards to the north, where it reorganized. Company
E also reached its objective and then formed its night perimeter. At
1815 the Japanese launched a counterattack against the perimeter of
Company G but the attack was repulsed. For the night a platoon of heavy
machine guns was attached to each rifle company to protect its
perimeter.
Since the position of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
had by this time become clear, Colonel Verbeck ordered the battalion to
move from the east and to relieve the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, on
Hill 1525. One company was to be established on a ridge overlooking
Highway 2 while the remainder of the battalion was to block the trail
that passed Hill 1525.49 The 1st Battalion, 21st
Infantry, was to push westward from its position on Hill 1525 and cut
the Ormoc road some 1,800 yards south of Limon in order to forestall
the escape of Japanese troops from Breakneck Ridge. Company A was to
remain on the hill and hold it until the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
arrived.
The 1st Battalion, less Company A, jumped off at 0730.
After it had advanced about one and a half miles and was within sight
of Highway 2, the battalion was halted by heavy enemy fire from the
front and both flanks. It renewed the attack and informed Colonel
Verbeck that it was moving slowly northwest and was less than a mile
from Limon. In the meantime the enemy attacked Company A on Hill 1525,
and the company was able to maintain its position with difficulty.
Because of this fight and the fact that no contact had been established
with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, Colonel Verbeck ordered the
battalion to rejoin Company A. The troops therefore returned and took
part in the fight to repel the Japanese. The 1st Battalion withstood
the enemy force until 1400, when an estimated battalion of fresh troops
from the 57th Infantry was thrown into the fight.50 The Americans then broke off the engagement, and
the battalion, covered by Company A, withdrew from Hill 1525 to the
vicinity of Pinamopoan.51
Information that the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was
being attacked on Hill 1525 reached the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
shortly after noon as it was on its way to relieve the 1st Battalion.
Colonel Spragins pushed forward immediately with two companies, hoping
to reach the 1st Battalion by 1500, but progress was slowed by steep,
slippery slopes that were often blocked by huge fallen trees. At 1630,
without having heard any sounds of battle, which they had hoped would
guide them to the 1st Battalion’s position, the troops reached
what they believed to be the western slopes of Hill 1525. Patrols
reported no contact either with friendly or enemy units and the 2d
Battalion set up its night perimeter.
“At this time,” states the 24th Infantry
Division operations report on Leyte, “it began to dawn on all
concerned that Hill 1525, as shown on the map, was not a single hill
mass, but a long ridge of many knolls and hilltops.”52 [217]
VIEW FROM THE RIDGES LOOKING NORTH UP THE LIMON
VALLEY
Breakneck Ridge: Second Phase
On 9 November the Japanese 26th Division
arrived at Ormoc in three large transports with a destroyer escort. The
troops landed without their equipment and ammunition, since aircraft
from the Fifth Air Force bombed the convoy and forced it to depart
before the unloading was completed. During the convoy’s return,
some of the Japanese vessels were destroyed by the American
aircraft.53
The arrival of these troops was in accord with a plan
embodied in the order which had been taken from the dead Japanese
officer on the previous day. This plan envisaged a grand offensive
which was to start in the middle of November. The 41st Infantry
Regiment of the 30th Division and the 169th and
171st Independent Infantry Battalions of the 102d
Division were to secure a line that ran from a hill 3,500 yards
northwest of Jaro to a point just south of Pinamopoan and protect the
movement of the 1st Division to this line. With the arrival of
the 1st Division on this defensive line, a coordinated attack
was to be launched—the 1st Division seizing the Carigara
area and the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 26th Division
attacking the Mt. Mamban area about ten miles southeast of Limon.
(See Map 2.) The way would then be open for a drive into Leyte
Valley.54
General Krueger was quick to realize the significance of
this order. Since General Suzuki apparently wished to make the
mountains of northern Leyte the battleground for [218]the
island, Krueger disposed his forces to meet the enemy threat. The X
Corps was to continue its drive south down Highway 2 but at the same
time was to dispose units in the central mountain range to protect the
exits from Ormoc Valley into Leyte Valley. The XXIV Corps was to send a
reinforced regiment into the hills northwest of Dagami to prevent any
Japanese from infiltrating into Leyte Valley, and the corps was also to
be prepared to assist elements of the X Corps that guarded the trail
running from Daro to Dolores, a village about six miles northeast of
Ormoc. A regiment of the XXIV Corps was to be placed in Sixth Army
Reserve at Dagami, where the central mountain range began.55
General Sibert then ordered the 24th Division to
continue its attack south. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team,
under Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, which was expected to arrive on
14 November, was to relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that
guarded the beaches in the Carigara-Barugo area. The 1st Cavalry
Division was then to drive southwest from the central mountains and
relieve some of the pressure against the 24th Division.56
General Hodge at the same time ordered the 96th Division
to seize the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, secure all routes of
exit from the west coast through the central mountain range, and send
patrols through the passes to the west coast of Leyte. The division was
also ordered to maintain in the vicinity of Dagami one infantry
regiment in Sixth Army Reserve. At the same time elements of the 7th
Division had reached the shores of Ormoc Bay in the vicinity of Baybay
and were ordered to send patrols toward Ormoc and to prepare the route
for a future advance in strength.57
If the attention of the Japanese could be fastened upon
the X Corps in the north and northeast, it might be possible for
General Krueger to put into effect his plan to send a strong force from
the XXIV Corps over the mountains far to the south along the
Abuyog—Baybay road to the eastern shores of Ormoc Bay in order to
reinforce elements of the 7th Division already there. This force was to
drive north toward Ormoc while elements of the X Corps pushed south
toward the town along Highway 2. It might even be possible later to
land an amphibious force, perhaps as large as a division, at a point
just below Ormoc. But first it was all-important that the Japanese be
contained in Ormoc Valley and that their attention continue to be
directed to the north.58
On 9 November General Irving ordered the 24th Division
to launch a co-ordinated assault on the following day to drive the
1st Division from Breakneck Ridge and also deny it commanding
ground from which the Japanese could conduct delaying actions just
south of the barrio of Limon. (See Map 13.) The 21st Infantry
was to drive south along Highway 2 and the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
was to proceed west from its position on the east flank of the enemy
and establish a roadblock on Highway 2 about 2,000 yards south of
Limon. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to make a wide enveloping
movement around the west flank of the 57th Infantry and seize
the high ground known as Kilay Ridge which was about 700 yards from
Highway 2 and west of the proposed roadblock of the 2d Battalion, 19th
Infantry. General Irving announced: “Success of the Leyte
Campaign [219]depends upon quickly and completely destroying
hostile forces on our front.”59
By the morning of 10 November the 1st Battalion, 21st
Infantry, had reorganized and re-equipped itself. The 2d and 3d
Battalions of the regiment were disposed along a ridge southwest of
Pinamopoan. The companies of the two battalions were
intermingled.60
The rains continued to pour down upon the troops, and
the thick mud was slippery and treacherous underfoot. After the
artillery had fired a ten-minute concentration on Breakneck Ridge, the
21st Infantry attacked at 0945. Company A, the lead company, passed
through Company E and pushed south. At 0955 Company G seized OP Hill.
Simultaneously, Company I moved to the site of the destroyed bridge 300
yards east of OP Hill. Company L moved toward the high ground 300 yards
southeast of its position and at 1120 secured this ground.
Colonel Verbeck then ordered the 1st Battalion to attack
a ridge 200 yards to its front by maneuvering through the defiles on
each side of the enemy-held spur. The maneuver was unsuccessful and the
1st Battalion resumed its former position.61 The
Japanese resisted all efforts of the 2d Battalion to move down the
reverse slope of OP Hill.62 During the day the 1st
Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved
out to secure the commanding positions south of Limon.63
The ten guns of the 2d Battalion, 1st Artillery
Regiment of the 1st Division, were moved to a position east
of Limon where they could be used to assist the 57th Infantry
Regiment.64 During the night of 10–11 November the
57th Infantry severed the telephone lines from the headquarters
of the 21st Infantry to all of the regiment’s battalions.
That night the American artillery fired heavy
interdiction fires, and before 0900 on 11 November it delivered
preparations, including white phosphorus shells, on enemy pockets and
strong points on Breakneck Ridge. Company C of the 85th Chemical
Battalion maintained constant harassing fires on the reverse slopes of
the east ridge and OP Hill, at the rate of approximately two 4.2-inch
mortar rounds every five minutes.65 Colonel Verbeck attached
Company L to the 2d Battalion.
The 21st Infantry resumed the attack at 0900 with the
1st and 2d Battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion to the north of OP
Hill and the 2d Battalion south and west of the parts of Breakneck
Ridge previously captured.
Strong elements of the 57th Infantry from the
south and from positions in the wooded ridges east of Corkscrew Ridge
immediately fired upon the 2d Battalion and pinned it down for the rest
of the day. The 1st Battalion encountered little opposition until it
reached a point about 300 yards south of the crest of Breakneck Ridge,
where the Japanese strongly resisted. The troops then moved west of the
enemy left flank about 200 yards to enable the tanks from Company A,
44th Tank Battalion, to make an attack against the main position of the
57th Infantry on Breakneck Ridge.66
The tanks proceeded along Highway 2 up Breakneck Ridge
and down its reverse slope. They destroyed an estimated twenty-five
enemy positions which contained automatic [220]weapons. One tank got
stuck when it went off the edge of the road. As darkness approached,
its crew was rescued by another tank which then put a 75-mm. shell into
the stalled vehicle to prevent its use by the Japanese.67
At 1600 the 308th Bombardment Wing dropped twenty-eight
500-pound bombs on the Valencia airfield in the middle of Ormoc Valley
and twenty-four 500-pound bombs on a Highway 2 bridge in the vicinity
of the airfield.68
At nightfall the 1st Battalion had secured its
objective, a ridge 300 yards to the southwest of OP Hill, and all
positions were consolidated. During the night the 226th and 465th Field
Artillery Battalions placed harassing fire on the enemy positions. In
order to shake the morale of the Japanese, the artillery fired its
rounds at exact five-minute intervals but scattered the fire throughout
the enemy-held area.69
On the morning of 12 November the 3d Battalion,
supported by six tanks and a platoon from the 632d Tank Destroyer
Battalion, moved out along the road skirting the crest of Breakneck
Ridge. By 1115 it had passed over the crest and was moving down the
reverse slope. After the 3d Battalion crossed the hill, the 1st
Battalion attacked on the right of the road with the mission of
enveloping the Japanese left (north) flank.70 There was
little resistance, and soon after 1200 the crest of Breakneck Ridge was
in the hands of the 21st Infantry. But shortly afterward the 2d
Field Artillery Battalion of the 1st Division shelled the
regiment and stopped all forward advance.71
On 13 November the 1st and 2d Battalions took up the
fight, with machine guns from the vicinity of OP Hill firing in
support. The 1st and 2d Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards,
respectively. By 14 November it appeared to General Irving that the
21st Infantry had eliminated nearly all resistance on Breakneck Ridge.
The regiment controlled the ridge proper, but several adjacent spurs,
notably Corkscrew Ridge, were still controlled by the 57th
Infantry. On 15 November the 1st Battalion, the most advanced unit,
was about 1,500 yards north of Limon. On 16 November the 128th Infantry
of the 32d Division relieved the 21st Infantry. The battle of Breakneck
Ridge had not been an easy one for the 21st Infantry; it had lost 630
men killed, wounded, and missing, together with 135 men from other
causes. By actual count it had killed 1,779 Japanese.72
[221]
1 Sixth
Army FO 28, 3 Nov 44. ↑
3 Sixth
Army FO 27, 30 Oct 44. ↑
5 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 3 Nov 44. ↑
6 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 3 Nov 44. ↑
7 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 3 Nov 44. ↑
8 24th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 39–40. ↑
10
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 18. ↑
11 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army
on Leyte, Part I, p. 5. ↑
13
Ibid., Part IV, p. 2, interrog of Col Junkichi Okabayashi, CofS
1st Div. Colonel Okabayashi makes the following statement about
Japanese planning: “It is not the ordinary practice in the
Japanese Army for higher headquarters to provide unit commanders with
alternate plans. When conferences are held between unit commanders and
the staff of higher headquarters, all possible alternatives are, of
course, discussed. At any rate, unit commanders are invariably oriented
with the general plan of higher headquarters. In the event an original
order cannot be carried out because of the changing battle situation,
the responsibility for making changes in plans devolves upon the
commander of the unit concerned.” ↑
14 Rpt of
Sixth Army G-3 Liaison Sec, 3 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov
44. ↑
15 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. ↑
16 Memo,
Maj Reppert for Col Clyde D. Eddleman, Rpt of Conf with Rear Adm
William M. Fechteler, 5 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov
44. ↑
17 Ltr of
Instns, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps, 4 Nov 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt
Leyte, p. 199. ↑
18 Ltr, CG
X Corps to CG’s 24th Div and 1st Cav Div, 4 Nov 44; X Corps G-3
Jnl, 5 Nov 44. ↑
19 1st Cav
Div FO 7, 4 Nov 44. ↑
20 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 103. ↑
21 X Corps
Opn Plan, 5 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. ↑
22 24th
Div Opns Sum, 5 Nov 44, X Corps G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. ↑
23 Msg,
G-2 X Corps to G-3 Sixth Army, 5 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov
44. ↑
24 Sixth
Army FO 29, Nov 44. ↑
25 X Corps
Amendment to FO 6, 5 Nov 44. ↑
27 Col
William J. Verbeck, A Regiment in Action (n. p., n. d., copy in
OCMH), p. 16; 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 42. ↑
28 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 42. ↑
29 24th
Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. ↑
30 24th
Div G-2 Jnl, 6 Nov 44. ↑
31 Rad,
Maj Clark, X Corps, to G-2 Sixth Army, BA 669, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 6
Nov 44. ↑
32 Msg,
S-2 21st Inf to CG 24th Div, 6 Nov 44, 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 6 Nov
44. ↑
33 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 42. ↑
34 Sixth
Army G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. ↑
35 Msg,
S-2 21st Inf to G-2 24th Div, 7 Nov 44, 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 7 Nov
44. ↑
36 21st
Inf FO 19, 7 Nov 44, 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44. ↑
37 Msg,
308th Bombardment Wing to Sixth Army, 7 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 7
Nov 44. ↑
38 Msg, CO
21st Inf to CG 24th Div, 7 Nov 44, 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44; 35th
Army Opns, p. 57. ↑
39 Msg,
S-3 21st Inf to CG 24th Div, 7 Nov 44, 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 7 Nov
44. ↑
40 Interv
with Col Verbeck, 26 Sep 51. Colonel Verbeck stated that for the
remainder of the campaign Colonel Weber was an excellent and loyal
executive officer. ↑
41 Msg,
S-3 21st Inf to G-3 24th Div, 7 Nov 44, 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44;
24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 43. ↑
42 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 43. ↑
43 24th
Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. ↑
44 Jan
Valtin [Richard J. Krebs], Children of Yesterday (New York, The
Readers Press, Inc., 1946), p. 187. ↑
45 24th
Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44. ↑
46 24th
Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 20, 8 Nov 44. ↑
47 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 45. ↑
48 Msg, CO
21st Inf to CofS 24th Div, 8 Nov 44, 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 8 Nov
44. ↑
49 Msg,
G-3 24th Div to G-2 24th Div, 9 Nov 44, 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 9 Nov
44. ↑
50 24th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 21, 9 Nov 44. ↑
51 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 47. ↑
54
Ibid.; Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 50; Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 9
Nov 44. ↑
55 Sixth
Army FO 30, 11 Nov 44. ↑
56 X Corps
FO 12, 12 Nov 44. ↑
57 XXIV
Corps FO 23, 10 Nov 44. ↑
58 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 57. ↑
60 24th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 10 Nov 44. ↑
61 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 49. ↑
62 24th
Div G-2 Jnl, 10 Nov 44. ↑
65 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 49. ↑
66 24th
Div G-3 Jnl, 11 Nov 44. ↑
67 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 50; 44th Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
2. ↑
68 Msg,
308th Bombardment Wing to Sixth Army, 11 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 11
Nov 44. ↑
69 X Corps
Arty S-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 12 Nov 44. ↑
70 24th
Div G-3 Jnl, 12 Nov 44; 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 50. ↑
71 24th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 12 Nov 44; 35th Army Opns, p.
62. ↑
CHAPTER XIII
The Mountain Barrier: Part Two
By the middle of November both the Americans and
the Japanese realized that the struggle for the island of Leyte was
going to be long and costly—far longer and costlier than either
had anticipated.
On 9 and 10 November, Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi,
the senior officer of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, held a
series of conferences on the progress of the campaign. General
Yamashita, commanding general of the 14th Area Army, strongly
urged that the Leyte operation be discontinued and offered reasons for
this stand: There was little likelihood that additional reinforcements
would reach the Philippines, and the vital manpower needed for the
defense of Luzon would be drained off uselessly at Leyte. The naval
battle of Leyte Gulf, he also thought, had been
“unsatisfactory” and there was reason to believe that the
air battle off Formosa had been equally disappointing. The shortage of
shipping and escort strength greatly aggravated the already difficult
problem of troop transportation. Finally, the land operations were not
proceeding favorably.1 But Yamashita’s superior,
Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding general of the Southern Army,
insisted that the reinforcement program be continued and that the
battle for Leyte be brought to a successful conclusion. General
Yamashita is said to have replied, “I fully understand your
intention. I will carry it out to a successful end.”2
Reinforcements
At the same time General Krueger was anxious to
complete the third phase of the American campaign, the two-pronged
drive toward the port of Ormoc. He felt, however, that there were
insufficient troops to both protect the mountain passes into Leyte
Valley and make the drives toward Ormoc.
In preparing for the Leyte Campaign, General Krueger had
asked that the units which were to participate be embarked with a 10
percent overstrength. This request was disapproved. Just before the
embarkation, however, he received 5,000 untrained
replacements.3 He had also requested that during the course
of the operation 18,800 replacements be delivered to the combat zone,
the first 10,000 to arrive by A plus 10. During the first thirty days
of the operation he would need the following replacements: 14,300
Infantry, 1,300 Field Artillery, 1,130 Corps of Engineers, 750 Medical
Corps, 375 Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Artillery, 185
Quartermaster Corps, 185 Ordnance, [222]185 Signal, and all others
375. Approximately 6 percent of these should be officers.4
Table 1—Sixth Army Daily Strength Reports, 12 November-25 December
1944
| Date | Authorized strength | Difference Between Effective and Authorized Strength | ||
| Officers | Enlisted Men | Officers | Enlisted Men | |
| 12 Nov 1944 | 6,978 | 107,461 | -1,050 | -11,754 |
| 19 Nov 1944 | 9,290 | 147,497 | -1,099 | -15,058 |
| 26 Nov 1944 | 11,977 | 185,462 | -1,603 | -17,977 |
| 2 Dec 1944 | 11,637 | 191,060 | -1,819 | -19,012 |
| 9 Dec 1944 | 10,721 | 174,148 | -1,194 | -18,261 |
| 16 Dec 1944 | 10,905 | 176,466 | -1,361 | -21,059 |
| 25 Dec 1944 | 11,019 | 176,628 | -1,228 | -22,536 |
Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20
October–25 December 1944, p. 153.
As the fighting extended into the mountains, the lack of
sufficient replacements began to be greatly felt. At no time did
General Krueger know when replacements would arrive, or whether they
would be combat or service troops, or what their individual specialties
would be. During the course of the operation he received only 336
officers and 4,953 enlisted men as replacements.
To add to these difficulties, General MacArthur’s
headquarters used figures for “assigned strength” rather
than “effective strength,” that is, the number actually
present with a unit, in computing the need for replacements. Such
figures gave an entirely erroneous picture, since evacuations were to
change rapidly the figures for medical installations, and dispositions
reports were delayed for long periods. For example, on 12 November the
assigned strength of the Sixth Army was only 289 officers and 1,874
enlisted men short of its Table of Organization strength, but its
effective strength was 1,050 officers and 11,754 enlisted men short of
the Table of Organization strength. By 20 December this shortage had
pyramided to about 21,000—considerably more than a division.
(Table 1) General Krueger was seriously concerned about the
situation, especially since nearly 79 percent of the casualties
occurred in the infantry.5
Fortunately, the 32d and 77th Infantry
Divisions—the Sixth Army reserve—were due to come in soon
or had already done so, and there were on the island additional units
that were to have used Leyte as a shipping area for subsequent
operations. The availability of the 11th Airborne Division, under Maj.
Gen. Joseph M. Swing, and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat
Team,6 under General Cunningham, was most timely. They
could be used to help guard the mountain passes into Leyte Valley and
also to give support to the drive of X Corps south down the Ormoc
Valley.
At the same time General Krueger proposed that as soon
as there were sufficient troops and supplies available, an amphibious
landing be made near Ormoc to capture [223]the town. This
operation would speedily reduce the Japanese opposition south of Ormoc,
cut the enemy’s line of communication at Ormoc, and place the
hostile forces in Ormoc Valley “in a vise which could shortly
squeeze them into extermination.”7
The supporting naval forces, however, could not make
available sufficient assault and resupply shipping to mount and support
such an operation. The Navy also thought that there was insufficient
air support on the island to insure the safe arrival of a convoy into
Ormoc Bay. There was a strong possibility that severe losses might
result from the suicide bombing techniques of the Japanese pilots.
General Krueger therefore set aside his plan until it could be
introduced at a more opportune time.8 When the
11th Airborne Division arrived, General Krueger could attach it to the
XXIV Corps in southern Leyte. General Hodge could then relieve some of
the troops that had been guarding the mountain entrances into the
valley and also send additional support to the troops on the shores of
Ormoc Bay, thus enabling the XXIV Corps to launch a strong drive toward
Ormoc from the south.
General Krueger originally had planned to have the 32d
Division, under Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, establish control over
southern Samar, but in view of the limited number of Japanese on that
island, he decided to make use of the division to add momentum to the
attack of X Corps and to give rest to the weary troops of the 24th
Division.9 On 14 November General Krueger therefore directed
General Sibert to relieve the units of the 24th Division with elements
of the 32d Division. At the same time, the 112th Cavalry was attached
to the 1st Cavalry Division in order to give impetus to the
attack.10
32d Division Assumes the Offensive
General Sibert made arrangements for the
introduction of the 32d Division and the 112th Cavalry into the battle.
The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
which had reached positions overlooking Highway 2 south of Limon, were
to remain in those locations and temporarily under the operational
control of General Gill. The 112th Cavalry was to operate in the
mountains between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys and assist the 1st Cavalry
Division in a drive to the southwest toward Highway 2. A regimental
combat team from the 32d Division was to relieve the 21st Infantry on
Breakneck Ridge. Another regiment from the division would mop up in the
vicinity of Hill 1525 and prepare to assist in the drive south.
Elements of the division were to relieve the units of the 24th Division
in the Daro area, from which the artillery had been shelling Ormoc. The
24th Division artillery was to support the advance of the 32d Division
until relieved.11 The flanks of the 32d Division were
protected. The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had established a roadblock
on Highway 2, about 2,000 yards south of Limon, and the 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, was on the high ground known as Kilay Ridge, which was
700 yards from the road and west of the roadblock of the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry.
General Gill directed the 128th Infantry of the 32d
Division, commanded by Col. John A. Hettinger, to pass through the 21st
Infantry and attack south astride Highway [224]2, to push through
Breakneck Ridge, and to capture Limon, 1,500 yards to the south.
Colonel Hettinger ordered the regiment to move out on 16 November at
0800 with battalions abreast—the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt.
Col. William A. Duncan, on the right (west) of Highway 2, and the 1st
Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James P. Burns, on the left.12 (Map 14)
BATTLE FOR NORTHERN ENTRANCE TO ORMOC VALLEY
16 November–14 December 1944
The forward elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions moved
out of their assembly areas on time. They were followed by the
remainder of the troops as fast as rations and ammunition could be
distributed. The battalions assembled immediately in the rear of the
21st Infantry and at 1200 pushed through that regiment and entered upon
their first battle on Leyte.13
Colonel Hettinger ordered Colonel Burns to overcome the
enemy opposition on Corkscrew Ridge. The 1st Battalion made little
progress. Company A was immediately pinned down by machine gun, mortar,
and rifle fire, and Company B went forward only 150 yards. The 3d
Battalion encountered no opposition and advanced to a point 350 yards
south of its line of departure, from which Company M delivered machine
gun fire and Company L rifle fire at long range on the enemy in the
vicinity of Limon.14
On the morning of 17 November the 1st Battalion reached
the slopes of Corkscrew Ridge, where it dug in. At 0737 the 3d
Battalion moved out along Highway 2 with companies
abreast—Company K on the right and Company L on the left. Company
K met no resistance, advanced about 1,000 yards, and reached a ridge
about 500 yards north of Limon. Elements of the 57th Infantry
stopped Company L almost immediately, but a platoon from the company
moved fifty yards west around the pocket of resistance and destroyed
it. The company then continued its advance to the ridge.15 Companies K and L dug in on the ridge for the
night.16
On the following morning Colonel Hettinger ordered the
3d Battalion to hold its position until the 1st Battalion could come
abreast. The 3d Battalion therefore limited its activities to sending
out patrols. The 1st Battalion again attacked Corkscrew Ridge but made
very limited gains.
Elements of the 57th Infantry had dug in on the
reverse slope of the ridge, and heavy jungle prevented complete
observation of these enemy positions. The Japanese regiment had placed
automatic weapons to command the only routes of approach, thus forcing
the American troops to move uphill in the face of hostile fire. The
2d Artillery Battalion had placed its guns so that they covered
Highway 2.17
The 1st Battalion continued to besiege Corkscrew Ridge
until 20 November, while the 3d Battalion remained on the ridge
overlooking Limon. Late in the afternoon of 21 November, Colonel
Hettinger ordered the 128th Infantry to seize Limon, and then move
south to secure a bridge-crossing over a tributary of the Leyte River.
The 1st Battalion was to contain the enemy on Corkscrew Ridge. The two
assault battalions of the regiment got into position on the ridge north
of Limon, the 2d Battalion on the [225]east side of Highway 2 and
the 3d on the west side.18
During the night the 120th Field Artillery Battalion
delivered harassing fire along the road between Limon and the Limon
bridge.19 At 0800 the assault troops moved out. The 3d
Battalion met little opposition, but the 2d met strong resistance from
the 57th Infantry.20 Company I encountered no
resistance as it moved along a bluff which was just west of the town
and which overlooked Limon and the bridge. Company K and the 2d
Battalion pushed through Limon and at 1400 the leading elements crossed
a tributary of the Leyte River south of the town. A determined Japanese
counterattack forced back the left flank of the 2d Battalion and
exposed Company K. A sudden flood of the stream, caused by heavy rains,
cut off the advance elements of Company K south of the river from the
rest of the company. These troops moved to the right and joined Company
I on the bluffs. The rest of the company and the 2d Battalion
established a night perimeter along a ridge east of the village. The 3d
Battalion, less Company K, established itself for the night around the
positions of Company I that overlooked the bridge and the tributary of
the river.21
On 23 November the 128th Infantry straightened out its
lines and consolidated its positions. For the next three days activity
was limited to extensive patrols and the placement of harassing fire on
an east-west ridge that overlooked the highway about 1,000 yards south
of Limon. Entrenched on this ridge, elements of the 1st Division
successfully resisted until 10 December all efforts of the 32d Division
to dislodge them.22
With the occupation of Limon, the battle of Breakneck
Ridge was over, but a number of bypassed pockets of resistance were not
eliminated until mid-December. The battle cost the 24th and 32d
Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing in
action, as compared with an estimated 5,252 Japanese killed and 8
captured.23
The Japanese had failed in their attempt to block off
Highway 2 at the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley. In no small
measure, the establishment and maintenance of a roadblock south of
Limon by the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the defense of Kilay
Ridge in the rear of the Japanese front lines by the 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, had made this achievement possible. (See Map 13.) Under constant fire and greatly outnumbered,
these units had prevented General Suzuki from sending additional troops
into Limon. From 12 to 23 November the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had
defended the roadblock under extremely difficult conditions. The
operations report of the 24th Division graphically summarizes the deeds
for which the battalion received a presidential citation:
These bearded, mud caked soldiers came out of the
mountains exhausted and hungry. Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow,
bodies emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen thirty-one comrades
mortally wounded, watched fifty-five others lie suffering in muddy
foxholes without adequate medical attention. Yet their morale had not
changed. It was high when they went in and high when they came out.
They were proud that they had rendered invaluable aid to the main
forces fighting in ORMOC CORRIDOR, [227]by disrupting the Japanese
supply lines and preventing strong reinforcements from passing up the
ORMOC ROAD. They were proud that they had outfought the Emperor’s
toughest troops, troops that had been battle trained in Manchuria. They
were certain they had killed at least 606 of the enemy and felt that
their fire had accounted for many more. And they were proud that this
had all been accomplished despite conditions of extreme hardship. Two
hundred and forty-one of the battalion’s officers and enlisted
men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue,
and sheer exhaustion.24
AMERICAN TROOPS IN LIMON (above), and taking
cover there as enemy shells hit the area (below).
The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, under Colonel
Clifford, operated west of Highway 2 on Kilay Ridge, behind the
Japanese front lines. It “wrote a brilliant page in the history
of the campaign”25 but, since its influence on the
situation was not appreciated until later and since it affords an
excellent example of a battalion fighting independently, the operation
of “Clifford’s Battalion” will be discussed
separately.
Battle of Kilay Ridge
When General Krueger told General Sibert to push
the X Corps south with all possible speed down Highway 2 toward Ormoc,
the latter had selected the 24th Division to make the drive. General
Irving wished to protect the sides of the road and prevent the Japanese
from sending reinforcements north up the highway. On 9 November he
therefore ordered the 34th Infantry to send a battalion around the
Japanese west flank to harass the enemy’s rear and thus relieve
the pressure that was holding up the frontal attack of the 21st
Infantry on Breakneck Ridge.
Nipponese Caught Napping
At 0100 on 10 November Colonel Dahlen, commander
of the 34th Infantry, alerted the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, for an
amphibious landing to take place at 0700. The battalion had been in
contact with the enemy for twenty-one days and was reduced to an
effective strength of 560 men. The 1st Battalion, with an
observer’s party from the 63d Field Artillery Battalion, was
ordered to move from Capoocan in eighteen LVT’s and proceed seven
miles northwest up the coast of Carigara Bay.26 It was then
to move inland and seize Kilay Ridge, which was west of the Ormoc road
some 3,000 yards behind the Japanese front lines.27
At 0700 the battalion, under Colonel Clifford, moved
out, taking every available man on the mission and leaving only a
minimum of cooks and drivers behind. Since the troops had to hand-carry
their equipment the Headquarters Company left the antitank guns behind,
and Company D took only one section of heavy machine guns and one
section of 81-mm. mortars. Colonel Clifford used the men thus released
to carry other weapons and ammunition. Because of the scant time
allowed by the orders, the battalion left without sufficient
rations.
At 0750 Clifford’s battalion went aboard the
LVT’s and at 0930 arrived at its destination. Debarking without
opposition it pushed rapidly inland and at 1145 reached a hill
approximately one mile from the landing area. At dusk the 1st Battalion
reached a ridge in the vicinity of Belen and about 2,000 yards north of
Agahang. [228]There it set up a night perimeter. Since his
maps were inaccurate, Colonel Clifford relied upon the services of
Filipino guides from this time until the end of the mission. The rugged
and muddy hillsides, made considerably worse by almost constant rain
and fog, were similar to those encountered by other units fighting in
the area.
At 0730 on 11 November Colonel Clifford sent out patrols
to pick up a promised airdrop of rations. The battalion had been
without food since the morning before. At 0910 Colonel Dahlen ordered
Colonel Clifford not to move on to Agahang, which was about 3,800 yards
northwest of Limon, until he received rations. The rations were not
forthcoming but at 1400 Dahlen told Clifford to obtain the promised
rations at Agahang, to which the battalion then proceeded. No supplies
were received, but Filipinos furnished the unit with bananas, cooked
rice, boiled potatoes, and a few chickens. A night perimeter was set
up.28
At 0850 on the following day Colonel Clifford’s
men received their first airdrop of rations. Ten minutes later the
commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the guerrilla 96th Infantry
made contact with Colonel Clifford and gave him a résumé
of the enemy situation. (The guerrillas rendered invaluable aid to the
1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, throughout the Kilay Ridge episode by
furnishing intelligence and protecting the rear of the unit.) The
battalion moved out at 1200 for Consuegra near the Naga River and
entered the town at 1240. At 1310 Colonel Clifford outlined to the
officers the plan for the next two days. For the rest of the day, the
battalion was to advance to Cabiranan and bivouac for the night. On the
morning of 13 November it was to split into two columns and make a fast
advance by separate routes to Kilay Ridge, where it would reorganize.
As Colonel Clifford was briefing his officers, LVT’s entered
Consuegra with rations for the troops. The LVT’s had left
Carigara Bay, passed through Biliran Strait, gone down Leyte Bay and
into the Naga River, and then proceeded up the river to the vicinity of
Consuegra.
At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women,
and children entered the perimeter and brought approximately
thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the
area at 0930 and reached the ridge without opposition. Trenches and
prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from
one end to the other. It was evident that elements of the 1st
Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages of
the battle for Limon.29
Kilay Ridge ran from southeast to northwest, with its
northern tip about 2,500 yards directly west of Limon and its southern
end about 3,000 yards south and slightly west of the same point. The
ridge was approximately 900 feet high and though narrow in some places
in others it widened to 400 yards. The summit was broken into a series
of high knolls from which the entire Limon area and some parts of the
Ormoc road could be observed. A view of the latter feature was
obstructed to some extent by a ridge, hereafter called Ridge Number 2,
between Kilay and the road. Kilay Ridge was about 3,900 yards southwest
of Breakneck Ridge. It would be necessary to maintain control of Kilay
Ridge and deny its use to the enemy in order to give complete support
to units advancing south from Breakneck Ridge. [229]
LT. COL. THOMAS E. CLIFFORD, JR., discusses
plans with his staff as Filipino guerrillas look on.
Preliminary Attack
On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his
battalion to entrench itself along the ridge in positions that would
afford the best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong
points and observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails
leading through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate
enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the
Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end
of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump at
Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010 with
twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the
radios.30
At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the
ridge and twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The
battalion did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d
Battalion, 19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it
was able to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the
battalion were active in searching out enemy positions.
On 15 November Company A sent a patrol to Ridge Number
2, which was 600 yards east of the battalion’s positions and
which overlooked the Ormoc road. The patrol [230]found numerous enemy emplacements and
approximately fifty Japanese, who began firing with mortars. After
killing five of the Japanese the patrol retired.31 During the
day the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop reported to Colonel Clifford
and was assigned the mission of patrolling the west flank of the
battalion. Although patrols from the 1st Battalion pushed east of the
Ormoc highway south of Limon, they again were unable to make contact
with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. On 16 November Colonel Clifford
again sent out patrols which tried, still unsuccessfully, to establish
physical contact with this battalion.32
A platoon from Company B, on 17 November, carried on a
running fire fight with the Japanese and forced its way past Ridge
Number 2. It crossed the Ormoc road and made contact with the 2d
Battalion, 19th Infantry, at its roadblock. A line of communication
between the battalions could not be established because of the strong
enemy forces between them. At the same time parts of Companies B and D
engaged the enemy on Ridge Number 3, six hundred yards south of Ridge
Number 2 and slightly lower. Approximately 200 of the enemy with
rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery were entrenched on Ridge
Number 3. The American fire killed at least fifty Japanese. A patrol
from Company D probed the Japanese defensive position but was forced to
retire with two men missing and one wounded. Then Company B entered the
fray, and the fire fight grew in intensity. The Japanese directed fire
from at least three automatic weapons as well as strong rifle fire
against the Americans.
Colonel Clifford went to investigate and found Company B
engaged in a bitter fight. While he was there the company sustained six
casualties. One of the men had been shot through the thigh and was
unable to walk. Since the heavy underbrush and bad trails made it
impossible for two men to carry him on a litter, Colonel Clifford
carried the wounded soldier on his back for about a mile to the command
post, over a difficult mountain trail which ran for several hundred
yards in the bed of a swift stream.33 Colonel Clifford was
awarded a Distinguished Service Cross.34
At nightfall Company B was separated from the rest of
the battalion. Colonel Clifford decided to pull the company off the
ridge and replace it with Company C. He was determined to hold what he
had “at all costs.”35 During the day General
Sibert attached the battalion to the 32d Division.
Red Badge of Courage
At daylight on 18 November Colonel Clifford
brought heavy machine guns into place on the perimeter of the battalion
and began to fire on the enemy positions on Ridge Number 3, catching a
group of about twenty-five Japanese who were cooking their breakfast.
At 0700 a carrying party with rations and medical supplies moved out
toward the besieged Company B, and at 1100 Company C started forward to
relieve the company. Colonel Clifford decided to displace a platoon at
a time during the day. Under intense rifle fire, Company C succeeded in
relieving Company B. The fire fight continued throughout the day, and
approximately fifty more Japanese were [231]killed. At 1200 the
battalion conducted burial services for Henry Kilay, a Filipino soldier
and guide who had served the battalion well.36 During the
night and continuing into 19 November, Japanese heavy machine guns
fired into the perimeter on Ridge Number 2.
In the meantime the enemy began to deliver heavy fire
against Company B, which had moved to the south flank of the battalion
on Kilay Ridge. Colonel Clifford estimated the Japanese assault force
to be one reinforced company well equipped with mortars and light
machine guns. By 0905 on 19 November the Japanese had destroyed one
heavy machine gun and had begun a flanking movement to the east of the
southernmost outpost of Company B.
The artillery liaison party moved south and directed
artillery fire on the enemy. By 1150, however, Company B was being
surrounded and its ammunition was very low. Colonel Clifford made a
reconnaissance of the area and ordered the besieged company to fall
back 100 yards to the north and set up a strong point with the
assistance of Company A. The next morning Company A was to attack and
retake the knoll from which Company B had been forced to retire.
Because of strong Japanese resistance, the gradual attrition of the
battalion’s forces, and the “extreme scarcity” of
ammunition, Colonel Clifford also decided to have Company C withdraw
from Ridge Number 2 to Kilay Ridge on the following morning.37
Rain fell constantly upon the troops and churned the
surface of the ridge into a “slick mass of mud and
slime.”38 Men were tired. With insufficient rations,
broken sleep in sodden foxholes, and constant harassing fire, many had
sickened. Fever, dysentery, and foot ulcers were commonplace.
Early on the morning of 20 November Company C withdrew
silently in the rain without the knowledge of the Japanese, who threw
an attack of company strength against the position thirty minutes after
it had been vacated. Company C established a strong position 200 yards
south of the battalion command post. The artillery fired intermittently
on the enemy to the south until 1200, when it concentrated its fire in
front of Company B. So intense was the rain that although artillery
shells were falling only 150 yards away, the artillery liaison party
had to adjust the fire almost entirely by sound. At 1225 Company B
moved out in an effort to retake the knoll from which the enemy had
launched his attacks the previous day, but it came under intense rifle
and mortar fire which forced it to retire. At this point the
battalion’s supply of ammunition became critically low.39
The downpour continued through the night and the next
day. Patrols, sent to search for a means of flanking the Japanese, were
unsuccessful, but they brought back information which made it possible
to place artillery and mortar fire on enemy positions. At 1430 Colonel
Clifford received the report that two strong Japanese columns were
converging on the battalion from the southeast and northeast. One of
the platoons from Company C moved to the north end of the ridge to
assure that the supply line to Consuegra would be kept open. A carrying
party from Consuegra brought in rations and at [232]1705
the battalion received an airdrop of blankets, ammunition, and
litters.40 There was no major enemy contact.
The rains persisted during the night and the next day,
22 November. Throughout the morning, patrols probed the area. At 1130
the battalion received an airdrop of ammunition, medical supplies, and
ponchos. The main perimeter lines were comparatively quiet until 1430
when the enemy pinned down Company B with heavy fire and assaulted
Company A. These attacks rapidly grew in intensity. The Japanese with
fixed bayonets charged against the perimeters and almost completely
surrounded both companies.
At 2000, since the enemy completely surrounded Company
B, Colonel Clifford ordered the company to break through and withdraw
through Company A to the rear of the battalion command post. Under
cover of machine gun and artillery fire, the company withdrew. When a
litter train of the wounded was ambushed, one of the bearers was killed
by enemy fire.
Within the new perimeter of Company B, 750 yards north
of the battalion command post, Colonel Clifford established a rear
command post and all communications moved to it. From this new location
the mortars from Company D began to fire in front of Company A, the
most advanced company. The battalion cached all supplies and ammunition
in case the enemy should suddenly break through. The rains
continued.
Colonel Clifford made tentative plans to withdraw during
the night but abandoned them when General Gill ordered him to hold the
ridge at all costs. Advance elements of the 32d Division had entered
Limon, and the withdrawal of Clifford’s battalion would have left
their western flank completely exposed.41
Fortunately the Japanese did not follow up the attacks
on 23 November, but there was scattered automatic weapons and artillery
fire. Next day American artillery and mortar fire repulsed a small
enemy attack at 0830. A platoon from the battalion slipped through the
enemy lines and brought information on the situation to General Gill.
It returned with orders that the battalion was to hold fast. Two
airdrops of supplies, although they drew enemy fire, were successfully
recovered.
For the next two days there was comparative quiet in the
sector except for patrol activity and intermittent fire. At 1000 on 25
November, General Gill sent Colonel Clifford the following message:
“You and your men are doing a superb job. Hang on and keep
killing the Japs….”42
At nightfall on 25 November, however, the semiquiet was
shattered when an enemy force armed with automatic weapons, mortars,
and artillery began a heavy assault against the perimeter of Company A.
The company beat off the attack with losses to both forces. On the
following morning, Colonel Clifford had Company C relieve Company A. At
1630 Colonel Dahlen informed him that he, Clifford, was “in a
tight spot,” since the 32d Division could give “no
immediate help,” and advised him to “use artillery and hang
on.”43 It became apparent that the Japanese were so
disposed that they could launch attacks from different directions.
Further evidence to this effect was supplied on 27 November, when a
Japanese patrol of almost platoon strength [233]got
astride the supply line to Consuegra on the northern front of Kilay
Ridge. A patrol from Company B dispersed the unit and killed three of
the enemy. Colonel Clifford estimated that elements of the 1st
Regiment were disposed as follows: a minimum of one reinforced
company was south of him, at least two reinforced companies were on the
ridge about 1,000 yards to the east, and a strong but unknown number of
the enemy opposed him on the west. If this last force pushed northward
Clifford’s supply line to Consuegra would be severed. From 1725
to 2020 on 27 November, Company C came under a strong long-range attack
from enemy positions on the ridge to the east. A patrol from the 128th
Infantry, 32d Division, brought Colonel Clifford the welcome
information that reinforcements were en route.
The Main Effort
At 1000 on 28 November the battalion repulsed a
small party of the enemy that attacked from the south. There was a lull
until 1930 when the Japanese unleashed a strong effort to drive the
defenders from Kilay Ridge and recapture it. The opening was marked by
90-mm. mortar fire upon the outposts of the battalion. Heavy weapons
from the ridge on the east then began firing as at least two machine
guns and many small arms began to rain lead from the west. The enemy
fire rose to a crescendo as the mortars joined in and directed their
heaviest fire at a platoon of Company C on the southwestern end of the
ridge. The Japanese began to deploy troops, apparently in an attempt to
reach a gulch to the west of the battalion’s positions. A heavy
assault was launched from the south against Company C.
By 1955 the mortars of the battalion were brought to
bear against the advancing Japanese as the crews worked in feverish
haste to break up the assault. At 2015, although Company C now had
mortar support, the enemy charged with bayonets and grenades. Fighting
was at close quarters and the Japanese began to infiltrate the forward
positions. An hour later the advance platoon of Company C pulled back
to join the company, which had been cut off from the rest of the
battalion. The fire fight continued throughout the night with constant
rifle fire, numerous attempts at infiltration by the Japanese, and
intermittent mortar fire.44
At dawn on 29 November the Japanese forces were still on
the ridge in strength and their automatic weapons began to fire anew.
All forward elements of the battalion were under attack and Company C
was still separated from the rest of the battalion. A reinforced
platoon from Company B, at 0730, was able to break through to Company
C, kill six of the enemy, and seize two machine guns en route. As
Company C’s ammunition was practically exhausted, Colonel
Clifford immediately sent a carrying party forward. Since the Japanese
had blocked off the trail immediately after the passage of the platoon
from Company B, the carrying party was pinned down.
In the meantime two carrying parties from Consuegra
entered the perimeter of the battalion with food and ammunition. One
carried the “Thanksgiving ration of roast turkey and … fresh
eggs.” The battalion therefore hoped for “a good
meal” if the situation permitted.45
Colonel Clifford urgently requested General Gill to send
reinforcements. At 1325 [234]Gill told Clifford that he had
ordered the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, 32d Division, to proceed to
Kilay Ridge immediately and come under Clifford’s control.
Colonel Clifford forcibly reopened the trail to Company C and had food
and ammunition brought into the forward position. A short time later,
Company G, 128th Infantry, arrived and Clifford immediately committed
it to reinforce Company C. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, 128th
Infantry, arrived at 1835 and was held in reserve. (See Map 14.)
The action for 1 December began at 0800 when a patrol
from Company B proceeded down a draw to the west of Kilay Ridge. The
patrol was to swing wide and approach the right rear almost directly
south of the enemy-held knolls on Kilay Ridge. These were thought to be
the Japanese strong points and were the objectives for the day. A
preparatory concentration from supporting artillery and from mortars of
both battalions was first laid. The heavy machine gun section of the
128th Infantry moved into the draw to the west and set up its guns on
the right flank of the ridge in order to be in a position to fire
across the face of the ridge when the main assault began. Company E of
the 128th Infantry then passed through Company C and launched an attack
against the Japanese-held knolls on the southeastern end of the ridge.
Heavy and light machine gun fire from Company C protected the flanks of
Company E.
The company took the first knoll easily, but heavy fire
from behind a huge log on the second knoll halted Company E. Company A
sent a bazooka team forward to knock out the position and Company C
sent all of its grenades forward, but by 1320 the Japanese soldiers
were still resisting all attempts to dislodge them. The patrol from
Company B returned at 1345 with the report that it had been to the rear
of its objective and had seen no enemy activity. No unit made any
further progress that day. At 1720 General Gill ordered Colonel
Clifford to withdraw the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry.46
At 0925 on 2 December, Company E, 128th Infantry,
attacked the knolls at the south tip of Kilay Ridge, while Company F
moved down the ridge and swung to the right to attack the ridge to the
south—the objective of the two-battalion assault. The 1st
Battalion, 34th Infantry, withdrew one unit, but at 1245 Colonel
Clifford received orders to halt all further withdrawals pending orders
from the commanding officer, 128th Infantry. By then Company E had
taken its objective but Company F had encountered determined resistance
fifty yards from the top of the ridge. It doggedly advanced and by 1625
reached the crest and dug in, though still receiving hostile mortar
fire.
The next day examination of the battlefield where the
two battalions had been fighting revealed numerous enemy dead and the
following abandoned equipment: three 70-mm. mountain guns, four heavy
machine guns, seventeen light machine guns, one 90-mm. mortar, and many
rifles, pistols, sabers, and field glasses. Documents containing
valuable intelligence were also found. On 4 December the 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, started to withdraw. During the next two days elements
of the battalion moved through Consuegra and Calubian to Pinamopoan.
The battalion had lost 26 men killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, but
it [235]estimated that it had killed 900 men of the
1st Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had
acquitted itself well. It had prevented the Japanese from reinforcing
the Limon forces and imperiling the 32d Division. For its work the
battalion received the presidential unit citation.
Central Mountain Range
1st Cavalry Division
As elements of the X Corps were pushing south on
Highway 2 through Breakneck Ridge, other units from the corps were
engaged in securing the central mountain range that divided Leyte and
Ormoc Valleys in order to prevent any Japanese forces from debouching
into Leyte Valley. General Suzuki had ordered the 1st Division
commander to place the 57th Infantry in the Limon area while the
1st and 49th Infantry Regiments were to go to the central
mountain range. The two regiments last mentioned were to prevent any
American attempts to infiltrate into Ormoc Valley and to exploit any
favorable opportunity to break through into Leyte Valley. About 8
November the 102d Division, including its signal, artillery, and
engineer units, arrived at Ormoc and General Suzuki immediately sent
them into the mountains of central Leyte.47
General Krueger had already anticipated this movement
and had stationed elements of the X and XXIV Corps at the principal
entrances into Leyte Valley. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area extensively.48
The northern mountains between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys
were high and rugged, with precipitous sides. The area was heavily
forested, and there were many ground pockets which constituted natural,
heavily wooded fortresses for the Japanese. The very few trails in the
sector were scarcely better than pig trails. The area had not been
properly mapped and at all times the troops were seriously handicapped
by insufficient knowledge of the terrain. The nearly constant rainfall
bogged down supply and made the sides of the hills slippery and
treacherous. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and
had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the
supply situation was precarious.
The 1st Cavalry Division utilized motor transport,
LVT’s, tractors and trailers, native carriers, and airdrops to
get supplies to forward troops. Motor transport hauled supplies from
the warehouses in Tacloban to Carigara, a distance of thirty miles. At
this point LVT’s of the 826th Amphibian Tractor Battalion hauled
the supplies, through rice paddies churned into waist-deep morasses, to
Sugud, three miles south of Carigara. The supplies were manhandled from
the LVT’s into one-ton two-wheeled cargo and ammunition trailers,
which were towed by the tractors of the artillery battalions that fired
in support of the division. The tractors wound their way laboriously
into the foothills through boulder-strewn streams and up steep inclines
that made it necessary for the tractors to be arranged in tandem. There
was always mud, which made traction difficult, and the LVT’s were
better able than the tractors to navigate through slick, soft mud which
had little body texture.
The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at
the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that
[236]was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest
camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection
of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time
and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino
leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying
assignment was extremely arduous.
FILIPINO CARRIERS HAUL SUPPLIES over slippery
mountain trails for the 12th Cavalry.
Under armed escort, the long train of carriers, two men
to each fifty-pound load of rations, ammunition, and other types of
supply, began immediately to struggle forward from the supply camp over
narrow, slippery trails, across waist-deep rivers and streams, and
through heavy undergrowth. In the never-ending climb to gain altitude,
it took five hours to traverse a track that measured less than three
miles. At the base of a vertical descent of more than 500 feet, there
was a second supply base, the relay station. From this station it was
another day’s forced march to the forward troops. An additional
300 Filipinos were stationed at the relay station in the mountain
wilderness, surrounded by elements of the enemy. These carriers made
the last half of the tortuous journey, while the others returned to the
base camp for resupply. It took four days to get supplies from the
warehouses to the front-line troops.49
[237]
The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under General
Cunningham, had arrived at Leyte on 14 November.50 At this
time the 21st Infantry was advancing very slowly along Breakneck Ridge,
against strong resistance, and the units of the 1st Cavalry Division
were spread thinly over the central mountain area.51 In order
to strengthen the defense line, the 112th Cavalry was committed upon
its arrival and passed to the control of X Corps.52 On 15
November General Sibert attached the 112th Cavalry to the 1st Cavalry
Division and ordered it to operate in the Carigara area.53 General Mudge directed the 112th Cavalry to
assume, on 16 November, the responsibility for beach defenses in the
Capoocan-Carigara-Barugo area and to mop up in the Mt. Minoro area
about 3,000 yards south of Capoocan.54
The 112th Cavalry patrolled the Mt. Minoro area until 22
November. In accord with General Krueger’s desire to relieve some
of the pressure that was being exerted against the 32d Division in its
drive south down Highway 2, General Mudge on 23 November ordered the
112th Cavalry to move southwest from Mt. Minoro toward the highway. The
combat team encountered sporadic resistance and on the morning of 30
November reached a ridge about 2,500 yards east of Highway 2 and about
5,000 yards southeast of Limon.55 A strongly entrenched
enemy force on the ridge resisted all attempts of the 112th Cavalry to
dislodge it.
The ridge was covered with a dense rain forest, and the
lower slopes were thickly spotted with bamboo thickets and other
extremely dense vegetation. Clouds covered the tops of the peak and
rain fell almost continuously, churning the ground into ankle-deep mud.
Visibility was limited to only a few yards. The enemy defensive field
works consisted of foxholes, prone shelters, communication trenches,
and palm-log bunkers. These positions presented no logical avenue of
approach. They were complete perimeters and employed all-round mutually
supporting automatic weapons fire. Although the fields of fire were
limited, the weapons were so effectively placed that they covered all
approaches.56
The strong resistance made further progress impossible
and the 112th Cavalry established its perimeter. During the night the
Japanese subjected the 1st and 2d Squadrons, 112th Cavalry, to heavy
artillery fire and launched several patrol attacks against the
perimeter of the 2d Squadron. The night assaults were beaten
off.57
The next two days were spent by the 2d Squadron, 112th
Cavalry, in trying unsuccessfully to dislodge the Japanese from the
ridge. At 1310 on 2 December the 112th Cavalry received orders to move
north-northwest toward the Leyte River, from which point they were to
send out patrols to make contact with units of the 32d
Division.58 At this time, however, the 112th Cavalry was
still opposed by a strong enemy force. Troop A nevertheless moved out
to make contact with the 32d Division and to reconnoiter to the west
for further enemy concentrations and for routes by which the 112th
Cavalry could advance to Highway 2. [238]
FOOTHILLS OF CENTRAL MOUNTAIN RANGE are
patrolled by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division.
On 3 December, after an artillery concentration, Troop
G, 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, started out toward the enemy-held ridge.
The slope was so precipitous that the troops could not climb and shoot
at the same time. The Japanese were able to throw grenades upon Troop G
without exposing themselves, and the troop retired to the bottom of the
hill. An artillery concentration was called for and delivered on the
ridge, after which the troop again started up the hill. The Japanese,
however, quickly regained their former positions after the artillery
fire ceased and again repulsed Troop G with grenades and small arms
fire. The troop withdrew to its former position at the bottom of the
hill. For the remainder of the day, the artillery placed harassing fire
on the enemy strong point while patrols probed to the south and west
around the flanks of the Japanese position, seeking better avenues of
approach.59
Troop A journeyed without incident toward Highway 2, at
1415 on 3 December made contact with the left rear of the 126th
Infantry west of Hill 1525, and at the end of the day was moving
southwest to make contact with the leading elements of the 126th
Infantry. No contact had been made with the enemy and there was little
sign of enemy forces. The 1st Squadron received orders to proceed to
the Leyte River and locate a dropping ground.60
[239]
Henceforward, until 10 December, the 2d Squadron, 112th
Cavalry, was stalemated by the strongly entrenched Japanese force. Each
day repeated attacks were made against the enemy position, but to no
avail, and patrols that probed the flanks of the enemy to discover a
means of enveloping the hostile force had no success. On 8 and 9
December the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, attempted to locate and cut
off the supply line of the Japanese force that was holding up the
advance of the 2d Squadron.61
On 10 December the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, which had
been in the Barugo-Capoocan area, relieved the 2d Squadron, 112th
Cavalry, which passed to the control of Sixth Army. In the meantime the
1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, less Troop A had moved west toward the
Leyte River. Troop A reached the left flank of the 126th Infantry. The
progress of the 1st Squadron was slow because of the hilly terrain, but
on the morning of 7 December it arrived at the Leyte River and
established physical contact with Troop A and the 126th
Infantry.62 At the end of 10 December, the 1st Squadron,
112th Cavalry, was on the Leyte River.
The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, after relieving the 2d
Squadron, 112th Cavalry, sent out patrols to study the terrain and
attempt to find avenues of approach to the flanks and rear of the enemy
strong point which had long held up the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry. An
aerial reconnaissance was made of the area. The aerial observer
reported that the Japanese position was “definitely as bad”
as the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, had reported it to be, and that the
approach from the rear was even worse than the one from the
front.63
The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, spent 11 December in
sending out patrols on both sides of the enemy-held ridge. The Japanese
let the patrols through and then fired, wounding two of the men. The
patrols then returned. An artillery concentration was placed upon the
enemy position, and at 1245 the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out
behind a barrage which lifted twenty-five yards at a time. One platoon
attacked frontally while the other platoons attempted to flank the
Japanese. The platoon on the right flank suffered three casualties and
was immediately pinned down. After the other platoons got to within
fifty yards of a Japanese machine gun position, they also were pinned
down. At 1600 they dug in for the night at the base of the hill.
During the engagement fifteen to twenty enemy bunkers
were observed on each side of the ridge and four machine guns were
definitely spotted. A night infiltration party armed with hand
grenades, rifles, and knives was sent to knock out these bunkers. It
destroyed two machine guns and killed four Japanese.
At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron,
7th Cavalry, moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine
guns well emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with
sixty-degree slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The
troops were pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron
worked south in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but
was unable to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established
[240]night perimeters near the same positions it had
held the previous night.
On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm.
artillery and the 4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy
fire on the Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron
jumped off, attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved
in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed
forward and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed
several machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the
enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of the
day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the 2d
Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit
captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3 heavy
machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with
considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge
was secured, “over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed
on [the] … position without appreciably affecting it.”64
The 96th Division
By the end of October the XXIV Corps, having
secured the southern part of Leyte Valley, the
Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan road net, and all airfields in the area,
was ready for the next phase of its mission. General Hodge thereupon
immediately initiated operations whereby the XXIV Corps was to liberate
southern Leyte concurrently with the drive of the X Corps in the north.
General Hodge’s plan called for the 96th Division to make a
holding attack east of the mountains while the 7th Division drove north
from Baybay up the coast of Ormoc Bay.65 (See Map
2.) He therefore ordered the 96th Division to defend the
Tanauan-Dagami-Burauen-Dulag area and to relieve as rapidly as possible
all elements of the 7th Division in the area. Finally it was to mop up
all enemy forces in its zone and to furnish security for all the
principal roads and installations in the area.66 General
Bradley on 2 November ordered Colonel Dill’s 382d Infantry to
relieve the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division in the vicinity of
Dagami, to send strong reconnaissance and combat patrols into the hills
to the west and northwest, and to destroy all enemy forces
encountered.67
General Suzuki was desirous of pushing through to Leyte
Valley, one of the best entrances to which was through the Dagami
sector. At the foot of the central mountain range, Dagami was the
center of a network of roads that led to all parts of Leyte Valley and
to the airfields. Since it was one of the key positions for control of
the valley, its recapture would be of great advantage to the 35th
Army. Just west of Dagami, the central mountain range served as a
natural fortification. The mountains consisted of a series of ridges
separated by deep gorges which were usually covered with a dense
tropical growth. At key points in the area, the 16th Division
had built coconut-log and concrete pillboxes.
There were substantial parts of the 9th,
20th, and 33d Infantry Regiments of the 16th
Division in the mountains west of [241]Dagami. In the latter
part of October the 16th Division became short of food and
General Makino asked that it be supplied by air. The 4th Air
Army therefore attempted with six light bombers to supply the
division, but for some unexplained reason it failed. The 16th
Division henceforward was forced to supply itself and forage off
the land.68
On 2 November the 382d Infantry started to relieve the
17th Infantry. The 2d Battalion at 1500 relieved the 3d Battalion, 17th
Infantry, just north of Dagami and at 1430, the 1st Battalion relieved
the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, about 1,000 yards west of
Dagami.69
Elements of the 16th Division were entrenched on
“Bloody Ridge,” a small promontory on the left side of the
road west of Dagami just short of Hitomnog in front of the 382d
Infantry. A waist-deep swampy rice paddy was between the ridge and the
road. The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, after moving into this area
engaged the enemy, but at nightfall it broke off the fight and
established its night perimeter.
At 0805, the 1st Battalion renewed the attack and met
increased heavy resistance as it advanced through the rice paddy. The
companies came under mortar and automatic weapons fire at 1445 as they
came into the open.
The Japanese took full advantage of the exposed troops
and from machine guns and mortars delivered heavy fire which
immobilized the 1st Battalion. The unit was unable to move in any
direction until nightfall, when, with the aid of some artillery smoke,
the troops began to withdraw. “Men threw away their packs,
machine guns, radios and even rifles. Their sole aim was to crawl back
through the muck and get on solid ground once more. Some of the wounded
gave up the struggle to keep their heads above the water and drowned in
the grasping swamp.”70 After every officer in
Companies B and C had been killed or wounded, 1st Sgt. Francis H.
Thompson took charge and organized the evacuation. He silenced an enemy
machine gun and also assisted in removal of the wounded. As a result of
his leadership both companies successfully withdrew and
reorganized.71
At 1745 five enemy planes strafed the battalion. The
advance units of the 1st Battalion withdrew some 300 yards in order to
consolidate their defensive positions for the night. During the day
Company E of the 2d Battalion reached Patok, and Company G moved out at
2100 to reinforce the 1st Battalion.72
During the night of 3–4 November the 16th
Division launched a strong counterattack of an estimated
two-company strength against the perimeter of the 1st Battalion. Mortar
and artillery fires repulsed the assault. There was no further enemy
activity during the night. On the morning of 4 November the 1st
Battalion moved out against light resistance, advancing about 800 yards
and past the scene of the bitter fighting of the previous day. Colonel
Dill ordered the 2d Battalion (minus Company E) and one platoon from
Company G to move west from Dagami and join the 1st Battalion. The 2d
Battalion joined close behind the 1st Battalion in a column. At 1430
the 1st Battalion encountered increased [242]enemy resistance and
committed its reserve company on the left flank. The 2d Battalion
received orders from Colonel Dill to move up to the left flank of the
1st, but the 2d arrived too late for the two battalions to launch a
co-ordinated assault before nightfall. They therefore consolidated
their positions for the night, having advanced about 1,000
yards.73
The night of 4–5 November was not quiet. The
Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205
elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against
the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration
immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead
and wounded behind them.
The following morning, after the artillery had fired a
preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions
renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion
protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced
about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The
defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete
emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By
nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from
Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their
front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter
and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November.74
At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support,
moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was
well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive
positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300
the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the
1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox
which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing
apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to
neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes
and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the
enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight
tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only
isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained.75
The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad
beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion
commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery
battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6
November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on
the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new
position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of
Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of
Burauen.76
On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry
engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his
positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d
Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered
[243]the more determined resistance. Advancing,
preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A
large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to
destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flame throwers
and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The
regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an
estimated 474 of the enemy.77 Company E of the 2d Battalion
had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out
isolated pockets of enemy resistance.
On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d
Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank
of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of
Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8–9 November made an
assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night
artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10
November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the
swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light
tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th
Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards.78 The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized
enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami.
By this time General Krueger was devoting the main
effort of the Sixth Army toward preventing the 35th Army from
debouching into Leyte Valley. The 96th Division received orders from
General Hodge to halt the relief of the 7th Division and to move north
to the Jaro-Palo road and secure the mountain entrances in that sector.
The 7th Division was to relieve the 96th Division on the Dagami-Burauen
road. A regiment was also to be made available for immediate motor
movement to the north and another for a proposed operation on northern
Mindanao.79
The 96th Division moved to the mountains northwest of
Dagami and sent extensive patrols into the central mountain range along
a ten-mile line that extended from Dagami to Jaro. Constant small
contacts with the enemy continued until the end of the campaign. The
7th Division patrolled the Burauen area.
The Sixth Army had prevented the Japanese from
debouching into Leyte Valley. The X Corps had secured Limon, the
entrance to Ormoc Valley, and was in a position to drive south down the
valley to the port of Ormoc. Although General Krueger’s troops
had performed well, they had made mistakes which gave their commander
serious concern. [244]
1 GHQ FEC,
MI Sec, Hist Div, Statements of Japanese Officials of World War II,
Vol. II, p. 687, Statement of Maj Gen Toshio Nishimura [Asst CofS
14th Area Army], copy in OCMH. ↑
3 G-1 Rpt,
Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 152. ↑
4 Ltr, CG
Sixth Army to CINC SWPA, 29 Aug 44, sub: Replacements for Forthcoming
Opn, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 29 Aug 44. ↑
5 Ltr, Gen
Krueger to Gen Ward, 12 Sep 51, OCMH. ↑
6 This
unit was a separate regimental combat team. ↑
7 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 62. ↑
10 Sixth
Army FO 32, 14 Nov 44. ↑
11 X Corps
FO’s 12–15, 12–16 Nov 44. ↑
12 128th
Inf FO 4, 15 Nov 44. ↑
13 3d Bn,
128th Inf, Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
14 128th
Inf Unit Rpt 1, 16 Nov 44. ↑
15 Capt
Julius A. Sakas, The Operations of the 3d Battalion, 128th Infantry …
at Limon…., p. 29, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, 1949–50,
The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga. ↑
16 128th
Inf Unit Rpt 2, 17 Nov 44. ↑
17 35th
Army Opns, p. 66; 128th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
18 128th
Inf Unit Rpt 6, 21 Nov 44; 128th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
3. ↑
19 32d Div
Arty Unit Rpt 2, 20 Nov 44. ↑
20 X Corps
G-2 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. ↑
21 X Corps
G-3 Periodic Rpt 34, 22 Nov 44; X Corps G-2 and G-3 Jnls, 22 Nov
44. ↑
22 32d Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
23 X Corps
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 29. ↑
24 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 59. ↑
25 X Corps
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 27. ↑
26 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 10 Nov 44. ↑
27 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 61. Unless otherwise stated this subsection is
based on the above report, pages 61–68. ↑
28 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 11 Nov 44. ↑
29 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 13 Nov 44. ↑
30 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 14 Nov 44. ↑
31 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 15 Nov 44. ↑
32 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 16 Nov 44. ↑
33 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17 Nov 44. ↑
34
Curiously enough, while on leave in the United States, he had been
caught without his dog tags and arrested for “impersonating an
officer.” 24th Div Opns Dpt Leyte, p. 78. ↑
35 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17 Nov 44. ↑
36 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 18 Nov 44. Jan Valtin in Children of
Yesterday, page 247, states that Henry Kilay was the owner of the
ridge. Properly the ridge bears his name. ↑
37 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 19 Nov 44. ↑
38 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 63. ↑
39 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 20 Nov 44. ↑
40 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 21 Nov 44. ↑
41 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 22 Nov 44. ↑
42 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 25 Nov 44. ↑
43 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 26 Nov 44. ↑
44 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 28 Nov 44. ↑
45 1st Bn,
34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 29 Nov 44. ↑
46 The
message to Colonel Clifford, a former all-American football player from
West Point, concluded: “You and your men have not been forgotten.
You are the talk of the island, and perhaps the United States. Army
beat Notre Dame 59 to 0, the worst defeat on record.” 24th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 67; 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 1 Dec
44. ↑
47 35th
Army Opns, pp. 47–48. ↑
48 1st Cav
Div FO 9, 10 Nov 44. ↑
49 1st Cav
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 43–45. ↑
50 112th
Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
51 Sixth
Army G-3 Periodic Rpt 514, 14 Nov 44. ↑
52 Sixth
Army FO 32, 14 Nov 44. ↑
53 X Corps
FO 14, 15 Nov 44. ↑
54 1st Cav
Div FO 11, 14 Nov 44. ↑
55 X Corps
G-3 Periodic Rpt 47, 5 Dec 44. ↑
56 7th Cav
Opns Rpt, Leyte, Part IV, S-2 Rpt, Tactical and Technical
Characteristics of the Enemy, pp. 2, 5. ↑
57 1st
Cavalry Division G-3 Periodic Rpt. 42, 1 Dec 44. ↑
58 112th
Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnls, 2 Dec 44. ↑
59 1st Cav
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 45, 4 Dec 44; 112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6;
112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 3, 4 Dec 44. ↑
60 112th
Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 3, 4 Dec 44; 112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
6. ↑
61 112th
Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6–8; 112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl,
4–10 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 46–51,
5–10 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
46–50. ↑
62 112th
Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6–8; 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
47–50; 112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 4 Dec 44, 6–9 Dec 44; 1st
Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 46–51, 10 Dec 44. ↑
63 112th
Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 10 Dec 44. ↑
64 112th
Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 9–14 Dec 44; 7th Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
11–12; 112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7–9; 1st Cav Div G-3
Periodic Rpts 53–56, 12–15 Dec 44. ↑
65 XXIV
Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. ↑
66 XXIV
Corps FO 22, 8 Nov 44. This order confirmed previously issued oral
orders. ↑
68 14th
Area Army Opns Leyte, p. 8. ↑
69 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 14, 2 Nov 44. ↑
70 Orlando
Davidson, J. Carl Willems, and Joseph A. Kahl, The Deadeyes: The
Story of the 96th Infantry Division (Washington, Infantry Journal
Press [now Combat Forces Press], 1947), p. 49. ↑
71
Sergeant Thompson was awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross. ↑
72 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 54; 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 14, 3 Nov 44; 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 15, 3 Nov 44; Davidson et al., The Deadeyes,
p. 49. ↑
73
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 51; 96th Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, p. 54; 382d Inf Unit Rpt 16, 4 Nov 44; 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt
15, 4 Nov 44. ↑
74
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 51; 382d Inf Unit Rpt
17, 5 Nov 44; 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 55; 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt
16, 5 Nov 44; 763d Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
75 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 55; 382d Inf Unit Rpt 18, 6 Nov
44. ↑
76 35th
Army Opns, pp. 57–58. ↑
77 382d
Inf Unit Rpt 19, 7 Nov 44. ↑
CHAPTER XIV
Measure of the Fighting
By the latter part of November, the fighting on
the island had entered a crucial stage. The additional troops received
from General MacArthur had enabled General Krueger to put into effect
his squeeze play against the Japanese. While the X Corps continued to
apply unremitting pressure on the 1st and 102d Divisions
in the northern mountains of Ormoc Valley near Limon, elements of the
XXIV Corps would drive north against the 26th Division along the
shores of Ormoc Bay toward Ormoc.
General MacArthur had full confidence in the ability of
General Krueger to carry out this plan and thus bring the Leyte
Campaign to a successful conclusion. Once having given the Sixth Army
commander the assignment for the operation, General MacArthur did not
interfere with General Krueger’s prosecution of the battle. But
from his headquarters on Leyte, he closely followed the progress of the
campaign, frequently visited the command posts of the Sixth Army units,
and made available to General Krueger additional troops upon
request.
Similarly, General Krueger allowed his corps commanders
to exercise their independence of judgment and kept his orders to the
minimum. He, too, made frequent visits to the front lines, observed the
progress of the fighting, inspected the living conditions of the men,
and noted the status of the construction program. General
Krueger’s concern is made evident by a critique issued on 25
November in which he analyzed the performance of the Sixth Army on
Leyte.1
The Americans had had time to test their experience on
Leyte against past operations, as well as to determine the good and bad
features of their training and tactics and the performance of their
weapons and to contrast them with those employed by the Japanese. An
evaluation of American methods at this point serves to explain in
concrete terms the nature of the fighting that had occurred and of that
which would occur in the critical days ahead.
The American Ground Forces
Tactics
Following the customary procedure, the divisions
went ashore with two regiments abreast. Within the regiments there were
variations, some going ashore with the battalions abreast and others
with the battalions in column. The size of the landing beach and the
nature of the expected opposition determined the type of landing
formation that was employed. Once ashore, the nature of the tactical
situation resulted in numerous [245]independent actions by
subordinate units. The formation most frequently used was the normal
one of two units in the assault and one in reserve.
GENERAL MacARTHUR AND MAJ. GEN.
ARCHIBALD V. ARNOLD at Headquarters, 7th Division.
Frontal assaults were usually employed against enemy
positions, and not enough use was made of envelopments. When
envelopments were tried they were nearly always successful. It was
sometimes advantageous to bypass isolated enemy strong points, leaving
them to be mopped up by the follow-up units.
Although the primary mission of the infantry is to close
with the enemy and destroy or capture him, the natural reluctance of
American infantrymen to engage the enemy in close quarters had to be
overcome. There were several instances in which the American attacking
force felt out the Japanese position and then sat back to wait it out.
In one area no progress was made for four days. On several occasions
strong combat patrols of platoon or company strength were sent to feel
out enemy positions, but as soon as they made contact with the Japanese
the patrols withdrew. They accomplished nothing except to determine the
presence of an unknown number of enemy soldiers.
If more than minor resistance was encountered, the
troops frequently fell back and called for fire from supporting
weapons. On one occasion a company called for artillery fire upon a
roadblock and then withdrew 350 yards while the concentration was
delivered. After the lifting of the artillery [246]fire, it was very difficult to reorganize the
company and get it back to the objective. Meanwhile the Japanese had
again covered the roadblock and the whole process had to be
repeated.
The American soldiers were too road-bound. Sometimes
resistance along the road stopped the advance of an entire division.
This opposition could have been eliminated quickly by the employment of
simple envelopments and flanking attacks. Although the presence of
swamps, jungle, and rice paddies tended to channelize the attack, the
Japanese had displayed superior adeptness, and willingness to go into
the swamps and stay there until rooted out.
The standard employment of artillery in close support of
the infantry again proved to be very effective and was used
extensively. However, since the artillery fire enabled the infantry to
secure many heavily fortified positions with few casualties, the
infantrymen tended to become too dependent upon the artillerymen and
expected them to do the work of the infantry. General Krueger insisted
that the infantry must be prepared to close in immediately after the
cessation of the artillery fire.
The Americans had developed a strong tendency to
telegraph their punches. In the morning, before an assault by the
infantry, the artillery pounded the Japanese positions, after which the
mortars opened up. The mortar fire nearly always lasted for a half
hour, and then the infantry moved out. Upon occasion, the infantry did
not attack immediately after the preparation by the supporting weapons.
This delay gave the Japanese time and opportunity to regroup and
consolidate their forces, and thus nullified the effects of the
preparatory fires.
Parenthetically, it may be remarked that although the
actual casualties per artillery shell were few, the cumulative effect
of the heavy and prolonged fire of the artillery and mortars was very
great. Col. Junkichi Okabayashi, chief of staff of the Japanese 1st
Division, estimated that the losses sustained by the division were
distributed as follows: by artillery, 60 percent; by mortars, 25
percent; by infantry fire, 14 percent; and by aircraft, 1
percent.2
The employment of tanks singly, or in small groups,
materially aided the infantrymen, since the tanks could be used
effectively to reduce enemy pillboxes and to flush out bamboo thickets.
Although light tanks were more mobile it was found that the mediums
were more efficient in reducing pillboxes. For successful employment,
it was necessary that the tanks have close infantry and engineer
support. In some instances the tanks secured objectives when no
infantrymen were present to consolidate and hold the positions. For
example, a regiment supported by a tank battalion received orders to
attack and secure an objective. The tanks quickly moved out and secured
the objective with little resistance. Since the infantrymen did not
arrive during the day, the tanks withdrew at nightfall. During the
night the Japanese mined the area and four of the tanks were lost when
they returned next morning.
Likewise, tanks were often disabled because the
engineers had failed to remove mines and give support in the crossing
of streams. In one case, the engineers failed to repair a bridge, which
collapsed after three tanks had crossed over it. The Japanese
completely destroyed one of the tanks and disabled the other two. It
was necessary for the Americans to destroy the disabled tanks
[247]with their own gunfire in order to prevent their
use as stationary pillboxes by the enemy.
It was found advantageous to establish a night perimeter
before dusk. An early establishment of the perimeter enabled the troops
to take effective countermeasures against Japanese infiltrations and
night assaults.3 The soldiers also had an opportunity to
become familiar with their surroundings and were less likely to fire
indiscriminately during the night. In spite of this precaution, there
was considerable promiscuous firing during the night and at dawn. One
corps commander effectively stopped this practice in his command post
area by the adoption of two simple measures. First, he employed a
reserve battalion to cover an area extending outward for one mile and
when no Japanese were found the fact was announced over the
loudspeaker. Second, any man caught firing before dawn was immediately
court-martialed and fined fifty dollars. “There was very little
promiscuous firing thereafter.”4
Although there were three war-dog platoons available for
the Leyte operation, their combat value was practically nil. The unit
commanders to whom they were attached knew little of their capabilities
or limitations. Some expected the dogs to spot a Japanese position
exactly at a distance of 200 or more yards. One unit took the dogs on a
four-day patrol without sufficient dog rations. Another unit attempted
to use dogs in a populated area; the presence of so many civilians
thoroughly confused the dogs.
In general, the troops found that their training had
been sound and that the methods which in the past had been employed in
overcoming the Japanese were also useful on Leyte. It was felt,
however, that greater emphasis in training should be placed on night
patrols and night movements near the enemy lines, as well as on closer
co-ordination between the infantry and the supporting weapons. Finally,
it was believed that the service troops should be given training in
basic infantry tactics and prepared to maintain their own
defenses.5
All units were in agreement that there could be
“no substitute for aggressive leadership.”6 An infantry unit could be no better than its
leaders. General Krueger said in this connection:
Infantry is the arm of close combat. It is
the arm of final combat. The Jap is usually most tenacious
particularly when in entrenched and concealed positions. Individual
enemy soldiers will remain in their holes until eliminated. Although
the supporting arms are of great assistance, it ultimately becomes the
task of the small infantry units to dig them out. The American soldier
has demonstrated on many battlefields that he can and will do it, but
he must be aggressively led. There can be no hesitating on the part of
his leaders.7
Welfare of the Men
At the same time, in order to obtain the best
results from the troops, the unit commanders must concern themselves
with the well-being and comfort of their men. Many commanders were
indifferent to such matters. One corps, for example, had sufficient
rations of all types available, but the meals served the men were
poorly prepared and monotonous. Another corps, at the time it landed,
was prepared to live indefinitely on [248]field rations. As
late as ten days after the landing, no unit—not even any of the
fixed installations, including higher headquarters—operated a
mess or served hot meals. Some units did serve hot coffee after the
first few days.
Although there was considerable rain and mud, few units
made a genuine effort to get their men under shelter even when the
tactical situation permitted. Night after night, officers and men slept
in wet foxholes even when no enemy troops were within shooting
distance. “It must never be forgotten,” said General
Krueger, “that the individual soldier is the most important
single factor in this war…. He is expected to do a lot including
risking his life. But to get the most out of him he must have the
feeling that everything possible under existing circumstances is being
done for his well being and comfort. This is a prime responsibility of
command….”8
Weapons and Vehicles
The basic weapons—the U.S. .30-caliber rifle
Model 1903, the U.S. .30-caliber rifle M1, the BAR, bayonets, and
grenades—with which the rifle squads and the individual soldiers
of the heavy weapons company were equipped were generally satisfactory
and notably superior to comparable weapons of the Japanese.
The troops used a variety of hand grenades. The white
smoke grenade was considered to be defective and was frequently
discarded. The white phosphorus grenade was extensively used, mainly as
an antipersonnel weapon. It was thrown with telling effect into
foxholes, caves, and heavy underbrush. An Australian grenade was
introduced, but because the troops were unfamiliar with its use, it was
not too successful. Incendiary hand grenades were effectively used
against enemy weapons, ammunition dumps, and supplies. Colored grenades
were employed to mark strips for the air dropping of supplies.9 The fragmentation grenade was most favored by the
troops, and after that the phosphorus grenade.10
The Browning automatic rifle was very popular, the best
results being obtained when two were allotted to a squad. The increased
fire power thus obtained was very effective in night defense.
The 81-mm. mortar continued to be highly esteemed as a
close support infantry weapon. The 4.2-inch chemical mortars of the
attached chemical mortar battalions were extensively employed,
affording excellent results when emplaced on firm ground. On marshy or
swampy ground, however, their base plates would sink and cause
inaccurate firing or put the weapons out of commission. The most
popular mortar was the 60-mm., which was very mobile and especially
suitable for use in close terrain. This mortar fired an illuminating
shell which was used constantly for night defense, but its base plate
also tended to sink into the ground.
Flame throwers were employed with very good effect in
reducing strongly fortified positions. The M2–2 flame thrower was
an excellent incendiary weapon against bamboo thickets and shacks. The
cartridge type was considered to be more satisfactory, since the
spark-ignited flame thrower was not dependable in rainy weather. The
flame [249]thrower was considered “a very important
factor in overcoming the enemy’s inherent ‘will to
resist.’”11
The .50-caliber machine gun again proved its value in
defense, being highly effective not only against ground targets but
also against aircraft. The 96th Division found the Thompson submachine
gun excellent for use by patrolling units but “some difficulty
… has been encountered with the M3 machine gun in its failure to feed
properly.”12
The 7th Division found the 75-mm. self-propelled
howitzer, because of its superior mobility, to be the most effective
infantry weapon for reduction of Japanese pillboxes. The 105-mm.
howitzers of the field artillery battalions again proved their worth by
the speed, accuracy, and effectiveness of their fire. The greater
striking range of the 155-mm. howitzer had special value for general
support missions.
Demolition charges were used effectively by patrols for
the destruction of enemy ammunition dumps in inaccessible locations and
not salvageable because of the tactical situation. Except for this
purpose, demolitions were not extensively used.13
The 37-mm. gun was an antitank weapon only occasionally
employed by the 7th Division because there were few Japanese armored
vehicles against which to use it. The excessive difficulty of
manhandling it into a position from which fire could be delivered
against Japanese pillboxes and machine guns rendered it ineffective for
that purpose. The 90-mm. guns of the antiaircraft artillery had a
considerable number of erratic bursts because of corroded fuzes and
worn fuze setting lugs.
The tanks and tank destroyers could have been used more
frequently and with greater versatility. Situations often arose in
which an infantry platoon was held up by enemy machine gun and mortar
fire, but “the use of indirect artillery fire was impracticable
either because of overhead cover for the enemy weapons or because of
undue risk to our enveloping infantry.” General Krueger
recommended that the infantry employ direct fire by the tanks or tank
destroyers. He felt that “the tank destroyer commanders lacked
aggressiveness and skilled direction.”14 The tank
destroyer commanders admitted that they were idle but added that the
infantry had not called for them. The tanks and tank destroyers were
ideal weapons for the destruction of machine guns, mortars, and other
heavy infantry weapons, but the infantry commanders seemed to be
unaware of their capabilities. Many commanders employed their armored
vehicles down the middle of the road when they could have used them
more effectively on the flanks and for envelopments.
The 96th Division found the Cannon Company’s
self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer extremely mobile in swamps and
mountainous terrain. It was able to go several miles farther up the
mountains than any other vehicle and gave excellent support in covering
the mountain passes.15
The cargo carrier M29 (weasel) proved to be a most
useful supply vehicle. The commanders used it for reconnaissance and
visits to units in isolated areas and over roads that were impassable
to wheeled vehicles. It also was employed to carry supplies
[250]and to evacuate the wounded from inaccessible
areas. The weasel was much less destructive of roads than any of the
other tracked vehicles, but the tendency to use it on dry roads
resulted in worn-out tracks and excessive maintenance requirements.
The 96th Division found the DUKW to be an excellent
vehicle when waterborne but on land, regardless of the condition of the
roads and terrain, it was not half as effective as the 2½-ton
cargo truck. On roads the DUKW was a traffic hazard and an obstacle to
other cargo traffic.16
The 7th Division landed with seventeen one-ton trailers.
They were found to be of little value and the division recommended that
they should not be used in any future operation unless a hard-surfaced,
all-weather road net existed at the anticipated target.17
Intelligence
General Krueger pointed out that prompt,
aggressive reconnaissance should have been instituted immediately upon
the landing of the troops. The fact that knowledge of the terrain was
very limited before the assault—inaccuracies in the distances on
existing maps were as high as 50 percent—gave urgency to the need
for immediate reconnaissance.
The sources of information on the Japanese were as
follows: ground and aerial reconnaissance, Filipino civilians,
guerrillas, captured documents, and prisoners. Air observation was of
limited value because of the Japanese ability at camouflage and because
the inclement weather prevented aerial observation of many areas. The
tendency of the Filipinos to say “yes” to everything was
also a handicap. In general, the guerrilla reports were more accurate
than those of civilians. Considerable information was obtained from
patrols, which were especially valuable for on-the-spot
intelligence.
In interrogating prisoners the best results were
obtained by employing Nisei, who obtained more information from
prisoners when the latter were not subjected to questioning by an
officer through an interpreter. Since most of the prisoners had been
separated from their units for a considerable time and were seriously
wounded, their information was sparse and generally out of date.
Captured documents were the most fruitful source of
intelligence. Although the Japanese made a few attempts to destroy dog
tags and other means of identification before going into battle, they
were not too successful. The fact that General Krueger obtained
information on the proposed ground offensive of the Japanese for the
middle of November from papers found on the body of a Japanese officer
was not an isolated incident. Many officers carried on their persons
sets of orders and maps.
The Japanese received much of their information on the
American order of battle from broadcasts emanating from San Francisco.
At first, the Japanese on the island were unable to find out the
American order of battle for Leyte but within a few days the Americans
gratuitously furnished them the information. Said General
Tomochika:
At the time of the landing, 35th Army
Headquarters did not know the number or name of the American units
which had landed … but within a day headquarters learned…. We found
out … by tuning in on the San Francisco broadcasts; Japanese troops
in the combat area were unable to determine [251]their identity. From the same source, we later
obtained information which was of considerable help in planning. In
fact, that was the only way we could get information…. Information
was always received through the San Francisco broadcast before reports
from our front line units reached headquarters…. Since the
information came much sooner from the American broadcast than from the
Japanese communications, the Army Headquarters depended on the American
broadcasts for much intelligence.18
Japanese Warfare
The 24th Division found the Japanese troops on
Leyte to be better trained in combat and more skillful than those the
division had encountered during the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay
operation.19 In general the Japanese fought a delaying
action, and when forced to yield ground they would fall back to
previously prepared positions. During a bombardment by American heavy
weapons, the enemy troops would withdraw but when the fire lifted they
would quickly reoccupy the vacated positions.20
The 21st Infantry was impressed with the Japanese
“excellence in battle” on Breakneck Ridge. There were few
instances of “reckless charges, needless sacrifices or failure to
observe known tactical principles.” The most notable
characteristics exhibited were the excellent fire discipline and the
effective control of all arms. Without exception individual soldiers
withheld their fire until it would have the greatest possible effect.
The heaviest firing would generally start about 1530 and increase in
intensity until about dark, the fire being accompanied by
counterattacks from the front and on the flanks. These assaults usually
came when the Americans’ energy and ammunition were at their
lowest point during the day and when they would prevent proper
consolidation of the front lines before dark.21
The Japanese employed reverse slope defense tactics with
much skill and were successful in utilizing terrain for their defensive
positions. Caves and other natural formations were exploited to the
limit and positions were dug in deeply and expertly camouflaged. The
Japanese frequently sacrificed fields of fire for cover and
concealment, a fact which made it very difficult for the Americans to
locate hostile positions.
Captured documents indicated that the Japanese attacks
were generally well conceived but that there were not enough troops at
the time of the assault. The documents also gave repeated indications
that units either did not receive their orders or did not reach the
appointed place on time. The Japanese employed two main types of
attack. The first, which was similar to that employed by the Americans,
utilized a base of fire from supporting weapons, followed by infantry
fire and movement. This type of attack was not usually accompanied by
artillery or mortar support. The other method consisted of a localized
charge in which the Japanese by sheer force of numbers tried to crack
the American lines. The heavy weapons fire of the Americans was nearly
always able to break up both types of attack. Enemy forces, generally
in small numbers, tried repeatedly to infiltrate through the American
lines. The objectives [252]were artillery pieces, supply
dumps, and key installations. Rarely did they accomplish even minor
damage.
Artillery weapons were seldom used by the Japanese to
maximum effect. The gunnery techniques were “remarkably
undeveloped” and inefficient, the pieces being used singly or in
pairs and only rarely as batteries. Their fire was never massed. The
gun positions generally were well constructed but they were frequently
selected with such high regard for concealment that the fields of fire
were limited. The use of mines and demolition charges was poor, the
mine fields being hastily and obviously laid.
The troops were well trained and led by officers imbued
with a sense of duty. Consequently, “as long as any officers
remain alive, the remnants of a … force are capable of determined
action.”22
The Japanese view of American methods was summed up by
General Tomochika as follows: “The strong points of the American
strategy in the Leyte Operation were numerous but the two outstanding
points were (1) the overwhelming striking power of the American Army,
and (2) the American operations were planned in minute detail and on
the whole were carried out scrupulously.”23
[253]
1 Ltr,
CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps et al., sub: Mistakes Made and
Lessons Learned in K-2 Operation, 25 Nov 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte,
pp. 204–212. Unless otherwise stated this chapter is based upon
General Krueger’s critique. ↑
2 10th
I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte,
Interrog Col Okabayashi, pp. 5–6. ↑
3 7th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Tactics, n. p. ↑
4
Krueger’s Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
205. ↑
5 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Incl 1 to Annex 3, n. p. ↑
7
Krueger’s Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 205. Italics
are Krueger’s. ↑
9 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 113–14. ↑
10 7th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Effectiveness of Weapons, n.
p. ↑
11 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 85. ↑
12
Ibid., p. 83. Presumably the .45-caliber submachine gun M3 is
intended by the term “M3 machine gun.” ↑
13 7th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Effectiveness of Weapons, n.
p. ↑
14
Krueger’s Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
208. ↑
15 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 82. ↑
17 7th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Deficiencies in Equipment, n.
p. ↑
18 10th
I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte,
Interrog Gen Tomochika, pp. 2–3. ↑
19 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 86. ↑
20 96th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 88. ↑
21 24th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Enemy Tactics on Breakneck Ridge, n.
p. ↑
22 7th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Japanese Opns, n. p. ↑
23 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army
on Leyte, Interrog Gen Tomochika, p. 26. ↑
CHAPTER XV
Battle of the Ridges
American Plans and Preparations
With the securing of the beachhead areas in the
last week of October and the first days of November, General Krueger
was ready to launch that part of his plan that concerned a drive north
along the west coast of Leyte. Since a preliminary reconnaissance
indicated that there were not a great many Japanese troops in the
southern half of the island, elements of the 32d Infantry had already
started to push west through the mountains to the west coast along the
road from Abuyog to Baybay. After the attention of the Japanese had
been diverted to the struggle in the northern mountains, the X Corps
could launch a drive against Ormoc, proceeding north from Baybay on
Highway 2 along the shores of the Camotes Sea and of Ormoc Bay. At the
same time elements of the X Corps—the 24th Division and later the
32d Division—could drive down the Ormoc corridor to Ormoc. The
enemy forces would then be caught between the jaws of a trap, with
their freedom of maneuver limited and most of their strength employed
in defensive action. But the need for blocking the exits from the
central mountain range and the scarcity of combat troops made it
necessary for General Krueger to postpone sending a strong force to the
shores of the Camotes Sea until additional reinforcements arrived on
Leyte in the middle of November. General Hodge was to be prepared,
however, to send strong elements of the XXIV Corps over the
mountains.
American Plans
On 30 October General Hodge directed the 7th
Division to move elements, not to exceed one battalion, over the
mountain road from Abuyog to Baybay, the western terminus of the road.
He also ordered the 7th Division to be prepared to move to the west
coast when relieved in the Burauen area.1 In
anticipation of this plan, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, had moved to
Abuyog on 29 October to occupy and defend that area. Company G had
spearheaded the advance to Baybay. On 2 November General Arnold alerted
the main body of the 32d Infantry, under Colonel Finn, for a move to
Abuyog. [254]
As soon as word was received that the Americans were on
the west coast, General Suzuki, believing these forces to be a small
unit of American and Philippine troops, sent a company from the
364th Battalion south from Ormoc to hold Albuera until the
26th Division could arrive.2 Albuera was important
tactically, since from it ran a mountain trail that the Japanese had
tried unsuccessfully to develop into a road to the Burauen airfield in
Leyte Valley.
On 9 November the 26th Division landed at Ormoc
after a rough voyage from Manila. The transport vessels had been
repeatedly attacked by Allied aircraft, which damaged many of the
landing barges and ship hatches. These damaging attacks hindered the
unloading of equipment, which did not proceed as planned. Many of the
landing barges were run aground and destroyed by Allied aircraft, and
the transports were forced to sail away before being completely
emptied. They carried most of the ordnance, provisions, and munitions
of the division with them. On their return trip, all the vessels were
sunk by aircraft. The division consequently came ashore underequipped.
The strength of the 26th Division consisted of Division
Headquarters, one battalion of the 11th Independent Infantry
Regiment, three battalions of the 13th Independent Infantry
Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry
Regiment. These units had only light, portable weapons, and none
was equipped with machine guns except a battalion of the 13th
Independent Infantry Regiment.
General Suzuki had intended to use the 26th
Division in the Carigara area but the arrival of American forces in
the Baybay area forced him to change his plans. On 13 November he
received word from Manila that the 26th Division was to be used
in the Burauen area and consequently the main force of the 26th
Division was directed to Albuera. General Suzuki first sent the
13th Independent Infantry Regiment, under Col. Jiro
Saito,3 but eventually the entire 26th Division,
including the division headquarters, was committed to the Albuera
area.
As the troops of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved
over the mountains to Baybay, guerrillas informed them that about three
hundred Japanese soldiers were pushing south toward the Abuyog-Baybay
road. These enemy troops were “six marauding units” of the
company which had been sent south to make contact with the American
forces and contain them until the 26th Division could
arrive.4 Company E set up an ambush, killed many of the
Japanese, and forced the others to disperse.
By this time the appearance of Japanese reinforcements
going north from Ormoc caused General Krueger to shift the weight of
the Sixth Army to the north to meet the new threat, and to order
General Hodge to hold up on the relief of the 7th Division in the
Burauen area. It was not until after the arrival of the 11th Airborne
Division that the 7th Division, on 22 November, was able to move in
force to the west coast.5
Damon
SHOESTRING RIDGE
23–25 November 1944
At 1025 on 14 November General Arnold ordered Colonel
Finn to start moving the 32d Infantry north to the Damulaan-Caridad
[255]area and to be prepared to advance upon Ormoc on
further orders.6 The units of the 32d Infantry moved to their
assigned areas near the Palanas River, and both the Japanese and
Americans made ready their positions for the clash. (Map 15) The battle that was about to be fought over the
ridge lines along the Palanas River was later called the “Battle
of Shoestring Ridge” by troops of the 32d Infantry. This name
applied to the supply technique rather than to any terrain features of
the ridge, since the supply of the 32d Infantry throughout the battle
was precarious. Said Colonel Finn: “The old slogan ‘Too
little and too late’ became ‘Just enough and just in
time’ for us.”7
The Palanas River runs in a southwesterly direction
between two ridges that end abruptly on reaching the road. The ridges
slope sharply toward the river and are separated by a narrow valley.
Colonel Finn chose to stand on Shoestring Ridge, the southernmost of
the two, which rises steeply from the fields. Its northerly face drops
precipitately for more than 125 feet to the valley, [256]where dense bamboo thickets cover the river
banks. The main body of the ridge is covered with cogon grass,
interspersed with palms and bamboo, growth being especially heavy in
the gullies. Between the western tip of the ridge and the sea are rice
paddies and clusters of palm trees, while at a point 3,000 yards
northeast of the road the ridge falls into a saddle and then rises to
join Hill 918.
Offensive Preparations
While the 26th Division was building up
positions on the opposite bank of the Palanas River, Colonel Finn had
to solve problems that existed to the rear. Since enemy barges still
operated freely a few thousand yards offshore and two Japanese
destroyers had cruised by, General Arnold thought that the enemy might
try to land forces and seize Baybay in order to separate the American
units and sever their line of communications. There were only three
infantry battalions on the west coast. The mud and floods on the narrow
route that connected this force with the source of supplies at Dulag,
on the east coast, made the road so undependable that the 7th Division
could not rely on a quick transfer of reinforcements to the west.
Lt. Col. Charles A. Whitcomb’s 3d Battalion, 32d
Infantry, had moved from Baybay to a position just south of the 2d
Battalion on 21 November8 and established defensive
positions in depth. To have increased the defensive strength on
Shoestring Ridge would have placed the bulk of the forces in a position
where they would be surrounded if the Japanese breached their line.
General Arnold, to prevent such an envelopment, directed that the 2d
Battalion, 184th Infantry, should not be used to reinforce the front
lines without his permission.9 This order left only Lt.
Col. Glenn A. Nelson’s 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, to hold the
front. The 1st Battalion had been sent to the vicinity of Panaon Strait
to relieve the 21st Infantry. In addition to the infantry there was a
concentration of artillery at Damulaan for support. Batteries A and B
of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzer) had moved up
and registered fire by 21 November,10 and on
the morning of 23 November Battery B of the 11th 155-mm. Marine Gun
Battalion arrived at Damulaan.11 The regimental Cannon
Company brought two more pieces, which boosted the total to fourteen.
All the artillery pieces were only about 1,500 yards behind the front
lines, concentrated in a small area in the vicinity of Damulaan. The
light weapons were situated so that their fire could be placed as far
forward as possible, and the 155-mm. guns were in positions from which
they could shell Ormoc.12 The defenses of the infantry
and the artillery were consolidated on ground that afforded the best
protection.
A platoon from the 7th Reconnaissance Troop patrolled
the road between Baybay and Damulaan, and a platoon of light tanks from
the 767th Tank Battalion at Damulaan was the only armor on the west
coast.13 [257]
For several days preceding the 23d of November,
Filipinos moving to the south through the lines reported that large
enemy forces were massing on the opposite side of the Palanas River and
emplacing field guns. Artillery observers on Shoestring Ridge could see
the Japanese constructing trenches, machine gun pits, and other
installations on the opposite ridge. The Japanese forces consisted of
the 1st and 2d Battalions, 13th Independent Infantry
Regiment, and two battalions from the 11th and 12th
Independent Infantry Regiments.14 Colonel
Saito was ordered to hold back the American advance, which threatened
to cut off a trail the Japanese had been building at Albuera over the
mountains to Burauen.
On 23 November the defenses of the 32d Infantry were
stretched very thin. Because of the great distance involved it was not
possible to have a continuous front line extending from the sea to the
mountains, and therefore some passages of approach had to be left open
to the enemy. Only the longest and most difficult were
undefended.15 The main defensive sector of the 32d
Infantry, just south of the Palanas River, was astride the highway and
on that part of the ridge which overlooked the regiment’s
artillery and command post installations. The defensive sector of
Companies F and G was 1,500 yards in width. Company F occupied the
flat, marshy land between the sea and the hills to the east. The men
built barricades of dirt and sandbags at intervals of seventy-five
yards and mined the area in front of them. Company E and guerrillas of
Companies F and G, 94th Philippine Infantry, which were attached to the
2d Battalion, were on a ridge that extended to Hill 918. Some
guerrillas were also outposted between Companies G and E. Regimental
headquarters was at Baybay.16 “The main strength of
the line was American guts and fighting spirit.”17 During the night, Battery B of the 11th 155-mm.
Gun Battalion had moved in and was in position at 0800 to start firing.
The battery was so well camouflaged that during the ensuing engagement
it was never discovered by the enemy. The regiment now had in support
two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers and one of 155-mm. guns.
Battle of Shoestring Ridge
The Battle Begins
At about 1830 on 23 November, the 26th
Division opened up the long-expected attack.18 The
signal for the commencement of hostilities was an artillery
concentration, the first rounds of which fell in the area of Battery A,
49th Field Artillery Battalion. The next rounds were scattered. Enemy
mortars joined the artillery and concentrated their fire on the front
lines of the 32d Infantry. Counterbattery fire of the 105-mm. howitzers
from Battery B of the 49th Field Artillery temporarily silenced the
Japanese fire. At 2000 the enemy artillery and mortars again opened up
against the front lines of the 32d Infantry and cut all communications
between the 2d Battalion and the regimental headquarters at Baybay.
Communications were later re-established by relay from the 3d Battalion
at Caridad. [258]
At 2100 the Japanese infantry launched a well-planned
attack, supported by artillery, mortars, and machine guns, against the
lines of Company E. Although the company retaliated with all weapons at
its command, the Japanese continued to come on, despite heavy
casualties, through the covered draws, high cogon grass, and bamboo
thickets. The guerrilla outpost between Companies G and E withdrew when
the Japanese attacked Company E. The enemy force, which consisted of
two reinforced rifle companies from the 13th Independent Infantry
Regiment, seized portions of the ridge and dug in.
Colonel Nelson, the commander of the 2d Battalion,
ordered Capt. John J. Young, commanding officer of Company E, to
withdraw his troops. Since the Japanese had penetrated the lines and
were digging in, the withdrawal was difficult. At about 2200, when
Capt. Roy F. Dixon, commanding officer of Company G, received word that
Company E was to withdraw to a position behind Company L and thus leave
the right flank of Company G exposed, he ordered the right platoon
leader to move his right from a position in front of the ridge to one
on the ridge facing east, refusing this flank.19 The two
right squads moved back and secured the right of Company G.
At dawn on 24 November Colonel Nelson re-formed the 2d
Battalion. A patrol from Company F went to the Palanas River and found
no enemy troops. At 0800 three companies moved to the east toward Hill
918. The troops succeeded in pushing back a Japanese force that had
penetrated south of the Palanas River and east of Hill 918. Colonel
Finn ordered Company K to move up from Caridad, and he attached it to
the 2d Battalion.
Battery C of the 57th 105-mm. Howitzer Battalion, which
had just arrived, was placed on the left, south of the Bucan
River.20 By 1800 the troops had regained some of the
ground lost the previous night and occupied a perimeter approximately
2,000 yards long and less than 1,500 yards deep.
During the day, as far as their limited ammunition would
allow, the artillery units fired at enemy troop concentrations and
possible observation posts. The service troops worked feverishly to
move badly needed ammunition to the front lines. The two most critical
items were 105-mm. and 81-mm. ammunition, and by nightfall the front
lines had received 1,400 rounds of the first item and 1,600 rounds of
the second. General Arnold attached the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry,
to the 32d Infantry but Colonel Finn was forbidden to commit it to
action without permission from the 7th Division.
Japanese Counterattack
The enemy forces did not wait. That night, under a
full moon, they attacked American positions with great ferocity,
opening the engagement with the heaviest artillery barrage the 32d
Infantry had yet experienced.21 The first rounds fell on
the front-line troops, but the fire then shifted and centered on
Battery A, 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and the infantry and
artillery command posts in the rear at Damulaan. At the same time the
enemy pounded the front lines of Companies G, L, E, and K with heavy
mortar fire. Additional mortars joined the battle and shifted the
greater [259]part of their fire against Battery B. The
cannoneers held fast and returned the fire.
After this thirty-minute artillery and mortar
preparation, the Japanese 13th Independent Infantry Regiment
attacked the front lines of the Americans, concentrating the assault
against three main positions: the right flank of Company G, the draw
between Companies L and K, and the center of Company K. At the same
time, combat patrols moved from the north against Companies F and G.
The companies easily threw back these patrols.
Colonel Nelson ordered all supporting weapons of the 2d
Battalion to fire. All three artillery batteries fired at the maximum
rate for seven minutes, while the mortars placed their fire directly on
the assault force in order to chop it up or drive it back into the
artillery fire. Colonel Nelson then put the Ammunition and Pioneer
Platoon of the 2d Battalion and a squad from Company B, 13th Engineer
Battalion, in previously prepared positions between Companies G and E.
Company G was thus able to strengthen its lines at the heaviest point
of pressure and repel the frequently repeated assaults.
At about 1900 a strong force of the enemy gathered on
the ridge in front of the right flank of Company L. The American
mortars fired on the ridge but the American machine guns kept silent in
order to conceal their locations. A group of about fifty Japanese came
to within thirty yards of the right platoon of Company L and showered
it with grenades. Mortar fire also fell on this platoon, and at the
same time the platoon of Company K in the draw came under heavy fire.
At least twelve emplaced machine guns, in addition to those carried up
by the assaulting troops, raked the positions of Companies K and L with
intense fire. Company L employed all weapons and threw back the assault
with heavy casualties to the Japanese.
Company K did not fare so well, since it was operating
at little more than half strength and there were only nineteen men in
the platoon that guarded the draw on the company’s left flank.
Under the protection of machine gun and mortar fire, the Japanese moved
against the platoon, which was ringed by machine gun fire that cut off
any avenue of withdrawal. The platoon seemed to be faced with imminent
extermination. A Marine machine gunner from the 11th 155-mm. Gun
Battalion, who was stationed on the high ground just south of the draw
of the besieged platoon, opened fire and knocked out the enemy machine
guns which had cut off the line of withdrawal. He then directed his
fire against the Japanese weapons on the ridge across the draw and
raked the ridge from one end to the other. After the enemy guns had
been silenced the platoon made an orderly withdrawal to the foot of the
ridge to positions on its right rear, from which it could cover the
draw.22 Many enemy dead were left in the vacated
positions.
The Japanese then attempted to break through the center
of Company K’s line, but were driven off by the use of artillery,
together with the mortars, machine guns, grenades, and rifles of the
company. For the rest of the night the Japanese kept probing the left
flank of the company and placing machine gun and mortar fire along the
entire line. At one time about twenty-five of [260]the
enemy pushed past the outer perimeter to within fifty yards of the
perimeter of the command post and set up two machine guns. Headquarters
personnel, medical men, and engineers who were manning the perimeter
drove the group off.
Meanwhile, the Japanese forces in front of Company L
withdrew and were regrouping, preparatory to launching a new attack.
Since there was no artillery observer with the company, 1st Lt. William
C. Bentley, of the Cannon Company, with two men went to a vantage point
from which they could observe the draw and the ridge where the enemy
force was assembling. Lieutenant Bentley directed an artillery
concentration on the draw. Three times the Japanese tried to pierce the
right flank of Company L and three times the artillery drove them back
with heavy casualties. The enemy then tried unsuccessfully to get
through the left flank of the company. The front line of Company L had
comparative quiet for the rest of the night, except for a few
infiltrators.
Having failed to pierce the front lines, the 26th
Division troops tried desperately to knock out the artillery
supporting the 32d Infantry—Batteries A and B of the 49th Field
Artillery Battalion receiving the heaviest blows. Battery B had all
four of its guns knocked out, but by “cannibalizing” the
damaged guns the battery had one of them back in operation by dawn. The
enemy shelling gradually slackened in intensity, and by 0400, except
for occasional outbursts of fire, all was quiet.
At dawn of 25 November each company sent scouting
patrols 2,000 yards to its front in order to forestall any Japanese
attempts to move in. The patrols remained out all day. The front lines
were reinforced by Company I, which moved into the draw between
Companies K and L. The troops prepared positions but occupied them only
at night, since they were located in a swampy rice paddy. Headquarters
and B Battery of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion moved into the
Damulaan area to provide additional artillery support. Four 105-mm.
howitzer batteries and one 155-mm. gun battery were then available. The
troops of the 3d Battalion reverted to the control of the 3d Battalion
commander, Colonel Whitcomb. Because of the intense firing during the
night, the ammunition in the front lines had been nearly exhausted, but
a sufficient supply was brought forward to the guns by the next
evening.
At 2200 the enemy, using the same tactics as on the
previous night, again assaulted the eastern positions of the 32d
Infantry with approximately one battalion, after an artillery
preparation. Although apparently well led and well organized, they were
in less strength than before and were driven back, but not without a
grenade battle and some hand-to-hand fighting.
While the infantry troops were thus engaged, eight
Japanese led by an officer moved unnoticed along the Bucan River about
one and a half miles south of the Palanas River. Coming up on the right
of B Battery, 49th Field Artillery Battalion, these enemy troops threw
a shower of grenades at the gun crews and tried to clamber over the
river bank and get at the guns. One man made it, and by placing a
satchel charge behind the breechblock of a howitzer he put it
permanently out of commission. All of the Japanese were killed.
The troops of the 32d Infantry spent the 26th of
November improving their positions, moving automatic weapons,
restocking ammunition, and securing much-needed rest. The only
important change in the lines was the moving of B Company, 184th
Infantry, [261]less one platoon, into the position of B
Battery, which was made part of A Battery.23
(Map 16)
Damon
SHOESTRING RIDGE
26–27 November 1944
Bloody Bamboo Thicket
At 2100 Colonel Saito renewed the assault against
the American position, following the pattern set by the previous night
actions. The Japanese first laid down mortar and machine gun
fire,24 and then heavy-weapons fire of the 13th
Infantry Regiment hit the right platoons of Company G, shifting to
the east in about fifteen minutes. Immediately afterward, about a
battalion of Japanese infantry attacked Company G, while twelve machine
guns started to fire from a ridge 1,200 yards to the east. The Japanese
moved into the fire of their own heavy weapons. The 32d Infantry, using
all of its artillery batteries, mortars, machine guns, and rifles,
started throwing lead against the enemy force as fast as its men could
load and fire. The Japanese, employing an estimated fifty machine guns,
continued [262]to come on. “All hell broke
loose”25 as the enemy shot off flares to guide their
own artillery fire. The sharp declivity in front of the American lines
did not allow for a close concentration of friendly artillery fire.
Just as it appeared that the lines were to be overrun, some more enemy
flares went up, and the Japanese withdrew, covered by heavy machine gun
and mortar fire. Colonel Finn, taking advantage of this fortunate
circumstance, hastily rearranged riflemen to fill gaps caused by
casualties and replenished his ammunition supplies. The mortars of the
regiment continued to fire into the draw.
After a short lull Colonel Saito renewed the attack.
There was no preparatory artillery fire, but the mortars and machine
guns introduced the assault. The attack did not seem as determined as
the previous one, though the number of troops was apparently about the
same. The 32d Infantry again called down all types of fire upon the
enemy. Elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment continued to
advance, although “the carnage was terrific,”26 and attempted to pass through the American
lines. A strong enemy group moved into a bamboo grove on a nose in
front of the center platoon of G Company. From this position the enemy
launched an attack which the company resisted with grenades and
bayonets. As Colonel Finn later reported: “The battle continued
to flare up and die down as the valiant soldiers fought like devils to
hold our lines.”27 The 81-mm. mortars from the
mortar platoon of H Company fired 650 rounds in five minutes, and fire
from the 60-mm. mortars was “practically
automatic.”28 After an hour’s intense
fighting, the enemy force withdrew.
The Japanese had not attacked the left flank of G
Company. These troops heard the battle raging to the right and the
sounds of the Japanese forming below them. A noncommissioned officer in
charge of a listening post sent a man to get permission for his
three-man group to withdraw. After receiving permission he shouted the
order from a distance of fifty yards. As the men from the listening
post started back, they were joined by the left platoon and two squads
from the center platoon. Within forty-five minutes the two platoons,
less one squad, plus the section of heavy machine guns, were moving
south on the highway. “There was no thought in their minds that
the withdrawal was not authorized.”29 After
proceeding down the road 250 yards they met the executive officer of
Company H who ordered them back. It was too late, the damage was done.
Though the left platoon was able to regain its position without
trouble, the two squads from the center platoon found the enemy well
dug-in in the bamboo thicket where the squads had been. It was later
learned that there were about two hundred hostile troops with twenty
machine guns in the thicket.
The Japanese were within the American lines and in a
position from which they could fire on A Battery and the flanks of
Companies E, L, I, and K.30 Colonel Finn immediately took
steps to contain the penetrators. The reserve platoon from I Company
moved behind E Company to face north in order to stop any enemy troops
moving south [263]along the high ground. The squad of the center
platoon of Company G that had remained in position was faced to the
west in order to forestall any attempt to roll up the line of G
Company. That part of G Company which had withdrawn was moved along the
high ground behind E Company where it established contact with the rest
of G Company that faced the bamboo thicket. The right of F Company was
turned south along the highway. Although the enemy could not be denied
access to the flat, open ground leading to Damulaan, the rear of E and
G Companies was protected and the flat ground could be covered by fire.
The Japanese apparently did not realize the predicament of the
Americans, since they made no attempt to exploit it.
At the same time that G Company was fighting, the other
companies, E, L, and I, were also hit, though the assault was not so
heavy as the one against G Company. The commanding officer of E
Company, next to G Company, felt that the situation left him “in
a hell of a spot,”31 but he held his position. The
Japanese steadily persisted in their pressure against the lines of the
companies and the fighting continued throughout the night. The
defenders yielded no ground and effectively used many supporting fires
to disrupt the attack of the 26th Division. The Americans
counted 400 Japanese dead the next morning, but casualties of the 32d
Infantry, despite the heavy fighting, had been surprisingly light. For
the twenty-four hour period ending at 1430 on 27 November, four
officers and fifteen enlisted men had been wounded and one enlisted man
killed.32
Colonel Finn made plans for the recapture of the ground
lost by G Company, and General Arnold made available to him part of the
1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, which was at Caridad. The 1st Battalion,
less B Company and two platoons from C Company, left Caridad at 0415 on
27 November, and by 0515 it was in Damulaan in readiness for the
assault. Company G, 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was also available.
At the same time, the enemy was in the midst of
preparing new plans. The Japanese felt that if they could recapture the
Burauen airfields, all the American forces on Leyte would be in
jeopardy. General Suzuki therefore ordered his troops to prepare for an
operation at Burauen. In order to concentrate the 26th Division
for his daring move across the mountains to strike at the Americans in
the vicinity of the Burauen airfields, General Suzuki risked his right
flank, leaving only a detachment consisting of the 12th Independent
Infantry Regiment, one and one-half battalions of the 13th
Independent Infantry Regiment, and one battery of the 26th
Artillery Battalion with two mobile guns to prevent the Americans
from reaching Albuera and cutting off the base of his attack. At the
same time, staff members of the 26th Division moved south to
direct operations against the 7th Division.33
These Japanese measures were taken just as General
Krueger was able to reinforce the attack toward Ormoc. The commanding
officer of the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, at dawn on 27 November
got his troops ready for the drive toward Albuera. He moved his
battalion behind L and E Companies, 32d Infantry. Because of the
limited [264]area involved, the battalion commander decided
that only A Company would make the attack. The artillery, mortars, and
machine guns placed heavy fire on the bamboo thicket. At 0855 the
troops moved out but were stopped by heavy machine gun fire after they
had advanced about 200 yards. They then withdrew about fifty yards
while the artillery and mortars again covered the area.34 A second attack was also halted, and A Company
again pulled back. At 1430 a very heavy artillery concentration was
placed on the thicket.35 Immediately thereafter C
Company moved in swiftly and cleared out and secured the area by 1600.
A total of 109 enemy dead was counted and twenty-nine machine guns were
removed.
The defensive perimeters of the 32d Infantry were set
up. With the addition of the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, the lines
were much stronger. During the night of 27 November elements of the
13th Independent Infantry Regiment made minor attempts to
infiltrate through the lines but were easily repulsed.
By now the Sixth Army had received substantial
reinforcements. General Hodge therefore ordered the 7th Division to
assemble all forces in the Baybay area as rapidly as the logistical
situation would permit.36 By 27 November sufficient
troops had assembled to enable him to order General Arnold to make
“an early and vigorous attack” to destroy the Japanese in
the area and then capture Ormoc.37 On 28 November all the
assault elements of the 7th Division, with the exception of the 1st
Battalion, 32d Infantry, which was patrolling in the vicinity of Panaon
Strait, were either on the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea or on the
way there. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 32d Infantry, were still engaging the enemy at a bamboo
thicket on Shoestring Ridge south of the Palanas River and east of
Damulaan.38
The troops of Colonel Finn’s 32d Infantry were
weary. They had prevented the Japanese 26th Division from going
south along the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea and had held back the
best the enemy had to offer. General Arnold desired that the 7th
Division push through the enemy lines with two regiments abreast toward
Ormoc. The tired 32d Infantry was to be drawn back and replaced by the
184th and 17th Infantry Regiments.
On 28 November, after receiving orders from General
Arnold, the commanding officer of the 184th Infantry, Col. Curtis D.
O’Sullivan, outlined to his battalion commanders the new roles
they were to play. The 184th Infantry was to relieve the 32d Infantry
and then attack to the front and cover the division’s left
sector. The 1st Battalion of the regiment was to relieve Company F, 32d
Infantry, from the beach inland to a clump of trees held by the enemy
600 yards inland. Parts of Companies A and C were already at the edge
of the grove. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, with the 57th Field
Artillery Battalion in direct support, was to relieve Companies G and E
of the 32d Infantry, tie in with Company L of the 32d Infantry, and
attack in the direction of Hill 918. The 3d Battalion, in regimental
reserve, was to take a position in San Agustin. The 32d Infantry was to
fall back to Tinagan.39 At 1700 the 2d Battalion,
184th [265]Infantry, relieved the 2d Battalion, 32d
Infantry, at Damulaan.40
At 1945 on 28 November elements of the 26th
Division attacked from the southeast and northeast the right flank
of Company A, 184th Infantry, at the bamboo thicket and pushed it back
fifty yards. Battery B, 57th Field Artillery Battalion, fired at the
southern point of the enemy infiltration and also 100 yards to the
west.41 The Japanese attack was stopped, and the 1st
Battalion held fast and dug in.42
Company E, 2d Battalion, hurriedly moved into a position
from which, if requested, it could support the 1st Battalion. The
81-mm. mortar section of the 2d Battalion was prepared to place fire in
front of the zone of Company A, and two platoons from Company C were in
position to fill a gap existing between the 1st and 2d
Battalions.43 By 2045 the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, and
the 2d and 1st Battalions, 184th Infantry, were on a line from right to
left.44 The night was quiet except for sounds of enemy
activity in front of the 2d Battalion.45
At 0900 on 29 November Company A of the 1st Battalion
and Company F of the 2d Battalion, after a mortar barrage, attacked to
retake the lost ground and to overrun the Japanese position in the
bamboo thicket. They regained the ground without opposition, but as the
troops approached the thicket they met strong resistance. For the rest
of the day the battle seesawed back and forth as elements of the 184th
Infantry and the 26th Division contested for control of
“Bloody Bamboo Thicket,” as it came to be called. Between
1820 and 1920, Company A repulsed three heavy enemy attacks and killed
an estimated fifty to eighty Japanese.46 At 1800
Companies A and F made a co-ordinated but unsuccessful attack against
the Japanese. They dug in for the night in positions from which they
successfully withstood enemy attacks.47
The following morning both battalions sent patrols to
scout out the strength and installations of the enemy. At 1045 Company
A, which had been in action for several days, was relieved by Company C
and moved to the old position of the latter.48 At 1400,
after a ten-minute artillery preparation, Company C and two platoons
from Company F on its right were to move out toward a ridge 150 yards
north in order to strengthen the lines and secure positions on the
commanding terrain—part of which was the bamboo thicket over
which Company A and the enemy had fought.
The companies moved out on time and met little
resistance until they had penetrated twenty to thirty yards into the
thicket, when the enemy strongly opposed any further advance. The
troops of the 184th Infantry, however, steadily pushed on, and by 1603
Company C, with the platoons from Company F just behind it, had cleared
the bamboo thicket. Since the line of Company C extended over a wide
front, it was tightened and shortened and tied into Company B. By 1730
the troops of Companies C and F had consolidated their positions and
formed a night perimeter on the forward slope of the ridge.49 Shoestring Ridge was firmly in American hands.
[266]
Battles of the Hills
The attempts of the 26th Division to drive
the Americans back had been checked, but the front lines remained
practically the same as they had been at the outset of the battle for
Shoestring Ridge. It had become apparent that the most one regiment
could do was to conduct a holding action and that if the 7th Division
was to continue the advance it would be necessary to commit a stronger
force against the Japanese. Elements of the 26th Division were
by now firmly ensconced in the hills that overlooked Highway 2 and were
in a position to contest bitterly any forward movement of the 7th
Division.
A series of sharply edged ridges with many spurs,
heavily overgrown with bamboo thickets and high cogon grass, rose from
the coastal plain to the central mountain range. (Map
17) One of these, Hill 918, was especially important
tactically, since from it one could observe the entire coast to the
south, and as far as Ormoc to the north. About four fifths of a mile
northeast of Hill 918 was the barrio of Kang Dagit, and about one and a
half miles north of the hill was Kang Cainto.50 Other
important high points were Hill 380, between the Palanas and Tabgas
Rivers and about one and a third miles east of Balogo on Highway 2, and
Hill 606, between the Tabgas River and Calingatngan Creek and
approximately one and a third miles east of Calingatngan on Highway
2.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES
5–12 December 1944
General Arnold wished to attack north with two regiments
abreast. He therefore ordered Colonel O’Sullivan to send out a
strong patrol to the front of the 184th Infantry but not to attempt any
advance until the 17th Infantry could arrive from the east coast. On 3
December, when most of the 17th Infantry had reached the west coast,
General Arnold called a meeting of his regimental commanders. He told
them that the 7th Division was to renew the attack north at 0800 on 5
December with regiments abreast, the 17th Infantry on the right and the
184th Infantry on the left, and secure the Talisayan River about three
and a half miles north, together with the intervening enemy positions
on Hills 918, 380, and 606. The boundary between the regiments was to
be roughly 2,000 yards from the beach.51 At this
time the front-line units of the 26th Division, which had been
occupying a hill about two miles northwest of Damulaan, withdrew to the
Palanas River and a hill northeast of the river. A battalion of the
26th Division was on the western slope of a hill north of the
river.52
On 4 December the 184th Infantry prepared for the attack
and sent patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions to the front. These
patrols penetrated as far north as Balogo. The 17th Infantry spent the
day in moving forward the various elements of the regiment.53 By nightfall the units of the 7th Division were
in readiness for the offensive which was to start the following
morning.
Hill 918
On 4 December General Arnold ordered Lt. Col.
O’Neill K. Kane to move the tanks of the 776th Amphibian Tank
Battalion by water under cover of darkness to a position 1,000 yards at
sea to the west of Balogo, the next coastal town, about a mile to the
north [267]of the front lines. The tanks at dawn on the 5th
were to assault the beaches in that vicinity and fire on the town and
on the north slopes of hills and ravines in the area. These movements
of the tank battalion were to be closely co-ordinated with the 184th
and 17th Infantry Regiments, into whose areas the attack was to be
made.
At 0635 on the 5th, the tank battalion in a column
formation started to move north over water. The tanks advanced toward
Balogo until they were at a point offshore about 200 yards from the
town. They then continued north in a column formation and fired into
the town of Tabgas. At the mouth of the Tabgas River, just short of
Tabgas, the tanks attacked in line formation. Moving ashore at 0700,
they sent approximately 2,550 rounds of 75-mm. ammunition in direct
fire against the northern slopes of the hills that confronted the 7th
Division.
The tanks completed their mission, took to the water
again, and headed north for a mile to reconnoiter the area around
Calingatngan. They then turned south and started for the bivouac area.
On the return, Colonel Kane, elated over the success of their previous
landing and wishing to use up the remaining ammunition, ordered the
tanks to land 500 yards south of the Tabgas River. From here the tanks
fired and then withdrew unhindered by enemy fire. At 1045 they were
back in their bivouac area.54
At 0800 on 5 December the 184th and 17th Infantry
Regiments moved out with the 184th Infantry on the left. The 1st
Battalion, 184th Infantry, on the extreme left, reached the Palanas
River without incident and without having to fire a single
shot.55 The Japanese historians, however, claimed that
one of the amphibian tanks was set on fire and that the 2d
Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, repulsed the advance
of the 184th Infantry.56
There were numerous finger ridges inland which were cut
by deep ravines and gorges that came to within a few hundred yards of
the coast line. The entrenched Japanese, using reverse slope tactics,
were able to deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry. In many
cases the reverse slopes were so steep that effective artillery fire
could not be placed upon them.57 The 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, moved forward slowly toward a small hill which faced the
Palanas River, and at 0858 it encountered enemy small arms fire from
the western slope of the hill. Using grenades, the battalion pushed
forward, but at 0938 the Japanese opened up with three light machine
guns. The supporting weapons of the 2d Battalion fired on the enemy
positions to the front. At 1037, as the battalion reached the military
crest of the hill, the Japanese launched a small counterattack on the
left flank of Company E. This attack was repulsed, but the companies
continued to receive small arms and machine gun fire.
At 1325 the 1st Battalion renewed its advance and
proceeded without incident, finding the situation “very
quiet” to its front. At 1435 the battalion dug in for the night
approximately 300 yards south of Balogo.58 The 3d
Battalion moved through the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions and
across the front of the 2d Battalion on the right toward Hill 380,
which consisted of a series of ridges. As the 3d Battalion advanced
toward the hill, it came under machine gun [268]fire
on each flank. With artillery support, the troops reached the top of
the second ridge of Hill 380 and dug in, nine of the men having been
wounded.59 At 1635 the battalions of the 184th Infantry
received orders to set up night defense positions in depth and to hold
the “positions at all costs.”60 Colonel
O’Sullivan decided that the 3d Battalion was to bear the brunt of
the advance of the 184th Infantry on 6 December and push on to Hill
380.61
On the right of the 184th the 17th Infantry had had a
busy day in working toward its objective, Hill 918. At 0800 on 5
December the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry, with the 1st
Battalion on the left, had moved through the 32d Infantry. At 0906 the
advance elements of the 1st Battalion secured a ridge south of the main
ridge leading from Hill 918, and at 1000 the entire battalion closed on
this ridge. In the face of sporadic rifle and machine gun fire, the
leading platoons pushed forward to secure a ridge that led west from
Hill 918. As the advance platoons neared the crest of this ridge, they
received intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire to the front and
on both flanks from the 2d Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment. At the same time the rest of the battalion, in attempting
to reach a forward ridge and support the leading platoons, also
encountered cross fire that came down the intervening draw. As enemy
gunfire pinned down the troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with
Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the 1st and 2d
Battalions.
The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, quickly
alert to exploit this opportunity to drive a wedge between the two
forces, threw approximately a company armed with machine guns and
mortars into the gap. Although they did not penetrate completely, the
enemy troops were able to secure a position which would make any
forward movement of the 1st Battalion very costly. The 1st Platoon of
Company B and the 3d Platoon of Company A were still out on the forward
ridge and cut off from the rest of the battalion. The reserve platoon
of Company A tried an envelopment around the right flank of the 1st
Battalion but was stopped by the enemy in the gap. Company C moved up
to protect the rear of Company A. Eventually the forward platoons
withdrew to the battalion lines and preparations were made for the
night. Under cover of darkness the 1st Battalion reorganized and moved
into positions on top of the first ridge.62
Earlier that day the 2d Battalion had driven forward
with Company E on the right and Company G on the left. Company E went
east along the Bucan River for approximately 1,000 yards and then
turned northeast to ascend Hill 918. At first, however, the company had
to secure a small ridge southwest of Hill 918 on which was a small but
dense banana grove. Company E encountered and destroyed a small enemy
force on this ridge, after which the company reorganized and at
approximately 1300 began to ascend Hill 918 itself. When Company E
reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese began heavy firing
with grenade launchers and at least three machine guns. The enemy fire
swept the crest of the hill and prevented any movement over the lip of
the ridge.
Meanwhile, Company G went to the left of Company E and
secured a small ridge about 1,200 yards from the line of departure
[269]and west of Hill 918. The advance platoon of
Company G then received fire from automatic weapons that were emplaced
in a draw to the left front of the platoon. The rest of the company
attempted to move around to the right of the ridge but also encountered
automatic weapons fire coming from another draw. Since high cogon grass
covered the area, observation was limited to a matter of inches. At
about 1300, elements of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment
counterattacked through a gap between Company G and Company A of the
1st Battalion. A machine gun platoon, which was thrown in to plug the
gap, succeeded in stopping the attempted Japanese advance.
Company G, however, continued to be pinned down by the
enemy fire directed at its front. Company F, the reserve company, was
then committed to take a position between G and E Companies. Its
mission was to come abreast of Company E, take Hill 918, and then turn
west and wipe out the resistance in front of Company G. At 1415 Company
F moved up Hill 918 and reached Company E without opposition.
Three spurs led down from Hill 918. The one occupied by
Company E ran southwest, that occupied by Company F ran west, and the
third ran northwest. As the two commanders started to launch a
co-ordinated assault from their respective spurs, their companies
received a concentration of about fifty rounds of mortar fire but
pushed through this fire and secured the crests of both spurs. They
immediately came under automatic weapons and rifle fire from the
northwest ridge.
Since the left flank of Company F was in the tall cogon
grass, it was practically impossible for the company to observe the
enemy. On the other hand, Company E was on bare and open ground which
exposed it to machine gun and mortar fire from Hill 918. Both companies
also came under long-range machine gun fire from the vicinity of Kang
Dagit, northeast of Hill 918. It was impractical to attempt an
envelopment to the right, since the flank of Company E rested on a deep
ravine which ran to the bed of the Bagan River. An envelopment to the
left would have necessitated going down the hill, circling behind
Company G, and attacking east from the positions of the 1st Battalion.
Because of these unfavorable conditions, Companies E and F with their
wounded withdrew to make a line with Company G.63
In support of the advance of the 17th Infantry, the 49th
Field Artillery Battalion fired 577 rounds of ammunition during the
day. The fires “varied from knocking out machine guns to fire on
mortars and on troops in the open.”64 The 17th
Infantry had forced the 1st Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment, to start withdrawal to a hill farther north. At the same
time, Japanese engineer and artillery units at Albuera “were
erecting anti-landing obstacles along the beach and putting up antitank
defenses.”65
At the end of 5 December the 17th Infantry had secured
the ridge west of Hill 918 and the 184th Infantry had secured a line
extending from the beach 300 yards south of Balogo east to the high
ground southeast of the Palanas River. Company K, 32d Infantry, had
filled a gap that had existed between the 17th and 184th Infantry
Regiments, while the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had crossed the
Palanas River and, advancing up the southwest slope of Hill
[270]380, reached the top of the first ridge. There
were no enemy attacks during the night.
Hill 380
General Arnold ordered the regiments to capture
all of Hill 918, the northern slope of Hill 380, and the Palanas River
valley. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 17th Infantry, aided by the 2d
Battalion, 184th Infantry, were to move northeast until their front
lines were on an east-west line south of the Palanas River. They were
then to launch an attack to the north and capture the slope of Hill 380
in their zone of action. The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, was to attack
to the north on the eastern slope of Hill 918 and capture the slope of
Hill 380 in its zone of action. The 184th Infantry was to capture the
northern slope of Hill 380 and assist the 17th Infantry in its movement
north.66
The 184th Infantry started out at 0800 on 6 December
with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right.
Supported by eight tanks, the 1st Battalion pushed through rifle fire,
moved into Balogo, and cleared the town. The battalion commander then
ordered Company B to seize a ridge just east of Balogo. Though the
company temporarily secured the ridge, at 1155 the Japanese drove the
men off. At 1210 artillery and mortar fire was placed against the
Japanese positions on the ridge. As soon as the supporting fire lifted,
at 1305, Company B sent a platoon through Company K to hit the ridge
from the right flank.67 Company B secured the ridge
at 1510 but fifty yards farther north on the southern slope of the next
ridge strong elements of the 26th Division had dug in, making it
impossible for the troops to move forward. Before the jump-off of the
3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, a platoon from Company K secured the
first ridge north of the battalion position. At 1000 the rest of the
battalion reached the top of Hill 380 and secured an enemy field
artillery observation post from which it could see enemy activity in a
deep valley north of Hill 380. Elements of the 26th Division set
up machine guns and delivered mortar and artillery fire on Hill 380
throughout the afternoon.68 The 1st and 3d Battalions,
184th Infantry, covered by mortar and artillery fire, set up night
perimeters, the latter on Hill 380 and the former on the ridge east of
Balogo. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, remained in the Palanas River
valley throughout the day.
The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry jumped
off abreast. The 1st Battalion reached the ridge which led west from
Hill 918 and overlooked the Palanas River, where it found strong enemy
positions that had been abandoned. While the 1st Battalion reorganized,
advance platoons, one each from Companies B and C, went across the
Palanas River to the next ridge, which overlooked the Tabgas River. The
1st Battalion, in conjunction with the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,
followed the platoons at a distance of about 500 yards. Company B moved
behind a “protective nose” which led south from the main
ridge and Company C pushed “a knife edge east of Company
B.”69 As Company C reached a point just short of the
main ridge, the men moved in single file and were pinned down by heavy
machine gun cross fire from both flanks and to their front. Company B,
attempting to envelop the entrenched enemy from the west, [271]encountered heavy fire on its left front, which
made any envelopment in that direction impossible. At 1500 a strong
column of the enemy counterattacked the left flank of Company C, but
six machine guns from Company D broke up the enemy attack. The 1st
Battalion dug in for the night halfway up Hill 380.70
Meanwhile, at 0800, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, had
started for Hill 918. The 49th Field Artillery Battalion established a
smoke screen on the hill to cover the advance of the infantry,71 and at 1100 Company E reached the crest of the
hill. A patrol located a trail that led down to the Palanas River. As
Company E moved down this trail, Company G, though under machine gun
fire, pushed straight ahead through the saddle to its front.72 By 1715 all elements of the 2d Battalion had
reached the Palanas River and were moving left to establish contact
with the 1st Battalion. From dug-in positions in the dense bamboo
thickets on the northern bank of the river, the Japanese opened fire
upon the 2d Battalion. Nothing serious developed, however, and the
troops formed their night perimeters. The elements of the 1st and 2d
Battalions, 17th Infantry, were now in contact on a line along the
Palanas River.73
The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, swung to the extreme
right towards Kang Dagit and Kang Cainto in order to hit Hill 380 from
the east, but it was hampered by ravines two to three hundred feet
deep. Though the advance was very slow, the 3d Battalion in a column of
companies with Company L in the lead was able to reach Kang Dagit where
it closed for the night.74
At the end of the day the 7th Division had secured the
barrio of Balogo, had overrun Hill 918 and occupied Kang Dagit, and had
established elements of the division on the banks of the Palanas River
and on part of Hill 380.
The night of 6–7 December was quiet. General
Arnold ordered the 7th Division to attack north at 0800 on 7 December
and secure Hills 380 and 606. The 184th Infantry was to capture the
high ground south of the Tabgas River.75 Colonel
Pachler ordered the 17th Infantry, with its 1st Battalion on the left
and its 2d Battalion on the right, to attack north to secure the
portion of Hills 380 and 606 in its sector. The 3d Battalion, 17th
Infantry, was to secure Kang Cainto and to be prepared to attack Hill
380 from the east or to continue north. At 0630 patrols went out to
make reconnaissance and determine the enemy strength and dispositions
to their front.76
At 0913 the 184th Infantry moved out. It met little
opposition, and at 1643 the regiment reached the high ground
overlooking the Tabgas River and dug in for the night.77
At dawn the 17th Infantry sent out patrols. The one from
the 1st Battalion located an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine
guns, and a mortar, emplaced 150 yards from the battalion’s
lines. When the patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on the position
and it was wiped out. The 1st Battalion moved out at approximately
0900. Though long-range fire fell on the troops and small arms fire hit
the left flank of Company [272]C, the men continued to push
forward. The battalion found several ridges leading up Hill 380—a
knifelike ridge in front of Company C and a double ridge in the form of
a horseshoe, with its closed end toward the hill, in front of Company
B.
Company B moved across the double ridge while Company C
forced its passage through machine gun and rifle fire across the closed
part of the horseshoe. At 1600 the two companies re-established contact
on the northernmost ridge leading to Hill 380. At 1630 the Japanese
with machine guns launched a counterattack against the right flank of
the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the left flank of the 1st
Battalion, 17th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 184th, was pinned down but
did not yield any ground. The troops on the front lines of the 1st
Battalion, 17th Infantry, at first were forced back slightly but in a
few minutes regained the lost ground. They dug in for the night on the
crest of the ridge.78
After its dawn patrols had reported on 7 December, the
2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, jumped off to the attack. Company E
secured the first of the three spurs leading from Hill 380, and
continued forward to the middle spur in the face of light fire that
came from in front of the company in the area the 17th Infantry wished
to secure. Presently the fire grew to considerable intensity and the
company’s section of light machine guns and two platoons of heavy
machine guns moved onto the middle spur, where they neutralized the
enemy position.
While this action was going on, Companies G and F moved
to the first spur. Company G received orders from the battalion
commander to make a wide envelopment of Hill 380 and then assault the
hill from the east. At 0930 the company dropped below the military
crest of the southern slope of Hill 380 unobserved and made its way
very slowly over the steep terrain and through the thick cogon grass.
At 1200 the 49th Field Artillery Battalion laid a five-minute
preparatory fire in front of the battalion.79 The
American troops then routed the surprised Japanese defenders and killed
the majority of them as the others fled into the mountains northeast of
the hill.
Apparently realizing that Hill 380 was the key to
defense of the Tabgas River valley and Hill 606, troops of the 26th
Division poured long-range machine gun fire from Hill 606 into
Company G and at the same time halted the company with small arms fire
from the immediate left along the ridge. At 1355, after a heavy mortar
barrage, about fifty men from the 26th Division counterattacked
the positions of Company G, but the company held firm and mowed down
the attackers with fire from its rifles and automatic weapons. The
position on the hill was maintained.
Although Company G occupied the top of Hill 380, it was
not in a position to aid the advance of Company E. The Japanese troops
were dug in on the reverse slopes and could only be rooted out by
close-in fighting. The commanding officer of the 2d Battalion committed
Company F down the main spur from the east, supported by Companies E
and G and the machine guns from Company H. As soon as Company F started
down the ridge, the enemy concentrated fire upon it both from the north
and the west. In a matter of minutes Company F was reduced to a point
where the number [273]of its riflemen hardly equaled one platoon.
The company commander secured an additional platoon from Company G and
renewed the assault behind a concentration of 100 rounds of 60-mm.
mortar fire and 80 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire. The attack succeeded,
and the enemy force was overrun and annihilated. Company E thereupon
moved to the main ridge and helped mop up the area.80
At 0700 the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out,
reaching the source of the Palanas River at 1400. An enemy force of
about fifty men was observed in a natural bowl to its immediate front.
The battalion placed long-range rifle and machine gun fire on the group
as two platoons from Company K attacked from the flank. They destroyed
the entire Japanese force without any casualties to the American
troops. The 3d Battalion then crossed the Palanas River and went into
night perimeter at Kang Cainto. At 1907 eight rounds of artillery fire
fell into the area, killing seven men and wounding eighteen
others.81
At the end of the day the 184th Infantry was on the
banks of the Tabgas River and the 17th Infantry had secured Hill 380,
which commanded the Tabgas River valley.
Although several days of hard going still lay ahead
before the 7th Division was to reach its objective, the Talisayan
River, the backbone of the Japanese resistance had been broken and the
Battle of the Ridges was virtually won. The division had achieved what
the Japanese had considered impossible. It had pushed through Leyte
over the tortuous mountain road between Abuyog and Baybay, it had held
the enemy back at Shoestring Ridge, and it had then pushed north along
the shores of Ormoc Bay toward Ormoc, decimating the right flank
detachment of the 26th Division in the process. General Suzuki
had been forced to send south much of his tactical strength, which was
to have been used for the defense of Ormoc. The 7th Division had
assisted in no small way in tightening the ever-shortening noose about
the Japanese who remained on the island.
On this day, 7 December, the 77th Division landed at
Deposito just below Ormoc. The 26th Division was caught between
two strong American divisions. It was doomed. At this point the action
of the 7th Division merged with that of the 77th Division in the drive
of the XXIV Corps against Ormoc. [274]
Damon
SITUATION ON LEYTE
7 December 1944
[275]
1 XXIV
Corps FO 12, 30 Oct 44. The operations of the 7th Division on the
western coast of Leyte were more adequately covered than any other
action in the Leyte campaign. Capt. Tucker Dean and 1st Lt. Russell A.
Gugeler, two combat historians, prepared very complete manuscripts on
the battle of Shoestring Ridge. Gugeler’s Battle of the
Ridgelines and Dean’s King II: the Liberation of Leyte, on file
in the Office of the Chief of Military History, have much information
that is not given in the official reports. In addition Col. John M.
Finn, who commanded the 32d Infantry which bore the brunt of the
Shoestring Ridge battle, wrote an account of the engagement that
appeared in the September and October 1945 issues of the Infantry
Journal. (Unless otherwise stated, this chapter is based upon these
accounts and the 32d Infantry Operations Report Leyte, pp.
10–26.) ↑
2 The
Japanese historians make the following ambiguous statement: “The
Army had doubts as to the authenticity of this broadcast, but from past
experience with U. S. broadcasts, the Army estimated it to be a small
unit of U. S. and Philippine troops which had landed there.”
35th Army Opns, p. 51. Unless otherwise stated the part of this
section dealing with Japanese plans is based upon this study, pp.
51–84. ↑
3
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 24. ↑
5 XXIV
Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 11–12. ↑
6
Fragmentary Order, CG 7th Div to CO 32d Inf, 14 Nov 44, 7th Div G-3
Jnl, 14 Nov 44. ↑
7 Col.
John M. Finn, “Shoestring Ridge,” Infantry Journal,
LVII, 3 (September, 1945), 47. ↑
8 7th
Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt, 21 Nov 44. ↑
9 7th
Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Nov 44. ↑
10 7th
Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt, 21 Nov 44. ↑
11 7th
Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. The 11th 155-mm. Gun Battalion and the 5th
155-mm. Howitzer Battalion were Marine artillery units and part of the
V Amphibious Corps artillery which had been designated for Yap. With
the cancellation of that operation, these two battalions had been
assigned to the XXIV Corps as part of the corps artillery for
Leyte. ↑
12 Msg,
XXIV Corps to 7th Inf Div, 21 Nov 44. ↑
13 32d
Inf Regt S-3 Periodic Rpt, 23–24 Nov 44. ↑
14 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. ↑
16 That
evening General Arnold, acting on instructions from the Sixth Army that
“guerrillas not be given missions beyond their
capabilities,” ordered Colonel Finn to use guerrillas only as
outposts and not as part of the main line of resistance. 7th Inf Div
G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. ↑
17 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. ↑
19 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. ↑
20 49th
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10. ↑
21 Msg,
CO 32d Inf to CG 7th Div, 25 Nov 44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 25 Nov
44. ↑
22
“The platoon leader, a technical sergeant, insisted that the
Marine gunner either transfer to the Army or he would have to transfer
to the Marines, as he couldn’t get along without him.”
(Finn, op. cit., p. 52.) A check of Marine Corps records, and
interviews with Marine Corps historians and Colonel Finn failed to
disclose the name and rank of the Marine gunner. ↑
23 Msg,
32d Inf to 7th Div, 1520, 26 Nov 44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 26 Nov
44. ↑
24 Msg,
32d Inf to 7th Div, 2213, 26 Nov 44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 26 Nov
44. ↑
25 The
Japanese give the number of enemy troops as two and a half battalions
while the 32d Infantry estimated it as three battalions. 35th
Army Opns, p. 78; 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. ↑
26 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. ↑
30 Msg,
CO 32d Inf to CG 7th Div, 0220, 27 Nov 44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov
44. ↑
31 Msg,
CO 32d Inf to S-3 2d Bn, 0305, 27 Nov 44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov
44. ↑
32 Msg,
32d Inf to 7th Div, 1443, 27 Nov 44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov
44. ↑
34 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24; Msg, 2d Bn to 32d Inf, 27 Nov 44, and Msgs,
Exec Off 32d Inf to CO 32d Inf, 1005, 1120, and 1210, 27 Nov 44, 32d
Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov 44. ↑
35 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24. ↑
36 XXIV
Corps FO 28, 22 Nov 44. ↑
37 XXIV
Corps FO 30, 27 Nov 44. ↑
38 7th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 40, 28 Nov 44. ↑
39
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 1200, 28 Nov 44. ↑
40
184th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. Unless otherwise stated the material on
the 184th Infantry is based on this operations report of the
regiment. ↑
41
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 2005, 28 Nov 44. ↑
42
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 2045, 28 Nov 44. ↑
43 Msg,
S-3 2d Bn to 184th Inf, 2010, 28 Nov 44, 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 28 Nov
44. ↑
44 Msg,
CO 184th Inf to CG 7th Div, 2045, 28 Nov 44, 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 28 Nov
44. ↑
45
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 0125, 29 Nov 44. ↑
46
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 2020, 29 Nov 44. ↑
47
184th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt 42, 30 Nov 44. ↑
48
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 30 Nov 44. ↑
50
Cainto is also known as Caintic. The Army spelling, Cainto, will
be followed here. ↑
51
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 3 Dec 44. ↑
53 17th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex B, The Battle of the Ridgelines, p. 1. Unless
otherwise stated, the part played by the 17th Infantry during this
engagement is based upon the above report, pp.
1–9. ↑
54
Armor on Leyte, a research rpt prepared by Committee 16, Officers
Advanced Course, The Armored School, 1948–49, Ft. Knox, Ky., May
1949, pp. 89–91, copy in OCMH. ↑
55
184th Inf. Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
58
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 5 Dec 44. ↑
62 17th
Inf Unit Jnl, 5 Dec 44. ↑
64 49th
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. ↑
66
184th Inf FO B, 5 Dec 44. ↑
67
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 6 Dec 44. ↑
68
184th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt 48, 6 Dec 44; 7th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec
44. ↑
69 17th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex B, The Battle of the Ridgelines, p.
4. ↑
70 17th
Inf Unit Jnl, 6 Dec 44. ↑
71 49th
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. ↑
72 32d
Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt, no number, 6 Dec 44; 7th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec
44. ↑
73 17th
Inf Unit Jnl, 6 Dec 44. ↑
75
184th Inf FO C, 6 Dec 44. ↑
76
184th Inf Unit Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
78 17th
Inf Unit Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
79 49th
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. ↑
CHAPTER XVI
The Fall of Ormoc
It was a time for decision. By the first of
December the two adversaries had taken the measure of each other, but
neither felt satisfied with the progress of the campaign.
The tide of battle was slowly turning against the
Japanese. They had wagered major stakes that the battle of Leyte should
be the decisive one of the Philippines. Someway, somehow, the Japanese
felt, they must regain the initiative or Leyte, for which so much had
been sacrificed, would be lost to them. The days had dwindled to a
precious few.
Imperial General Headquarters was loath to write
off the Leyte Campaign. A daring plan was conceived whereby the ground
and air forces, working in close co-ordination, would attempt to wrest
the initiative from General Krueger’s forces. Before the main
effort, suicide aircraft carrying demolition teams were to crash-land
on the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips and render them unfit for use.
Thereafter, the 2d Raiding Group of the 4th Air Army
would transport two paratroop companies to the Burauen airfields. The
paratroops in conjunction with elements of the 35th Army,
including the 26th Division, would then seize the Burauen
airfields. The time was to be the evening of 5 December. With the loss
of the airfields, the U. S. Sixth Army, it was hoped, would be in a
perilous situation.1
General Krueger was also making plans. By the middle of
November strong elements of the Sixth Army were trying to force their
way into the Ormoc Valley and others were on the eastern shore of Ormoc
Bay. The plan of General Krueger was simple. He wanted to secure
control of the valley and the port of Ormoc and thus force the Japanese
into the mountains near the western coast, from which they could escape
only by sea.
At this time the XXIV Corps was with difficulty driving
west and north from the center of the island. The 96th Division was
engaged in mopping up in the mountains overlooking Leyte Valley. Units
of the 7th Division, far to the south, were moving westward toward
Baybay on the shore of the Camotes Sea. The 1st Cavalry Division and
the 24th and 32d Infantry Divisions of the X Corps were making slow
progress in driving down the Ormoc corridor from the
Limon-Pinamopoan-Carigara area.
Several courses of action were now open to General
Krueger. He could concentrate on the drive of the 32d Infantry Division
and the 1st Cavalry Division south down the Ormoc corridor, or on the
advance of the 7th Division north along the coast of Ormoc Bay from
Baybay to Ormoc. A third course also presented itself. An amphibious
overwater movement might be attempted by landing troops just below
Ormoc in the midst of the enemy force, thus dividing the [276]Japanese strength. After landing, the troops
could push north, seize Ormoc, and then drive up the Ormoc corridor and
effect a juncture with elements of the X Corps. This move, though
highly hazardous, would considerably shorten the Leyte Campaign if
successfully carried out.
In mid-November, therefore, General Krueger proposed
that an amphibious movement and a landing at a point just below Ormoc
be made. At that time, however, the naval forces did not have the
necessary assault and resupply shipping on hand to mount and maintain
such an operation and to execute as well the Mindoro operation
scheduled for 5 December. Since there was insufficient air support, the
local naval commander felt that a convoy entering Ormoc Bay might be in
jeopardy and that Japanese suicide bombing tactics could cause heavy
losses. Unable to secure the necessary assault shipping, General
Krueger temporarily set aside his plan.2
Plan for Amphibious Movement
On 30 November General MacArthur postponed for ten
days the Mindoro operation.3 The postponement would make
available the amphibious shipping and naval support that were necessary
for a landing in the Ormoc area. From a naval point of view, however,
the operation was very precarious, since the Japanese were still making
aerial attacks that could seriously damage the shipping needed for the
forthcoming Mindoro and Luzon operations. After careful consideration
of the risks involved, Admiral Kinkaid decided to make available to
General Krueger the shipping required for an amphibious movement to a
point below Ormoc.4
After issuing a warning order on 1 December, General
Krueger on 4 December ordered the two corps to make their “main
effort,” starting 5 December, toward the defeat of the enemy
forces in the Ormoc area. The X Corps was to advance “vigorously
south astride Highway 2 so as to support the effort made by the …
XXIV Corps.” The commanding general of the XXIV Corps was to
arrange with the commander of the naval task group for the shipping and
naval gunfire support necessary to transport and land a division just
below Ormoc. General Hodge, also, was to arrange with the commanding
general of the Fifth Air Force for close air support for the landing
and subsequent operations ashore.5 The 77th Division was
selected to make the amphibious movement to the Ormoc area.
In planning for the Leyte operation the Sixth Army had
designated Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce’s 77th Infantry Division,
then on Guam, as the second of its two reserve divisions. As a result
of the successes in the first days of the campaign, however, General
MacArthur thought it would not be necessary to use the division on
Leyte. On 29 October, without General Krueger’s concurrence,
General MacArthur transferred control of the division from General
Krueger to Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean
Area.6 Shortly afterward the Japanese began their
reinforcements of Leyte and a captured Japanese [277]field order revealed that an all-out offensive
would be launched against the Americans in the middle of November.
These developments led General MacArthur to request Admiral Nimitz to
divert the 77th Division, which was on its way to New Caledonia, to the
Tacoloban area on Leyte.7 Admiral Nimitz acquiesced and
told General MacArthur that the division was being sent to Manus. After
its arrival there, operational control over it would pass to General
MacArthur.8
Upon arrival of the 77th Division at Seeadler Harbor on
Manus at 1330, 15 November, General MacArthur ordered it to go to Leyte
and come under the control of General Krueger.9 After the
ships’ stores had been replenished, the convoy sailed out of the
anchorage at 1700, 17 November, and made the voyage to Leyte without
incident.10 The units commenced landing on the eastern
shores of Leyte in the vicinity of Tarragona and Dulag about 1800, 23
November, and came under the control of General Krueger who assigned
the division to General Hodge. From 23 to 25 November it was engaged in
unloading the transports and establishing bivouac areas.
On 19 November, while it was still at sea, General
Krueger had ordered the 77th Division to furnish immediately after
landing a ship-unloading detail of about 1,200 men for the projected
operation at Mindoro.11 At 1600 on 27 November the
detail, a battalion of the 306th Infantry, boarded LCI’s at
Tarragona Beach and departed for the staging area for the Mindoro
operation.
In conformity with General Krueger’s plans,
General Hodge ordered the 77th Division to make preparations for the
amphibious operation below Ormoc. (Map 19) It
was to be assisted by the 7th Division, which was to attack and capture
the high ground south of the Panilahan River. General Bruce, once
ashore, was to direct and co-ordinate the attack of the 7th Division
with that of the 77th Division.12 General Krueger informed
General Hodge that he did not approve of this arrangement and added
that such co-ordination as was necessary should be exercised by Hodge
as corps commander.13
At a point about three and a half miles southeast of
Ormoc was the barrio of Deposito where the 77th Division was to land.
Along the eastern shore of Ormoc Bay, south from Ormoc, there were many
areas which offered suitable landing beaches. These were crossed by
numerous rivers and streams which discharged into Ormoc Bay. None of
these would be a handicap, since all could be forded except during the
monsoon season. The beach area selected, though narrow, was suitable
for landing, having a surface of hard sand and gravel that could be
used as a road by vehicles. [278]
Johnstone
SECURING THE SOUTHERN ENTRANCE TO ORMOC
VALLEY
7–15 December 1944
[279]
The terrain was level for about a mile and a half inland
from the beach, and then rose gradually to a height of twenty to thirty
feet. Half a mile farther inland, the mountain slopes began. Highway 2,
which was ten feet wide and composed of sand and gravel, ran along the
entire length of the east coast of Ormoc Bay. Several roads ran from
Highway 2 to the beach: one was about a hundred yards south of the Baod
River and skirted the rice paddies in the middle of the landing beach
area; another, just south of the rice paddies, extended inland about
two miles from the beach.14
Naval Plans
When the naval forces were informed that the
overwater movement to Ormoc would take place and that the Mindoro
operation was postponed, the shipping reserved for the Mindoro
operation was turned over to the Ormoc force. Rear Adm. Arthur D.
Struble was given command of Task Group 78.3, which was to transport
and land the 77th Division, together with its supplies and equipment,
in the Ormoc Bay area and support the landing by naval
gunfire.15
Admiral Struble divided his task group into six units,
in addition to the destroyer which was his flagship. These consisted
of: a Fast Transport Unit of eight transports; a Light Transport Unit
of twenty-seven landing craft and twelve LSM’s (medium landing
ships); a Heavy Transport Unit of four LST’s (tank landing
ships); an Escort Unit of twelve destroyers; a Mine-Sweeping Unit of
nine mine sweepers and a transport; and a Control and Inshore Support
Unit made up of four LCI(R)’s (infantry rocket landing craft),
two submarine chasers, and one tug. The landing was to be made between
the Baod and Bagonbon Rivers but clear of the Bagonbon River delta. The
northern half of the beach was called White I and the southern half
White II. Six destroyers would bombard the landing beaches.
The line of departure was fixed at 2,000 yards from the
beach, but if the shore fire became heavy the line of departure would
be moved back 1,000 yards. There would be five assault waves with two
LCI(R)’s flanking the first wave to the beach. Each craft would
fire so as to cover the sector of the beach in its area to a depth of
600 yards. After completion of the bombardment the LCI(R)’s would
reload and remain on the flanks to engage targets of opportunity.
Air Support Plans16
The Fifth Air Force would provide both day and
night air cover for the journey of the assault convoy to the target,
for the landings, and for the return convoy. It was estimated that on 5
December, for the journey to the target, seventeen night fighter
sorties and seventy-two day fighter sorties would be required.
Protection would also be furnished by the bombers, and forty-six
aircraft would be available on call for strikes against enemy
installations and targets of opportunity, as well as for special
missions.
On the day of the landings, the tempo would be
accelerated. There would be nineteen [280]night fighter sorties
and ninety-six day fighter sorties; ten flights of forty bombers to
cover the beachhead; six nights of twenty-four bombers to cover the
return of the assault convoy; and eleven night fighters to cover the
LST and main assault convoys, the beachhead, and the return convoy.
There would also be available sixteen bombers for interception or
additional cover for the beachhead and convoy; twenty-four P-47’s
for interception, ground support, and attacks against enemy shipping or
targets of opportunity; sixteen P-40’s for ground strikes; and
thirty-four F4U’s for cover or interception.
The 77th Division continued to assemble its troops on
Tarragona Beach, on the east coast of Leyte, and during the night of 5
December the loading of supplies and equipment on the landing ships
began. The loading was slowed by frequent air alerts. The division had
previously been told that the convoy would be unable to stay in the
landing area more than two hours and consequently there was no attempt
to bulk load supplies, since they would take too long to unload. All
supplies and equipment to support the initial assault had to be
mobile-loaded, that is, loaded on the vehicles taken with the division
so that the supplies could be brought ashore in the vehicles upon
debarkation. There were only 289 vehicles in the initial convoy,
including tanks, M8’s, and M10’s that could not carry
supplies. The LVT’s (tracked landing vehicles) were filled with
supplies rather than troops in order that they could be discharged from
the landing ships into the water and go ashore fully loaded.
Furthermore, since the supplies were mobile they could be moved either
by water or inland by motor.17 The 77th Division gave the
highest priority to ammunition, water, and rations.
About 0700 on 6 December the assault shipping
rendezvoused off Tarragona and Rizal Beaches, and one hour later the
assault troops began to board the vessels. The loading was completed at
1200 and the convoy assembled offshore from Dulag to await the arrival
of the twelve escorting destroyers.
The Movement Overwater
The Convoy Sails
Two mine sweepers swept the Canigao Channel
between Leyte and Bohol on 27 November and again on 4 and 6 December,
but they encountered no mines of any sort.18 At 1200
on 6 December the convoy’s escorting destroyers departed from San
Pedro Bay and moved to the point of rendezvous offshore, near the
Tarragona-Rizal area. The principal convoy was formed and got under way
at 1330, having been preceded by four slower-moving LST’s
escorted by two destroyers. The commander of the destroyer unit gave
additional protection to the transports with four destroyers until
2300, when the destroyers departed for a prelanding raid on Ormoc Bay.
They were also to intercept any Japanese surface vessels that might be
attempting to bring reinforcements into Ormoc harbor.
The journey through Leyte Gulf, Surigao Strait, and the
Camotes Sea was uneventful. Several unidentified planes flew over the
convoy but did not launch an attack. The only alert during the voyage
was about twilight on the 6th of December, when an unidentified group
of eighteen bombers flew over the formation in the direction of
[281]Tacloban. The convoy encountered numerous small
native craft en route and checked several of these but found no
Japanese.19
TROOPS OF THE 77TH DIVISION BOARD LCI’S AT
TARRAGONA
Throughout the night the vessels steamed toward the
target. Silently they took their stations in Ormoc Bay, off the coast
of Deposito, before dawn. At 0634 on 7 December an enemy shore battery
opened fire, which was answered at 0640 as the destroyers commenced
firing upon their assigned targets. Behind Ipil, in the vicinity of the
northern fire support group, a number of enemy 3-inch gun positions
were observed. The destroyers took the positions under fire and quickly
silenced them. At 0655 a large number of Japanese were observed in the
town of Albuera and these also were taken under fire. The destroyers
covered the landing beaches until ordered to lift fire just as the
first wave of the landing party was approaching the beach.20
As the American convoy steamed into position, it
received word that an enemy convoy was on the way to Ormoc with
reinforcements. Aircraft of the V Fighter Command flew to intercept the
Japanese vessels, which comprised six transports and seven escort
vessels. During the morning occurred one of the most intense aerial
battles of the Leyte Campaign. Fifty-six P-47’s of the 341st and
347th Fighter Squadrons dropped ninety-four 1,000-pound and six
500-pound bombs on the enemy shipping and strafed the vessels. The Army
and Marine land-based aircraft [283]destroyed two cargo vessels
and two passenger transports.21 Nearly all the available
American aircraft were engaged in the attack. General MacArthur in his
daily communique estimated that the entire convoy was wiped out and
that 4,000 enemy troops lost their lives.22
CONVOY CARRYING 77TH DIVISION APPROACHES DEPOSITO
(above). Bombardment of enemy positions at Ipil (below), with
stack of sugar mill visible. Village is near center of picture.
“Land the Landing Party”
The landing of the first wave, scheduled for 0630,
was delayed until 0707 to take advantage of better light for the naval
bombardment. There were to be five waves for each regiment.23 At 0701 the first wave of small landing craft
left the line of departure and raced for the shore. The first wave was
landed at 0707, co-ordinating its spacing and timing with that of the
LCI(R)’s supporting the landing. There was no opposition, and the
troops moved inland.
The dispatch and landing of the fourth wave of
LCI(R)’s was delayed because the third wave had been unable to
disembark the troops and retract according to schedule. The fifth wave
of LSM’s was delayed for the same reason. Since the tide was
rapidly falling and the sand bar was exposed, a tug was used in several
instances to pull the craft off. At 1100 the commander of the task
group pulled out, leaving behind one LCI and four LSM’s stranded
on the beach. The tug left at the same time, and Admiral Struble
ordered the grounded craft to retract at high tide and proceed back to
San Pedro Bay under cover of darkness.24
With the departure of the landing waves for the shore,
the destroyers turned their fire upon targets adjacent to the landing
beaches. The Laffey at 0830 opened fire against some enemy
troops approaching the barrio of Ipil from the north and turned them
back. At 0930 the Conyngham fired upon a possible concentration
south of Ipil and at 1000 this destroyer’s shore fire control
party requested additional support against enemy troops that were
moving into Ipil.25
At 0820 the Japanese launched a strong aerial offensive
against the American vessels in Ormoc Bay. The enemy air attacks
continued for nearly nine and a half hours. The Fifth Air Force,
beginning at 0700, gave air cover throughout the day and “did an
excellent job.”26 Upon a number of occasions,
however, the enemy airplanes slipped through the antiaircraft fire and
the air protection and hit the shipping. Japanese suicide aircraft
struck and badly damaged five vessels. At 0945 the destroyer
Mahan and the high-speed transport Ward received such
damaging blows that they later had to be sunk by gunfire.27 The Japanese made [284]sixteen different
raids on the shipping, during which an estimated forty-five to fifty
enemy aircraft attacked the formation. Thirty-six of these were
believed to have been shot down.28
The landing waves arrived ashore without incident and
without casualties. Within thirty-five minutes the advance echelon of
division headquarters, including the assistant division commander and
the general staff sections, were ashore.29
Approximately 2,000 men were placed on a 1,000-yard beach every five
minutes. Mobile-loading of supplies had made this speed possible.
“Logistically it was a difficult operation to push that mass of
troops and equipment on a beach in so short a time and had there been
any considerable unexpected enemy mortar or artillery fire at any time
during the period, great casualties might have
resulted.”30 At 0930 General Bruce assumed
command ashore.
Japanese Plans
Until the middle of November, the commander of the
Japanese 35th Army had failed to put any beach obstacles along
the shores of Ormoc Bay,31 since he believed that there
was little likelihood of an American thrust up the bay. General Suzuki
thought that the Americans would be deterred by the presence of a
Japanese naval base on Cebu in front of Bohol Strait. As American naval
activity increased along the coast in the last part of November,
however, the Japanese finally conceded that there was “a great
possibility” of an American landing at Ormoc Bay. By the middle
of the month the Ormoc Defense Headquarters was organized under
the command of Colonel Mitsui, the commanding officer of the
Shipping Unit. The main force of the Defense Headquarters
was the Shipping Unit, but the Antitank and
Antiaircraft Gun Units, the Automatic Gun Company, and
other units were added. In addition, all units then in Ormoc were
temporarily placed under Colonel Mitsui. The enemy plan of defense was
simple. At the town of Ormoc the Japanese, from their main defensive
positions, were to stop the advance and then, gathering as much
strength as possible, they were to counterattack.
The Japanese defenses, however, were not completed at
the time of the American landings. Only individual trenches had been
dug along the coast, and the field positions in the northern part of
Ipil were elementary. Upon being alerted that the Americans had landed,
the Shipping Unit of Colonel Mitsui took up its main defensive
positions in the Ipil area. At the same time, troops of the Nonaka
Battalion of the 30th Division, consisting of an infantry
company and a machine gun company, were placed under the command of
Colonel Mitsui. The major part of the 30th Division remained on
Mindanao. The American strength was estimated to be one regiment.
Drive Toward Ormoc
Ipil
The assault elements of the 77th Division advanced
inland immediately after landing. The 1st Battalion of Col. Vincent J.
Tanzola’s 305th Infantry, with two companies [285]abreast, was to seize the crossings over the
Bagonbon River in the vicinity of Highway 2.32 The
307th Infantry was to move rapidly inland and establish an initial
beachhead line about 1,300 yards east near a bridge over the Baod
River. The 305th Infantry landed in a column of battalions with the
1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions going ashore in that order. The 1st and 3d
Battalions moved rapidly inland to the objective while the 2d Battalion
remained in regimental reserve. The 307th Infantry also reached the
bridge without difficulty. In the town of Deposito, enemy foxholes had
been dug in the tall grass and apparently were to be used only as a
protection against Allied air attacks, since they had no field of fire.
Immediately upon landing, a reconnaissance patrol went to locate a
trail leading from the beach to Highway 2. About 300 yards north of the
Bagonbon River, the patrol found a small access road which was put to
immediate use.33 The initial beachhead line was achieved
within forty-five minutes after landing. Most of the Japanese 26th
Division which had been in the area were either moving over the
mountains to participate in a battle for the Burauen airfields or were
engaging the 7th Division south of Deposito. Little besides service
troops remained to oppose the 77th Division.
General Bruce originally had planned to hold the
beachhead line, establish a defensive position, and await the arrival
of additional supplies and reinforcements on the following day. But
because of the lack of organized resistance, the speed with which the
troops moved inland, and his desire to fully exploit the situation
before the Japanese could counterattack, he very early decided to
continue the attack northward astride the highway and extend the
division’s beachhead to Ipil.34
The 307th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion which was on
Samar), under Col. Stephen S. Hamilton, together with the 2d Battalion
of Col. Aubrey D. Smith’s 306th Infantry, which was attached to
the regiment after the landing, was ordered by General Bruce to move
northward and take Ipil.35 At about 1045, with the 1st
Battalion in the lead, the regiment moved out northward astride Highway
2 toward Ipil. At the same time the division artillery was in position
to support the advance. The 306th Field Artillery Battalion had been
previously placed in the 7th Division area at a position from which it
could fire as far north as Ipil and 6,000 yards inland.36 At first there was little enemy opposition, but
the troops observed many well-camouflaged foxholes under the houses,
and many stores of Japanese food and ammunition.
Within ten minutes after starting, the 1st Battalion,
307th Infantry, was 300 yards north of Deposito and by 1215 had
advanced 500 yards farther north. Japanese resistance became heavier as
the troops neared Ipil. The remaining troops of the Nonaka
Battalion of the 30th Division, consisting of an infantry
company and a machine gun company, had landed at Ormoc from junks and
“fought bravely” under the command of the Shipping
Unit.37 The enemy had emplaced machine guns, and in one
instance a cannon, in dugouts under the [286]houses.38 By 1455 the 307th Infantry was on the outskirts
of Ipil, but its advance was temporarily held up when the Japanese
exploded one of their ammunition dumps.39 By 1740
the 1st Battalion had cleared the barrio and set up a night perimeter
on its northern outskirts. The regiment had killed an estimated
sixty-six Japanese and had captured one prisoner of war, a medical
supply dump, a bivouac area, and numerous documents.40
The 305th Infantry during the day moved south to the
Bagonbon River without serious opposition. Patrols of platoon strength
were sent to scout out enemy positions and, if possible, establish
contact with the 7th Division which was fighting north along the coast
from Baybay. These patrols went as far south as the Panalihan River,
destroying three food dumps and knocking out an enemy pillbox.41
During the afternoon enemy aircraft that were molesting
the shipping dropped some bombs ashore but no appreciable damage
resulted. The division artillery established a command post
approximately 200 yards inland on the southern banks of the Baod River.
As the beachhead line extended, the artillery moved to the northern
banks of the river. This position afforded better cover and
concealment. The artillery fired on enemy machine guns, mortars, and
troops.42
At 1640 General Bruce issued orders for the regiments to
consolidate their positions and form night perimeters. The 77th
Division had established a two-mile beachhead extending from Ipil in
the north to the Bagonbon River on the south and had penetrated inland
nearly a mile.
General Bruce’s plan at this time was to push
forward vigorously and capture Ormoc, after which he would drive north,
take Valencia, and make contact with elements of the X Corps. Each day
he would “roll up his rear” to form a defensive perimeter
at night. Patrols would be sent east to locate enemy concentrations and
destroy them by artillery fire, and at the same time other patrols
would move to the east to search out routes and Japanese dispositions
with a view to taking Valencia from the east.43
In planning for the amphibious landing, the Fifth Air
Force had ordered the 308th Bombardment Wing to conduct bombing and
strafing missions, in addition to providing cover for the
movement.44 The plans for 8 December called for the 308th
Bombardment Wing to be prepared on request to bomb Camp Downes—a
prewar military post south of Ormoc—maintain a close vigilance
over Ormoc, and continue the overhead air patrols.45 The
307th Infantry was to move north at 0800 astride Highway 2 and seize
Camp Downes. The 305th Infantry was to withdraw from the south and move
north in support of the attack of the 307th Infantry and at the same
time protect the southern and southeastern flanks of the division. The
902d Field Artillery Battalion and Company A of the 776th Amphibian
Tank Battalion would support the attack. At [287]least two patrols of the 305th Infantry would be
sent south to disrupt enemy communications. All other units of the
division were to be prepared to move north on division order.46
Camp Downes
Immediately north of Ipil, Colonel Mitsui had
constructed a few small strong points, each of which consisted of two
coconut log pillboxes, several trenches, and foxhole emplacements for
machine guns. Between these positions and Camp Downes were groups of
enemy riflemen and machine gunners on the banks of the streams and at
the ends of wooded ridges that extended from the northeast toward the
highway. They had dug in at the bases of the trees and on the edges of
the bamboo clumps. In the sector between Ipil and Camp Downes the
highway was nine feet wide, with three-foot shoulders, and surfaced
with coral or gravel. Fields of sugar cane or grassy hills lay east of
the road, which was fringed with clumps of acacia or coconut trees. At
least one reinforced enemy company had taken up its last defensive
stand at Camp Downes. Less than a mile from Ormoc, Camp Downes had been
an important Philippine Army and Constabulary camp before the war. The
plateau on which it was situated lay east of the highway and commanded
all approaches, most of which were open and without cover. A ravine ran
along the southern side of the barrio. At Camp Downes the Japanese had
placed thirteen machine guns, two 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and three
75-mm. field pieces under the porches and in the foundations of
buildings. These were well camouflaged and mutually supporting and were
protected by concealed riflemen.47
As the 77th Division consolidated its positions in Ipil,
the Japanese started to use reinforcements to check any further advance
toward Ormoc. The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment had been
assembling at Dolores, northeast of Ormoc. On the night of 7 December
its commander, Colonel Imahori, ordered the newly arrived Kamijo
Battalion, which consisted of two companies, to co-operate with the
Shipping Unit under Colonel Mitsui in delaying the advance of
the American forces until the arrival of the main body of the 12th
Independent Infantry.48 By the morning of 8 December
it became evident to the 77th Division that it had surprised the
enemy.
At 0615 enemy planes flew over the command post area,
and ten minutes later one of these was shot down by antiaircraft
fire.49 At 0800 Colonel Hamilton’s 307th Infantry
moved out.50 By 1000 the regiment was 200 yards north of
Ipil, but it encountered more determined resistance when it reached the
Panalian River at 1200. General Bruce ordered the attacking force to
continue north with the objective of reaching the ravine just south of
the Camp Downes plateau. The 307th Infantry was to make the assault and
employ if necessary all reserves, while the 2d Battalion of the 306th
Infantry continued to be attached to the regiment in support. The 902d
Field Artillery Battalion, [288]Company A of the 776th Amphibian
Tank Battalion, and Company A of the 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion
were also to continue their support. Farther south, the 305th Infantry
would move north to defend the bridgehead at the Baod River and the
77th Reconnaissance Troop would move at 1330 to an area 500 yards north
of the Panilahan River to clear out a position for the division command
post.51
A PATROL OF THE 307TH INFANTRY warily
approaches a river crossing near Camp Downes.
Upon receiving its mission, a platoon from Company A of
the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion moved over water toward Camp Downes
to secure information on the dispositions of the Japanese. The platoon
proceeded north 500 yards offshore to the vicinity of Panalian Point
where it received heavy enemy artillery fire from Camp Downes. The
platoon returned and reported the location of the enemy
artillery.52 The 902d Field Artillery Battalion
thereupon shelled the Japanese artillery positions.53
The assault units of the 307th Infantry steadily pushed
out against determined opposition in which the enemy used rifles,
mortars, and small artillery from dug-in positions along finger ridges
and streams. The Japanese had a prepared position 1,000 yards in depth
from which they swept the rice fields which the troops had to traverse,
but fire from the American automatic weapons and mortars forced the
Japanese to fall back.54 An enemy company
counterattacked [289]and hit Company A of the 88th Chemical
Battalion. The Japanese were repulsed on two separate
occasions—the first time at 1320 and the second at 1520, when in
company strength they charged the Americans. The chemical company
stopped both charges with high explosive and white phosphorus
shells.55 The 307th Infantry pressed forward, capturing
considerable quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition, and by
nightfall had advanced some 2,000 yards. The 1st Battalion, 306th
Infantry, was to relieve the regiment’s 2d Battalion, which had
been attached to the 307th Infantry as an assault battalion.56
Colonel Tanzola’s 305th Infantry during the day
protected the southern and southeastern flanks of the 77th Division in
its advance northward. At night the regiment’s defensive
perimeter centered around Ipil but extended as far south as the Baod
River.57
The Japanese forces suffered greatly in the course of
the day. The commander of the Kamijo Battalion was severely
wounded and the battalion itself had many casualties. Consequently, the
Tateishi and Maeda Battalions of the 12th Independent
Infantry Regiment, which had been alerted to join the Kamijo
Battalion, were ordered to take positions north of Ormoc, on the
night of 9 December.58 The Japanese troops in the
sector opposing the 77th Division were two companies totaling 100 men
of the 1st Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry, with three
machine guns and two battalion guns; three companies totaling 250 men
of the 3d Battalion of the same regiment with nine machine guns,
two battalion guns, and four antitank guns; sixty men with three
machine guns from the 30th Division; a paratroop unit of eighty
men; a ship engineer unit of 500 men; and 750 personnel from the Navy.
The total effective military strength was 1,740 men.59
At 0400 on 9 December the first resupply convoy arrived
carrying with it the rest of the 306th Infantry. The 3d Battalion,
306th Infantry, was placed on the eastern flank which connected the
305th Infantry on the south with the 307th Infantry on the north. Its
mission was to protect the east and center of the beachhead. At 0530
the batteries of the 902d Field Artillery Battalion fired 110 rounds on
a harassing mission and at 0820 they fired 192 rounds in preparation
for the attack by the infantry against Camp Downes.60 The
1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, was to pass through the 2d Battalion,
306th Infantry, and continue the attack with the 3d Battalion, 307th
Infantry, on the left. The 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, would protect
the regimental right flank.61 After the artillery
concentration the 307th Infantry at 0830 moved out toward Camp
Downes.
The 307th Infantry inched slowly forward. It became
evident that the Japanese had regrouped and emplaced the forces on
ridges and high ground which overlooked all possible approaches to Camp
Downes and Ormoc, In selecting his defensive positions the enemy used
“excellent judgment”62 and defended the area
with at least two companies heavily reinforced with automatic weapons.
The assaulting forces received intense small arms and artillery
fire.63 [290]
The 902d Field Artillery Battalion supported the attack
from positions north of the Baod River. The 305th Field Artillery
Battalion, which had just arrived, was sent forward to support the
attack.64 At one of the Japanese strong points that had
been overrun were found eleven heavy machine guns, two 40-mm.
antiaircraft guns, and three 75-mm. guns. At 1700, Japanese aircraft
strafed the regiment and inflicted several casualties. At 1750,
however, the 307th Infantry entered Camp Downes, secured the area, and
established a night perimeter. Its total advance for the day was about
one thousand yards.65
At 1245 the 305th Infantry, which had been protecting
the southern flank of the division, received a new assignment from
General Bruce. The 2d Battalion of the 305th Infantry was to protect
the division’s rear by taking a position just south of Ipil. The
1st and 3d Battalions were to move north of the Panilahan River and
1,000 yards to the east in order to complete an all-around defense of
Camp Downes.66 At 1345 the battalions moved north. As soon
as the 307th Infantry entered Camp Downes, General Bruce ordered his
forward command post into that area, and the advance echelon of his
headquarters moved out. Upon its arrival at the selected camp site, a
coconut grove on a hill just south of Camp Downes, the advance echelon
became involved in a fire fight between the 307th Infantry and the
enemy forces on the hill. It dug in under fire in the new area. The
Japanese defenders were driven out of the coconut grove as the rest of
the command post moved in.67
During the day the 307th Infantry had advanced about
1,000 yards and captured Camp Downes. The 305th Infantry had secured
the area northeast of Camp Downes and protected the northeastern flank
of the 77th Division. The 306th Infantry had moved into an assembly
area 600 yards north of Ipil.68
Two Sevens are Rolled in Ormoc
At 1830 General Bruce issued verbal orders for the
attack on 10 December. Ormoc was the target. The 307th and 306th
Infantry Regiments were to move out abreast. The 307th Infantry would
attack along the highway to its front while the 306th Infantry would
move to the northeast and attempt to envelop the opposing enemy force.
The 305th Infantry initially was to remain in position and defend its
part of the line.69
Ormoc, the largest and most important commercial center
in western Leyte, possessed a concrete and pile pier at which a vessel
with a sixteen-foot draft, and two smaller vessels, could anchor at the
same time.70 On the route to Ormoc and in the town
itself, the Japanese dug strong defensive positions. The favored sites
were in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek beds, and under
buildings. Individual spider holes about six feet deep were covered
with logs and earth and “beautifully camouflaged.” Against
such positions, artillery and mortar fire did little more than daze the
defenders. [291]Each position had to be searched out and
destroyed.71
On 9 December the commander of the Japanese 35th
Army ordered the four companies of the 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment to return to their regiment from positions north of Ipil
and to be prepared to help defend the Ormoc area.72
In preparation for the assault against Ormoc, the 902d
Field Artillery Battalion at 0830 established an observation post at
Camp Downes. At 0920 the battalion fired 100 rounds of ammunition
during a ten-minute period in front of the area which the attacking
forces were to traverse. At 0930 the artillery fire was directed at
enemy positions observed in Ormoc.73 General Krueger made
arrangements with Admiral Kinkaid for LCM’s, LCV’s, and
LVT’s to operate along the coast at dawn and nightfall for an
indefinite period.74
At 0900, Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion
with its 75-mm. howitzers moved into Ormoc—the first American
troops to enter the city. The 2d and 3d Platoons of the company moved
through the streets and sent high explosives and smoke shells into the
buildings occupied by the Japanese.75 The
enemy defenders were also hit from the bay. LCM(R)’s from the
Navy came overwater, moved near the Ormoc pier, and fired their rockets
into the center of the town. As the rockets were being fired, the crews
of the LGM’s engaged the enemy defenders on the pier in a small
arms fight, the antiaircraft machine guns on the LCM’s exchanging
fire with the Japanese rifles and machine guns. After the last of the
rockets were launched the LCM’s withdrew, still under small arms
fire.76
Colonel Smith’s 306th Infantry was to move to the
northeast with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast and forestall any
attempt to reinforce the Ormoc garrison. At 0945 the commanding officer
of the 306th Infantry announced that both battalions had moved out on
time.77 The 1st Battalion on the left encountered only
light opposition during the day. The 3d Battalion met light resistance
in two deep ravines but was able to push through without difficulty.
Throughout the day, however, the regiment received harassing fire from
well-concealed riflemen, each of whom generally worked alone. By 1600
the 1st Battalion was at a bridge on Highway 2 north of Ormoc and the
3d Battalion was within 500 yards of the 1st but was slowed by the
necessity for maintaining contact with the regiment’s 2d
Battalion. This unit had been committed on the right in order to secure
contact with the 305th Infantry.78
At 0930 the troops of the 307th Infantry moved
out.79 They encountered little resistance until they
neared the outskirts of Ormoc, where a deep ravine lay between the
southern edge of the town and the front lines of the advancing troops.
An enemy force, which had dug in on both sides and along the top of
this ravine, had to be rooted out with bayonets, grenades, and mortars.
In spite of the determined enemy resistance, American casualties were
very light. Entering the western part of the city, the 307th
[292]Infantry hit the front line of the Mitsui
Unit on the left flank of the 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment.80
AERIAL VIEW OF ORMOC after the
bombardment. In the middle background is the Antilao River, with
the mountains of western Ormoc Valley in the distance.
Ormoc “was a blazing inferno of bursting white
phosphorus shells, burning houses, and exploding ammunition dumps, and
over it all hung a pall of heavy smoke from burning dumps mixed with
the gray dust of destroyed concrete buildings, blasted by …
artillery, mortar, and rocket fire.”81
The 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments squeezed the
enemy like a tube of toothpaste. The 306th Infantry enveloped the
northeast flank, while the drive of the 77th Division up the shore of
Ormoc Bay banished any hopes that the Japanese might have entertained
of escaping southeast by Highway 2. The Japanese were squeezed through
Ormoc to the north.
Left behind, however, were some defenders who heroically
but hopelessly fought to delay the American advance. Situated in spider
holes beneath the buildings, they stubbornly fought back until
overcome. Street by street, house by house, the 307th Infantry cleared
Ormoc, which was a scene of gutted buildings and rubble. Many
ammunition and signal supply dumps were captured, including a church
that had been [293]filled with artillery and small arms
ammunition.82
As his troops were reducing Ormoc, General Bruce made a
report to the commanding general of the XXIV Corps on the status of the
attack and referred to a promise that had been made by the commanding
general of the Fifth Air Force: “Where is the case of Scotch that
was promised by General Whitehead for the capture of Ormoc. I
don’t drink but I have an assistant division commander and
regimental commanders who do….”83
At the same time that the 77th Division was entering
Ormoc, the 32d Division was pushing southward toward Ormoc Valley, the
11th Airborne Division was working westward over the mountains toward
the town, and the 7th Division was pushing northward along the eastern
coast of Ormoc Bay in an attempt to make a juncture with the 77th
Division. General Bruce advised General Hodge: “Have rolled two
sevens in Ormoc. Come seven come eleven.”84
The 307th Infantry pushed through the town and at 1730
established a night perimeter on the banks of the Antilao River on the
western edge of Ormoc where it tied in with the front line of the 306th
Infantry. At long last, Ormoc was in American hands.
In its drive north the 77th Division killed an estimated
1,506 Japanese and took 7 prisoners.85 Its own
casualties were 123 men killed, 329 wounded, and 13 missing in
action.86
On 7 December, the 7th Division moved north from its
position about seven miles south of Deposito to join the 77th Division,
which had landed that day at Deposito. It advanced with two regiments
abreast—the 184th Infantry on the left and the 17th Infantry on
the right. The regiments made slow progress as they pushed over a
series of hills and river valleys. On the night of 9–10 December
the Japanese who were caught between the 7th and 77th Divisions
withdrew into the mountains. At 1000 on 11 December an advance element,
the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, reached Ipil and established contact
with the 77th Division.
The XXIV Corps was now in undisputed control of the
eastern shore of Ormoc Bay and the town of Ormoc. The capture of Ormoc
had very important effects. It divided the Japanese forces and isolated
the remaining elements of the enemy 26th Division. It drew off
and destroyed heretofore uncommitted enemy reserves, thus relieving the
situation on all other fronts, and it hastened the juncture of the X
Corps with the forces of the XXIV Corps. It denied to the Japanese the
use of Ormoc as a port, through which so many reinforcements and
supplies had been poured into the campaign. Finally, the Japanese were
unable to use Highway 2 south of Ormoc and were driven north up Ormoc
Valley.87 General Krueger had realized an important part
of his plan for the seizure of Ormoc Valley, since sealing off the port
of Ormoc would enable the Sixth Army to devote its major effort toward
completion of that plan. [294]
1
Japanese Studies in World War II, 7, 14th Area Army Opns Leyte,
pp. 10–13, OCMH. ↑
2 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 62. ↑
3 Rad,
CINCSWPA to AGWAR, CM-IN 2966, 30 Nov 44. ↑
4 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt, pp. 69–70. ↑
5 Sixth
Army FO 36, 4 Dec 44. ↑
6 Rad,
MacArthur to Halsey, Nimitz, and Krueger, CM-IN 29353, 29 Oct 44.
General Krueger later wrote: “The 77th Division was actually
taken away from me without my knowledge and I complained about
it.” Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 13 Aug 51,
OCMH. ↑
7 Rad,
MacArthur to Nimitz, CM-IN 10478, 10 Nov 44. ↑
8 Rad,
Nimitz to MacArthur, CM-IN 10683, 10 Nov 44. ↑
9 Rad,
GHQ to Comdr Allied Naval Forces, CX 52239, 16 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3
Jnl, 17 Nov 44. ↑
10 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
11
Memo, CofS XXIV Corps for G-3 XXIV Corps, 19 Nov 44, XXIV Corps G-3
Jnl, 23 Nov 44. ↑
12 XXIV
Corps FO 33, 4 Dec 44. In a lecture delivered before the Command and
General Staff College on 19 January 1951, General Bruce indicated that
his previous study of the Civil War was helpful in planning for the
77th Division’s part in the operation: “May I suggest that
you do not sell short the study of history. One does not parallel
history, but the previous study of Jackson’s Valley Campaign in
friendly territory influenced the mind OCMH.” ↑
13 Ltr,
Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 13 Aug 51, of the Division Commander in this
campaign. ↑
14 77th
Div FO 13, App. 4 to Annex Baker; Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA,
Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44; Allied Geographical Sec,
GHQ SWPA, Special Rpt 55, Airfields, Landing Beaches and
Roads—Samar, Leyte, and Dinagat Group, 10 Jul 44. ↑
15 Opn
Plan Comdr Task Group 78.3, Attack Order Comphib Grp NINE, 5–44,
1 Dec 44. ↑
16
Fifth Air Force Fighter Cover Plan for Ormoc Bay Opn, 731.326, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
17 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
18 Opns
Rpt, CTU 78.3.6 to COMINCH, Ser 0017, 22 Dec 44, Off Nav Rcds and
Library. ↑
19 Opns
Rpt, CTU 78.3.5 to COMINCH, 056–60/A163, Ser 0016, 22 Dec 44, Off
Nav Rcds and Library. ↑
21 The
Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchants
Shipping Losses During World War II by all Causes (Washington,
1947), p. 77. ↑
22 Hist
of V Fighter Command, Ch. 4, pp. 62–63, AAF Hist
Archives. ↑
23 77th
Div FO 13, 4 Dec 44, Annexes 5 and 6. In each small landing craft there
were thirty-six men—a platoon leader or sergeant, messenger, aid
man, flame thrower and bazooka operators, a rifle squad, and a machine
gun or mortar crew. The composition of the second wave was about the
same. The third wave, consisting of LCI’s, included engineer and
heavy weapons personnel, artillery units, and other troops and
vehicles. The fourth wave consisted of LCI’s and the fifth wave
of LSM’s. ↑
24 Opns
Rpt, CTU 78.3.7 to COMINCH, no serial, 17 Dec 44, Off Nav Rcds and
Library. ↑
25 Opns
Rpt, CTU 78.3.5 to COMINCH, Ser 0016, Off Nav Rcds and
Library. ↑
26
Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
27
“By a coincidence, Commander W. W. Outerbridge, USN, the
commanding officer of the O’Brien, which sank the
Ward by gunfire, had been the commanding officer of the
Ward at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, when that vessel fired
the first shot of the war in sinking a Japanese submarine attempting to
enter Pearl Harbor, just three years previously to the day.”
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in the Pacific Ocean Areas During the Month of
December 1944, Ser 002910, 25 Jun 45, p. 41, Off Nav Rcds and
Library. ↑
28 Opns
Rpts, CTU 78.3.5, Ser 0016, 22 Dec 44; CTU 78.3.3, Ser 082, 22 Dec 44.
Both in Off Nav Rcds and Library. ↑
29 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 11. ↑
30
Study, Hq Army Ground Forces, 319.1/3 (POA), 16 May 45, in OPD 319.1
Sec. XII. ↑
31 The
material in this subsection on Japanese planning is based on Japanese
Studies in World War II, No. 11, 35th Army Opns, 1944–45,
pp. 94–98, OCMH. ↑
32
305th Inf FO 1, 5 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 44. ↑
33 77th
Div S-2 Recon Rpt for Leyte, p. 1. ↑
34 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 12; 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1; 307th Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
35 Msg,
307th Inf to CG 77th Div, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec
44. ↑
36 Msg,
Lt Col Douglas C. Davis, Div Arty, to CG 77th Div, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div
G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
38
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3; Msg, S-2 307th Inf to 77th Div, 7 Dec
44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
39
Msgs, 307th Inf to G-3 77th Div, 1055, 1215, 1445, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div
G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
40
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3; Msg, 307th Inf to G-2 77th Div, 7 Dec
44, 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
41
305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
42 77th
Div Arty Opns Rpt, pp. 2–3. ↑
43
Observers Rpt, 20 Dec 44, Col Paul L. Freeman, Operation in the Ormoc
area, OPD 319.1 SWPA (20 Dec 44) Sec X. ↑
44
308th Bombardment Wing Fragmentary FO 341-C, 6 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3
Jnl, 9 Dec 44. ↑
45 Msg,
XXIV Corps to Sixth Army, 8 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec
44. ↑
46 77th
Div FO 14, 8 Dec 44. ↑
47 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-2 Sum 3, App. 2; Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ
SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44, pp. 57, 60,
65. ↑
49 Msg,
G-2 Observer to G-2 77th Div, 8 Dec 44, 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 8 Dec
44. ↑
50 Msg,
307th Inf to 77th Div, 8 Dec 44, 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 8 Dec
44. ↑
51 77th
Div FO 15, 8 Dec 44. ↑
52
776th Amphib Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. ↑
53 77th
Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
54
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3–4. ↑
55
Company A, 88th Chemical Bn, Jnl, 8 Dec 44. ↑
56
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3–4. ↑
57
305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–2. ↑
60 902d
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
61
307th Inf Unit Jnl, 8 Dec 44. ↑
62
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
63 Msg,
CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 9 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec
44. ↑
64 77th
Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
65
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
66 Msg,
G-3 77th Div to S-3 305th Inf, 9 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec
44. ↑
67 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 14–15. ↑
68
306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
69 77th
Div Plan of Action for 10 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44; 77th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 15–16. ↑
70
Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17
Aug 44, pp. 10, 22, 60, 69. ↑
71
Observers Rpt, 20 Dec 44, Col Freeman, Operation in the Ormoc Area, OPD
319.1, SWPA (20 Dec 44) Sec X. ↑
73 902d
FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
74 Rad,
CG Sixth Army to CTF 77, 9 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec
44. ↑
75
776th Amphib Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19. ↑
76 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 16; Msgs, 307th Inf to 77th Div, 1110, 1130, 10
Dec 44, 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 10 Dec 44. ↑
77
306th Inf Unit Jnl, 10 Dec 44. ↑
78
306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. ↑
79
307th Inf Opns Rpt, p. 4. ↑
81 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 16. ↑
82
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. ↑
83 Msg,
CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 1400, 10 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 10 Dec
44. ↑
84 Msg,
CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 1645, 10 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 10 Dec
44. ↑
85 77th
Div G-2 Summary Leyte Opns. ↑
CHAPTER XVII
Battle of the Airstrips
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, American
submarines began to attack Japanese shipping to the Netherlands Indies.
From the beginning they were successful. In September 1943 the
submarines accelerated the tempo of their attack. The Japanese lost to
the submarines “tremendous tonnages of shipping … all over the
ocean. No route was secure from their attack; no ship was safe south of
Honshu.”1 By the early fall of 1944 the Japanese line
of communications to the Netherlands Indies was virtually cut.
With American land-based air strength on Leyte
increasing steadily, a strong possibility existed that the line of
communications between the Japanese homeland and the South Pacific area
would be completely severed, especially if the main American air force
should move up from New Guinea to Leyte. Imperial General
Headquarters felt, therefore, that the Dulag and Tacloban airfields
must be neutralized, and the Burauen airfields in southern Leyte Valley
seized before the American air force could establish itself in strength
on the island. Japanese control of the airfields would also facilitate
the movement of Japanese supplies to the island and greatly assist the
ground operations of the 35th Army.2
In the latter part of November, Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita,
commanding general of the 14th Area Army, sent a liaison officer
from his headquarters in Manila with orders to Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki,
the 35th Army commander, at Ormoc. General Yamashita is quoted
as saying: “If the construction of air bases on Leyte is
permitted to continue, the communications between the Southern areas
and the homeland will be cut and this would be a serious situation.
Therefore, we must occupy Burauen airfield as soon as possible and at
the same time neutralize Tacloban and Dulag airfields. Moreover, we
must annihilate the enemy’s air power.”3
Therefore, in a desperate attempt to gain the
initiative, the Japanese embarked on a rash scheme to seize the
airfields of Leyte. Their plan entailed a co-ordinated effort by both
the ground and air forces. Beginning on 23 November and continuing
through 27 November, the army air force was to launch a campaign to
eliminate American air resistance. On the night of 26 November,
aircraft carrying specially trained demolitionists were to crash-land
on the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips and put them out of
commission.4 [295]
Johnstone
JAPANESE ATTACK ON BURAUEN AIRFIELDS
6 December 1944
Plans were made for the 3d and 4th Airborne
Raiding Regiments to descend from Luzon on the Burauen airfields.
The 26th Division, together with the 16th Division, which
had fought the Americans in Leyte Valley, and the 68th Independent
Mixed Brigade of the 35th Army were to infiltrate through
the mountains and attack and capture the Burauen airfields. The 16th
Division was to move from its position in the mountains west of
Dagami toward Buri, the northernmost of the Burauen airfields. Elements
of the 26th Division which were engaging the 7th Division on the
shores of Ormoc Bay were to break off the fight, move over the
mountains, and attack Bayug and San Pablo, the southernmost of the
Burauen fields. (Map 20) If all went well
they were to proceed east and capture the Dulag airfield, on the shores
of Leyte Gulf. The airborne assault was to be made on the night of 5
December. The ground troops were to arrive early on the morning of 6
December and assist in the attack.
Because he felt that he had not made sufficient
preparation, General Suzuki requested that the attack be postponed
until 7 December. General Yamashita disapproved this request, but since
bad weather was forecast for 5 December, he sent a message to General
Suzuki changing the date of attack to the night of 6 December. This
information was immediately transmitted to the 26th Division. At
the same time, efforts were made by General Suzuki’s headquarters
to relay the information to the 16th [296]Division, but
because of radio difficulties General Makino never received the
message.
General Makino, after receiving the order for the
airborne attack on the night of 5 December to be followed with an
attack by his forces on the following morning, concentrated the
remaining strength of the 16th Division into one battalion.
General Suzuki personally took command of the Burauen operation, and on
1 December he and a part of his staff moved east into the mountains
near Burauen. General Tomochika was left in command of the Ormoc
forces.5
Unwittingly, the Japanese were flogging a dead horse.
General Krueger had stopped all work on these airfields on 25
November.
The American Dispositions
The Sixth Army planners for the Leyte operation
had not envisaged the employment of the 11th Airborne Division during
the campaign. This division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing,
was to have staged on Leyte for subsequent operations.6
On 22 November, however, General Hodge ordered the
relief of the 7th Division, minus the 17th Infantry, by the 11th
Airborne Division in order to free the 7th Division for the drive up
the eastern shore of Ormoc Bay. On the same day the 11th Airborne
Division, along with the 17th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, was
ordered to seize and secure all exits from the mountains into Leyte
Valley in its area. The division was then to advance through the
central mountain range, and secure the western exits from the mountains
in order to assist the attack of the 7th Infantry Division in its drive
north toward Ormoc.7 Upon receipt of this order,
General Swing assigned to the units of the 11th Airborne Division the
mission of securing the mountain exits.
General Swing immediately started to relieve elements of
the 7th Division and by 28 November the relief was completed. For
several days the 11th Airborne Division sent patrols to the west and
maintained small security guards at the Buri and Bayug airfields.
There were three airstrips—San Pablo, Bayug, and
Buri—north of the Dulag-Burauen road in the area between San
Pablo and Burauen. Both the Bayug and San Pablo airfields were on the
Dulag-Burauen road. The Buri airstrip was almost directly north of the
Bayug airstrip. The land between the Bayug and Buri airstrips was flat
for a distance of about 800 yards. The northern half of this flat land
was a swamp, sometimes five feet in depth. At the northern end of the
swamp was a narrow stream, about fifteen feet wide, which ran along the
base of a plateau. This plateau, which was directly north of the Buri
airfield, was forested with palm trees and jungle growth. Buri airfield
lay between the swamp and the plateau.8
By 27 November information from captured documents and
prisoners interrogated by units of the Sixth Army indicated that the
enemy was planning a co-ordinated ground and airborne attack to seize
the airfields in the Burauen area. The intelligence officers of the
XXIV Corps, however, thought that the Japanese were not capable of
putting this assault plan into effect. The American patrols operating
west of Burauen had found no new trails being constructed [297]nor
any old ones being extensively used. Furthermore, the American forces
had blocked all known trails leading east over the mountains into the
area. Although the enemy might be able to make an airborne attack,
“he is not at this time capable of launching a co-ordinated
ground airborne attack of major proportions in the Burauen
area.”9
Despite the trail blocks, however, elements of the
16th Division were able to descend upon the Buri airstrip from
the mountains southwest of Dagami. Only one battalion of the 26th
Division, which was to have attacked the airfields in the Burauen
area on 7 December, ever reached the area. The movement over the
mountains was difficult, and it was not until the night of 10–11
December that the unit arrived west of Burauen. It made a half-hearted
attack, which was repulsed by elements of the 11th Airborne
Division.10
Although the intelligence officers of the XXIV Corps
believed there was no possibility of a co-ordinated ground and aerial
assault, General Hodge alerted the XXIV Corps to a possible enemy
paratroop landing. All units were directed to strengthen local defenses
and establish in each sector a twenty-four-hour watching post. All men
were to be armed and wear helmets, or to have arms and helmets within
reach at all times. In the event of any unusual enemy activity, the
headquarters of the XXIV Corps was to be notified immediately.11
In order to protect the airfields more adequately, a
company of the 77th Division was furnished to the 11th Airborne
Division to defend the Dulag airfield, while the latter division held
one battalion alerted at Burauen in readiness to move against hostile
forces at any of the three airfields in the area.12 One
battalion of the 306th Infantry Regiment and a platoon each from
Companies A and B of the 767th Tank Battalion were stationed north of
Burauen; the regiment was to be prepared to assemble two companies near
the headquarters of the Fifth Air Force for motor movement in defense
against airborne attack, and to maintain security detachments at the
Bayug and Buri airstrips.13
First Japanese Effort
In the meantime the first phase of the Japanese
plan to regain the initiative had begun. At 0245 on 27 November, three
enemy air transports with lights on flew over Leyte Gulf at an altitude
of about fifty feet. Ten minutes later one of these aircraft
crash-landed in the water about twenty-five yards offshore in the area
of the 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which was about two miles
south of Rizal and about three miles north of Tarragona.
A guard from the battalion, assuming the plane to be
friendly, approached it and climbed on the wing to offer assistance.
The Japanese emerged from the plane and threw grenades at the guard.
The men of the tractor battalion, hearing the noise, came on and killed
two Japanese with small arms fire. Three others, however, escaped and
reached a swamp west of the landing point. [298]Ten
or twelve more of the enemy moved south along the beach in the surf and
also disappeared into the swamp.14
One of the other two planes crash-landed on the Buri
airstrip and all its occupants were killed. The remaining plane crashed
on the beach near the Bito River, north of Abuyog. Opposite, across the
river, elements of the 11th Airborne Division were encamped.15 With the exception of one soldier, who was
killed at dawn, all of the Japanese in this plane escaped. The 728th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion found many demolition charges abandoned in
the plane. In view of this discovery, and the fact that the enemy made
no attempt to follow up the landing by an airborne attack in force, the
Americans concluded that the Japanese were on a suicide mission of
demolition and destruction in the Dulag and Burauen airfield areas.
Although the operation caused no damage, Radio Tokyo informed the
Japanese people that it was “most successful.” If the enemy
believed that his attempt had been successful, however, the possibility
existed that other airborne troops would be landed, either as raiding
parties or in force.16
By 5 December the XXIV Corps was lulled into a sense of
false security. The 2d Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry, which had
been in the Burauen area, had rejoined its regiment, which was fighting
for the mountain passes on the trail to Albuera. The 3d Battalion,
306th Infantry, on the northwestern approaches to the airfields,
reverted on 5 December to the control of the 77th Infantry Division,
which was embarking for the Ormoc operation. The only infantry unit in
the Burauen area at the time of the Japanese attack was the 1st
Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry (less one company), which was on San
Pablo airfield. The G-2 periodic report on 5 December at 2000 stated
with regard to the general situation in the Burauen-Dagami-Mount Alto
area: “An examination of reports of action in this area since 1
Nov may well warrant the assumption that organized resistance has about
ceased.”17 But before morning, the remnants of the
Japanese 16th Division hit the Buri airfield.
Battle of Buri Airstrip
On or about 2 December General Makino, commanding
general of the 16th Division, had assembled from the hills
southwest of Dagami the remaining elements of the division. The total
strength thus massed was only about 500 men. The men rested, and then
marched on toward the Buri airstrip. On the way, American artillery and
tank fire killed approximately 200 of them. The remaining force moved
to a new location—a deep gorge about 6,500 yards southwest of
Dagami. On 5 December, this force was to move out of the gorge, join
the paratroopers, and launch a combined assault against the Buri
airstrip. [299]
BURI AIRSTRIP as it appeared in 1946.
The Americans later learned from interrogated prisoners
that the morale of the men of the 16th Division was very low at
that time. They were living on coconuts and bananas, since the officers
had taken the few remaining rations. Wounded men in the force had been
abandoned.18
The 16th Division was still unaware that the
target date for the Burauen operation had been postponed to the night
of 6 December, and consequently proceeded with its plans to attack the
Buri airstrip on 6 December at 0630—over fourteen hours before
the paratroopers were scheduled to land. On the night of 5–6
December, approximately 150 Japanese made their way quietly toward the
Buri airstrip.
At 0600, the 287th Field Artillery Observation
Battalion, northwest of Burauen, saw elements of the Japanese 16th
Division crossing the main road south of the battalion’s
position and heading east toward the Buri field. The battalion
immediately relayed this information to the XXIV Corps
headquarters.19 After crossing the road, the enemy moved
into the swamp near the airfield. One Japanese unit of about 15 men,
armed with a machine gun, stationed itself at a Filipino shack 300
yards west of the highway in order to cover the road.20
At the Buri strip were about 47 men from the 287th Field
Artillery Observation Battalion [300]and 157 miscellaneous
troops.21 Small units of engineering troops and a signal
company were at the foot of the bluff, on the northern edge of the
strip.
At 0630, the 16th Division launched its surprise
attack. Led by a Filipino,22 the Japanese broke into the
American bivouac area while the men were still asleep. Some were
bayoneted while in their blankets, or before they could seize their
weapons. Others held the Japanese off until they could retreat,
shoeless and in their shorts and undershirts, either up the bluff to
the headquarters of the V Bomber Command, or to the road, where an
infantry company had come up in support.23 The
service troops were “firing at everything that moves and …
probably inflicting casualties among our troops.”24 The Japanese from the 16th Division
entrenched themselves in the woods north of the airstrip.
Meanwhile, General Hodge ordered that the 1st Battalion,
382d Infantry, be released from the 96th Division and placed under the
operational control of General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. The
battalion was to proceed immediately to the aid of the two companies of
the 11th Airborne Division in the Buri airfield area. General Hodge
emphasized that the area was “critical” and “must be
kept closed.” It would be “dangerous” to let the
enemy “get into the service troops along the road and around
airfields.”25 One reinforced company of the
1st Battalion was already in the area and the rest of the battalion
made ready to follow.26
Small patrols of combat troops held the enemy forces in
check. At 1030 one patrol killed seventeen Japanese north of the Buri
airfield, and another killed three of the enemy west of the airstrip.
The 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Infantry was moved from the San
Pablo airfield to the Buri area and went into position near the
airfield.27 By 1800 on 6 December, the enemy had been driven
off the Buri airfield, though pockets of resistance still remained on
the edges of the airstrip. The battalion encountered a portion of the
16th Division east of the strip and destroyed it.28 Forty of the enemy were known to be dead, and it
was believed that as many more had also been killed.
Attack From the Sky
San Pablo Airstrip
The Japanese air transports were scheduled to be
over the airfields at 1840 on 6 December, with an escort of fighter
aircraft. Fighters were to neutralize the airstrips and, just before
the paratroopers jumped, medium bombers were to strafe the Buri, San
Pablo, and Bayug airstrips. At the same time light bombers were to hit
antiaircraft positions between San Pablo and Dulag and points west.
Fifty-one aircraft in all (transports, bombers, and fighters) were
assigned to the operation. The transports were allotted as follows:
twenty to the Buri airstrip, nine to San Pablo airstrip, six to Bayug
airstrip, and two each to the Tacloban and [301]Dulag airstrips. Each transport carried fifteen
to twenty men.29
SAN PABLO AIRSTRIP as it appeared in
1946.
The Japanese parachutists were well drilled as to their
mission. The operation was to be divided into five phases. The first
phase was to begin with the jump-off. The men, immediately after
landing, were to attack and destroy aircraft on the ground, and one
element was to attack the barracks and communications. This phase was
to end when the moon rose. In the second phase, ending about 2230, the
troops would destroy matériel, ammunition dumps, bridges, and
remaining barracks. During the third phase, from 2330 to 0300, the
paratroopers were to destroy the remaining aircraft and installations.
In the fourth phase, lasting from 0300 to 0600, they were to build
defensive positions. In the fifth phase, from 0600 on, preparations
were to be made for future operations.
There were to be three assault waves. The first wave
would consist of the headquarters unit with approximately 25 men; the
signal unit with 7; the 1st Company with 100; the 2d
Company with 86; the construction company with 97; and a platoon
with 50 men. The second would be composed of 9 men from the
headquarters unit; the 3d Company; the Heavy Weapons
Company; and the signal unit. The final wave would consist of the
remaining troops—about 80 men.30
[302]
Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese transports with
supporting bombers and fighters roared over the Burauen airfields.
Several incendiary bombs fell on the San Pablo strip, setting a
gasoline dump afire and burning a liaison plane. Approximately eighteen
enemy aircraft were shot down. Parachutists began to descend from the
transports. The commander of the 3d Regiment with about 60 of
his men dropped on the Buri strip, while between 250 and 300
parachutists landed near the San Pablo strip.31
The parachutists, immediately after landing, ran up the
north and south sides of the San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones
and allegedly called out in English, “Hello—where are your
machine guns?” Most of the enemy forces assembled on the north
side of the airstrip. They burned three or four more liaison planes, a
jeep, several tents, and another gasoline dump, throwing ammunition on
the latter.
The only American troops in the area, a small detachment
of the 11th Airborne Division, consisted of elements of the 127th
Airborne Engineer Battalion, the signal company, Headquarters Battery
of the division artillery, special troops as well as Air Corps service
troops. During the night of 6–7 December, confusion reigned on
the airstrip. There was uncontrolled and disorganized firing and much
difficulty arose in establishing a co-ordinated command.32
At dawn, after most of the paratroopers had assembled on
the San Pablo airfield, they moved north and west to the northern edge
of the Buri airstrip and joined elements of the 16th
Division.
At the San Pablo airstrip, Lt. Col. Douglas C. Davis,
the commanding officer of the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion,
organized the miscellaneous service troops into an infantry unit to
protect the San Pablo airstrip. The 674th Parachute Field Artillery
Battalion, which was at the mouth of the Bito River, north of Abuyog,
was to leave its guns at that place and come to the assistance of
Colonel Davis’ force. At daylight, the troops of the 127th
Airborne Engineer Battalion moved out toward the airstrip and met the
674th Field Artillery Battalion, under Col. Lukas E. Hoska. The
artillery battalion swung into line and the two units moved out as a
provisional infantry regiment under Colonel Davis—the airborne
engineers on the left and the artillery battalion on the right.
They encountered strong resistance to the west of the
San Pablo airstrip. After advancing north of the strip, the engineers
ran out of ammunition. The field artillery battalion went forward to a
coconut grove, also to the north of the airstrip. The gap between the
two units was closed by a strong patrol. Since the food and ammunition
situation remained uncertain, the composite force went into a perimeter
in defense of San Pablo strip, where it remained for the next few
days.33
Buri Airstrip
On the night of 6–7 December, the Air Corps
service personnel had abruptly quitted the Buri airfield, leaving
behind carbines, rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine
guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion had been
ordered [303]to take charge of the situation, co-ordinate the
action of forces on the airstrip, and recover abandoned armament and
ammunition. Apparently he was unsuccessful, because later in the day
the Japanese made “the best use” of the same arms and
ammunition. By the middle of the morning, on 7 December, the enemy had
completely occupied the Buri airstrip.
In anticipation of the landing of Japanese paratroopers,
General Krueger had requested General MacArthur to release elements of
the 38th Division for employment against the enemy airborne troops. The
38th Division had arrived on Leyte to stage for future operations.
General Headquarters assigned the 149th Infantry to the control of the
commanding general of the Sixth Army; two battalions of the 149th
Infantry were in turn released on 6 December to the control of General
Hodge, the commanding general of XXIV Corps, who put them under the
operational control of the 11th Airborne Division for employment
against parachutists in the Burauen area. The remaining battalion of
the 149th Infantry was alerted for the movement in the Burauen area on
twenty-four hours’ notice.34
The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, 38th
Division, were alerted at 0200 on 7 December for movement to the San
Pablo airstrip. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion were greeted
at the San Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have
said: “Glad to see you. I am General Swing of the 11th Airborne
Division. We’ve been having a hell of a time here. Last night
approximately seventy-five Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which we
have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen hundred yards from here on an
azimuth of 273° is another airstrip just like this one. Between
here and there are about twenty-five Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I
want that strip secure by nightfall.”35
The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to
attack with Companies A and C abreast, Company A on the right, with
approximately a 200-yard frontage for each company. A section of heavy
machine guns was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars
from Company D was to support the attack from positions on the San
Pablo airstrip.
Moving out at 1430, the troops covered the first 400
yards without incident but were stopped by a rain-swollen swamp. Since
attempts to bypass the swamp were fruitless, the men were forced to go
through it. The water was shoulder-high in places, and the companies
lost contact during the crossing. Company A proceeded to the Buri
airstrip, arriving there about 1630. Company C, which had been delayed
by a slight skirmish with the enemy, did not arrive until about 1800.
Because of the lateness of the hour and the fact that observation had
shown there were “many more Japanese” on the north of the
airstrip than had been estimated by General Swing, it was decided to
establish perimeters for the night.36
By the end of 7 December the 1st Battalion, 149th
Infantry, had established a toe hold on the southwestern fringe of the
Buri strip. During the day the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, northwest
of the Bayug airstrip, had received machine gun fire from an estimated
enemy platoon just west of the Burauen-Dagami road. This enemy force
was contained throughout the day as advances [304]were
made southeast toward the Buri airstrip. At 1630 the 1st Battalion,
187th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, established
contact at the western end of the Buri airstrip. The 1st Battalion,
382d Infantry, 96th Division, had been placed under the control of the
11th Airborne Division. At dusk of 7 December, it took a position near
the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry.37 At 2000 the sector was
reported quiet. It was impossible to estimate the total number of
American and Japanese casualties for the day, but it was believed to be
large.38
During the night of 7–8 December, the Japanese
brought forward two machine guns and emplaced them directly in front of
Company A of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns
opened up. Their low, grazing fire pinned down the company, but Pfc.
Warren G. Perkins, in the face of enemy bullets, located the guns and
called mortar fire upon the site. The mortar concentration, falling
within fifty yards of Perkins, silenced the machine guns and startled
the Japanese. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and
charged with his M1 rifle and a carbine. Kelley killed eight of the
enemy before he himself was slain.39 The rest of Company A
followed Kelley and secured the edge of the airstrip where it set up a
perimeter. During 8 December the Americans consolidated their
positions.
At 1045 on 9 December the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry,
attacked north with Companies A, B, and C on a line. The companies got
across the airstrip but then came under fire from Japanese weapons
emplaced on high ground to the north. The 1st Battalion therefore
withdrew to the southern edge of the strip. During the day it had
killed fifty of an enemy force estimated to consist of two hundred men.
The 2d Battalion remained in position throughout the day.40
At twilight the assault companies of the 1st Battalion,
382d Infantry, were sent out in various directions to locate enemy
patrols said to be converging upon the airfield. Only a few mortar men
and headquarters personnel were left behind to guard the perimeters. At
midnight approximately 150 Japanese attacked. The headquarters and
service troops with rifle fire, together with the mortar men, stopped
the charge. They killed fifty of the enemy and suffered seven
casualties.41
On 10 December, after a half-hour artillery
concentration, the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, attacked with
Companies A and C abreast, and Company B in the rear. After the 1st
Battalion had pushed north 300 yards across the airstrip, Companies A
and C moved northwest while Company B went to the northeast. The
companies cleared the airfield area of individual riflemen and
destroyed small pockets of enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion went
into perimeter at 1700 on the Buri airstrip. The 2d Battalion remained
in position throughout the day.42
At 1930 the Japanese launched their final concentrated
attack against the airfields. They began to fire at the administration
buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through
the plywood walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead.
“The General ducked a bullet, ordered [305]someone to find out who the blankety-blank was
responsible and that he’d blankety-blank better stop or think up
a blankety-blank good reason.”43
A staff officer immediately started to investigate the
situation. He got Lt. Col. Paul V. Kaessner of the 8th Aviation Signal
Battalion on the telephone. The following conversation is reported to
have ensued:
“Colonel,” he said sternly,
“you’ve got to stop that promiscuous firing down there
immediately!”
“Like to, sir,” answered the colonel,
“but the Japs….”
“Japs,” shouted the staff officer,
“that can’t be Japs. That fire is coming from our
fifties.”
“That’s right … and the Japs are doing the
shooting!”
“Where in the hell did the Japs get our machine
guns?”
“How in hell should I know, sir?”
“The bullets are coming right through the
general’s quarters.”
“Tell the general to get down on the floor.
Incidentally, that yelling you hear is a Banzai raid on our mess
hall.”44
The air force personnel were pushed back until they
reached the hospital, where they halted and held. They then
counterattacked and drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese
left thirty of their dead behind them.
This action was the last major effort of the Japanese
against the Burauen airfields. Only a little more than a battalion of
the 26th Division, which was to have assisted the 16th
Division, managed to reach the airstrips, and it had arrived in a
very disorganized condition. Immediately afterward, General Suzuki, the
commanding general of the 35th Army, learned that the 77th
Division had landed just below Ormoc on the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay.
Since Ormoc was the southern entrance to Ormoc Valley, it was highly
important that the town be defended at all costs. General Suzuki
therefore ordered that the operations against the Burauen airfields be
discontinued and that all troops repair to Ormoc Valley. The return
through the mountains was difficult. Nearly all organization was lost,
and the Japanese made their way back through the mountains as scattered
individuals.45
The air transports allotted to Tacloban were destroyed
by antiaircraft fire, while those destined for Dulag crash-landed,
killing all their occupants.46
The Japanese had failed to achieve any major objective.
Though they had destroyed minor fuel and supply dumps and a few
American aircraft, delayed airfield construction, and isolated Fifth
Air Force headquarters for five days, they had not appreciably delayed
the Leyte operation.47
The Japanese attempt to take the initiative away from
the Americans had failed. The Sixth Army was at the northern and
southern entrances to Ormoc Valley. Elements of the X Corps had been
battering for a long time at the northern portal. With the capture of
Ormoc, the XXIV Corps had sprung the lock on the southern doorway and
was in a position to drive north and thus relieve some of the pressure
being exerted against the X Corps.
The arrival of the XXIV Corps at the entrance to Ormoc
Valley brought the critical logistical situation on the island of Leyte
to the fore. The tenuous supply line already had been stretched very
thin, and, with the 77th Division extending its lines, a strong
possibility existed that it might snap altogether. [306]
1
USSBS, The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941–1942
(Washington, 1947), p. 48. ↑
2
Japanese Studies, 11, 35th Army Operations 1944–45, p. 74,
OCMH. ↑
3
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 23. ↑
4
Japanese Studies in World War II, 7, 14th Area Army Operations
on Leyte, p. 11; 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese
35th Army on Leyte, Part III, The Part Played by the Japanese
Air Force … p. 5. ↑
5
35th Army Opns, pp. 80–84. ↑
6 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 62. ↑
7 XXIV
Corps FO 28, 22 Nov 44. ↑
8 149th
Para-Glider Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
9 XXIV
Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 39, 27 Nov 44. ↑
10 11th
Airborne Div After Action Rpt, 18 Nov–11 Dec 44. ↑
11 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div et al., 27 Nov 44, XXIV Corps G-3
Jnl, 27 Nov 44. ↑
12 Msg,
G-3 XXIV Corps to CG 11th AB Div, 28 Nov 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 28 Nov
44, and Sixth Army G-3 Periodic Rpt 528, 28 Nov 44. ↑
13 11th
Airborne Div FO 3, 29 Nov 44. ↑
14
728th Amph Tractor Bn Unit Rpt 30, 27 Nov 44, and 20th Armored Gp Unit
Rpt 5, in 20th Armored Gp Opns Rpt Leyte. ↑
15 The
history of the 11th Airborne Division tells the following story about
the landing of the third plane. “An antiaircraft machine gun
crew, which outfit is forgotten now, was in position on the alert for
enemy aircraft. When the plane landed and came to a halt, they called
across the small river: ‘Need any help?’ ‘No,
everything OK,’ someone yelled back, and the machine gun crew
went back to watching the skies for enemy aircraft.” Maj. Edward
M. Flanagan, Jr., The Angels, a History of the 11th Airborne
Division, 1943–1946 (Washington, 1948), p. 34. ↑
16 XXIV
Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 43, 1 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 2 Dec 44; XXIV
Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 45, 3 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 4 Dec
44. ↑
17 XXIV
Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 47, 5 Dec 44. ↑
18 XXIV
Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 50, 8 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec
44. ↑
19 Msg,
Corps Arty to G-2 XXIV Corps, 0710, 6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec
44. ↑
20 Msg,
96th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 1350, 6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec
44. ↑
21 Msg,
287th FA Obsn Bn to XXIV Corps, 1350, 6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6
Dec 44. ↑
22 This
man was later caught and turned over to the Filipino
guerrillas. ↑
23
Combat History, 5th Bomber Command, 8 June 44-May 45, pp. 5–6,
AAF Archives. ↑
24 Msg,
11th Airborne Div to XXIV Corps, 1220, 6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6
Dec 44. ↑
25 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to CG 96th Div, 1400, 6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec
44. ↑
26 96th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 47, 6 Dec 44. ↑
27 XXIV
Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 48, 6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec
44. ↑
28
Flanagan, The Angels, p. 49. ↑
29 Air
Evaluation Board, SWPA, Leyte Campaign, p. 174, AAF
Archives. ↑
30 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to CG Sixth Army, 1440, 9 Dec 44, XXIV G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44;
XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 50, Incl 1, 8 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 9
Dec 44. Both are translations of Japanese documents giving plans for
the airborne attack. ↑
31
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, pp. 67–68; Flanagan,
The Angels, pp. 40–50; 408th Airborne QM Co, Opns Rpt
Leyte, pp. 10–11; CG 11th AB Div to CG XXIV Corps, 2205, 6 Dec
44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. ↑
32 Rpt,
Capt Charles Bellows to G-3 XXIV Corps, 8 Dec 44, Investigation of
Enemy Paratroopers, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 44. ↑
33
127th AB Engr Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–2; Flanagan, The
Angels, p. 51. ↑
34
Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 72. ↑
35 Maj
Martin C. Grigg, The Operations of the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry
… in the Battle for the Buri Airstrip…, pp. 6–7,
OCMH. ↑
37
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 67. ↑
38 Rpt,
Capt Charles Bellows to G-2 XXIV Corps, 8 Dec 44, Investigation of
Enemy Paratroopers, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 44. ↑
39
Private Kelley was posthumously awarded the Medal of
Honor. ↑
40
149th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt, 9 Dec 44, 149th Inf Opns Rpt
Leyte. ↑
41
Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 69. ↑
42
149th Infantry S-3 Periodic Rpt, 1800, 10 Dec 44, 149th Inf Opns Rpt
Leyte. ↑
43 Maj
Herbert O. Johansen, “Banzai at Burauen,” Air Force,
Vol. 28, No. 3, March 1945, p. 7. ↑
45
Japanese Studies, 11, p. 86, OCMH. ↑
46 Air
Evaluation Board, SWPA, Leyte Campaign, p. 174, AAF
Archives. ↑
CHAPTER XVIII
Logistics
The conquest of Leyte was taking longer than had
been anticipated. The decision of the Japanese to make Leyte the
decisive battleground of the Philippines had forced the Americans to
commit not only the reserve 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions but also
the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, the 11th Airborne Division,
and elements of the 38th Infantry Division. The inability of the
Americans to establish considerable land-based air forces on Leyte, as
well as the unexpected Japanese reinforcement program, had retarded the
campaign. Not only was the timetable of future operations in the
Pacific upset, but a strong possibility existed that it would not be
feasible to establish a major logistical and air base on the
island—the primary purpose of the operation.
The construction program on Leyte was hampered by
conflicting priorities and, as had been foreseen, very poor terrain,
bad weather conditions, and a shortage of service personnel.
Construction
Retelling the disagreements and describing the
conflicts that arose over the everchanging needs of the Army, Navy, and
Air Forces would be involved, tedious, and unprofitable. But the
progress of the construction program must be recounted, since it had
direct bearing not only on the Leyte Campaign but also on the Mindoro
and Luzon operations.
Airfields
The importance of the development of the airfields
cannot be overemphasized. The inability of the Sixth Army to meet its
construction dates on the airstrips, because of poor soil conditions
and heavy rains, prevented the U. S. forces from stopping the flow of
Japanese reinforcements and made it impossible for the Allied Air
Forces to give sufficient land-based air support to the ground troops.
It also forced a postponement of the Mindoro operation. It is well,
therefore, to summarize just what had been accomplished in airfield
construction.
Work on the Tacloban airstrip had been handicapped at
first by the heavy concentration of troops, supplies, and equipment in
the area during the early stages of the operation. Thereafter, work was
further hampered by the insufficient supply of coral for surfacing the
runway and by the very heavy traffic concentrated on the haul road
because of the necessity for unloading cargo over White Beach. By 25
December, 1 runway, 50 dispersal areas, 536,000 square feet of alert
apron, 1 diagonal taxiway, 1 parallel dispersal taxiway, and 8,943 feet
of additional dispersal taxiways had been constructed. [307]
OPERATIONAL LOSSES AT THE BURAUEN AIRFIELDS
forced their abandonment and the construction of the field at
Tanauan.
The Dulag airfield was located on the flat flood plain
of the Marabang River. The difficulties encountered were numerous: time
lost because of excessive rains that amounted to thirty-five inches in
forty days; air alerts; very poor drainage, which required the
construction of a system of drag-line trenches to the river; and very
poor access roads. The access roads required an excessive expenditure
of time, labor, and material in order to maintain traffic to the
airfield. One runway, 2 alert areas with gravel surface and 2 with mat
surface, 1 matted transport parking area, 133 dispersal areas, and
24,200 feet of dispersal taxiways were constructed by 25 December.
In the latter part of November all construction work was
stopped on the three airfields in the Burauen area, but not before
considerable time and effort had been expended in futile attempts to
make the airfields usable.1 Since these airfields could
not be made serviceable, General Krueger received permission from
General MacArthur to construct an airfield in the Tanauan area, and
moved his headquarters from Tanauan to Tologosa on 28 November in order
that construction might be started. The new site had a good sandy
surface, its drainage was satisfactory, and it proved to be an
excellent location for an airfield. By 16 December the field became
operational, and by the 25th there had been completed 1 runway with mat
surfacing, 1 overrun, 90,000 square feet of warm-up area, 120,000
square feet of [308]alert apron, 1 parallel taxiway, and 26 large
dispersal areas.2
Roads
The rehabilitation of roads presented problems as
vexatious as those in airfield construction. In southern Leyte Valley,
the road that ran from Dulag through Burauen to Dagami soon became
impassable for about two miles on each side of Burauen. This section of
the road was completely rebuilt by dumping approximately three feet of
gravel over it. The remainder of the road was kept open most of the
time by permitting only one-way traffic. The other roads were just as
bad. After heavy rains the road in the Army Service Command area was
frequently under at least two feet of water. The streets in Tacloban
disintegrated so rapidly that much engineer effort was required to keep
them open. Such maintenance was necessary to assure continued operation
of the many supply and administrative facilities located in the
city.3 The roads on the west coast were, if possible,
even worse. Upkeep of the roads in general required a “profligate
expenditure of engineer troops.” It was found that a battalion
could accomplish no more in a month than a platoon could have carried
out in a week under good weather conditions. The roads required a rock
or gravel foundation one to three feet thick, whereas a road-metal
surface of three to four inches on an earth base was normally adequate.
Since priority was given to work on the principal roads and airfields,
the construction of access roads, as well as hardstands for hospitals,
depots, and other needed installations was greatly delayed. In this
connection General Krueger stated: “This, in turn, greatly
affected the supply situation, including construction materials, by
lack of access to the depots, lack of storage space into which to
discharge ships, and lack of facilities and spare parts to permit
repair and servicing of engineer heavy equipment as well as other
critical transportation and combat vehicles.”4
On 21 December General Krueger estimated that after the
elimination of certain projects on which informal agreements had been
reached, the extent of completion by 5 January of the other projects
would be as follows: main supply roads, 50 percent; access roads, 20
percent; Air Forces installations (exclusive of air depot and assembly
plants), 44 percent; hospitals, 40 percent; base supply and services,
25 percent; oil and aviation gasoline storage (exclusive of naval oil
storage which had not been started), 50 percent; Navy installations, 20
percent; and headquarters construction, 40 percent.5 The
gloomy prognostications of Sixth Army engineers had proven all too
true.
Supplies
Inland Movement of Supplies
As the roads on Leyte became more and more
unserviceable, greater reliance was placed on the use of naval vessels
to transport supplies and personnel to various parts of the island. The
Transportation Section, Sixth Army, maintained a small-boat pool that
was used extensively to transport light cargo and personnel between
Tacloban, San Ricardo, Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa, Dulag, and [310]Catmon Hill.6
LCM’s were widely employed on the northern and eastern coasts of
the island and LSM’s operated on the west coast.7 (Table 2)
APPROACH ROAD TO QUARTERMASTER SERVICE CENTER
at Tacloban after a heavy rain (above). The 7th Cavalry motor pool
on 17 December 1944 (below).
Table 2—Shipping Tonnage
Discharged in Leyte-Samar Area, 28 October-25 December 1944
| Period | Tonnage Discharge | Average Daily Rate of Discharge | Lighterage on Hand | |||
| LCT’s | LCM’s | DUKW’s | Barges | |||
| Total | 571,350 | |||||
| 28 Oct–3 Nov | 33,901 | 4,843 | 11 | 54 | 107 | 18 |
| 4 Nov–10 Nov | 32,421 | 4,632 | 35 | 63 | 315 | 33 |
| 11 Nov–17 Nov | 141,238 | 20,177 | 26 | 69 | 219 | 33 |
| 18 Nov–24 Nov | 110,494 | 15,785 | 18 | 59 | 253 | 39 |
| 25 Nov–1 Dec | 47,744 | 6,821 | 28 | 71 | 289 | 38 |
| 2 Dec–8 Dec | 56,786 | 8,112 | 24 | 53 | 297 | 43 |
| 9 Dec–15 Dec | 53,387 | 7,627 | 21 | 53 | 294 | 42 |
| 16 Dec–22 Dec | 68,677 | 9,811 | 39 | 68 | 300 | 49 |
| 23 Dec–25 Dec | 26,702 | 8,900 | 39 | 69 | 287 | 49 |
Source: G-4 Report, Sixth Army Operations Report
Leyte, p. 218.
The troops that were fighting in the mountains were
frequently supplied by airdrops by the 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron
from supplies that were available in the Leyte area. From about the
middle of November until the latter part of December, 1,167,818 pounds
of supplies were either dropped or delivered by air. (Table 3)
Two hundred and eighty-two plane loads of supplies were dropped, a
total of 2,776 parachutes being used. Because of the nature of the
terrain and the proximity of the Japanese, the proportion of airdropped
supplies that could be recovered varied from 65 to 90 percent.
Approximately 60 percent of the parachutes were recovered and returned
to the 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron.8
Supplying the West Coast
The landing of the 77th Division on the west coast
of Leyte brought into sharper focus the difficult job of giving
adequate logistical support to the tactical units. The Sixth Army
supply lines were tenuous. There was a shortage of shipping, and
furnishing supplies to the troops fighting in the mountains was
especially difficult.
In planning for the amphibious movement of the 77th
Division, the resupply shipping set up for the division was as follows:
on 9 December, two days after the division’s landing at Deposito,
12 LSM’s and 4 LCI’s would bring in supplies; on 11
December, 12 LSM’s and 5 LCI’s would bring in additional
supplies; and on 13 December 12 LSM’s and 4 LCI’s would
carry further supplies to the division. Thereafter, 3 LSM’s would
be assigned the task of supplying the 77th Division.9
[311]
Table 3—Airdrops by 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, 11 November-25
December 1944
| Branch | Supplies | Weight in Pounds | Percent of Total |
| Total | 1,167,818 | 100.0 | |
| Quartermaster | Rations | 445,916 | 38.3 |
| Miscellaneous | 357,061 | 30.4 | |
| Ordnance | Ammunition | 337,761 | 28.9 |
| Medical | Supply and Equipment | 21,308 | 1.8 |
| Signal | Supply and Equipment | 4,546 | 0.4 |
| Chemical | Chemical Warfare Supplies | 1,226 | 0.2 |
| Units Supplied | Weight | Percent of Total | |
| Total | 1,167,818 | 100.0 | |
| 11th Airborne Division | 388,570 | 33.3 | |
| 1st Cavalry Division | 301,058 | 25.8 | |
| 32d Infantry Division | 167,859 | 14.3 | |
| 24th Infantry Division | 126,004 | 10.7 | |
| Guerrillas | 91,054 | 8.7 | |
| 96th Infantry Division | 52,973 | 4.2 | |
| 77th Infantry Division | 14,800 | 1.1 | |
| 112th Cavalry Regiment | 10,300 | 0.8 | |
| 7th Infantry Division | 4,200 | 0.3 | |
| Others | 11,000 | 0.8 | |
Source: Report of Transportation Officer, Sixth
Army Operations Report Leyte, p. 271.
The Japanese had sunk two LSM’s near Baybay on 4
December and damaged several other vessels during the Deposito
landing.10 Because of the extreme shortage of shipping that
resulted, General Hodge suggested to General Bruce on 8 December that
thirty trucks, which had been scheduled for delivery on the first two
convoys of resupply shipping, be sent overland along the Abuyog-Baybay
mountain road and used to shuttle supplies of the division between the
two towns. These supplies could be sent forward to the 77th Division
when its beachhead merged with that of the 7th Division.11 On the following day the first resupply for the
77th division left Abuyog in a convoy of trucks which went over the
mountains to Baybay, where LCM’s took the cargo and moved it to
the area of the 77th Division.12
At 2100 on 10 December, General Hodge notified General
Bruce that the second echelon of resupply was to arrive at 2359 on the
following day at any beach that General Bruce desired. The supplies
consisted of [312]40,000 rations, 1,000 gallons of 80-octane
gasoline, 500 gallons of diesel oil, 100 tons of ammunition, and 10
tons of medical supplies. Certain tactical and service units were also
to be sent forward. The third echelon, which was scheduled to arrive on
the west coast on the night of 14–15 December, was to consist of
the remaining units of the 77th Division and “considerable
resupply.”13
As the tide of battle swept the 77th Division farther
northward, its line of supply and that of the 7th Division became very
thin. About 15 December the supply officer of the XXIV Corps summarized
the situation to the corps chief of staff. Between 19 and 25 December
three resupply echelons, consisting of twenty-four LSM’s and five
LCI’s carrying 3,250 tons of supplies, were to arrive on the west
coast. He believed this amount was insufficient. According to his
calculations, the daily requirements for two divisions in heavy
fighting were 500 tons of supplies. He estimated that the supplies of
the 77th Division could not last beyond 18 December. By 19 December the
division would be in short supply unless 100 truck loads of supplies
could be sent over the mountains before that time. The convoy that was
to go forward on the 19th would carry only two days’ supplies and
there would be a three-day interval before the arrival of the next
convoy. The XXIV Corps, therefore, was faced with the problem of moving
200 truck loads of supplies during those three days merely to keep
even. After 25 December, one and a half days’ supply would be
sent overwater every three days. Since the supply officer of the XXIV
Corps had strong doubts that the road would stand “a movement
involving 300 trucks every three days” it was believed that the
supply situation would steadily worsen.14
On 15 December General Krueger sent a radio message to
Admiral Kinkaid reviewing the critical supply situation and requesting
that sufficient amphibious shipping be made available immediately to
carry supplies to the forces on the west coast. Admiral Kinkaid
acquiesced, and on 22 December a resupply convoy arrived at Ormoc with
“sufficient supplies and equipment to alleviate the critical
situation.”15
By 26 December a general level of five to ten
days’ supply of all classes had been built up, a level that was
maintained throughout the rest of the operation. The XXIV Corps
utilized to the maximum the available space on the LSM convoys, and
units on the west coast employed all available motor transportation to
supplement the tonnage on the convoys. Finally, the supplies were
pooled in dumps at Ipil and Ormoc and then allotted to the units.
On 25 December General Hodge received a Christmas
message from his supply officer: “Best wishes for Merry Xmas and
a New Year filled with supplies, resupplies, more supplies and no
supply worries.”16
The serious logistical situation was to affect
definitely the progress of the Sixth Army as it fought its way into
Ormoc Valley—the last important enemy stronghold on the island.
[313]
1 Sixth
Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 233. ↑
4 Ltr,
CG Sixth Army to CINCSWPA, sub: Construction Program, 21 Dec 44, Sixth
Army G-4 Jnl, 24 Dec 41. ↑
6 Rpt
of Transportation Off, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
270. ↑
8 G-4
Rpt, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 218. ↑
9 Msg,
G-3 XXIV Corps to G-4 XXIV Corps, n. d. (probably 4 Dec 44), XXIV Corps
G-4 Jnl, Annex, Vol. III. ↑
10
Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 79. ↑
11 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to CG 77th Div, 8 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex, Vol.
III. ↑
12 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to Col Gillette, 9 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex,
Vol. III. ↑
13 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to CG 77th Div, 10 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex,
Vol. III. ↑
14
Memo, G-4 XXIV Corps to CofS XXIV Corps, n.d. (probably 15 Dec 44),
XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex, Vol. IV. ↑
CHAPTER XIX
The Entrances to Ormoc Valley
General Bruce’s quick exploitation of the
surprise landing of the 77th Division just below Ormoc had resulted in
the capture of Ormoc on 10 December. With each successive advance, he
had displaced his entire division forward. General Bruce, as he phrased
it, preferred to “drag his tail up the beach.”1
With the seizure of Ormoc, General Krueger’s Sixth
Army had driven the main elements of the Japanese 35th Army into
Ormoc Valley. The Japanese were caught in the jaws of a trap—the
1st Cavalry Division and the 32d Infantry Division were closing in from
the north and the 77th Infantry Division from the south. General
Krueger ordered the X and XXIV Corps to close this trap upon the
Japanese.
Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley
Japanese Plans
When General Suzuki, the commander of the Japanese
35th Army, ordered the action against the Burauen airfields, his
anticipations had been high. Accompanied by his chief of staff and six
other staff officers, he had gone to the headquarters of the 26th
Division, in the mountains near Lubi, in order to supervise the
operation personally. General Tomochika, the deputy chief of staff,
remained at Ormoc because of the advance of the Americans up the west
coast, and took command of operations in the area.
A mixed battalion, consisting of four companies,
reinforced the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. This
regiment, under Colonel Imahori, was to be prepared at a moment’s
notice for action in the Ormoc sector.2 The
16th and 26th Divisions received orders to retreat
westward and establish defensive positions in the Ormoc Valley. The
16th Division, which had less than 200 men, had ceased to exist
as a fighting unit. The Japanese decided that henceforward their
operations would be strictly defensive. The 26th Division
started to withdraw through the mountains, but its orders to retreat
were very hard to carry out. The Americans had blocked the road, and
the 11th Airborne Division units, which had advanced west from Burauen,
were attacking in the vicinity of Lubi. As a result, the staff officers
of General Suzuki’s 35th Army “disbanded and
scattered.” General Suzuki passed through the American lines and
reached the command post at Huaton, four miles north of Ormoc, on 13
December; his chief of staff arrived there the following day. As for
the 26th Division, “all contact with [314]the
Division was lost by Army Headquarters until the early part of
March.”3
In the meantime General Tomochika had prepared new
plans. On 6 December he was told by a staff officer of the 1st
Division, which was fighting the 32d Division in the north, that
the 1st Division had “reached the stage of
collapse.”4 The mission of the 1st
Division was then changed to one of defense. Colonel Imahori by the
night of 7 December had sent two companies south.5 These
companies, known as the Kamijo Battalion, were destroyed at Ipil
by the 77th Division in its march to Ormoc. Colonel Imahori, fearful
that the rest of his detachment would suffer the same fate, ordered his
main force, the Tateishi and Maeda Battalions, to
construct positions north of Ormoc. The remnants of the Kamijo
Battalion established a position northeast of Ormoc. In his plan
for the parachute attack on the Burauen airfields, General Suzuki had
decided to use as a part of his attacking force the 4th Air Raiding
Landing Unit. In view of the unfavorable situation that had
developed, the 14th Area Army commander, General Yamashita,
decided that after the 4th Air Raiding Landing Unit landed at
the Valencia airfield it was to be kept in the Ormoc area. From 8 to 13
December approximately 500 men from the unit arrived in the Ormoc area,
and were attached to the Imahori Detachment. They had traveled
only at dawn or dusk to avoid detection.
At the same time, “in order to ease the difficult
Leyte Island Operation,” General Yamashita dispatched from Luzon
to assist the troops in the Ormoc sector the Takahashi
Detachment, composed of the 5th Infantry Regiment of the
8th Division, an artillery battalion, a company of engineers, a
transportation company, and a Special Naval Landing Force of 400
men with four light tanks and sixteen trench mortars. In order to
suppress the guerrillas, who were active in the Camotes Islands off the
west coast of Leyte and who were guarding the entrance to Ormoc Bay,
the area army commander ordered a detachment, known as the Camotes
Detachment, to those islands. This detachment was composed of one
battalion (less two companies) of the 58th Independent Mixed
Brigade, an artillery battery, and an engineering platoon.
The transports carrying the troops to the Ormoc area
underwent a severe aerial bombardment from American aircraft. As a
consequence, only the Special Naval Landing Force arrived at its
target. On the same day the transports carrying the Takahashi
and Camotes Detachments were forced to put in at Palompon on the
west coast. The subsequent advance of these detachments toward Ormoc
was greatly delayed.
On 9 December the 77th Infantry Regiment, the
last of the Japanese reinforcements for Leyte, landed at Palompon and
moved to Matagob. General Suzuki intended to assemble and integrate
these units and to launch a counteroffensive against Ormoc starting on
17 December.6 [315]
HEAVY MACHINE GUNS COVER CROSSING of the
Antilao River by men of the 77th Division at Ormoc.
Cogon Defenses
On 10 December General Bruce devised a new scheme
of maneuver: the 77th Division was to break loose from its base and use
Indian warfare or blockhouse tactics. At night each “fort”
was to establish an all-round defense from any Japanese night attacks.
In the daytime, an armed convoy was to go “from fort to
fort.” The Filipino guerrillas were to guard the bridges and
furnish intelligence.7
By nightfall of 10 December the 77th Division had
cleared Ormoc. (See Map 19.) The front lines
of the 307th Infantry were on the western outskirts of the town along
the bank of the Antilao River, a stream which flows past the entire
western side of Ormoc. At the city’s northern edge the river is
crossed by Highway 2, which then proceeds directly north about 300
yards west of the river and parallel to it for a distance of about
1,000 yards. The 306th Infantry on the right of the 307th Infantry had
come abreast of that regiment at twilight.
General Bruce’s plan for 11 December provided for
a limited attack north to enable the division to straighten out its
lines. The 305th Infantry in the afternoon would come between the 306th
Infantry on the right and the 307th Infantry on the left. The 305th
Infantry was to be prepared to attack on the morning of 12 December
with battalions abreast, one on each side of the highway.8 [316]
At 0930 on 11 December the 306th and 307th Infantry
Regiments jumped off with the 307th Infantry on the left. The assault
battalions of the 307th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry,
attempted to cross the Antilao River but came under heavy fire and were
pinned down.
The fire came from a well-fortified position of the
12th Independent Infantry Regiment on the north bank of the
river at Cogon, a small barrio on Highway 2 just north of Ormoc. The
enemy position was on a small elevated plateau, adjacent to Highway 2,
overlooking the river to the south and rice paddies to the east and
west. Innumerable spider holes had been constructed throughout the
area. The principal defensive position, slightly east of Cogon, was in
the vicinity of a three-story reinforced concrete building that had
been converted into a blockhouse. The well-camouflaged positions, with
the exception of the fortress, were so situated in the underbrush and
the waist-high cogon grass that it was impossible to detect them at a
distance of more than ten feet. From these positions the Japanese could
command the bridge over the Antilao River and deny the U. S. troops the
use of Highway 2 to the north. An estimated reinforced battalion with
machine guns, antitank guns, and field pieces, together with small
arms, defended the area.
The artillery fired on the enemy front lines, which were
only twenty-five yards in front of the American assault troops, but
failed to dislodge the Japanese. The assault battalions of the 307th
Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, thereupon delivered
point-blank fire from their tank destroyer guns, amphibian tank guns,
light and medium machine guns, and infantry weapons on the Japanese
position but still could not overcome it. The lack of shipping had
prevented the division from taking its medium tanks with it. Unable to
move forward, the battalions established their front lines and
perimeters for the night along a line just north of Ormoc.
On the division’s right, the 3d Battalion, 306th
Infantry, moved forward against increasingly strong resistance from the
12th Independent Infantry Regiment. After advancing about 1,000
yards the 3d Battalion encountered a well-entrenched position. Elements
of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment had dug in on a steep
ridge in front of which was a deep ravine. Eight hundred yards of rice
paddies lay between this position and the one opposing the other
battalions, though both positions were part of the same defensive
system. The artillery placed fire upon the ridge. Although able to
utilize only a company and a half against the enemy position, the 3d
Battalion, under cover of the artillery fire, attacked and succeeded in
gaining a foothold on the ridge. The 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment at the same time directed two unsuccessful counterattacks
against the right flank and rear of the 3d Battalion. Since the forward
elements on the ridge were vulnerable and any further advance would
have exposed both flanks of the 3d Battalion, the commanding officer of
the 306th Infantry at 1600 ordered the 3d Battalion to withdraw the
forward units on the enemy-held ridge and consolidate its
position.9
At 1600 the 2d and 3d Battalions, 305th Infantry, moved
north of Ormoc and took up the position held by the 1st Battalion,
306th Infantry, between the 307th Infantry [317]on
the left and the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, on the right. The
relieved battalion was ordered to take a position to reinforce the 2d
and 3d Battalions, 306th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry,
remained just south of Camp Downes as the extreme right flank of the
77th Division.10
In his plan for the drive of the XXIV Corps up Ormoc
Valley, General Hodge ordered the 7th Division to “continue the
attack as directed and coordinated” by General Bruce.11 To strengthen the Ormoc defenses, elements of
the 7th Division were scheduled to be brought forward. General Bruce
planned to attack daily towards Valencia, which was about six and a
half miles north of Ormoc. The 77th Division would eventually cut loose
from the Ormoc defenses and take up each night an all-round defense.
The supply convoy, protected by strong guards, would move along Highway
2 and measure its advance by that of the assault units. The 305th
Infantry was to proceed along Highway 2 and the 306th Infantry, while
protecting the division right flank, was to be prepared to proceed
2,000 to 3,000 yards east of Highway 2, move north through the hills to
a point due east of Valencia, and then turn west across Highway 2 and
capture that town. The 307th Infantry, while protecting the division
left flank, was to be prepared to relieve the 305th Infantry. The
artillery of the division at the outset was to support the advance from
Ormoc and eventually move with the forward element of the 77th Division
when the latter cut loose from the Ormoc sector.12
Enemy Night Landings
At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach
defense units observed a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the
Special Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the
apparent intention of landing at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought
that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first craft noticed by the
U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading directly
for the Ormoc pier. By the time the barge came within range of the
shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited with guns trained
upon it. They withheld their fire until the barge was within fifty
yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the
craft. The first rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst
into flames. The Japanese clambered atop the gunwales and are reported
to have screamed, “Don’t shoot,” under the mistaken
notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc.
The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm.
illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that
another enemy vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore
northwest of the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in
discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th
Infantry, emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel,
opened fire on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery
Battalion directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The
enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less
than fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two
tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of
ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel [318]sank, but most of the supplies, including four
ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by American fire while the vessel
was unloading.
The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of
the same type farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank
destroyer guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the
shores of Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range.
Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel
as it moved at a snail’s pace. During the night the American fire
had to be closely co-ordinated, since American vessels, including a
resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U. S. craft was
damaged.
Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had
disembarked got in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered
them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent
Infantry Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the
order, since the 77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They
thereupon decided to join a naval airfield construction unit at
Valencia, but again they failed. In the latter part of December, the
men of the Special Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part
of the Palompon area without having taken part in the battle for the
Ormoc corridor.13
Battle of the Blockhouse
Because the fighting on the previous day had been
extremely intense, General Bruce on 12 December consolidated his
positions and brought forward supplies and supporting artillery. The
front-line units sent out strong combat and reconnaissance patrols to
the front and flanks to secure information on the dispositions of the
Japanese.14 Throughout the day and night the artillery
battalions of the division placed harassing and interdiction fires on
the enemy positions across the Antilao River.15
The 902d and 305th Field Artillery Battalions, two
batteries of the 304th Field Artillery Battalion, and one battery of
155-mm. howitzers from the 306th Field Artillery Battalion fired
continuously for five minutes on the morning of 13 December at the
enemy position in front of the 305th Infantry. So intense was the fire
that the enemy soldiers were bewildered and streamed toward the front
lines of the division where they were cut down in great numbers by
machine gun and small arms fire. The Japanese in and around the
concrete building, however, lay low and weathered the barrage.
General Bruce attached Col. Paul L. Freeman, an observer
from the War Department General Staff, to the 305th Infantry. Colonel
Freeman was made the commander of a special attack force, consisting of
Companies E and L, which was to storm the blockhouse. The 305th
Infantry, which was to make the main effort, had the 3d Battalion on
the right of Highway 2 and the 2d and 1st Battalions on the left of the
road. The 3d Battalion in a column of companies moved out at 0830. In
support of the 305th Infantry, the 2d Platoon, Company A, 88th Chemical
Battalion, fired on and silenced two enemy machine guns. The Japanese
held their fire until the infantrymen were upon them, making it
necessary for the artillery to fire at very close range. The fire from
the 305th Field Artillery Battalion came to [319]within fifty yards of the American front
lines.
After Company I, the lead company, reached the ridge at
0925, K Company moved up and attempted to consolidate the 3d
Battalion’s position by making an oblique turn to the right flank
of Company I. It was hit at 1155 by the first of five counterattacks by
the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. The enemy preceded the
infantry assault by artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. The
3d Battalion estimated the enemy force to be a reinforced battalion.
All of the counterattacks were driven off with heavy casualties on both
sides.
The 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, on the left of the
highway, jumped off at 0830 in a column of companies, Company F
leading. At 0845 the troops ran into concentrated automatic weapons
fire, which pinned them down. Company G moved around the left flank of
Company F and also came under heavy fire. A Japanese force estimated as
two reinforced companies opposed Companies F and G. With the right
flank of Company F on the blockhouse, the 2d Battalion pivoted on this
point until the line ran in a generally northern direction from the
blockhouse and faced toward the east. The 1st Battalion faced north and
tied in with the 307th Infantry on its left. Colonel Freeman’s
special attack force was unable to move forward. The 3d Battalion held
the commanding ground east of Highway 2. The battalions of the 305th
Infantry arranged co-ordinating fires that covered all open
spaces.16
The 307th Infantry moved westward along the Ormoc-Linao
road to forestall any enemy reinforcements and counterattacks from that
direction. The troops encountered few Japanese. The 307th Infantry in
its advance of 1,000 yards took the barrio of Linao and captured three
artillery pieces and two antiaircraft guns, as well as ammunition for
those weapons.17
The 306th Infantry, protecting the right flank of the
305th, received no opposition during the day but assisted the attack of
the 305th Infantry by fire. Patrols of the 306th Infantry explored the
area in the vicinity of Donghol, about two miles northeast of Ormoc,
but made no contact with the enemy.18
Although the 77th Division had extended its western
boundary during the day by about 1,000 yards, the front lines in the
center remained generally where they had been in the morning. The 1st
and 2d Platoons of Company A, 88th Chemical Battalion, laid a
continuous smoke screen in front of the troops from 0930 to 1630,
enabling the aid men to remove the wounded from the front lines and
carry them to the rear.19
During the night of 13–14 December the artillery
of the 77th Division delivered harassing and interdiction fires to the
front, the principal target being the concrete house that had withstood
the onslaught of the previous two days. The 1st Battalion, 305th
Infantry, received enemy mortar fire during the night, and both it and
the 2d Battalion received light machine gun fire in the early morning
hours. The 2d Battalion destroyed one machine gun with mortar fire.
At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his
special assault force to [320]renew the attack. Before the
jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and
beyond. Under cover of artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out
at 1030 with Company L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100
yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a
tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested.
The troops used hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the
enemy out of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting.20 Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of
Company E, although seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his
command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his
rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor.
While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right
advanced through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their
foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was
assisted by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred
yards on all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep
foxholes only a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some
with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal
and earth. One was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored
bulldozer drove over the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of
the foxholes, after which small arms fire into the holes killed the
occupants. The crews of the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank
at targets but opened the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the
foxholes.21 At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it,
was secured.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry,
flanked the blockhouse at 1225 and wheeled 1,000 yards to the east,
cutting off the enemy line of communications on Highway 2. The 3d
Battalion, 305th Infantry, remained on the high ground. By 1510 the
crossroad north of Ormoc was taken. At the end of the day, the front
lines of the 305th Infantry ran south to north along Highway 2 with
Company L in the blockhouse sector. A large pocket of the enemy, which
had been bypassed by the 1st Battalion, was centered generally in front
of the 2d Battalion. The 307th Infantry was on the left flank of the
305th, while the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, which had relieved the
306th Infantry, was on the right flank in Ormoc.22
During the day the 307th Infantry continued its mission
of protecting the left flank of the 77th Division in its northward
advance and sent patrols and a strong reconnaissance force, consisting
of two reinforced rifle companies, one dismounted cannon platoon, and
four tanks, west to the banks of an unnamed river near Jalubon. The
reconnaissance force killed twenty-one of the enemy, also capturing and
destroying great quantities of Japanese matériel and supplies.
By the time the perimeter of the 307th Infantry was established in the
late afternoon of 14 December, as reported by General Bruce, “the
coast line from Ormoc to Jalubon was dotted with fires and the
explosions of burning Japanese ammunition dumps.”23 [321]
Two other patrols, composed of volunteers from the 306th
and 307th Infantry Regiments, reconnoitered approximately 3,000 yards
to the west of the 307th Infantry for possible trails for a wide
envelopment.24 These patrols met only scattered groups of
the enemy and advanced within 2,000 yards of Valencia, returning with
the information that an envelopment was feasible.25 During
the day the 184th Infantry relieved the 306th Infantry of its mission
of holding the coastal defenses, freeing the latter unit for an
enveloping movement to the north.
On 15 December the 77th Division consolidated its lines
and sent out small patrols. The enemy continued to be very active in
the sector of the 305th Infantry. During the night the artillery
operating in the 1st Battalion sector knocked out four 2½-ton
trucks and killed seventeen of the enemy, while the 2d Battalion beat
off two Japanese counterattacks. In the 3d Battalion sector all was
quiet.
By 15 December the port of Ormoc had been sealed off. It
was through this port that the Japanese had sent in a profusion of men,
supplies, and equipment, thus prolonging the battle for the island
beyond the time anticipated in the original American plans for the
operation. The 77th Division estimated that for the period from 11
through 15 December it had taken 9 prisoners and killed 3,046 of the
enemy.26 Its own casualties were 2 officers and 101
enlisted men killed, 22 officers and 296 enlisted men wounded, and 26
enlisted men missing in action.27
The Mountain Passage
As a result of General Suzuki’s abortive
attempt to seize the Burauen airfields, a number of Japanese soldiers
remained in the mountains west of Burauen. Most of these were from the
26th Division and they were trying to rejoin the main part of
the 35th Army in Ormoc Valley. Earlier, the 11th Airborne
Division had started out over the mountains from Burauen in order to
relieve enemy pressure on the eastern flank of the XXIV Corps in its
drive toward Ormoc. (Map 21)
Mahonag
Just west of Burauen the central mountain range
rises abruptly from Leyte Valley to peaks that are 4,000 feet or more
in height. Many of the deep, precipitous gorges were impassable even
for foot soldiers. No roads went through the mountains but there were
short footpaths from one locality to another. Some of these trails led
over boulder-strewn, swiftly running streams and frequently bridged
deep gorges with a single log where a slip meant a drop of thirty to
forty feet. The paths were often so steep that footholds had to be cut
into the hillsides, and soldiers were forced to use their hands to
avoid falling as much as forty to a hundred feet.28
[322]
Frost
MOUNTAIN PASSAGE
25 November–22 December 1944
On 25 November the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment
moved west from Burauen for Mahonag, ten miles away. The almost
impassable terrain, heavy rainfall, and pockets of lurking Japanese
made passage very difficult. It was impossible for the regiment to move
as a unit. In small parties, sometimes even less than a squad, the
511th moved forward. “The journey to Mahonag defies description.
Sucking mud, jungle vines, and vertical inclines exhausted men before
they had marched an hour. Though it rained often during any one trip,
still there was no drinking water available throughout the
journey.”29 The 3d Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry
Regiment, after considerable hardship entered Mahonag on 6
December.30
On 9 December the 2d Battalion, though encountering
heavy fire from enemy machine guns, mortars, and rifles, pushed
steadily forward and established contact with the other units of the
511th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Mahonag. For several days
thereafter, this regiment was busily engaged in sending out patrols.
Company G, patrolling in force for two miles to the front, was cut off
from the rest of the regiment, which was held down because of strong
enemy action. On 13 December the 32d Infantry pushed northeast from
Ormoc Bay in an effort to make juncture with the 11th Airborne Division
and assist it in moving out of the mountains.
Drive of 32d Infantry
The 32d Infantry also encountered very precipitous
hills and its advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese. By the
evening of 14 December the regiment had considerably reduced the
distance between itself and the 511th Parachute Infantry.
At 0700 on 15 December, as the 3d Battalion was moving
out, a patrol of six men from Company G, 511th Parachute Infantry,
entered the battalion’s lines. The rest of Company G was only 700
yards east of the ridge. The patrol reported that Company G had been
cut off from the rest of the regiment for four days and was without
food. [323]
The 3d Battalion encountered only slight resistance and
at 0950 was on top of the ridge. A platoon moved out to make contact
with Company G of the 511th Parachute Infantry. The platoon reached the
company, and at 1855 Company G entered the lines of the 3d Battalion,
which fed and sheltered its men for the night.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion had moved out at 0800
and encountered scattered resistance. To the east and south of the 32d
Infantry was an impassable canyon, several hundred feet deep. In order
to reach the 511th Parachute Infantry, it would be necessary for the
regiment to go either north for an undetermined distance or down the
ridge toward the coast and then up again. A third possibility involved
crossing the Talisayan River in the foothills several miles to the
west. With these facts in mind Colonel Finn asked his executive
officer, “Are we to actually contact the 511th personally[?] What
is the purpose of the contact and are we to lead them out by
hand[?]”31
At the same time, General Arnold advised the 511th
Parachute Infantry of the situation and that “present
orders” from General Hodge required the displacement of the 32d
Infantry from its positions in order to wipe out pockets of resistance
that remained near Ormoc. The 511th Parachute Infantry was to make
every effort to drive toward the position of the 32d Infantry, since
the latter would soon be withdrawn. The 511th would then have to fight
it out alone. General Arnold finally decided that the 1st and 3d
Battalions, 32d Infantry, would be withdrawn and that the 2d Battalion,
which was fresher, would move up and attempt to establish contact with
the 511th Parachute Infantry.32
At 0700 on 16 December the 2d Battalion started eastward
along the south bank of the Talisayan River. For the next few days the
battalion made slow progress, meeting and destroying small groups of
the enemy pushing west. As the troops advanced they were confronted
with steep and heavily wooded ridges which were separated by gorges
several hundred feet deep. The Japanese, well concealed by the heavy
foliage and entrenched in caves, were most difficult to dislodge, but
the distance between the 2d Battalion and the 511th Parachute Infantry
daily diminished. On 20 December the 2d Battalion was held up by the
terrain and strong enemy opposition on two ridges to its front. For the
next two days the battalion pounded at the Japanese force in attempts
to dislodge it. At this time the distance between the 2d Battalion and
the 511th Parachute Infantry had narrowed down. Enemy resistance was
overcome on the morning of 22 December. In the meantime the 187th
Glider Infantry Regiment passed through the 511th Parachute Infantry
Regiment and continued the attack. At 1330 on 22 December the 2d
Battalion of the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment passed through the 2d
Battalion, 32d Infantry, and pushed on to the coast. The difficult
mountain passes had been overcome.33
The Drive South
Regrouping of Japanese Forces
When the Americans took Limon, the key point of
entrance on Highway 2 into Ormoc Valley from the north, the Japanese
[324]forces were thrown into confusion. The
Americans, unknown to themselves, had successfully divided the Japanese
1st and 102d Divisions that had been charged with the
defense of northern Leyte. The Japanese were forced to regroup their
various units in an attempt to correct the rapidly deteriorating
situation along their front lines. The strong American infantry
assaults, which had been co-ordinated with heavy mortar and artillery
fire, induced General Kataoka, the commanding general of the 1st
Division, to redistribute his forces along Highway 2.34
The onslaught of the X Corps had forced General Suzuki
to abandon the earlier plan of advancing the 35th Army north
along three widely separated routes. Instead he had to concentrate the
main strength of the 1st Division along the highway to check the
American advance. The plan to use the 1st Division as a strong
offensive force had to be discarded in favor of using it in a strictly
defensive role.
The 1st Division had suffered much: as of 2
December, 3,000 of its men had been killed or wounded. Furthermore, one
third of the infantry weapons of the 1st Infantry Regiment and
two thirds of those belonging to the 57th Infantry Regiment had
been rendered inoperable. The infantry was short of grenades and
ammunition for the 50-mm. grenade dischargers. “The men were
suffering from the effect of continuous fighting, from lack of
provisions, overwork, and especially from the lack of
vitamins.”35
By this time communications between the 1st
Division and other units had broken down. Telephonic and
telegraphic communications between the division and 35th Army
headquarters were out for long periods of time, and liaison between the
division headquarters and front-line units was carried out by
messengers moving on foot. The supply lines had also broken down. The
1st Division Transport Regiment found it virtually impossible to
supply food and ammunition to the 1st and 57th Infantry
Regiments and the 1st Artillery Regiment.
General Kataoka grouped his forces along Highway 2 in
the Limon-Pinamopoan area in order to concentrate the maximum strength
along Highway 2. The 1st Reconnaissance Regiment was to attack
the left flank of the 32d Division,36 which
was already opposed by the 57th Infantry in the Limon sector;
the 1st Battalion, less Company 3 and the 2d
Battalion, plus Company 11, of the 49th Infantry were
to occupy the 1,900-yard sector two miles southeast of Limon in order
to hold back American forces in that area; and the 1st Artillery
Regiment was to defend its prepared positions south of Limon. The
troops of the 1st Engineer Regiment and other noncombat units
were issued small arms and ordered to take part in the defense of
Highway 2.37 [325]
Drive of the 32d Division
In order to support the amphibious landing of the
77th Division at Deposito and its subsequent movement northward,
General Krueger had ordered the X Corps to make its main effort,
beginning on 5 December, by advancing vigorously south astride Highway
2 from the vicinity of Limon.38 Acting on Corps orders,
General Gill prepared to move out with two regiments abreast. The 32d
Division consolidated its positions on 5 December, and readied itself
for a strong assault south down Highway 2.39 (See
Map 14.)
The 127th Infantry had pushed past the 3d Battalion,
128th Infantry, which was south of the Leyte River and west of Limon.
The 127th encountered very determined resistance from the Japanese
entrenched on the high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River
bridge. The well-camouflaged enemy defenses consisted of numerous
foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many of which were connected
by interlacing communication trenches.
The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to
defensive fighting, and the 1st Division took full advantage of
this fact. There were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had
dug in on both the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was
covered by heavy rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant
rainfall made observation difficult and the maps for the area were very
inaccurate.
By 12 December the 32d Division had
“detoured” around the 1st and 57th Infantry
Regiments of the 1st Division and was assaulting the
Japanese artillery positions south of Limon. On this date the division
straightened out its lines, established physical contact between the
assault battalions, resupplied the assault units, and sent out patrols.
The sector in which the greatest Japanese resistance was encountered
continued to be that of the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry. Employing
mortars and four tanks, this battalion was able to make only limited
gains.40
During the night of 12–13 December the artillery
battalions of the 32d Division fired harassing missions near the
perimeters of the 126th and 127th Infantry Regiments and southward on
Highway 2 as far as the vicinity of Lonoy.
The 14th Area Army had planned to land the
39th Infantry Regiment and an artillery company from the 10th
Division near Carigara on 16 December, but in view of the American
77th Division’s advance to Ormoc the plan was canceled on 11
December. On 13 December General Suzuki attached an [326]infantry company of about 100 men from the
102d Division to the 1st Division in order to strengthen
the latter’s lines.
On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th
Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed
past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most
determined opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets
of resistance which had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d
Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a
roadblock set up by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion,
less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the
road, was to attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come
abreast of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry.
At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks
were coming up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks
withdrew at nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion,
126th Infantry, the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to
dislodge the enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested
ground consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300
yards wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st
Battalion had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end
of the sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine
guns, mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the
Japanese and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for
this action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men
of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the
previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed a
request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third
ration that had been received the day before was insufficient.
The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received
orders from the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st
Battalion on the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and
link up with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion,
127th Infantry, moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400
yards when it encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its
front, about 150 yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT
and grenades against the battalion, effectively pinning down the
troops. A night perimeter was established.
The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, moved abreast of the
regiment’s 1st Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was
bitterly contested by the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars,
and rifles against the battalion, which dug in for the night under
fire.41 At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired
upon fifteen Japanese who were walking along the road south of Lonoy
and killed twelve of them.42
The night of 13–14 December was not quiet. At 2300
an enemy force from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the
command post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun
in the area and attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand
fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area
had quieted down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters
Company got things in order and everyone was “happy to hear sound
of comrade’s voices.” Six Japanese [328]were
killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded.43
U.S. AND JAPANESE TANKS. Camouflaged U.S.
tanks are shown (above) on Highway 2, between Limon and Lonoy. Burning
Japanese tanks (below) are checked by 127th Infantry troops north of
Lonoy.
On 14 December nearly all battalions of the 127th and
126th Infantry Regiments were engaged in moving slowly forward and
maintaining physical contact with each other. At 1045 the air observer
of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion located what appeared to be a
camouflaged four-gun position at a point 300 yards northeast of Lonoy.
The battalion fired upon the site and the Japanese fled from the
position. The 11th Field Artillery Battalion again fired into the same
general area at 1315 and set a supply and ammunition dump and three
buildings on fire. At 1530 the battalion and the corps artillery massed
their fires in order to cover all of Lonoy.44 At 1730,
the 127th Infantry destroyed two enemy tanks going north.
The 126th Infantry, on the same day, moved forward in a
column of battalions. The 1st Battalion made a limited advance, since
it was very short of ammunition and completely out of food. It did
establish a roadblock, however, and made contact with the 2d Battalion,
127th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, the northernmost unit of the 126th
Infantry, moved slowly behind the 3d Battalion of the regiment. An
interval of about 250 yards existed between the two battalions. The
Japanese in front of the 32d Division, especially in the sector of the
3d Battalion, had strongly entrenched themselves and resisted the 3d
Battalion from both sides of the highway.
Every bend of the road was lined with … foxholes
dug into the banks of the road and spider holes dug underneath the
roots of trees and under logs on the hillsides. It was bitter, close
hand to hand fighting and because of the steepness of the terrain, the
denseness of the tree growth, the inaccuracy of maps and nearness of
adjoining units, artillery and mortar fire could not be used to its
full advantage in reducing these positions.45
The main Japanese defensive line had been reached. By 14
December the 32d Division had advanced more than two miles south of
Limon. The 77th Division had crushed the Cogon defenses and was in a
position to drive north and make juncture with elements of the X Corps.
The northern and southern entrances to Ormoc Valley were denied to the
Japanese. The jaws of the Sixth Army trap were starting to close.
[329]
1 Maj
Charles V. McLaughlin, Operations of the XXIV Corps in the Invasion of
Leyte Island, pp. 29–30. Advanced Infantry Officers’
Course, 1947–48, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga. ↑
3
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 25; 14th Area Army Opns
Leyte, p. 13. ↑
4
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 25. ↑
5
General Tomochika was unqualified in his praise of the commander of the
Imahori Detachment. He said, “Colonel Imahori had good
personality and was a good leader. His subordinates were willing to
join the suicide squads when the American forces increased in number.
We did not have any worries about the attacking Americans on this
detachment’s front because the suicide squads brought good
results …” Ibid., pp.
19–20. ↑
6
35th Army Opns, pp. 87–89. ↑
7 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
8 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 11 Dec 44. ↑
9 77th
Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 15, 11 Dec 44; Company A, 88th Chemical Bn, Jnl,
10 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
18; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 11 Dec 44; 77th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 17, 12 Dec 44. ↑
10
305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 17, 12 Dec
44. ↑
11 XXIV
Corps FO 33, 4 Dec 44. ↑
12 Ltr,
CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, sub: Future Plans, 11 Dec 44, 77th Div
G-3 Jnl, 12 Dec 44. ↑
13 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 18–19; 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5;
35th Army Opns, p. 8. ↑
14 77th
Div G-2 Jnl, 13 Dec 44. ↑
15 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 20. ↑
16
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3–4; Company A, 88th Chem Bn, Jnl,
0900, 13 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 20–21; 77th Div
Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 13 Dec 44. ↑
17
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 21; 77th
Div G-2 Jnl, 0850, 13 Dec 44. ↑
18
306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
21. ↑
19
Company A, 88th Chem Bn, Jnl, 0930, 1000, 13 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, p. 21. ↑
20
305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
21 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
22
305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 20, 15 Dec
44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22; 77th Div G-2 Summary Leyte Opn, p.
2; 77th Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. ↑
23
“This force succeeded in destroying 6 amphibious tanks, 7 landing
barges, 1 eighty-foot two-masted schooner, 50 tons of ammunition,
approximately twenty-five tons of miscellaneous supplies, 4 40-mm. AA
guns, 4 20-mm. AA guns, 1 77-mm. dual purpose gun [probably a 75-mm.
gun], several machine guns, a radio transmitter and generator, 1
seacoast range finder and had burnt about half the town of Linao in
order to destroy Japanese positions dug in that vicinity….
“Although the force was unable to carry
back much of the equipment it captured owing to its small size and the
necessity of mobility, it managed to return 1 seacoast range finder, 1
large radio transmitter and 2 20-mm. AA guns.” 77th Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, p. 23. ↑
24 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. ↑
25
Ibid., pp. 22–23; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 20, 15 Dec 44;
306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
9. ↑
26 77th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpts Nos. 17–21, 13–16 Dec
44. ↑
27 77th
Div G-1 Daily Strength Rpts, 11–15 Dec 44. ↑
28
188th Prcht Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. ↑
29
511th Prcht Inf Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6; 11th Airborne Div Special
Study Leyte, p. 5. ↑
30
During the movement Pvt. Elmer E. Fryar of Company E was killed on 7
December when he voluntarily got in the way of enemy fire in order to
shield his platoon leader. Private Fryar posthumously received the
Medal of Honor. ↑
31 32d
Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Dec 44. ↑
32 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 29–30; 32d Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt, no
number, 15 Dec 44; 32d Inf S-2 Periodic Rpt, no number, 15 Dec 44; 32d
Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Dec 44. ↑
33 32d
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 30–31; 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 16 to 22 Dec 44;
11th Airborne Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10. ↑
34 The
part of this section dealing with Japanese plans and maneuvers is based
upon the following documents: Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn;
35th Army Opns; 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study, Opns of
Japanese 35th Army on Leyte. ↑
36 The
1st Reconnaissance Regiment could not carry out this assignment,
since it had been attacked by a larger American force. ↑
37
General Tomochika made the following comments on the 1st
Division:
The personnel were brave but the officers
lacked sufficient training in modern warfare and it finally did not
live up to the expectations of its leaders. The division commander, Lt.
Gen. Kataoka worried about the loss of his troops, lacked brave command
ability and did not establish any set battle policy. [He refused to
commit one of his important units to the defense of Highway 2.] …
therefore the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff and senior staff
officers were dispatched from Army to Division on three different
occasions to urge General Kataoka to submit to these orders….
Regardless of how much we urged General Kataoka to change his views he
would not budge. Colonel Ikeda, the Chief of Staff of the 1st Division
[until 13 December] was partially deaf and further because of a former
lung ailment, he was unsuited to hold his important position.
(Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 18.)
General Tomochika was less than fair to the
1st Division. From its positions in the mountains of
northern Leyte, the division contested every
foot of advance of the X Corps. General Krueger said of the 1st
Division: “This unit more than any other hostile unit on
Leyte was responsible for the extension of the Leyte Operation.”
(Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 41.) ↑
38
Sixth Army FO 36, 4 Dec 44. ↑
39
During the action of 5 December, Pfc. William A. McWhorter sacrificed
his life that a companion might live. He deliberately held next to his
body and away from his comrade a Japanese grenade which had been thrown
into his position. The charge exploded and killed him instantly but did
not harm his companion. He was awarded posthumously the Medal of
Honor. ↑
40
“However for a patrol from Company I [127th Infantry] it was a
red letter day in that the patrol found a bottle of U.S. Golden Wedding
Wiskey [sic] at an evacuated Jap hospital. It was consumed.”
127th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Dec 44. See also 127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9;
126th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 12 Dec 44; 32d Div
Leyte Opn Diary, pp. 21–22. ↑
41 32d
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 27, 13 Dec 44; 32d Div Opns Diary Leyte, pp.
23–24; 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 13 Dec 44. ↑
42 32d
Div Arty Daily Rpt, 14 Dec 44. ↑
43
126th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Dec 44. ↑
44 32d
Div Arty Daily Rpt, 14 Dec 44. ↑
45 32d
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 12; X Corps G-3 Jnl, 14 Dec 44; X Corps G-3
Periodic Rpt, X Corps G-3 Jnl, 14 Dec 44; 32d Div G-2 Jnl, 14 Dec 44;
126th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Dec 44; 127th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Dec 44; 32d Div
Opns Diary Leyte, p. 24; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. ↑
CHAPTER XX
Seizure of Ormoc Valley
General Krueger wished the two corps to attack
aggressively through Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, about six and a half
miles north of Ormoc. The X Corps, pushing south along Highway 2, was
to seize the high ground north of Valencia and the XXIV Corps was to
continue its drive north, capture Valencia, and establish contact with
the X Corps. (Map 22) Driving north along
Highway 2, the 77th Division was to seize Valencia and its airfield and
effect a juncture with the X Corps to separate the enemy forces in the
mountains east of its zone of action from those on the west coast in
the Palompon area. General Bruce was to co-ordinate all artillery fires
and air support missions in the Ormoc-Valencia area.1
After the seizure of Ormoc, although the 35th
Army still controlled Ormoc Valley, the Sixth Army had closed the
northern and southern entrances. There remained available to the
Japanese as a principal port only Palompon. A road from this town
through the mountains joined Highway 2 in the vicinity of Libongao and
constituted the only main route from the west coast of Leyte to Ormoc
Valley. The Americans noticed that the Japanese were moving supplies,
men, ammunition, and artillery to the Valencia area and concluded that
the Japanese would make a defensive stand in Valencia.2
By the end of 15 December the forces of General Bruce
had cleared the Japanese defenders from the Ormoc area and were ready
for the next phase of the drive north up the Ormoc corridor. Reports
made the previous day by the reconnaissance patrols from the 306th and
307th Infantry Regiments indicated that there was little enemy
resistance to the west of Highway 2. These led General Bruce to decide
in favor of a plan for enveloping the enemy from the west. The 306th
and 307th Infantry were to strike the flanks and rear of the Japanese
defending the highway and thus permit a more rapid advance along this
road by the 305th Infantry.3
Johnstone
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY
15–21 December 1944
General Hodge had informed General Bruce that the
commanding general of the Sixth Army desired to have the attack pushed
“with all possible vigor.” The operations of the 77th
Division were to depend upon the situation and conditions then
existing.4 On 14 December General Hodge visited General
Bruce, who explained his plans. General Hodge thought they were
“sound”5 and later told General Bruce
to keep his plans flexible in order to take advantage of every break to
speed the advance north. It was imperative that the XXIV [330]Corps secure control of the roads north before
the Japanese could establish positions.
Drive From the South to the Libongao Area
Seizure of the Road Junction
According to its plan of attack for 16 December
the 305th Infantry, from the vicinity of Cogon, was to continue its
assault north on Highway 2, liquidate the remaining enemy forces in
Cogon, and finally secure a large defensive position centered around
the road junction north of Cogon. All three battalions of the regiment
were to consolidate around the point while the 306th and 307th Infantry
Regiments were to drive toward Valencia.
The Cannon and Antitank Companies and the heavy weapons
units of the other two regiments were attached to the 305th Infantry
for movement only and were to be used solely in case of emergency.
These units were to be sent to the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments
upon call by those regiments.
At 0930 on 16 December the assault units of the 305th
Infantry moved out. The 1st Battalion, on the left of Highway 2, was to
attack north, and the 3d Battalion, on the right of Highway 2, was to
attack north and then northeast to effect a juncture with the 1st and
2d Battalions at the road junction north of Cogon. The 2d Battalion was
to attack east to flank the enemy positions along the highway. The
operation was to be assisted by artillery.
During the morning the artillery in support of the 1st
Battalion knocked out two antitank guns, a heavy machine gun, and an
enemy dugout position. At 1035 the 1st Battalion had advanced several
hundred yards. As the 3d Battalion came forward, Company L moved in on
the right flank of the 1st Battalion. At 1100 the 2d Battalion had
reached the enemy positions along the highway and by 1215 had cleared
out the enemy pocket and the road in its sector. A light tank platoon
from the 706th Tank Battalion was attached to the 1st Battalion at 1255
in order to assist the battalion in clearing the Japanese from their
foxholes. Although progress was slow, it was thorough. The localized
envelopments of the enemy’s right (west) flank resulted in the
capture of Cogon at the end of the day. The 305th Infantry advanced 400
yards north of the road junction and established night positions around
it.6
Envelopment of Valencia
In the meantime, the 306th and 307th Infantry
Regiments had been ordered to make a series of sweeping envelopments on
the Japanese right (west) flank toward Valencia. The 307th Infantry was
to move northwest about six and a quarter miles through the barrios of
Jalubon, Liloan, and Bao to Catayom on the Bao River, then swing
northeast to the barrio of San Jose and continue northeast to the
Valencia airstrip. The 306th Infantry was to follow the 307th Infantry
northwest and then drive east and cut Highway 2.7
The 306th Field Artillery Battalion, though in general
support, was to give priority to the 307th Infantry. The 902d and 305th
Field Artillery Battalions were to support elements of the
reconnaissance [331]troops operating on each flank of the division.
The artillery battalions would fire in the regimental zones of action
only on call from or with the approval of the regiments.8
On 16 December the 307th Infantry crossed the line of
departure on time. Since there were no roads and the route was across
rice paddies, through waist-deep rivers, and over terrain impassable
for vehicles, the troops hand-carried their supplies. Arrangements were
also made for Filipinos to carry supplies, and, as the advance
progressed, more and more Filipinos joined the column of the 307th
Infantry for this purpose.9 The regiment met only
scattered resistance. Some Japanese troops encountered in the vicinity
of Liloan were dispersed. At 1525 leading elements of the 307th
Infantry passed through Bao and moved on toward San Jose. On the
outskirts of that barrio, the troops met and destroyed two platoons of
the enemy. At 1645 the 307th Infantry dug in for the night in San Jose.
The regiment had covered eight miles, a rapid rate of advance
considering the nature of the terrain and the load carried. At 2340
General Bruce told the 307th Infantry that an incendiary air strike
would be made on Valencia before 0900 the following day and that the
regiment was to hold its present position until further
orders.10
At 0900 on 16 December the 306th Infantry moved past the
initial point of departure on the northwestern edge of Ormoc. At 1035
the regiment was 1,000 yards west of the starting point and close
“on the tail” of the 307th Infantry. The 306th waited until
the 307th cleared and then moved north. Although it did not encounter
any Japanese its progress was very slow because the route of advance
ran through deep rice paddies. At 1730 the regiment established its
night perimeter about 700 yards south-southwest of Tipic.11 During the day the 305th Infantry had cleared
Cogon and occupied defensive positions around the road junction north
of the town.
The Japanese had constructed defensive positions along
Highway 2 in the southern part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction of
Highway 2 with the road to Liloan were many trenches three to four feet
deep and parallel to the highway. Trenches had also been dug along the
sides of a machine gun emplacement that occupied a slight elevation
commanding Highway 2 both to the north and to the south. On both sides
of the road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined Highway 2, in the
ditches and under the shacks. Some of these positions were dug on a
slant and were six to seven feet deep. At Tambuco the foxholes extended
along the highway for 400 yards, with machine gun emplacements on the
sides of the foxholes. Other positions along Highway 2 consisted of
poorly integrated foxholes and machine guns that covered the road. The
field artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom were placed along
the highway, with the exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded a bridge
and was well concealed inside a roadside shack.12
The 14th Area Army had planned to reinforce the
35th Army by dispatching the Takahashi Detachment, which
consisted of the 5th Infantry Regiment, one artillery
[332]battalion, and one engineer company and one
transport company each from the 8th Division, together with the
Ito Naval Landing Force of 400 troops from Luzon.
JAPANESE DUG-IN POSITIONS ALONG HIGHWAY BANKS
delayed the advance of the 77th Division north of Ormoc.
The 77th Infantry Regiment had landed at Palompon
on or about 9 December from Cebu and moved to Matagob where, after
assembling its troops, it began to move southeast toward Huaton, the
new headquarters of the 35th Army. Huaton was a small barrio on
Highway 2 about three and a half miles north of Cogon. On 13 December
General Suzuki, the commander of the 35th Army, arrived at
Huaton from the Burauen area. After the 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment, the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment, the Mitsui
Shipping Unit, the Ito Naval Landing Force, and the 77th
Infantry Regiment were assembled, General Suzuki on 15 December
ordered an attack, which was to start 17 December, against the American
forces in the Ormoc area.13
The fall of Cogon and the envelopment to the west forced
General Suzuki to change his plans again. The 305th Infantry had
captured the positions of the Tateishi Battalion of the 12th
Independent Infantry Regiment, and the position of the 77th
Infantry Regiment was greatly weakened. As the attack against Ormoc
could not be successfully completed, the 12th and 77th
Infantry Regiments were to carry out a delaying action.14
Since the fall of Valencia might break the organized
resistance of the Japanese in Ormoc Valley, General Bruce decided to
push [333]forward rapidly and take the barrio before the
enemy could regroup.15 General Krueger asked General
Whitehead for air strikes against Valencia. If the weather permitted, a
strike would be made at 0900 and another would be delivered on call. In
addition, nearly all available artillery of the division that could
arrive within firing distance, as well as the 226th Field Artillery
Battalion from positions east of the mountains near Daro, would shell
the town until ordered to lift the fire.
The 305th Infantry was to drive rapidly north on Highway
2 and clear out the Japanese for a distance of 200 to 300 yards on each
side of the road, even though it might mean bypassing groups of the
enemy on the flanks. A patrol from the regiment was to operate east of
its sector to locate enemy forces. The 306th Infantry was to drive
rapidly east toward Highway 2 and then advance north up the highway,
clearing a lane 200 to 300 yards wide. At a point 500 to 600 yards
north of Cabulihan, it was to await further orders. The regiment was to
be prepared to send a battalion south to assist the 305th Infantry in
its advance.
General Bruce organized an armored column to carry
rations and ammunition to the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments. This
column, which was to move north on Highway 2, consisted of five light
tanks from the 7th Division, the Cannon and Tank Destroyer Companies of
the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments, part of Company C, 302d
Engineer Battalion, a platoon from the 305th Infantry, and sufficient
LVT’s to carry men and supplies. An artillery observer
accompanied the column.
Elements of the 302d Engineer Battalion were to repair
immediately the highway between Ormoc and Valencia and at night retire
within the nearest infantry defensive perimeter. The order was summed
up as follows: “The action will be pressed with the utmost vigor
by careful planning but every effort will be made to save
casualties.”16
At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out
along Highway 2. At 1000 the 1st Battalion reported that it was
advancing at the rate of 100 yards every ten minutes against light
opposition. By 1145 the 305th Infantry was fighting through Tambuco. At
a road junction just north of Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy
resistance and the advance slowed down. The regiment moved forward to a
point about 300 yards north of the road junction and established its
night perimeter, which extended 300 yards to the northeast along the
Tambuco-Dolores road in order to forestall any Japanese counterattacks
from that direction.17
On the same day the 306th Infantry pushed its attack
northeast at 0800. The advancing troops almost immediately encountered
Japanese who, apparently taken by surprise, were unable to offer
organized resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000
yards southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the
regimental commander therefore committed the 3d Battalion on the left
of the 2d Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared
Highway 2, resistance became more intense. The 306th Infantry
encountered the Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of
the 305th Infantry [334]and the heavy artillery that accompanied
it. (Unknown to the Americans, General Suzuki and his staff were among
the retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping to Libongao,
where he established a new headquarters for the 35th Army.) At
1440 the 306th Infantry reached Highway 2 between Catayom and Cabulihan
and proceeded north toward Cabulihan, its objective. Advance elements
of the 3d Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but withdrew
three or four hundred yards to take advantage of more commanding
terrain. After combat patrols had cleared the area, the 306th Infantry
established its night perimeter five hundred yards south of Cabulihan
at 1600.18
General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain
in San Jose until further notice. Since the guerrilla forces had
reported a large number of Japanese in the area, General Bruce had made
arrangements to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and
artillery fire before the infantry attack. In response to Bruce’s
request, fifteen P-40’s from the V Fighter Command had been made
available by General Whitehead for an air strike against the Valencia
area.
The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field Artillery Battalion
at Daro began firing on Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of 17
December and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire
was halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes the area was
bombed and strafed. With the conclusion of the air attack, at 1335, the
artillery began anew to pound the area. “The medium artillery …
reached out from Ormoc and the ‘Long Toms’ … from Daro
joined in the fighting.”19 In the meantime the 902d
Field Artillery Battalion moved forward to a point from which it could
support the advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire
stopped and the 307th Infantry moved out astride the San Jose-Valencia
road toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment
had driven some of the Japanese from the area, a strong well-equipped
force, including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the 307th
Infantry. The regiment pushed forward, however, and at 1640 its leading
elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip and within 1,000
yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry formed its night perimeter on the
edge of the airfield and made preparations to continue the attack on 18
December.20
During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the
Japanese forces, Colonel Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment tried to reach Ormoc, but he was unsuccessful.21 A few enemy artillery shells landed in the Ormoc
area but that was all. General Bruce wrote later: “The men got a
laugh because the General’s latrine, unoccupied, was struck. He
wished about that time that he had remained up front which he had
reached by landing in a cub plane on an unimproved jungle
road.”22
On the morning of 18 December, since supplies and
ammunition for the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments were becoming
dangerously low, General Bruce pushed the armored column vigorously
forward through [335]the 305th Infantry. The column swept past
enemy strong points and succeeded in bringing supplies to both
regiments.
JAPANESE LIGHT TANK destroyed during the
fighting along Highway 2. Note dugouts in the sides of banks
behind the tank.
The attack of the 305th Infantry was consequently
delayed. The 3d Battalion of the regiment, however, jumped off in a
northeast direction on the Dolores road in order to cut off any
Japanese reinforcements from that area. At 0945 the rest of the 305th
Infantry started out along Highway 2 and encountered little resistance.
By 1400 the battalions had passed through the barrios of Dayhagan and
Huaton (the former and short-lived headquarters of General Suzuki), and
knocked out fifteen enemy trucks and three tanks. The 3d Battalion
proceeded northeast from the road junction along the road to Dolores,
and crushed all resistance. The battalion then moved west toward
Highway 2, leaving a platoon behind to seal off the Dolores road from
Highway 2.23
At 0830 on 18 December the 306th Infantry renewed its
attack. At first the 2d Battalion moved south astride Highway 2 in
order to make contact with the 305th Infantry, which was pushing north
along the highway, but since there was little resistance the battalion
withdrew and rejoined the regiment. As the rest of the regiment
continued north it met moderate opposition but pushed ahead steadily.
The troops encountered many strong points along the road but no
organized main line of resistance. [336]
The 306th Infantry proceeded astride the highway against
moderate to strong opposition. An enemy force estimated as two
battalions had dug in under the houses and in foxholes along the sides
of the road. The Japanese tried to halt the advance with heavy machine
guns and a few mortars, but without avail. Patrols from the 306th
Infantry made contact with the 305th Infantry at 1500. The 306th
Infantry reached the southern edge of Valencia at 1630 and tied in with
the 307th Infantry. Night perimeters were established.24
At 0830 on 18 December the 307th Infantry from the
southwestern edge of the Valencia airstrip renewed the attack. There
was no opposition and at 0905 the airfield and the town of Valencia
were in the hands of the regiment. General Bruce considered the heavy
artillery and aerial assaults of the previous day “most
effective.” The airfield was in “fair” condition; it
was safe for light aircraft and with minor repairs could be made
suitable for other aircraft. The 307th Infantry spent the rest of 18
December consolidating its positions and conducting extensive patrols
to the north and east. At 1630 it established physical contact with the
306th Infantry.25
In three days of relatively fast fighting and
maneuvering the 77th Division had shaken the Japanese forces badly and
disrupted the plans of General Suzuki. The 307th Infantry, by making a
wide envelopment of the west flank, had captured Valencia and its
airfield, and the 306th Infantry, making a smaller envelopment, had
bisected Highway 2 at Cabulihan while the 305th Infantry moved up the
highway from Cogon. All of southern Ormoc Valley from Ormoc to
Valencia, a distance of about six and a half miles as the crow flies,
was securely in American hands. All units were in contact and ready for
the next phase of their mission.
Drive to Palompon Road Junction
Since elements of the XXIV Corps had been able to
make more rapid progress through Ormoc Valley than the X Corps units,
General Krueger on 19 December enlarged the zone of action of the XXIV
Corps to include Libongao, the barrio just below the juncture of
Highway 2 with the Palompon road.26 General Hodge thereupon
ordered the 77th Division to continue north and seize Libongao and then
to secure the Palompon road and establish contact with the X
Corps.27
General Bruce ordered the 305th Infantry to assume
responsibility for the defense of Valencia and its airfield, and thus
free the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments for new assignments. The
307th was to move north astride Highway 2 to Libongao and then continue
to the junction with the Palompon road. The 306th was to move across
country and strike northwest toward the Palompon road. Although its
advance would parallel that of the 307th, the 306th was to be about
2,300 yards west of the other regiment. After reaching the Palompon
road in the vicinity of the Togbong River the 306th Infantry would
strike west for the crossing and then move east to the road
[337]junction. The 304th, 305th, and 902d Field
Artillery Battalions were to remain in the Valencia area while the
306th Field Artillery Battalion was to be prepared to move forward on
call.28
At Libongao, General Suzuki prepared his defense. In the
area he had his headquarters guard and a part of the 4th Airborne
Raiding Regiment, in addition to a field artillery battalion, an
engineering company, and a transportation company. An advance battalion
of the Takahashi Detachment arrived in the sector from Palompon
on the night of 17 December. General Suzuki ordered it to proceed south
from Libongao and destroy the American forces in the Valencia
area.29
As the 307th Infantry advanced north at 0900 on 19
December, it became apparent that General Suzuki had organized a
defense of the highway. Many machine gun and light artillery
emplacements were dug in along the road, and the enemy resistance
became more determined as the troops moved north. A force estimated to
be of battalion strength was dug in in depth along streams and ridges.
With the use of grenades the 307th routed the defenders, the battalion
from the Takahashi Detachment. The 307th Infantry pushed
steadily north and at 1800 established a night perimeter; it had
advanced nearly three miles and captured much enemy equipment during
the day.30
The 306th Infantry moved out at 1100 and proceeded
rapidly, without meeting resistance, to a point about 500 yards south
of the Palompon road where it encountered elements of the 5th
Infantry Regiment. At 1530 a battery of artillery and infantry
mortars and machine guns fired upon the Japanese. In co-ordination with
fire from these weapons, the 306th Infantry was then able to push
forward. At 1800, though patrols from the regiment had reached the
Palompon road, the regiment itself dug in for the night at a point 300
yards south of the Palompon road.31
On 20 December, after a five-minute artillery
preparation to its front, the 307th Infantry moved out at 0830 and
encountered the “strongest fortified positions” since it
had left Camp Downes. The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment and
other elements of the 1st Division resisted any forward advance.
By 1000 the 307th Infantry had “mowed down” and annihilated
two suicide counterattacks of fifty men each on its right flank. An
additional force, estimated at 2,000 men, well equipped with machine
guns, mortars, and a limited amount of artillery, opposed the 307th
Infantry from hastily constructed defensive positions. The attack of
the enemy forces was not well co-ordinated; consequently the regiment,
though slowed down, was able to continue forward. At 1549 the leading
elements of the 307th Infantry were at Libongao. The enemy defensive
fire increased in intensity on the northern outskirts of the village.
At 1710, about 200 yards north of Libongao, the regiment repulsed a
force estimated to consist of 200 Japanese armed with machine guns and
mortars. The 307th Infantry established its night perimeter about 1,000
yards south of the road junction. During the day the regiment had
captured many tons of ammunition and matériel in supply dumps,
together [338]with more than thirty enemy trucks. The 307th
Infantry put many of the latter into serviceable condition and made
immediate use of them.32
For the same day, 20 December, the 306th Infantry, on
the left of the 307th, was assigned the mission of advancing to the
Palompon road. Upon reaching the road, the 1st Battalion on the left
would turn west along it to seize a bridge crossing the Togbong River
and the 3d Battalion would turn east to seize the junction of the road
and Highway 2.33 During the night the enemy artillery
heavily shelled the sector of the regiment. After a ten-minute
artillery preparation the assault battalions moved out at 0830, and by
0925 they had reached the Palompon road. Each of the battalions
thereupon started to execute its part of the mission.
The 1st Battalion pushed steadily forward and reached
the eastern banks of the Togbong River at the bridge crossing, the
bridge itself having been destroyed by the enemy. From a commanding
ridge upon the western banks of the river, just north of the bridge
site, a Japanese force estimated to be a battalion in strength opposed
any further advance. The company on the left forced a passage across
the river south of the bridge site, but the company on the right,
despite repeated attempts, was unable to cross the river. At 1630 the
1st Battalion received orders to take up a night defensive position on
the eastern banks of the river. During the night the enemy
unsuccessfully launched three counterattacks against the 1st Battalion.
In the morning the battalion counted more than 400 Japanese dead around
its position.
The 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, upon reaching the
Palompon road turned east and encountered steadily increasing enemy
opposition. By 1500, however, Company K reached the road junction. At
the same time the 3d Battalion received orders to withdraw west 300
yards so that the 307th Infantry could register unrestricted fire to
its front. This withdrawal was carried out and the 3d and 2d Battalions
of the 306th Infantry established night positions 300 yards west of the
road junction.
At 1900 General Bruce ordered the 306th Infantry to
deliver harassing fire on the enemy forces to the west during the night
of 20–21 December and the 307th Infantry to fire 500 yards to its
front up Highway 2 and east of the highway.34
The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment had assembled
in the Libongao sector with orders to proceed to the Valencia sector,
but the 77th Division had advanced so rapidly that it was attacking the
35th Army Headquarters. The Takahashi Detachment suffered
heavy casualties and withdrew to Matagob, on the Palompon road between
Palompon and Libongao. The field artillery battalion and the
engineering and transportation companies that had been left at Matagob
were absorbed by the Takahashi Detachment. On 21 December
General Suzuki ordered the regiment to make a defensive stand, so that
the main force of the 35th Army could withdraw to the Palompon
sector on the shore of the Camotes Sea.35
[339]
During the night of 20–21 December the 77th
Division artillery expended half a unit of fire, intermittently
bombarding enemy positions west of the 77th Division and to the east of
Highway 2. The bombardment was the most intensive made by the 77th
Division during the campaign. Just before renewal of the attack on 21
December, the artillery delivered a concentrated thirty-minute
preparation. General Bruce ordered the 306th Infantry to move out at
0630. Since the 1st Battalion was short of ammunition, it was to await
the arrival of Company E, which had been attached to the battalion,
with additional ammunition. At 1250, having received the ammunition,
the battalion moved out and at 1330 secured the ridge (overlooking the
bridge site), which had blocked its advance the previous day.
Immediately afterward General Bruce ordered the
battalion to proceed west along the Palompon road and secure the bridge
over the Pagsangahan River. The ridge was thereupon outposted as the
1st Battalion withdrew to prepare for continuation of the assault, but
elements of the 5th Infantry Regiment drove the outposts off the
ridge and immediately occupied it. At 1500 the 1st Battalion attacked
unsuccessfully in an effort to retake the position. It formed a night
perimeter at the river crossing at 1600, and at 0750 concentrated a
ten-minute artillery preparation on the enemy positions on the ridge.
The 1st Battalion then moved out toward the high ground and secured the
ridge within twenty minutes, the Japanese offering only slight
resistance.36
The 77th Division had reached the Palompon road. In its
drive north the division had destroyed the major elements of the
5th and 77th Infantry Regiments and the 4th Airborne
Regiment.
The 32d Division Resumes the Offensive
Elements of the X Corps were slowly moving south
in an attempt to effect a juncture with the XXIV Corps. On 14 December
the 126th and 127th Infantry Regiments of the 32d Division had pushed
south down Highway 2 against very determined resistance and through
mountainous terrain to the main defense line of the 1st
Division. The Japanese were well entrenched on a series of ridges
overlooking Highway 2. A heavy rain forest covered the ridges and the
deep ravines in between. The enemy had carefully selected his defensive
positions and camouflaged his machine guns, which were flanked by
hidden riflemen. Targets could not be spotted beyond a range of about
seventy-five feet. The employment of mortars was very limited because
of the lack of visibility, and the hazards of tree burst were equally
dangerous to both the Japanese and the Americans. The troops had to
“approach within spitting distance of the [Japanese machine]
guns” before they could locate the weapons.37
For the next few days the regiments of the 32d Division
fought valiantly against a foe that limited the division’s
advance to a few score yards a day. Of the many acts of individual
bravery, those of Pfc. Dick J. Vlug and Sgt. Leroy Johnson were
outstanding. Private Vlug single-handedly destroyed five enemy tanks
that were moving north along the highway. Sergeant Johnson threw
himself upon an enemy grenade that killed him [340]but
did not hurt those comrades near him. Both men were awarded the Medal
of Honor.
On the morning of 17 December advance elements of the
126th Infantry were about 4,000 yards south of Limon. After a
preparation of heavy mortar fire the 1st Battalion moved out at 0730,
encountering about a platoon of the enemy on a knoll 300 yards east of
the road. A bitter fire fight broke out and continued throughout the
day. The battalion was unable to advance farther and set up a night
perimeter. During the fight the 1st Battalion captured four enemy
machine guns.
In the zone of the 2d Battalion, east of the highway,
all the battalion’s mortars, machine guns, and 37-mm. guns,
together with four medium tanks, massed their combined fires on the
enemy positions to the front. These positions consisted of numerous
foxholes, pillboxes of coconut logs, and L-shaped fortifications dug
into the mountain sides. A rain of steel descended upon the Japanese on
the high ground directly east of the battalion. This preparatory fire
had excellent results and the 2d Battalion, after moving out at 1100,
quickly secured the ridge and consolidated its position. It captured
three 47-mm. antitank guns, three 75-mm. mountain guns, and two 70-mm.
battalion guns. About 150 of the enemy were killed by the preparatory
fire and the battalion attack.
Company I, 3d Battalion, quickly secured and destroyed a
roadblock that the enemy had constructed the previous day. Accompanied
by the four tanks, the company then advanced down the highway just
behind the 2d Battalion without encountering opposition. For the rest
of the day the 3d Battalion protected the road and patrolled five or
six hundred yards to the rear. The 127th Infantry to the south remained
in position awaiting the 126th Infantry.38
By the following morning, 18 December, the 126th
Infantry was on a line that extended east of Highway 2. To the front of
the regiment, elements of the 1st Division occupied three
positions on an east-west line approximately 800 yards in length and
extending across Highway 2. There were actually three ridges along this
line. The first ran north and south beside the road, and on it was
located the western position of the enemy. From this site the Japanese
were able to roll hand grenades down on the road. About 200 yards to
the east was another strongly fortified north-south ridge, east of
which was a small valley with a banana grove. Still farther east was a
small knoll upon which was located a strong enemy defensive position.
An estimated two reinforced enemy companies, well supported by
automatic weapons and well dug in, occupied this position. The whole
area was covered with a dense rain forest, and it was impossible to
spot any Japanese fortified position more than thirty yards away.
Before the troops moved out, the mortars and tanks
placed heavy fire on the Japanese positions for twenty minutes. At 1010
on 18 December the 126th Infantry attacked with the 1st Battalion on
the right and the 2d Battalion on the left. In advancing to the ridge
nearest the road, the American troops received considerable small arms
fire just east of the road. The 1st Battalion moved ahead up the ridge
east of the road and by 1230 it had advanced 200 yards to the top of
the ridge. The Japanese resisted strongly and heavy fighting occurred
in which both sides used machine guns, grenades, and [341]bayonets. By 1800 the 1st Battalion was in firm
possession of the ridge. The 2d Battalion, supported by machine guns
and mortars, was able to creep up through the forested ravine to within
thirty yards of the enemy position on the knoll before it was fired
upon. A bitter engagement then ensued. After five hours of intense
fighting the battalion drove the Japanese defenders off the knoll. The
1st and 2d Battalions formed their night perimeters within fifty yards
of the enemy front lines. The 3d Battalion of the 126th Infantry moved
south along the road and closed the gap between the 126th and 127th
Infantry Regiments.39 The artillery fired upon
several buildings about 800 to 1,500 yards southwest of the forward
elements of the 32d Division. Lucrative artillery targets were
practically nonexistent.40
On the morning of 19 December the 126th Infantry
followed the same procedure that had been used the previous day. A
heavy machine gun and mortar concentration was placed upon the Japanese
positions on the crest of a ridge fifty yards to the front. At 1100 the
126th Infantry moved out with battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion on
the right and the 2d on the left. Six heavy machine guns immediately
fired on the left flank of the 1st Battalion. The battalion withdrew
and placed a concentration of more than 200 rounds of mortar fire on
the position while its machine guns raked the Japanese force
“fore and aft.” The troops then renewed the assault but the
Japanese continued to resist. Elements of the 1st Division had
dug in on the top and both sides of a ridge and had utilized caves to
construct a defensive position in which there were more than 100
foxholes with communicating trenches. Heavy fighting continued
throughout the day. The 1st Battalion used mortars, flame throwers,
white phosphorus grenades, hand grenades, rifles, and supporting
flanking fire from its heavy and light machine guns, but was able to
advance only seventy-five yards. Although the battalion overran many
emplacements, a determined Japanese force remained to be overcome when
the battalion established its night perimeter on the eastern slope of
the ridge.
The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, encountered only
scattered rifle fire that came principally from the enemy position on
its right flank. During its advance the battalion delivered flanking
machine gun and rifle fire in support of the 1st Battalion on its
right. By 1200 the 2d Battalion had advanced 200 yards and secured the
area in its zone of action. At 1530 the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry,
which had been protecting the eastern flank of the 32d Division,
relieved the 2d Battalion, which withdrew to an assembly area in the
rear.
During the night of 19–20 December, the commanding
officer of Company B, 126th Infantry, which had borne the brunt of the
enemy resistance, placed one platoon of the company along the eastern
side of the ridge and another platoon on the western side. At the same
time he continued the pressure from the south. Throughout the night the
company kept firing at known enemy positions and the sector in general.
The company commander also required each of his men to throw hand
grenades periodically. At first light and without any breakfast the
troops rushed the enemy position. The Japanese had lost the power to
resist and by 1000 the company had taken the last of the three enemy
positions. Two hundred Japanese dead were counted in the area.
[342]
At 1245 on 20 December the 127th Infantry took over the
conquered sector and the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, withdrew to an
assembly area in the rear.41
Debouchment From the Mountains
Since the 32d Division had borne the brunt of the
assault, General Sibert ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to make the
main attack south. It was to assist the advance of the 32d Division to
a bridge 1,000 yards north of Lonoy and then move south and make
contact with the 77th Division.42 The 1st Cavalry Division
had been operating in the central mountain chain on the eastern flank
of the 32d Division and had been opposed by the 102d Division.
The latter, after its arrival at Ormoc, had gone directly into the
mountains in the vicinity of Mt. Pina.43 The
102d Division did not play a significant role in the Leyte
campaign.
The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team had moved south
on the eastern flank of the 32d Division. The 1st Squadron of the 112th
Cavalry had been able to keep pace with the 32d Division, but the 2d
Squadron had encountered a very strong enemy force on a ridge
overlooking the Leyte River south of Limon. The Japanese resisted all
the squadron’s efforts to dislodge them. The 2d Squadron, 7th
Cavalry, relieved the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, and on 14 December it
had succeeded in overcoming the Japanese and had seized the ridge.
Spearhead of the Assault
While the 112th and 7th Cavalry Regiments were
busily engaged in defending the east flank of the 32d Division in its
push south along Highway 2, the 12th Cavalry was mopping up enemy
groups entrenched in the mountains farther to the east. Particularly
strong enemy resistance had been encountered in the Mt. Badian and Hill
2348 sector, which was about five miles northeast of Kananga, a barrio
on Highway 2.44 In the process of reducing the
Japanese-held area, it was estimated that an enemy force of 500 to 600
men had been wiped out. From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th
Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, sent out
westward patrols, and slowly moved westward.
On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2
south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be
concurrent with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the
highway.45 The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the
vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000
yards northeast of the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to
the north of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent
10 December in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against
this enemy force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830
while the 2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping
the left flank of the enemy. In furtherance [343]of
this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward
the southwest and dug in for the night just north of Mt.
Cabungaan.46
On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and
artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of
the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell
on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with
Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E
attacked from the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or
eight pillboxes and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The
men of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill
“throwing grenades and firing from the hip.”47 The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at 1003 after
very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held up by the
terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After the capture of
the Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at
1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned from the vicinity
of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese had prepared strong
defensive positions in that area. The platoon had gained a good
observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy.48 The next
several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving the 2d
Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron.
On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue
west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to
establish a roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces
to the north between it and the 32d Division.49 In
furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved
west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area that was
about 1,800 yards east of the barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana
plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and
as an excellent dropping ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having
encountered little opposition, closed on the area before dusk.
Thereupon the rest of the regiment was ordered to close in on the area
before nightfall on 17 December.
Lonoy
The 12th Cavalry on 18 December sent out patrols
to Lonoy, Kananga, and to the northwest to make contact with the
nearest friendly troops. The patrols to Lonoy and Kananga, although
they ran into scattered groups of the enemy, were able to locate
suitable approaches to Lonoy for their squadrons.50
At 2235, on 18 December, the 12th Cavalry received
orders to move out the following morning, seize Lonoy, and be prepared
to seize Kananga. The commanding officer of the regiment decided to
have the 1st and 2d Squadrons move out abreast with the 2d Squadron on
the left. During the entire night the artillery was to deliver
harassing fire on the highway north of Lonoy and on the area between
the routes of approach of the two squadrons.
After a preparation on 19 December, the 1st and 2d
Squadrons moved out at 0800. The 1st Squadron met only light, sporadic
resistance. The troops observed many Japanese [344]proceeding north along the highway and had
mortar and artillery fires placed upon them. At 1200, the 1st Squadron
seized Lonoy, captured much enemy equipment, and destroyed many supply
dumps. The 1st Squadron moved to assist the 2d Squadron in the capture
of a knoll southeast of the barrio. The 1st Squadron closed on the
knoll about 1400, and aided the assault of the 2d Squadron by fire and
by sending a troop east to assist it.
The 2d Squadron jumped off on schedule but at 0930, when
it was 800 yards short of its objective, the squadron came under heavy
rifle and machine gun fire from the thick woods. The 271st Field
Artillery Battalion placed fire on the area and a great many of the
enemy were killed, the remainder fleeing south. The squadron received
additional machine gun fire from the north but a patrol quickly
silenced it. In the meantime the mortar platoon from Troop D, in
support of the 1st Squadron, fired upon Lonoy. The Japanese immediately
responded with fire from a 105-mm. gun, which they had cleverly
concealed in the gap between the two squadrons and about 600 yards from
the regimental observation post at which the gun directed its fire. The
enemy gun killed one man and wounded fifteen others of the command-post
group. The heavy machine guns from the Weapons troop and the artillery
from the 271st Field Artillery Battalion began concentrating their
fires upon the enemy gun. The Antitank Platoon was sent out to destroy
the gun and its crew. Following the machine gun and artillery fire, the
enemy gun was silent for about half an hour. It then suddenly opened up
against the 2d Squadron at a range of about 300 yards. The enemy fire
resulted in tree bursts which killed five men and wounded fifteen
others. Troop G, which suffered the most casualties, and the Antitank
Platoon immediately turned and attacked to the north to destroy the
gun. The 2d Squadron, less Troop G, renewed the attack towards Lonoy,
receiving scattered rifle fire. At 1730 it reached Lonoy and was in
contact with the 1st Squadron.
Meanwhile, Troop G sideslipped to the west and with the
Antitank Platoon attacked and destroyed the enemy gun and four of its
crew. A patrol located another enemy 105-mm. gun but, because of
darkness and point-blank fire from the weapon at a range of about
twenty-five feet, it was unable to knock out the gun. At 2200 Troops G
and H, the medical group, and the Antitank Platoon formed a joint night
perimeter.51
Late that night the regimental commander ordered the 2d
and 1st Squadrons of the 12th Cavalry to move south on the morning of
20 December along Highway 2 in a column of squadrons, with the 2d
Squadron in the lead. During the night, in preparation for this
advance, the 271st Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,096 rounds on
Kananga, on the road north of Lonoy, and on sectors occupied by the
enemy artillery. This fire destroyed the enemy 105-mm. gun.
At 0715 on the morning of 20 December the 2d Squadron,
less Troop G, moved out and immediately came under heavy fire from
enemy forces that had dug in underneath houses and behind small pieces
of cover along the road. The squadron eliminated these pockets of
resistance by direct fire and by flanking movements on both sides of
the highway. At 1200 the 2d Squadron forced the Japanese off a ridge
which was just east of the highway and about 500 yards north of
Kananga. The squadron then [345]encountered heavy rifle and
machine gun fire that came from a coconut grove and some houses about
200 yards south of the ridge.
In the meantime, the 1st Squadron, at 0830, moved south
to support the attack of the 2d Squadron. At about 1230, the 1st
Squadron arrived behind the ridge occupied by the 2d Squadron and then
continued south, at 1500, seizing and completely dominating a ridge
about fifty yards east of Kananga. The 2d Squadron and a platoon from
the 1st Squadron attacked north, parallel to the highway, and by
nightfall cleaned out the coconut grove and set up a night
perimeter.
General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry
Division, said of the 12th Cavalry:
As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of the
12th Cavalry Regiment, elements of the Division are within 2,500 yards
of making contact with forward elements of the 77th Division.
Considering the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength
by the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, the display
of courage, stamina, and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is a
credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry.52
During the night General Mudge ordered the 12th Cavalry
to move out at 0800 21 December, seize Kananga, and then make physical
contact with the 77th Division, which was pushing north from Libongao.
He attached the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, to the 12th Cavalry.
Juncture of Forces
On the morning of 21 December the 1st and 2d
Squadrons of the 12th Cavalry, supported by the 271st Field Artillery
Battalion, moved out in a co-ordinated assault against Kananga. The 1st
Squadron attacked from the north while the 2d Squadron drove in from
the ridge on the east. The first elements of the regiment reached
Kananga at 1157 and by 1425 the 12th Cavalry was in the town. The
regiment methodically cleared out every hut, ferreted out each
Japanese, and destroyed every installation. While the mopping up was
going on, patrols from the 12th Cavalry pushed to the south to make
contact with the 77th Division.
The regimental commander ordered the commander of the 3d
Battalion, 306th Infantry, to push east at 0730 on 21 December along
the Palompon road to the juncture of the road with Highway 2 and then
turn north for 1,000 yards and attempt to establish contact with the
1st Cavalry Division. The 3d Battalion moved out on time, and within
fifteen minutes reached the road junction and turned north. The
battalion had gone only 200 yards north when its left-flank company
came under intense fire from a ridge overlooking the road. The 2d
Battalion complied with orders from the regimental commander to
“put out something” on the 3d Battalion’s left flank
and sent out one rifle company to envelop the enemy position. This move
relieved the pressure to some extent but the advance was still slow and
costly.
In the meantime, the 307th Infantry reached the road
junction at 0800, having advanced without incident. With the slowing up
of the 306th Infantry, General Bruce ordered the commander of the 307th
Infantry Regiment to send forward additional troops. The 2d Battalion,
307th Infantry, and the Cannon and Antitank Companies of the regiment
were sent to the front to reinforce the 306th Infantry. This maneuver
[346]was successful and the attacking forces pushed
forward.
At 1645, the 306th Infantry and Troop A of the 12th
Cavalry made physical contact. At 1115 on 22 December, Col. John H.
Stadler, the commanding officer of the 12th Cavalry, representing
General Mudge, met General Bruce at a bridge south of Kananga. The X
and XXIV Corps had joined hands. Highway 2 was at long last open for
its entire distance from Ormoc to Pinamopoan.53
The Ormoc Valley, in which the Japanese had so
tenaciously resisted the American advance, was now securely in the
hands of the Sixth Army. The northern and southern prongs of the trap
had closed. There remained only Palompon as an exit for the Japanese
forces. To the securing of that port, the X and XXIV Corps, acting in
concert, could concentrate their main efforts. Plans had been readied.
The Sixth Army was poised in a position from which it could drive
westward to the sea and bring the Leyte campaign to a successful
conclusion. [347]
1 XXIV
Corps FO 37, 18 Dec 44. ↑
2 Sixth
Army G-2 Wkly Rpt 68, 13 Dec 44, p. 14. ↑
3 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
4 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to CG 77th Div, 13 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 13 Dec
44. ↑
5 Msg,
CG XXIV Corps to G-3 Sixth Army, 14 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 14 Dec
44. ↑
6 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 24–25; 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5;
305th Inf Unit Rpt 11, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 16 Dec
44; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Dec 44. ↑
7 XXIV
Corps FO 37 (Confirmatory of Oral and Fragmentary Orders), 18 Dec 44;
77th Div FO 17, 15 Dec 44. ↑
8 77th
Div FO 17, 15 Dec 44. ↑
9 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
10 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 16 Dec 44; 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 25; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
6. ↑
11
306th Inf Unit Jnl, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 16 Dec 44;
77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 24–25; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
9. ↑
12 MI
Div, War Dept, “Leyte Field Fortifications,” Tactical
and Technical Trends, No. 57 (April, 1945), pp.
108–10. ↑
13
35th Army Opns, pp. 99–101. ↑
15 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 26, 27. ↑
16 77th
Div FO 18, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
25–26. ↑
17 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt
Leyte, p. 27; 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt
23, 17 Dec 44. ↑
18 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3
Periodic Rpt 23, 17 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9; 35th
Army Opns, pp. 101–103. ↑
19 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
20
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7; 77th Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
5–6; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 27;
77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 23, 17 Dec 44. ↑
22 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
23
305th Inf Unit Rpt 15, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div
G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 18 Dec 44; 305th Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 28. ↑
24
306th Inf Unit Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div
G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 9–10; 77th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 28; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 18 Dec
44. ↑
25 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 18 Dec 44; 307th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p.
28. ↑
26
Sixth Army FO 39, 19 Dec 44. ↑
27 XXIV
Corps FO 38 (Confirmatory of Oral and Fragmentary orders), 21 Dec
44. ↑
28 77th
Div FO 19, 19 Dec 44. ↑
30 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 25, 19 Dec 44; 307th
Inf Unit Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. ↑
31
306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10; 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 29; 77th Div G-3
Periodic Rpt 25, 19 Dec 44. ↑
32 77th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 26, 20 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 31;
77th Div G-2 Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 307th Inf
Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7–8; 307th Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Dec
44. ↑
33
306th Inf FO 11, 19 Dec 44. ↑
34 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 30–31; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 77th
Div G-2 Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns
Rpt Leyte, pp. 10–11; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 26, 20 Dec
44. ↑
35
35th Army Opns, pp. 103–104. ↑
36
306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 11–12; 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Dec
44. During this action Pfc. George Benjamin, Jr., a radio operator from
Company A, killed the crew of a machine gun nest at the cost of his
life. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. ↑
37 32d
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 30, 16 Dec 44. ↑
38 32d
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 31, 17 Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 126th
Inf Unit Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 31, 17 Dec
44. ↑
39 32d
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 32, 18 Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 126th
Inf Unit Jnl, 18 Dec 44. ↑
40 32d
Div Arty Daily Rpt, 18 Dec 44. ↑
41 32d
Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 33, 19 Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 126th
Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Dec 44. ↑
42 X
Corps FO 22, 20 Dec 44. ↑
43 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 102d
Division on Leyte and Cebu, Interrog of Maj Chuji Kaneko, p.
3. ↑
44
Unless otherwise stated the part of this subsection dealing with the
12th Cavalry is based on: 12th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 20–30,
76–85; 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 51–63, 10–22 Dec
44; and 12th Cav Unit Rpts 54–65, 11–22 Dec
44. ↑
45 1st
Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 52; 1st Cav Div FO 17, 10 Dec
44. ↑
46 12th
Cav Unit Rpt 53, 10 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 52, 11 Dec 44.
The spelling of Mt. Cabungaan used here follows that of the maps
employed by the combat troops. The Board of Geographic Names gives the
spelling as Mt. Cabungangan. ↑
47 12th
Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24. ↑
48 12th
Cav Unit Rpt 54, 11 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 53, 12 Dec
44. ↑
49 1st
Cav FO 18, 14 Dec 44. ↑
50 1st
Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 60, 19 Dec 44. ↑
51 1st
Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 61, 20 Dec 44; X Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 59, 19
Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl,
19 Dec 44. ↑
52 1st
Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 62, 21 Dec 44. ↑
53 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 27, 21 Dec 44; 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 31–32; 307th Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Dec 44;
307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Dec 44; 306th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 11–12. ↑
CHAPTER XXI
Westward to the Sea
The co-ordinated pressure exerted from the north
and south on the Japanese forces in the Ormoc area had compelled the
commander of the 35th Army to make successive changes in his
plans. General Suzuki had abandoned the aerial and ground assault
against the Burauen airfields, transferred the field base of the
35th Army from Ormoc to Palompon and, finally, had found it
necessary to order the remaining Japanese units on Leyte to retreat to
the hills behind Ormoc Valley. General Tomochika said afterward,
“The best that the 35th Army could do from then on was to
hold out as long as possible.”1
The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay
provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest
coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for
escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the
terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low
hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south.
The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon
grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were
gradually supplanted by dense forests.
Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an
auxiliary port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of
the road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to
join Highway 2 near Libongao. (Map 23) It was
this road junction that the X and XXIV Corps had seized. The Palompon
road, as it was called, followed the lower slopes of the hills until
the flat interior valley floor was reached. The confining hills were
steep-sided with many knife-edged crests.2 Such was
the area into which the forces of the Sixth Army had driven remnants of
the Japanese 35th Army.
When the 77th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry
Division joined forces on 21 December just south of Kananga, Highway 2
between Ormoc and Pinamopoan was opened to the Americans. The Sixth
Army, anxious to deliver the coup de grâce, arranged its
troops for a four-division thrust to the west coast on a long front. In
the south the 77th Division was to drive west along the Palompon road.
To its right (north) there would be, from left to right, the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 32d and 24th Infantry Divisions. The Sixth
Army had started the Leyte Campaign with two corps on a four-division
front and was ending its part in the campaign with two corps on a
four-division front. [348]
Damon
OPENING THE PALOMPON ROAD
22–31 December 1944
The 77th Division Goes West
Overwater to Palompon3
Guerrillas had informed General Bruce that the
bridges on the road that wound through the mountains from the vicinity
of Libongao to Palompon either were intact or could be quickly
repaired. General Bruce decided to verify this by having an engineer
patrol work with the guerrillas and by having a reconnaissance made
over the area in a cub plane. On 19 December General Bruce directed
that a fast-moving force be organized to operate along the road to
Palompon. The engineers later informed him that because of the
condition of many of the bridges it would be impossible to send an
advance column along the road.4 [349]
On 21 December General Hodge, anticipating the juncture
of the X and XXIV Corps, ordered the 77th Division to be prepared after
that event to move rapidly west and seize the Palompon area.5 On 22 December General Krueger, acting on a
recommendation that had been made by General Bruce through General
Hodge,6 informed Admiral Kinkaid that it might be
possible to expedite the capture of Palompon by having an infantry
battalion, utilizing amphibian vehicles and LCM’s, make an
amphibious movement from Ormoc to the vicinity of Palompon. He
therefore asked Admiral Kinkaid if naval support to escort and guide
this movement could be furnished for either the night of 23–24 or
that of 24–25 December. If possible, the amphibious force should
have a destroyer escort.7 Admiral Kinkaid stated, in
reply, that because of preparations for other operations it would be
“most difficult” to provide a destroyer escort but that he
could furnish a PT escort which he believed would be sufficient
protection.8 This was satisfactory to General Krueger and
he ordered the XXIV Corps to make plans for the amphibious
movement.9 In turn General Hodge told General Bruce to
prepare for the operation.
On 22 December, General Bruce put his plan into
operation. The 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, was to make the
amphibious landing in the vicinity of Palompon while the 2d and 3d
Battalions were to proceed west along the Palompon road, after moving
in trucks from Valencia to the Palompon road near the Togbong River.
Previously, on 21 December, Battery A of the 531st Field Artillery
Battalion (155-mm. gun) was brought with a great deal of effort to a
position near San Jose from which it could fire on Palompon, which the
guerrillas and civilians had received instructions to
evacuate.10
The 1st Battalion was to commence loading at 1400 on 23
December at Ormoc. The convoy was to be protected en route by patrol
torpedo boats and close air support. Upon arriving at Palompon at 0500
on 25 December, the mortar-firing LCM’s were to bombard the shore
before the assault forces moved in. Beginning 23 December, the
artillery of the 77th Division was to bombard Palompon and to continue
as long as Lt. Col. James E. Landrum, the task force commander, desired
it.11
The 1st Battalion was to move ashore on the beach about
1,500 yards north of Palompon with Companies C and B in assault,
Company C on the left. Its mission was to destroy the enemy force in
Palompon and then turn north.12
In support of the proposed landing, aircraft from the
Fifth Air Force bombed Palompon on 23 December. The results were
“hot stuff,” an overenthusiastic observer reported,
claiming that “only half of two houses were left standing in the
whole town.”13
On 23 December, the reinforced 1st Battalion moved to
Ormoc to prepare for the amphibious landing and at 1930 on 24
[350]December the troops embarked.14 The
convoy departed at 2000. The vessels included, in addition to the
mechanized landing craft, the LVT’s of the 718th and 536th
Amphibian Tractor Battalions. They made the tedious ten-hour trip
without incident as far as enemy action was concerned, although three
of the LVT’s “sank owing to mechanical failure.”
PALOMPON AFTER ALLIED BOMBINGS. Note bomb
craters in foreground.
The vessels took position off the landing beaches on the
morning of 25 December. After the 155-mm. guns of the 531st Field
Artillery Battalion had fired from positions near San Jose, twelve and
a half miles east of Palompon, the mortar boats of the 2d Engineer
Special Brigade softened up the beaches. The landing waves then started
for the shore, the first wave landing at 0720 and the last one at 0755.
They received no hostile fire.
“Meanwhile,” wrote General Bruce, “the
Division Commander could stand it no longer and called for a plane,
flew soon after daylight across the mountains and seaward, located the
amphibious forces still at [351]sea, … witnessed the preparatory
fires by the 155-mm. guns and that from the mortar boats … saw them
going in … and advance to the beach. (He obeyed a rather boyish
impulse and flew from 25 to 50 feet above the heads of the troops in
the assault boats and leaned out, giving a boxer’s victory sign
with both hands.)”15
The troops quickly organized on the beach. A light fast
armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any
Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task
force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which
fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island
to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the
battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as
Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south.
The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great
satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the
Commanding General, XXIV Corps: “The 77th Infantry
Division’s Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the
capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all
grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season
of the Feast of Lights.”16 The 1st Battalion
received “warm congratulations and thanks” from General
Krueger.17
The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the
vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was
Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out
patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of
the 305th Infantry. On 30 December, Company C made a reconnaissance in
force and an amphibious landing at Abijao, about seven miles north of
Palompon. The company overcame some Japanese resistance and burned down
the town to prevent its reoccupation. It then pushed 1,300 yards north
and established radio contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division, which had pushed through the mountains to the vicinity of
Villaba.18
The Palompon Road
The Palompon road wound through the mountains and
crossed many rivers, over which some forty bridges would have to be
built or repaired. It ran northwest two and a half miles from the
Togbong River to the barrio of Humaybunay and then cut sharply to the
southwest for about four miles to Matagob, at which point it went into
the hills almost directly south for about 2,000 yards, and then turned
south-southwest for 1,000 yards. At this point it turned and twisted to
the southwest for approximately five and a half miles to the vicinity
of San [352]Miguel, from where it arched 3,500 yards to
Look, on the Camotes Sea.
The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area
surrounding it with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes
under the houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the
hills, the enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on
both sides of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of
these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and
widened to six feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine
guns in culverts and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut
log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost
invisible installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in
on the forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel.
It had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight
miles of the road to the north and east could be observed.
The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment was the
principal enemy unit in the sector, although remnants of other units
retreating west from Highway 2 were in the area. The following Japanese
units were identified: 1st, 3d, and 6th Batteries
of the 8th Field Artillery Regiment; elements of the 8th
Division Signal Unit; the 8th Transport Regiment; and the
8th Engineer Regiment. Although intelligence officers estimated
that there were between 2,000 and 3,000 enemy troops in the sector,
only a force of about battalion strength opposed the 305th Infantry.
The rest had scattered into the hills to the northwest.
At 0700, on 22 December, the 2d Battalion, 305th
Infantry, left Valencia followed at 1035 by the 3d Battalion. The 2d
Battalion crossed the Togbong River, moved through the 1st Battalion,
306th Infantry, and at 1030 attacked along the Palompon road. The
battalion had advanced 1,600 yards northwest by 1230 and secured the
Pagsangahan River crossing. The assault continued with the 3d Battalion
coming up on the right flank of the 2d. The battalions moved through
rice paddies and through Humaybunay and established a night perimeter
about one mile southwest of the barrio.
The 302d Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the
assault battalions, fought the “battle of
bridges.”19 The engineers worked around the clock,
frequently without any infantry protection, to restore the bridges as
soon as possible. The bridges were to be sufficiently strengthened
initially to support 2½-ton truck traffic for infantry supply,
then they were to be reinforced to carry 20 tons in order to bring
M8’s forward, and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry the
M10’s. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient Bailey bridges
could be made available for important crossings to carry traffic while
engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited
number of Bailey bridges were furnished, however, and engineer progress
to the west was slowed down.20
The assault battalions of the 305th Infantry that were
astride the Palompon road spent a quiet night. They had before them the
enemy’s strongly fortified positions at Matagob. At 0830 on 23
December, the 2d Battalion moved out, followed at 1130 by the 3d
Battalion. The 2d Battalion moved forward west of the road while the 3d
advanced east of the road. Intermittent enemy rifle fire fell upon the
2d Battalion but it pushed ahead steadily. At 1500, the 2d Battalion
[353]was 500 yards beyond Matagob and the 3d was 300
yards behind the 2d. The troops came under heavy fire from two enemy
75-mm. guns on the hills west of Matagob and suffered several
casualties. The mortars and artillery with the 305th Infantry silenced
the Japanese guns. The regimental commander issued orders for the
battalions to move out for the assault at 1000 on the following day
against the regimental objective, a road bend that was 2,000 yards to
its front. The 2d Battalion set up its night perimeter in place while
the 3d Battalion withdrew to a point 1,000 yards east of Matagob. The
regimental command post moved from Humaybunay to the 3d Battalion
perimeter.21
During the night the Japanese made several attempts to
penetrate the American lines. The 3d Battalion destroyed a demolition
squad that entered its position, while the 2d Battalion beat back one
attack at 0245 and another one, which was accompanied by mortar fire,
at 0630. The 305th Infantry killed an estimated 100 Japanese with no
casualties to the regiment.22
At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off.
The Japanese resistance was light and intermittent, but American
progress was slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the
enemy had established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves.
Since it was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had
to clear each one before the advance could continue. The force received
some artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical
Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set
up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During the
night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the
defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed.23
At 0800 on 25 December the attack was renewed, but made
very slow progress. The enemy, dug in in small pockets along the road,
resisted stubbornly. The 3d Battalion advanced 200 yards and was pinned
down by machine gun, mountain gun, and rifle fire. The 2d Battalion
attempted to envelop the enemy strong point on the Japanese right
(south) flank but was repulsed.24
On 26 December the regiment limited its activity to
patrolling. Since it was Christmas Day in the States, “All guns
of the Division Artillery fired … at … 1200 as a salute to the
nation on Christmas Day. This was followed by one minute of silent
prayer for the dead and wounded of the 77th Division.”25 That night General Bruce ordered the troops to
build bonfires and sing, and employ other ruses in the hope that the
Japanese might believe that the troops were celebrating Christmas and
might therefore try to enter the defensive perimeters. These ruses were
unsuccessful in the sectors of the assault battalions, but a similar
one employed in the area of the regimental command post attracted some
Japanese patrols, which were either destroyed or driven off.
At dawn on 27 December the 3d Battalion moved around the
Japanese left flank toward the high ground six hundred yards from the
line of departure. Despite enemy artillery and machine gun fire and the
difficult terrain, the battalion reached the objective, killing 160
Japanese. The remainder fled to the hills. [354]
When it became apparent that the Japanese resistance was
strong and determined and might unduly delay the progress of the 305th
Infantry, General Bruce decided to move the 2d Battalion of the
regiment overwater to the vicinity of Palompon at the western terminus
of the road. The 2d Battalion could then attack east along the road
while the 3d Battalion continued the attack west. The Japanese
defenders would thus be under fire on their front and rear. This
eastern attack force, which was called the Provisional Mountain Force,
moved to Ormoc and thence, after arrangements had been made with the
naval representatives of Krueger’s staff, overwater by
LCM’s to Palompon. It arrived at the latter without incident at
1500 on 28 December. On the same day the 3d Battalion, reinforced,
continued the attack westward. The Japanese resisted strongly with
small arms fire from pillboxes and with artillery. The 3d Battalion
advanced approximately 1,000 yards during the day.26
At 0800 on 29 December, the 3d Battalion moved out. The
battalion had advanced 650 yards at 1000 when it encountered very
determined resistance from an enemy force in very well camouflaged,
dug-in positions. The troops were pinned down for the rest of the day.
The Provisional Mountain Force moved out of Look at 1200 to a position
from which it could launch its assault eastward along the road.
At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along
the Palompon road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional
Mountain Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only
scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from
well-entrenched positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a
point about four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun
fire along the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high
ground overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The
3d Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted it
the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards
southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in
the road and could fire directly on the advancing American troops.
Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it
was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others
intact.27
During the night, the Japanese force withdrew; only
scattered troops were left to delay the advance. At 0800 on 31
December, the assault forces of the 305th Infantry resumed the attack,
and encountered only sporadic rifle fire. At 1225 at a point two miles
northeast of San Miguel the 3d Battalion and the Provisional Mountain
Force met. This ended all organized resistance along the Palompon road
and secured an overland route from Highway 2 in the Ormoc Valley to
Palompon on the west coast.28 The 77th Division made the
astounding estimate that for the period from 21 through 31 December
1944, it had killed 5,779 Japanese, taken 29 prisoners, and had lost 17
men killed, 116 wounded, and 6 missing in action.29
X Corps Goes West
Meanwhile, to the north of the 77th Division,
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32d Infantry Division had
turned [355]off Highway 2 and were pushing over the
mountains to the west coast.30
The 1st Cavalry Division
With the clearing of Highway 2 and the junction of
the X and XXIV Corps at a point just south of Kananga, the 1st Cavalry
Division was in readiness to push toward the west coast in conjunction
with assaults by the 77th Division on its left and the 32d Division on
its right. The troops were on a 2,500-yard front along Highway 2
between Kananga and Lonoy.
On the morning of 23 December the assault units of the
1st Cavalry Division moved out from the highway and started west. None
encountered any resistance. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, established
a night perimeter on a ridge about 1,400 yards slightly northwest of
Kananga. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, set up a night perimeter 1,000
yards north of that of the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, while the 1st
Squadron, 7th Cavalry, dug in for the night on a line with the other
two squadrons.
This first day’s march set the pattern for the
next several days. The regiments pushed steadily forward, meeting only
scattered resistance. The chief obstacles were waist-deep swamps in the
zone of the 12th Cavalry. These were waded on 24 December. The tangled
vegetation and sharp, precipitous ridges that were henceforward
encountered also made the passage slow and difficult.
On 28 December, the foremost elements of the 5th and
12th Cavalry Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the
barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao.
(See Map 2.) By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry
was also on the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had
encountered and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy,
most of whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at
Villaba, two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in
securing the town killed thirty-five Japanese.
During the early morning hours of 31 December, the
Japanese launched four counterattacks against the forces at Villaba.
Each started with a bugle call, the first attack beginning at 0230 and
the final one at dawn. An estimated 500 of the enemy, armed with
mortars, machine guns, and rifles, participated in the assaults, but
the American artillery stopped the Japanese and their forces scattered.
On 31 December, the 77th Division began to relieve the elements of the
1st Cavalry Division, which moved back to Kananga.
On the morning of the 30th of December, the 7th Cavalry
had made physical contact northeast of Villaba with the 127th Infantry,
32d Division, which had been driving to the west coast north of the 1st
Cavalry Division.
The 32d Division
On 22 December the 127th Infantry had reached
Lonoy and made contact with the 7th Cavalry. On the following day the
troops rested.31 The 128th Infantry had been [356]engaged in sending out patrols throughout the
Limon area from 11 to 18 December. These patrols were successful in
wiping out pockets of resistance that had been bypassed by the advance
forces of the 32d Division in the division’s drive along Highway
2 to the south. On 20 December, the 128th received orders from General
Gill to prepare for a move to the west coast.32
Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent
out patrols on 23 December to reconnoiter the terrain. At 0800 on 24
December the two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the
march to the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who
put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost
impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance.
The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the
hills encountered on 24 December:
The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a
mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out,
the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the
side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this
almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves
up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first
descent to the first possible bivouac area.33
The hills were less rugged from then on. On the morning
of 25 December, the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, encountered and
dispersed 300 to 400 Japanese. Throughout the march both regiments
received supplies by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory
since none of the drops was made at the requested time and frequently
there was a wide scattering of supplies.
On the afternoon of 29 December the two regiments were
on their objectives: the 128th Infantry on the high ground overlooking
Tabango and Campopo Bays and the 127th Infantry on the high ground
overlooking Antipolo Point, approximately three miles to the south.
Patrols were sent out to scout the terrain and establish contact with
the 1st Cavalry Division on the south and with the 24th Infantry
Division on the north.34
The 24th Infantry Division35
The 24th Division, after having been relieved by
the 32d Division on Breakneck Ridge, had protected the rear areas on a
trail leading from Jaro to Ormoc. Two weeks before the march to the
west coast a large Japanese convoy had been attacked by U. S. aircraft
and forced into San Isidro Bay on the northern part of the west coast.
Although the vessels were destroyed, some of the troops were able to
get ashore. On 9 December they headed toward Calubian, on Leyte Bay
about six miles northeast of San Isidro. General Woodruff, who had
replaced General Irving on 18 November, ordered Colonel
Clifford’s 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been defending
Kilay Ridge, to wipe out the part of the enemy force that had landed at
San Isidro and fled northeastward to the vicinity of Calubian.
[357]
At 2300 on 21 December, Colonel Clifford notified
Colonel Dahlen, the commanding officer of the 34th Infantry, that a
Japanese force of about 160 men was at Tuktuk, about four miles south
of Calubian. He added that at 0800 on the following morning the 1st
Battalion would move out and destroy the force.
At 0300 a force consisting of a platoon from Company C
and a platoon from Company A moved toward the high ground northwest of
Tuktuk in preparation for the assault, but because of very poor trails
the force was delayed. In the meantime four LVT’s with a platoon
of mortars moved overwater to Tuktuk. At 0830 the attack started, with
machine guns mounted on the LVT’s and mortars furnishing
supporting fire. The Japanese resistance was sporadic, although some
mortar fire was received. As the troops of the 34th Infantry neared the
barrio, the enemy defenders broke and fled, and the town was deserted
as the soldiers entered. Approximately thirty enemy dead were counted
in the barrio and vicinity. The fleeing enemy force was later destroyed
by patrols that worked over the sector. The Japanese had obviously been
looting because linens, silverware, and women’s clothing were
found in their packs. One soldier had a baby’s high chair tied on
the top of his pack.
On 23 December, Col William W. Jenna, former commanding
officer of the 34th Infantry, returned from sick leave in the States
and assumed command of the 34th Infantry. With his arrival plans were
expedited to clean up the northwestern end of the Leyte peninsula in
conjunction with the assaults of other units of the Sixth Army.
From 23 to 26 December, extensive patrolling was
conducted along the west coast of the Leyte peninsula. On 26 December
the 34th Infantry issued orders for clearing the part of the Leyte
peninsula in its zone. The 1st Battalion was to secure all trails and
high ground in the interior, prevent any enemy movement to the north
and to the east, and, finally, be prepared to assist the 2d Battalion
in the capture of the San Isidro Bay area.
At 2245 on 26 December the LCM’s at Villalon (a
barrio on Biliran Strait and about six miles northwest of Calubian)
began to load Companies F and G. By 2300 the embarkation was completed
and the craft moved to Gigantangan Island, arriving there fifteen
minutes after midnight. The troops disembarked and slept. At 0530 they
again embarked and proceeded to Taglawigan, arriving there at 0730.
After strafing the shore the companies landed, meeting no resistance.
At the same time Company F completed its assignment without opposition,
pushing east and south and encircling Taglawigan. Before noon, some
elements of the 2d Battalion were moving overland to Daha, about two
miles to the south, while others had re-embarked and were making an
overwater movement toward it. By noon Taglawigan and Daha had fallen to
the 2d Battalion.
Company G, reinforced, left Company F at Daha,
re-embarked on the landing craft, and headed toward the San Isidro Bay
area, 6,000 yards to the south. As the convoy neared San Isidro, it
came under machine gun fire from the barrio and the hills to the
southwest. A frontal attack on the town was abandoned and the landing
craft moved to the southwest of the jetty to make their landing. The
LVT’s mired in the mud about 100 to 150 yards offshore. The rest
of the force, which was in the LCM’s, waded ashore. Some of the
troops from the LVT’s met with great difficulty in trying to get
[358]ashore but the LVT’s finally succeeded in
retracting and picked them up. Approximately 150 soldiers with supplies
for the task force returned to Gigantangan Island. The convoy had only
one casualty.
In the meantime, the 1st Battalion had received orders
at 1300 to take San Isidro. The battalion moved overland from Calubian
and at nightfall it dug in on the high ground overlooking San
Isidro.
At 0800 on 28 December, the co-ordinated assault was
made against San Isidro, with elements of the 2d Battalion attacking
from the north while the 1st Battalion attacked from the east. The
troops encountered light resistance, the Japanese defenders being only
partially armed. Fifty-five of the enemy were killed and one prisoner
was taken. By 1230, the 1st Battalion was out-posting San Isidro.
With the capture of San Isidro, the last main point on
the Leyte peninsula was safely in the hands of the 34th Infantry. The
troops moved south along the coast and destroyed small, poorly equipped
groups of the enemy. One group of Japanese, whose only weapons were
bayonets attached to bamboo poles, tried hopelessly to break through
the lines.
On 1 January 1945, the 77th Division was ordered to
relieve the 32d and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry
Division. The relieved divisions were to move to staging areas and
prepare for future operations.
The Japanese Retreat
Condition of Japanese Forces
The morale and physical condition of the Japanese
Army were very low. With the juncture of the American X and XXIV Corps,
the 35th Army had begun to disintegrate. Desertion became
common. The wounded would not assemble with their units. The problem of
the wounded became serious since there were no proper facilities for
medical treatment. General Tomochika later said: “Commanders
employing persuasive language frequently requested seriously wounded
soldiers at the front to commit suicide; this was particularly common
among personnel of the 1st Division and it was pitiful. However
the majority died willingly. Only Japanese could have done a thing like
this and yet I could not bear to see the sight.”36
Those of the slightly wounded that could not march with
the able-bodied soldiers walked by themselves. They became separated
from their units and some, although able to do so, refused to rejoin
their outfits, giving their wounds as an excuse. In addition there were
deserters who fled to the hills. The 35th Army began the policy
of sending the slightly wounded back to the front lines. Many of the
service units, such as the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the air
corps ground crews, refused to fight since they were not trained as
combat troops. “Even the artillery and antiaircraft units
retreated without facing the enemy. Their excuse was that they were not
trained to fight as infantry and were useless without their
guns.”37
Doubtless, some of the unwillingness of the Japanese
service troops to serve on the front lines was due to their physical
condition. When the 1st Division arrived on Leyte on 1 November
it brought with it enough food and ammunition for one month, and by 1
December this supply was exhausted. On 3 December an additional
one-half month’s supply was brought in at Ormoc; [359]but
this was destroyed or captured by the 77th Division in its advance.
Consequently after the 1st of December all Japanese troops on Leyte
“were on a starvation diet and had to live off the
land.”38 The 1st and 57th Infantry
Regiments were the principal sufferers. The men were forced to eat
coconuts, various grasses, bamboo shoots, the heart fibers of coconut
tree trunks, and whatever native fruits or vegetables they could
forage. When the troops received orders to withdraw to the west coast
of Leyte, “they were literally in a starved condition, … many
instances occurred in which men vomited seven to ten times a day
because they could not digest some of the food due to their weakened
stomachs.”39
The 1st Division abandoned much equipment,
ammunition, and rations along the highway through the Ormoc Valley.
Many of the stragglers and deserters clothed and fed themselves with
the abandoned matériel. The chief of staff of the 35th
Army stated that when the Americans captured army headquarters, he
left the headquarters without any clothing. However, he picked up
“a new uniform and sufficient food while on the
road.”40
Withdrawal Plans
On 19 December, General Suzuki, the commander of
the 35th Army on Leyte, had received word from the 14th Area
Army in Manila that henceforth the 35th Army was to subsist
on its own resources and what it could obtain within its operational
area.41
On the same day, probably because of the information
received from Manila, General Suzuki ordered a conference of the staff
officers of the 1st and 102d Divisions. At this meeting,
General Suzuki ordered the 1st Division to retreat to the
northern sector of the Matagob area and the 102d Division to the
southern part of the same sector. At Matagob the divisions were to
reorganize for a counterattack. The order did not give any specific
time for the withdrawal; each division was to take action according to
the situation in its sector. On 20 December, General Suzuki moved his
headquarters farther west to a point approximately three and a half
miles north of Palompon.42
On 21 December, the 102d Division, which had
about 2,000 men, began to withdraw to the vicinity of Matagob. The
division, having failed to get in touch with the 35th Army,
moved to the west coast near Villaba, approximately ten miles north of
Palompon.43 It made contact with the 1st Division at
the end of December, and also with the 68th Infantry Brigade and
the 5th Infantry Regiment, which were already in that
sector.44 The 1st Division also began to withdraw
on 21 December, making the withdrawal in two columns. The southern
column consisted of about six hundred men of the 49th Infantry
Regiment, 1st Division Transport Regiment, and other units.
On its way west, it was met on 23 December by the 68th Brigade
which, unaware of the loss of the Ormoc road, was proceeding toward the
highway. The brigade joined the southern column, which reached the
Bagacay [360]sector the following day. (The barrio of Bagacay
is six miles northeast of Villaba.) The northern column also had about
six hundred men and consisted of elements of the Division
Headquarters, the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 57th
Infantry Regiment, and other units. The detachment was forced to
cut its way through dense jungle. On 25 December it was attacked by the
Americans and further decimated. That night the northern and southern
columns met at Bagacay and on the following day started towards
Matagob. On the 28th, following orders from General Suzuki, they turned
north and established defensive positions on the eastern slope of Mt.
Canguipot, two and a half miles southeast of Villaba.45
As the Japanese, pursued by the forces of the X and XXIV
Corps, spiritlessly retreated toward the mountains of western Leyte,
Imperial General Headquarters notified the Japanese people:
“Our forces are still holding the Burauen and San Pablo airfields
and continue to attack the enemy positions. Our forces are fighting
fiercely on the eastern mountain slopes near Ormoc and
Albuera.”46 [361]
1 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of 35th Army on Leyte, Part 1,
p. 24, Interrog of Maj Gen Yoshiharu Tomochika. ↑
2 Sixth
Army G-2 Wkly Rpt 69, 20 Dec 44, pp. 14–18. ↑
3
Unless otherwise indicated, this subsection dealing with the 77th
Division is based upon the following: 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
32–35; 77th Div Supp Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–8, 28–29;
77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 33–37, 27–31 Dec 44; 77th Div
G-2 Summary Leyte Campaign; 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7–8;
305th Inf Hist Rpt 1944, pp. 5–7; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 23–30
Dec 44; 77th Div Admin O 7, 24 Dec 44; 77th Div FO 20, 19 Dec 44; 77th
Div FO 22, 24 Dec 44; 1st Bn, 305th Inf, FO 3, 23 Dec 44; 305th Inf
Unit Jnl, 25 Dec 44–2 Jan 45. ↑
4 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
5 XXIV
Corps FO 38, 21 Dec 44. ↑
6 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
7 Rad,
CG Sixth Army to CTF 77, 22 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec
44. ↑
8 Msg,
CTF 77 to CG Sixth Army, 23 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 23 Dec
44. ↑
9 Memo
for Col Guerard, unsigned, 23 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 23 Dec
44. ↑
10 Ltr,
Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51, OCMH. ↑
11 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44. ↑
12 77th
Div FO’s 20 and 21, 19 Dec 44; 1st Bn, 305th Inf, FO 3, 23 Dec
44. ↑
13 Rad,
9th Air Liaison Party to Fifth Air Force, X Corp G-3 Jnl, 24 Dec
44. ↑
14 In
addition to the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, the Special Task Force
included: the Amphibian Tractor Company; Company A, 776th Amphibian
Tank Battalion; one platoon of Company D, 706th Tank Battalion; three
guns from the regimental Cannon Company; the 2d Platoon of Company A,
302d Engineer Battalion; a detachment from Company A, 302d Medical
Battalion; the 292d JASCO detachment; the 305th Field Artillery
Battalion; a detachment of the 306th Field Artillery Battalion; a
detachment from Battery A, 531st Field Artillery Battalion. 77th Div
Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 33. ↑
15 Maj
Gen A. D. Bruce, The Operations of the 77th Division in Leyte, 19
January 1951, pp. 27, 28, MS in OCMH. ↑
16 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44. ↑
17 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 26 Dec 44. It is possible that the weary soldiers were
more interested in the following administrative order of General
Bruce:
- 1. Supply
- a. Rations
- (1) Turkey ration—distribution from Valencia ration dump at
0900, 25 Dec 1944. Ration and mess personnel will exercise great care
and speed in handling turkey and keep covered at all times. - (2) Organization commanders will serve turkey to every man in this
command on 26 Dec 1944. The Division commander has made arrangements
for air drop to troops located in areas not accessible by road.
- (1) Turkey ration—distribution from Valencia ration dump at
- a. Rations
General Brace wished the troops to have turkey
on the same day that Christmas is observed in the States. 77th Div
Admin Order 7, 24 Dec 44. ↑
18 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 32–35 and Supplemental Opns Rpt, pp.
1–8, 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 26–30 Dec
44. ↑
19 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35. ↑
20 77th
Div and 305th Inf Opns Rpts Leyte; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec
44. ↑
21 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Dec 44; 305th Inf Opns
Rpt, p. 7. ↑
22 77th
Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Dec 44. ↑
23 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 36. ↑
24 77th
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 37; 77th G-3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44; 305th Inf Unit Rpt
No. 19, 25 Dec 44. ↑
25 77th
Div Supplemental Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. ↑
26
Ibid., p. 4; 305th Inf Supplemental Opns Rpt, p.
2. ↑
29 77th
Div G-1 Casualty Rpts; 77th Div Supplemental Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
2–7. ↑
30 The
subsection dealing with the elements of the 1st Cavalry Division is
based upon the following: 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 59–69;
1st Cav Div Supplementary Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–7; 1 Cav Div FO
No. 21, 24 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpts Nos. 65–84, 23
Dec 44–11 Jan 45; 1st Cav Div G-2 Periodic Rpts Nos. 64–75,
23 Dec 44–3 Jan 45; 5th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 28–29; 1st
Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 21–22; 1st Cav Div Brig Opns Rpt
Leyte, pp. 6–7; 12th Cav Unit Rpts Nos. 66–68, 23–25
Dec 44; 5th Cav S-3 Periodic Rpt 72, 2 Jan 45; 1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl,
26–31 Dec 44. Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte and 8th Army Opns Rpt
Leyte. ↑
31
127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. ↑
32
128th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 11. ↑
33
127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. ↑
34 32d
Div Supplementary Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1–5; 127th Inf Opns Rpt
Leyte, pp. 12–14; 32d Div Leyte Opn Diary, pp. 31–43; 128th
Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 10–12. ↑
35 The
material in this subsection is based upon 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.
73–76; 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 9–30 Dec 44; 34th Inf Unit Rpts
Nos. 51–71, 9–29 Dec 44; 2d Bn, 34th Inf, FO No. 8, 26 Dec
44; 34th Inf FO No. 17, 18 Dec 44; 34th Inf FO No. 18, 26 Dec 44; 24th
Div G-3 Periodic Rpts Nos. 45–67, 2–25 Dec 44; 24th Div FO
No. 12, 8 Dec 44 and FO No. 13, 17 Dec 44. ↑
36
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 28. ↑
38 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of the Japanese 35th Army on
Leyte, Interrog of Col Junkichi Okabayashi [CofS 1st Div] pp.
10–11. ↑
40
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 28. ↑
42
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 27. ↑
44 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Japanese 102d Division on
Leyte and Cebu, Interrog of Maj Chuji Kaneki [G-2 102d
Division], p. 5. ↑
45 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte,
Part IV, Col Junkichi Okabayashi, Opns of the 1st Division on
Leyte, p. 18. ↑
CHAPTER XXII
Leyte Is Liberated
On 15 December, General MacArthur had directed
General Eichelberger’s Eighth Army to be prepared to assume
control of nearly all Sixth Army units in the Leyte area at 0001 on 26
December 1944 in order to relieve the Sixth Army for future operations.
The Eighth Army was to relieve the Sixth of all duties and missions in
the area except certain ones dealing with logistics and construction.
These were assigned to the USASOS (SWPA). The Allied Naval and Air
Forces were directed to continue, in support of the Eighth Army, the
missions which hitherto had been specified for the Sixth.1
In furtherance of General MacArthur’s
instructions, General Krueger issued orders covering the transfer to
Eighth Army control of certain Sixth Army units. On 21 December he
named the units over which he was relinquishing control as of 0001, 26
December, and stated that the responsibility for continuing assigned
duties and missions in the area would then pass from him to the
Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, the Commanding General, USASOS
(SWPA), and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces.2
General Eichelberger, also, prepared orders for the
forthcoming transfer of authority. The supply and evacuation procedures
of the Sixth Army would remain in effect. The X and XXIV Corps would
“continue on their present assigned missions of destroying
Japanese wherever found, and … be prepared to conduct overland or
amphibious shore to shore operations to seize enemy supply points and
bases, and ports of entry.”3
On 25 December, when elements of the 77th Division had
seized Palompon, the last important port on Leyte, General MacArthur
declared that all organized resistance had ended. He said in a message
to General Krueger: “Heartiest congratulations on capture of
Palompon. This closes a campaign that has had few counterparts in the
utter destruction of the enemy’s forces with a maximum
conservation of our own. It has been a magnificent performance on the
part of all concerned.”4
The Eighth Army Assumes Control
On 26 December, General Eichelberger assumed
control of all combat units in the Leyte-Samar area. It was not until
the first part of January 1945 that the American troops secured the
west coast of Leyte. Thereafter only isolated pockets of enemy
resistance remained.
Assembly of Japanese Forces
On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding
the 14th Area Army, [362]notified General Suzuki, the
35th Army commander, that he had written off the Leyte Campaign
as a loss; henceforward the 35th Army on Leyte would be
self-sustaining and self-supporting, the units on Leyte would be
transferred to other areas, and, finally, the units on the island would
be assembled at a point from which raiding operations could be
conducted. Since these orders were ambiguous and apparently
contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the message be repeated but he
never received an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part of December,
he sent his chief of staff to Manila for further clarification of the
orders. The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way of Cebu, in late
January, but he was unable to obtain any further information for
General Suzuki.
The decision of General Yamashita to abandon the Leyte
operation followed a series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th of
December, he canceled an optimistic plan for an amphibious assault
through the shallow waters of Carigara Bay against Carigara, an assault
that had been scheduled for 16 December. This cancellation followed the
sighting of an Allied convoy en route to Mindoro.5 The
convoy reached Mindoro and the troops landed successfully on 15
December. On 19 December, two days prior to the junction of the X and
XXIV Corps on Highway 2, General Yamashita told General Suzuki that he
could no longer send any reinforcements and supplies to Leyte and that
the 35th Army would have to become self-supporting. On the same
day, General Yamashita assigned to the defense of Luzon three divisions
that Imperial General Headquarters had earmarked for Leyte.
Shortly afterward, at a conference with representatives from the
Southern Army and Imperial General Headquarters, the
representative from the latter told General Yamashita to forget the
Leyte operation.
In the meantime, General Suzuki interpreted his orders
to mean that units of the 35th Army would assemble at a common
point at which they could be self-supporting. He had selected the
western area of Matagob-Palompon in the vicinity of the road leading
from Highway 2 at Libongao over the mountains to Palompon on the west
coast. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of
communications and the army headquarters was to have been established
at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th
Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army
headquarters.6 He then selected as a base of operations an
area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was
about three kilometers north of Villaba.
The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about
1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western
slopes that made it “a natural fortress.” From it one could
command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu
to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and
coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The
area “was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive
action.”7 General Suzuki ordered the units of the
35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the
vicinity of the new base of operations. [363]
The units continued to straggle westward towards the
selected area. By 1 January, most of them had taken up positions in the
Balanac sector, which was about three and a half miles southeast of
Villaba and overlooked the Palompon road. They had been hard pressed.
The 68th Brigade and the 1st Division made contact and
successfully concentrated south of Villaba in early January. The
12th Independent Regiment (the Imahori Detachment), the
Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment
and the remaining troops of the 77th Infantry Regiment, which
had been operating northeast of Ormoc, reached the southern Matagob
area about the middle of January. It was not until the beginning of
February that these units made contact with the 35th Army. The
few remaining elements of the 16th Division stayed in the
vicinity of Valencia until the end of February. The 26th
Division also remained in this area until the middle of January,
when it moved west and established contact with the 35th
Army.8
The 102d Division presented certain difficulties.
There had been instances of forty to fifty deserters fleeing to Cebu or
Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were
apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been
out of touch with Lt. Gen. Shimpei Fukue, the commanding general of the
102d Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of
Suzuki’s officers learned that Fukue was planning to evacuate to
Cebu. General Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that
Fukue “was violating the military code in taking these steps
without consent.” He thereupon sent the following message to
Fukue: “Lt. General Fukue and his headquarters will remain in
Leyte and at the same time I am attaching other units and groups in the
Visayan and Mindanao sectors to your Division. General Fukue and his
Chief of Staff will report to me in person at Army Headquarters.”
The commander of the 102d Division did not answer but his chief
of staff sent the following reply: “We appreciate the efforts of
Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat.
The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army
Headquarters.”9
General Suzuki was “entirely displeased”
with the reaction of Fukue and sent his chief of staff, General
Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he
found that Fukue, with his chief of staff and some headquarters
personnel, had already left for Cebu. This fact was communicated to
General Suzuki by Tomochika, who states that “for several days I
had a difficult time in consoling the general.”10 The
sequel to these events was that General Suzuki relieved General Fukue
of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received
further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of
1945, Fukue was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. General
Suzuki asked Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo for
authority to court-martial General Fukue; no reply was forthcoming.
General Fukue was released and later returned to command of the 102d
Division.11
In the meantime, the leaderless 102d Division,
with a strength of approximately 2,000 men, crossed Highway 2 north of
Libongao and reached the southern area of [364]Matagob about 24
December. The troops failed to contact the 35th Army and after
remaining for a short time at Matagob moved to the vicinity of
Villaba.
The units that arrived on the west coast were much
understrength and very poorly equipped. All artillery had been lost.
There were only five to ten machine guns per regiment in addition to
individual weapons. Each man had an average of sixty rounds of
ammunition and several hand grenades.
On the 30th of December, General Yamashita sent the
following message to General Suzuki:
Sixty days have already elapsed since the American
forces invaded Leyte Island, during which period the Thirty-fifth
Army, under the forceful leadership of its commander, has waged
many a heroic battle against superior enemy forces and in the face of
numerous difficulties. The Army gave a great blow to the enemy.
Moreover, the Thirty-fifth Army by containing the opposing enemy
for this long period of time deprived him of freedom of action for the
coming operation, thereby facilitating the general conduct of our
operations in this battle and rendering great services to our cause. I
am deeply impressed, particularly with the fact that the Takachiho
Unit captured the hostile airfield at BURAUEN after the
Thirty-fifth Army, despite its inferiority in equipment and
number of men, and the stoppage of supply, made a timely and resolute
attack against the enemy with the commander himself leading them.
However, the enemy, who has increased his material power and war
potential, now threatens, solely on the strength of his material
superiority, to bear down on Luzon Island despite the heroic and
desperate efforts of our sea and air forces as well as of the
Thirty-fifth Army. In view of the sudden change in the
situation, we shall seek and destroy our enemy on Luzon Island, thereby
doing our part in the heroic struggle of the Army and avenging many a
valiant warrior who fell before the enemy. As munitions have not been
supplied adequately, I cannot keep back tears of remorse for tens of
thousands of our officers and men fighting in Leyte Island.
Nevertheless, I must impose a still harder task upon you. Please try to
understand my intentions. They say it is harder to live than to die.
You officers and men, be patient enough to endure the hardships of
life, and help guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne
through eternal resistance to the enemy, and be ready to meet your
death calmly for our beloved country. I sincerely instruct you as
above.12
General Suzuki took steps to make the force on Leyte
self-supporting. In January 1945, he established two principles for his
troops. First, the troops were to utilize as much of the local food and
material as possible and plant sweet potatoes and Indian corn. Second,
all provisions in the area outside of the operation base were to be
purchased. The execution of the first part of his first precept worked
reasonably well but the constant American air raids and mopping-up
operations prevented the Japanese from being too successful in planting
and harvesting the corn and potatoes. They were also not very fortunate
in purchasing supplies from outside the area, although some supplies
were obtained each time the men could pass through the American
protective screen.
The Japanese arrived on the western shores of Leyte at
the end of the harvest season. They secured large quantities of
provisions which the Filipinos had stored and also a great number of
coconuts and sweet potatoes. The soldiers used the carabaos of the
island as meat and obtained salt from sea water. For vegetables, the
army’s chief reliance was upon wild ferns, tokay grass, and wild
spinach. [365]
In conclusion, “although there was not enough food
to increase the fighting power of the Army, no one died of starvation
and some units stored enough supplies for two to three
months.”13
The Mop-up
By the end of December, most of the enemy troops
were in northwest Leyte, west of Highway 2 and north of Palompon.
Another large enemy concentration was located in the hills south of
Palompon.14
The mop-up of any operation is dangerous, difficult, and
unglamorous, but it is highly essential. The activities of the 7th
Division on Leyte during January and February 1945 are typical of the
large-scale mop-up in which many small units are sent out daily in all
directions. This division was assigned all of the west coast area south
of a line from Palompon to Valencia. Its records state that the
division “sent out as many as forty combat patrols daily to hunt
down and destroy thousands of Japanese stragglers wandering throughout
the area.”15
Eight divisions were engaged in mopping up for varying
lengths of time on Leyte, but only an outline of their activities will
be attempted here. The operation may be divided into three phases: XXIV
Corps activities from 1 January to 15 February 1945; X Corps activities
from 1 January to 24 February 1945; and Eighth Army Area Command
operations from 24 February to 8 May 1945.16
During the XXIV Corps phase, the 11th Airborne Division
encountered an enemy force well dug in on the southern slopes of Mt.
Majunag, five miles northwest of Burauen. After much bitter
hand-to-hand fighting the Japanese were destroyed. The 96th Division
engaged in extensive patrolling, relieved the 11th Airborne Division,
and relieved the X Corps of all tactical responsibility east of the
mountains. The 7th Division sent out numerous patrols in the southern
part of the island, and sent out a reinforced battalion that destroyed
all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. The 77th Division, which
operated in the northwestern part of the island, cleared up many
pockets of enemy resistance.
In the X Corps phase, the island of Samar was cleared of
Japanese troops. The Americal Division, advance elements of which
arrived on 24 January, extensively patrolled both the islands of Leyte
and Samar.
During the Eighth Army Area Command phase, the constant
searching out of isolated groups of enemy soldiers continued. In
addition to the Americal Division, the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment
patrolled Leyte. On 8 May, the control of the Eighth Army over the area
came to an end.17
The Japanese Withdrawal
At the time that General Suzuki made his plans for
the units of the 35th Army on Leyte to become self-sufficient,
he felt that there were too many soldiers on the island to make the
plan fully effective. General Suzuki decided therefore to transfer to
other islands those who, because of their good physical condition and
morale, would be able to withstand the rigors of a long fight.
[366]Consequently the sick, weak, and wounded were
dropped from the units that were to be withdrawn.18 General
Suzuki also considered the selection of the location of the new
headquarters for the 35th Army. Since there were 15,000 Japanese
residents in and around Davao on Mindanao, it was finally decided to
remove the army headquarters to Davao. As a preliminary step, the
1st Division was to be sent to Cebu.19
General Suzuki had plans drawn up showing the order of
precedence by which the units on Leyte were to be withdrawn and their
destinations. All available landing barges on Leyte and additional
vessels from Cebu and other areas would be used. The order of the
proposed withdrawal and the destinations of the units were as
follows:
| 1st Division | northern Cebu and later to Negros |
| 41st and 77th Infantry Regiments | Mindanao |
| 102d Division | Visayan area |
| 26th Division | Bacolod sector of Negros |
| Takahashi Detachment | northern Cebu |
| Units of the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade | northern Cebu |
General Suzuki and 35th Army Headquarters would
leave Leyte about the same time as the 26th Division. The
16th Division, the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, and
other small units were to remain on Leyte and would be under the
command of Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, the 16th Division
commander.20
When these plans were announced Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka,
the commanding general of the 1st Division, suggested that as
the 1st Division had lost so many men and officers in the Leyte
operation it might be better to use the 68th Independent Mixed
Brigade, which had fresh troops and would be better suited for the
assignment to Cebu. He was overruled.21 There
were, however, other officers who were more anxious to leave Leyte.
General Tomochika later wrote: “Many of the troops rushed to join
this movement and Staff Officer Nakamura experienced difficulty in
controlling them. However, quite a number of men succeeded in
transferring without the commander’s orders. The commander was
displeased because only a small number of staff officers were willing
to stay on Leyte.”22
On the morning of 12 January, four launches arrived at
Abijao to begin evacuation of the 1st Division. The Americans
attacked and damaged the vessels, but three were repaired. By 2300,
with the embarkation of the first party, composed of elements of the
49th Infantry and Division Headquarters, the evacuation
got under way. This group left Abijao at 0130 on 13 January and reached
Tabogon, in northern Cebu, about 0730. At about the same time, the
remnants of the 57th Infantry reached Cebu. The rest of 1st
Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry Regiment, and part
of the 1st Transport Regiment left Leyte on the 18th, and on the
20th the rest of the 49th Infantry Regiment and the 1st
Division Transport quitted the island.
Between the 13th and 20th of January the three launches,
each carrying about seventy men, made four round trips. After the
second trip, the Americans spotted the operation. The hiding place of
the craft at Tabogon was frequently strafed by aircraft and shelled by
submarines and motor torpedo boats, which kept the channel waters
[367]under sharp surveillance. On the night of the
20th, American aircraft sank three launches. Although additional craft
were sent up from Liloan on Cebu, these were also sunk. It was
impossible to evacuate any more personnel until the middle of
March.23
The number of men from the 1st Division evacuated to
Cebu was estimated to be as follows: 1st Division Headquarters,
73; 1st Infantry Regiment, 72; 49th Infantry Regiment,
208; 57th Infantry Regiment, 178; and 1st Transport
Regiment, 212; a total of 743 men. The equipment evacuated included
332 rifles, 4 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 5 grenade
launchers, and a small amount of small arms ammunition.24 In addition several hundred men obtained their
own transportation and left for other islands in the Philippines.
The Road Ends
From 20 January on, the remaining Japanese forces
stayed in the Villaba sector, hoping that succor would come. On 20
January General Tomochika “waited on the beach” for a boat
that never came. The men were “plunged into the depths of
despair.” Time passed. On the evening of 17 March, two Japanese
vessels appeared. General Suzuki and part of his staff boarded the
craft and at 0030, 18 March, left the island of Leyte, For days the
vessels sailed from island to island in the Visayas only to find that
they were too late. The Americans were already in possession. On the
evening of 16 April, the vessel bearing General Suzuki was bombed by
American aircraft off the coast of Negros Island and Suzuki was
killed25 The Leyte Campaign had ended.
The liberation of Leyte had been accomplished at no
slight cost. During the peak month, January 1945, there were 257,766
American Army, including Air Forces, troops on Leyte.26 The
total Army casualties for the Leyte Campaign were over 15,500,
including more than 3,500 killed and nearly 12,000 wounded. (Tables
4 and 5)
It is impossible, with data now available to determine
with any degree of exactitude the number of Japanese who participated
in the campaign or their casualties. The estimates of the Sixth and
Eighth Armies vary greatly, as do those of the various Japanese
sources. The Sixth Army estimated that it had killed 56,263 and
captured 389 men.27 and that as of 26 December
1944 when it relinquished control to Eighth Army about 5,000 of the
Japanese remained on the islands of Leyte and Samar.28 The
Eighth Army estimated that, for the mop-up period from 26 December 1944
to 8 May 1945, it [368]killed and found dead 24,294 and captured
439 Japanese.29 General Eichelberger stated that his forces
killed “more than twenty-seven thousand Japanese.”30
Table 4—U. S. Army Battle
Casualties at Leyte, 20 October 1944–8 May 1945
| Organization | Total | Killed | Wounded | Missing |
| Total | 15,584 | 3,504 | 11,991 | 89 |
| Sixth Army Troops | 961 | 141 | 831 | 317 |
| Eighth Army Troops | 404 | 61 | 340 | 3 |
| X Corps | 7,126 | 1,670 | 5,384 | 72 |
| Americal Div and 164th RCT | 731 | 162 | 566 | 3 |
| 24th Infantry Division | 2,342 | 544 | 1,784 | 14 |
| 32d Infantry Division | 1,949 | 450 | 1,491 | 8 |
| 38th Infantry Division | 272 | 68 | 171 | 33 |
| 1st Cavalry Division | 931 | 203 | 726 | 2 |
| 11th Airborne Division | 532 | 168 | 352 | 12 |
| 1st Filipino Division | 52 | 14 | 38 | 0 |
| 108th RCT | 53 | 14 | 39 | 0 |
| 112th RCT | 160 | 32 | 128 | 0 |
| Corps Troops | 104 | 15 | 89 | 0 |
| XXIV Corps | 7,093 | 1,632 | 5,454 | 7 |
| 7th Infantry Division | 2,764 | 584 | 2,179 | 1 |
| 77th Infantry Division | 2,226 | 499 | 1,723 | 4 |
| 96th Infantry Division | 1,660 | 469 | 1,189 | 2 |
| Corps Troops | 443 | 80 | 363 | 0 |
Source: Reports of the Commanding Generals,
Eighth U. S. Army, Inclosure 1, and Sixth U. S. Army, on the
Leyte-Samar Operation, p. 155.
The Japanese historians of the Leyte operation estimate
that the total strength of their army ground troops was 70,000
men.32 General Tomochika, the chief of staff of the
35th Army, was interrogated several times after the war. On one
occasion he estimated that the total number of Japanese involved in the
Leyte operation, including naval and air personnel and those who lost
their lives in transports sunk en route to Leyte, was 59,400 men,
approximately one fifth of all Japanese forces in the Philippine
Islands.33 On another occasion General Tomochika estimated
that 61,800 Japanese had been on Leyte, and that 13,010 were alive and
48,790 had been killed by 17 March 1945.34
In the plan for the defeat of Japan the objective sought
in reconquering the Philippines was not only to liberate the Filipinos
[369]but also to cut off the Japanese from the rich
empire that they had acquired in the Netherlands Indies, and at the
same time to establish a base for the final assault on the
enemy’s homeland. As early as 1942 Allied submarines had begun to
gnaw at the lifeline between Japan and its new empire, rich in rubber,
tin, rice, and, above all, in oil, without which Japan could not remain
in the war. By the fall of 1944 the submarines had virtually cut this
lifeline, which ran past the Philippines. The loss of the Philippines
to the Allies would finally sever it.
Table 5—Sixth Army Battle
Casualties by Arm or Service, 20 October-25 December 1944
| Arm or Service | Killed | Wounded and Injured | Missing in Action | Total | ||||
| Number | Per Cent | Number | Per Cent | Number | Per Cent | Number | Per Cent | |
| Infantry | 2,380 | 82.42 | 7,749 | 78.61 | 85 | 52.80 | 10,214 | 79.14 |
| Engineer | 132 | 4.58 | 762 | 7.73 | 46 | 28.57 | 940 | 7.28 |
| Medical | 100 | 3.47 | 375 | 3.80 | 8 | 4.97 | 483 | 3.74 |
| Field Artillery | 96 | 3.33 | 328 | 3.33 | 5 | 3.11 | 429 | 3.32 |
| Coast Artillery | 47 | 1.59 | 248 | 2.52 | 1 | .62 | 296 | 2.30 |
| Ordnance | 45 | 1.56 | 100 | 1.01 | 1 | .62 | 146 | 1.13 |
| Quartermaster | 41 | 1.42 | 67 | .68 | 9 | 5.59 | 117 | .91 |
| Signal | 12 | .42 | 76 | .77 | 0 | .00 | 88 | .68 |
| Transportation | 7 | .24 | 73 | .74 | 1 | .62 | 81 | .63 |
| Chemical Warfare | 13 | .45 | 44 | .45 | 0 | .00 | 57 | .44 |
| Military Police | 13 | .45 | 27 | .27 | 4 | 2.48 | 44 | .34 |
| Chaplain | 0 | .00 | 0 | .00 | 0 | .00 | 0 | .00 |
| Miscellaneous | 2 | .07 | 9 | .09 | 1 | .62 | 12 | .09 |
| Total | 2,888 | 100.00 | 9,858 | 100.00 | 161 | 100.00 | 12,907 | 100.00 |
Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20
October-25 December 1944, p. 155.
The object of the Leyte Campaign had been to force an
entry into the Philippines and establish a solid base for their
reconquest. It had accomplished this object, though the base had not
been secured and developed as promptly or as effectively as the
planners had anticipated. The construction program on the island had
been a disappointment. Leyte never became a major air base. But the
campaign had other and more important effects that had not been
foreseen when it was launched. In their determination to make Leyte the
decisive battle of the Philippines, the Japanese had committed the
major portions of their fleet and air force in a vain attempt to stay
the American advance. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf the Japanese Navy
suffered irreparable damage—all of the carriers were lost and
most of the capital ships were sunk or damaged. The air force was now
almost completely dependent upon the suicidal kamikaze pilot. Finally,
the dispatch of reinforcements and supplies to Leyte had seriously
crippled the defenses of Luzon—the strategic heart of the
Philippine Archipelago. [370]
The Americans had established an air base in the midst
of the Japanese-held Philippine Islands—a base within medium
bomber range of Luzon, the principal American target in the
archipelago.35 As General Yamashita, commanding officer of
all Japanese Army troops in the Philippines later said: “After
the loss of Leyte … I realized that decisive battle was
impossible….”36
Three years of hard fighting over jungle trails had
finally brought the U. S. forces back to the Philippines. Ahead lay
months of weary struggle but ultimate victory was no longer in doubt.
[371]
1 GHQ
SWPA Opns Instns 81, 15 Dec 44. ↑
2 Sixth
Army FO 40, 21 Dec 44. ↑
3
Eighth Army FO 8, 20 Dec 44. ↑
4
Quoted in Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84. ↑
5 See
M. Hamlin Cannon and Robert Ross Smith, Luzon and the Southern
Philippines, a forthcoming volume in this series. ↑
7
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 32. ↑
8
35th Army Opns, pp. 115–16. ↑
9
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 29. ↑
11 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 102d
Division on Leyte and Cebu, App., p. 3; Tomochika, True Facts of
Leyte Opn, pp. 29–31. ↑
12 Msg,
Gen Yamashita to Gen Suzuki, 1535, 30 Dec 44. Translation of HS-23A,
file of 35th Army Headquarters documents held by former Maj.
Takahash Kohet, P8, GHQ FEC, MI Sec, ATIS. Copy in OCMH. ↑
13
35th Army Opns, pp. 120–24. ↑
14
Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
16
Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. Unless otherwise cited, this
subsection is based upon this operations report, pp.
1–18. ↑
17
Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7–17. ↑
18
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34. ↑
19
35th Army Opns, pp. 118, 127. ↑
21 10th
I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV, Opns of Japanese
1st Division on Leyte, pp. 19–20. ↑
22
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34. ↑
23 10th
I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV, Opns of Japanese
1st Division on Leyte, pp. 21–22. ↑
25
During his travels, General Suzuki composed two poems which he
presented to his “dear brother Tomochika,” One of these,
entitled “A Farewell Poem,” ran as follows:
Every soldier must expect to sacrifice his life in
War,
Only then has his duty been done;
Be thankful that you can die at the front,
Rather than an inglorious death at home.
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp.
34—39. ↑
26
Strength Accounting Br, AGO, STM-30, 1 Feb 45. These figures must be
treated with caution as they include, in addition to those who had
actually participated, troops who were merely staging on the island and
had played no part in the operation. It is important to remember that
at all stages of the Leyte Campaign troops and units were constantly
coming and going. ↑
27
Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84. ↑
28
Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. ↑
30
Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York,
1950), p. 181. ↑
33 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army on
Leyte, Interrog of Gen Tomochika, pp. 9–10. ↑
34
Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, Interrog of Gen Tomochika, p.
7. ↑
35 See
Cannon and Smith, Luzon and the Southern Philippines. ↑
36 U.
S. Military Commission, U. S. Army Forces Western Pacific, United
States of America vs Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of General
Yamashita, XXVIII, 3527. ↑
Appendix A
GHQ Operations Instructions Number 70, 21
September 1944
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
A. P. O. 500
21 September 1944.
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 70
- 1.
- a. See current Intelligence Summaries and Annex No.
3—Intelligence. - b. Allied Forces occupy the line:
MARIANAS–ULITHI–PALAU–MOROTAI and control the
approaches to the southern and eastern PHILIPPINES. - c. The THIRD FLEET, Admiral W. F. Halsey commanding, covers and
supports the LEYTE GULF–SURIGAO STRAIT Operations by:- (1) Containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet.
- (2) Destruction of hostile air and shipping in the FORMOSA, LUZON,
VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas during the period A-9 through A-3 and from A
Day through A+30 as necessary to maintain their continued
neutralization. - (3) Destruction of ground defenses and installations and shipping
in the objective and adjacent enemy supporting areas from A-2 until the
escort carriers assume the mission of direct support. - (4) Providing direct support of the landing and subsequent
operations by fast carrier aircraft as required.
- d. Coordination of operations of THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
Naval and Air Forces will be published later. - e. I Time (Zone-9) of Z Time will be used during the
operation.
- a. See current Intelligence Summaries and Annex No.
- 2.
- a. Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, covered and supported by the
THIRD FLEET, will continue the offensive to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES by
seizing and occupying objectives in the LEYTE and western SAMAR areas,
and will establish therein naval, air and logistic facilities for the
support of subsequent operations. - b. Target Date for A Day: 20 October 1944.
- c. Forces
- (1) SIXTH US ARMY—Lt General Walter Krueger, US Army. As
constituted, less elements assigned by subsequent orders to EIGHTH US
ARMY. [372]
SIXTH US ARMY reserve:- 77th US Infantry Division—GUAM
- 6th US Infantry Division—CAPE SANSAPOR, DUTCH NEW GUINEA.
Forces allocated for the operation as designated in Annex No. 1.
Tentative Troop List for the Operation. The exact composition of the
landing force as designated by Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY.
- (2) FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY—Lt General V. A. H. Sturdee, CBE
- As constituted.
- (3) EIGHTH US ARMY—Lt General Robert L. Eichelberger, US
Army.- As later specified.
- (4) ALLIED NAVAL Forces—Vice Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, US NAVY.
- As reinforced.
- (5) ALLIED AIR Forces—Lt General George C. Kenney, US Army.
- As constituted.
- (6) USASOS—Maj General J. L. Frink, US Army.
- As constituted.
- (1) SIXTH US ARMY—Lt General Walter Krueger, US Army. As
- a. Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, covered and supported by the
- 3.
- a. The SIXTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces,
will:- (1) By overwater operations seize and occupy:
- (a) Objectives in the TACLOBAN and DULAG areas in LEYTE and such
adjacent areas as are required to initiate and insure uninterrupted
naval and air operations therefrom. - (b) Objectives in the HOMONHON and DINAGAT ISLANDS and such
adjacent areas prior to the main assault in LEYTE as will insure the
uninterrupted access for amphibious shipping into LEYTE GULF. - (c) Objectives in the PANAON STRAIT area that will permit passage
of naval forces through the PANAON STRAIT for operations in the CAMOTES
SEA. This objective will be secured simultaneously with (1) (a)
above.
- (a) Objectives in the TACLOBAN and DULAG areas in LEYTE and such
- (2) Establish control of SAN JUANICO STRAITS in order to permit
passage of naval forces through the SAN JUANICO STRAITS for operations
in the SAMAR SEA. - (3) In subsequent operations, establish control over the remainder
of LEYTE ISLAND; occupy and consolidate the western portion of southern
SAMAR to include the TAFT-WRIGHT Highway and seize objectives that will
permit opening of SURIGAO STRAITS for naval operations. [373] - (4) Prepare to conduct such operations as may be later directed by
this headquarters to:- (a) Complete the consolidation of SAMAR.
- (b) Destroy or contain hostile garrisons in the VISAYAS.
- (5) Occupy and defend sites for radar and air warning installations
as arranged with the Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces. - (6) Assume control of and direct the operations of FILIPINO Forces
of the 9th Military District (LEYTE-SAMAR). - (7) Establish facilities for minor naval operations at the earliest
practicable date in the LEYTE-SAMAR area as arranged with the Commander
ALLIED NAVAL Forces and initiate the establishment of naval, air and
logistic facilities for the support of subsequent operations to
reoccupy the PHILIPPINES as directed in Annex No 4, Logistics, and
Annex No 6, Engineer, and as later directed by this headquarters. - (8) Establish air facilities in the LEYTE area with objectives as
follows:(a) First Objective: 1 fighter gp (P-38) Immediately following the assault and by A+5 for: 1 fighter gp (P-40) 1 night fighter sq (b) Second Objective: 1 tactical reconnaissance sq Additional by A+15. 1 photo sq 1 medium bomb gp plus 1 sq P. O. A. 3 PBY sqs (tender-based) 1 VMR sq (Marine) (c) Third Objective: 2 light bomb gps (A-20) Additional by A+30. 1 air-sea rescue sq 1 tactical reconnaissance sq 1 fighter gp (P-38) (d) Fourth Objective: 1 fighter gp (P-47) Additional by A+45. 1 PB4Y sq (Air Ech) 2 heavy bomb gps 1 LAB sq (e) Fifth Objective: 1 photo sq (F-5) Additional by A+60. 1 PB4Y sq (Air-Ech) 2 troop carrier gps 1 combat mapping sq (Air Ech) (f) As later designated. [374]
- b. The Commanding General EIGHTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED
NAVAL and AIR Forces will:- (1) Relieve the SIXTH US ARMY of missions in NEW GUINEA, the
ADMIRALTIES, NEW BRITAIN, and the MOROTAI area as later directed by
this headquarters. - (2) Prepare to relieve the SIXTH US ARMY in the VISAYAN area as
later directed by this headquarters. - (3) Assist the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by training,
staging and mounting units of the SIXTH US ARMY in the EIGHTH US ARMY
area of responsibility as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH US
ARMY.
- (1) Relieve the SIXTH US ARMY of missions in NEW GUINEA, the
- c. The FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR
Forces, will continue:- (1) The defense of naval and air installations within assigned
areas of combat responsibility. - (2) The neutralization of Japanese forces within assigned areas,
seizing every opportunity for the destruction of hostile forces.
- (1) The defense of naval and air installations within assigned
- d. The Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, while continuing present
missions, will:- (1) Transport and establish landing forces ashore in the LEYTE
GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH
US ARMY - (2) Support the operations by:
- (a) Providing air protection for convoys and naval task forces and
direct air support for the landing and subsequent operations,
supplemented as arranged with the Commander THIRD FLEET and the
Commander ALLIED AIR Forces. - (b) Arranging direct air support and cover with carrier aircraft
for minesweeping and preliminary landings in the LEYTE GULF area during
the period A-2 to the time escort carriers assume the mission of direct
support on A Day. - (c) Transporting supporting troops and their supplies as required
to the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area in naval assault shipping. - (d) Denying Japanese reinforcement of the LEYTE area from the
SAMAR, western VISAYAS and northeastern MINDANAO areas. - (e) Clearing the SURIGAO STRAIT area of hostile naval forces and
shipping and sweeping the SURIGAO STRAIT to open it for naval
operations and shipping in the CAMOTES SEA and adjacent waters, in
conjunction with operations of the SIXTH US ARMY.
[375]
- (a) Providing air protection for convoys and naval task forces and
- (3) Provide submarine offensive reconnaissance along probable
routes of hostile naval forces and of water-borne reinforcements and
supplies. - (4) Provide lifeguard services as required.
- (5) Transfer to the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces the mission of
direct air support when land-based fighters and light bombers are
established in the LEYTE area, at a time as arranged with the Commander
ALLIED AIR Forces. - (6) Escort and protect shipping on the lines of communication into
the LEYTE and SAMAR areas. - (7) Establish in VISAYAN waters, naval forces required to support
current and future operations.
- (1) Transport and establish landing forces ashore in the LEYTE
- e. The Commander ALLIED AIR Forces, while continuing present
missions, will:- (1) Support the operation by:
- (a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as
required. - (b) Neutralizing, in coordination with carrier and land-based
aircraft of the THIRD FLEET, hostile naval and air forces in areas
within range in the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO, intensifying the
neutralization in the western VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas from D-9 to
cover the movement of naval forces, the landing and subsequent
operations. (Cooperation of air operations of the THIRD FLEET and
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Forces will be published later.) - (c) Providing protection of convoys and naval forces and direct
support of the landing and subsequent operations within capabilities
and as requested by Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces. - (d) Assuming the mission of direct support of the operations in the
LEYTE-SAMAR area at the earliest practicable date after the
establishment of fighters and light bombers in the LEYTE area, as
arranged with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces.
- (a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as
- (2) Continuing the destruction of hostile naval and air forces and
shipping in the ARAFURA and CELEBES SEA areas and by initiating strikes
on northeastern BORNEO and the SULU ARCHIPELAGO at the earliest
practicable date; denying use of naval facilities in the SULU
ARCHIPELAGO to the Japanese and protecting the western flank of the
operation. - (3) Destroying hostile installations and sources of war materials
in Eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. - (4) Establishing and operating radar and air warning facilities as
required in the LEYTE-SAMAR area, as arranged with the Commanding
General SIXTH US ARMY. [376] - (5) Establishing air forces in the LEYTE area in the priority as
listed in paragraph 3a (8).
- (1) Support the operation by:
- x.
- (1) For the coordination of planning the Commander ALLIED NAVAL and
AIR Forces will cause their respective close support commanders to
report to the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, who is charged with the
coordination of plans. - (2) A brief of the coordinated plan of operations will be furnished
this headquarters by the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by 5 October
1944. - (3) Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA,
will submit to this headquarters by 1 October 1944 their respective
plans for general support to be afforded by their forces during the
period of operations. - (4) During the amphibious movement and landing, the Commander Naval
Attack Forces is in command of the amphibious operations; his command
continues until the landing forces are established ashore. Command of
the forces ashore is then passed to the Landing Force Commanders. The
exact time of transfer of command from the Commanders Landing Forces
will be announced by radio. The controlling considerations for fixing
the time when the landing forces are established ashore will be as
agreed by the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces and the Commanding General
SIXTH US ARMY, and will be announced by them to this headquarters and
appropriate subordinates. - (5) For coordination of land-based and naval aircraft in support of
the operation, see Standing Operating Procedure Instructions Number
16/1, this headquarters, dated 10 August 1944. - (6) To coordinate the attack of THIRD FLEET carrier aircraft, the
Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, in concert with the Commander ALLIED AIR
Forces and Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, will furnish the Commander
THIRD FLEET at the earliest practicable date the following:- (a) Schedule and tracks of echelons.
- (b) Target maps of air and surface bombardment.
- (c) Communication plans.
- (d) Naval gunfire plans.
- (e) Other plans and data necessary for the support of the operation
by the fast carrier forces.
- (7) Areas of responsibility for naval and air operations of the
THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces will be designated later. - (8) Instructions for long range reconnaissance, and bombing and
attack restrictions will be issued in subsequent Operations
Instructions. [377] - (9) Annex No. 1 indicates the tentative troop list for the
Operation, and Annex 2 indicates the troop movements for the
concentration.
- (1) For the coordination of planning the Commander ALLIED NAVAL and
- (1) By overwater operations seize and occupy:
- 4. See Annex No. 4—Logistics. (to be issued later)
- 5.
- a. See Annex No. 5—Communications.
- b. Command Posts.
- PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS—HAWAII
- THIRD FLEET—AFLOAT
- GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA—HOLLANDIA
- Rear Echelon—BRISBANE
- Advanced Echelon—LEYTE (date and hour of opening to be
announced later)
- SIXTH US ARMY—LEYTE (as announced by Commanding General SIXTH
US ARMY)- Rear Echelon—HOLLANDIA
- FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY—LAE
- EIGHTH US ARMY—HOLLANDIA
- ALLIED NAVAL FORCES—HOLLANDIA
- Rear Echelon—BRISBANE
- ALLIED AIR FORCES—HOLLANDIA
- Rear Echelon—BRISBANE
- UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY—HOLLANDIA
- Rear Echelon—BRISBANE
- a. The SIXTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces,
By command of General MacARTHUR:
R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
/s/ S. J. Chamberlin,
S. J. CHAMBERLIN,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
ANNEXES: (Omitted) [378]
Appendix B
Basic Military Map Symbols1
Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military
unit, within a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a
supply point.
Military Units—Identification
| Antiaircraft Artillery |  |
| Armored Command |  |
| Army Air Forces |  |
| Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery |  |
| Cavalry, Horse |  |
| Cavalry, Mechanized |  |
| Chemical Warfare Service |  |
| Coast Artillery |  |
| Engineers |  |
| Infantry |  |
| Medical Corps |  |
| Ordnance Department |  |
| Quartermaster Corps |  |
| Signal Corps |  |
| Tank Destroyer |  |
| Transportation Corps |  |
| Veterinary Corps |  |
Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing
symbol with the arm or service symbol:
| Airborne Artillery |  |
| Airborne Infantry |  |
[379]
Size Symbols
The following symbols placed either in boundary
lines or above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the
identifying arm or service symbol indicate the size of military
organization:
| Squad |  |
| Section |  |
| Platoon |  |
| Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight |  |
| Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron |  |
| Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) |  |
| Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force Wing |  |
| Division or Command of an Air Force |  |
| Corps or Air Force |  |
| Army |  |
| Group of Armies |  |
EXAMPLES
The letter or number to the left of the symbol
indicates the unit designation; that to the right, the designation of
the parent unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
| Company A, 137th Infantry |  |
| 8th Field Artillery Battalion |  |
| Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division |  |
| Observation Post, 23d Infantry |  |
| Command Post, 5th Infantry Division |  |
| Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry |  |
List of Abbreviations
| AA | Antiaircraft |
| AAF | Army Air Forces |
| Admin O | Administrative Order |
| AFPAC | U.S. Army Forces, Pacific |
| AGO | Adjutant General’s Office |
| AGS SWPA | Allied Geographic Section, Southwest Pacific Area |
| AGWAR | Adjutant General, War Department |
| AIB GHQ SWPA | Allied Intelligence Bureau, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area |
| AKA | Cargo Ship, attack |
| Amph | Amphibious, amphibian |
| APA | Transport, attack |
| APH | Transport for wounded |
| Arty | Artillery |
| ASCOM | Army Service Command |
| ATIS | Allied Translator and Interpreter Section |
| BAR | Browning automatic rifle |
| Bn | Battalion |
| Br | Branch |
| Bull | Bulletin |
| Cav | Cavalry |
| CCS | Combined Chiefs of Staff |
| CG | Commanding General |
| CINC | Commander in Chief |
| CINCPAC | Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet |
| CINCPOA | Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area |
| CINCSWPA | Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area |
| CM-IN | Classified Message, incoming |
| CM-OUT | Classified Message, outgoing |
| CO | Commanding Officer |
| CofS | Chief of Staff |
| Com3dFlt | Commander, Third Fleet |
| COMINCH | Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet |
| CTF | Commander, task force |
| CTG | Commander, task group |
| CTU | Commander, task unit |
| CVE | Aircraft carrier, escort[381] |
| Div | Division |
| DNI | Division of Naval Intelligence |
| DUKW | Amphibian, 2½-ton, 6 × 6 truck, used for short runs from ship to shore |
| Engr | Engineer |
| ESB | Engineer Special Brigade |
| FA | Field Artillery |
| FE | Far East |
| FEAF | Far East Air Forces |
| FEC | Far East Command |
| Flt | Fleet |
| FM | Field Manual |
| FO | Field Order |
| G-2 | Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff |
| G-3 | Operations section of divisional or higher staff |
| G-4 | Supply section of divisional or higher staff |
| GHQ SWPA | General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area |
| Gp | Group |
| GS | General Staff |
| Hist | History, historical |
| Hq | Headquarters |
| HRS DRB AGO | Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General’s Office |
| Inf | Infantry |
| I&HS | Information and Historical Service |
| Instns | Instructions |
| Intel | Intelligence |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| Jnl | Journal |
| LCI | Landing craft, infantry |
| LCI (R) | Landing craft, infantry (rocket) |
| LCM | Landing craft, mechanized |
| LCM (R) | Landing craft, mechanized (rocket) |
| Log | Logistics |
| LSD | Landing ship, dock |
| LSM | Landing ship, medium |
| LST | Landing ship, tank |
| Ltr | Letter |
| LVT | Landing vehicle, tracked |
| M29 | Weasel |
| MC | Medical Corps |
| MI | Military Intelligence |
| Mil | Military[382] |
| Msg | Message |
| Mtg | Meeting |
| OCMH | Office of the Chief of Military History |
| OCNO | Office of the Chief of Naval Operations |
| Off | Officer |
| ONI | Office of Naval Intelligence |
| OP | Observation post |
| OPD | Operations Division, War Department General Staff |
| Opns | Operations |
| PCE (R) | Patrol craft, escort (rescue) |
| POL | Petrol oil and lubricants |
| Prcht | Parachute |
| QM | Quartermaster |
| Rad | Radiogram |
| Rcds | Records |
| Regt | Regiment |
| Rpt | Report |
| S-2 | Intelligence section of regimental or lower staff |
| S-3 | Operations section of regimental or lower staff |
| Sec | Section |
| Ser | Series |
| Sq | Squadron |
| SSUSA | Special Staff, U.S. Army |
| Stf | Staff |
| SWPA | Southwest Pacific Area |
| Tel Conf | Teletype Conference |
| USA | U.S. Army |
| USASOS | U.S. Army Services of Supply |
| USMC | U.S. Marine Corps |
| USN | U.S. Navy |
| USNR | U.S. Naval Reserve |
| USSBS | U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey |
| WD | War Department |
| WDGS | War Department General Staff |
| Wkly | Weekly |
[383]
Bibliographical Note
Records and studies on the Leyte operation fall
into eleven general classes: Joint Chiefs of Staff records, U.S. Army
Air Forces records, U.S. Army records, U.S. Marine Corps records, U.S.
Navy records, guerrilla records, Japanese studies, interviews,
manuscript histories, special studies, and published works.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Records
The official records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
as well as those of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, are now in the
custody of the Research Analysis Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They
consist primarily of the formal papers and minutes of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. An almost complete file of these JCS and CCS papers and
minutes was kept for the Army during the wartime period by the
Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and is now in
the possession of the G-3 Division, the successor to the Operations
Division. This Army file contains plans for projected operations, the
working papers of the Army planning personnel, and correspondence with
officers in the Pacific theaters, as well as the copies of the JCS and
CCS minutes and papers.
Army Air Forces Records
The archives of the United States Army Air Forces
contain manuscript histories of the various units and commands, written
during or shortly after the war. The quality of these varies
considerably. The following histories are of especial value for a study
of the Leyte Campaign: those of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Fighter Squadrons
of the 49th Fighter Group, 86th Fighter Wing, V Fighter Command, Fifth
Air Force; V Fighter Command; V Bomber Command; XIII Bomber Command;
Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; and Far East Air Forces. Two
studies are also useful: Far East Air Forces Staff Study Operation KING
II, 12 July 44; and Fifth Air Force Fighter Cover Plan for Ormoc Bay
Operation, file 731.326.
Army Records
The voluminous Army records on the Leyte Campaign
vary considerably in quality and content. The documents range from
messages between the Chief of Staff and theater commanders to company
journals.
The Chief of Staff’s Log, 1944, which is in the
Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, contains the
daily high level radiograms and telephonic communications between
Washington and the theaters. These give a concise daily summary of the
strategic situation throughout the world, shed considerable light on
joint and combined command, and summarize important plans and
decisions.
Most of the records of General MacArthur’s
headquarters are in Japan. Available in the Historical Records Section
of the Adjutant General’s Office is a nearly complete file of the
G-3 journals for the entire war period. The “Top Secret”
messages are [384]not included. In addition there is a nearly
complete file of Allied Translator Interpreter Section, GHQ SWPA,
“Current Translations” and “Enemy
Publications.” The Allied Geographical Section, GHQ SWPA, made
terrain studies of the geographical regions in the Southwest Pacific
Area. Although they contain errors three of these were of
value—Special Report 55, Airfields, Landing Beaches and Roads,
Samar, Leyte and Dinagat Group, 10 July 1944; Terrain Study 84, Leyte
Province, 17 August 1944; and Terrain Handbook 34, Tacloban, 25
September 1944. The Military Intelligence Section prepared information
bulletins on the guerrillas that were of some use. These are: The
Resistance Movement on Leyte Island, 7 October 1944, and The Resistance
Movement on Samar Island, 10 October 1944.
The records of the Sixth Army for the campaign are very
complete and in excellent condition. In addition to a fine operations
report, there are complete G-2, G-3, and G-4 journals. These journals
contain the daily messages, reports, and memoranda exchanged between
Sixth Army, General Headquarters, responsible naval commanders, and
subordinate units of the Sixth Army, as well as planning papers,
periodic reports of Sixth Army and subordinate units, field and
administrative orders, interrogations, and estimates of the enemy
situation. For the period after 26 December 1944 the operations report
of the Eighth Army is useful.
The operations report of the X Corps is helpful but too
brief. The journals (G-2, G-3, and G-4) of the corps, however, are
good. The XXIV Corps prepared an inadequate and incomplete operations
report and its journals as a whole are inferior to those of the X
Corps. The sections and sub-sections of the headquarters of the XXIV
Corps completed “histories.” These consist mainly of
photographs of individuals and notations of changes in personnel. The
“history” of the Sixth Army Service Command is poor and
there are few records of ASCOM in the Historical Records Section,
Adjutant General’s Office.
The records of the 1st Cavalry Division and subordinate
units are generally adequate, although those of the two brigades are
inferior to those of the division and of the regiments. The narrative
of the operations report of the 7th Division is inferior but the
appendixes are excellent and very complete; the journals of the
division are good. In general the operations reports and journals of
the infantry regiments are very helpful. The operations report of the
32d Infantry is excellent and a model for a perfect regimental
operations report. In contrast, the operations reports and journals of
the 11th Airborne Division and subordinate units are very poor and
incomplete. The 24th Infantry Division prepared a superb operations
report and kept good journals. The records of the regiments of the
division are sparse and incomplete and their operations reports are
either inadequate or nonexistent. The records and operations reports of
the 32d Division and its regiments are extremely sketchy and inexact.
The 38th Division used Leyte as a staging area; when the Japanese
parachuted into the Burauen airfields, its 149th Infantry was
committed. The operations report of that regiment for the resultant
action is far too brief. The 77th Infantry Division and its regiments
have very good operations reports but their journals are inadequate.
The operations reports and journals of the 96th Division are good.
[385]The journals and operations reports of the
Americal Division are only fairly good. There are
“histories” and operations reports of small independent or
attached units, but these are frequently one to three pages in length
and very incomplete. Finally, it should be noted that the operations
reports of the various artillery units are in the main poor and
incomplete and the journals are highly technical.
Marine Records
Special Action Report of Corps Artillery, V
Amphibious Corps, 28 December 1944.
Navy Records
The naval records that were consulted include the
operation plans and reports by naval commanders. Copies of most of
these are among the records of the Historical Records Section, Adjutant
General’s Office, Department of the Army. All of the documents
are in the files of the Office of the Naval Records and Library,
Department of the Navy.
Guerrilla Records
There is in the Office of the Chief of Military
History a large, completely disorganized collection of heterogeneous
materials by and about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. These
are incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some of the guerrilla
bands had no records and all that is known of others is from violently
prejudiced sources. Some of the American guerrillas published books on
their experiences. These are impressionistic, generally replete with
derring-do, and consequently possess scant value as sources. The Combat
History Division, G-1 Section, AFWESPAC, prepared a four-volume
work—“Triumph in the Philippines,” the third volume
of which, entitled “Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation,” is
colorful, but poor history.
Japanese Studies
At the cessation of hostilities, General MacArthur
ordered the former Japanese War and Navy Ministries to prepare studies
on Japanese plans and operations in World War II. The resulting
studies, translations and originals, of which those mentioned below
deal with the Leyte Campaign, are on file with the Office of the Chief
of Military History. Although there are errors in dates, designations
of units, and frequently in facts, these are the best sources for
information on Japanese plans and operations. An exception is the
independent study by General Tomochika, which despite its garish title
is very good and contains much human interest. Tomochika, evidently a
man of strong prejudices, at times was unduly critical of some of his
fellow officers. Japanese Studies used in this volume are:
Tomochika, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu, The True Facts of the
Leyte Operation, typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth Army,
3 December 1946
Japanese Studies in World War II, 5, 4th Air Army
Operations, 1914–45
——, 7, 14th Army Operations on
Leyte
——, 11, 35th Army Operations,
1944–45
——, 14, Naval Operations in the Philippine
Area, 1942–45
——, 21, History of the Southern Army,
1941–45 [386]
——, 72, History of the Army Section,
Imperial General Headquarters, 1941–45
——, 102, Philippine Area Naval Operations,
October 1944–December 1944, Part II, The Battle of Leyte Gulf
Interviews
The following U.S. Army officers furnished the
author valuable information on the Leyte Campaign: Lt. Gen. Robert L.
Eichelberger, Maj. Gen. George H. Decker, Col. W. J. Verbeck, Col. Fred
Weber, Col. Sidney F. Mashbir, Col. John M. Finn, Capt. Francis Cronin,
Capt. Robert Ross Smith, and 1st Lt. James J. Frangie. Fleet Admiral
William D. Leahy, Lt. Comdr. Henry M. Dater, Lt. Comdr. Russell L.
Harris, Lt. Comdr. Philip A. Crowl and Lt. Roger Pineau of the U.S.
Navy were very co-operative, helping to clear up moot points that
arose. Capt. Samuel E. Morison furnished information on the Pearl
Harbor Conference of July 1944.
Manuscript Histories
There are in the files of the Office, Chief of
Military History, the following manuscript histories of certain phases
of the campaign:
Dean, Captain Tucker—The Liberation of Leyte. A
preliminary work based principally upon the earlier study by Capt.
Russell A. Gugeler.
Gugeler, Captain Russell A.—The 7th Division on
Leyte. A good study although poorly documented.
History of the Engineer Corps in the Southwest Pacific,
Chapter VI, Philippine Campaign.
Special Studies
There are available in the Office, Chief of
Military History, copies of special studies that bear upon the Leyte
Campaign. As a group they are capably done, although, of course, some
are better than others.
Air Evaluation Board, POA, Leyte Campaign, 1944. Highly
critical of Army close air support.
Committee 16, Officers Advanced Course, The Armored
School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, Armor on Leyte, May 1949.
Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, O. N. I. No. 93, Field Monograph of the Philippines,
3 parts, III, Visayan Islands, January 1944.
Grigg, Maj. Martin C., The Operations of the 1st
Battalion, 149th Infantry … in the Battle for the Buri Airstrip …
Advanced Infantry Officers Class, 1948–1949, The Infantry School,
Fort Benning, Georgia.
MacLaughlin, Maj. Charles V., Operation of the XXIV
Corps in the Invasion of Leyte Island, Advanced Infantry Officers
Class, 1947–1948, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
“Leyte Field Fortifications,” Tactical and Technical
Trends, April 1945.
Military Intelligence Service, General Staff, War
Department, Survey of the Philippines, 3 volumes, 15 February 1943.
National War College, Analytical Study, Japanese
Opposition at Leyte and Okinawa, 1948.
Fellers, Col. Bonner F., Psychological Warfare in the
Southwest Pacific Area, 1944–45, 15 March 1946.
Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese 35th
Army on Leyte, typescript of translation, [387]10th
I&HS, Eighth Army (not dated), 4 parts.
Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese 102d
Division on Leyte and Cebu, typescript of translation, 10th
I&HS, Eighth Army (not dated).
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Employment of
Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command, February 1947.
Williams, Maj. E., Intelligence Activities During the
Japanese Occupation (not dated).
Publications
Arnold, General Henry H., Global Mission
(New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949).
Cronin, Capt. Francis D., Under the Southern Cross,
The Saga of the Americal Division (Washington, Combat Forces Press,
1951).
Davidson, Orlando R., Williams, J. Carl, and Kahl,
Joseph A., The Deadeyes: The Story of the 96th Infantry Division
(Washington, Infantry Journal Press (now Combat Forces Press), 1947). A
divisional history definitely above the average.
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The
Army Air Forces in World War II: V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to
Nagasaki (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953).
Eichelberger, Robert L., Our Jungle Road to Tokyo
(New York, The Viking Press, 1950).
Field, James A., Jr., The Japanese at Leyte Gulf, The
Shō Operation (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947).
An excellent study based upon Japanese documents and interrogations.
There are many superb photographs, maps, and charts.
Flanagan, Maj. Edward M., Jr., The Angels: A History
of the 11th Airborne Division, 1943–1946 (Washington,
Infantry Journal Press, 1948). A popular history written for the men of
the division.
Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., and Bryan, Lt. Comdr.
J., Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York, Whittlesey House,
1947). An interesting and popular account, of value in showing
Halsey’s strong interest in an early return to the
Philippines.
Johansen, Maj. Herbert O., “Banzai at
Burauen,” Air Force, XXVIII, 3 (March, 1945). A popular
account based entirely on American sources.
Kenney, George C., General Kenney Reports (New
York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949).
Karig, Capt. Walter, USNR, Harris, Lt. Comdr. Russell
L., and Manson, Lt. Comdr. Frank A., Battle Report, Victory in the
Pacific (New York and Toronto, Rhinehart and Co., Inc., 1949) (5
vols.), V. A highly readable journalistic salty account based upon
documentary sources and interviews. There are many excellent
photographs.
Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., I Was There (New
York, Whittlesey House, 1950). Excellent. Based entirely on his diary
and notes written at the time.
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of
War (Washington, 1945).
The Medal of Honor (Washington, 1948). A history
of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the official citations of the
men who had been awarded the medal.
Morton, Louis, “American and Allied Strategy in
the Far East,” Military Review, XXIX, 12 (December, 1949).
An excellent analysis of prewar strategy up to the summer of 1941.
[388]
Reel, A. Frank, The Case of General Yamashita
(Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949). An able pleading for
General Yamashita by one of his defense counsel at his trial as a war
criminal.
Sturgis, Brig. Gen. S. D., Jr., “Engineer
Operations in the Leyte Campaign,” reprint from The Military
Engineer, November, December 1947, and January 1948.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific, Naval
Analysis Division, prepared two studies on the Pacific campaigns which
are valuable for the student of the Leyte operation. The Campaigns
of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946) is excellent for a study of
the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Interrogations of Japanese
Officials (2 vols., n. d.) contains much highly important material
but it should be remembered that the interrogated Japanese officers
were naturally desirous of making a good case for themselves and at the
same time were anxious to give an answer which would please the
interrogator.
Valtin, Jan [Richard J. Krebs], Children of
Yesterday (New York, The Reader’s Press, 1946). An excellent
popular account of the activities of the 24th Division.
Verbeck, Col. W. J., A Regiment in Action, (n.
p., n. d., privately printed, copy in OCMH). The story of the 21st
Infantry Regiment which consists mainly of excerpts from the operations
reports and journals of higher echelons.
Woodward, C. Vann, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New
York, The Macmillan Co., 1947). An extremely readable popular account
based upon American and Japanese sources and interviews with which Dr.
Woodward became acquainted while an officer on duty with the Office of
Naval Intelligence during the war. The book is valuable in spite of a
few minor errors of fact. [389]
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The multivolume series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II, consists of a number of subseries which are tentatively
planned as follows: The War Department, The Army Air Forces, The Army
Ground Forces, The Army Service Forces, The Defense of the Western
Hemisphere, The War in the Pacific, The European Theater of Operations,
The War in the Mediterranean, The Middle East Theater, The
China-Burma-India Theater, Civil Affairs, The Technical Services,
Special Studies, and Pictorial Record.
The following volumes have been published or are in
press:1
- The War Department
- Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
- Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
- Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare:
1941–1942
- The Army Ground Forces
- The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
- The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
- The Army Service Forces
- The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
- The War in the Pacific
- Okinawa: The Last Battle
- Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
- The Approach to the Philippines
- The Fall of the Philippines
- Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
- The European Theater of Operations
- The Lorraine Campaign
- Cross-Channel Attack
- Logistical Support of the Armies (Volume I)
- The Supreme Command
- The Middle East Theater
- The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
- The China-Burma-India Theater
- Stilwell’s Mission to China
[390]
- The Technical Services
- The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and
Operations - The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services,
Volume I - The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
- The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and
- Special Studies
- Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
- The Women’s Army Corps
- Pictorial Record
- The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent
Areas - The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
- The War Against Japan
- The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent
[391]
Index
A Day
deployment of U. S. forces at end of: 107
operations: 60–84
results of naval bombardment on: 104
Abuyog: 12, 33, 34,
57, 137, 144–45,
218, 253–54, 273,
298, 302, 311
Aerial photographs: 41
Aerial reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance,
aerial.
Agahang: 227–28
Air Assault Force. See Fifth Air Force.
Air attacks, Japanese
on airfields: 86–88, 187
on shipping: 86–88, 93, 155, 192
on troops: 86, 93, 241,
290
on U. S. naval units: 91, 155
Air attacks, U. S.
A Day: 60–62, 80
on airfields: 94, 99, 220
in Arafura Sea: 27
on artillery positions: 93,
99
on Bacolod airfield: 88
on bridges: 93, 99
against Burma: 28
on Camotes Islands: 98, 99
on Cebu: 27, 45, 96
in Celebes Sea area: 27
in close support: 130, 159, 161
on convoys in Ormoc Valley: 208,
210
on Davao area: 42
on East Indies: 27
effect of, on Japanese tactics: 54
estimate of results of, A Day: 61,
93
on Formosa: 27, 28, 43–44
on Japanese aircraft: 155
on Japanese ground troops: 93,
99
on Japanese naval units: 86,
88, 90–91, 96,
99–102
on Japanese shipping: 27, 45, 88,
96, 98, 99–102,
217, 254, 366–67
on Labiranan Head: 108
on Leyte: 27, 45
on Luzon: 27, 43, 44,
45
against Malaya: 28
on Mindanao: 8, 96
on mortar positions: 93
on Negros: 27, 45, 96
northern Leyte Valley: 146,
148
on Okinawa: 27
on Ormoc: 98, 212–13
in Ormoc area: 283–84,
286
on Palaus: 8
on Palompon: 98, 349
on Panay: 45
on Philippines: 23–24,
27, 42–43, 85–86
plans to launch, against Japan: 2
on Ryukyus: 43
on Samar: 45
in Sulu Sea: 27, 96
on supply dumps: 93
on Valencia: 98, 331, 333,
334
on Visayan Islands: 96
on Yap: 8
Air bases: 3–4.
See also Airfields.
establishment of, planned: 6,
7–8, 23–24, 28,
35–36, 62
Japanese plans to attack: 53,
85
need of: 1, 3, 7
shortage of troops to construct: 36
Air Force, Japanese. See Japanese Air Force.
Air Forces, U. S. See Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth
Air Force; Twentieth Air Force.
Air losses, Japanese: 42–44, 45,
54, 86, 88, 96, 284
Air losses, U. S.: 42, 43, 86, 96,
98–99, 208
Air plans, Japanese: 53–54, 86
Air plans, U. S.
to combat Japanese air offensive: 86
against Japan: 2
for Leyte Campaign: 2–3,
6, 8, 27–28,
45
missions of Fast Carrier Task Force: 27, 45
missions of Fifth Air Force: 26,
94
mission of Task Force 77: 24
Air superiority, Allied
attained over Leyte: 43–44
Kuroda on effect of: 49
over Philippines: 4, 6, 7
Air support, U. S.: 7–8. See also Air plans, U. S.; Fifth Air
Force; Twentieth Air Force.
on A Day: 60–61
close naval, of ground troops: 93
estimate of: 93
factors affecting: 93–94
lack of, in attack on Formosa: 3–4
lack of, in 6th Ranger operations: 54
MacArthur on availability of, 1944: 4
for Ormoc operation: 276, 279–80
Air units, Allied. See also Allied Air Forces;
Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; XIII Bomber Command; Twentieth
Air Force.
5th Bombardment Squadron: 96
V Fighter Command: 281
7th Fighter Squadron: 96–98
9th Fighter Squadron: 96
11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron: 310 [392]
42d Bombardment Group: 96
49th Bomber Group: 98–99
49th Fighter Group: 187
307th Bombardment Group: 96
308th Bombardment Wing: 94,
96, 212–13, 220,
286
341st Fighter Squadron: 28
347th Fighter Squadron: 281
868th Bombardment Squadron: 96
Airborne Battalions
2d, 187th Glider: 324
2d, 511th Parachute Regiment: 322
3d, 511th Parachute Regiment: 322
127th Engineer, 302
Airborne Division, 11th: 254, 293
commander of: 296
and defense of airfields: 296–98, 298n,
300, 302–05
in Mahonag area: 322
missions of: 222–23,
313
mopping-up operations of: 365
Airborne operations, Japanese: 294–96, 300–305
Airborne Regiments
187th Glider: 298, 300, 303–04, 323
511th Parachute: 298, 322–23
Aircraft, Japanese: 8, 22, 30, 42,
61
Aircraft carriers, Japanese: 89–91
Aircraft carriers, U. S.: 7, 8, 24, 40–41, 43,
57, 60–61, 85,
90–92
Airdromes. See Airfields.
Airdrops: 112,
228, 231–32, 235,
310, 356
Airfields: 99. See also Air bases; towns as main
entries.
Bacolod: 86, 88
Bayug: 12, 98, 124, 137, 139, 188, 295, 296, 297, 300
Burauen: 34, 111, 254,
263, 275, 285, 294–97, 298–305, 307,
313–14, 321–22
Buri: 12, 124, 131, 133–38, 139, 188, 296–300, 302–05
Clark Field: 86
condition of: 94, 98
constructed by Japanese on Leyte: 12
construction of: 35–36,
185–88, 204, 306–08
Davao: 42, 50
Dulag: 12, 22, 62, 72, 76,
78, 107, 124–29,
131, 132, 187, 275, 294–95, 297,
298, 305, 307
estimate of Japanese: 21–23
Japanese attempt to retake: 294–305
Kuroda on construction of Japanese: 49–50
on Leyte: 1, 3, 6, 24, 33,
45, 59, 60–62,
103, 107.
See also airfields by name.
on Mindanao: 45
San Pablo: 12, 124, 132–34, 135,
188, 276, 295, 300–303
Tacloban: 12, 22, 33,
34, 50, 62, 63, 65,
72, 78, 86–88,
97–98, 146, 168,
185, 187, 188, 190
275, 294, 305, 306
Tanauan: 188, 189
Valencia: 12, 220, 314,
329, 330, 334, 336
in Visayan Islands: 45
Airstrips. See Airfields.
Aitape: 27
AKA’s: 41,
80 Alamo
Force: 23, 26. See also
Sixth Army, U. S.
Alangalang: 170
Albuera: 104,
176, 208, 254, 257, 263, 269, 298
Allied Air Forces: 306. See also Air units,
Allied; Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; Royal Australian Air
Force.
command of: 23, 24, 26
composition of: 26
missions of: 23, 26, 27,
94–96, 188, 361
Allied Land Forces: 23, 26. See also Sixth Army, U. S.; X Corps; XXIV
Corps.
Allied Naval Forces. See also Seventh Fleet;
Central Philippine Attack Force; Task Force 77; Task Force 78; Task
Force 79.
command of: 23, 24–26
composition of: 24–26,
28–30
missions of: 23, 24–26, 27–30, 31,
361
Ambush. See Tactics, Japanese.
Ammunition: 38,
80, 83
shortage of: 231, 233
supply of: 36, 37–38, 111
supply operations for: 232,
236
Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, 19th Infantry: 68
Amphibian tanks. See Tanks, U. S., amphibian.
Amphibian tractors: 65, 75, 130
Amphibian truck battalions: 26
Amphibious forces: 41–42. See also III Amphibious Force; VII
Amphibious Force.
Amphibious operations: 175
casualties during: 68, 69, 70,
72
command of: 24
on east coast of Leyte: 60–80
Leyte to Samar: 153–57
logistical operations in, A Day: 80–84
mine sweeping: 57
in northwest Leyte: 357
at Ormoc: 222–23
in Ormoc area: 275–84,
291
in Palompon area: 348–51,
354
plans for: 3, 23–39, 74
of 6th Rangers: 54–55
underwater demolition teams: 57–58
on west coast of Leyte: 266–67
Anchorages. See Harbor facilities; Ports.
Anguar: 38
Anibung: 107,
110–11, 113, 114
[393]
Antiaircraft fire, Japanese: 60, 96, 99, 208
Antiaircraft fire, U. S.: 98
Antilao River: 293,
315–16, 318
Antipolo Point: 356
Antitank Companies:
of the 17th Infantry: 141n
of the 307th Infantry: 345
APA’s: 80
APH’s: 194
Area Allocation Group: 189
Arisue, Maj. Gen. Seizo: 49
Armies, Japanese. See Japanese Army units,
Armies.
Armies, U. S. See Eighth Army, U. S.; Sixth Army,
U. S.
Army Service Command. See Sixth Army Service
Command.
Arnold, Maj. Gen. Archibald V.
and advance on Burauen: 131–33
command of: 128
in Ormoc Valley: 323
tactical plans of: 252, 254–56, 257n, 263, 266, 270
Arnold, General Henry H.: 1n, 8, 9
Artillery, Field. See Field Artillery
Battalions.
Artillery, Japanese
air attack on: 93, 99
estimate of: 22
use of: 68, 74, 77, 212
Artillery, U. S.: 130, 148, 163–64
Catmon Hill: 119–20
close support: 135, 136–37, 138, 159, 161, 163, 165, 166, 212, 231, 239–40, 318–19
concentrated preparations: 180
failure to land, A Day: 68
Krueger on: 246
on Labiranan Head: 107–08
San Vicente Hill: 117
at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 257–58, 260, 261
at Tabontabon: 115–17
Arafura Sea: 27
ASCOM: See Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.; Logistics;
Sixth Army Service Command.
Aslom: 114
Assault craft: 6–8. See also by name.
Atago: 90
Attu: 26
Austin, Capt. Paul: 159–61
Australian Air Force. See Royal Australian Air
Force.
Avengers: 60–62
Awards. See by name.
Bagacay: 359
Balanac: 363
Balud: 181
Balaud: 206
Bao: 330–31
Bao River: 330
Baod River: 279, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290
Barbed wire: 67
Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel E.: 24–26, 28. See also Northern Attack Force;
Task Force 78.
BAR’s. See Weapons, U.S. Browning automatic
rifles.
Barugo: 12, 33, 67,
163, 175, 175n, 180–81, 210, 218, 237, 239
Bataan: 59
Battalions, Japanese. See Japanese Army units,
Battalions.
Battalions, U.S. See Airborne Battalions;
Engineer Battalions; Field Artillery Battalions; Infantry Battalions;
Tank Battalions; Tractor Battalions.
Battle of the Hills: 266–73
Battle of Leyte Gulf: 44, 86, 93, 208, 369
effect of, on Japanese tactics: 94
effect of, on U. S. tactics: 92
Japanese estimate of: 221
Japanese tactics for: 89
operations: 89–92
results of: 92
Battleships, Japanese: 89, 90–91,
92, 96
Battleships, U. S.: 24, 41–42,
44, 90
California: 30
Maryland: 30, 60
Mississippi: 30, 60
Pennsylvania: 30
Tennessee: 30
West Virginia: 30, 60
Baybay: 12, 33–34, 144–45, 183,
203, 206, 218, 240, 253–54, 256,
257, 273, 275, 311
Bayug. See Airfields, Bayug.
Bazookas. See Weapons, U. S., rocket
launchers.
Beach demolition teams: 57
Beachheads
on Homonhon Island: 57
on Leyte: 67, 72
on Samar: 157
on Suluan Island: 55
Beaches. See Landing beaches.
Belen: 227–28
Benjamin, Pfc. George, Jr.: 339n
Bentley, 1st Lt. William C.: 260
Bicol: 27
Biliran Strait: 11
Binahaan River: 112, 144, 164, 172, 178, 179
Bito River: 114,
298, 302 [394]
Blacker, Maj. Kemuel K.: 211
Blamey, General Sir Thomas: 23, 26. See also Allied Land Forces.
Bloody Bamboo Thicket: 261–65
Bloody Ridge: 241
Blue Beach. See Landing beaches, Blue.
Blue Ridge: 200–201
Bohol Strait: 284
Bombardment, naval: See Naval bombardment.
Bombardment and fire support group: 28–30, 57, 60, 90, 91
Bombers, Japanese, estimate of: 22
Bombers, U. S.: 45. See also B-24’s.
Bombs, Japanese, used as mines: 134, 137
Bong, Maj. Richard I.: 96
Booby traps, Japanese: 122, 163
Bostock, Air Vice Marshal William D.: 26
Bougainville: 26
Bradley, Maj. Gen. James L. See also 96th
Infantry Division.
assumes command ashore: 76
command of: 76
and medical support: 192–94
tactical plans of: 107, 110, 113, 114, 119, 121, 240
Bradley, Col. William J.: 63, 148. See also Cavalry Regiments, 8th.
Breakneck Ridge: 207, 210, 228, 235, 237, 251, 356
battle of: 211–20, 223–25
description of: 211
Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H.: 19n
Bridges: 138,
140
air attacks on: 93, 99
Burayan River: 65
Carigara River: 181
condition of: 35
construction of: 130
Daguitan River: 33, 76, 78
at Dao: 33, 78
Mainit River: 170–71,
173, 175n, 177
Malirong River: 169
Palo River: 163, 164
at Tanauan: 112, 121
repaired: 65, 112, 140,
164, 169
British Malaya: 10
Brostrom, Pfc. Leonard C.: 143n
Browning automatic rifles, U. S. See Weapons, U.
S.,
Browning automatic rifles.
Bruce, Maj. Gen. Andrew D.: 311. See also
Infantry Divisions, 77th.
assumes command ashore: 284
command of: 276
in Palompon area: 348–49,
350–51, 351n, 352,
353–54
and Ormoc operation: 276–77,
277n, 285–87 290,
293
and Ormoc Valley operations: 313,
315, 317–18, 320,
329, 332–36, 339,
346
Brunei Bay: 89
Buaya: 351
Bunkers, Japanese: 71, 77, 129
Burauen: 12,
78, 103–04, 121,
137, 138, 144, 145, 176, 240, 243, 253, 254, 257, 297, 308, 313, 322, 365
advance on: 124–33
airfields: 34, 111, 263,
275, 285, 294–97,
298–305, 307, 313,
314
plans to take: 33
Burayan River: 65
Buri: 12, 395
airfield: 124, 131, 133–39, 188,
296–300, 302–05
Burns, Lt. Col. James P.: 224
Butuan prison camp: 16
Cabalian Bay: 11
Cabiranan: 228
Calamian Islands: 90
Calbasag River: 72,
76, 104, 130, 131, 145 California: 30
Calingatngan Creek: 266
Camotes Islands: 98,
99, 314, 365
Camotes Sea: 62,
253, 275, 280, 338, 351–52, 362
Canigao Channel: 280
Canmangui: 111
Cannon Companies
of the 17th Infantry: 141n,
143
of the 19th Infantry: 68
of the 23d Infantry: 129
of the 32d Infantry: 136, 256, 260
of the 305th Infantry: 350n
of the 307th Infantry: 345
of the 381st Infantry: 120,
121n
of the 382d Infantry: 113–14,116–17
Caomontag River: 181
Cape Sansapor: 26
Capoocan: 33,
67, 181, 206, 207, 210, 227, 237, 239
Capps, Sgt. Charles W.: 170n
Carabaos, use of, in supply operations: 111, 111n
[395]
Cargo carriers, M29: 112
Caridad: 254–55, 257,
258, 263
Carigara: 12,
67, 93, 157, 163, 168, 198, 203, 204, 206, 208–10, 218, 235, 237, 275, 325
advance on: 169–79
capture of: 179–83
center for Japanese reinforcements: 103–04
estimate of enemy forces at: 23
plan to take: 33
as supply base: 190
Carigara Bay: 11–12, 23,
33, 94, 146, 150, 155, 157, 173, 175–76, 206,
209, 210, 211, 227, 228
Carney, Rear Adm. Robert B.: 5
Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.: 35–36, 187–88, 199–200
Casualties, guerrilla: 17n, 18
Casualties, Japanese: 114, 123, 145
in area of 77th Division attack: 354
at Breakneck Ridge: 220
for Campaign: 367–68
at Hill 522: 71–72
in Ormoc area: 293
in Ormoc Valley: 321
in northern Leyte Valley: 157,
181–83
as results of guerrilla operations: 18, 20
at Shoestring Ridge: 263
at Tabontabon: 117
Casualties, U. S.
A Day: 78
at Breakneck Ridge: 220, 225
for Campaign: 367
causes of: 195
evacuation of: 112, 140, 161, 189–90,
192–94, 198
of 1st Cavalry Division: 157
at Hill 522: 72
in landing operations: 68–69
of 96th Division: 114
of 77th Division: 293, 321, 354
at Shoestring Ridge: 263
at Tabontabon: 117
of 24th Division: 181–83
Cataisan Peninsula: 12, 62–65,
72, 78, 187, 190
Catmon Hill: 33,
34, 52, 60, 72, 74,
107, 110, 114, 120–21, 123, 131, 308–10
description of: 104
Japanese tactics at: 111
Japanese defense of: 104–07
operations at: 117–20
plans to take: 107, 108, 268
U. S. tactics at: 110–111
Cavalry Brigades. See also Cavalry Division, 1st;
Cavalry Regiments; Cavalry Squadrons.
1st: 63, 151, 165, 168, 210
2d: 63–65, 146, 151,
153, 174–75, 180–81, 210
Cavalry Division, 1st: 9, 26, 40, 67,
68, 72, 82, 167, 185, 223. See also Cavalry Regiments; Cavalry
Squadrons; X Corps.
A-Day operations of: 62–67
A-Day tactical plan for: 33,
62–63
advance on Ormoc Valley: 235–40
casualties of: 157
combat experience of: 26
commander of: 63
deployment of: 275
lateral liaison: 157, 173, 210
medical support of: 192
missions of: 33, 34, 62,
146, 153, 168, 173, 206, 210, 218, 313, 347
in northern Leyte Valley: 146–57, 173–75, 179–81
in Ormoc Valley: 342–45
in Palompon area: 351, 355–56, 358
shipping for, planned: 38–39
Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops
7th: 144, 256
24th: 167, 230
77th: 288
Cavalry Regiments
5th, 1st Division: 165, 180–81
A-Day: 63–65, 66
advance on Caibaan: 151–52
advance on Carigara: 175, 175n
command of: 66, 151n
honor guard for MacArthur: 152
in Ormoc Valley: 345
in Palompon area: 355
at Pawing: 166
7th, 1st Division: 155, 174
A-Day operations of: 63–65
advance on Carigara: 175, 181
advance to Ormoc Valley: 239–40
advance on Tacloban: 146–48,
150, 377
command of: 148
missions of: 146, 155, 175,
180–81
in Ormoc Valley: 342
in Palompon area: 355
8th, 1st Division:
A-Day operations of: 67
advance on Caibaan: 148, 150–51
advance on Carigara: 175, 180–81
command of: 63, 148
missions of: 150, 174–75
secures San Juanico Strait: 153–57
12th, 1st Division: 174, 235–36
A-Day operations of: 63–66
advance on Caibaan: 151
at Hill 522: 166–67
at Marasbaras: 165
in Ormoc Valley: 342–46
in Palompon area: 355 [396]
112th: 222, 306
command of: 218
advance to Ormoc Valley: 237–39
Krueger on use of: 31–32
missions of: 218, 223, 237
in Ormoc Valley: 341, 342
Cavalry Squadrons
1st, 5th Regiment: 355
advance toward Caibaan: 151–52
advance on Carigara: 175n
missions of: 165
in Ormoc Valley: 345
at Pawing: 166
2d, 5th Regiment: 151–52,
165, 175, 180–81
1st, 7th Regiment: 355
A-Day operations of: 65
advance on Carigara: 175, 180–81
advance on Tacloban: 146–48
casualties of: 175
commander of: 155
missions of: 65, 175
on Samar: 174
at San Juanico Strait: 155
2d, 7th Regiment: 174
A-Day operations of: 65
advance to Ormoc Valley: 239–40
advance on Tacloban: 146–48
landing area of: 65
missions of: 65
in Ormoc Valley: 342
1st, 8th Regiment: 150, 153–57, 174
2d, 8th Regiment
advance on Caibaan: 150–51
advance on Carigara: 181
lateral liaison: 173
missions of: 150, 174, 180–81
in northern Leyte Valley: 174,
175
1st, 12th Regiment: 151, 174–75, 342–45
2d, 12th Regiment: 166–67,
432–45
1st, 112th Regiment: 238–39,
341
2d, 112th Regiment: 238–40,
342
CCS. See Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Cebu: 17, 22, 27,
45, 94, 96, 284, 332, 362–63,
366–67
Celebes: 53
Central Pacific Area: 1–2, 23,
31, 43
air support from, for Campaign: 27–28
missions of naval forces of: 30
plans for operations in: 7
progress in, June 1944: 3
shipping in: 17
as source of supply for Campaign: 37
Central Philippine Attack Force: 24. See also
Allied Naval Forces.
Chapman, Lt. Col. George H., Jr.: 171, 213
Chase, Brig. Gen. William C.: 63. See also
Cavalry Brigade, 1st.
Chemical Battalions
85th: 161, 212, 219
88th: 288–89, 318, 319, 353
91st: 139, 141n
Chemical mortars: See Mortars, chemical.
Chief of Naval Operations. See King, Admiral
Ernest J.
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. See Marshall, General
George C.
China-Burma-India theater: 8, 28
“China Incident”: 208
Cities. See by name.
Civil affairs, Philippines: 152, 198–204
Clark Field: 86
Clifford, Lt. Col. Thomas E., Jr.: 230n
in advance on Carigara: 169–70, 173
in advance on Pinamopoan: 206–07
awarded Distinguished Service Medal: 230
commands: 169–70
at Kilay Ridge: 227–34,
234n
in northwest Leyte: 356–57
Close air support: See Air support.
Coastwatchers: 20
Coconuts, use of as food: 111
Cogon: 316–17, 328,
330–32, 336
Colasian Point: 210
Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1n, 2, 9 Combined Fleet: 45. See also Battle
of Leyte Gulf; Japanese naval units.
absence of, in Philippine waters, prerequisite for Leyte Campaign:
24
in action off Formosa: 44
command of: 46, 54, 88
co-operation with Army: 53–54
estimate of use of: 22
missions of: 46–48, 54
and missions of Central Pacific naval forces: 30
operations of: 89–92
plans of: 46–49, 88–89
Suzuki on ability of: 50
Command, Allied
for Campaign: 24–26
co-ordination of: 27, 31
line of: 23, 24, 31, 244
for Ormoc operation: 277
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. See King,
Admiral Ernest J.
Communications
difficulties of: 115
effectiveness of: 112
radio: 19–20, 112
supply of: 111
Third Fleet to protect: 30
[397]
Construction: 306–08. See also Logistics.
Consuegra: 228,
229, 231–32, 234
Contact, lateral. See Lateral liaison.
Convoys, Japanese
attacked: 93, 98–99, 208, 210, 281–83
reinforcing Leyte forces: 99–102
Convoys, U. S.: 38,
216
composition of: 40, 41–42
entrance into Leyte Gulf: 58–59
formation of: 38, 40–41, 55–57
protection for: 27
Conyngham: 283
Coral reefs: 55
Corkscrew Ridge: 212, 219, 220, 224–25
Cornell, Lt. Col. Theodore M.: 1
Corps, U. S. See XIV Corps; X Corps; XXIV
Corps.
Counter Intelligence Corps: 200
Counterattacks, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,
counterattack. Crosby: 54
Cruisers, Allied: 24, 30, 41–42, 90
A-Day operations of: 60–61
Canberra: 44
Denver: 54
Houston: 44
Cruisers, Japanese: 22, 89, 91, 92,
96
Atago: 90
Maya: 90
Cunningham, Brig. Gen. Julian W.: 218, 222,
237.
See also Cavalry Regiments, 112th.
Dagami: 33, 52, 103–04, 107,
111, 120–21, 122,
123, 127, 131, 133, 145, 169, 172, 204, 218, 240–41, 295, 296–97,
298, 303–04
advance on: 137–45
defenses at: 141
description of: 141–42
as Japanese command post: 124
mopping-up operations in area of: 241–43
Daguitan River: 76,
78, 104–07, 127,
131, 145, 307
Daha: 357
Dahlen, Lt. Col. Chester A.: 176–78, 227,
228, 232, 357
Damulaan: 254–55, 256,
260, 263, 264, 266
Daro: 209, 210–11, 218, 223, 333, 334 Darter: 90
Davis, Lt. Col. Douglas C.: 302
Dayhagan: 335
Defenses, Japanese
against air attacks: 42–43
at Aslom: 114
at Breakneck Ridge: 211, 215, 224
at Burauen: 133
at Buri airfield: 133–34,
136
on Catmon Hill: 104, 111
at Dagami: 141
along Highway 2: 331, 337, 339
at Hill 522: 70
at Hill B: 166, 167
at Hindang: 113
intelligence on: 21
of Jolo Islands: 8
at Labiranan Head: 108–09
at landing beaches: 30, 51–52, 59, 65, 74–75
in Leyte Valley: 52–53
on Luzon: 49
in Ormoc area: 284, 287, 290–91
in Ormoc Valley: 316, 320, 340
at Palo: 161
in Palompon area: 352
at Pastrana: 171
at Shoestring Ridge: 257
in southern Leyte: 124, 128, 129, 131
at Tabontabon: 115, 116
Defenses, U. S., at Shoestring Ridge: 257
Demolition charges: 120, 137, 249
Demolition teams, naval. See Underwater
demolition teams. Denver: 54
Deployment, Japanese
August 1944: 46
in Dagami sector: 141
intelligence on: 21
in landing areas: 104–07
in Leyte Valley: 168, 175–76
of 16th Division: 124,
131
of Southern Army: 50
at Tacloban: 146
of 35th Army: 52, 103–04
Deployment, U. S.
air forces: 98
of forces at end of A Day: 107
Deposito: 273,
277, 281, 285, 293, 310–11, 325
Desolation Point: 55
Destroyer escorts, U. S.: 24, 41, 91, 92,
280
Destroyers, Japanese: 22, 96, 101
Destroyers, U. S.: 24, 30, 42, 55,
90, 91, 92, 280
A-Day operations of: 60–62
bombardment by: 58, 59
Conyngham: 283
and floating mines: 57
Laffey: 283
Mahan: 283
missions of: 30
O’Brien: 283n
Dick, 1st Lt. Dallas: 71–72
Digahongan: 122
Diit: 151
Dill, Col. Macey L.: 107, 122. See also 382d Infantry Regiment.
command of: 74
at Dagami: 240–42
at Tabontabon: 116
tactics of: 110
Dinagat Island: 20,
31, 34, 55–58
Distinguished Service Crosses
Kangleon, Lt. Col. Ruperto: 152
Newman, Col. Aubrey S.: 176n
Robinson, Pfc. Frank B.: 69n
Thompson, 1st Sgt. Francis H.: 241, 241n
Distinguished Service Medal, Clifford, Lt. Col. Thomas
E.: 230
Divisions, square. See 1st Cavalry Division.
Divisions, U. S. See Airborne Division, 11th;
Cavalry Division, 1st; Infantry Divisions; Marine Division, 1st.
Dixon, Capt. Roy F.: 258
Dogs, use of: 247
Donghol: 319
Dulag: 12, 34, 76,
78, 83, 86, 97–98, 103–04, 107,
109, 111, 130, 145, 185, 188, 192, 208, 240, 256, 277, 280, 300, 308
airfield: 22, 72, 124–29, 131–32, 187,
275, 294–95, 297,
298, 305, 307
amphibious operations in area of: 33, 45, 60, 62,
72
control of civilians in area of: 202–03
description of: 72
Japanese defenses in area of: 52,
124
as supply base: 190
Duncan, Lt. Col. William A.: 224
East Indies: 27
Edris, Maj. Edwin N.: 165
Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.: 26, 361, 368
Ely, Col. William J.: 35–36, 184
Engineer Battalions
3d: 169
13th: 130, 137, 140–41,
142, 259
127th Airborne: 302
302d: 320, 333, 350n, 352
321st: 121, 121n
Engineer units, Japanese: 52
Engineer units, U. S. miscellaneous: 65
2d Special Brigade: 80, 350
532d Boat and Shore Regiment: 80
592d Boat and Shore Regiment: 80
1122d Combat Group: 80
1140th Combat Group: 80
reconnaissance by: 112
shortage of: 36
Engineers
and construction program for Leyte: 35–36
logistical operations of: 80,
83
missions of: 26, 35
problems of: 35–36, 184–90
repair bridges: 65, 112, 121
use of: 348
Eniwetok: 41
Envelopments, U. S. See Tactics, U. S.,
envelopment.
Escort carriers: 24,
28, 31, 42
Evacuation, Japanese: 30
Evacuation of casualties. See Medical operations,
evacuation of casualties.
F4U’s: 280
Far Eastern policy: 2
Fast Carrier Task Force: 24, 27
Fellers, Brig. Gen. Bonner F.: 199
Field Artillery Battalions
11th: 167, 171, 177, 326–28
13th
at Colasian Point: 210
at Hill 522: 70–71
at Hill B: 166–67
at Palo: 163–64
at Pastrana: 171
14th: 171
31st: 130
49th: 143
at Buri airfield: 135, 136
at Hill 380: 269, 271, 272
at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 257, 258, 260
52d: 167, 177, 210, 211, 212
57th: 258, 260, 264–65
61st: 67, 146
63d
advance on Carigara: 170, 177
advance on Pinamopoan: 207
at Capoocan: 210
at Hill 522: 71
at Kilay Ridge: 227
at Palo: 164
at Pawing: 159–61
120th: 225
198th: 119
226th: 211, 220, 333,
334
271st: 344
287th Observation: 299–300
304th: 318, 337
305th: 290, 318–19, 330–31, 337,
350n
306th: 285, 318, 330–31, 337,
350n
361st: 107–09, 119, 121, 121n
363d: 108, 109, 117, 119
465th: 220
531st: 349, 350, 350n
[399]
674th Parachute: 302
902d
in drive on Ormoc: 286, 287–90, 291
in Ormoc Valley: 317, 318, 330–31, 334,
337
921st: 108–09
947th: 206
Fifth Air Force
airfields for: 188
command of: 26
establishes units on Leyte: 96
missions of: 26–28, 38, 45,
94, 187
operations of: 98–99,
217, 283–84, 286,
349
plans of: 94
reinforcements for: 45
shortage of airfields for: 209
tactical plans for: 276, 279–80
V Amphibious Corps: 256n
Filipinos. See also Native labor.
care of: 201–03
guerrilla activities of: 14–20
as guides: 228, 230–31
impressment of, by Japanese: 70
medical treatment of: 194,
195
reaction to invasion: 57, 148, 152, 163
recruitment of: 204
religion of: 10
as source of intelligence: 250,
257
and supply operations: 111,
112, 228, 229, 235, 331
supply to: 203–04
Finance ministry, Japanese, on Allied losses off
Formosa: 120–21
Finn, Lt. Col. John M.
at Bun airfield: 135–36
command of: 133–34
in Ormoc Valley: 323
at Shoestring Ridge: 254–55,
257n, 258, 259n, 262–64
Finnegan, Col. Walter H.: 148
Flame throwers. See Weapons, U. S., flame
throwers.
Flanagan, Maj. Edward M., Jr.: 298n
Food. See Rations.
Formosa: 1, 4, 45,
90
discussed at Hawaii conference, July 1944: 6
Japanese reaction to action off: 54, 85
neutralization of Japanese forces on, prerequisite to Leyte Campaign:
24
plans for attack on: 2–3,
7, 27, 28, 30–31
Third Fleet action off: 43–44
Fortifications, Japanese. See Defenses,
Japanese.
Fourteenth Air Force: 28
Foxhole Corners: 122. See also Digahongan.
Freeman, Col. Paul L.: 318–20
Frink, Maj. Gen. James L.: 23, 26. See also Services of Supply, SWPA.
Fulston, Maj. Robert C., Jr.: 135
Fryar, Pvt. Elmer E.: 322n
Fukue, Lt. Gen. Shimpei: 363
G-2. See Intelligence, U. S.
Galotan: 173
Garcia, Carlos: 17n
General Headquarters, SWPA: 16, 18–20,
36, 38, 39 George F.
Clymer: 41
Giagsam: 179
Gibucauan: 179
Gigantangan Island: 357–58
Gill, Maj. Gen. William H. See also Infantry
Divisions, 32d.
command of: 223
in Ormoc Valley: 325
tactical plans of: 223–24,
232–34, 234n, 356
Ginabuyan: 362
Ginagan River: 178
Ginogusan: 139
Grammatico, Pfc. Fedele A.: 129
Gray, 1st Lt. Leslie M.: 54
Greenbowe, 1st Lt. Tower W.: 175
Gregory, Lt. John: 152
Grenades, Japanese. See Weapons, Japanese,
grenades.
Grenades, U. S. See Weapons, U. S., grenades.
Grove, Pfc. Kenneth W.: 148, 148n
Guerrilla movement, Philippines: 14–20. See also Fertig, Col. Wendell;
Kangleon, Col. Ruperto; Miranda, Brig. Gen. Blas E.; Parsons, Lt.
Comdr. Charles; Peralta, Col. Macario.
intelligence on Carigara: 179
at Kilay Ridge: 228
in Ormoc Valley: 314, 315
after Sixth Army landing: 201,
204
as source of intelligence: 250,
254, 348
use as troops in Campaign: 257n
Gugeler, Lt. Russell A.: 128n
Guinarona River: 111–12, 114,
116, 118–19
Gun fire support units, naval: 30
Guns, Japanese: 30
37-mm.: 179
75-mm.: 69, 108–09, 121,
129, 130, 137, 353, 354
105-mm.: 344
antitank: 77, 129
coastal: 108
estimate of emplacement of: 22
[400]
Guns, U. S.
M3 machine: 249, 249n
37-mm.: 249
.50-caliber machine: 249
75-mm.: 240
90-mm. antiaircraft: 249
155-mm.: 209, 211, 212–13, 256,
256n, 257, 349, 350
antitank: 109, 136–37
self-propelled: 69, 213
tank destroyer: 317, 320
Thompson submachine: 249
used by Japanese: 138, 164
Hagins, Col. William A.: 194
Hainan: 31
Halloran, Col. Michael E.: 119, 121
Halmahera: 53
Halsey, Admiral William F.: 27, 30, 42, 54,
90, 91.
See also Third Fleet.
on air attacks on Ryukyus: 43
on Battle of Leyte Gulf: 92
on bypassing objectives before Philippines: 4–5
on carrier support for Leyte Campaign: 44–45
to command operations in Palaus: 8
in line of command: 24
on operations in Pacific: 8–9
ordered to support Sixth Army: 23
orders air attack on Philippines: 45
and San Bernardino-Surigao Straits operation: 45
at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5
and Third Fleet action off Formosa: 44
Hamilton, Col. Stephen S.: 285, 287
Harassing fire: 67,
75–76, 119, 130,
225
Harbor conditions: 35
Harbor facilities: 12
Hawaiian Islands: 3–4, 5–6,
39, 40
Hawkins, 1st Lt. Jack, USMC: 17n
Headquarters, Alamo Force:
26
Headquarters, Leyte Area Command (guerrilla): 18
Headquarters, Sixth Army: 26, 78
Headquarters, SWPA: 222
Headquarters, XXIV Corps: 41
Hettinger, Col. John A.: 223–25
Hiabangan: 131
Highway 1. See Roads, Highway 1.
Highway 2. See Roads, Highway 2.
Hill 85: 167
Hill 120: 75
Hill 331: 165
Hill 522: 67–68, 70–72, 78,
146, 157, 161, 165, 166, 190
Hill 918: 256,
257, 258, 264, 266–71
Hill 1525: 213,
215, 216, 223, 238
Hill 2348: 242–43
Hill B: 163,
164, 165, 166–67,
168
Hill Mike: 165
Hill Nan: 165
Hitomnog: 241
Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.: 145, 206, 243.
See also XXIV Corps.
and advance on Burauen: 124–27
assumes command ashore: 80
and civil affairs on Leyte: 199,
202
commands XXIV Corps: 26
and defense of airfields: 300,
303
in Ormoc Valley: 317, 323
and Ormoc Valley operations: 329,
336
and plans for Ormoc operation: 276, 277, 293
and supply problems: 311, 312
tactical plans of: 218, 223, 240, 253, 254, 296, 297, 300, 349
Hoffman, Brig. Gen. Hugh F.: 63, 153–55,
174–75, 180–81
Hokoda, Col. Keijiro: 124, 133
Hollandia: 9,
26, 28, 34, 37, 38–39, 40,
54, 57, 190, 251
Homonhon Island: 31,
34, 55–57
Honolulu: 40
Honshu: 294
Hoska, Col. Lucas: 302
Hospitals: 192–93, 236
attacked: 164
construction of: 189–90
for Filipinos: 201, 203–04
ships as: 194
sites for: 189 Houston:
44
Howard, Maj. Elmer C.: 171
Howitzers, Japanese
70-mm.: 122
75-mm.: 119
Howitzers, U. S.
75-mm.: 291
75-mm. self-propelled: 129,
249
105-mm.: 119, 240, 249,
257, 260
105-mm. self-propelled: 178–79, 249
155-mm.: 117, 119, 206,
249, 256, 257, 260, 318
self-propelled M8’s: 142–43
Humaybunay: 351–52
Hydrographic ships: 42
Ignacio, 1st Lt. R. C: 19n
Imahori, Col.: 287,
313–14, 314n, 334
Imperial General Headquarters: 49, 208, 275, 360, 362, 363
co-ordination between services: 88
and defense of Philippines: 49–50, 51–52
and deployment of naval forces: 44
[401]
naval plans of: 88
orders reinforcement of Pacific bases, summer 1944: 46
plans for defense of Philippines: 85
and replacement of Kuroda: 50
Suzuki on defense plans of: 50
tactical plans of: 294
Improvisations, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,
improvisations.
Improvisations, U. S. See Tactics, U. S.,
improvisations.
Infantry Battalions, Japanese. See Japanese Army
units, Battalions.
Infantry Battalions, U. S. See also Infantry
Divisions, U. S.; Infantry Regiments, U. S.
1st, 17th Regiment: 241
advance on Burauen: 133
advance on Dagami: 137–40,
141, 142–43
at Battle of the Hills: 268–72
at end of A Day: 127
missions of: 132, 138
2d, 17th Regiment
advance on Burauen: 133
advance on Dagami: 137–40,
141–43
at Battle of the Hills: 268–71, 272–73
commander of: 142
at end of A Day: 127
missions of: 132, 138
3d, 17th Regiment: 132, 241
A-Day operations of: 78
advance on Burauen: 131
advance on Dagami: 139, 140–41, 143–44
at Battle of the Hills: 270,
271, 273
missions of: 76
results of A-Day operations: 127
1st, 19th Regiment
A-Day operations of: 68, 69–72
advance on Carigara: 171–72,
173
commander of: 171
at Hill 522: 161, 166–67
at Hill 85: 167
missions of: 166–67,
178, 211
2d, 19th Regiment
A-Day operations of: 69–70
advance on Carigara: 172
advance on Ormoc: 223, 225–27, 229–30
at Breakneck Ridge: 213, 215, 216
commander of: 167, 215
at Hill B: 166–67
missions of: 163, 166, 213,
218, 219, 223
at Palo: 163–64
3d, 19th Regiment
A-Day operations of: 69
advance on Carigara: 171–72
casualties of: 164
at Castilla: 165
commander of: 171
lateral liaison of: 112
missions of: 212
at Palo: 161, 164, 166
at San Joaquin: 164
1st, 21st Regiment: 212, 213, 215, 216, 219–20
2d, 21st Regiment: 212–16,
219, 220
3d, 21st Regiment: 211–12,
213, 215–16, 219,
220
1st, 32d Regiment
advance on Burauen: 129, 130, 131, 133
commander of: 129
in Mahonag area: 323
missions of: 134, 136, 256,
264
ordered to Panaon Strait: 145
securing Buri airfield: 134–37
2d, 32d Regiment: 131, 134, 135, 144–45
A-Day operations of: 77–78
advance on Burauen: 128–29,
130, 133
advance on Ormoc: 243–54
commander of: 256
in Mahonag area: 323
securing Buri airfield: 135–37
at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 257–59, 261–64
3d, 32d Regiment
A-Day operations of: 77–78
advance on Burauen: 128–30,
133
at Battle of the Hills: 269–70
commander of: 256
in Mahonag area: 322–23
missions of: 128, 135, 136
securing Buri airfield: 135–37
at Shoestring Ridge: 257–60,
262–63, 264–65
1st, 34th Regiment: 173
A-Day operations of: 68
advance on Carigara: 169–70,
179, 181
advance on Ormoc: 218, 219
advance on Palo: 161
advance on Pinamopoan: 206–07
casualties of: 234–35
commander of: 165, 169–70
at Hill C: 165
at Kilay Ridge: 225–35
missions of: 177–78,
223
in northwest Leyte: 356–58
2d, 34th Regiment
A-Day operations of: 68
advance on Carigara: 169, 170–71, 173, 178–79,
181
casualties of: 158–59
commander of: 157
at Hill C: 166
missions of: 176–77
in northwest Leyte: 357–58
at Pawing: 158–61
at Pinamopoan: 207 [402]
results of A-Day operations: 157
3d, 34th Regiment
A-Day operations of: 68
advance on Carigara: 171, 172–73, 176–78, 179,
181
at Breakneck Ridge: 207
at Capoocan: 207
commander of: 173
at Hill C: 165–66
missions of: 173, 176
at Pawing: 159
results of A-Day operations: 157
1st, 126th Regiment: 326, 328, 340–42
2d, 126th Regiment: 325–26,
328, 340–41
3d, 126th Regiment: 326, 328, 340–41
1st, 127th Regiment: 326
2d, 127th Regiment: 326, 328
1st, 128th Regiment: 224–25
2d, 128th Regiment: 224–25,
234
3d, 128th Regiment: 224–25,
325
1st, 149th Regiment: 303–04
2d, 149th Regiment: 303, 304
1st, 184th Regiment: 133
A-Day operations of: 78
at Battle of the Hills: 266,
267–68, 270
missions of: 128
in Ormoc: 320
results of A-Day operations: 127
at Shoestring Ridge: 258, 260–61, 263–65
2d, 184th Regiment: 133
A-Day operations of: 78
advance on Burauen: 127–28
advance toward Dagami: 137–39, 140
at Battle of the Hills: 266,
267–68, 270
missions of: 132
at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 264–65
3d, 184th Regiment
A-Day operations of: 78
advance on Burauen: 128
at Battle of the Hills: 267–68, 269–70, 272
missions of: 128, 264
results of A-Day operations: 127
1st, 305th Regiment
in drive on Ormoc: 285
mission of: 290
in Ormoc Valley: 317, 318–20, 321, 330, 333
in Palompon area: 349–51
2d, 305th Regiment
in drive on Ormoc: 285
mission of: 290
in Ormoc Valley: 315, 316, 318–20, 321,
330
in Palompon area: 349, 352–54
3d, 305th Regiment
in drive on Ormoc: 285
mission of: 290
in Ormoc Valley: 315, 316, 318–20, 321,
330, 335
in Palompon area: 349, 352–54
1st, 306th Regiment: 289, 291, 316–17, 338–39
2d, 306th Regiment
in drive on Ormoc: 287, 289, 291
missions of: 285
in Ormoc Valley: 317, 333, 335, 338, 345
3d, 306th Regiment: 298
in drive on Ormoc: 289, 291
in Ormoc Valley: 316–17,
333–34, 338, 345–46
1st, 307th Regiment: 285–86,
289
2d, 307th Regiment: 285
1st, 381st Regiment: 119–20
2d, 381st Regiment: 119–20
3d, 381st Regiment: 119–22
1st, 382d Regiment: 107
A-Day operations of: 75
advance to Kiling: 122–23
at Aslom: 114, 116
commander of: 122–23
in Dagami area: 241–43
and defense of the airfields: 304
missions of: 110, 111, 113,
122, 300
operations: 110, 111, 113–14
2d, 382d Regiment: 122, 123
A-Day operations of: 74–75,
107
casualties of: 117
in Dagami area: 241–43
missions of: 110, 111, 113,
116
operations of: 110–11,
114
at Tabontabon: 116–17
3d, 382d Regiment: 110, 113, 114, 242–43
A-Day mission of: 75
A-Day operations of: 107
advance to Kiling: 122
missions of: 116, 122
operations of: 110, 111, 113–14
at Tabontabon: 116
1st, 383d Regiment: 114, 120
A-Day operations of: 74
at Labiranan Head: 108–09,
118–19
at Labir Hill: 114
missions of: 107, 108, 112,
119
results of A-Day operations of: 107
2d, 383d Regiment: 110
A-Day operations of: 74
commander of: 117
missions of: 108, 110, 117,
118
operations of: 110, 111–12
at Pikas: 114
results of A-Day operations of: 107
at San Vicente Hill: 117–19
3d, 383d Regiment: 114
on A Day: 115–16
[403]
missions of: 108, 110, 118
operations of: 110, 111, 112
results of A-Day operations of: 107
at San Vicente Hill: 118–19
at Tabontabon: 115–16
6th Ranger: 58
casualties of: 55
commander of: 54
confirms target date: 39
Krueger on use of: 32
medical support of: 192
missions of: 28, 31, 34,
55
operations of: 54–55
Infantry Divisions, Japanese. See Japanese Army
units, Divisions.
Infantry Divisions, U. S. See also Infantry
Battalions, U. S.; Infantry Regiments, U. S.
7th: 80–82, 111, 256,
273, 285, 295, 333.
See also Infantry Regiments, U. S., 17th, 32d, and 184th; XXIV
Corps.
A-Day operations of: 72, 76–78, 83–84
casualties of: 145
combat experience of: 26
deployment of: 275, 293
estimate of Army and Navy air support: 93
lateral liaison of: 76, 107–08, 286
medical support: 192, 195, 198, 202
missions of: 33, 107, 124–27, 145,
218, 243, 253, 266, 271, 277
mopping-up operations of: 365
on one-ton trailer: 250
results of A-Day operations: 127
secures XXIV Corps beachhead line: 133–45
on 75-mm. self-propelled howitzer: 249
supply problems: 83–84
on 37-mm. gun: 249
tactical plans: 34, 240, 254
zone of action: 124
24th: 32, 144–45, 200–201, 275.
See also Infantry Regiments, U. S., 19th, 21st, and 34th; X
Corps.
A-Day operations of: 67–72,
78–80, 82
available for Campaign: 9
casualties of: 181–83,
225
combat experience of: 26
commander of: 67
drive on Ormoc: 206–08,
210–20
at Hollandia: 40
Irving assumes command ashore: 72
on Japanese training: 251
landing area: 33, 67, 80–82
lateral liaison: 67, 112, 185, 210, 356
medical support of: 192, 194, 195, 198
missions of: 33, 34, 62,
67–68, 157, 168,
206, 210, 218, 223, 253, 347
in northwest Leyte: 356–58
operations in northern Leyte Valley: 157–67,168–74, 176–83
results of A-Day operations: 157
shipping for: 38–39
tactical plans of: 33, 62, 347
32d: 34, 220, 222, 230, 232, 237, 306.
See also Infantry Regiments, U. S., 126th, 127th, and 128th; X
Corps.
casualties of: 225
combat experience of: 26–27
at Kilay Ridge: 234
lateral liaison: 238
missions of: 26, 223, 253,
347
in Ormoc Valley: 275, 293, 313, 324, 325–28, 339, 342, 343
in Palompon area: 354–56,
358
strength of: 26
38th: 303–04
77th: 222, 298, 305, 306, 361, 362, 365.
See also Infantry Regiments, U. S., 305th, 306th, 307th; XXIV
Corps.
casualties of: 293, 321, 354
combat experience of: 27
commander of: 276
and defense of the airfields: 297
landing area of: 273
lateral liaison of: 293, 342, 345
missions of: 277, 329, 336,
349, 358
mopping-up operations of: 365
in Ormoc area: 276–79,
280, 284–87, 289–90, 293
in Ormoc Valley: 313–15,
319–21, 325–28, 339, 342, 345
in Palompon area: 347, 349, 354–55, 358
shipping for: 38
strength of: 26
supply problems: 310–12
81st: 38
96th: 26, 27, 34, 41, 76,
83, 131. See also Infantry
Regiments, U. S., 381st, 382d, and 383d; XXIV Corps.
A-Day operations of: 72–76
advance to Kiling: 121–23
casualties of: 114, 123
in Catmon Hill area: 114–23
commander of: 76
and defense of the airfields: 300,
303–04
on DUKW: 250
enlarges its beachhead area: 107–14
landing area of: 33, 72–74, 80
lateral liaison: 77, 127, 144, 164
medical support of: 192–95
missions of: 33, 34, 107,
218, 243
mopping-up operations of: 240–43, 275,
365
on 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer, 249
results of A-Day operations of: 76
[404]
tactical plans of: 107
on Thompson submachine gun: 249
zone of action: 124
Americal: 365
Infantry Regiments, Japanese. See Japanese Army
units, Regiments.
Infantry Regiments, U. S. See also Infantry
Battalions, U. S.; Infantry Divisions, U. S.
17th, 7th Division: 240, 241, 264, 293
A-Day operations of: 76, 78
advance on Burauen: 132–33
advance on Dagami: 121, 137–44
at Battle of the Hills: 266–67, 268–73
commander of: 138
estimate of enemy forces in Dagami: 141
lateral liaison: 131
missions of: 144, 296
results of A-Day operations: 127
19th, 24th Division
A-Day operations of: 67–72
advance on Carigara: 171–73,
179
at Breakneck Ridge: 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219
commander of: 171, 213
in drive on Ormoc: 223, 225–27, 229–30
headquarters moved to Palo: 164
at Hill B: 166–67
lateral liaison of: 112, 144, 171, 229–30
missions of: 67, 166, 168,
171–72, 178, 206,
223
at Palo: 161–65
presidential citation: 225–27
results of A-Day operations: 157,
161
21st, 24th Division: 67, 168
A-Day operations of: 78, 145
at Breakneck Ridge: 211–16,
218–20, 223–24, 227, 237
casualties of: 220
confirms target date: 39
commander of: 211, 213
on Japanese training: 251
Krueger on use of: 31–32
medical support of: 192
missions of: 32,
33, 34, 62, 206, 210, 223–24
at Panaon Strait: 32, 33, 78,
145, 206, 256
32d, 7th Division: 138, 268, 269
A-Day operations of: 77–78
advance on Baybay: 144–45,
253
advance on Burauen: 128–33
at Buri airfield: 133–37
casualties of: 263
commander of: 76, 133–34
landing area of: 76
lateral liaison: 76, 107, 127–28, 129,
131
in Mahonag area: 322–23
missions of: 127, 128, 134,
253
results of A-Day operations: 127
at Shoestring Ridge: 254–65
tactical plans of: 76
34th, 24th Division: 210–11
A-Day operations of: 66–69
advance on Carigara: 169–71,
172–73, 175n, 176–79, 181
advance on Ormoc: 206–08,
211, 218, 219
advance on Palo: 161–63
amphibious operations of: 227
commander of: 68, 357
at Hill C: 165–66
at Kilay Ridge: 225–35
lateral liaison: 66, 157, 171, 173, 181, 229–30
missions of: 67–68, 168, 180, 206, 223, 227, 277
in northwest Leyte: 365–58
at Pawing: 157–61
results of A-Day operations: 157
126th, 32d Division: 238–39,
325–28, 339–41
127th, 32d Division: 325, 326, 328, 339, 340, 341–42, 355–56
128th, 32d Division: 220, 223–25, 233, 234, 325, 355–56
149th, 38th Division: 303–04
158th: 31–32
184th, 7th Division: 256, 258, 265, 273, 293
A-Day operations of: 78
advance on Burauen: 127–28,
129–30, 131, 132,
133
advance toward Dagami: 137–39, 140
at Battle of the Hills: 266–68, 269–70, 271–72
commander of: 76
landing area of: 76–77
lateral liaison: 127–28,
129, 131
missions of: 76, 127, 128
in Ormoc Valley: 320, 321
results of A-Day operations: 127
at Shoestring Ridge: 260–61,
263–64
305th, 77th Division
in advance on Ormoc: 284–85,
286, 288, 289–90,
291
commander of: 284
missions of: 284–85,
286–87
in Ormoc Valley: 315, 316–17, 318–20, 321,
329, 330, 331, 333–36
in Palompon area: 349–51,
352–54
306th, 77th Division: 297,
298, 352
in advance on Ormoc: 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293
commander of: 285
missions of: 277, 285, 291
[405]
in Ormoc Valley: 315–17,
319–21, 329–31, 333–37, 338–39, 345
307th, 77th Division
in advance on Ormoc: 285–86,
287–90, 291, 292–93
commander of: 285
missions of: 285, 286
in Ormoc Valley: 315–17,
319, 320–21, 329–31, 333,
334, 336–38, 345
381st, 96th Division: 34, 76, 117, 119–22
382d, 96th Division: 114, 122
A-Day operations of: 74–75
advance to Kiling: 122–23
advance on Tanauan: 141
at Buri airfield: 304
casualties: 110, 117
commander of: 74
expands beachhead: 110, 111, 112, 113–14
landing area of: 72
lateral liaison: 144
missions of: 107, 108, 110,
113, 122, 300
mopping-up operations in Dagami area: 240, 241–43
results of A-Day operations: 107
at Tabontabon: 116–17
383d, 96th Division: 120
A-Day operations of: 74
commander of: 74
expands beachhead: 110–12
landing area of: 72
missions of: 107–08,
110, 119
results of A-Day operations: 107
at San Vicente Hill: 117–19
at Tabontabon: 114–16
Infiltration, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,
infiltration.
Intelligence, Japanese: 18, 250–51,
254n
Intelligence, U. S.
on Carigara: 179–80
coastwatchers: 20
on condition of landing beaches: 57
estimate of: 9
estimate of enemy strategy: 22–23
estimate of enemy strength: 8,
21–22, 42–43
estimate of enemy forces: 141
estimate of guerrilla strength on Leyte: 18
estimate of political situation in Japan, July 1944: 21–22
from guerrillas: 250, 254, 348
from Filipinos: 200–201
Kangleon mission: 17, 19–20
Krueger on: 250
of mine charts on Suluan: 31
Parsons mission: 16
from prisoners of war: 135,
141, 296
results of guerrilla movement: 20
of survivors of Corregidor: 18
Villamor mission, 1942: 19
Ipil: 101, 283, 287, 289, 290, 293, 312, 314
operations at: 284–87
Irving, Maj. Gen. Frederick A.: 200–201, 210,
213, 220, 356.
See also Infantry Divisions, U. S., 24th.
assumes command ashore: 72
command of: 67
tactical plans of: 179, 206, 210, 211, 212, 215, 218–19,
227
Janabatas Channel: 155
Japan: 3, 10, 86
MacArthur on: 4
missions of Japanese forces in: 54
plan for invasion of: 2
reaction to action off Formosa: 44
reinforcement of: 46
route to: 7
situation in, July 1944: 21–22
Japanese Air Force: 49, 85–88.
See also Air plans, Japanese; Japanese Army units; Japanese
naval units.
Japanese Army: 14,
20.
See also Imperial General Headquarters; Japanese Army
units.
condition of, December 1944: 358–60
moves reinforcements to Leyte: 14
tactics of, as results of Leyte Campaign: 361–67
Japanese Army units. See also Imperial General
Headquarters.
Armies
2d Area: 46
3d Air: 46
4th Air: 46, 53–54, 85–86, 88,
241, 275
7th Area: 46
14th Area: 46–52,
53, 85, 88, 93–94, 101–02, 103,
104, 175, 221, 294, 314, 325–26,
358, 361–62
35th: 22, 46, 50,
52, 59, 94, 103–04, 168, 173–74,
175–76, 208, 240,
243, 275, 284, 291, 294, 295, 305, 313, 322, 324, 329, 331–32,
334, 338, 347, 358, 359, 361–64,
365–66
Burma Area: 46
Southern: 46, 49–50, 85, 221, 362
Divisions
1st: 94, 99, 101,
103, 104, 175, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 215, 217, 218, 219, 225, 228, 235, 314, 324–26, 324n-325n, 337, 339, 340, 341, 358–59,
363, 366–67
2d Air: 85–86,
88
2d Imperial Guards: 51
7th Air: 86
8th: 94, 314, 332
10th: 325 [406]
16th: 21–22, 52–53, 59, 80, 94, 103–07, 111,
120, 122, 124, 131, 168, 172, 240–42, 295–96, 297,
298–300, 305, 313,
366
26th: 94, 99–101, 103–04, 175–76, 208,
217, 254, 256, 260, 263, 264–65,
266, 270, 272, 273, 275, 285, 293, 295–97, 305,
313–14, 322, 363,
366
30th: 52, 59, 94,
99, 103–04, 168,
176, 208, 217, 284, 285, 289
100th: 52
102d: 22, 52, 99,
103–04, 168, 175–76, 208,
217, 235, 324, 326, 342, 359, 363–64, 366
Brigades
12th Air: 86
28th Independent Mixed: 366
55th Independent Mixed: 94,
103
57th Independent Mixed: 94,
103, 176
58th Independent Mixed: 314
68th Independent Mixed: 94,
101, 103, 104, 123, 176, 208, 295, 359–60, 363,
366
Regiments
1st Artillery: 219,
324
1st Engineer: 324
1st Infantry: 233, 235, 324, 325, 326, 359, 360, 366–67
1st Reconnaissance: 324,
324n
1st Transport: 324,
359, 366–67
3d Airborne Raiding: 295
4th Airborne Raiding: 295,
332, 337, 339, 363
5th Infantry: 101, 314, 331, 337, 338, 339, 359
8th Engineer: 352
8th Field Artillery: 352
8th Transport: 352
9th Infantry: 52, 72, 74–75, 107,
108, 111n, 114–17,
120, 131, 141, 157, 240–41
11th Independent Infantry: 254, 257
12th Independent Infantry: 208, 257, 263, 267, 268, 269, 287, 289, 291–92, 313, 316, 318, 332, 334, 363
13th Independent Infantry: 254, 257, 258–59, 261–62, 263,
264, 269
16th Engineer: 111,
131, 141
16th Reconnaissance: 22
20th Infantry: 22, 72, 104, 117, 124, 131, 133, 134, 137, 141, 142, 240–41
22d Field Artillery: 104,
111n, 124, 131
33d Infantry: 22, 52–53, 65, 67, 69–70, 131, 141, 146, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 170, 240–41
39th Infantry: 325
41st Infantry: 168,
170, 176, 178–79,
217, 366
49th Infantry: 235,
324, 359, 366–67
57th Infantry: 209,
211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219–20, 224, 225, 235, 324, 325, 359–60, 366–67
77th Infantry: 314,
332, 339, 363, 366
Battalions
2d Field Artillery: 220,
224
26th Artillery: 263
98th Airfield: 131,
134
169th Independent: 168,
176, 217
171st Independent Infantry: 168, 217
364th Independent Infantry: 254
Kamijo: 289
Moeda: 314
Nonaka: 284
Tateishi: 314
Miscellaneous
1st Division Headquarters: 366
2d Raiding Group: 275
7th Independent Tank Company: 22, 124, 128, 131, 135
16th Division Headquarters: 22
30th Fighter Group: 86
35th Army Headquarters: 338, 366
54th Airfield Company: 124,
131, 134
Camotes Detachment: 314
Imahori Detachment: 314,
363
Mitsui Shipping Unit: 363
Northern Leyte Defense Force: 111, 131
Ormoc Defense Headquarters: 284
Southern Leyte Defense Force: 111, 131
Takahashi Detachment: 314,
331–32, 337, 338,
366
Japanese defenses. See Defenses, Japanese.
Japanese dispositions. See Dispositions,
Japanese.
Japanese Fleet: 86,
96. See also Combined Fleet; Japanese naval units.
Japanese fortifications. See Defenses,
Japanese.
Japanese garrison armies: 3–4, 46
Japanese home islands. See Japan.
Japanese intelligence. See Intelligence,
Japanese.
Japanese Military Administration, on Leyte: 14
Japanese naval craft. See by name.
Japanese naval units. See also Combined
Fleet.
1st Air Fleet: 46
1st Diversion Attack Force: 89–92
2d Air Fleet: 44, 90, 91
2d Diversion Attack Force: 44, 89–91
Carrier Division 3: 44
Carrier Division 4: 44
Ito Naval Landing Force: 332
Main Body: 90–91
Southern Fleet: 96
Southwest Area Fleet: 46
Special Naval Landing Force: 314, 317–18
Third Fleet: 53–54
[407]
Japanese Navy. See Combined Fleet;
Japanese Fleet; Japanese naval units.
Japanese occupation, of Leyte: 17–18
Japanese resistance, Krueger on: 33–34
Japanese seaplane bases. See Seaplane bases,
Japanese.
Japanese strength. See Strength, Japanese.
Japanese tactics. See Tactics, Japanese.
Jaro: 52, 104, 168–69, 172–74, 175,
175n, 176, 177–78,
179–80, 206, 208,
209–10, 211–13, 217, 218, 243, 356
JASCO, 292d: 350n
JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Jeeps. See Trucks, ¼-ton.
Jenna, Col. William W.: 357
Johnson, Pfc. Johnnie: 128
Johnson, Sgt. Leroy: 339–40
Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1n
approve strategic plan for defeat of Japan: 2
ask opinion of Pacific commanders, June 1944: 3
on bypassing objectives in Pacific: 5
and cancellation of Pacific operations: 9
and civil affairs in Philippines: 199
direct Nimitz to support Leyte operation: 30
and plans for Leyte operation: 6–8
and plans for Mindanao operation: 2–3
on primary purpose of Leyte Campaign: 6
set target dates: 9
strategic plans of, 1942: 1–2
and strategy conference in Brisbane, August 1944: 7
Joint Staff Planners: 8
Jolo Islands: 52
Jorge, Sgt. P.: 19n
JPS. See Joint Staff Planners.
Kaessner, Lt. Col. Paul V.: 305
Kakuda, Lt. Col.: 141 Kalibapi: 14
Kamikaze: 88,
275, 276, 283, 369
Kananga: 342,
343, 344–46, 347,
355
Kane, Lt. Col. O’Neill K.: 266–67
Kangleon, Lt. Col. Ruperto: 16–20, 152
Kang Cainto: 266,
266n, 271, 273
Kanmonhag: 114
Kapahuan: 122
Kataoka, Lt. Gen. Tadasu: 208, 324, 366
Kelley, Pvt. Ova A.: 304, 304n
Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.: 23, 24–26,
27.
See also Allied Air Forces.
Kilay Ridge: 218,
223, 356
battle of: 225–35
King, Admiral Ernest J.: 1n
on bypassing Philippines: 4–5
at Quebec Conference, September 1944: 9
and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 6
King, Maj. F. Raymond: 155
King Two: 39. See also Leyte Campaign; Sixth
Army.
Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C.: 58, 90, 91. See also Allied Naval
Forces.
and amphibious operations in Palompon area: 349
commands of: 23, 24, 26,
28
and plans for Ormoc operation: 276, 291
and plans for Seventh Fleet operations: 28–30
and supply of XXIV Corps: 312
Koiso, Kuniaki: 46
Kompisao: 362
Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 37, 38, 102, 145, 183, 237, 351, 361.
See also Sixth Army.
assumes command ashore: 78–80
on Campaign: 244–50
and civil affairs in Philippines: 199
commands of: 23, 24, 26
and construction of airfields: 307
and construction of roads: 308
and drive on Ormoc: 221–23,
227
on effect of terrain on Campaign: 184
on 1st Division: 325n
forms Area Allocation Group: 189
and Guerrillas: 204
on Japanese resistance on Leyte: 33
on lack of airfields: 188
and Leyte airfields: 296, 303
and line of command: 244
and logistics: 191–92
and Ormoc Valley operations: 313,
325
plans for capture of Leyte Valley: 107
and plans for Leyte Campaign: 31–32, 33–34, 36–37, 39,
62, 86
and rear area security: 235
and strength of Sixth Army: 221–23
and supply problems: 312
tactical plans of: 206, 209, 210, 217–18,
243, 253, 254, 263, 275–77, 291,
293, 329, 333, 336, 349
and tactics in northern Leyte Valley: 168
transfers units to Eighth Army: 361
and XXIV Corps mission: 107
Kumazawa, Comdr. Kazumasa: 124
Kurile Islands: 46
Kurita, Vice Adm. Takeo: 89, 90–92
Kuroda, Lt. Gen. Shigenori: 94.
See also Japanese Army units, Armies, 14th Area.
command of: 46
on effect of Allied air superiority: 49
on Imperial General Headquarters concept of defense of
Philippines: 49–50
[408]
on negotiated peace with Allies in October 1944: 49
and plans to defend Philippines: 49
relieved of command: 50–51
Kwajalein: 26
Labiranan Head: 74,
104, 119
description of: 72
operations at: 107–09
Labiranan River: 72,
74, 76, 104, 107, 108 Laffey: 283
Landing beaches
Blue: 72–75, 83
bombardment of: 30, 33, 59,
60, 61–62
choice of: 34
clearing of: 30
condition of: 34, 58
description of: 80–82
Dulag: 33
intelligence on: 21
Japanese defense of: 74–75
Labiranan: 33
Marasbaras: 33
Orange: 72–74, 107
Palo: 33
Panaon Strait: 33
Pawing, 33
Red: 62, 67–72, 82
on San Pedro Bay: 11
X Corps area: 33
XXIV Corps area: 33, 72
and underwater obstacles: 57
Violet: 76, 78
White: 62–67, 82–83, 306
White I: 279
White II: 279
Yellow: 76–77, 78
Landing craft: 11–12, 41,
54–55, 72–73, 76
APH’s: 194
LCI’s: 42, 61–62, 63, 74, 153–55, 283, 283n, 310, 312
LCI(R)’s: 61–62,
279, 283
LCM’s: 82, 291, 310,
311, 349, 357
LCM(R)’s: 291
LCT’s: 52
LCV’s: 291
LCVP’s: 61
PCE(R)’s: 194
loss of, in landing operations: 68
Landing operations. See Amphibious
operations.
Landrum, Lt. Col. James E.: 349
Lapdok: 172
Lateral liaison
1st Cavalry Division–24th Division: 185, 210
5th Cavalry–34th Infantry: 157, 181
X Corps–XXIV Corps: 112,
165, 172
17th Infantry–184th Infantry: 131
17th Infantry–382d Infantry: 114
19th Infantry–8th Cavalry: 173
19th Infantry–34th Infantry: 171, 173, 229–30
32d Infantry–184th Infantry: 127–28, 129,
131
112th Cavalry–32d Division: 238
112th Cavalry–126th Infantry: 238–39
184th Infantry–77th Division: 293
Laurel, Jose: 13
LCI’s: 42,
61–62, 63, 74, 153–55, 283, 283n, 310, 312
LCM’s: 82,
291, 310, 311, 349, 357
LCM(R)’s: 291
LCT’s: 42
LCVP’s: 61
Leaf, Col. William N.: 191
Leahy, Admiral William D.: 1n, 6, 9
Lewis, Maj. Joseph R.: 123
Leyte: 1, 10, 21,
22
Allied plans for operations on: 23–34
Army relations with Filipino civilians: 200–204
civil affairs: 198–200
culture of: 13–14, 18
description of: 10–13,
22, 35–36
guerrillas on. See Guerrilla movement.
importance of: 3, 10
Japanese occupation of: 13–14, 17–18
maps of: 21
population of: 13, 14
Leyte Area Command (guerrilla): 17, 19–20
Leyte Campaign
air support for: 27–28
effect on Luzon operation: 102
field orders issued for: 41
forces for: 24–26
logistical support for: 36–37
naval support for: 28–31
Nimitz considers advisability of: 4
plans for: 7–9, 23–34
prerequisites for: 24
purpose of: 1, 6, 7, 8, 28, 32–33, 35
results of: 368–70
shipping for: 38–39
Sixth Army plan for: 35
and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
target date for: 6–9, 23–24, 39
Leyte Gulf: 1,
6, 11, 12, 53, 107, 153, 280.
See also Battle of Leyte Gulf.
on A Day: 60
air support of operations in: 27
assault convoy in: 58–58
ground forces of operations in: 31–32
importance of: 3, 7, 11
[409]
mines in: 57
operations in: 34, 54–57
plans for operations in: 23–24, 30,
31–32, 45
weather conditions in, A Day: 42
Leyte River: 211,
224–25, 238–39, 325, 342
Leyte Valley: 1,
23, 33–34, 72
description of: 11, 35, 67,
104
estimate of enemy defense in: 24
importance of: 11–13
mopping-up operations in: 206
operations in: 107–23,
124–45, 146–67, 168–83
rear area security in: 210,
218, 222, 223, 235, 241–43
road conditions in: 11
Liaison, lateral. See Lateral liaison.
Liberty ships: 37
Libongao: 329,
330, 334, 335–38,
345, 347, 362, 363
Limon: 181,
208, 209, 211, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223–25, 228, 230, 232, 235, 237–38,
243, 275, 323–25,
328, 340, 355–56
Lines of communication, Japanese: 46, 294
Lines of communication, U. S.: 1–2, 18–20, 256–59
List, Lt. Col. Edwin O.: 108
Logie, Col. Marc J.: 76, 128–29,
133
Logistics. See also Supply operations.
A-Day unloading operations: 80–84
airfield construction: 185–90, 204–05
base construction: 188–90,
204–05
bases on Leyte: 1, 6, 7
plan, Ely recommendation on: 35–36
plans for Leyte operation: 35–37
problems of: 306–12
resources in SWPA, June 1944: 3
road construction: 184–85
shipping for Leyte operation: 38–39
and Sixth Army Service Command: 26
and SOS SWPA: 26
supplies for Filipinos: 203–04
supply of troops: 190–92,
195–98
traffic control: 185
Lonoy, operations in area of: 325, 326–28,
342–44, 355
LSD’s: 42
LSM’s: 38,
80, 82, 279, 283, 283n, 310–11
LST’s: 28,
37, 38, 41–42,
68, 69, 74, 80, 82,
83, 190, 194, 279–80
Lubi: 313
“Lure of the Streamlined Bait”: 44
Luzon: 1, 10, 19,
23, 90, 91, 94, 175, 208
air attacks on: 27, 44–45
air supremacy over: 8
as area of main defense in Philippines: 85
discussed at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 6
effect of Leyte Campaign on operations on: 102
estimated Japanese strength on: 22
and Japanese plans: 49, 103
MacArthur on occupation of: 4
naval bombardment of, planned: 30
neutralization of Japanese strength on: 1, 6
operations on: 306
plans for occupation of: 6
submarine operations against: 31
tactical plans for: 276
target date for occupation of, set by JCS: 9
LVT’s: 74,
83, 112, 227, 228, 235, 291, 333, 350, 357–58
Macalpe: 172
Macanip: 178
MacArthur, General Douglas: 6, 9, 23, 24,
27, 30, 31, 36, 37,
58, 84, 94, 96, 184, 303, 307
to attack along north coast of New Guinea: 2
and civil affairs in Philippines: 198–200
directed by JCS to carry out Leyte Campaign: 8
gives timetable for future operations, August 1944: 7
and guerrilla movement in Philippines: 16–20
on Japanese air defenses for Leyte: 42
on Japanese casualties in Ormoc area: 283
on JCS tentative plans of June 1944: 3–4
on Leyte: 244
and Leyte Campaign: 1–2,
3, 6, 9, 23, 24,
26, 27, 31, 34, 35,
37, 38
on Leyte Campaign: 361
in line of command: 24
orders Eighth Army to relieve Sixth Army: 361
and plans for Ormoc operation: 276–77
and recapture of Philippines: 2
at strategy conference in Brisbane, August 1944: 7
at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
Supreme Commander, SWPA: 1–2,
23, 24
at Tacloban: 152
Machine guns, U. S. See Guns, U. S., Machine.
Mahan: 283
Mahonag: 322
Mainit River: 170–71, 173,
175n, 177
Makino, Lt. Gen. Shiro: 104, 107, 145, 172, 295–96,
366
alerts 16th Division: 53
command of: 52
and defenses on Red Beach: 67
and deployment of 16th Division: 124, 131
and fortifications on Hill 522: 70
and Leyte airfields: 298
and tactical plans for 16th Division: 52–53
tactics for defense of Leyte: 111
[410]
Malay Archipelago: 10
Malaya: 28
Malie, Sgt. D.: 19n
Malirong: 169
Malirong River: 169
Mamula, 2d Lt. Rudolph: 302–03
Mandated islands. See Japanese mandated
islands.
Manila: 10, 46, 51,
54, 88, 101, 103, 208, 254, 294
Manus: 28, 38, 40,
41, 57, 277
Maps
accuracy of: 21, 215, 216,
228, 250, 325
distributed to Headquarters, XXIV Corps: 41
Marabang River: 307. See also Daguitan River.
Marine Division, 1st: 38
Marine units
5th 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion: 256n
11th 115-mm. Gun Battalion: 256,
256n, 257, 259
Marshall, General George C.: 1n, 9
at Quebec Conference, September 1944: 9
on recapture of Philippines: 4
receives Pacific timetable from MacArthur: 7–8
and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
Martin, Charlotte: 17n Maryland: 30, 60
Matagob: 314,
332, 338, 351–53,
359, 362, 364
Mathias, Maj. Leigh H.: 129, 135
Mati: 111
May, Col. Edwin T. See also 383d Infantry
Regiment.
and battle training for 383d Infantry: 114–15
at Catmon Hill: 118–19
command of: 74, 107
and operations at Catmon Hill: 110–111 Maya: 90
McCray, Lt. Col. James O.: 117–18
McWhorter, Pfc. William A.: 325n
Mecham, Lt. Col. Jesse W.: 122–23
Medals. See by name.
Medals of Honor
Benjamin, Pfc. George, Jr.: 339n
Brostrom, Pfc. Leonard C.: 143n
Fryar, Pvt. Elmer E.: 322n
Johnson, Sgt. Leroy: 339–40
Kelley, Pvt. Ova A.: 304n
McWhorter, Pfc. William A.: 325n
Moon, Pvt. Harold H., Jr.: 158–59, 159n
Mower, Sgt. Charles E.: 207
Nett, Capt. Robert B.: 320
Thorson, Pfc. John F.: 143n
Vlug, Pfc. Dick J.: 339–40
Medical Battalions
302d: 350n
321st: 121n
Medical operations
evacuation of casualties: 112,
140, 161, 164, 189–90, 192–94, 198
for Filipinos: 201, 203–04
supply: 36–37, 38, 195–98
treatment: 195
Medical units, Japanese: 52
Medical units, U. S.: 192–94. See also Medical Battalions.
Medium tanks. See Tanks, medium.
Military Intelligence Section, GHQ SWPA: 18
Mindanao: 9, 10, 11,
20, 52, 94, 96, 103, 243, 284, 366
air attacks on: 8, 42, 45
as base for 4th Air Army: 53
bases to be established on: 23
estimate of Japanese strength on: 22
guerrillas on: 16
naval bombardment of, planned: 30–31
neutralization of: 7
operations on, canceled: 23
plans for seizure of: 2–3,
6
Suzu plan for defense of: 52
target dates for: 23
Mindanao Sea: 62
Mindoro: 90,
276, 277, 279, 306, 362
Mine sweepers, U. S.: 24, 42, 54, 58
mission of: 32–33
operations of: 27, 28–30, 40, 57–58
in Ormoc operation: 280
Mines, Japanese
antitank: 133
land: 121, 122, 137, 164, 207
magnetic: 213
Mines, U. S.
land: 257
naval: 30, 57, 58, 67
Miranda, Brig. Gen. Blas E.: 16–17, 16n
Mississippi: 30, 60
Mitscher, Vice Adm. Marc.: 24, 42, 90.
See also Fast Carrier Task Force.
Moon, Pvt. Harold H., Jr.: 158–59, 159n
Moore, Lt. Col. William B.: 142
Mopping-up operations: 237
after Campaign: 365
in Dagami area: 240, 241–43
Morale, Filipino: 20
Morale, Japanese: 49–50, 93–94, 103
Morison, Capt. Samuel Eliot, USNR: 5n
Morotai Island: 8,
9, 34, 94
air support of operations on: 42
as base for air support of Leyte Campaign: 45
plans for capture of: 4, 7
security of, prerequisite to Leyte Campaign: 24
Mortars, Japanese: 77
50-mm.:
122
90-mm.: 233
air attacks on: 93
use of: 68, 69, 74, 77, 108, 117, 212
Mortars, U. S.
4.2-inch: 30, 165, 171,
240
4.2-inch chemical: 71, 139, 161, 248
60-mm.: 170, 240, 248,
262
81-mm.: 68, 139, 163, 171, 248, 262, 265, 303
on LCI’s: 61–62
use of: 75, 108, 112, 117, 128, 158–59,
160, 166, 207, 318
Motor torpedo boats, Japanese: 22
Motor torpedo boats, U. S.: 90, 91, 101, 349, 366
Mottlet, Pvt. Harold O.: 170n
Mower, Sgt. Charles E.: 207
Mt. Alto: 298
Mt. Badian: 342
Mt. Cabungaan: 342–43
Mt. Canguipot: 360
Mt. Majunag: 365
Mt. Mamban: 217
Mt. Minoro: 237
Mt. Pina: 242
Mucci, Lt. Col. Henry A.: 54
Mudburon River: 170
Mudge, Maj. Gen. Verne D.: 63, 67, 148, 174, 181, 210, 235, 237, 345.
See also Cavalry Division, 1st.
Muto, Lt. Gen. Akira: 51
Naga River: 228
Nakamaru, Pvt. Isamu: 135
Native labor. See also Filipinos.
plans for use of: 35
recruiting of: 150–51,
201, 204
use of: 111, 112, 185,
192, 194
Naval Attack Force: 24.
See also Seventh Fleet, U. S.
Naval bombardment: 161
A Day: 80
of Catmon Hill: 119
close support: 146, 159, 281, 283
of Dingat Island: 55
effect of: 124
effect of, on Japanese defenses: 104
of friendly troops: 108
of Homonhon Island: 55
on Labiranan Head: 107–08
of Leyte: 58–62, 70, 75
plans for: 28–30, 33
of Suluan Island: 54
Naval forces, Japanese. See Japanese naval
units.
Naval support: 30,
60, 276, 279
Naval losses, Japanese: 90–91, 92,
96
Naval losses, U. S.: 68, 91–92
Negros: 27, 45, 90,
96, 363, 366, 367
Nelson, Lt. Col. Glenn A.: 256, 258
Netherlands Indies: 2, 10, 28, 46,
294
Netherlands New Guinea: 46. See also New
Guinea.
Nett, Capt. Robert B.: 320
New Caledonia: 277
New Georgia: 26
New Guinea: 2,
3, 9, 26–27,
28, 37, 42, 46, 53,
294
Newman, Col. Aubrey S.: 68, 161, 173, 174, 176
Night perimeters
appraisal of: 247
attacks on: 112, 127–28, 258–60
defense of: 158–59
Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 6, 8, 9, 27.
See also Pacific Ocean Area.
command of: 2, 24
and control of 77th Division: 276–77
on JCS tentative plans of June 1944: 3–4
in line of command: 24
and plans for Leyte operation: 8–9, 24–26, 30,
31, 37–38
at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
Nishimura, Vice Adm. Shoji: 89–91
Nishimura, Maj. Gen. Toshio: 51, 101–02
Northern Attack Force: 24, 45, 60–62.
See also VII Amphibious Force; Task Force 78.
Ohmae, Capt. Toshikazu: 53–54
Okabayashi, Col. Junkichi: 208n, 246
Okinawa: 27
Oldendorf, Rear Adm. Jesse B.: 28, 30, 57, 91.
See also Bombardment and fire support group.
O’Neill, 2d Lt. Owen R.: 118
Operations Instructions 70: 27
OP Hill: 211–12, 215–16, 219,
220
Orange Beach. See Landing beaches, Orange.
Ormoc: 12–13,
34, 92, 93, 94, 98–99, 104,
145, 146, 175–76,
206, 208, 209, 210–11, 216, 217, 235, 243, 254, 273, 296, 305, 312.
See also Ormoc Valley.
advance on: 218, 280–93
bombed: 212
estimate of enemy defenses around: 23
Japanese reinforcements arrive at: 99–102, 254
operations in area of: 313–28, 334,
336, 349–50, 354,
356
plans for drive on: 221–23,
253, 254–55, 263–64, 266,
275–80
shelling of: 256
30th Army headquarters moved to: 59
Ormoc Bay: 11,
12, 34, 98–99,
101, 104, 183, 206, 218, 223, 240, 253, 273, 275, 276, 277–84,
296, 305, 314, 318, 322
Ormoc Valley: 11,
34, 98, 146, 176, 305, 362
description of: 12 [412]
importance of: 12
Japanese tactical plans for: 208,
217
operations in: 222, 227, 313–28, 329–46
U. S. tactical plans for: 206,
209, 217–18
Osmeña, President Sergio: 41, 152
O’Sullivan, Col. Curtis D.: 76, 264, 266, 268
Outerbridge, Comdr. W. W.: 283n
Ozawa, Vice Adm. Jisabuto: 70, 92
P-38’s: 98
P-40’s: 280
Pachler, Lt Col. Francis T.: 138, 139, 271
Pacific Fleet, U. S.: 1
Pacific Ocean Areas: 2, 24, 38
Palanas River: 255,
257, 258, 260, 266, 267–68, 269–71, 273
Palaus: 7, 8, 21,
24, 27, 37, 38, 42,
57
Palawan Island: 89–90
Palo: 12, 34, 67,
72, 78, 107, 111, 146, 157, 166, 167, 190, 243, 308
advance on: 161–63
control of civilians in: 201
defense of: 163–65
importance of: 163
Japanese defenses at: 161
plans to take area of: 33, 62, 67,
69–70
Palompon: 11,
12, 98, 101, 314, 318, 329, 332, 359, 361, 362, 365
operations in area of: 336–39, 345,
346, 347–54
Panalian Point: 288
Panalian River: 287
Panaon Strait: 24,
32–33, 34, 45, 62, 78,
145, 168, 183, 192, 206, 256, 264
Panay: 16, 45, 52,
94, 175, 208
Panilahan River: 277, 286, 288, 290
Paravanes: 58
Parsons, Lt Comdr. Charles: 16, 21
Patrol boats, Japanese: 101
Patrol boats, U. S.: 42
Patrols, Japanese: 17
Patrols, U. S. See also Reconnaissance, U. S.
air: 86
5th Cavalry Regiment: 66
in Ormoc area: 286
probing: 164, 166
security: 155, 161–63
submarine: 31
northern Leyte Valley: 174–75
training of: 114–16
24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: 230
PCE(R)’s: 194
Pearl Harbor: 9
Pearsall, Lt. Col. James F., Jr.: 157–61, 169, 170, 173
Peralta, Col. Macario: 16
Perkins, Pfc. Warren G.: 304
Pescadores Islands: 89–90
Philippine Academy and General Service School: 16
Philippine Army units
1st Filipino Infantry Regiment: 365
6th Military District: 16
7th Military District: 16
8th Military District: 16
9th Military District: 16
10th Military District: 16
92d Infantry Division: 16–17
94th Infantry Regiment: 18,
257
95th Infantry Regiment: 18
96th Infantry Regiment: 18,
228
Philippine Civil Affairs Units: 35
Philippine Islands: 9, 22, 23, 24,
26, 28
air attacks on: 8, 27–28
air supremacy over: 4
Carney on: 5
civil affairs in: 198–200
description of: 10
guerrillas in. See Guerrilla movement.
importance of: 2, 10
Japanese occupation of: 13,
14
Japanese plans for defense of: 22,
46–54
JCS on bypassing: 3
MacArthur on: 3–4, 6
neutralization of Japanese forces in, prerequisite to Leyte Campaign:
24
population of: 10
restoration of Civil Government in: 152
and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
Pikas: 72, 104, 111–12, 114,
118
Pillboxes, Japanese: 77, 93, 104, 108–09
Pinamopoan: 12,
206–07, 209, 210,
211, 212, 216, 217, 234, 275, 324, 346, 347
Pincers movement. See Tactics, U. S.,
pincers.
Planning. See Air plans, U. S.; Strategic plans,
U. S.; Tactical plans, U. S.
Ports
Baybay: 12
facilities of: 190
Ipil: 101
Ormoc: 12, 23, 92, 94, 98,
99–101, 145, 206,
210, 221, 243, 275, 290
Palompon: 11, 101
San Isidro (west Leyte): 101
Tacloban: 12, 23, 190
Takao, Formosa: 43
Postlethwait, Lt. Col. Edward M.: 173, 176
[413]
Presidential citation, of 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry:
225–27
President of the United States. See Roosevelt,
President Franklin D.
Prisoners of war, Japanese: 18, 114, 117, 250
Provisional Mountain Force: 354.
See also Infantry Battalions, 2d, 305th Regiment.
PT boats. See Motor torpedo boats, U. S.
Quebec Conference: 9
Quezon, President Manuel Luis: 17n, 199
Quinto, 2d. Lt. E. F.: 19n
Radios. See Communications, radio.
Rangers. See Infantry Battalions, 6th Ranger.
Rangoon: 46
Rations: 36,
38, 80, 83, 111, 112 Raymond: 188
Rear area security, Leyte Valley: 210, 218,
222, 223, 235, 241–43
Reconnaissance: 66
aerial: 27, 42, 45, 140, 239, 348
armored: 351
by 1st Cavalry Brigade: 63
by 1st Cavalry Division: 343
in force: 117–18
ground: 67, 111–12, 114–16, 118,
131, 136, 165, 172, 174, 179, 181, 211, 229–30,
231, 238, 318, 319, 320, 320n
in Hill 522 area: 71
Krueger on: 250
mechanized: 137, 138, 142,
164, 173
motorized: 112, 207, 211
naval air: 90–91
overwater: 153–55, 266–67
submarine: 31
by underwater demolition teams: 57–58
Red Beach. See Landing beaches, Red.
Regimental combat teams. See 112th Cavalry
Regiment.
Regiments. See Airborne Regiments; Cavalry
Regiments; Infantry Regiments.
Reinforcements, Japanese: 176, 208–09,
217
effect of Sixth Army success on: 62
for Formosa: 54
intelligence on: 22, 24
for Kurile Islands: 46
for Leyte: 14, 17, 21,
59, 86, 88, 92, 93–94, 99,
103–04
at Limon: 225
at Ormoc: 99–102, 254
in Ormoc Valley: 317–18
in Pacific: 46
for Philippines: 49
policy on: 49
prevention of: 30, 150, 151
for Ryukyus: 46
TA Operation: 99–102
Terauchi on: 221
Reinforcements, U. S.: 31–32, 34,
221–23, 253
Resistance movement, Philippines. See Guerrilla
movement.
Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C.: 5n
Ridge Number 3: 230
Rifles. See Weapons, U. S., Browning automatic
rifles.
Ritchie, Col. William L.: 7
River crossing operations: 140–41
Rivers
Antilao: 293, 315–16, 318
Bagonbon: 279, 285, 286
Bao: 330
Baod:
279, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290
Binahaan: 112, 144, 164,
172, 178, 179
Bito: 114, 298, 302
Bucan: 258, 260, 268
Burayan: 65
Calbasag: 72, 76, 104,
130, 131, 145
Calingatngan: 266
Canomontag: 181
Carigara: 181, 210
Daguitan: 76, 78, 104–07, 127,
131, 145, 307
Diit: 150, 174
effect of, on construction program: 35
Ginagan: 178
Guinarona: 111–12, 114, 116, 118–19
Labiranan: 72, 74, 76,
104, 107, 108
Leyte: 211, 224–25, 238–39, 325,
342
Mainit: 170–71, 173, 175n, 177
Malirong: 169
Marabang: 307. See also Daguitan.
Mudburon: 170
Naga: 228
Palanas: 255, 257, 258,
260, 266, 267–68,
269–71, 273
Palo: 67, 161–63
Panilahan: 277, 286, 287–88, 290
Silaga: 153, 157
Tabgas: 266, 267, 270,
271, 273
Talisay: 76
Talisayan: 266, 273, 323
Togbong: 336, 338, 349,
351–52
Yapan: 178
Roadblocks. See Tactics, Japanese, roadblock;
Tactics, U. S., roadblock.
Roads
Abuyog-Baybay: 12, 144–45, 218, 253, 254, 273, 311
Baybay-Damulaan: 256
Baybay-Ormoc: 12
Burauen-Dagami: 121, 124–27, 131, 133, 137, 138, 145, 243, 296, 303–04
[414]
condition of: 11, 12, 35–36, 97,
112, 124
construction of: 35, 184–85, 204, 308
Dagami-Tanauan: 107, 111, 121, 122, 123, 124, 131
Dagami-Tingib: 111
Dulag-Burauen: 33, 78, 107,
111, 124–33, 145,
308
Highway 1: 33, 63, 65,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
72, 74–75, 77–78, 104,
107, 109, 112, 121, 127, 144, 153, 155, 157–58,
163, 164, 185
Highway 2: 67, 146, 163,
165, 166, 167, 168–70, 175–76, 206,
208–09, 210, 211,
213, 216, 218, 219, 223–25, 227,
235, 237, 253, 266, 276, 279, 285, 292, 315–16,
317–19, 320, 323–26, 329–30, 331–36, 338,
339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 345–46,
347, 352, 355, 365
Jaro-Carigara: 176–80,
208, 210
Jaro-Palo: 243
Ormoc-Carigara: 12, 93
Ormoc-Limon: 208–16
Ormoc-Linao: 319
Ormoc-Valencia: 99
Palo-Carigara: 157
Palompon: 347–54
Palompon-Highway 2: 336–39,
345, 362–63
in Red Beach area: 82
San Jose-Valencia: 334
Tambuco-Dolores: 333, 335
Roberts, Brig. Gen. Frank N.: 7
Robinson, Pfc. Frank B.: 69, 69n
Rocket launching craft: 10, 62
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 5, 5n
and civil affairs in Philippines: 199
on landing on Leyte: 84
and Osmeña: 41
at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
Royal Australian Air Force: 26, 28
Saito, Col. Jiro: 254, 257, 262
Samar: 10, 11, 12,
21, 91, 146, 361, 365
air attacks on: 45
bases to be established in: 23
control of: 6
operations on: 153–57,
174, 223
plan to secure: 24
as point of entry: 10
under Japanese occupation: 14
Samar Sea: 153
San Bernardino Strait: 45, 89, 90–91
San Francisco: 38
San Isidro (northwest Leyte): 356–58
San Isidro (west Leyte): 101, 153
San Joaquin: 164
San Jose (east Leyte): 62, 65, 67, 72,
74, 76, 78
San Jose (northwest Leyte): 331, 334, 349, 350
San Jose Ricardo. See San Jose (east Leyte).
San Juanico Strait: 12, 62, 150, 167, 183, 210
description of: 153
importance of: 146, 153
plan to secure: 24, 33
securing: 152–57
San Miguel: 173,
174, 175, 351–52,
354
San Pablo: 12,
131
airfield: 124, 132–34, 135, 188, 295, 296, 300–303
San Pedro Bay: 11–12, 62,
146, 155, 208, 280, 283
San Ricardo: 308. See also San Jose (east
Leyte).
San Roque: 33,
107, 109, 120, 122
San Vicente: 104,
114, 117, 119
San Victor: 114–15
Sarangani Bay: 3,
4, 6–8, 9, 50, 52
Sarmi: 26
Sasebo: 31
Scanlon, Brig. Gen. Martin F.: 93n
Schofield Barracks, Oahu: 40
Seeadler Harbor: 277
Service Command, Sixth Army. See Sixth Army
Service Command.
Service ships: 42
Services of Supply, SWPA: 23, 26, 37
Services of Supply, USA: 35
VII Amphibious Force: 28, 33, 38, 40,
80
Seventh Fleet, U. S.: 21, 24–26,
28–30, 33, 96
close support by: 130, 159, 161
command of: 28, 90
composition of: 28, 90
effect of air strikes by: 93
effect of Battle of Leyte Gulf on: 209
and medical support of Sixth Army: 194
missions of: 28, 31, 45,
90
operations of: 90, 91
rendezvous with III Amphibious Force: 41
requests aerial reconnaissance: 45
results of air attacks by: 45
Shima, Vice Adm. Kiyohide: 89, 91
Shipping, Japanese
attacks on: 8, 27, 30,
43, 45, 96, 98, 99–102, 281,
294
effect of attacks on: 45–46
for reinforcement of Leyte forces: 99–102
Shipping, U. S.
air attacks on: 86, 88, 93,
114, 190, 192
availability of: 7
for Campaign: 7–8, 31, 37–39
cargo: 38, 41
MacArthur on availability of: 4
[415]
Mac Arthur’s control of: 38
for Ormoc operation: 276
shortage of: 6, 34, 38
troop: 34, 38, 40–41
SHO ICHI GO (Victory Operation Number One): 46, 103
SHO (Victory) Operations: 46, 88
Shoestring Ridge: 273
battle of: 257–65
defenses at: 256, 257
description of: 255–56
Shore, Lt. Col. Mayers: 155
Shortages
of aircraft: 92, 99, 209,
223
of ammunition: 231–33
of labor troops: 188
of naval forces: 223
of rations: 111, 112, 228
of shipping: 316
of tanks: 316
of troops: 32, 253
Sibert, Lt. Gen. Franklin C.: 165, 174, 211.
See also X Corps.
assumes command ashore: 78–80
at Breakneck Ridge: 213
and civil affairs on Leyte: 199,
201
command of: 26
and drive on Ormoc: 223, 227
tactical plans of: 175, 180, 206, 209–10,
211, 218, 223, 230, 342–43
Signal Battalion, 8th Aviation: 305
Signal companies, assault: 26
Silver Star, to Grove, Pfc. Kenneth W.: 148, 148n
Simons, Capt. Arthur D.: 55
Sixth Army: 21–22, 26,
28, 34, 36, 84, 91,
94.
See also Infantry Divisions, U. S.; Infantry Regiments, U. S.;
Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter.
and Alamo Force: 23, 26
on Battle of Leyte Gulf: 92
combat experience of: 26–27
composition of: 26, 34, 36
effect of success of: 62
at end of A Day: 78–80,
107
logistical problems of: 184–92
MacArthur orders SOS SWPA to supply: 37
missions of: 23, 34, 35,
62
releases the 381st Infantry to XXIV Corps: 119
relief of: 361
and shipping schedule for Campaign: 38
strength of: 26
tactical plans for: 206, 209, 217–18
target date confirmed by: 39
transportation officer for: 38
Sixth Army Headquarters. See Headquarters, Sixth
Army.
Sixth Army Reserve: 34, 76.
See also 77th Infantry Division; 32d Infantry Division.
Sixth Army Service Command: 36
command of: 35
confirms target date: 39
at Hollandia: 40
MacArthur creates: 35
mission of: 26, 35
operations on Leyte: 184–204
6th Ranger Infantry Battalion. See Infantry
Battalions, 6th Ranger.
Smith, Col. Aubrey D.: 285, 291
Smith, Maj. Leonard E.: 155
Smoke screens. See Tactics, U. S., smoke.
Soliman, Maj. Marcos G.: 17
Southeast Asia Command: 28
Southern Attack Force: 45, 60–62,
72.
See also Task Force 79; III Amphibious Force.
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA): 1, 23, 31, 35
MacArthur commander of: 23
missions of, in Leyte Campaign: 23–24
and shipping for Leyte Campaign: 38
and use of garrison forces: 37
Southwest Pacific Forces: 28
Spragins, Lt. Col. Robert B.: 167, 215, 216
Sprague, Rear Adm. Clifton A. F.: 91–92
Squadrons, air: 35
Squadrons, Cavalry. See Cavalry Squadrons.
Stadler, Col. John H.: 346
Stilwell, General Joseph W.: 8
Strafing. See Tactics, U. S., Strafing.
Strategic bombing. See Air attacks; Air support,
strategic.
“Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan”:
2
Strategic plans, Japanese: 46, 54, 85, 88,
103
Strategic plans, U. S.
conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5–6
JCS plan for defeat of Japan: 2
for operations in Pacific: 8–9
for operations in Philippines: 1,
3, 6–8, 23–24
prewar, for Pacific: 1
Streett, Maj. Gen. St. Clair: 26
Strength, Japanese
estimate of, in Philippines: 21–23, 24,
93
on Leyte: 8, 103
neutralization of, planned: 1,
6
in Ormoc area: 289
in Ormoc Valley: 313–14
plan to reduce, before invasion: 24
reduced by air attack: 8
Strength, U. S., of Sixth Army: 221–23
Struble, Rear Adm. Arthur D.: 279, 283
Sturgis, Col. Samuel D.: 36
Submarine chasers, Japanese: 101
Submarines, Japanese: 22
Submarines, U. S.: 16, 19, 21, 31,
90, 294, 366
Sulu Archipelago: 10
Suluan Island: 31,
34, 54–55, 57,
85, 89
Sumatra: 51
Supply, Japanese: 24, 51, 99–102, 240–41
Supply, U. S. See Logistics; Supply
operations.
Supply bases, U. S.: 35
construction of, planned: 23,
35
need of, for invasion of Japan: 2
shortage of troops to construct: 36
strategic importance of, in Leyte: 11
Supply dumps, Japanese: 30, 52, 59, 60–61, 93,
151
Supply dumps, U. S.: 80, 82, 83–84, 189
Supply operations, U. S.: 112
airdrop: 228, 232, 235,
356
amphibious: 227, 228, 284
from beachhead: 114
at Breakneck Ridge: 212
effect of terrain on: 111
for guerrilla movement: 19
hand-carry: 228, 229, 233–34, 236
for Leyte Campaign: 35, 36–37
methods: 111, 112, 333,
334–35
in Ormoc Valley: 317
problems: 308–12
Support, naval. See also naval units by
name.
for Campaign: 23, 31, 44,
45, 74
direct, of 6th Rangers: 31
for underwater demolition teams: 59
Supreme Commander, SWPA. See MacArthur, General
Douglas.
Surigao: 7
Surigao Strait: 45,
280
and Battle of Leyte Gulf: 89–91
control of: 6
Japanese defenses: 52
mines in: 57
plans to secure: 23–24,
45
target date for: 23
Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K.: 152
Suzu Plan: 52–53, 59.
See also Philippines, Japanese plans to defend; Tactical plans,
Japanese.
Suzuki, Lt. Gen. Sosaku: 225, 273.
See also Japanese Army units, Armies, 35th.
command of: 50, 52, 94
death of: 367
on defense of Philippines: 50
disagrees with General Headquarters on air power: 50
estimates U. S. tactics: 103
headquarters bombed: 212
issues Suzu Plan: 52–53
and Leyte airfields: 294–96,
305, 313, 321–22
ordered to take the offensive: 94
orders 16th Division to defend Leyte: 59
and Ormoc operation: 284
and Ormoc Valley operations: 313–14, 324,
325–26,332, 334–35, 336, 337, 338
receives orders on troop deployment: 52
and reinforcements for Leyte: 103–04
tactical plans of: 52, 103–04, 168, 173–76,
181, 208–09, 235,
240, 254, 263, 347, 359
tactics after Leyte Campaign: 361–62, 364–67
Suzuki, Col. Tatsunosuke: 164
Swamps: 11, 72, 83
effect of on operations: 65–66, 74,
75, 76, 110
Swing, Maj. Gen. Joseph M.: 222, 296, 300, 303 See also Airborne Division, 11th. TA
Operations. See Reinforcements, Japanese.
Tabango Bay: 356
Tabgas: 267
Tabgas River: 266,
267, 270, 271, 273
Tabogon: 336
Tabontabon: 107,
111, 114, 115, 122
description of: 115
importance of: 123
Japanese defenses at: 115,
116
operations at: 115–17
Tacloban: 10,
12, 24, 34, 57, 78,
97, 103–04, 107,
151, 153, 155, 165, 176, 189, 198, 203, 208, 235, 308
advance on: 146–50
airfield: 22–23, 63, 65,
67, 72, 86, 146, 168, 185, 187, 188, 190, 294, 300–301, 305,
306
description of: 146
importance of, to Japanese: 23
Japanese air attack on: 86–88
Japanese defenses at: 22, 52
Kuroda on airfields: 49–50
MacArthur at: 152
plans to take area of: 33, 45, 62
port facilities at: 190
Tactical plans, Japanese
appraisal of: 251–52
for Battle of Leyte Gulf: 89
for defense of Ormoc: 284,
287, 290–91
for defense of Philippines: 49–53
for Leyte Campaign: 111, 221, 275
for Leyte Valley: 168, 175–76, 263
naval, for defense of southwestern Pacific: 54
for Ormoc Valley: 208, 208n, 217, 235, 254, 313–14, 321–22, 323–25, 331–32
to retake airfields: 294–96,
300–301
of Suzuki for Leyte: 103–04
Tactical plans, U. S.
air forces, for Campaign: 27–28
for drive on Ormoc: 206, 209, 217–18, 221,
222–23
ground forces for Campaign: 31–34
at Hill 522: 71
for Leyte Valley: 107 [417]
naval forces for Campaign: 28–31
for northern Leyte Valley: 146,
168, 174–75, 180–81
for operations on Leyte: 23–34
for Ormoc area: 275–80,
284–85, 313, 315
for Palompon area: 347
of 7th Division: 131–32
for west coast of Leyte: 253,
254–57, 266
Tactics, Japanese
on A Day: 78–80
airborne: 294, 300–301
ambush: 130
antitank: 111, 133
artillery: 252, 257–58
camouflage: 251
at Catmon Hill: 111
counterattack: 69–70,
75–76, 109
deceptive: 151–52, 164, 209
demolition: 252
double envelopment: 158–59
envelopment: 142
flanking: 231
improvisations: 134, 137, 143–44
infiltration: 12, 44, 72,
89, 251, 260, 295
mine: 246, 252
offensive: 257
preinvasion estimate of: 22–23
at Red Beach: 68–70
reverse slope: 251, 267
roadblock: 148
sniper: 97
suicide bombing: 88, 275, 276, 283, 369
Tactics, U. S.
airdrop: 228, 232, 235,
310
artillery: 119, 246
blockhouse: 315
against bunkers: 148
at Catmon Hill: 110–11
deceptive: 353
defense in depth: 256
envelopment: 110, 119, 138–39, 207,
215, 218, 220, 246, 330
flanking: 177, 179, 213,
234, 239, 246
frontal assault: 245
improvisations: 69, 188
Indian: 315
infiltration: 239
mopping-up: 237, 240, 241–43, 365
pincers: 33–34
rear area security: 210, 218, 222, 223, 235, 241–43
roadblock: 74, 83, 155,
157, 171–72
smoke: 119, 121, 241
strafing: 159, 161
tank-infantry: 77, 113–14, 130, 133, 136, 142–43, 178,
246–47, 270
withdrawal: 115, 118, 119,
135
Taglawigan: 357
Takao, Formosa: 43
Talisay River: 76
Talisayan River: 266, 273, 323
Tanahmerah Bay: 251
Tanauan: 12,
33, 52, 67, 72, 104, 110, 111, 112, 121, 122, 123, 124, 131, 141, 164, 176, 188, 189, 208, 240, 307, 308
Tank barriers, Japanese: 67, 69, 74–75, 77
Tank Battalions
44th: 212, 219
706th: 330, 350n
763d: 109, 113, 121, 121n, 242
767th: 130, 132, 141n,
256, 297, 302–03
776th Amphibian: 77, 266–67, 286, 288, 291, 350n
780th Amphibian: 119
Tank Destroyer Battalion, 632d: 212, 220
Tank destroyers, 96th Division on: 249
Tanks, U. S.: 69,
133, 280
amphibian: 63, 74, 130
at Buri airfield: 136–37
failure to land: 68
Japanese defenses against: 111,
133
Krueger on: 246–47, 249
light: 120, 155, 242,
243, 333
medium: 65, 77, 129, 139, 340
reconnaissance by: 112, 138–39
use of: 68, 113, 114, 121, 132–33, 170,
178, 213, 219–20
used by Japanese: 138
Tanzola, Col. Vincent J.: 284–85, 289
Tarbuck, Capt. Ray: 60
Target dates
acceleration of, in Pacific in 1944: 7
for air attacks: 27
for all Philippines: 23
for assault convoy: 38
JCS on, June 1944: 3
for Leyte: 4, 6, 8–9, 23–24, 28, 30, 31, 34,
36, 39, 42
for Leyte Campaign, Japanese Finance Minister on: 44
for Leyte Gulf: 23, 30
for Luzon Campaign: 9
MacArthur’s, for 15 September–20 December 1944: 7–8
for Mindanao: 7–8, 23
for Morotai: 4, 7
for naval attacks: 30
for Palaus: 7
for Sarangani Bay: 4, 6
for Talauds: 23 [418]
for transfer of responsibilities from ASCOM to SOS: 35
Targets of opportunity: 60, 119, 170, 216
Task Force, Fast Carrier. See Fast Carrier Task
Force.
Task Forces
38: 42, 43–44, 90.
See Fast Carrier Task Force.
77: 24, 41
78: 24, 41
79: 26, 41
Task Group 78.3: 279 Tennessee: 30
X Corps: 31,
37, 67, 74, 78–80, 145, 222.
See also Cavalry Division, 1st; Infantry Divisions, U. S., 24th,
32d.
A-Day operations of: 62–72
combat experience of: 26
commander of: 26
composition of: 26
confirms target date: 39
deployment of: 210, 235, 275–76
effect of tactics of, on Japanese plans: 324
at end of A Day: 107
juncture with XXIV Corps: 346
landing area of: 33
lateral liaison of: 112, 165, 172
medical support of: 192, 198
missions of: 33–34, 62, 206, 209, 218, 253, 276, 313, 325, 329, 361
mopping-up operations of: 365
operations in northern Leyte Valley: 146–67, 168–83
progress of, in Ormoc Valley: 336,
339, 346
roads in zone of: 185
strength of: 26
supply of: 190
transport for: 28
unloading operations of: 80–83
Terauchi, Field Marshal Count Hisaichi: 46, 221
Terrain. See also geographical and
topographical entries.
Catmon Hill: 104
eastern Leyte: 347, 351–52
effect of, on medical support: 194
effect of, on operations: 65–66, 74,
76, 110–11, 112,
129, 130–31, 133,
152
effect of, on troops: 135
of Hill 522: 70
of Leyte: 10–13
Krueger on effect of, on Campaign: 184
Leyte Valley: 104, 109
in Mahonag area: 319–22
northern Leyte Valley: 168–69
between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys: 235–36, 238
in Ormoc area: 287
in Ormoc Valley: 340
in Pawing area: 159
of Red Beach: 67
of Shoestring Ridge: 255–56
of Suluan Island: 55
of XXIV Corps landing area: 72
of White Beach: 62–63
III Amphibious Force: 9, 28, 33, 40–41
Third Fleet, U. S.: 4, 24, 27, 45,
209.
See also Task Force 38.
air attacks by: 42–43
commander of: 24, 90
composition of: 24, 42, 90
effect of air strikes by: 93
missions of: 9, 23–24, 27, 30–31,
44, 45, 90
operations of: 43–44,
90–91
Thirteenth Air Force, U. S.: 26, 28, 45
XIII Bomber Command, U. S.: 96
Thomas, Capt. Jesse R.: 117, 118
Thompson, 1st Sgt. Francis H.: 241, 241n
Thorson, Pfc. John F.: 143n
Tibur: 355
Tilk, Pfc. George W.: 128
Timor: 46
Tinagan: 264
Tingib: 111,
131, 172, 178, 179
Tipic: 331
Tipolo: 354
Togbong River: 336,
338, 349, 351–52
Tojo, Premier Hideki: 21–22, 46
Tokyo Bay: 31
Tokyo Rose: 49
Tologosa: 307
Tomochika, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu: 347
on condition of the Japanese Army: 358
on defense of Leyte: 94
on 1st Division: 324n-325n
and General Fukue: 363
on Japanese casualties: 368
and Ormoc Valley operations: 313,
314, 314n
on U. S. strategy: 252
Torpedo barges, Japanese: 30
Torpedo boats, Japanese: 101
Torpedo launching ramps, Japanese: 30
Torres, Bernardo, Governor of Leyte: 1
Towns. See by name.
Toyoda, Admiral Soemu: 46, 54, 88–89.
See also Combined Fleet.
Tractor Battalions, Amphibian: 26
536th: 350
718th: 350
728th: 297, 298
826th: 235 [419]
Tractors, amphibian: 65, 75, 130
Trails: See Roads.
Training, Japanese, 24th Division on: 251
Training, U. S.
Krueger on: 247
of 383d Infantry: 114–15
Transportation units, Japanese: 52
Transports, Japanese: 99–102
Transports, U. S.: 41. See also LST’s.
attack: 38, 42
George F. Clymer: 41
improper loading of cargo: 80
troop: 38, 40, 54, 55, 76
Ward: 283, 283n
Troops, shortage of. See Shortages, of
troops.
Trucks. See Vehicles, ¼-ton trucks,
2½-ton trucks.
Tuba: 179
Tuktuk: 357
XXIV Corps: 9,
33, 34, 37, 38, 93n, 119, 133, 145, 173, 275.
See also Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.; Infantry Divisions, U. S.,
7th, 96th.
A-Day operations of: 72–76,
107
beachhead secured: 123
civil affairs in area of: 202
combat experience of: 26
commander of: 26
composition of: 26
confirms target date: 39
en route to Leyte: 40–41
in Hawaii: 40
issued field orders: 41
juncture with X Corps: 346
landing area: 33, 80–82
lateral liaison with X Corps: 112,
165, 172
medical support of: 194, 198
missions of: 33–34, 62, 72,
107, 206, 210, 218, 253, 276, 313, 322, 329–30,
361
mopping-up operations of: 365
offered to MacArthur: 9
and operations in Ormoc Valley: 223
ordered to Manus: 41
progress of, in Ormoc Valley: 336, 346
replacements for: 31
results of A-Day operations of: 78–80
roads in zone of: 185
shipping for: 28, 31, 38,
39
strength of: 26
supply for: 36–38
supply problems: 312
unloading operations of: 83–84
zone of action: 124
Typhoons. See Weather conditions, typhoons.
Ulithi, security of, prerequisite to Leyte Campaign:
24
Underwater demolition teams: 24
missions of: 30, 32–33, 57–58
naval support of: 60
operations of: 58
Underwater obstacles: 67
Units of fire, plan for supply of: 36–37
U. S. Army intelligence. See Intelligence, U.
S.
U. S. Department of Interior: 198–99
U. S. Fleet: 85
U. S. Navy intelligence. See Intelligence, U.
S.
U. S. Pacific Fleet. See Pacific Fleet, U. S.
U. S. Seventh Fleet. See Seventh Fleet, U. S.
U. S. Sixth Army. See Sixth Army, U. S.
U. S. Third Fleet. See Third Fleet, U. S.
U. S. War Department: 36, 198–99
Utap: 151
Valencia: 12,
98–99, 286, 317,
318, 321, 349, 352, 365
airfield: 220, 314
operations in area of: 329–31, 333,
334, 336–37, 338
Vehicles
¼-ton truck: 137, 194
2½-ton truck: 198, 250
M8’s: 280
M10’s: 280
cargo carrier M29: 249–50
DUKW: 250
one-ton trailer: 250
supply of: 36–37
tank destroyers: 249
tanks. See Tanks.
Weapons carriers: 155
Weasel: 249
Verbeck, Col. William J.: 213–14, 213n,
216, 219
Vigia Point: 121
Villaba: 351,
355, 359–60, 362–63, 367
Villages. See by name.
Villalon: 357
Villamor, Maj. Jesus Antonio: 18–19, 19n
Violet Beach. See Landing beaches, Violet.
Visayan Islands: 1,
10, 19, 22, 24, 85,
96, 366
air attacks on: 42
air supremacy over: 7–8
estimate of Japanese strength in: 22
Japanese plans for defense of: 22,
46
neutralization of: 7–8,
30, 45
Suzu Plan for defense of: 52–53
Vlug, Pfc. Dick J.: 339–40
Wakde: 26
War Ministry, Japanese: 50
Warning Instructions 5: 27
Weapons, Japanese. See also Artillery, Japanese;
Guns, Japanese; Howitzers, Japanese
Bangalore torpedoes: 133
grenades: 159, 160, 165,
166, 212
satchel charges: 133
Weapons, U. S. See also Guns, U. S.; Howitzers,
U. S.; Mortars, U. S.
appraisal of: 248–49
Browning automatic rifles: 68,
138
flame throwers: 69, 113, 121, 144, 214, 240, 243, 246, 341
grenades: 68, 69, 77,
128, 130, 137, 161, 165
rocket launchers, 2.36-inch: 128,
129, 243
Weather conditions
on A Day: 42, 60, 62
effect of, on air operations: 97–98
effect of, on convoy: 58
effect of, on Japanese air operations: 85–86
effect of, on supply operations: 235
effect of, on troops: 75, 118, 129, 131, 133, 152, 213–14,
215, 219, 231
on Leyte: 11, 21, 35,
185
and mine sweeping operations: 57
monsoons: 11
predicted for time of landing operations: 35
reports of, by submarine: 31
on San Pedro Bay: 11
in 6th Ranger operations: 54,
55
typhoons: 35, 42, 213–14
Weber, Lt. Col. Frederick R.: 211–13, 213n
West Virginia: 30, 60
Whitcomb, Lt. Col. Charles A.: 256, 257
White, Col. H. V.: 21n
White Beach. See Landing beaches, White, White I,
White II.
Whitehead, Maj. Gen. Ennis C.: 26, 293, 304, 333.
See also Fifth Air Force.
Wilkinson, Vice Adm. Theodore S.: 26, 28.
See also Task Force 79.
Withdrawals. See Tactics, U. S., withdrawals.
Woodruff, Maj. Gen. Roscoe B.: 37, 356.
See also Garrison force, U. S.
X Day: 89
Yamashita, General Tomoyuki: 294–96.
See also Japanese Army units, Armies, 14th Area.
activates SHO ICHI GO: 103
command of: 50–51, 93–94
on conditions in 14th Area Army: 50–51
on Leyte Campaign: 221, 364, 370
orders Suzuki on the offensive: 94
and Ormoc Valley operations: 314
replaces Kuroda: 50–51
sends reinforcements to Leyte: 93–94
tactics of, after Leyte Campaign: 361–62
Yap: 8, 9, 27,
31, 37, 38, 41, 83
Yapad: 179
Yapan River: 178
Yellow Beach. See Landing beaches, Yellow.
Yoshie, Lt. Col. Seiichi: 50–51
Young, Capt. Hugh D.: 108–09
Young, Capt. John J.: 258
Ypad: 172
Yuhice, 2d Lt. D. C.: 19n
Zamboanga: 52
Table of Contents
Colophon
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This eBook is produced by the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at www.pgdp.net.
This book was first published in 1954. A second edition
appeared in 1993. The text of this ebook is based on the 1954 edition,
of which scans are available on-line (copy 1,
2); The 1993
edition is also available on-line (copy 1);
and from various other locations on-line. This edition has been used to
obtain the illustrations, which where of low quality in the 1954
scan-set available.
The US Army Center of Military History also provides
access to this 1993 copy. (copy 1).
An alternative
html-version is available from the hyperwar project, based on the
1993 edition.
The maps indicated as located “Inside back
cover” in this book are missing from the scan-sets available (and
are completely missing from the 1993 edition; as a result in that
edition the maps have been renumbered through-out the book).
Related Library of Congress catalog page: 53061979.
Related Open Library catalog page (for source): OL6148782M.
Related Open Library catalog page (for work): OL3406324W.
Related WorldCat catalog page: 1259234.
Encoding
Revision History
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External References
Corrections
The following corrections have been applied to the text:
| Page | Source | Correction |
|---|---|---|
| x | Wsevelod | Wsevolod |
| 13 | piling | pilings |
| 16, 318, 411 | [Not in source] | . |
| 24 | caputre | capture |
| 133 | Bangalor | Bangalore |
| 136 | liasion | liaison |
| 138 | . | , |
| 153, 412, 414 | Osmena | Osmeña |
| 157 | divison | division |
| 211 | Carrigara | Carigara |
| 262 | terriffic | terrific |
| 277, 314, 360 | [Not in source] | ” |
| 277 | ” | [Deleted] |
| 298 | sucessful | successful |
| N.A. | [Not in source] | “ |
| N.A., 408 | [Not in source] | , |
| N.A. | nothern | northern |
| 344 | , | [Deleted] |
| 373 | a+5 | A+5 |
| 393, 413 | Boad | Baod |
| 404 | [Not in source] | : |
| 407 | . | [Deleted] |
| 410, 414, 419 | , | : |
| 410 | 29 | 30 |
| 418 | Toyko | Tokyo |