HISTORY
OF
MORGAN’S CAVALRY
By BASIL W. DUKE
CINCINNATI:
MIAMI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY,
CORNER BEDINGER STREET AND MIAMI CANAL.
1867
[Pg 2]
Entered according to Act of Congress in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-six,
By MRS. HENRIETTA MORGAN,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of Kentucky, at Covington.
TO THE WOMEN OF KENTUCKY,
FRIENDS AND RELATIVES
OF THE GALLANT MEN WHOSE HEROISM HAS BECOME PART OF THE HISTORIC
HERITAGE OF THE STATE,
AND
To the Noble Women of the South,
Whose kindness alleviated the hardships
which these men so long endured, and for whose sake they were
proud to suffer and bleed,
THIS BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.
PREFACE
The writer presents to the reading public the narrative of an arduous
and adventurous military career, which, commencing at a period but
little subsequent to the outbreak of the late civil war, continued through
the four eventful years.
He has endeavored to make the work a correct and graphic representation
of the kind of warfare of which Morgan was the author, and in
which his men won so much celebrity. Strict accuracy has been attempted
in the description of the military operations of which the book is a
record, and it is hoped that the incidents related of personal daring and
adventure will be read with some interest.
The author regrets that, for reasons easily understood, the book is far
less complete than he desired to make it. The very activity of the service
performed by Morgan’s Cavalry prevented the preservation of data
which would be very valuable, and a full account of many important
operations is therefore impossible. Limited space, also, forbids the mention
of many brave deeds. If many gallant and deserving men were
noticed as they deserve, the book could not be readily finished.
To the friends whose contributions assisted the work, the author
returns his warmest thanks.
To Mr. Meade Woodson, to whom he is indebted for the maps which so
perfectly illustrate his narrative, he is especially grateful.
He regrets, too, that many of his old comrades have altogether failed
to render him aid, confidently expected, and which would have been very
[Pg 6]valuable. B.W.D.
CONTENTS
History of Morgan’s Cavalry—Why written—First enlistments—Popularity of
Morgan—Misrepresentation of the press—New uses of cavalry.
Early life of General Morgan—His qualities as a commander—His personal
qualities.
Political condition of Kentucky in 1861—Bewilderment of the people—Camp Dick
Robinson—First entrance of Confederate troops.
Military situation in the West—Advance to Bowlinggreen—Scarcity of arms—Organization
of the army—Want of discipline—Qualities which compensated
for its absence.
Morgan leaves Lexington—Roger W. Hanson—Service on Green River—Scouting—Our
first skirmish—Narrow escape—Terry’s Rangers.
Retreat from Bowlinggreen—Evacuation of Nashville—Our Fourth Ohio acquaintances—Scouting
near Nashville—Morgan holds Murfreesboro’—Dash on
Mitchell—Night attack—Capture of Gallatin—Stampede of our pickets—Promotion
of Morgan—Concentration at Corinth.
Battle of Shiloh—Death of Sidney Johnson—Result of the battle—Expedition
into Tennessee—Cotton turning and telegraphing—Defeat at Lebanon—Expedition
to Cave City in Kentucky.
Reorganization at Chattanooga—First raid into Kentucky—Fight at Tompkinsville—Capture
of Lebanon—Telegraphic strategy—Morgan master of the situation—Fight
at Cynthiana—Evade the pursuing troops.
Capture of Gallatin—Active service near Nashville—Fights at Gallatin and
Cairo—Destruction of the railroad—Sojourn at Hartsville—The videttes—Kentuckians
running from the draft—”The Vidette.“
[Pg 8]
CHAPTER X
Again on the march for Kentucky—Bushwhacking experience—The Confederate
army enters the State—Service in front of Covington—Efforts to embarrass
the retreat of the Federal General Morgan—Fight at Augusta—Retreat of
the army from Kentucky—Morgan captures Lexington.
Morgan’s retreat through Southwestern Kentucky—At Gallatin again—Scouting
and ambuscades—Driven from Gallatin—A week’s fighting around Lebanon—Battle
of Hartsville.
December raid into Kentucky—Capture of Elizabethtown—Fighting at the Rolling
Fork—Escape from the toils.
Service during the winter of ’63 and ’64—Cluke’s raid into Kentucky—Battle
of Milton—Defeat at Snow’s Hill.
Service in Tennessee, and on the Cumberland in Kentucky—Fight at Greasy
Creek—Active scouting—The division starts for the Ohio—Crossing of the
Cumberland in the face of the enemy—Fights at Columbia, Green River
and Lebanon—Crossing the Ohio—The militia objecting—Fight with the
gunboats—March through Indiana and Ohio—Detour around Cincinnati—Defeat
at Buffington.
Life in prison—Escape of Morgan from the Ohio Penitentiary—Exchange at
Charleston.3
Services of the remnant of Morgan’s command while their General was in prison—Reception
of General Morgan by the people of the South—He is assigned
to command in Southwestern Virginia—Fight with Averill—Action at Dublin
Depot—Last raid into Kentucky—Capture of Mt. Sterling—Severe engagement
next day—Capture of Lexington—Success at Cynthiana—Defeat
at Cynthiana—Retreat from Kentucky.
Death of Morgan—Grief of his men—Subsequent active service of his old command—Hard
fight at Bull’s Gap—A battle by moonlight, and a night-long
chase—The Stoneman raid—Disaster at Kingsport—Fighting the enemy and
the elements—Battle of Marion—Winter quarters at Abingdon—March to
Charlotte after Lee’s surrender—Escort to Jefferson Davis after Johnston’s
surrender—The last Council of War—Surrender at Woodstock.
HISTORY
OF
MORGAN’S CAVALRY
CHAPTER I
In undertaking to write the history of General Morgan’s services,
and of the command which he created, it is but fair that I
shall acknowledge myself influenced, in a great measure, by the
feelings of the friend and the follower; that I desire, if I can do
so by relating facts, of most of which I am personally cognizant,
to perpetuate his fame, and, at the same time, establish the true
character of a body of men, who recruited and inured to war by
him, served bravely and faithfully to the close of the great
struggle. It may be that credence will be given with hesitation
to the statements of one, who thus candidly confesses that personal
regard for his chief, and esprit-de-corps mainly induce him
to attempt the task I propose to myself. To all works of this
nature, nevertheless, the same objection will apply, or the more
serious one, that they owe their production to the inspiration
of hatred, and those who have witnessed and participated in the
events which they describe, must (under this rule), for that very
reason, be denied belief.
General Morgan’s career during the late war was so remarkable,
that it is not surprising that the public, accustomed to the contradictory
newspaper versions of his exploits, should be disposed
to receive all accounts of it with some incredulity.[Pg 10]
It was so rapid, so crowded with exciting incidents, appealed
so strongly to the passions and elicited so constantly the comments
of both sides, that contemporary accounts of his operations
were filled with mistakes and exaggerations, and it is
natural that some should be expected in any history of his
campaigns, although written after the strife is all over.
Convinced, however, that, if properly understood, his reputation
will be greater in history than with his contemporaries,
and believing that the story of his military life will be a contribution
not altogether valueless to that record which the Southern
people, in justice to themselves and their dead, must yet publish,
I can permit no minor consideration to deter me from
furnishing correct, and, I deem, important information, which
my relations, personal and official, with General Morgan enabled
me to obtain. A correct representation of a certain series of
events sometimes leads to a correct understanding of many
more, and if the vail which prejudice and deliberate unscrupulous
falsification have thrown over some features of the contest
be lifted, a truer appreciation may perhaps be had of others of
greater moment and interest. I may add that, as no one has
been more bitterly assailed, not only while living but even after
death, than General Morgan, so no man’s memory should be more
peculiarly the subject of vindication and protection to his friends.
But there are also other and cogent reasons why this tribute
should be rendered him by some one, who, devoted to the interests
of the living chieftain, is sensitive regarding the reputation
he has left. The cruel ingratitude which embittered the
last days of his life, has made his memory all the dearer to the
many who were true and constant in their love and esteem for
him, and they feel that he should be justly depicted. The fame
which he desired will be accorded him; the reward for which
he strove is his already, in the affection of the people by whom
he hoped and deserved that the kindest recollections of him
should be cherished and the warmest eulogies pronounced. In
the glory won, in the tremendous and unequal struggle, in the[Pg 11]
pride with which they speak the names of the dead heroes whose
martyrdom illustrated it, the Southern people possess treasures
of which no conqueror can deprive them.
A man who, like General Morgan, uninfluenced by the public
opinion of the State in which he resided, yet surrendered fortune,
home and friends to assist the people of the South
when embarked in the desperate and vital strife which their
action had provoked, because sharing their blood and their convictions,
he thought that they had an imperative claim upon
his services; who pledged his all to their cause, and identified
his name with every phase of the contest, until his death became
an event of the last and most bitter—such a man can never be
forgotten by them. It is impossible that the memory of his
services can ever fade from their minds.
In the beautiful land for which he fought and died, the traditions
which will indicate the spots where he struck her foes, will
also preserve his name in undying affection and honor. The
men of the generation which knew him can forget him only
when they forget the fate from which he strove to save them;
his name belongs to the history of the race, and it can not die.
A narrative of the operations of a command composed, in
great part, of Kentuckians, must possess some interest for the
people of their own State. So general and intense was the
interest which Morgan excited among the young men of the
State, that he obtained recruits from every county, numbers
running every risk to join him, when no other leader could enlist
a man. The whole State was represented in his command.
Many Kentuckians who had enlisted in regiments from other
States procured transfers to his command, and it frequently
happened that men, the bulk of whose regiments were in prison,
or who had become irregularly detached from them by some of
the many accidents by which the volunteer, weary of monotony,
is prompt to take advantage, would attach themselves to and
serve temporarily with it. Probably every native citizen of
Kentucky who will read these lines, will think of some relative[Pg 12]
or friend who at some time served with Morgan. Men of even
the strictest “Union principles,” whose loyalty has always been
unimpeachable, and whose integrity (as disinterested and as
well assured as their patriotism) forbids all suspicion that they
were inclined to serve two masters, have had to furnish aid in
this way to the rebellion. Frequently after these gentlemen had
placed in the Federal army substitutes, white or black, for loyal
sons of unmilitary temperaments, other sons, rebellious, and
more enterprising, would elect to represent the family in some
one of Morgan’s regiments. It is not unlikely, then, that a
record of these men, written by one who has had every opportunity
of learning the true story of every important and interesting
event which he did not witness, may be favorably received
by the people of Kentucky. The class of readers who will be
gratified by an account of such adventures as will be herein
related, will readily forgive any lack of embellishment. My
practical countrymen prefer the recital of substantial facts, and
the description of scenes which their own experience enables
them to appreciate, to all the fictions of which the Northern war
literature has been so prolific.
The popular taste in Kentucky and the South does not require
the fabulous and romantic; less educated and more primitive
than that of the North, it rejects even the beautiful, if also
incredible, and is more readily satisfied with plain statements,
supported by evidence, or intrinsically probable, than with the
most fascinating legend, although illustrated with sketches by
special artists.
There rests, too, upon some one identified with this command,
the obligation of denying and disproving the frequent and
grave charges of crime and outrage which have been preferred
against General Morgan and his soldiers. So persistently have
these accusations been made, that at one time an avowal of
“belonging to Morgan” was thought, even in Kentucky, tantamount
to a confession of murder and highway robbery. To
this day, doubtless, the same impression prevails in the North,[Pg 13]
and yet, when it is considered how it was produced, it is surprising
that it should or could last so long.
The newspapers are of course responsible for it, as for every
other opinion entertained at any time by the Northern public.
It will repay any one who will take the trouble to examine
the files of these papers printed during the war, if he desires a
curious entertainment. Among many willful misrepresentations
of Morgan’s as well as of other Confederate commands, many
statements palpably false, and regarding events of which the
writers could not possibly have obtained correct information,
will be found under the most astounding captions, proclaiming
the commission of “unheard of atrocities” and “guerrilla outrages,”
accounts of Morgan having impressed horses or taken forage
and provisions from Union men, while highly facetious descriptions
of house-burning, jewelry snatching, and a thorough
sacking of premises are chronicled, without one word of condemnation,
under the heading of “frolics of the boys in blue.” In
thus referring to the manner in which the Northern newspapers
mentioned the respective combatants whose deeds their reporters
pretended to record, I have no wish to provoke a renewal of
the wordy war.
The Southern journals were undoubtedly sufficiently denunciatory,
although they did not always seem to consider a bad
deed sanctified because done by their friends. Nor have I any
intention of denying that inexcusable excesses were committed
at various times by men of Morgan’s command. I freely admit
that we had men in our ranks whose talents and achievements
could have commanded respect even among the “Bummers.”
There were others, too, whose homes had been destroyed and
property “confiscated,” whose families had been made to “feel
the war,” who were incited by an unholy spirit of revenge to
commit acts as well worth relation, as any of those for which
the “weekly” of his native township has duly lauded the most
industrious Federal raider, actuated by a legitimate desire of
pleasure or gain. It will not be difficult to prove that such prac[Pg 14]tices
met with rebuke from General Morgan and his officers,
and that they were not characteristic of his command. There
are other impressions about Morgan and “Morgan’s men” which
I shall endeavor to correct, as, although by no means so serious
as those just mentioned, they are not at all just to the reputation
of either leader or followers. It is a prevalent opinion
that his troops were totally undisciplined and unaccustomed to
the instruction and restraint which form the soldier. They
were, to be sure, far below the standard of regular troops in
these respects, and doubtless they were inferior in many particulars
of drill and organization to some carefully-trained
bodies of cavalry, Confederate and Federal, which were less
constantly and actively engaged in service on the front.
But these essential requisites to efficiency were by no means
neglected or in a great degree lacking. The utmost care was
exercised in the organization of every regiment to place the
best men in office—General Morgan frequently interfering, for
that purpose, in a manner warranted neither by the regulations
nor the acts of congress. No opportunity was neglected to attain
proficiency in the tactics which experience had induced us
to adopt, and among officers and men there was a perfect appreciation
of the necessity of strict subordination, prompt unquestioning
obedience to superiors, and an active, vigilant
discharge of all the duties which devolve upon the soldier in
the vicinity or presence of the enemy.
I do not hesitate to say that “Morgan’s Division,” in its best
days, would have lost nothing (in points of discipline and instruction)
by comparison with any of the fine cavalry commands,
which did constant service, of the Confederate army, and the
testimony of more than one inspecting officer can be cited to
that effect. More credit, too, has been given General Morgan
for qualities and ability which constitute a good spy, or successful
partisan to lead a handful of men, than for the very decided
military talents which he possessed. He is most generally
thought to have been in truth, the “Guerrilla Chief,” which the[Pg 15]
Northern press entitled and strove to prove him. It will not
be difficult to disabuse the minds of military men (or, indeed, intelligent
men of any class) of this impression. It will be only
necessary to review his campaigns and give the reasons which
induced his movements, to furnish an authentic and thorough statement
of facts, and, as far as practicable, an explanation of attendant
circumstances, and it will be seen that he had in an eminent
degree many of the highest and most necessary qualities
of the General.
An even cursory study of Morgan’s record will convince the
military reader, that the character he bore with those who served
with him was deserved.
That while circumspect and neglectful of no precaution to
insure success or avert disaster, he was extremely bold in
thought and action. That using every means to obtain extensive
and accurate information (attempting no enterprise of importance
without it), and careful in the consideration of every contingency,
he was yet marvelously quick to combine and to revolve,
and so rapid and sudden in execution, as frequently to confound
both friends and enemies.
And above all, once convinced, he never hesitated to act; he
would back his judgment against every hazard, and with every
resource at his command.
Whatever merit be allowed or denied General Morgan, he is
beyond all question entitled to the credit of having discovered
uses for cavalry, or rather mounted infantry, to which that arm
was never applied before. While other cavalry officers were adhering
to the traditions of former wars, and the systems of the
schools, however inapplicable to the demands of their day and
the nature of the struggle, he originated and perfected, not only
a system of tactics, a method of fighting and handling men in
the presence of the enemy, but also a strategy as effective as it
was novel.
Totally ignorant of the art of war as learned from the books
and in the academies; an imitator in nothing; self taught in all[Pg 16]
that he knew and did, his success was not more marked than
his genius.
The creator and organizer of his own little army—with a
force which at no time reached four thousand—he killed and
wounded nearly as many of the enemy, and captured more than
fifteen thousand. The author of the far-reaching “raid,” so
different from the mere cavalry dash, he accomplished with his
handful of men results which would otherwise have required
armies and the costly preparations of regular and extensive
campaigns.
I shall endeavor to show the intimate connection between his
operations and those of the main army in each department where
he served, and the strategic importance of even his apparently
rashest and most purposeless raids, when considered with reference
to their bearing upon the grand campaigns of the West.
When the means at his disposal, the difficulties with which he
had to contend, and the results he effected are well understood,
it will be conceded that his reputation with the Southern soldiery
was not undeserved, and that to rank with the best of the many
active and excellent cavalry officers of the West, to have had,
confessedly, no equal among them except in Forrest, argues him
to have possessed no common ability. The design of this work
may in part fail, because of the inability of one so little accustomed
to the labors of authorship to present his subject in the
manner that it deserves; but the theme is one sure to be interesting
and impressive however treated, and materials may, in
this way be preserved for abler pens and more extensive works.
The apparent egotism in the constant use of the first person
will, I trust, be excused by the explanation that I write of matters
and events known almost entirely from personal observation,
reports of subordinate officers to myself, or personal
knowledge of reports made directly to General Morgan, and that,
serving for a considerable period as his second in command, it
was necessarily my duty to see to the execution of his plans,
and I enjoyed a large share of his confidence.[Pg 17]
For the spirit in which it is written, I have only to say that
I have striven to be candid and accurate; to that sort of impartiality
which is acquired at the expense of a total divestiture of
natural feeling, I can lay no claim.
A Southern man, once a Confederate soldier—always thoroughly
Southern in sentiments and feeling, I can, of course,
write only a Southern account of what I saw in the late war,
and as such what is herein written must be received.
CHAPTER II
John Hunt Morgan was born at Huntsville, Alabama, on the
first day of June, 1825. His father, Calvin C. Morgan, was a
native of Virginia, and a distant relative of Daniel Morgan, the
rebel general of revolutionary fame. In early manhood, Mr.
Morgan followed the tide of emigration flowing from Virginia
to the West, and commenced life as a merchant in Alabama.
In 1823, he married the daughter of John W. Hunt, of Lexington,
Kentucky, one of the wealthiest and most successful merchants
of the State, and one whose influence did much to develope
the prosperity of that portion of it in which he resided.
Mr. Morgan is described by all who knew him as a gentleman
whom it was impossible to know and not to respect and esteem.
His character was at once firm and attractive, but he possessed
neither the robust constitution nor the adventurous and impetuous
spirit which characterized other members of his family.
He was quiet and studious in his habits, and although fond of
the society of his friends, he shunned every species of excitement.
When failing health, and, perhaps, a distaste for mercantile
pursuits induced him to relinquish them, he removed
with his family to Kentucky (his son John was then four years
old), and purchased a farm near Lexington, upon which he lived
until a few years before his death.
John H. Morgan was reared in Kentucky, and lived in Lexington
from his eighteenth year until the fall of 1861, when he
joined the Confederate army. There was nothing in his boyhood,
of which any record has been preserved, to indicate the
distinction he was to win, and neither friends nor enemies can
deduce from anecdotes of his youthful life arguments of any
value in support of the views which they respectively entertain
of his character. In this respect, also, he displayed his singular[Pg 19]
originality of character, and he is about the only instance in
modern times (if biographies are to be believed) of a distinguished
man who had not, as a boy, some presentiment of his
future, and did not conduct himself accordingly.
When nineteen he enlisted for the “Mexican War” and was
elected First Lieutenant of Captain Beard’s company, in Colonel
Marshall’s regiment of cavalry. He served in Mexico for
eighteen months, but did not, he used to say, see much of
“war” during that time. He was, however, at the battle of
Buena Vista, in which fight Colonel Marshall’s regiment was
hotly engaged, and his company, which was ably led, suffered
severely. Soon after his return home he married Miss Bruce,
of Lexington, a sweet and lovely lady, who, almost from the day
of her wedding, was a confirmed and patient invalid and sufferer.
Immediately after his marriage, he entered energetically into
business—was industrious, enterprising and prosperous, and at
the breaking out of the war in 1861, he was conducting in Lexington
two successful manufactories. Every speculation and
business enterprise in which he engaged succeeded, and he had
acquired a very handsome property. This he left, when he
went South, to the mercy of his enemies, making no provision
whatever for its protection, and apparently caring not at all
what became of it. As he left some debts unsettled, his loyal
creditors soon disposed of it with the aid of the catch-rebel
attachment law.
When quite a young man he had two or three personal difficulties
in Lexington, in one of which he was severely wounded.
To those who recollect the tone of society in Kentucky at that
day, it will be no matter of astonishment to learn that a young
man of spirit became engaged in such affairs. His antagonists,
however, became, subsequently, his warm friends. The stigmas
upon General Morgan’s social standing, so frequent in the
Northern press, need not be noticed. Their falsity was always
well known in Kentucky and the South.[Pg 20]
The calumnies, so widely circulated regarding his private life,
must be noticed, or the duty of the biographer would be neglected
in an important particular. And yet, except to positively
deny every thing which touched his integrity as a man and his
honor as a gentleman, it would seem that there is nothing for
his biographer to do in this respect. The wealth at the disposal
of the Federal Government attracted into its service all the purchasable
villainy of the press—North and South. It was not
even necessary for the Government to bid for them—they volunteered
to perform, gratis, in the hope of future reward. To undertake
a refutation of every slander broached by this gang
against a man, so constantly a theme for all tongues and pens,
as was Morgan, would be an impossible, even if it were a necessary,
task. It is enough to say that he was celebrated, and therefore
he was belied. General Morgan was certainly no “saint”—his
friends may claim that he had no right to that title and not
the slightest pretension to it. While he respected true piety in
other men, and, as those who knew him intimately will well remember,
evinced on all occasions a profound and unaffected
veneration for religion, he did not profess, nor did he regulate
his life by religious convictions. Like the great majority of the
men of his class—the gentlemen of the South—he lived freely,
and the amusements he permitted himself would, doubtless, have
shocked a New Englander almost as much as the money he spent
in obtaining them. Even had the manners of the people among
whom he lived have made it politic to conceal carefully every
departure from straight-laced morality, he, of all men, would
have been the least likely to do so, for he scorned hypocrisy as
he did every species of meanness. To sum up, General Morgan,
with the virtues, had some of the faults of his Southern blood
and country, and he sought so little to extenuate the latter
himself, that it may be presumed that he cared not the least
whether or no they were recorded.
While no censure can, of course, be directed against those
who slandered him, as they did others, for hire—and it would[Pg 21]
be as absurd in this age and country, to gravely denounce the
lie-coiners of the press, as to waste time in impeaching the
false witnesses that figure before military commissions—nevertheless,
as justice ought to be done to all, it should be remarked
that among the respectable people who furtively gave currency
to every story to his injury were some who owed their power to
harm him to the generosity of his grandfather, who loved to
assist all sorts of merit, but was particularly partial to manual
skill.
The qualities in General Morgan, which would have attracted
most attention in private life, were an exceeding gentleness of
disposition and unbounded generosity. His kindness and goodness
of heart were proverbial. His manner, even after he had
become accustomed to command, was gentle and kind, and no
doubt greatly contributed to acquire him the singular popularity
which he enjoyed long before he had made his military reputation.
The strong will and energy which he always displayed
might not have elicited much notice, had not the circumstances
in which the war placed him developed and given them scope
for exercise. But his affection for the members of his family
and his friends, the generosity which prompted him to consult
their wishes at the expense of any sacrifice of his own, his
sensitive regard for the feelings of others, even of those in
whom he felt least interest, and his rare charity for the failings
of the weak, made up a character which, even without an uncommon
destiny, would have been illustrious.
His benevolence was so well known in Lexington, that to “go
to Captain Morgan” was the first thought of every one who
wished to inaugurate a charitable enterprise, and his business
house was a rendezvous for all the distressed, and a sort of
“intelligence office” for the poor seeking employment. His
temper was cheerful and frequently gay; no man more relished
pleasantry and mirth in the society of his friends, with whom
his manner was free and even at times jovial; but he never
himself indulged in personal jests nor familiarities, nor did he[Pg 22]
permit them from his most intimate associates; to attempt them
with him gave him certain and lasting offense. There was never
a more sanguine man; with him to live was to hope and to dare.
Yet while rarely feeling despondency and never despair, he did
not deceive himself with false or impossible expectations. He
was quick to perceive the real and the practical, and while enterprising
in the extreme he was not in the least visionary. His
nerve, his powers of discrimination, the readiness with which
he could surrender schemes found to be impracticable, if by
chance he became involved in them, and his energy and close
attention to his affairs, made him very successful in business,
and undoubtedly the same qualities, intensified by the demand
that war made upon them, contributed greatly to his military
success.
But it can not be denied that not only the reputation which
he won, but the talent which he displayed, astonished none more
than his old friends. He would, I think, have been regarded as
a remarkable man under any circumstances, by all who would
have intimately known him, but he was born to be great in the
career in which he was so successful. It is true that war fully
developed many qualities which had been observed in him previously,
and (surest sign of real capacity) he to the last continued
to grow with every call that was made upon him. But he
manifested an aptitude for the peculiar service in which he acquired
so much distinction, an instinctive appreciation of the
requisites for success, and a genius for command, which made
themselves immediately recognized, but which no one had expected.
Nature had certainly endowed him with some gifts
which she very rarely bestows, and which give the soldier who
has them vast advantages; a quickness of perception and
of thought, amounting almost to intuition, an almost unerring
sagacity in foreseeing the operations of an adversary and in
calculating the effect of his own movements upon him, wonderful
control over men, as individuals and in masses, and moral
courage and energy almost preternatural.[Pg 23]
He did not seem to reason like other men, at least no one
could discover the logical process, if there was one, by which
his conclusions were reached. His mind worked most accurately
when it worked most rapidly, and sight or sound were scarcely
so swift as were its operations in an emergency.
This peculiar faculty and habit of thought enabled him to
plan with a rapidity almost inconceivable. Apparently his
combinations were instantaneously commenced and perfected,
and, if provided with the necessary information, he matured on
enterprise almost as soon as he conceived it. His language
and manner were often very expressive of this peculiar constitution
of mind. In consultation with those whom he admitted
to his confidence, he never cared to hear arguments, he would
listen only to opinions. In stating his plans, he entered into no
explanations, and his expressions of his views and declaration
of his purposes sounded like predictions. At such times his
speech would become hurried and vehement, and his manner
excited but remarkably impressive.
He evidently felt the most thorough and intense conviction
himself, and he seldom failed to convince his hearers. Advice
volunteered, even by those he most liked and relied on, was
never well received, and when he asked counsel of them he required
that it should be concise and definite, and resented hesitation
or evasion. Without being in the ordinary sense of the term
an excellent judge of character, he possessed, in a greater degree
than any of his military associates, the faculty of judging how
various circumstances (especially the events and vicissitudes of
war) would affect other men, and of anticipating in all contingencies
their thoughts and action. He seemed, if I may use
such expressions, capable of imagining himself exactly in the
situations of other men, of identifying his own mind with
theirs, and thinking what they thought. He could certainly,
with more accuracy than any one, divine the plans and wishes
of an enemy. This was universally remarked, and he exhibited
it, not only in correctly surmising the intentions of his own im[Pg 24]mediate
opponents, but also in the opinions which he gave regarding
the movements of the grand armies. He sought all
the information which could however remotely affect his interests
and designs with untiring avidity, and the novel and ingenious
expedients he sometimes resorted to in order to obtain
it, would perhaps furnish materials for the most interesting
chapter of his history. It was a common saying among his
men, that “no lawyer can cross-examine like General Morgan,”
and indeed the skill with which he could elicit intelligence from
the evasive or treacherous answers of men unwilling to aid, or
seeking to deceive him, was only less astonishing than the confidence
with which he would act upon information so acquired.
In army phrase, he was a capital “judge of information,” that
is, he could almost infallibly detect the true from the false, and
determine the precise value of all that he heard. His quickness
and accuracy, in this respect, amounted almost to another sense;
reports, which to others appeared meager and unsatisfactory,
and circumstances devoid of meaning to all but himself, frequently
afforded him a significant and lively understanding of
the matters which he wished to know.
He had another faculty which is very essential to military
success, indispensably necessary, at any rate, to a cavalry commander
who acts independently and at such distances from any
base or support as he almost constantly did. I believe the English
term it, having “a good eye for a country.” It is the faculty
of rapidly acquiring a correct idea of the nature and peculiar
features of any country in which military operations are
to be conducted. He neglected nothing that a close study of
maps and careful inquiry could furnish of this sort of knowledge,
but after a brief investigation or experience, he generally
had a better understanding of the subject than either map-makers
or natives could give him.
However imperfect might be his acquaintance with a country,
it was nearly impossible for a guide to deceive him. What he
had once learned in this respect he never forgot. A road once[Pg 25]
traveled was always afterward familiar to him, with distances,
localities and the adjacent country. Thus, always having in his
mind a perfect idea of the region where he principally operated,
he could move with as much facility and confidence (when there)
without maps and guides as with them. His favorite strategy,
in his important expeditions or “raids,” was to place himself by
long and swift marches—moving sometimes for days and nights
without a halt except to feed the horses—in the very heart of
the territory where were the objects of his enterprise. He relied
upon this method to confuse if not to surprise his enemy,
and prevent a concentration of his forces. He would then strike
right and left. He rarely declined upon such expeditions to
fight when advancing, for it was his theory that then, a concentration
of superior forces against him was more difficult, and
that the vigor of his enemy was to a certain extent paralyzed
by the celerity of his own movements and the mystery which
involved them. But after commencing his retreat, he would
use every effort and stratagem to avoid battle, fearing that while
fighting one enemy others might also overtake him, and believing
that at such times the morale of his own troops was somewhat
impaired. No leader could make more skillful use of detachments.
He would throw them out to great distances, even
when surrounded by superior and active forces, and yet in no
instance was one of them (commanded by a competent officer
and who obeyed instructions) overwhelmed or cut off. It very
rarely happened that they failed to accomplish the purposes for
which they were dispatched, or to rejoin the main body in time
to assist in decisive action. He could widely separate and apparently
scatter his forces, and yet maintain such a disposition
of them as to have all well in hand. When pushing into the
enemy’s lines he would send these detachments in every direction,
until it was impossible to conjecture his real intentions—causing,
generally, the shifting of troops from point to point as
each was threatened; until the one he wished to attack was
weakened, when he would strike at it like lightning.[Pg 26]
He was a better strategist than tactician. He excelled in the
arts which enable a commander to make successful campaigns
and gain advantages without much fighting, rather than in skillful
maneuvering on the field.
He knew how to thoroughly confuse and deceive an enemy,
and induce in him (as he desired) false confidence or undue caution;
how to isolate and persuade or compel him to surrender
without giving battle; and he could usually manage, although
inferior to the aggregate of the hostile forces around him, to be
stronger or as strong at the point and moment of encounter.
The tactics he preferred, when he chose to fight, were attempts
at surprise and a concentration of his strength for headlong
dashing attacks.
To this latter method there were some objections. These
attacks were made with a vigor, and inspired in the men a reckless
enthusiasm, which generally rendered them successful.
But if the enemy was too strong, or holding defensible positions,
was resolute and stubborn in resistance, and the first two
or three rushes failed to drive him, the attack was apt to fail
altogether, and the reaction was correspondent to the energy of
the onset.
He did not display so much ability when operating immediately
with the army, as when upon detached service. He
would not hesitate to remain for days closely confronting the
main forces of the enemy, keeping his videttes constantly in
sight of his cantonments, observing his every movement, and
attacking every detachment and foraging party which he could
expect to defeat. But when a grand advance of the enemy was
commenced he preferred making a timely and long retreat, followed
by a dash in some quarter where he was not expected,
rather than to stubbornly contest their progress.
He could actively and efficiently harass a retreating army,
multiplying and continuing his assaults until he seemed ubiquitous;
but he was not equally efficient in covering a retreat or
retarding an advance in force. Upon one or two occasions,[Pg 27]
when the emergency was imminent, he performed this sort of
service cheerfully and well, but he did not like it, nor was he
eminently fitted for it. He had little of that peculiar skill with
which Forrest would so wonderfully embarrass an enemy’s advance,
and contesting every inch of his march, and pressing
upon him if he hesitated or receded, convert every mistake that
he made into a disaster.
In attempting a delineation of General Morgan’s character,
mention ought not to be omitted of certain peculiarities, which to
some extent, affected his military and official conduct.
Although by no means a capricious or inconsistent man, for
he entertained profound convictions and adhered to opinions
with a tenacity that often amounted to prejudice, he frequently
acted very much like one.
Not even those who knew him best could calculate how unusual
occurrences would affect him, or induce him to act.
It frequently happened that men for whose understandings
and characters he had little respect, but who were much about
his person, obtained a certain sort of influence with him, but
they could keep it only by a complete acquiescence in his will
when it became aroused. He sometimes permitted and even
encouraged suggestions from all around him, listening to the
most contradictory opinions with an air of thorough acquiescence
in all. It was impossible, on such occasions, to determine
whether this was done to flatter the speakers, to mislead as to
his real intentions, or if he was in fact undecided.
He generally ended such moments of doubt by his most original
and unexpected resolutions, which he would declare exactly
as if they were suggestions just made by some one else, almost
persuading the parties to whom they were attributed that they
had really advanced them. In his judgment of the men with
whom he had to deal, he showed a strange mixture of shrewdness
and simplicity. He seldom failed to discern and to take
advantage of the ruling characteristics of those who approached
him, and he could subsidize the knowledge and talents of other[Pg 28]
men with rare skill. He especially excelled in judging men
collectively. He knew exactly how to appeal to the feelings of
his men, to excite their enthusiasm, and stimulate them to dare
any danger and endure any fatigue and hardship. But he sometimes
committed the gravest errors in his estimation of individual
character. He more than once imposed implicit confidence
in men whom no one else would have trusted, and suffered himself
to be deceived by the shallowest imposters. He obtained
credit for profound insight into character by his possession of
another and very different quality. The unbounded influence
he at once acquired over almost every one who approached him,
enabled him to make men do the most uncharacteristic things,
and created the impression that he discovered traits of character
hidden from others.
General Morgan had more of those personal qualities which
make a man’s friends devoted to him, than any one I have ever
known.
He was himself very warm and constant in the friendships
which he formed. It seemed impossible for him to do enough
for those to whom he was attached, or to ever give them up.
His manner when he wished, prepossessed every one in his
favor. He was generally more courteous and attentive to his
inferiors than to his equals and superiors. This may have
proceeded in a great measure from his jealousy of dictation and
impatience of restraint, but was the result also of warm and
generous feelings. His greatest faults, arose out of his kindness
and easiness of disposition, which rendered it impossible
for him to say or do unpleasant things, unless when under the
influence of strong prejudice or resentment. This temperament
made him a too lax disciplinarian, and caused him to be frequently
imposed upon. He was exceedingly and unfeignedly
modest. For a long time he sought, in every way, to avoid the
applause and ovations which met him every where in the South,
and he never learned to keep a bold countenance when receiving
them.[Pg 29]
It was distressing to see him called on (as was of course often
the case) for a speech—nature certainly never intended that he
should win either fame or bread by oratory.
When complimented for any achievement he always gave the
credit of it to some favorite officer, or attributed it to the excellence
of his troops. Nothing seemed to give him more sincere
pleasure than to publicly acknowledge meritorious service
in a subaltern officer or private, and he would do it in a manner
that made it a life long remembrance with the recipient of the
compliment.
When displeased, he rarely reprimanded, but expressed his
displeasure by satirically complimenting the offender; frequently
the only evidence of dissatisfaction which he would show was a
peculiar smile, which was exceeding significant, and any thing but
agreeable to the individual conscious of having offended him.
His personal appearance and carriage were striking and
graceful. His features were eminently handsome and adapted
to the most pleasing expressions. His eyes were small, of a
grayish blue color, and their glances keen and thoughtful. His
figure on foot or on horseback was superb.
He was exactly six feet in hight, and although not at all
corpulent, weighed one hundred and eighty-five pounds.
His form was perfect and the rarest combination of strength,
activity and grace. His constitution seemed impervious to the
effects of privation and exposure, and it was scarcely possible
to perceive that he suffered from fatigue or lack of sleep. After
marching for days and nights without intermission, until the
hardiest men in his division were exhausted, I have known
him, as soon as a halt was called, and he could safely leave his
command, ride fifty miles to see his wife. Although a most
practical man in all of his ideas, he irresistibly reminded one
of the heroes of romance. He seemed the Fra-Moreale come to
life again, and, doubtless, was as much feared and as bitterly
denounced as was that distinguished officer.
Men are not often born who can wield such an influence as[Pg 30]
he exerted, apparently without an effort—who can so win men’s
hearts and stir their blood. He will, at least, be remembered
until the Western cavalrymen and their children have all died.
The bold riders who live in the border-land, whose every acre
he made historic, will leave many a story of his audacity and
wily skill. They will name but one man as his equal, “The
wizard of the saddle,” the man of revolutionary force and fire,
strong, sagacious, indomitable Forrest, and the two will go down
in tradition together, twin-brothers in arms and in fame.
CHAPTER III
The position assumed by Kentucky, at the inception of the
late struggle, and her conduct throughout, excited the surprise,
and, in no small degree, incurred for her the dislike of both the
contending sections.
But while both North and South, at some time, doubted her
good faith and complained of her action, all such sentiments
have been entirely forgotten by the latter, and have become intensified
into bitter and undisguised animosity upon the part of
a large share of the population of the former.
The reason is patent. It is the same which, during the war,
influenced the Confederates to hope confidently for large assistance
from Kentucky, if once enabled to obtain a foothold
upon her territory, and caused the Federals, on the other hand,
to regard even the loudest and most zealous professors of loyalty
as Secessionists in disguise, or, at best, Unionists only to save
their property. It is the instinctive feeling that the people of
Kentucky, on account of kindred blood, common interests, and
identity of ideas in all that relates to political rights and the
objects of political institutions, may be supposed likely to sympathize
and to act with the people of the South. But a variety
of causes and influences combined to prevent Kentucky from
taking a decided stand with either of the combatants, and produced
the vacillation and inconsistency which so notably characterized
her councils and paralyzed her efforts in either direction,
and, alas, it may be added, so seriously affected her fair
fame.
Her geographical situation, presenting a frontier accessible
for several hundreds of miles to an assailant coming either from
the North or South, caused her people great apprehension, es[Pg 32]pecially
as it was accounted an absolute certainty that her territory
(if she took part with the South) would be made the
battle-ground and subjected to the last horrors and desolation
of war. The political education of the Kentuckians, also, disposed
them to enter upon such a contest with extreme reluctance
and hesitation.
Originally a portion of Virginia, settled chiefly by emigration
from that State, her population partook of the characteristics
and were imbued with the feelings which so strongly prevailed
in the mother commonwealth.
From Virginia, the first generation of Kentucky statesmen
derived those opinions which became the political creed of the
Southern people, and were promulgated in the celebrated
resolutions of ’98, which gave shape and consistency to the
doctrine of States’ Rights, and popular expression to that construction
of the relations of the several States to the General
Government (under the Federal Constitution), so earnestly insisted
upon by the master-minds of Virginia. The earlier population
of Kentucky was peculiarly inclined to adopt and cherish
such opinions, by the promptings of that nature which seems
common to all men descended from the stock of the “Old Dominion,”
that craving for the largest individual independence,
and disposition to assert and maintain in full measure every personal
right, which has always made the people of the Southern
and Western States so jealous of outside interference with their
local affairs. It was natural that a people, animated by such a
spirit, should push their preference for self-government even to
extremes; that they should esteem their most valued franchises
only safe when under their own entire custody and control;
that they should prefer that their peculiar institutions should
be submitted only to domestic regulation, and that the personal
liberty, which they prized above all their possessions, should be
restrained only by laws enacted by legislators chosen from among
themselves, and executed by magistrates equally identified with
themselves and appreciative of their instincts.[Pg 33]
In short, they were strongly attached to their State Governments,
and were not inclined to regard as beneficent, nor, even
exactly legitimate, any interference with them, upon the part
of the General Government, and desired to see the powers of the
latter exercised only for the “common defense and general
welfare.”
Without presuming to declare them correct or erroneous, it
may be safely asserted that such were the views which prevailed
in Kentucky at a period a little subsequent to her settlement.
This decided and almost universal sentiment was first shaken,
and the minds of the people began to undergo some change,
about the time of, and doubtless in consequence of, the detection
of the Burr conspiracy. Burr had been identified with the
party which advocated the extreme State Rights doctrines, and
his principal confederates were men of the same political complexion.
The utter uselessness of his scheme, even if successful, and
the little prospect of any benefit accruing from it, unless to the
leading adventurers, had disposed all the more sober minded to
regard it with distrust. And when it became apparent that
it had been concocted for the gratification of one man’s ambition,
the very people whom it had been part of the plan to flatter
with hopes of the most brilliant advantages, immediately
conceived for it the most intense aversion.
The odium into which Burr and his associates immediately
fell, became, in some measure, attached to the political school to
which they had belonged, and men’s minds began to be unsettled
upon the very political tenets, in the propriety and validity
of which they had previously so implicitly believed. The
able Federalist leaders in the State, pursued and improved the
advantage thus offered them, and for the first time in the history
of Kentucky, that party showed evidence of ability to cope with
its rival. Doubtless, also, the effect of Mr. Madison’s attempt
to explain away the marrow and substance of the famous resolutions,
which told so injuriously against the State Rights party[Pg 34]
every where, contributed, at a still later day, to weaken that
party in Kentucky; but the vital change in the political faith
of Kentucky, was wrought by Henry Clay. All previous interruptions
to the opinions which she had acquired as her birthright
from Virginia, were but partial, and would have been
ephemeral, but the spell which the great magician cast over his
people was like the glamour of mediæval enchantment. It bound
them in helpless but delighted acquiescence in the will of the
master. Their vision informed them, not of objects as they
were, but as he willed that they should seem, and his patients
received, at his pleasure and with equal confidence, the true or
the unreal. In fact, the undoubted patriotism and spotless integrity
of Mr. Clay, so aided the effect of his haughty will and
superb genius, that his influence amounted to fascination. Although
himself, in early life, an advocate of the principles of
(what has been since styled) the Jeffersonian school of Democracy,
he became gradually, but thoroughly, weaned from his first
opinions, and a convert to the dogmas of the school of politics
which he had once so ably combatted. The author of
the American System, the advocate of the United States Bank,
the champion of the New England manufacturing and commercial
interests, with their appropriate and necessary train of
protective tariffs, bounties and monopolies, could have little
sympathy with the ideas that the several States could, and
should, protect and develope their own interests without Federal
assistance, that the General Government was the servant of all
the States and not the guardian and dry nurse of a few—the
doctrine, in short, of “State Sovereignty and Federal Agency.”
Mr. Clay fairly and emphatically announced his political faith
in word and deed. He declared that he “owed a paramount
allegiance to the whole Union: a subordinate one to his own
State,” and, throughout the best part of his long political life,
he wrought faithfully for interests distinct from, if not adverse
to, those of his own State and section. His influence, however,
in his own State, has determined, perhaps forever, her destiny.[Pg 35]
If he did not educate the people of Kentucky (as has been so
often charged) to “defer principle to expediency,” he at least
taught them to study the immediate policy rather than the ultimate
effect of every measure that they were called to consider,
and to seek the material prosperity of the hour at the expense,
even, of future safety. He taught his generation to love the
Union, not as an “agency” through which certain benefits
were to be derived, but as an “end” which was to be adhered
to, no matter what results flowed from it.
Mr. Clay sincerely believed that in the union of the States
resided the surest guarantees of the safety, honor, and prosperity
of each, and he contemplated with horror and aversion any
thought of disunion. His own lofty and heroic nature could
harbor no feeling which was not manly and brave, but, in striving
to stimulate and fortify in his people the same love of union
which he entertained himself, he taught many Kentuckians to so
dread the evils of war, as to lose all fear of other and as great
evils, and to be willing to purchase exemption from civil strife
by facile and voluntary submission. After the death of Mr.
Clay, Kentucky, no longer subjected to his personal influence,
began to forget it.
In 1851, John C. Breckinridge had been elected to Congress
from Mr. Clay’s district, while the latter still lived, and beating
one of his warmest friends and supporters. Under the leadership
of Mr. Breckinridge, the Democratic party in Kentucky rallied
and rapidly gained ground. During the “Know-nothing” excitement,
the old Whigs, who had nearly all joined the Know-nothing
or American party, seemed about to regain their ascendency,
but that excitement ebbing as suddenly as it had
arisen, left the Democracy in indisputable power. In 1856,
Kentucky cast her Presidential vote for Buchanan and Breckinridge
by nearly seven thousand majority. Mr. Breckinridge’s
influence had, by this time, become predominant in the State,
and was felt in every election. The troubles in Kansas and the
agitation in Congress had rendered the Democratic element in[Pg 36]
Kentucky more determined, and inclined them more strongly to
take a Southern view of all the debated questions. The John
Brown affair exasperated her people in common with that of
every other slaveholding community, and led to the organization
of the State-guard.
Created because of the strong belief that similar attempts
would be repeated, and upon a larger scale, and that, quite
likely, Kentucky would be selected as a field of operations, it is
not surprising that the State-guard should have expected an
enemy only from the North, whence, alone, would come the aggressions
it was organized to resist, and that it should have
conceived a feeling of antagonism for the Northern, and an instinctive
sympathy for the Southern, people.
These sentiments were intensified by the language of the
Northern press and pulpit, and the commendation and encouragement
of such enterprises as the Harper’s Ferry raid, which
were to be heard throughout the North.
In the Presidential election of 1860, the Kentucky Democracy
divided on Douglas and Breckinridge, thereby losing the State.
After the election of Mr. Lincoln and the passage of ordinances
of secession by several Southern States, when the most important
question which the people of Kentucky had ever been
required to determine, was presented for their consideration,
their sentiments and wishes were so various and conflicting, as
to render its decision by themselves impossible, and it was
finally settled for them by the Federal Government.
The Breckinridge wing of the Democracy was decidedly
Southern in feelings and opinions, and anxious to espouse the
Southern cause.
The Douglas wing strongly sympathized with the South, but
opposed secession and disunion.
The Bell-Everett party, composed chiefly of old Clay Whigs,
was decidedly in favor of Union. Such was the attitude of parties,
with occasional individual exceptions. The very young men
of the State were generally intense Southern sympathizers, and[Pg 37]
were, with few exceptions, connected with the State-guard.
Indeed, divided as were the people of Kentucky at that time,
sympathy with the Southern people was prevalent among all
classes of them, and the conviction seemed to be strong, even
in the most determined opponents of secession, that an attack
upon the Southern people was an attack upon themselves.
Among the Union men it was common to hear such declarations
as that “When it becomes a direct conflict between North and
South, we will take part with the South,” “The Northern troops
shall not march over our soil to invade the South,” “When it
becomes apparent that the war is an abolition crusade, and
waged for the destruction of slavery, Kentucky will arm against
the Government,” etc.; each man had some saving clause with
his Unionism. It is no hazardous assertion that the Union
party, in Kentucky, condemned the secession of the Southern
States, more because it was undertaken without consultation
with them, and because they regarded it as a blow at Kentucky’s
dignity and comfort, than because it endangered “the
national life.” Certainly not one of the leading politicians of
that party would have dared, in the winter and spring of 1861,
to have openly advocated coercion, no matter what were his
secret views of its propriety.
Upon the 17th February, 1861, the Legislature met in extra
session at the summons of Governor Magoffin. Seven Southern
States had seceded, the Confederate Government had been inaugurated,
and it was time for the people of Kentucky to understand
what they were going to do. The Governor addressed
a message to the Legislature advising the call of a State Convention.
This the Legislature declined to do, but suggested the propriety
of the assembling of a National Convention to revise and
correct the Federal Constitution, and recommended the “Peace
Conference,” which was subsequently held at Washington. In
certain resolutions passed by this Legislature, in reference to
resolutions passed by the States of Maine, New York and Massachusetts,
this language occurs: “The Governor of the State[Pg 38]
of Kentucky is hereby requested to inform the executives of
said States, that it is the opinion of this General Assembly that
whenever the authorities of these States shall send armed forces
to the South for the purpose indicated in said resolutions, the
people of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the South,
will as one man, resist such invasion of the soil of the South,
at all hazards and to the last extremity.” Rather strong language
for “Union” men and a “loyal” legislature to use. It
would seem that Kentucky, at that time, supposed herself a
“sovereign” State addressing other “sovereign” States, and that
she entirely ignored the “Nation.” Her Legislature paid as little
attention to the “proper channel of communication” as a
militia Captain would have done. The Union men who voted
for the resolutions in which this language was embodied, would
be justly liable to censure, if it were not positively certain that
they were insincere; and that they were insincere is abundantly
proven by their subsequent action, and the fact that many of
them held commissions in the “armed forces” sent to invade
the South. On the 11th of February the Legislature resolved,
“That we protest against the use of force or coercion by the
General Government against the seceded States, as unwise and
inexpedient, and tending to the destruction of our common
country.”
At the Union State Convention, held at Louisville on the 8th
of January, certain amendments to the Constitution of the United
States were “recommended,” and it was resolved, “that, if the
disorganization of the present Union is not arrested, that the
States agreeing to these amendments of the Federal Constitution
shall form a separate Confederacy, with power to admit new States
under our glorious Constitution thus amended;” it was resolved
also that it was “expedient to call a convention of the border
free and slave States,” and that “we deplore the existence of a
Union to be held together by the sword.”
It almost takes a man’s breath away to write such things
about the most loyal men of the loyal State of Kentucky. For[Pg 39]
a Union Convention to have passed them, and Union men to
have indorsed them, the resolutions whose substance has been
just given, have rather a strange sound. They ring mightily
like secession.
“If the disorganization of the present Union is not arrested,”
the Union men of Kentucky would also help it along. A modified
phrase much in vogue with them, “separate State action”
expressed their “conservative” plan of seceding. Unless the
proper distinctions are drawn, however, the action of this class
of politicians will always be misunderstood. They indignantly
condemned the secession of South Carolina and Georgia. No
language was strong enough to express their abhorrence and
condemnation of the wickedness of those who would inaugurate
“the disorganization of the present Union.” But they did not,
with ordinary consistency,
“Compound for sins they were inclined to
By damning those they had no mind to!”
They committed the same sin under another name, and advocated
the “separate Confederacy” of “the border free and slave
States,” under our glorious Constitution thus amended.
“Orthodoxy,” was their “doxy;” “Heterodoxy,” was “another
man’s doxy.” Every candid man, who remembers the political
status of Kentucky at that period, will admit that the Union
party propounded no definite and positive creed, and that its leaders
frequently gave formal expression to views which strangely
resembled the “damnable heresies of secession.” Indeed, the
neglect of the seceding States to “consult Kentucky,” previously
to having gone out, seemed to be, in the eyes of these gentlemen,
not so much an aggravation of the crime of secession, as,
in itself, a crime infinitely graver. There were many who would
condemn secession, and in the same breath indicate the propriety
of “co-operation.” These subtle distinctions, satisfactory,
doubtless, to the intellects which generated them, were not aptly
received by common minds, and their promulgation induced, perhaps
very unjustly, a very general belief that the Union party[Pg 40]
was actuated not more by a love of the Union, than by a salutary
regard for personal security and comfort. It seemed that
the crime was not in “breaking up the Union,” but in going
about it in the wrong way.
The people of Kentucky heard, it is true, from these leaders
indignant and patriotic denunciations of “secession,” and, yet,
they could listen to suggestions amounting almost to advocacy,
from the same lips, of “central confederacies” or “co-operations.”
Is it surprising, then, that no very holy horror of disunion
should have prevailed in Kentucky?
But any inclination to tax these gentlemen with inconsistency
should be checked by the reflection that they were surrounded
by peculiar circumstances. It appeared to be by no means certain,
just then, that an attempt would be made to coerce the seceding
States, or that the Southern Confederacy would not be
established without a war. In that event, Kentucky would have
glided naturally and certainly into it, and Kentucky politicians
who had approved coercion, would have felt uncomfortable as
Confederate citizens. The leaders of the Union party were men
of fine ability, but they were not endowed with prescience, nor
could they in the political chaos then ruling, instinctively detect
the strong side. Let it be remembered that, just so soon
as they discerned it, they enthusiastically embraced it and clave
to it, with a few immaterial oscillations, through much tribulation.
As was explained by one of the most distinguished among
them (in the United States Senate), it was necessary to “educate
the people of Kentucky to loyalty.” It is true that in this
educational process, which was decidedly novel and peculiar,
many Kentuckians, not clearly seeing the object in view, were
made rebels, and even Confederate soldiers, although not originally
inclined that way.
But it is seldom that a perfectly new and original system works
smoothly, and the “educators” made amends for all their
errors by inflexible severity toward the rebels who staid at[Pg 41]
home, and by “expatriating” and confiscating the property of
those who fled. A “States Rights Convention” was called to
assemble at Frankfort on the 22nd of March, 1861, but adjourned,
having accomplished nothing.
After the fall of Fort Sumpter and the issuing of the proclamation
of April 15, 1861, Governor Magoffin responded to
President Lincoln’s call for troops from Kentucky in the following
language:
“Frankfort, April 16, 1861.
“Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War;
“Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say, emphatically,
that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of
subduing her sister Southern States.
“B. Magoffin, Governor of Kentucky.”
Governor Magoffin then a second time convened the Legislature
in extra session, to consider means for putting the State
in a position for defense. When the Legislature met, it resolved,
“That the act of the Governor in refusing to furnish troops
or military force upon the call of the Executive authority of the
United States, under existing circumstances, is approved.” Yeas,
eighty-nine; nays, four.
On the 18th of April a large Union meeting was held at
Louisville, at which the most prominent and influential Union
men of the State assisted. Resolutions were adopted,
“That as the Confederate States have, by overt acts, commenced
war against the United States, without consultation with
Kentucky and their sister Southern States, Kentucky reserves to
herself the right to choose her own position; and that while her
natural sympathies are with those who have a common interest
in the protection of slavery, she still acknowledges her loyalty
and fealty to the Government of the United States, which she
will cheerfully render until that Government becomes aggressive,[Pg 42]
tyrannical, and regardless of our rights in slave property;”
Resolved,
“That the National Government should be tried by its acts,
and that the several States, as its peers in their appropriate
spheres, will hold it to a rigid accountability, and require that
its acts should be fraternal in their efforts to bring back the
seceded States, and not sanguinary or coercive.”
The Senate resolved, just before the adjournment of the Legislature,
that “Kentucky will not sever her connection with the
National Government, nor take up arms for either belligerent
party; but arm herself for the preservation of peace within her
borders.”
This was the first authoritative declaration of the policy of
“Neutrality,” which, however, had been previously indicated at
a Union meeting held at Louisville on the 10th of April, in the
following resolutions:
“That as we oppose the call of the President for volunteers
for the purpose of coercing the seceded States, so we oppose
the raising of troops in this State to co-operate with the Southern
Confederacy.”
“That the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her
present independent position, taking sides, not with the Administration
nor with the seceding States, but with the Union
against them both, declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile
tread of either, and, if necessary, to make the declaration
good with her strong right arm.”
In other words, Kentucky would remain in the Union, but
would refuse obedience to the Government of the United States,
and would fight its armies if they came into her territory. Was
it much less “criminal” and “heretical” to do this than to
“take sides with the seceding States?”
What is the exact shade of difference between the guilt of a
State which transfers its fealty from the Union to a Confederacy,
and that of a State which declares her positive and absolute in[Pg 43]dependence,
entering into no new compacts, but setting at defiance
the old one? Where was the boasted “loyalty” of the
Union men of Kentucky when they indorsed the above given
resolutions?
In May of that year, the Louisville Journal, the organ of the
Union party of Kentucky, said, in reference to the response
which it was proper for Kentucky to make to the President’s
call for troops: “In our judgment, the people of Kentucky have
answered this question in advance, and the answer expressed in
every conceivable form of popular expression, and finally, clinched
by the glorious vote of Saturday, is; arm Kentucky efficiently,
but rightfully, and fairly, with the clear declaration that the
arming is not for offense against either the Government or the
seceding States, but purely for defense against whatever power
sets hostile foot upon the actual soil of the Commonwealth. In
other words, the Legislature, according to the manifest will of
the people, should declare the neutrality of Kentucky in this
unnatural and accursed war of brothers, and equip the State for
the successful maintenance of her position at all hazards?”
It is well known that loyalty means unqualified, unconditional,
eternal devotion and adherence to the Union, with a prompt
and decorous acquiescence in the will and action of the Administration.
Although a definition of the term has been frequently
asked, and many have affected not to understand it, it is positively
settled that every man is a traitor who doubts that this
definition is the correct one. It is impossible, then, to avoid
the conviction that in the year 1861, there was really no loyalty
in the State of Kentucky. A good deal was subsequently contracted
for, and a superior article was furnished the Government
a few months later.
Had their been during the winter and spring of 1861, a resolute
and definite purpose upon the part of the Southern men
of Kentucky, to take the State out of the Union; had those men
adopted, organized and determined action, at any time previously
to the adjournment of the Legislature, on the 24th of April,[Pg 44]
the Union party of Kentucky would have proven no material
obstacle.
The difficulty which was felt to be insuperable by all who approved
the secession of Kentucky, was her isolated position.
Not only did the long hesitation of Virginia and Tennessee effectually
abate the ardor and resolution of the Kentuckians who
desired to unite their State to the Southern Confederacy, but
while it lasted it was an insurmountable, physical barrier in the
way of such an undertaking. With those States antagonistic to
the Southern movement, it would have been madness for Kentucky
to have attempted to join it. When at length, Virginia
and Tennessee passed their ordinances of secession, Kentucky
had become infatuated with the policy of “neutrality.” With the
leaders of the Union party, it had already been determined upon
as part of their system for the “education” of the people.
The Secessionists, who were without organization and leaders,
regarded it as something infinitely better than unconditional
obedience to the orders and coercive policy of the Federal Government;
and the large class of the timid and irresolute of
men, who are by nature “neutral” in times of trouble and danger,
accepted it joyfully, as such men always accept a compromise
which promises to relieve them of immediate responsibility
and the necessity of hazardous decision. Disconnected from the
views and intentions of those who consented to it, this “neutrality”
will scarcely admit of serious discussion. Such a position
is certainly little else than rebellion, and the principle or
conditions which will justify it, will also justify secession. If a
State has the legal and constitutional right to oppose the action,
and to refuse compliance with the requisitions of the Federal
Government, to disobey the laws of Congress, and set at defiance
the proclamations of the Executive, to decide for herself
her proper policy in periods of war and insurrection, and levy
armed forces to prevent the occupation of her territory by the
forces of the United States, then she can quit the Union when
she pleases, and is competent to contract any alliance which[Pg 45]
accords, with her wishes. If, however, it be a revolutionary
right which she may justly exercise in a certain condition of
affairs, then the same condition of affairs will justify any other
phase or manner of revolution.
The practical effects of such a position, had it been stubbornly
maintained, would have been to involve Kentucky in more
danger than she would have incurred by secession and admission
into the Confederacy. A declaration of neutrality in such
a contest was almost equivalent to a declaration of war against
both sides; at any rate it was a proclamation of opposition to
the Government, while it discarded the friendship of the South,
and seemed at once to invite every assailant. The Government
of the United States, which was arming to coerce seceded States,
would certainly not permit its designs to be frustrated by this
attitude of Kentucky, and it was not likely that the States,
about to be attacked, would respect a neutrality, which they
very well knew would be no hindrance to their adversary. But
few men reason clearly in periods of great excitement, or, in
situations of peril, look steadfastly and understandingly at the
dangers which surround them. Nor, it may be added, do the
few who possess the presence of mind to study and the faculty
of appreciating the signs of such a political tempest, always
honestly interpret them. As has been said, a large class eagerly
welcomed the decision that Kentucky should remain neutral
in the great struggle impending, as a relief, however temporary,
from the harassing consideration of dangers at which
they shuddered. Nine men out of ten, will shrink from making
up their minds upon a difficult question, and yet will accept,
with joy, a determination of it, however paltry and inconclusive,
from any one who has the nerve to urge it. A great
many Union men, who would have earnestly opposed a concurrence
of Kentucky in the action of the seceding States, if for
no other reason than that they regarded it as “a trick of the
Democratic party,” and yet as obstinately opposed the policy
and action of the Government, thought they perceived in “neu[Pg 46]trality”
a solution of all the difficulties which embarrassed
them. A few of the more sagacious and resolute of the leaders
of the Union party, who were perhaps not incommoded with a
devotion to their State, their section, or to the “flag,” but who
realized that they could get into power only by crushing the
Democratic party, and knew that in the event of Kentucky’s
going South, the Democratic party would dominate in the State,
these men saw in this policy of neutrality the means of holding
Kentucky quiet, until the Government could prepare and pour
into her midst an overwhelming force. They trusted, and as
the sequel showed, with reason, that they would be able to demoralize
their opponents after having once reduced them to inaction.
The Kentuckians who wished that their State should
become a member of the Confederacy, but who saw no immediate
hope of it, consented to neutrality as the best arrangement
that they could make under the circumstances. They knew
that if the neutrality of Kentucky were respected—a vital portion
of the Confederacy, a border of four or five hundred miles
would be safe from attack and invasion—that the forces of the
Confederacy could be concentrated for the defense of the other
and threatened lines, and that individual Kentuckians could
flock to the Southern army. They believed that in such a condition
of affairs, more men would leave Kentucky to take part
with the South than to enlist in the service of the Government.
Some time in the early part of the summer, General S.B.
Buckner, commanding the Kentucky State-guard, had an interview
with General Geo. B. McClellan, who commanded a department
embracing territory contiguous to Kentucky—if, indeed,
Kentucky was not included by the commission given him
in his department. General Buckner obtained, as he supposed,
a guarantee that the neutrality of Kentucky would be observed
by the military authorities of the United States. He communicated
the result of this interview to Governor Magoffin, and,
immediately, it became a matter of official as well as popular be[Pg 47]lief
that the neutrality of Kentucky was safe for all time to
come.
The dream, however, was a short one, and very soon afterward
the Federal Government commenced to recruit in Kentucky,
to establish camps and organize armed forces in the
State.
“Camp Dick Robinson,” some twenty-six miles from Lexington,
was the largest, first formed, and most noted of these
establishments. For many weeks the Kentuckians were in a
high state of excitement about “Camp Dick,” as it was called.
They used the name as if it were synonymous with the Federal
army, and spoke of the rumors that “Camp Dick” was to be
moved from point to point, as glibly as if the ground it occupied
had possessed the properties of the flying carpet of the fairy
tale.
The Legislature, notwithstanding its high-sounding resolutions
about neutrality, stood this very quietly, although many citizens
(Union men) endeavored to have these camps broken up and
the troops removed. Others, again, professed to desire that the
Federal troops should be removed, but clandestinely advised
President Lincoln to rather increase than withdraw the forces,
and offered their services to introduce into Kentucky guns for
the armament of the loyal Home-guards. These men were of
the class of “Educators.” But the game required two to play
it. On the 4th of September, in anticipation of a Federal
movement upon that point, General Polk, of the Confederate
army, occupied Columbus, in Kentucky.
In the midst of the excitement created by the information of
the occupation of Columbus, Governor Magoffin sent in the following
message:
“Ex. Dep’t, Frankfort, Sept. 9, 1861.
“Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives:
“I have received the following dispatches by telegraph from
General Leonidas Polk, which I deem proper to lay before you,
“B. Magoffin.”
[Pg 48]
[If any answer were needed to the outcries of those who so
strongly condemned his action, General Polk certainly furnished
it. His first dispatch was a simple intimation to Governor
Magoffin of his presence upon the soil of Kentucky, and of the
authority by which he remained.]
“Columbus, Kentucky, Sept. 9, 1861.
“Governor B. Magoffin:
A military necessity having required me to occupy this town,
I have taken possession of it by the forces under my command.
The circumstances leading to this act we reported promptly to
the President of the Confederate States. His reply was, the
necessity justified the action. A copy of my proclamation I
have the honor to transmit you by mail.
“Respectfully,
“Leonidas Polk, Major-General Commanding.”
In a letter of the same date, inclosing his proclamation, General
Polk said, after explaining the cause of his delay in writing:
“It will be sufficient to inform you, which my short address
here will do, that I had information, on which I could rely, that
the Federal forces intended, and were preparing, to seize Columbus.
I need not describe the danger resulting to West Tennessee
from such success, nor say that I could not permit the
loss of so important a position, while holding the command intrusted
to me by my government. In evidence of the information
I possessed, I will state that as the Confederate forces occupied
this place, the Federal troops were formed, in formidable
numbers, in position upon the opposite bank, with their cannon
turned upon Columbus. The citizens of the town had fled with
terror, and not a word of assurance of safety or protection had
been addressed to them.”
General Polk concluded with this language:
“I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate
troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree[Pg 49]
that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn simultaneously;
with a guarantee, which I will give reciprocally for
the Confederate Government, that the Federals shall not be allowed
to enter, or occupy any point of Kentucky in the future.
“I have the honor to be
“Your obedient servant, respectfully,
“Leonidas Polk, Major-Gen, Com.“
General Folk’s proclamation was as follows:
“Columbus, Sept. 14, 1861.
“The Federal Government having in defiance of the wishes
of the people of Kentucky, disregarded their neutrality, by establishing
camps and depots of arms, and by organizing military
companies within their territory, and by constructing a military
work, on the Missouri shore, immediately opposite, and commanding
Columbus, evidently intended to cover the landing of
troops for the seizure of the town, it has become a military
necessity, worth the defense of the territory of the Confederate
States, that the Confederate forces occupy Columbus in advance.
The Major-General commanding has, therefore, not felt himself
at liberty to risk the loss of so important a position, but has
decided to occupy it. In pursuance of this decision, he has
thrown a sufficient force into the town and ordered fortifying it.
It is gratifying to know that the presence of his troops is acceptable
to the people of Columbus, and on this occasion they
assure them that every precaution will be taken to insure their
quiet, the protection of their property, with their personal and
corporate rights.
Leonidas Polk.“
Dispatches, concerning the peculiar manner in which Kentucky
observed her neutrality and permitted it to be observed
by her Federal friends, began to pour in on the Governor about
this time. He had already received, on the 7th, a dispatch from
Lieutenant Governor Reynolds, of Missouri, on the subject.
Governor Reynolds stated that, “The Mississippi river below[Pg 50]
the mouth of the Ohio, is the property of Kentucky and Missouri
conjointly.” He then alluded to the “presence of United
States gunboats in the river at Columbus, Kentucky, to protect
the forces engaged in fortifying the Missouri shore immediately
opposite.” “This,” he went on to say, “appears to me to be
a clear violation of the neutrality Kentucky proposes to observe
in the present war.” And then again on the 14th came a dispatch
from Knoxville, Tennessee, as follows:
“To his Excellency B. Magoffin:
Sir: The safety of Tennessee requiring, I occupy the mountain
passes at Cumberland, and the three long mountains in
Kentucky. For weeks I have known that the Federal commander
at Hoskin’s Cross Roads was threatening the invasion
of East Tennessee, and ruthlessly urging our own people to destroy
their own road bridges. I postponed this precaution until
the despotic Government at Washington, refusing to recognize
the neutrality of Kentucky, has established formidable camps in
the center and other parts of the State, with the view first to
subjugate our gallant sister, then ourselves. Tennessee feels,
and has ever felt, toward Kentucky as a twin sister; their people,
are as our people in kindred, sympathy, valor, and patriotism; we
have felt and still feel a religious respect for Kentucky’s neutrality;
we will respect it as along as our safety will permit.
If the Federal forces will now withdraw from their menacing
positions, the forces under my command shall be immediately
withdrawn.
Very respectfully,
F.K. Zollicoffer,
Brigadier General Commanding.”
It would seem that each one of these communications put the
case very clearly, and that, Kentucky having permitted her neutrality
to be violated by the one side, after her emphatic and
definite declaration that it was meant to be good against both,
could consistently take no action, unless it should be such as Gen[Pg 51]erals
Polk and Zollicoffer suggested, viz: to provide for a simultaneous
withdrawal of both Federal and Confederate forces.
Certainly Kentucky meant that neither of the combatants
should occupy her soil—as has been shown, her declarations
upon that head were clear and vigorous. If she intended that
troops of the United States should come into her territory, for
any purpose whatever, while the Confederate forces should be
excluded, it is unnecessary to say that she selected in “neutrality”
a word, which very inaccurately and lamely expressed
her meaning. The people of Kentucky had long since—two
months at least, a long time in such a period, before this correspondence
between their Governor and the Confederate Generals—ceased
to do anything but blindly look to certain leaders,
and blindly follow their dictation. The Southern men of the
State, and their peculiar leaders, were sullen and inert; the
mass of the people were bewildered, utterly incompetent to arrive
at a decision, and were implicitly led by the Legislature to
which all the politicians, who aspired to influence, now resorted.
In view of the history of this neutrality, of the professions made,
only a few weeks previously, by the same men who returned an
answer from the Capital of Kentucky to the propositions of the
Confederate authorities that Kentucky should act fairly, and not
declare one policy and clandestinely pursue another—in view
of the facts which are fastened in the record—what sort of men
does that answer prove them to have been? This was the
answer:
“Resolved, By the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky that his Excellency, Governor Magoffin, be, and he is
hereby instructed to inform those concerned, that Kentucky expects
the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from
her soil unconditionally.”
This, after a pledge to their own people, and a proclamation
to both sections, of neutrality! After Federal troops, and
Federal encampments had been for weeks upon the soil of[Pg 52]
Kentucky, and in response to action (which their own had invited)
from men (to whom they had promised assistance in just
such a contingency as was then upon them), when they resolved
the previous January, that Governor Magoffin should inform the
Governors of New York, Maine and Massachusetts, that when
Northern troops should march to invade the South, “the people
of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the South, will as
one man resist such invasion of the soil of the South, at all
hazards, and to the last extremity!” The Committee on Federal
Relations, to which was referred the communications addressed
to Governor Magoffin, exerted itself to outdo the resolutions
given above, and reported resolutions of which the substance
was, that as Kentucky had been invaded by the
Confederate forces, and the commanders of said forces had
“insolently prescribed the conditions upon which they will
withdraw;” “that the invaders must be expelled, inasmuch as
there are now in Kentucky Federal troops assembled for the purpose
of preserving the tranquillity of the State, and of defending
and preserving the people of Kentucky in the peaceful enjoyment
of their lives and property.” A candid confession, truly, and
one which it required nerve to make! Brave, honorable, consistent
men—fit to be the guardians of a people’s honor! Declare
neutrality, and warn both combatants off the soil of their
State! proclaim that Kentucky can and will take care of herself,
and then coolly resolve, when the issue is made, “that as there
are now Federal troops in Kentucky, for the purpose,” etc., that
the mask shall be thrown off, and deception no longer practiced.
But the cup of shame was not yet full; this unblushing Legislature
passed yet other resolutions, to publish to the world the
duplicity and dissimulation which had characterized their entire
conduct. After going on to set forth the why and wherefore
Kentucky had assumed neutrality, it was resolved, “that when
the General Government occupies our soil for its defense, in
pursuance of a constitutional right, it neither compromises our
assumed neutrality, nor gives the right to the Confederate forces[Pg 53]
to invade our State on the assumption that our neutrality has
been violated, especially when they first set foot upon our soil upon
the plea of military necessity.”
“That when the General Government occupies our soil for its
defense, it neither compromises our assumed neutrality,” etc.
Well! it is useless to attempt comment on this—”it is impossible
to do the subject justice.” We rebels never contended that
the Government was bound to respect Kentucky’s neutrality, if
it had the right to coerce the seceded States. We denied the
constitutional right and power of coercion—but if the Government
had that power, we conceded that there was the same right
and reason to employ it against Kentucky’s neutrality as against
South Carolina’s secession. But for the neutrality-mongers to
say this—were they generously striving to fool themselves also?
And, then, in hearing, as they had been for weeks, of the morning
and evening guns of “Camp Dick Robinson,” to speak of
the Confederates having “first set foot upon our soil.” Is it an
unfair construction of such conduct, to suppose that the men
guilty of it were, in part, time-servers, who had striven all the
while to get upon the strong and safe side, and believed that
they had succeeded, and, in part, politicians unscrupulous, if
in plan consistent, who had deliberately deceived the people of
Kentucky, and lulled them into a condition in which they would
receive the handcuffs, to be slipped upon them, without resistance?
But now that the men of purpose saw that it was no longer
necessary to conceal it, and the wavering had become satisfied
which side it was safe and politic to adopt, there was no more
dallying.
The Legislature prepared to finally crush the State-guard and
“an act to enlarge the powers of the Military Board of this
State,” was passed. It was enacted, “That the Military Board
created at the last session of the Legislature, are hereby authorized
to order into the custody of said Board any State arms
which may have been given out under the act creating said[Pg 54]
Board, or other law of the State, whenever said Board shall
deem it expedient to do so; said Board shall have like power
over the accouterments, camp equipage, equipments, and ammunition
of the State.” Willful failure or refusal “to return any
of said property for forty-eight hours after the receipt of the
order of the Board to that effect,” was made a high misdemeanor,
and punishable by fine of not less than one nor more
than five thousand dollars, and imprisonment until the fine was
paid, and the arms or other property restored. The removal,
concealment, or disposal of any of the property, mentioned in
the first section of the act, was made felony and punishable by
not less than one nor more than two years in the penitentiary.
A further resolution in the spirit of the same kind of neutrality
was approved September 23rd, “That the Military Board be
and they are hereby authorized to place any portion of the
arms, accouterments, equipments, camp equipage, baggage
trains, ammunition, and military stores of the State, not in use,
under the control of the commander of the Federal forces in
Kentucky,” etc.
Having once gotten on the right track (as they were compelled
to believe it, inasmuch as it was clearly the one which
conducted to immediate profit and safety) these gentlemen
thought they could not go too fast. “The people were educated
to loyalty,” now, and it was high time to commence the punishment
of those who had shown an inaptness to receive the lessons,
or a distaste for the method of instruction. The dignity of
Kentucky had been sacrificed by the avarice and cowardice of
her own sons, who sat in her councils—this is the way in which
those legislative-panders sought to assert it again. They passed
an act entitled “an act to prohibit and prevent rebellion by
citizens of Kentucky and others in this State.” By this act it
was provided that any citizen of this State, who as a soldier or
officer of the Confederate army, should, as part of an armed
force, enter the State to make war upon it, should be punished
by confinement in the penitentiary. “Making war upon the[Pg 55]
State,” doubtless meant any attack made upon the “Federal
soldiers assembled” (in the State) “for the purpose of preserving
the tranquillity of the State.” And it was farther enacted
that, “any person who shall, within the limits of this State,
persuade or induce any person to enlist or take service in the
army of the so-called Confederate States, and the persons so
persuaded or induced does enlist or take service in the same,
shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor and upon conviction,
shall be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand
dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months.” Whether,
in passing this act, the Legislature of Kentucky was treating a
question involving belligerent rights, is a matter for lawyers to
pass upon; but that it was disgracing the State is patent. Such
action might have been proper and competent—against both
belligerents—had Kentucky adopted it as a measure necessary
to the maintenance of her neutrality. It would have been, at
least, dignified, had she earnestly and unequivocally declared,
from the beginning, an adherence to the Government, and a
resolution to support its policy.
But under all the circumstances, and after the repeated declarations
of its authors that, to resist coercion, the very measures
ought to be taken (for the punishment of which this act
was now passed), it is difficult to stigmatize, with appropriate
emphasis, such conduct.
The lapse of time has mitigated the hostility of the actual
combatants, but has only intensified the contempt, and deepened
the distrust which the people of Kentucky feel for these
men.
The sincere Union men of Kentucky, and the men who sincerely
sympathized with the Southern movement and the Southern
people, can mutually respect each other. The Kentucky
soldiers, who fought against each other in the contending armies,
can appreciate and admire the devotion to the chosen cause, the
gallantry which each displayed. But for the men who showed
so plainly by that they were attached to no cause and no princi[Pg 56]ple,
but were ready to sell and barter each and all, who manifested
all through the struggle, that they were moved by
the most groveling ambition, influenced by the meanest thirst
for self-aggrandisement—for them there is no forgiveness.
All Kentucky has suffered from their duplicity, cowardice and
heartless avarice of gold and power—now they have neither, and
none regret it.
But, happily, the past political differences, and the animosity
engendered by the long, bitter strife, are fast being forgotten
by the Kentuckians who confronted each other under hostile
banners. The sons of the same Mother Commonwealth (who
in all sincerity gave their blood for her interests, safety and
honor, as each believed they could be best conserved), are no
longer antagonists—and, at no distant day, may find the respect
they have felt for each other as foes, replaced by the cordial
friendship and alliance, which the same blood and the same
views should induce. May Kentucky have learned from her
lesson in the past few years, and may she remember, that safety
is never best consulted by giving heed to the suggestions of
timidity, that the manliest and most consistent course, is also the
most truly expedient, and that the interest and honor of a people
go hand-in-hand, and are inseparable.
CHAPTER IV
When General Albert Sidney Johnson came to the command
of the great Western Department, he found but a few thousand
troops at his disposal to defend a territory of immense extent,
and vulnerable at a hundred points.
At that time the Trans-Mississippi Confederate States were
included in the same Department with the States of Tennessee,
Alabama, and Mississippi. Missouri on the Western side of
the Mississippi, and Kentucky on the Eastern—respectively the
Northernmost of the Western and Middle Slaveholding States—were
debatable ground, and were already occupied, the former
by both, the latter by one of the contending forces.
General Johnson assumed command about the latter part of
August, or first of September, 1861, and at once commenced
his vast labor with a vigor and wisdom which were neither appreciated
by his countrymen, nor were fruitful of happy results
until after his glorious death. Missouri had become the theater
of military operations some months previously. The people
had partially responded to the proclamation of Governor Jackson,
issued June 12, 1861, which called on them to resist the
military authorities appointed in the State by President Lincoln.
Smarting under a sense of the aggressions and the insolence
of these officials, believing that they were the victims of intolerable
injustice and flagrant faithlessness, the Missouri rebels
were eager to take the field, and irregular organizations, partisan,
and “State-guard” were formed in various sections of
the State. Several skirmishes, the most important of which
were “Booneville” and “Carthage,” occurred between these organizations
and the Federal troops, before any troops regularly
in the Confederate service were sent into the State. After[Pg 58]
winning the battle of “Carthage,” and forcing Siegel to retreat
until he affected a junction with Lyon, General Price was compelled,
in his turn, to retreat before the then concentrated
Federal army of Missouri.
On the 7th of August, Generals Price and McCullough, commanding
respectively such portions of the Missouri State-guard
as could be concentrated at that time, and the Confederate
troops destined for service in the extreme West, making an aggregate,
between them, of some six thousand effective men, established
themselves in the vicinity of Springfield, a small town
in Southwestern Missouri, confronting the Federal army which
had pushed on to that point in pursuit of Price. On the 9th of
August, the battle, called by the one side “Oak Hill,” and by
the other “Wilson’s Creek,” was fought. The Federal army
made the attack, was repulsed and routed (with the exception
of that portion of it commanded by Sturges, or protected by
him in the retreat), and its commander, General Lyon, was
killed. This victory laid open, and placed completely at the
disposal of the Rebel commanders, the southwestern and middle
portions of the State. Unhappily Generals Price and McCullough
differed totally in opinion regarding the proper policy to
be pursued after the battle, and the result of their disagreement
was a separation of their forces. Price pushed forward into the
interior of Missouri, where he believed that the fruits of the
Victory just gained were to be gleaned. McCullough remained
upon the Arkansas border. The campaign which General Price
then made is well known. He captured Lexington, taking a
large number of prisoners, and, what was much more valuable
to him, a considerable quantity of military stores, many stand
of small arms, and some artillery. He placed himself in a
position to enable the scattered detachments of his State-guard
to join him, and, encouraging the people, friendly to the South,
by his bold advance into the heart of the State immediately
after they had received the news of the victory he had helped
to win, he obtained recruits and abundant supplies. He was[Pg 59]
subsequently compelled to retreat before a vastly superior force,
but not until, taking into consideration the means at his disposal,
he had accomplished wonders. Not only were his men
perfectly raw, upon their first campaign, but no attempt was
made to train or form them. Method, administration, discipline,
drill, were utterly unknown in his camps; the officers
knew only how to set a gallant example to their men; the men
were rendered almost invincible by their native courage and the
devotion they felt to their chief and their cause. Upon this
campaign General Price exhibited, perhaps, more strikingly
than ever afterward, his two great qualities as a commander—the
faculty of acquiring the affection and implicit confidence of
his men, and his own gallant and perfect reliance upon them.
Without presuming to reflect upon General McCullough, who
was a brave, honest, and zealous officer, it may be safely assumed
that had Price, at this period, been backed by the force
which McCullough commanded (much superior in equipment
and organization to his own), he could have effected results
which, in all probability, would have stamped a very different
character upon the subsequent conduct of the war in the Trans-Mississippi
States. The consequence of another such victory
as that of “Oak Hill” gained in the heart of the State, as by
their combined forces might very readily have been done, at the
time when Price was forced to retreat, would have been of incalculable
value to the Confederacy. But the fate, which
throughout the contest, rendered Southern prowess unavailing,
had already commenced to rule. At the date of the battle of
“Oak Hill,” General Hardee was advancing through Southeastern
Missouri with about thirty-five hundred effective
men.
His base was the little village of Pocahontas, situated, nearly
upon the Missouri and Arkansas border, and at the head of
navigation upon the Big Black river. Here General Hardee
had collected all the Arkansas troops which were available for
service upon that line, amounting to perhaps six or seven[Pg 60]
thousand men. Various causes contributed to reduce his effective
total to about one half of that number. All of the troops
were indifferently armed, some were entirely unarmed. The
sickness always incidental to a first experience of camp life, in
the infantry, had prostrated hundreds. Change of diet and of
habits, and the monotony of the camp are sufficient of themselves,
and rarely fail to induce diseases among raw troops, but
a scourge broke out among the troops collected at Pocahontas
which confounded all, at least of the non-medical observers.
This was nothing more than measles, but in an intensely aggravated
and very dangerous form. It was hard to believe that
there was such a proportion of adult men who had escaped a
malady generally thought one of the affections of childhood. It
was so virulent, at the time and place of which I write, and in
so many instances fatal, that many confidently believed it to be
a different disease from the ordinary measles, although the Surgeons
pronounced it the same. It was called “black measles,”
and was certainly a most malignant type of the disease. I have
been since informed that it raged with equal fury and with the
same characteristics among the volunteers just called into the
field in many other localities. Its victims at Pocahontas were
counted by the scores.
As the Big Black river is navigable for small craft at all
seasons, General Hardee had no difficulty in supplying the
troops stationed at Pocahontas, but after leaving that point he
was compelled to depend for supplies upon wheel transportation,
with which he was very indifferently provided, and upon the
country, which was sterile and sparsely settled.
The only line of advance from Pocahontas which gave promise
of important results, or which, indeed, was practicable, was by
Greenville, distant some fifty-five or sixty miles from Pocahontas,
and Frederickton, to Ironton, and thence along the Iron
Mountain Railroad by the most practicable roads to St. Louis.
The country between Pocahontas and Ironton is rugged and
heavily wooded. It is penetrated by few roads, and, in 1861,[Pg 61]
by no means abounded in supplies. General Hardee advanced
as far as Greenville, and threatened Ironton.
This latter place, the terminus of the Iron Mountain Railroad,
is ninety-seven miles from St. Louis. It is a place of great
natural strength, and was already, at the time that Hardee advanced
toward it, partially fortified. General Hardee expected
when he moved from Pocahontas to effect a junction with General
Pillow at Frederickton, a small town to the east of north
of Greenville, twenty miles from Ironton and on the line between
that place and New Madrid. Pillow’s force was six or eight
thousand strong, and the best armed and accoutered of all the
western Confederate commands.
General Pillow could very easily have reached Frederickton
from New Madrid, as soon as Hardee could have gotten to the
former place from Pocahontas, had there been a timely and definite
understanding between them to that effect. And the united
strength of the two Generals, with the addition of some two
thousand of the State-guard, which were at hand under General
Jeff. Thompson (as well armed and better organized than those
which had already done such excellent service under Price),
would have enabled them, most probably, to take Ironton. At
any rate, by flanking and threatening to get between that place
and St. Louis, they would certainly have compelled its evacuation,
and then, either defeating the garrison in the open field,
or driving it back in disorder and demoralization upon St. Louis,
they would have become masters of the situation. They would
have cut off and destroyed the defeated and routed army of
Lyon, then in full flight for St. Louis.
General Price would have gladly embraced the opportunity
of uniting with them—the whole State would have risen to join
them. It is almost certain, when the number and condition of
the Federal troops then in Missouri are taken into consideration,
and the facts that but few troops were available from the
neighboring States for the defense of St. Louis, and that the
city was not fortified—it is almost positively certain, that St.[Pg 62]
Louis would have fallen into their hands, and that the entire
State of Missouri, at least all South of the Missouri river,
would have passed securely into their possession. At all events,
General Hardee was extremely desirous of attempting just such
a campaign.
It was deemed, however, more important, at that time, to
occupy and fortify Columbus, in Kentucky, situated on the
Mississippi river, some twenty-two miles below the mouth of the
Ohio. This measure, it was thought, would protect the States
lying along the Mississippi from invasion, by enabling the Confederates
to hold the river, as it was by the river, only, that
those States could be conveniently reached. General Pillow’s
forces were consequently ordered to that point. Finding that
his plans were rendered impossible of execution, on account of
the want of General Pillow’s co-operation, Hardee returned to
Pocahontas, and was shortly afterward transferred, with the
greater portion of the troops under his command, to the eastern
side of the river, and was ordered to Bowlinggreen as soon as that
place was occupied. Up to the date of General Johnston’s taking
command, the chief difficulty in the way of action and decisive
operations in the West (independently of the inferior number and
miserable equipment of the troops) was the lack of uniformity
and concert in the plans and operations of the various commanders.
There was no one in supreme military control from
whom the subordinate Generals could receive definite instructions,
and orders which they felt obliged to obey. While an
immense extent of country was included in one Department,
and theoretically under one chief, yet practically every officer,
no matter what was the strength or nature of his command, who
happened not to be troubled with a senior immediately at his
elbow, planned and acted for himself and with a perfect indifference
to the operations of every one else. The President and
Secretary of War were too distant to do any good, if such interference
ever does any good, and a ruling mind was needed at
the theater of events. It is true that General Polk, whose[Pg 63]
headquarters were at Memphis, was senior to the others, he
being a Major-General, and all the rest but Brigadiers, and he
was ostensibly in chief command and directed to a certain extent,
the movements of all.
But, whether it was that, in a period when nothing was fairly
organized, his authority was not clearly defined, or that he felt
some hesitation in vigorously exercising it, it is certain that each
of the Generals, who have been here mentioned, acted as if he
knew himself to be, to all intents and purposes, in independent
command.
This evil was completely remedied by the appointment to the
chief command in the West of General Johnson, and the prompt
and decided measures which he instituted. General Johnson’s
whole life had been one of the most thorough military training,
and no officer of his years in the old army of the United States
had seen more service; but more than that, he was a soldier
by instinct, and Nature had intended him for military command.
He felt the full importance of careful preparation, and the
establishment by order and system in every branch and department
of the service. No martinet of the schools was ever more
alive to the necessity of rigid method and exact discipline, for
he knew that without their inauguration and strict observance,
it would be impossible to even partially discharge the duties of
his vast commission. But he also saw clearly the vital necessity
of maintaining in tact the spirit which animated the men of his
army, and which had summoned them into the field. He knew
that to impair the ardor which had induced them to become soldiers
was to destroy their morale; that to attempt to make them
machines would result in making them worthless.
Although the troops at his disposal seriously needed instruction
and more perfect organization, he did not waste precious
moments in seeking to impart them then. He did not permit
the high spirit of his gallant army to sink into lethargy, nor the
interest which the people felt in the conduct of military affairs[Pg 64]
to abate by remaining inactive, and in a position which would
reduce him, under all circumstances, to the defensive. A concentration
of his forces any where upon the Tennessee border
would not only have placed him at great strategic disadvantage,
but would have been instantly accepted by the soldiery and the
people as a signal of his intention to await the pleasure and
movements of his adversary. Almost immediately after his arrival
at Nashville, the troops which had collected at Camp
Boone, the rendezvous of the Kentucky regiments, and the Tennessee
troops which were available, were pushed into Kentucky.
Kentucky’s neutrality, for a time recognized provisionally, and
so far as a discreet silence upon the subject amounted to recognition
by the Federal Government, had already been exploded.
The Government of the United States, having made the necessary
preparations, was not disposed to abandon a line of invasion
which led right to the vitals of the Confederacy, and promised
a successful reduction of the rebellion in at least three of
the seceded States, because of the partially rebellious attitude
assumed by Kentucky.
Camp Dick Robinson had been organized and put into successful
operation in July. General Anderson took command at
Louisville on the 20th of September. The other portions of the
state were occupied, and definite lines were established by the
opposing forces, nearly about the same time. General Johnson
advanced as far as Green river, making it his line of defense for
his center, while his right rested on the Cumberland and the
rugged ranges of its hills. His line might be said to extend
from Columbus through Hopkinsville, Munfordsville and Somerset
to the Virginia border somewhere in the vicinity of Pound
Gap. The Federal forces were pushed down, almost simultaneously
with General Johnson’s advance to Green river, to
Elizabethtown, and in a few days afterward to Nolin creek.
Their line may be described as running almost directly from
Paducah in the West, to Prestonburg in the East. This line
gave them possession of the mouths of the Tennessee, Cumberland and Green rivers, of the Blue grass region, and of a greater
share of the central and eastern portions of the State.
A single glance at the map will show the importance of Bowlinggreen[Pg 66]
as a strategic point. It will be seen that it is admirably
adapted for a base of operations, offensive or defensive,
in such a campaign as General Johnson was about to inaugurate
at the time of its occupation. Situated upon the bank of the
Barren river, it has that river and the Green river to protect it
against attack from the front. The Barren river empties into
the Green some twenty miles from and northwest of Bowlinggreen,
and the Green flowing in a northwesterly direction,
affords an admirable line of defense for many miles to the left.
There are few fords and ferries of Green river after its junction
with the Barren, and those which it has can be easily held. The
danger of attack from the extreme left flank was guarded
against, but as the result showed imperfectly, by Forts Henry
and Donelson constructed respectively upon the Tennessee
and Cumberland rivers. The one just upon, the other about ten
miles from, the Kentucky and Tennessee border. As there was
little danger to be apprehended in that direction, except from
forces brought up those rivers and established in the rear of
Bowlinggreen, these forts, whose strength was overrated, were
thought to sufficiently protect that flank. The Cumberland
river rising, in the mountains of Southeastern Kentucky, flows
nearly due East and West and upon the same parallel of latitude
on which Bowlinggreen is situated, until within sixty or seventy
miles of that place, when it inclines to the Southwest. The
Green river affords a line extending eastward, and defensible,
beyond the point where the Cumberland begins to bend to the
Southwest. At this point the two rivers are about thirty miles
apart. The country throughout this section of the State is
broken but accessible to the march of large bodies of troops.
It is apparent, however, that an army, with Bowlinggreen for
its base, unless immensely outnumbered, would have it in its
power to take advantage of an opponent advancing upon Bow[Pg 67]linggreen
by that route. Even if pressed in front, it could hold
the river with detachments until with the bulk of its strength it
struck the enemy coming from the East.
The line of march of the latter would render its communications,
and concert of action with its friends, very difficult, and
liable at any time to be entirely destroyed; while the General
upon the defensive, if vigilant and active, could know the movements
of both advancing columns, and attack either, with the
mass of his army, when he pleased. Moreover, in the disposition
of the Confederate forces, General Zollicoffer with some
two or three thousand men, was stationed at Monticello, about
ninety-five miles from Bowlinggreen, and a little to the south of
east. Monticello is twenty-one miles from the Cumberland; all
the neighboring fords were in Zollicoffer’s possession, and his
scouts explored the country for some distance beyond the river.
It is plain that any hostile force moving upon Bowlinggreen by
this eastern flank would have exposed itself to attack by Zollicoffer.
An army strong enough to hold all the approaches to Bowlinggreen
might rest in perfect security regarding its communications.
There is the railroad from Bowlinggreen to Clarksville,
running through many important points, and affording communication
with every thing upon that flank. Excellent roads run
from Bowlinggreen to Monticello upon the south side of the
Barren, affording secure communication with the right. Were
both of these lines interrupted, there would remain means of
certain and speedy communication with both flanks, in the railroad
and turnpike running from Bowlinggreen to Nashville, the
turnpike from Glasgow to Nashville, and the Cumberland river
navigable to Fort Donelson on the one side and Burkesville on
the other.
The country thus commanded is fertile, and almost exhaustless
of supplies. The railroad from Bowlinggreen to Louisville,
and the two turnpikes, respectively, from Bowlinggreen and
from Glasgow to Louisville, and with which good roads running[Pg 68]
in every direction are connected, afford admirable facilities for
offensive operations. These two turnpikes cross Green river
within eight miles of each other, but an army, once on the north
side of the river, and in possession of both roads, could march
with perfect ease in any direction. It will scarcely be denied
that if General Johnson had done nothing else to establish his
high reputation as a strategist, his selection of this line would
be enough to sustain it. In this advance into Kentucky, the
Kentucky regiments under Buckner, about thirteen hundred
strong in all, took the lead; the 2nd Kentucky infantry under
Colonel Roger W. Hanson, to which were temporarily attached
Byrne’s battery of four pieces, and one company of Tennessee
cavalry, was pushed on to Munfordsville on Green river. The
rest of the Kentuckians and two or three thousand Tennesseeans
(and some odds and ends) were stopped at Bowlinggreen.
All the cavalry which were available for that purpose, were
sent to scout the country between the Cumberland and Green
rivers, and subsequently Forrest’s regiment was stationed at
Hopkinsville, watching the country in that vicinity. Shortly
after he was sent there, Forrest attacked and defeated at Sacramento,
a little village not far from Hopkinsville, a regiment of
Federal cavalry. This was the first cavalry fight in the west,
and the Federals were completely routed.
Zollicoffer was sent to take position at Monticello, as has been
described before, at or nearly about the same time of the advance
to Bowlinggreen. Thus, it will be seen, that all the important
points of the line were almost simultaneously occupied.
Columbus was occupied by General Polk, as has been stated,
on the 4th, some days earlier.
It was generally believed that General Buckner, who, as has
been already stated, led the van, would have had no difficulty
in capturing Louisville had he pressed on. Very little doubt
was entertained, then, of the adequacy of his command, small
as it was, to have taken the place, and, I presume, no one doubts
it now. An impression prevailed that General Buckner was[Pg 69]
strongly in favor of continuing his advance to Louisville, and
that he urgently solicited permission to do so. But whether it
was suggested or not, it found no favor with General Johnson.
A plan to take and hold Louisville, without any provision for
the occupation of other portions of Kentucky up to the Ohio
river, would have been, to say the least, a very rash one, and
at that time captures with a view only to temporary occupation
were not in fashion. To hold the State, an army would have
been required numerous enough to furnish strong garrisons for
Paducah and Smithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers, for the protection of the mouth of Green
river for Carrollton, at the mouth of Kentucky river, for Louisville,
Covington, and other points farther eastward. General
Johnson could not have held Kentucky two months after he had
occupied her northern territory (if he had taken possession of
it) with the forces which he had at his disposal. He would
either have had to establish the garrisons, which have been indicated,
and provide the supporting force, or he would have
been compelled to adopt another plan, perhaps more advisable,
viz: to have organized three separate corps, one for the western,
one for the middle, and the third for the eastern portion of
the State, each charged with the defense of a certain length of
river line, and so disposed as to be readily concentrated, at
short notice, at any point upon it.
To properly carry into effect either plan, many more troops
would have been required than General Johnson had—it would
have been folly to have attempted either with his handful of men.
Another line in advance of that of the Green river, might
have been taken, which would have secured additional and very
valuable territory. General Johnson might have established one
half of his army at Muldraugh’s Hill, thirty miles from Louisville,
and upon the Louisville and Nashville railroad, and the
other half in the country about Lexington and Frankfort, and
have thus obtained possession of the greater part of central
Kentucky, and the Blue-grass region. The country between[Pg 70]
the point indicated upon the Louisville and Nashville railroad,
and Frankfort, and also in front of the line thus drawn, is extremely
rugged and difficult of access The hills of Salt river,
the Benson and Chaplin Hills, and those of the Kentucky,
present a barrier not easily forced. Directly in front, too, of
Frankfort and Lexington, at a distance of from twenty to forty
miles stretches a belt of broken and defensible ground from the
Kentucky to the main fork of the Licking river, and on to the
eastward.
A thorough tearing-up of the Louisville and Nashville railroad,
which would deprive the enemy of the use of the Bardstown
and Lebanon junctions, and the destruction of the Lexington
and Louisville, and Lexington and Covington railroads,
would have rendered this line secure against any attack from
the front, while the excellent roads traversing the region lying
just south of it, would have made communication easy between
the salient positions. But the left flank and the main line of retreat
and of communication with Nashville, would have been
constantly and dangerously exposed.
These were all matters for a military chief to study; but far
above all mere strategic considerations, was the moral effect of
these movements, and that, it is certain, had been profoundly
pondered by General Johnson. The idea of an advance to the
Ohio, of occupying the entire slaveholding territory east of the
Mississippi, of subsidizing all of its resources, of arousing and
recruiting from its whole population, was very fascinating then,
and opens a wide field for speculation now. But then there
was the reverse of the picture to be considered. The unsettled,
bewildered condition of the Kentucky mind, has already been
described. There were many who confidently predicted that the
Kentuckians would flock to the Confederate standard as soon
as it waved upon the banks of the Ohio, and innumerable bitter
objurgations were launched against them, because so few resorted
to it when it was planted upon the bluffs of Green river.
The patriotism which inspired, alike, the prophesies and the[Pg 71]
curses, can not be called in question. But Albert Sidney Johnson,
while he felt the enthusiasm which was the concomitant of his
perfect courage and high military genius, had trained himself to
coolly examine, and carefully calculate every influence which
could affect his plans. He had studied, and, I believe, he rightly
estimated the popular feeling.
Revolutions may be inaugurated and accomplished by the
unsworn, unarmed, unorganized masses; wars, once fairly commenced,
must be won by soldiers. An entire population is frequently
ripe for revolution, only a portion of it is available for,
and will enlist for, war. Even had the most favorable accounts
of the unanimity of the people of Kentucky, and their devotion
to the Southern cause, reached General Johnson from credible
sources, he would have been justified in still doubting that he would
derive immediate benefit from it. There are no braver men than
the Tennesseeans, they were then practically unanimous, except
in the eastern portion of the State, they were very ardent,
and yet the Tennesseeans took their time in flocking to the Confederate
standard.
The gallantry and patriotism of the Mississippians are as
bright as the light of day; and yet, in September, 1861, thousands
of young Mississippians who afterward bled for the cause,
were at home dealing out fiery denunciations against slaveholding
States which would not secede. The same history is true
of every other seceding State—States, unlike Kentucky, already
embarked in and committed to the war. It was not because
the men of these States lacked purpose—throngs of them who
stayed at home until the news of our first disasters came, then
enlisted, and fought and died with the quenchless valor which
had descended to them from unconquered sires, and was traditional
in a race which had believed itself invincible. It
was because they knew little of war at all, and were utterly
ignorant of the kind of war that was coming. The mighty
conviction had not yet forced itself upon them. It is true that
the Confederate Government had refused regiments raised and[Pg 72]
tendered by these States some time previously. Unable to arm
them, it dismissed them, instead of placing them in camps of instruction
until arms could be procured.
If, among the many errors which have been attributed to the
great patriot, hero and statesman who was at the head of that
Government, there was one really grave and fatal in its consequences,
it was that he himself failed to appreciate the danger,
failed to comprehend the magnitude of the struggle when it
began, and failed therefore to arouse his people to an early and
tremendous exertion, which might have triumphed. The absolute
confidence of the Government blinded the people, and its
policy tended rather to quiet, than to excite their enthusiasm.
But whatever may have been the causes, it was for General
Johnson to consider the effect. If, after the war had lasted
four months, his immense department, composed of seceded
States, could furnish him only six thousand troops, when he
advanced to Bowlinggreen, with what show of reason could he
count on obtaining from Kentucky—Kentucky that had not yet
seceded, that was divided, distracted by conflicting opinions—the
vast concourse of recruits, which so many professed to
expect her to furnish, and which she was so indignantly denounced
for not furnishing?
Could General Johnson have occupied Northern Kentucky without
opposition, and have held it undisturbed for some months,
it is highly probable that all dissensions would have been
allayed, that the revolutionary fever would have spread through
Kentucky (perhaps it might even have been propagated north
of the Ohio), and thousands of Kentuckians would have joined
the Confederate army, many of whom were subsequently its
most formidable foes. But it must be remembered that the Federal
Government had not been idle, that the North was on fire
with the war spirit, that a host of sturdy volunteers had been
gathered and organized for the special purpose of holding Kentucky,
that, with the abundant means at its command, the Federal
Government had already efficiently armed its soldiers, and[Pg 73]
provided all that was necessary for active and immediate
service.
In forty-eight hours after Louisville had fallen, certainly
before he could have brought up the forces to dispute its entrance
at any point, an army from the North, vastly stronger than
General Johnson’s, could have been thrown into Kentucky.
Could General Johnson have defeated this army? If defeated
himself in such a situation, what would have been the consequences,
not only to his hopes of revolutionizing Kentucky, not
only to the army immediately under his command, but to the
Confederate cause in the West? Would he, then, have been
warranted in risking so much upon this throw? If General
Johnson had been constrained to fight at once, and had been
driven back, he would have sustained a disaster, perhaps fatal.
The effect it would have had in Kentucky can easily be understood,
and it would have had some and not a very cheering
effect in more Southern latitudes. The patriotism and integrity
of the mass of the people is undeniable, but for all that, “there
is a great deal of human nature in man.” Success is the most
eloquent of arguments. He who appeals to the suffrages of an
enlightened community after a victory will be better received
then he who canvasses after a defeat. Again (it is a truth that
will bear repetition) in revolutions, popular convulsions, political
agitations—a method may be safely attempted which will be
hazardous and of doubtful policy after actual war has commenced.
In the former periods, enthusiasm runs higher, patriotism
is more reckless and demonstrative than when the bayonets
are about. The danger then is distant, and with the majority of
men, when a general excitement is prevailing, the remote danger
excites no fear. Many a patriot is willing to be Brigadier
General of the peaceful militia, and to devote himself to a
cause, from the stump, who would feel a strong and very natural
reluctance to leave home, wife, children and property, to
accept the hardships of a soldier’s life, and be shot at whenever
his officers feel enterprising.[Pg 74]
If the sentiment of the people be not unanimous and very
decided, the secret of success in revolutions is to captivate the
popular fancy, give the first direction to the popular current.
It is a struggle between the leaders, and the most audacious,
not to say the least scrupulous, are apt to win.
It is unsafe, in such periods, to rely surely upon any sort of
action from the people—it would be the mistake of supposing
that every man, unshaken by any influence, had made up his
mind, and knew what he was going to do, and that the majority
by some instinct, would be immediately obeyed. A brave, honest,
intelligent people will be likely, once convinced and committed,
to abide gallantly by their decision. If their education has
been wholesome, and their traditions unique, they will be stimulated
by ordinary perils and disasters to increased energy and
exertions.
But whether the revolutionary fermentation be in process, or
the stand has been taken—it is easier to induce the masses of
a people to vote for resolutions than to become soldiers.
It doubtless would have proven a successful policy, to have
pushed Buckner instantly to Louisville, and Zollicoffer to Lexington,
to stay as long as they were safe, and return with the
recruits and the supplies that they could have collected, leaving
behind them the positive assurance that the country was not inaccessible
to Confederate troops. But to have taken the army
into Northern Kentucky, upon the supposition that the unarmed
population would arise and enable it to remain there—in the
face of the threatening dangers and the almost positive certainty
of instant battle—would have been a blind, unreasoning daring,
which had no place among the qualities of General Johnson.
The wisdom and prescience of the great commander were afterward
so abundantly demonstrated, that we may be pardoned
for believing his judgment right in this instance also.
In establishing his base at Bowlinggreen, he secured, as has
been shown, a line well adapted to enable him to assume the
offensive so soon as his army was sufficiently strong to do so[Pg 75]
with effect. The very fact of his moving into Kentucky at all
was a pledge and guarantee to the people of his department,
that, if sustained by them, he would keep the war out of their
territory, and encouraged his army to hope for an active, dashing
campaign. He placed himself where the more enterprising
and determined of the Kentucky rebels could join him, and he
spared no effort, no appeal, which could stimulate enlistment in
his army among the young men of Kentucky, or of the States
of his department.
That his appeals were neglected was not only his, but the
Confederacy’s deadly misfortune. Numerical weakness frustrated
in September 1861, his plan to appear before the people,
not only of Northern Kentucky, but of the Northwestern States,
as the victor of a decisive battle, and, in the following February,
forced him to retreat from Kentucky altogether. The first and
most golden opportunity was lost; and the future history of the
war in the West, was a series of terrible reverses to the Confederate
arms, or of victories brilliant indeed, but, in the end,
fruitless.
The condition of the Confederate troops was far better, in
many respects, at this time, than at any subsequent period of
the war.
There were, then, facilities and means for providing them
with necessaries and comforts which more latterly did not exist.
Provisions were abundant everywhere, and were regularly supplied.
The railroads, which were then, all in good repair and well
provided with rolling stock, afforded sure means of supplying
the troops which were stationed in those parts of the country
through which they ran. The numerous navigable streams also
afforded facilities, and practically shortened the routes of supply.
In all cases, however, in which neither the railways nor the
rivers could be used to supply them, troops were compelled to
depend for subsistence, in a great measure, upon the country
immediately about their cantonments, and as they exhausted the[Pg 76]
surplus provisions in different neighborhoods, they would shift
their encampments. This was owing to the great lack of wheel
transportation. It was very difficult to procure wagons, except
by purchase or impressment from the citizens, and those so
gotten were of course inferior. Much less inconvenience was
subsequently experienced on this score, after they began to be
manufactured in the Confederate and were captured in great
numbers from the enemy. At this time, many articles such as
sugar, coffee, etc., indispensable to the comfort and conducive
to the health of troops in the field, were plentifully furnished—after
the first year of the war they were known among us only
by camp-fire traditions. The men rarely suffered, then, from
the want of clothing, blankets, shoes, etc., even when the
quartermasters could not furnish them, for they could obtain
them from home, or purchase them, wherever they happened to
be quartered, at reasonable prices. There was, perhaps, no
regiment in the army which had not its full complement of tents;
they were manufactured at Memphis, and other points, in numbers
adequate to the wants of all the troops.
Cooking utensils, also, could be had in abundance—the
marching commands suffered, not from the want of them, but
from the lack of transportation for them. It is true that those
which were furnished us were not of the kind and pattern which
experience has prescribed as most fitting for military use, but
they were capital substitutes for flat stones and forked twigs.
In the medical department there was an almost total lack of
the necessary material. The supply of medicines in the South
at the outbreak of the war was barely sufficient for the wants of
the population at that time. Some medicines were run through
the blockade from the North, in small quantities, during the
spring and summer of 1861. But the supply thus obtained by
no means met the demand. The volunteers collected together
in camps and crowded cantonments, subjected to a sudden
change of diet and mode of living, sickened in great numbers.
Diseases which had never before, or but in rare instances,[Pg 77]
proven dangerous, now assumed alarming types. The systems
of the patients may have been relaxed and their vitality
partially impaired, during the early period of camp life, when
they were just foregoing their old habits and were not yet
hardened to the new, or it may be that when men are congregated
in great numbers, certain diseases, by transmission
from one to another, may be cultivated into extraordinary malignancy—at
any rate a large proportion of the inmates of every
camp sickened and many died. At Bowlinggreen in the winter of
1861 and 1862, the mortality was dreadful, measles, typhoid fever,
pneumonia and diseases of the bowels, carried off a host of victims—every
sickness, however, seemed fatal at that time.
There was, consequently, a great and constantly increasing
need of medicines; and, perhaps, some waste of them,
when they were collected in large quantities and shipped from
point to point, was unavoidable. But all these problems, all the
difficulties of properly supplying the army, began to be solved
and modified, as the genius of adaptation and substitution was
developed among the troops themselves. If a man could not
get a blanket, he made an old carpet, cut to the proper size and
lined on one side with a piece of strong cotton cloth, serve him
instead. The soldier who lacked shoes bid defiance to the rough
roads, or the weather, in a pair of ox-hide buskins, or with complicated
wrappings of rags about his feet. I have known more
than one orderly sergeant make out his morning report upon a
shingle, and the surgeon who lacked a tourniquet used a twisted
handkerchief. Of the most necessary military material, arms
and ordnance stores, there was the greatest scarcity. Perhaps
one half of the entire western army (of all the troops in the department)
were armed (at the time that General Johnson came)
with shot-guns and squirrel rifles, and the majority of the other
half with scarcely as serviceable flint-lock muskets.
The troops under General Bragg at Pensacola were perhaps
better armed, but the rule held good with regard to the others.
A few companies composed of young men from the cities, and[Pg 78]
of rich planters, were armed with fancy guns, Maynard rifles,
etc., altogether unsuitable for the armament of infantry. In
September of 1861, there were probably not one thousand
Springfield and Enfield rifles in the army which General Johnson
was trying to concentrate in Kentucky, and it was several
months later before these unequaled weapons (the right arms for
soldiers who mean to fight) could be supplied in numbers at all
adequate to the need of them. In the advance to Bowlinggreen,
more than three hundred able-bodied men of the Second Kentucky,
and an equal, if not greater number of the Third Kentucky
were left in the rear because arms could not be gotten for them.
In November one or two regiments of the Kentucky brigade
were given the Belgian in place of the flint-lock musket, and in
December flint-lock guns, altered to percussion locks, were given
the other regiments of the brigade. Proper accouterments were
as scarce as guns. Cartridge-boxes, knapsacks, canteens, when
they could be gotten at all, were very inferior. By great industry
and effort, a considerable quantity of ammunition had
been prepared and worked up into cartridges, but there was
such a scarcity of lead and powder in the South, and such inferior
facilities for the manufacture of the latter, that apprehension
was felt lest, when the supply on hand was exhausted,
it could not be replaced.
There was scarcely a percussion cap to be had (in the early
part of the war) in the department, with the exception of some
that were manufactured by an enterprising citizen of Nashville,
and zealous Confederate, Mr. S.D. Morgan, an uncle of the
General. But while so few of the Confederate soldiers were
efficiently armed, almost every man of them, presuming that the
Yankees were to be whipped in rough and tumble style, had his
bowie-knife and revolver. The Arkansas and Texas troops,
especially, carried enormous knives, that might have made a
Malay’s blood run cold, but in the end those huge weapons did
duty far oftener as cleavers than as bayonets. The organization
of the troops first put in the field was, of course, to some extent,[Pg 79]
imperfect. A good deal has been said about the evils of the
system of electing officers, and much just censure has been
passed upon it. It has been claimed that it gives rise to a
laxity of discipline, and a disposition on the part of officers, who
owe their positions to the suffrages of the men they command,
to wink at irregularities and pardon gross neglect of duty.
This is undoubtedly true, in a great measure, and what is
stranger, but equally as true, is the fact that troops which have
been longest in the service, which know best what qualities are
necessary to constitute a good officer, which appreciate perfectly
the necessity of having good officers, not only to their efficiency
and success in the field, but to their well-being at all times—just
such troops seem least able to resist the temptation of
electing some good-natured fellow, whom they will never respect,
and will, perhaps, grow ashamed of, rather than men who will
enforce their obedience, but promote alike their efficiency and
their comfort. At all times they will look to and rely upon the
good officer, but when they come to elect, the love of doing as
they please, unchecked by the irksome restraints of discipline,
is apt to make them vote for the man who will indulge them.
But I believe that all those who observed these matters carefully
will agree, that there was far less of this sort of feeling
among the men who volunteered at the outbreak of the war
than there was later.
The officers elected by the regiments first raised were, generally,
about the best men that could have been selected. The
men, at that time, in good faith, chose those they believed best
qualified for the duties of command, and elected individuals who
had manifested, or were thought to possess, courage, energy,
and good sense. Of course some mistakes were made, and experience
disclosed the fact, now well-established, that many
men who figured respectably in times of peace, are unfitted for
military responsibility, and weaken in the ordeal of military
life.
No opportunity had been afforded then, for testing and dis[Pg 80]covering
those qualified for positions of trust and importance—it
was all a matter of experiment. Many injudicious selections
were made, but it quite as often happened that the appointing
system (as it was exercised at the beginning of the war) gave
incompetent officers to the army. The graduates of West Point
themselves, and even those officers who had served for years in
the “Old Army,” knew little or nothing of actual war. Their
studies at the academy, and the reading appropriate to their
profession, had instructed them in the theory of war.
They had the knowledge which the routine of camp and garrison
duty teaches. Most of them had seen service in expeditions
against the Indians on the Western plains. Some of them
had served with distinction and benefit to themselves in Mexico,
but this was an experience which they shared with many civilians.
They had soldierly habits. They were well acquainted
with, and knew the importance of the military etiquette and
ceremonial so conducive to proper subordination and discipline,
and without which neither can be maintained in an army. But
beyond the necessity (permanently impressed upon them, and
rendered a constant influence with them by long training and
habit) of strictly obeying all the rules of discipline themselves,
and of exacting the same obedience from others, they knew
nothing which a quick mind, if endowed with a natural military
aptitude and appreciation of military essentials, can not readily
acquire. While the regulations prescribed clear and excellent
rules of organization, the strictest conformity was not always
had to them, and it was sometimes difficult to strictly apply
them. Companies sometimes overran the maximum in a way
that rendered them as embarrassing to the regiments in which
they were placed, as they were painfully unwieldy to the unlearned
Captains and Lieutenants who immediately commanded
them.
When it was known that a very popular man was recruiting,
the number of enlistments in his company was limited only by
the number of able bodied men in his district who were inclined[Pg 81]
to enlist. As each volunteer had the right to select his Captain
and company, and generally objected very decidedly to being
transferred to any other, it was a delicate and difficult task
to reduce these over-grown companies to proper proportions.
Regiments frequently, on account of the popularity of their
Colonels, or from other causes, swelled out of due bounds
also. I knew one regiment, which in the early part of September,
1861, had in it seventeen companies and numbered, when
all answered to roll call, more than two thousand men. There
was at this time a very favorite, and very anomalous organization,
known as the “Legion,” which fortunately in a few months
entirely disappeared. It was something between a regiment
and a brigade, with all of a hybrid’s vague awkwardness of
conformation. It was the general supposition, too, for little
was ever definitely known about it, that it was to be somewhat
of an independent corps, something like the “Partisan Ranger”
regiment of later date. When the army was in the first process
of organization, these “Legions” could be heard of everywhere.
The idea doubtless originated with some officer who felt that
he deserved a higher grade than that of Colonel, and could not
obtain a Brigadier’s commission.
As organization went on, and system prevailed, the “Legions,”
perhaps according to the merit of their commanders, or their
numerical strength, sank into companies, were regularly organized
as regiments, or were elevated into brigades. The brigades
were from three to seven or eight thousand strong, and all arms
of the service were represented in them; they included regiments
of infantry and cavalry and batteries of artillery. It was in a
measure necessary that this organization should be adopted,
from the fact that for some months, each brigade commander
was entrusted with supervision and defense of a large tract of
territory, and it was impossible to dispense with either of the
three arms. Divisions were not organized until late in the fall
of 1861—the strength of the brigades was then, to some extent,[Pg 82]
equalized by the reduction of the larger ones; Army Corps
were of still later creation.
A significant custom prevailed of denoting the companies of
the first regiments which were raised, not by letter, but by some
company denomination which they had borne in the militia organization,
or had assumed as soon as mustered as an indispensable
nom-de-guerre. They seemed to vie with each other in inventing
titles of thrilling interest: “The Yellow Jackets,”
“The Dead Shots,” “The Earthquakes,” “The Chickasaha Desperadoes,”
“The Hell-roarers,” are a few which made the newspapers
of that day, in recording their movements, read like the
pages of popular romance. So fondly did the professors of
these appellations cling to them, that it was found almost as
difficult to compel their exchange for the proper designations,
as to effect far more harassing and laborious reforms. The
spirit which prompted these particular organizations to adopt
this method of distinguishing and identifying themselves, remained
to the last characteristic of the Southern troops. Regiments,
especially in the cavalry service, were quite as often
styled by the names of their commanders, as by the numbers
which they properly bore, and, if the commanders were popular,
the former method was always the most agreeable.
In the latter part of the war, after every effort had been made
to do away with this feeling, it was at length adjudged expedient
to enjoin such a designation of brigades, by the names of their
commanders, by order from the War Department. This peculiar
affectation was but one form in which the temper of the
Southern people was manifested—a temper which revolted
against complete loss of individuality, and was prone to self-assertion.
It is a temper which ought to be characteristic of a
free and high spirited people, which, while for prudential reasons
it will consent to severe restraints, seeks to mark the fact that
the restraint is self-imposed. Few will doubt, upon reflection,
that this feeling could have been turned to better account in the
Southern army; that to have allowed commands to win distinc[Pg 83]tive
and honorable appellations by extraordinary bravery would
have elevated the standard of morale, as much as did promotion
for personal gallantry and good conduct. The excellence of a
command mentioned in general orders might be only partially
known, but the fame conferred by the title of the “Stonewall
Brigade” is universal. For the first year, there was, in the
true sense of the word, no discipline in the Western army at
all. The good sense and strong feeling of duty which pervaded
the entire soldiery made them obedient, zealous, and tolerably
patient. High courage and natural resolution made them fight
well from the first, and, long exposure to the storms of battle
taught them coolness in the midst of danger, and the comparative
indifference to it, which become habitual with the veteran,
and which are usually confounded with the effects of discipline,
although they frequently exist where discipline has never obtained.
A spirit of emulation induced them to readily learn the
drill and all the more ostentatious duties of the soldier. A
fortitude which, until they were put to the test, they were not
themselves aware of, enabled them to endure without diminution
of spirit, great hardship and privation. Pride and patriotism, in
the midst of every suffering and temptation, kept them true and
patient to the last. While all these influences combined to make
excellent soldiers of the material of which that army was composed,
it will be nearer the truth to say, that there was, in the
true sense of the word, no discipline in the Western army, not
only in the first year of the war, but at any time during the
War. The rigid method introduced by General Bragg undoubtedly
told with good effect upon the men of least pride and
mettle, and kept all such men nearer the mark, but for the rest,
Bragg’s discipline improved the army rather by its operations
upon the officers than upon the men.
No man who has intimately known the Southern soldiery can
escape the conviction, that, while capable of acquiring any degree
of instruction, and, if the word may be used, veteranship,
they can not really be disciplined, that is, be converted, by the[Pg 84]
infliction and fear of punishment, into unreasoning machines.
If there were no other proof of this, the reflection which was invariably
shed upon the morale and tone of every command by
the personal character, prowess and skill of its particular
leader, would be sufficient proof of it, and the fact that the
Southern troops almost always read their chances of success or
defeat, not in the odds opposed to them, but in the reputation
and character of their commander—it would be as wide of the
truth to call this discipline, as it would be to speak of the perfect
discipline of the Norman knights, who would insult a
cowardly and indolent Prince upon his throne, and would, yet,
obey with “proud humility” an heroic adventurer.
While no practical soldier will underrate the value of discipline
and the marvels it works—still the experience of the late
war will make many officers believe that it is no match for native
intelligence, zeal, and pride—when those qualities have become
trained and used to the requirements of war. Instruction
and skill in military duties, are indispensable, although discipline
is not always so. Give the high strung young soldier
who has brains and good blood, some practice and knowledge
of actual warfare, and the unthinking automaton, formed by
routine and punishment, can no more stand before him than a
tree can resist the stroke of the lightning, than the book general
and paper tactician can resist the genius which throws his
plans out of gear, and his mind into convulsions.
It will be well for those who read Southern histories of the
war to keep in mind that the writers mean, when they use the
word “discipline,” the pride which stimulated the soldiers to
learn their duties rather than incur disgrace, and the subordination
which proceeded from self respect, and respect for an
officer whom they thought worthy to command them. It was
not the fault of the Southern men who took the field, that the efforts
of the Southern people failed to establish, for themselves,
a separate and independent Government.
Two great mistakes were made at the outset and were never[Pg 85]
retrieved. Mistakes which have lost battles and campaigns innumerable,
and in this instance lost a war. The vigor and irresistible
audacity which is gained by “taking the start” was
lost to us by the defensive policy, and our troops were scattered
so widely that even an energetic defense could nowhere be made,
except in Virginia. The Government did not mass the troops
for attack upon vulnerable points in the enemy’s territory, nor
to fall upon some one of his invading columns. Not only was
the defensive strictly maintained, but an effort was made to defend
every inch of the border. In the face of superior forces
concentrating for invasion at certain points, a skirmish line,
which employed all of our forces, was thrown out to hold all
points from Richmond to the Western prairies.
But one original and cardinal error gave birth to all the others.
The Confederate Government failed to invoke the only spirit
which could have done its bidding. It ought, with out delay, to
have stimulated the ardor and turned loose the tremendous energies
of revolution, and have made the people drunken with
its inspiration. The time was propitious, the Government was
just established and was popular, the people were, practically,
unanimous, and were irretrievably committed to the movement—they
had never seen hostile troops or been daunted by the sights
of war. The presence of formidable armed foes might have
aroused prudence, but when Sumpter fell and war became inevitable,
there were no armies in the field on either side. When
the first gun boomed, the Government ought to have taken advantage
of the glow of enthusiasm which was as yet unchilled
by any fear of the yet distant danger. It ought to have asked
for powers which the people in their, then, thorough confidence
in their leaders would have readily granted. They felt, that if
the struggle was really for important principles and vital rights,
it was better to make rulers of their own choice, omnipotent for
a short time, than to run the risk of defeat which would cause
them entire, and, perhaps eternal, loss of liberty. The leaders
knew that the temper of the people could be relied on—that if[Pg 86]
frankly told that success could be achieved only by prompt and
enormous efforts and sacrifices—the efforts and sacrifices would
be made. They were made later, when instead of universal
hope and enthusiasm, there prevailed a feeling of almost despair.
The strategy of revolution is identical, in principle, with
that of war—the side which masses and marches fast wins.
If, while it was yet a contest of peoples and not yet a conflict
of armies, the entire white population of the South had been
aroused, her territory converted into one vast camp, every male
citizen between the ages of sixteen and sixty made a soldier,
leaving to the President the power of exempting certain classes,
and not regulating by law a matter so essentially discretionary,
and every dollar’s worth of property had been pledged to the
cause, how different might have been the result? All this
could have been done in the then condition of public sentiment;
not a dissentient voice would have been heard. It would have
been far more popular than the “Conscript Act” was a year
later, and that caused little complaint.
Let any man think of what might have been done in May,
1861, with all the men, which were subsequently in the Confederate
army, arrayed and pressed on the front. If unarmed, they
would have met opponents also unarmed. Men followed the
armies in Missouri and picked up guns on the battle field, while
the Government was rejecting regiments because it had not
arms to give them. Subsequently it found arms easier to be
gotten than men.
If Jefferson Davis had possessed one tithe of the unscrupulous
ambition of which he has been accused, he would not now
be the inmate of a prison. He could have made, with all ease
his Government a dictatorate—or turning off the useless and
clamorous Congress, as an incumbrance to a Government which
(until the war was won) was an experiment, have ruled during
the war with a “committee of public safety.”
To excite the energies of the people to the utmost, and then
direct and employ them by means of some such machinery, was[Pg 87]
the way to win. But he preferred to believe that the danger
was not great. He would have died sooner than assume unconstitutional
power. The ardor of the people was rebuffed, and
they sank into an apathy, from which they were awakened by
terrible disasters, to find themselves encompassed by fierce and
hostile armies.
CHAPTER V
In 1857, the company of volunteer militia called the “Lexington
Rifles” was organized with John H. Morgan as Captain, it
subsequently, upon the organization of the State-guard, became
incorporated in that body. It was composed of the finest and
most spirited young men of Lexington, and soon won a high
reputation for proficiency in drill, and in all the duties taught
in the camps of the State-guards, as well as for the intelligence
and daring of its members.
From the hour of its organization the men of this company
seemed to entertain the profoundest love and admiration for their
Captain, and the influence and control they accorded him was
not too strongly expressed in the words of their motto, which,
written in large letters, framed and hung up in their armory,
caught the eye of every visitor and announced, “Our laws the
commands of our Captain.”
It was with the forty-five or fifty men of this company who
unhesitating followed his fortunes when he went to the Southern
army, and a few other kindred spirits who immediately attached
themselves to him, before he had won rank or fame, that Morgan
began his career, and around them as a nucleus he gathered his
gallant command. Although thoroughly Southern in sentiment,
and frank to the last degree in its expression, the members of
the company, with one or two exceptions, made no effort to go
South until Captain Morgan signified his readiness to lead them,
in this, as in all else, they awaited his decision and directions.
The extreme illness of his wife, who died in July, 1861, required,
during the early summer, his constant presence in Lexington,
and he did not determine to act until after the troops, posted at
Camp Dick Robinson and the Home guard organizations, began[Pg 89]
to give unmistakable evidences of hostility to all persons not
“loyal.”
When the order was issued for the disarming of the State-guard,
Morgan determined to save his guns at all hazards. The
State-guard was by this time virtually disbanded, many of its
officers of high rank, elected under the impression that they
were Southern men, had declared for the other side, and various
other influences tended to cripple and demoralize it. An officer
then, of that body, who decided to resist the edict, disarming
his men and leaving them defenseless, in the reach of armed
and bitter political opponents, could look for little backing
from his comrades. His best chance was to make his way at
once to the Confederate lines in Southern Kentucky. This
Morgan resolved to do.
On Friday night, September 20, 1861, he confided to a few
of his most reliable and trusted men his determination and
plans, and taking the guns from the armory, loaded them into
two wagons and started them out of Lexington on the Versailles
road under a small guard. The men composing this guard left
on such short notice that few of them had time to prepare and
carry with them even necessary clothing, scarcely time to take
leave of their families. They marched out of town with their
cartridge-boxes belted on, their rifles on their shoulders, loaded,
and their bayonets fixed. A regiment of Federal troops was
encamped that night at the fair ground, about a mile from town,
and many of the officers and men were in town at the time the
guns were removed. In order to deceive as to his movements
and lull any suspicion that might exist of his design to move
the guns, Captain Morgan caused twelve or fifteen men to parade
and tramp heavily about the armory for an hour or two
after the wagons had been loaded and started, and so created the
impression that his company was engaged in drilling.
The wagons were not stopped in the town, and only one soldier
was encountered who was made prisoner by the escort, carried
off some twenty miles, and then released.[Pg 90]
Morgan accompanied the wagons for a short distance until it
was apparent that there was no immediate danger to be apprehended,
and returned to Lexington.
On the next day when it was ascertained that the guns had
been taken away, and no trace of them could be discovered, a
great excitement was gotten up. That very day had been appointed
for their seizure by the authorities, and the authorities
had been completely tricked and baffled.
The loyal citizens who had calculated upon witnessing the
discomfiture of the “Rifles,” and of all their backers, were disappointed,
and had the farther mortification of learning that the
wagons containing the coveted prizes had passed the night before,
in the sight of them all, to a place where they dared not
follow. Of course many taunts were flung at the fooled spies,
and disappointed patriots; and at length the angry discussions
brought on a shooting affray between some of the “Rifles,” and
a part of the troops and Home-guards. The regiment stationed
at the fair grounds, was brought into town to quell this affair,
and two pieces of artillery were planted to sweep the principal
streets—and from that date, for four years, Lexington was under
military rule.
Captain Morgan, for whose arrest an order was immediately
issued, communicated during the day with such of his men as
desired to follow him, and at nightfall left Lexington with them
and rejoined those who had gone before. He passed through
Anderson county to Nelson, and halted a few miles from Bardstown.
Here he was joined by Captain John Cripps Wickliffe,
subsequently Lieutenant Colonel of the Ninth Kentucky Infantry,
and a very gallant officer. Captain Wickliffe had determined
also to save his guns and take his company, or all that
would follow him, to the Confederate army. The greater portion
of his company, one of the finest in the State-guards, elected
to go with him. Desirous, while about it, of doing a brisk business
in guns, he confiscated those of a neighboring Home-guard
company, and brought them to Morgan’s camp—they were im[Pg 91]mediately
placed in the hands of the unarmed men, who, finding
an organized force making for the Confederate lines, attached
themselves to it. Many such men, anxious to go South, but
afraid to go without a leader, came to this camp during the four
or five days that it was maintained.
On account of the kindness and liberality of the people who
lived in that neighborhood, and who supplied its inmates with
provisions of all kinds, this camp was entitled “Camp Charity,”
and long will it be remembered.
By the common wish and consent, Morgan took command of
all the forces, and when, on Saturday evening, September 28th,
he resumed his march, he was at the head of some two hundred
men. He encountered no enemy. The Home-guards, who mustered
strong in the region through which he passed, thought his
force too formidable to attack and kept out of his path. When he
would hear of two bodies of them, likely to give him trouble if
united, he would pass between them and scare both.
After two days and nights hard marching, he reached Green
river on Monday evening, September 30th. He received an
enthusiastic welcome from the Confederate troops stationed
there, most of whom were Kentuckians, and many of them knew
him well.
Colonel Roger W. Hanson, the officer in command, was
himself from Lexington, and was a warm personal friend of
Morgan.
There were, at Green river, encamped on the Southern side
of the stream, at this date, the Second Kentucky Infantry
(Hanson’s own regiment), six or seven hundred strong, Byrne’s
Battery, and four companies of Tennessee cavalry.
Colonel Thomas Hunt, an uncle of Captain Morgan, was also
there with two companies of the regiment he was then organizing.
Of all the general officers (he was made a General)
which Kentucky gave to the Confederate service, least justice
had been done by fame to Roger Hanson, and it is strange that
such should be the case. Not only was he well known, con[Pg 92]stantly
talked of, greatly loved, and ardently admired by the
Kentuckians, but his name was familiar in all parts of the army.
It is true that his early death blighted the reputation he was
rapidly winning, but it is hard for those who knew him to
understand how such a man could have failed to attract more
general and more lively interest. While a very young man, he
served with distinction in Mexico, returning home he indulged
for a short period in an erratic career which astonished even the
Kentuckians, and suddenly quitted it to beat all rivals at the
bar, and become a leading politician. Friends and opponents
agreed in pronouncing him one of the most effective speakers in
the State. His youth was too much occupied in more agreeable
pursuits, to admit of his employing profitably the educational
advantages which were offered him, but his mind, although
unused to the discipline of study, mastered all that it grappled
with. He read less and comprehended more law than any
member of the profession in Kentucky. His vigorous native
intellect and acute sense, were perhaps more formidable, for this
reason. Want of science made his method of attack more original
and irresistible. In the contests of the bar and the hustings,
he was a sort of heavy armed partisan, his irregular, rapid
onslaught crushed opposition. The learning and eloquence
of his ablest antagonists availed little against his manly
logic, and often sounded like the merest folly after having
been subjected to his telling ridicule. All of his ideas
seemed clearly defined; his mind was never in a mist. His
insight into character was extraordinary, and he had the
most remarkable faculty of accurate observation and life-like
reproduction, especially of ludicrous traits and scenes. His
command of humorous, graphic, forcible expression was unequaled.
He had very many noble traits of character. He
was candid and truthful to bluntness. His scorn of dissimulation
and affectation of any sort, gave his manner and speech a
bluffness, and apparent want of sympathy with the feelings of
other men, which caused him often to be misunderstood. I be[Pg 93]lieve
that he would rather that the whole world should have
thought him a scoundrel, than have seemed for one moment, in
his own eyes, a hypocrite. His will was dauntless, his resolution
inflexible, his courage high. He had little opportunity, during
his military life, to show the stuff that was in him, and to prove
that he possessed other qualities befitting an officer beside
courage and the strictest attention to the instruction, the comfort,
and the discipline of his men. Notwithstanding that he
was a very strict disciplinarian—and Kentucky troops have
little love of discipline—he was very popular with his men.
They retaliated by nick-naming him “Bench-leg,” or “Old flint-lock,”
and admired him all the more intensely, the more frequently
that he showed them that they could never deceive him
nor attempt it with impunity. Once, thinking that the health
of his regiment was getting too bad, and that many cases of
illness, reported as severe, were but ruses to escape doing duty,
he published an order that from that date “there should be but
two sick men at the same time in each company,” and caused it
to be rigidly enforced. No one who ever saw Hanson can forget
him. In stature he was a little under the medium hight, and he
was powerfully but ungracefully built. His bulky and ungainly
form indicated great but awkward strength. His shoulders
were huge, round, and stooping, and he sat on his horse in the
attitude in which a sick man bends over the fire. His head
was large and perfectly round. His complexion was fair and
florid, and his eyes gray and full of light. His strong and
marked features, when he became excited, worked strangely
and apparently without being moved by the same influences,
and the alert movement of his head, at such moments, was in
singular contrast to his otherwise heavy inactive manner. His
face, when he was calm and giving careful attention to any thing
said to him, wore a look of exceeding sternness, enhanced by a
peculiar twitch of the muscles of the mouth and eye. He had
a German face with all the Irish expressions. A wound received
in a duel had shortened one leg and gave him a singular gait,[Pg 94]
something between a jerk and a roll. His voice was deep and
guttural, and his utterance rapid, decided, abrupt, like that of a
man who meant all that he said, and knew that it would produce
an effect. No one could look him in the eye and fail to perceive
that he was every inch a man—a strong, brave, manly
nature looked out in every lineament of his face. Captain
Wickliffe attached his company to the regiment which Colonel
Hunt was organizing. Of the stragglers who had come out with
Captain Morgan, some went one way and some another—only
eight or ten remained with him. Although not yet in the Confederate
service, he at once commenced the active and daring
work which laid the foundation of his celebrity and brought him
at once into general notice. The cavalry which had been
stationed there previously to his coming, had confined themselves
to doing picket duty, and had never sought or been required
to do other service. This monotonous work, altogether
devoid of excitement, did not accord with his nature, which demanded
the stimulus of adventure; he, moreover, intuitively
understood then, and declared the fact since so completely demonstrated,
that cavalry can be employed to far better advantage,
if kept well out upon the front or flanks of the army to
which it belongs, and close upon the enemy, than by exacting
of it the sort of duty which can just as well be performed by infantry.
The Federal advanced forces were then stationed at
Elizabethtown, and were soon pushed to Nolin Creek, distant
about twenty-one or two miles from Munfordsville. Captain
Morgan had at first not more than twenty mounted men of his
own company, but with these and with volunteers from the
other cavalry who were inspired by his example, he made frequent
“scouts,” and watched and reported every thing that
transpired upon the front. These “excursions” were undertaken
about four or five times in every week, and would usually
occupy twenty-four hours. The scouting party would set out
at or a little before dark; before reaching the lines of the
enemy, some exciting chases would be had after the country[Pg 95]men
who were in Federal pay or sympathy, and who, always on
the lookout for us, would start at break-neck speed for the camp
of their friends, pursued by our foremost riders. At first they
tried to do this courier duty on horseback, but finding that we
were better mounted than they were, and that, when hard
pressed and forced to take to the brush, their horses were
abandoned for ever, they betook themselves to a less expensive
mode of conveying information. They were fleet of foot and
knew the paths through the thickets and hills perfectly, and it
was difficult to follow and impossible to catch them. We, also,
had many friends among the country people living near the
enemy’s camp, and as we would prowl all night around and
among the Federal pickets and outposts, seeking to entrap the
unwary, many were the secret conferences which we held in the
shade of the woods with faithful informants, who generally closed
their reports with emphatic adjurations that, “For the love of
God,” we would never breathe their names.
Once or twice Captain Morgan passed himself as a Federal
officer, in close vicinity to their camps, but this ruse could not
be repeated often with success. Once we were guided safely out
of a very dangerous situation by an intensely “loyal” man
who thought he was assisting some friends who had lost their
way. When day returned the scouting party would take a position
on the “line of retreat” at a convenient but safe distance
from the enemy, rest and refresh men and horses, observe closely
if there was any unusual movement in the hostile lines, and as
the day declined and it became evident that all was likely to remain
quiet, it would return to camp. After the first two or three
weeks of this sort of service, and its advantages had become apparent,
an order was given to turn over to Captain Morgan
some thirty “condemned” artillery horses. With a little care
and nursing they were rendered tolerably fit for his purposes,
and he was thus enabled to mount, the better part of his company.
I knew a scout to be performed, with most of the men riding
these same rejected horses, of sixty-eight miles in twenty hours.[Pg 96]
Although these scouts and expeditions were not nearly so exciting
as were subsequent ones, when the cavalry of both armies
had become more accustomed to them and more enterprising,
yet they were very pleasant episodes in the dull tedious life of
the camp, and excellent preparation for really hard and hazardous
service. Morgan himself derived great benefit from the
experience they gave him, for he rarely if ever missed them.
He always knew how to direct and how to estimate the scouting
duty of his command, one of the most important, by the practical
knowledge thus acquired. Nor will it injure any man who
is called upon to exercise the duties of a General to take a few
lessons in this school. The fatigue and discomfort from want of
sleep attending these expeditions to those who went constantly
upon them, was almost as great, as that suffered in later and far
more difficult service.
The first skirmish in which Morgan’s company or any portion
of it was engaged, was a very insignificant and bloodless one, and
served only to illustrate the character of the apprehensions
which are apt to assail raw troops.
It was upon the second or third scout that Captain Morgan
had taken, that we for the first time met the enemy. Contrary
to the usual practice, the scouting party had started out early in
the day; it consisted of some fifteen of Morgan’s own company,
twenty-five of the Tennessee cavalry, and ten or fifteen volunteers,
about fifty in all. After proceeding some twelve miles in
the direction of Nolin Creek, the advance of our party suddenly
discovered a body of Federal infantry moving down the road toward
us. Their bayonets glistening and just perceptible above
a little rise three or four hundred yards off notified the videttes
of their vicinity. They did not see us, and we immediately dismounted
and posted ourselves in the thickets on both sides of the
road, sending the horses to the rear under charge of eight or
ten men. No plan of battle was adopted, although many were
proposed—the various suggestions, however, that were thrown
out, in the inspiration of the moment are lost to history. I[Pg 97]
remember, however, that one man gave it as his decided opinion,
that we ought to charge them immediately on horseback, and
he then rode rapidly back to Green river to report the situation
to Colonel Hanson. Enjoining silence on the talkative, Captain
Morgan went forward on foot to a house, about one hundred and
forty or fifty yards in front of our position, and looked out from
a window, which commanded a full view of their approach, upon
the enemy. He saw a body of sixty or seventy, but this came
so close upon him that he was compelled to leave the house before
he could discover whether it was the advance of another
and larger body, or was unsupported. Fortunately he effected
his retreat from the house and rejoined his party without discovery
by the enemy. The latter continued to march on, past
the house, and toward our position, until, within forty or fifty
yards of us, something discovered us to them and they halted.
Captain Morgan immediately stepped out into the road, fired at
and shot the officer riding at the head of the column. Without
returning the fire his men fell back to the house before mentioned,
situated on a long low knoll, through which, to the left of
the house as we faced, was a cut of the railroad. This afforded
a pretty good position and one which we should have taken ourselves.
Here they deployed and opened a volley upon us, which
would have been very fatal if we had been in the tops of instead
of behind the trees. Both sides then continued to load and fire
rapidly. With us, every man ought to have behaved well, for
each acted upon his own responsibility. Captain Morgan with a
few of the more enterprising, and one or two personal followers
who always kept close to him, worked his way very nigh to the
enemy, and did the only shooting that was effective. We had
neither drill nor any understanding among ourselves. The fight
was much like a camp-meeting, or an election row. After it had
lasted about ten or twelve minutes, an intelligent horse-holder
came up from the rear, breathless, and announced that the enemy
was flanking us, and that he had been largely reinforced. The
receipt of this important intelligence necessitated the withdrawal[Pg 98]
of the forces, and every man withdrew after his own fashion
and in his own time. Our loss, was one man slightly wounded
and several shot through the clothes. It was as bloody as an
affair between Austrian and Italian outposts.
The horse-bolder who brought the information which led
to our retreat, was evidently one who had carefully studied
the military articles in the newspapers, and spoke from the
influence of a sudden recollection of the “science” he had thus
acquired, rather than from accurate observation. This may be
safely asserted, as we were not pursued by the enemy, and next
day, upon returning, learned that they had commenced retreating
about the same time that we did, and that they were but a scouting
party like ourselves. Two or three men who got first to Green
river, before Captain Morgan’s report was received there,
stated that we had encountered a strong Federal column advancing
to drive our forces away from Woodsonville; that we
had attacked, and after a hard fight checked it, but that unless
Captain Morgan was immediately reinforced it would probably
resume its march. This statement created much excitement at
Woodsonville, and was generally credited. But Colonel Hanson
treated the gentlemen who brought it rather roughly, and said
(with an unnecessary reflection on a gallant arm of the service)
that it was a “Cavalry Story.”
Several days after this affair, Morgan made his first narrow
escape of capture. Hanson determined to send a force to the
Nolin outposts sufficiently strong to drive them in and create
serious confusion and alarm in the Federal camps. He accordingly
ordered the Major commanding the battalion of Tennessee
cavalry, to take his entire force, about two hundred and
forty men, and, conducted by Morgan, who went with twenty
of his men, to make the attack upon the outposts. This force
started about nightfall. Morgan thinking that there were now
men enough upon the road to accomplish some of his most favorite
plans, was in high spirits. His own men, who had never[Pg 99]
in their lives seen so much cavalry on the march, believed the
column invincible.
The Tennesseeans who had long murmured at the inaction to
which they had been condemned, were anxious for a fight. The
Major arranged the plan with Captain Morgan—the latter was to
get, with his twenty men, in the rear of the pickets on post, and
then fire a gun. At this signal, the Major was to dash down
with his battalion, and, picking up the pickets, charge down
upon the base and reserve. In the meantime, Morgan expected
to entertain the latter with an unlooked-for volley. It
was proposed to push the plan as far as possible, even, if the
first features were successfully and quickly executed, to an
attack upon the camps.
But it happened that some five miles from Nolin, one of the
country fellows, who was in the habit of running into the Federal
lines at our approach, was surprised and arrested by Captain
Morgan who was in the advance.
The women of whom there were several in the house where
he was taken, made a terribly outcry and noise, and would not
be pacified.
Captain Morgan moved on, but was shortly afterward informed
by one of the men, that the Tennessee battalion had
turned back. He rode to the Major and urged, but unsuccessfully,
that the plan should not be abandoned. Determined, then,
to go forward himself, he proceeded to the point where the
pickets on the extreme front had usually stood, but they were
gone. He halted his detachment here, and taking with him one of
his best and most trusted men (private, afterward Captain John
Sisson), started down the road on foot to reconnoiter. He had
been gone but a short time, when the rear guard of the Tennessee
battalion, about twenty strong, came up; it was commanded
by Captain, afterward Colonel, Biffel. It seemed that the
Major had conceived that the shrieks of the women would notify
the enemy of his coming, and prevent his plan of surprising
the picket posts and base from succeeding.[Pg 100]
Finding that Morgan had still gone on, Biffel took advantage
of his position in the rear of the returning battalion and came
to support him. As soon as he got up and learned why we
were halted, he turned into the thicket with his detachment, on
the side of the road, opposite to that occupied by Morgan’s.
Just as he was doing this, a Federal column of cavalry came up
the road, and hearing the noise of horses forcing they way
through the brush, halted about one hundred yards from the
point where we lay. The night was clear, and we could easily
distinguish them in the moonlight. I had been left in command
of the detachment, and would not permit the men to fire, lest it
should endanger Captain Morgan’s safety, who, if we were
driven off, would probably be captured. I ordered, therefore,
that not a shot should be fired, unless they resumed their march
and came right upon us.
They remained at the spot where they had halted for perhaps
twenty minutes, apparently in consultation, when they countermarched
and went off rapidly. In a few minutes after they had
disappeared, Captain Morgan and Sisson returned and gave an
account of what had happened to them. They had walked
along the road for fifteen or twenty minutes, when suddenly they
heard the tramp of cavalry. They were in a stretch of the
road darkened for some distance by the shade of heavy timber.
This column came upon them, and they slipped aside some ten
or fifteen paces into the woods. Captain Morgan estimated it
at about one hundred and twenty men. After it had passed, it
occurred to him that his men would be attacked by it, and he
started back rapidly to rejoin them. The fatigue of running
through the woods was soon too much for him and he was compelled
to desist.
As he drew near to the point where he had left us and heard
no firing, he conceived a true idea of the situation. Stealing
cautiously along, he came upon the enemy, who, at the halt, had
gone into the woods also. He was then compelled to lie closely
concealed and perfectly still until the road was left clear by the[Pg 101]
retreat of the enemy. Fortunately his proximity was not discovered
by the enemy when in this last situation.
Captain Morgan continued actively engaged in this sort of
service until the troops were withdrawn from Woodsonville, when
he was also ordered to Bowlinggreen. There the men were
sworn into the service, the company regularly organized and
officers elected. John H. Morgan was of course elected Captain;
I was elected First Lieutenant; James West, Second Lieutenant;
Van Buren Sellers, Third, or, more properly, Brevet
Second Lieutenant. The strength of the company was then a
little above the “minimum” required for organization, numbering
sixty-seven privates.
Immediately after reaching Bowlinggreen, excellent horses
were purchased and turned over to the company, by General
Buckner’s order, and saddles, bridles, tents, etc., were issued to
it. It was already provided with the best guns and accouterments,
and when the fitting up at Bowlinggreen was completed,
no command in the Confederate service was better equipped, in
any respect.
At this period two other companies, one commanded by Captain
Thomas Allen of Shelbyville, Kentucky, and the other by
Captain James Bowles of Louisville, but principally recruited
in the neighborhood of Glasgow, were assigned to Captain Morgan’s
command at the earnest request of their officers and
men. Bowles’ company was not full, and was consolidated with
another fragment of a company commanded by Lieutenant
Churchill—the latter becoming First Lieutenant of the new organization.
The three companies composed “Morgan’s Squadron,” a popular
misnomer by which, however, the command came, in a short
time, to be regularly designated. Morgan’s company became
A, of this organization; Allen’s, B; Bowles’, C. The squadron
remained quietly in camp, at Bowlinggreen, for two or three
weeks after its organization. This time was profitably spent
in instructing the men in drill and teaching them something of[Pg 102]
discipline. The first expedition taken after this, was to Grayson
county, on the north side of Green river, to collect and bring
to Bowlinggreen a large drove of cattle which had been purchased,
but could not be brought out without a guard.
The “Home-guards” held this county in strong force; they
had long expected a Confederate inroad, and had sternly determined
to punish the invaders when they came. The squadron
reached the ferry, at which it was directed to cross at night.
We found the boats sunken, but raised them, filled up the holes
bored in their bottoms, bailed them out, and by eight o’clock
next morning we had one company across. The day was spent
in crossing the cattle to the southern side of the river.
On the following evening, the entire squadron was transferred
to the north side of the river and passed the night agreeably
in chasing the Home-guards, who did not make a hard fight,
but ran off some twenty or thirty miles to a neighboring county
to “rally.”
Shortly after his return to Bowlinggreen, from this expedition,
Captain Morgan was ordered to the front again, and
reported to Brigadier General Hindman, who commanded a
brigade of infantry and a strong force of cavalry, in all three
thousand or thirty-five hundred men, upon the extreme front of
our line.
General Hindman’s headquarters were at Bell’s tavern,
twenty-five miles from Bowlinggreen, and thirteen from Woodsonville,
then occupied by the enemy, who had advanced to
Green river, ten or fifteen days after we left there.
It would, perhaps, be more correct to say, that the enemy
held Munfordsville, for although Woodsonville was virtually in
his possession, and completely at his disposal, there were, at
that date, none of his regiments encamped on the southern
side of the river.
A few days before Morgan’s arrival, had occurred the fight,
in which Colonel Terry, of the Eighth Texas Cavalry (better
known then as Terry’s Rangers), was killed, and of which so[Pg 103]
many contradictory versions have prevailed. The Northern
account has often been published, and if the many later and
more important events have not crowded it out of memory, is
familiar to all who read the Northern newspapers at that time.
Without presuming to give a minute account of the fight, for I
did not witness it, nor have I ever seen a report of it, I can
present, in a few words, the idea which I derived from the description
of men who were present, and which was generally
received, just after the fight, in our army.
General Hindman had received information that a strong
body of the enemy had crossed the river, and desiring to ascertain
if this movement was preliminary to an advance of the
entire army, he moved forward with the greater part of his
infantry, some artillery and Terry’s regiment of cavalry, to
reconnoiter, and, perhaps, contest an advance, if it were made.
When he arrived at the ground upon which the fight commenced,
about three miles from the river, he discovered the enemy, and,
supposing his force to be not stronger than his own, determined
to engage him.
I am not familiar with the plan or details of the fight, but
am under the impression that, when first seen, the enemy was
slowly advancing, unaware of Hindman’s vicinity, and that the
latter screened the bulk of his force behind a large hill, upon the
eastern side of the Bowlinggreen road, the summit of which
he occupied with skirmishers, and posted his artillery some
distance farther back, where it was partially concealed, and
could yet sweep the road and the ground over which the enemy
was advancing.
Terry was instructed to skirmish in the enemy’s front, and
draw him on, until his flank should be exposed to the infantry,
that was masked behind the hill. It was the intention then, I
have always understood, to attack vigorously with all the infantry,
throw a part of it in the enemy’s rear, and between him
and the river, while Terry charged him on the other flank. One
part of Terry’s regiment, under his own immediate command,[Pg 104]
was on the right of the road at a considerable distance from
any support. Another, commanded by one of his Captains, was
posted nearer the infantry.
Hindman’s plan to bring his whole force into action and cut
off and capture a part of the enemy’s, if such was his plan, was
frustrated by the impatient ardor of Terry, who, after a very
brief retreat before Willich’s regiment of infantry, turned and
charged it furiously. The regiment was deployed in skirmish
order, and had barely time to “rally by fours,” when Terry, of
whose command they had, up to that moment, seen only a very
few, came down on them. The Texians rode around the groups
of four, shooting the men down with their revolvers and shot-guns.
Seeing his Colonel engaged, the officer commanding the
other portion of the regiment, charged the enemy nighest him
with similar success. Terry and six of his men were killed, and
perhaps twice that number wounded. All the witnesses on the
Confederate side concurred in saying that fifteen or twenty of
the Federals were killed, and as many more, at least, wounded.
I passed over the ground shortly afterward as bearer of a flag of
truce, and heard the same account from the citizens living near
the scene of the fight. Willich’s regiment was a very fine one,
and its commander a very superior officer.
General Hindman was an officer of great dash and energy,
and very ambitious—he was, therefore, just the man to encourage
an enterprising subordinate, and give him free rein in that sort
of service which keeps up the morale of an army at a time when
it must remain inactive, reflects credit upon the commanding
officer who directs it, and which rank and duty forbid a commanding
officer to undertake himself. Although his imperious
and exacting temper made him many enemies, he had other
qualities which gained him devoted friends. One was a disposition
(proceeding either from a desire to attach to himself men
whose friendship he thought would be valuable, or from a real
feeling of regard—perhaps from both) to go all lengths for a
friend. He entered heartily into all of Morgan’s plans, encour[Pg 105]aged
and gave him every facility to extend his enterprises, and
seemed to entertain a peculiar pride and pleasure in his success.
There is no doubt that there was something in his nature which
made him cordially sympathize with every thing that was daring
and adventurous. Morgan became very fond of him, and always
spoke with pleasure of this brief service with him. Although
almost constantly close upon the outposts of the enemy, sometimes
in small detachments, and occasionally with every effective
man, the squadron had no engagement except the picket fights,
which were of constant occurrence. The reason of this was that
the Federals never came outside of their lines, except for very
short distances, and then in bodies so strong that we dared not
attack them. The practice of firing upon and attacking
pickets was then much condemned by the Federal officers, but
no valid reason has ever been assigned for this condemnation.
It is true that killing and annoying pickets does not decide the
result of campaigns, neither do the minor skirmishes and partial
battles which so frequently occur in all wars, yet it is the means
of affecting the general result, and assisting to make it successful
as much as any other method of harassing an enemy. If
war is to be confined to sieges, pitched battles, etc., then every
method of wearying, annoying and discouraging an adversary,
of keeping him in doubt, or goading him to desperation, must
be equally condemned. All stratagem must be discarded, and
a return may as well be had to the polite but highly ridiculous
practice of lines of battle saluting each other and refusing to
fire first. There are certain rules of war whose observance
humanity and the spirit of the age demand. Prisoners ought
not to be killed or maltreated, unless in retaliation; the terms
of capitulations and surrenders ought to be honorably fulfilled
and observed; war ought not to be made on non-combatants.
But the soldier ought to be content to take his chance. It is
more soldierly to teach pickets to fight when attacked, than to
complain of it, and a picket who will allow himself to be surprised
on his post ought to be shot. At the time of which I[Pg 106]
write the Federal army at Green river was provided with no
cavalry, or cavalry that was useless. Its commander, therefore,
unless informed by his spies, whose reports were, of course, infrequent,
was ignorant of all that transpired even immediately
outside of his advance videttes, and it was impossible for him to
know whether an attack on his picket line was made by a scouting
party, or premised a serious affair. He was, then, obliged
either to prepare for battle every time any thing of the kind
occurred, greatly harassing his troops, or to take the risk of an
attack when unprepared. It was an excellent means, too, of
judging of the strength of an infantry camp and the changes
made from time to time in it, to attack the picket line at various
points, hear the “long rolls” beaten, and see the troops turn
out, as occasionally could be done.
One or two adventures of Captain Morgan at this period
attracted a good deal of notice. One of them, the burning of
Bacon creek bridge, took place before he reported to Hindman.
This bridge had been destroyed at the time our forces fell back
from Woodsonville. It was a small structure and easily replaced,
but its reparation was necessary to the use of the road. The
Federal army then lay encamped between Bacon and Nolin
creeks, the advance about three miles from Bacon creek—the
outposts were scarcely half a mile from the bridge. A few days
labor served to erect the wood work of the bridge, and it was
ready to receive the iron rails, when Morgan asked leave to destroy
it. It was granted, and he started from Bowlinggreen on
the same night with his entire command, for he believed that he
would find the bridge strongly guarded and would have to fight
for it. Halting at daybreak a short distance from the river, he
waited until night fell again before resuming his march. He
crossed the ford at Woodsonville, which was fortunately not
guarded, and dispersed a party of Home-guards, which, ignorant
of his vicinity, had assembled at Munfordsville to carry off some
Southern sympathizers of that place.
Pressing on vigorously he reached the bridge at midnight, and[Pg 107]
to his surprise and satisfaction found it without a guard; that
which protected the workmen during the day, having been withdrawn
at night. The bridge was set on fire and in three hours
thoroughly destroyed—no interruption to the work was attempted
by the enemy. The damage inflicted was trifling, and
the delay occasioned of little consequence. The benefit derived
from it by Morgan was two-fold—it increased the hardihood of
his men in that species of service, and gave himself still greater
confidence in his own tactics. Shortly after Woodsonville had
been included within the picket lines of the enemy and occupied
with troops, Captain Morgan with two men went at night to
Hewlett’s station, on the railroad, about two hundred yards from
the picket line, and found the small building which was used as
a depot in the possession of five or six stragglers, who were
playing cards and making merry, and captured them. He set
fire to the building, and when the troops had been called out by
the bright light, he sent in a message by one of his prisoners to
the effect that in the following week he would come and burn
them out of Woodsonville.
On the evening of the 20th or 21st of January, Captain Morgan
with five men left his camp at Bell’s tavern, crossed the
Green river at an unguarded ferry, and on the following day
rode into Lebanon, some sixty miles from his point of departure.
Several hundred troops were encamped near this place, and a
great many stores were in the town and in a large building between
the town and the nearest camp. The soldiers off or on
duty were frequently passing to and fro through the town.
Morgan destroyed the stores, and made all the stragglers prisoners;
some of them he was obliged to release after taking their
overcoats, with which he disguised his own men and was thus
enabled to get quietly through some dangerous situations. He
brought back with him nine prisoners, a large flag and several
other trophies. Two companies of cavalry followed him closely,
but he gained the river first, crossed and turned the boat adrift,
just as his pursuers reached the bank. Next day he marched[Pg 108]
into Glasgow with his five men and nine prisoners in column,
and the United States flag flying at the front. He scared the
citizens of the place and two or three straggling Confederates,
who were there, horribly. The flag and blue overcoats demoralised
them.
When he reached his own camp the prisoners were quartered
with different “messes,” but were not placed under regular
guard. The inmates of each tent, in which prisoners were
placed, were held responsible for them. On this occasion it
happened that some of the men (by means in which they were
learned and adroit) had obtained several bottles of wine—sparkling
catawba—and the prisoners were assured that this sort of
wine was regularly issued to the Confederate cavalry by their
commissaries. They approved the wine and the practice of
including it in soldiers’ rations, and five of them next morning
begged, with tears in their eyes, to be received into the Confederate
service. These adventures are not related because it
is thought that they will excite any especial interest, but because
they fairly represent the nature of the service in which
Morgan was constantly engaged during the occupation of Southern
Kentucky by the Confederate army, in the fall of 1861, and
the greater part of the succeeding winter.
Although greatly inferior in dash and execution to the subsequent
cavalry operations of the West, this service of Morgan’s
was much superior, in both, to any thing which had, up to that
time, been attempted by either side, and it served to educate
Morgan’s men and Morgan himself for the successful conduct of
more daring and far more important enterprises.
A strong and mutual feeling of regard and friendship commenced
(during the period that we served with General Hindman),
between the Eighth Texas (Terry’s Rangers), and the
squadron, which continued to the close of the war, growing
warmer as Morgan’s command grew in numbers, and, doubtless,
it exists, now, in the hearts of the men, who composed the two
organizations. This feeling interfered in some degree with[Pg 109]
discipline, for most of the men of both were young and wild,
and inclined, when they could evade the vigilance of camp
guards, to rove nocturnally and extensively, and neither, when
on picket, would arrest or stop their friends from the other command.
The gallant Rangers paid dearly for their proud record, and
few of those who used to roam and fight so recklessly then, are,
I fear, living now, to recall the events which we witnessed together.
The squadron remained with the forces under command
of General Hindman until the evacuation of Bowlinggreen and
the retreat from Kentucky. Then we left the scenes and the
region with which we had become so familiar with sad hearts.
We had hoped that when the signal for departure was sounded,
it would be also the order to advance; that we would press on
to recover the whole of Kentucky, and win victories that would
give her to us forever, and the retreat seemed to us like a march
to our graves. But a feeling of regret at leaving the country
in which we had passed months of such pleasant and stirring
service, was natural, even without other reasons for it. Men
are apt to become attached to the localities where they have led
free and active lives, and to connect with them agreeable associations.
This country had many such for us, and that part
especially between Bell’s tavern on the one side of Green river,
and Nolin on the other. For many miles to the right and left
there was scarcely a foot of the ground which we had not traversed,
nor a thicket in which we had not hidden; from almost
every hill we had watched the enemy, and at almost every turn
in the road shot at him. These are not precisely the kind of
reminiscences that the poetical and romantic sigh over, but
every man has a right to be sentimental after his own fashion,
and Morgan’s men were always mightily so about the Green
river country.
CHAPTER VI
In the latter part of January, 1862, it became evident that
General Johnson, with the inferior force at his disposal, could not
hold his line in Kentucky. Crittenden, upon the right flank,
had sustained a serious disaster at Mill Springs, near Somerset,
and had been forced back across the Cumberland, which he had
crossed to attack Thomas. In this battle General Zollicoffer was
killed—his death was in itself an irreparable loss. Crittenden
retreated first upon Monticello and subsequently to Gainesville
in Tennessee. He lost his artillery and trains, and his troops
could be relied on to oppose no effective resistance—for the
time—to the farther advance of the enemy. The superiority of
the latter in numbers had been not more marked than their superiority
in arms and equipment. The fatigue and privation
endured by Crittenden’s men upon their retreat had contributed
greatly to impair their efficiency. The expeditions against Forts
Henry and Donelson were vigorously pressed, and scarcely had
full confirmation arrived of the defeat of Crittenden, when we
got the first rumors of the fall of Fort Henry. General Johnson
had never been able to collect at all the points of defense
in Kentucky, exclusive of Columbus, more than twenty-four
thousand men. In this force were included sixty-days’ men and
all the minor garrisons. He had at Bowlinggreen in January
and the first of February about ten thousand.
Buell had organized, during the period that the two armies
lay inactive and confronting each other, fifty or sixty thousand
men, and they were, at the time when General Johnson commenced
his retreat, concentrated, mobilized, and ready to fall
upon him. Therefore, even before it became evident that Don[Pg 111]elson
must fall, before the capture of Nashville was imminent,
by an enemy moving from either flank, and before his line of
retreat was endangered, but just so soon as Buell put his army
in motion General Johnson evacuated Bowlinggreen. Then
began the campaign, in which more than in any other of the
war, was displayed the profoundest strategy, the most heroic
decision, the highest order of generalship.
General Johnson had long foreseen the storm of difficulties
which now assailed him. His resources were scanty and the
emergency was terrible, but he did not despair of fighting through
it to victory. Upon one flank of his line, he had sustained a
crushing defeat, the forces protecting it had been driven off.
Nashville might be taken by the victors. One of the forts protecting
the great water lines which led right into the heart of
his department, and away to the rear of his army, had been
taken. If the other fell the fate of Nashville was sealed, but
far worse, he would be inclosed at Bowlinggreen, should he
remain there, between three armies each much stronger than his
own. If he lingered around Nashville, he could not protect the
city, but gave his enemy the opportunity of cutting him off
completely from the only territory whence he could hope to
obtain recruits, and of preventing his junction with the reinforcements
which he had ordered to his assistance. He did not
hesitate a moment.
Price and Van Dorn were ordered from Arkansas, Bragg
was ordered from Pensacola, all the available troops at New
Orleans, and every point in the department where troops were
stationed, were called into the field, and the concentration of all
at Corinth, in Northern Mississippi, was arranged. Here he
would have every thing massed and in hand, and in his rear
would be no danger, nor indefensible line by which danger could
menace him. His adversaries on the contrary would be separated
from each other; rivers and all the perils of a hostile
population would be between them and safety, if they were
defeated or forced to turn and retreat; energy and promptness[Pg 112]
would enable him to strike them heavy blows before they could
unite; if every detail of his plan worked right, he might hope
to outnumber them at every collision.
This plan would require the evacuation of Columbus, even if
the occupation of New Madrid did not; but there was no longer
any use of holding Columbus, after a retreat to Mississippi had
been decided upon. Its garrison would help to swell the ranks
of the army for the decisive battle—and if that battle were won,
territory far North of Columbus would be gained. Therefore,
braving censure and remonstrance more general, energetic, and
daring, than was ever encountered by any Confederate officer,
before or since, General Johnson turned his back upon Kentucky
and commenced the retreat which culminated in the battle of
Shiloh. When the dangers from which this retreat extricated
him, the favorable position in which it placed him for offensive
operations, the exact calculation of the proper time to turn
retreat into attack, and the electric rapidity and courage with
which the latter was done—when all the features are considered,
is it claiming too much to say that no conception of the war was
more magnificent?
The evacuation of Bowlinggreen was commenced on the 14th
of February, and notwithstanding the discontent of the troops,
was accomplished in perfect order. On the day after it was all
over, the enemy arrived upon the opposite bank of Barren river—the
bridges had all, of course, been burned—and shelled the
town which he could not immediately enter.
The weather for the week following the evacuation, was intensely
cold, and the troops accustomed, for the most part, to
comfortable quarters during the winter, and exposed for the first
time to real hardships, suffered severely. Still, after the first
murmuring was over, they were kept in high spirits by the impression,
assiduously cultivated by their officers, that they were marching
to surprise and attack Thomas, who was supposed to have
compromised himself by an imprudent pursuit of Crittenden.
The news from Donelson, where the fight was then raging,[Pg 113]
was very favorable, and the successful defense of the fort for
several days encouraged even General Johnson to hope that it
would be held and the assailants completely beaten off.
As the army neared Nashville, some doubts of the truth of the
programme which the men had arranged in their imaginations
began to intrude, and they began to believe that the retreat
meant in good earnest the giving up of Kentucky—perhaps
something more which they were unwilling to contemplate.
While they were in this state of doubt and anxiety, like a
thunder-clap came the news of the fall of Donelson—the news
that seven thousand Confederate were prisoners in the hands of
the enemy.
General Johnson, himself, was thoroughly surprised by the
suddenness of the disaster, for, six hours before he received
information of the surrender, he had been dispatched that the
enemy had been signally repulsed, and were drawing off, and
until the intelligence came of the fate of the garrison, he had
learned of no new attack. The depression, which this information
produced, was deepened by the gloom which hung over
Nashville when the troops entered. It is impossible to describe
the scene. Disasters were then new to us, and our people had
been taught to believe them impossible. No subsequent reverse,
although fraught with far more real calamity, ever created the
shame, sorrow, and wild consternation which swept over the South
with the news of the surrender of Donelson. And in Nashville,
itself sure to fall next and speedily, an anguish and terror were
felt and expressed, scarcely to be conceived by those who have
not witnessed a similar scene. All the worst evils which follow
in the train of war and subjugation seemed to be anticipated by
the terrified people, and the feeling was quickly communicated to
the troops, and grew with every hour until it assumed almost the
proportions of a panic. The Tennessee troops were naturally
most influenced by the considerations which affected the citizens,
but all shared the feeling. Some wept at the thought of abandoning
the city to a fate which they esteemed as dreadful as utter[Pg 114]
destruction, and many, infuriated, loudly advocated burning it
to the ground that the enemy might have nothing of it but its
ashes.
During the first night after the army reached Nashville, when
the excitement and fury were at the highest pitch, and officers
and privates were alike influenced by it, it seemed as if the
bonds of discipline would be cast off altogether. Crowds of
soldiers were mingled with the citizens who thronged the streets
all night, and yells, curses, shots rang on all sides. In some
houses the women were pale and sobbing, and in others there
was even merriment, as if in defiance of the worst. Very soon
all those who had escaped from Donelson began to arrive.
Forrest had cut his way through the beleaguering lines and
brought off his entire regiment. He reached Nashville on the
day after it was entered by the army. It was impossible for the
infantry men who escaped to make their way from the scene
of disaster, except in small detachments. They were necessarily
scattered all over the country, and those who reached
Nashville in time to accompany the army upon its farther march,
came in as stragglers and without any organization. Neither
men nor officers had an idea of how or when they were to do
duty again. The arrival of these disbanded soldiers, among
whom it was difficult to establish and enforce order, because no
immediate disposition could be made of them, increased the confusion
already prevailing. Rumors, too, of the near approach
of the enemy were circulated, and were believed even by
officers of high rank.
Buell’s army, which was really not far south of Bowlinggreen,
was reported to be within a few miles of the city, and the Federal
gunboats, which had not yet reached Clarksville, were
confidently declared to be within sight of Fort Zollicoffer, only
seven miles below Nashville.
Upon the second day matters had arrived at such a state,
and the excitement and disorder were so extreme, that it became
necessary to take other precautions to repress the license that[Pg 115]
was prevailing, besides the establishment of guards and sentinels
about the camps where the troops lay, and General Johnson
ordered the establishment of a strong military police in Nashville.
The First Missouri infantry, one of the finest and best
disciplined regiments in the service, was detailed for this duty,
and Morgan’s squadron was sent to assist it. Our duty was to
patrol the city and suburbs, and we were constantly engaged at
it until the city was evacuated. General John B. Floyd, of
Virginia, was appointed commandant of Nashville, and entrusted
with the enforcement of discipline and with all the details of the
evacuation. His task was one of no ordinary difficulty. It
was hard, at such a time, to know how to begin the work. In
such a chaos, with such passions ruling, it seemed folly to hope
for the restoration of order. Those who remember the event,
will recall the feeling of despair which had seized upon the
soldiery—the entire army seemed, for the time, hopeless of any
retrieval of our fortunes, and every man was thoroughly reckless.
Few excesses were committed; but, with such a temper prevailing,
the worst consequences were to be apprehended, if the
influence of the officers should be entirely lost and the minds
of the men should be directed to mischief. General Floyd
would have found the demoralization and license which had
grown apace among the troops, and the terrors of the citizens,
serious impediments to his efforts to remove the valuable stores
which had been collected in Nashville, even if he had possessed
abundant facilities for their removal. But of such facilities he
was almost entirely destitute. The trains with the army were
needed for transportation of supplies for immediate use. The
scanty wheel transportation which belonged to captured and
disorganized commands, and had been brought to the city, could
scarcely be made available. When it could be discovered and
laid hold of, the wagons and teams were usually found to be
unserviceable. General Floyd’s first care (after satisfying
himself by active scouting, that there was no truth in the
reports of the proximity of the enemy, and burning the bridge[Pg 116]
at Edgefield junction), was to make arrangements for saving as
many of the stores as was possible, giving the preference to
ordnance stores. For this purpose he ordered an impressment
of transportation in Nashville and the vicinity, making a clean
sweep of every thing that ran on wheels. In this manner some
eighty or ninety vehicles were gotten together, with teams, and
as many loads of ordnance stores were saved for the army. He
issued orders that the citizens should be permitted to help
themselves to the remaining stores, and a promiscuous scramble
for clothing, blankets, meat, meal, and all sorts of quartermaster
and commissary stores, commenced and lasted three
days. Occasionally, a half-drunken, straggling soldier, would
walk into the midst of the snatchers, with gun on shoulder and
pistol at his belt, and the citizens would stand back, jackall like,
until he had helped himself. Crowds would stand upon the
pavements underneath the tall buildings, upon the Court House
Square, while out of their fourth and fifth-story windows large
bales of goods were pitched, which would have crushed any one
upon whom they had fallen. Yet numbers would rush and
fasten upon them, while other bales were already in the air
descending. Excitement and avarice seemed to stimulate the
people to preternatural strength. I saw an old woman, whose
appearance indicated the extremest decrepitude, staggering under
a load of meat which I would have hardly thought a quartermaster’s
mule could carry. Twice during the first day of these
scenes, orders were received by a portion of Forrest’s regiment,
drawn up on the Square, to stop the appropriation of stores by
the citizens, and they accordingly charged the crowd (deaf to
any less forcible reason) with drawn sabers; several men were
wounded and trampled upon, but fortunately none were killed.
Nothing could have been more admirable than the fortitude,
patience and good sense which General Floyd displayed in his
arduous and unenviable task. He had, already, for ten days,
endured great and uninterrupted excitement and fatigue; without
respite or rest, he was called to this responsibility and duty.[Pg 117]
Those who have never witnessed nor been placed in such situations,
can not understand how they harass the mind and try the
temper.
General Floyd soon found that he could (with no exertion)
maintain perfect order, or rescue more than a fragment from the
wreck, and he bent all his energies to the task of repressing
serious disorders, preventing the worst outrages, and preserving
all that was most absolutely required for the use of the army,
and that it was practical to remove.
It was easy for officers who respectively saw and considered
but one matter, to advise attention to that in particular, and to
censure if their advice was not taken. But the very multiplicity
of such counsellors, embarrassed rather than assisted, and
showed the utter impossibility, in the brief time allowed, of attending
to every thing. I saw a great deal of General Floyd,
while he was commanding in Nashville, and I was remarkably
impressed by him. I was required to report to him almost
every hour in the twenty-four, and he was always surrounded
by a crowd of applicants for all sorts of favors, and couriers
bringing all sorts of news. It was impossible in the state of
confusion which prevailed to prohibit or regulate this pressing
and noisy attendance, or to judge, without examination, of what
was important to be considered. Many matters which ordinarily
a general officer would not permit himself to be troubled with,
might need attention and action from him at such a time. Irascible
and impetuous as General Floyd seemed to be by nature—his
nerves unstrung, too, by the fatigues of so many busy days
and sleepless nights—and galled as he must have been by the
constant annoyances, he yet showed no sign of impatience. I
saw him give way but once to anger, which was, then, provoked
by the most stupid and insolent pertinacity. It was interesting
to watch the struggle which would sometimes occur between his
naturally violent temper and the restraint he imposed upon it.
His eye would glow, his face and his lips turn pale, and his
frame shake with passion; he would be silent for minutes, as if[Pg 118]
not daring to trust himself to speak, looking all the while upon
the ground, and he would then address the man, whose brusqueness
or obstinacy had provoked him, in the mildest tone and
manner. He was evidently endowed with no common nerve,
will, and judgment.
At last the evacuation was completed, the army was gotten
clear of Nashville, the last straggler driven out, all the stores
which could not be carried off, nor distributed to the citizens,
burned, and the capitol of Tennessee (although we did not know
it then) was abandoned finally to the enemy. Morgan’s squadron
was the last to leave, as it was required to remain in the extreme
rear of the army and pick up all the stragglers that
evaded the rear guards of the infantry. Our scouts left behind,
when we, in our turn, departed, witnessed the arrival of the
Federals and their occupation of the city.
The army was halted at Murfreesboro’, thirty miles from
Nashville, where it remained for nearly a week. Here it was
joined by the remnant of Crittenden’s forces. After a few days
given to repose, reorganization and the re-establishment of discipline,
General Johnson resumed his retreat. He concluded it
with a battle in which he himself was the assailant, and which,
but for his death, would have advanced our banners to the Ohio.
It was fruitless of apparent and immediate results, but it checked
for more than a year the career of Federal conquest, infused
fresh courage into the Southern people, and gave them breathing
time to rally for farther contest. His death upon the field prevented
vast and triumphant results from following it then—the
incompetency of his successors squandered glorious chances
(months afterward) which this battle directly gave to the Confederacy.
When the line of march was taken up, and the heads
of the columns were still turned southward, the dissatisfaction
of the troops broke out into fresh and frequent murmurs. Discipline,
somewhat restored at Murfreesboro’, had been too much
relaxed by the scenes witnessed at Nashville, to impose much
restraint upon them. Unjust as it was, officers and men con[Pg 119]curred
in laying the whole burden of blame upon General Johnson.
Many a voice was then raised to denounce him, which has
since been enthusiastic in his praise, and many joined in the
clamor, then almost universal against him, who, a few weeks
later, when he lay dead upon the field he had so gallantly fought,
would have given their own lives to recall him.
Crossing the Tennessee river at Decatur, Alabama, and destroying
the immense railroad bridge at that point, General
Johnson pressed on down through the valley, through Courtland,
Tuscumbia, and Iuca, to Corinth. This was for a short time,
until he could concentrate for battle, the goal of his march.
Here all the reinforcements at his command could reach him,
coming from every direction. He only awaited their arrival to
attack the enemy, which, flushed with the successes at Henry
and Donelson, lay exposed to his blows, ignorant of his vicinity.
The force with which he crossed the Tennessee river was a
little over twenty thousand men. It was composed of the troops
which had held the lines in Kentucky—those which had been
stationed at Bowlinggreen, all that was left of Crittenden’s
command, all that were left of the garrisons of Donelson and
Henry. The garrisons of minor importance in Tennessee
contributed, as the State was evacuated, to strengthen the army.
He was very soon joined by the forces from Pensacola, about
ten thousand strong, and a splendid body of men. They were
superior in arms, equipment, instruction and dress, to all of the
Western troops, and presented an imposing appearance and
striking contrast to their weather-stained, dusty and travel-worn
comrades. Nothing had ever occurred to them to impair their
morale; they seemed animated by the stern spirit and discipline
which characterized their commander, and a fit reserve with which
to turn the tide of fortune. Beauregard brought with him
some troops from New Orleans and other parts of Louisiana.
General Polk came with the troops which had held Columbus.
Several hurriedly raised and organized regiments came from
the various States of the department. Price and Van Dorn,[Pg 120]
having between them fifteen thousand veterans, did not arrive
in season to participate in the immediate movements which
General Johnson had determined upon. A knowledge that the
retreat had been brought to a close and that a battle was about
to be fought in which we would attack, did more to inspirit the
troops and restore to them soldierly feeling and bearing, than
any efforts in behalf of discipline. The spirit of the men who
had come from Florida and other points not surrendered to the
enemy had a favorable influence upon the remainder, whose
pride was aroused by the comparison and example. The sudden
and seemingly magical change from despondency to highest
hope, from a sullen indifference to duty to the most cheerful
alacrity and perfect subordination, showed how wonderfully
susceptible was the material which composed our army to the
hopes inspired by a daring policy. The same men who had
dragged themselves reluctantly along, as if careless of reputation
and forgetful of the cause they had to fight for, were now full
of zeal, energy and confidence. Those who had almost broken
out into open mutiny, now rendered the promptest obedience to
every order. The denunciations they had uttered against General
Johnson, were silenced just so soon as they learned that he
was about to lead them to instant battle, and his name was
never mentioned except with becoming respect, and often with
praise. In short, every trace of demoralization disappeared—courage,
pride and efficiency, returned; and, from a condition
not much better than that of an armed mob, the army became
again disciplined, valiant and reliable. While the masterly
ability and soldierly vigor and decision of General Johnson
must excite the profoundest admiration, those who remember him
may be pardoned for dwelling quite as much upon the grandeur,
the loftiness, the heroism of his character. In this we may
look in vain for his peer, except to the great Virginian, his
immortal comrade, the man whom every former Southern soldier
must feel it is his religious duty to venerate. Through all that
period of sickening doubt, amidst all the reverses, in the wide[Pg 121]
spread demoralization which attacked all ranks, General Johnson
towered like a being superior to the fears and fate of other
men. The bitter censure which was cast at him from all sides,
could move him to nothing weak or unworthy of his high nature.
He gave way to no anger or scorn—he deigned no argument or
apology. When the President, his devoted friend and warm
admirer, urged him to supersede the officers who had suffered
defeat, he answered that they were brave, although inexperienced
men, and that he preferred to trust them until he could
find better.
He defended unsuccessful generals with his generous warmth,
and reposed in them a confidence, which saved them, but directed
all the clamor against himself. He entertained with
courtesy and listened with patience, to importunate, censorious
civilians, while he had in his pocket copies of dispatches which
they had sent to Richmond furiously denouncing him. Not one
word was he ever heard to say in comment or rebuke, while censure
and detraction were most frequent against him, and his
zealous, paternal care for his army was never relaxed. His majestic
presence, calm and noble face and superb dignity, might
themselves—it would seem—have overawed and hushed the
cavilers. Surely, there never suffered a nobler, purer, braver
martyr to senseless prejudice and unjust, inconsiderate reproach.
While the enemy was retreating through Tennessee, Morgan’s
squadron remained in the neighborhood of Nashville until all
the detachments which had been left in the rear to protect and
ship off by rail the stores and supplies (which could be hastily
collected) at Murfreesboro’, Shelbyville, and other points, had
gotten through with their work and departed after the army.
Morgan encamped his command at La Vergne, a station upon
the railroad, about half way between Nashville and Murfreesboro’.
This little place became quite famous in the subsequent
annals of the war. Morgan first brought its name into men’s
mouths, Forrest and Wheeler kept it notorious.
Here, for the first time, we met the Fourth Ohio Cavalry—our[Pg 122]
acquaintance afterward became more intimate, and lasted as
long as that gallant regiment was in the field. The Fourth was
encamped at the “Lunatic Asylum”—I asked one of the officers
of the regiment (subsequently) why they were sent there, but he
did not seem to know—eight miles from Nashville, on the Murfreesboro’
pike, and seven miles from La Vergne. Our respective
“bases” were consequently pretty close to each other.
Our pickets used to stand in sight of theirs during the day, and
in hearing distance at night. The videttes treated each other
with respect and consideration, but the scouts were continually
slipping around through the woods and shooting some one. On
one occasion an officer of the Fourth placed some men in ambush
in a thicket upon the side of the road, and then with a small
party rode down near to our pickets, fired, turned and galloped
away again, hoping that some of us would be induced to follow
and receive the fire of his ambuscade. The night was dark, and
by an unaccountable mistake the men in ambush fired into their
own friends as they passed—no damage was done, I believe, except
to horses.
One morning our pickets came rushing in with a party of the
enemy in pursuit (no unusual occurrence), and as we stood to
arms, we noticed—they were three or four hundred yards off—one
of the pickets some distance in the rear of the others, and
almost in the clutches of the enemy, who were peppering away
at him. It was private Sam Murrill, of Co. C., (afterward
chief of my couriers, and a first rate soldier to the end of the
war), his horse was slow and blown, and the foremost pursuer
had gotten along side of him and presented his pistol at his
head. Murrill, too quick for him, fired first, and as his enemy
dropped dead from the saddle, seized pistol and horse, and, although
closely pushed, until the guns of his comrades drove
back his daring pursuers, brought both in triumph into camp.
These small affairs were of daily occurrence, but at last our opponents
became more wary and circumspect, and to obtain
decided advantages, we had to go far into their lines. We[Pg 123]
noticed finally that they adopted a practice of withdrawing their
pickets at night, from the points where they stood during the
day, some miles to the rear. Captain Morgan after making this
discovery, resolved to anticipate them at the place where they
made their picket base at night. He remained with a few men
demonstrating all day in sight of the outpost pickets, and just
before nightfall made a circuit which carried him far to their
rear, previously to their withdrawal. He reached the place
(where he learned that a party of twenty-five or thirty stood
nightly), about the time that it was fairly dark.
It was a small house, in a yard some eighty or ninety feet
square, surrounded by a picket fence of cedar. He had with
him nine men, of these he detailed five to hold horses, and with
the other four; all armed with shot guns loaded with buck-shot,
he lay down behind the low fence. The horses were sent back
some distance into the bushes. Captain Morgan instructed his
party to hold their fire until he gave the signal. It was his
intention to permit the party, which was expected, to pass and
then fire upon the rear—hoping thus to drive it down the road
toward his own camp and, following rapidly, capture it. When
it arrived, however, about twenty-five strong, the officer in command
halted it before it reached the point where we lay, but at a
distance of not more than thirty feet from us, so that we could
distinctly hear every word which was uttered. The officer in
command talked with his guide for some minutes, sending men to
reconnoiter upon each side of the road in the meantime. At length
the officer ordered his men to enter the little yard, and they
came right up to the fence, and just upon the opposite side from
our position. Captain Morgan shouted the word “Now,” and
each man arose and fired one barrel of his gun. The roar and
the flash so near, must have been terrible to men taken completely
by surprise. The officer fell immediately, and his party,
panic stricken, filed toward their camp. Another volley was
delivered upon them as they ran. A chain picket was established
between the point where this happened and the camp at the[Pg 124]
asylum; and we could hear shots fired at rapid intervals, for
minutes, as the fleeing party passed the men on post. Several
wounded men fell in the road, after they had fled a short distance.
A short time before he left La Vergne, Captain Morgan
selected fifteen men for an expedition to Nashville. Avoiding
the high roads, he made his way through the woods to the Lebanon
pike, which he struck only a mile from the city.
The vicinity of the city favored rather than endangered him,
and he rode down into the streets without attracting hostile
observation. A patrol of twenty or thirty cavalry, were making
the round of the streets, and he rode in the rear of this party.
After reconnoitering for a short time, he determined on his plan
of operations. He sent all but five or six of his men out into the
thickets, a short distance from the city, and, with those whom he
kept, he made his way, dismounted and leading the horses along
the river bank, until he came near the reservoir, about opposite
to which, and a little out in the river, a steamboat was anchored.
This boat was one which was in the employ of the Federal Government.
It was Captain Morgan’s desire to set her on fire, and
let her drift down into the midst of a number of other transports,
which lay a few hundred yards below, and were crowded with
troops, hoping she might fire them also. Three gallant young
fellows volunteered to do the work, and boarded the boat in an
old canoe, which was found, bottom upward, on the shore.
They fired her, but could not cut her adrift, as she was made
fast at stem and stern, with chain cables, and thus the best part
of the plan was frustrated. The work was done in full
view and notice of the troops on the other transports, and
the engineer and workmen, on board of the boat, were
brought to the shore. The names of the young men, or rather
boys, who did this, were Warfield, Garrett and Buckner—the
latter was soon afterward killed at Shiloh. The canoe was so
unmanageable that its crew came near falling into the hands of
the enemy—but accident favored them at the most perilous[Pg 125]
moment. A long line of panel fence had drifted out into the
river, one end still being attached to the bank. When their paddles
failed them in the swift current, they fortunately came in
reach of this, and they were enabled to pull in by it to the shore.
As soon as the land was gained, all remounted their horses,
watched for a while the rising flames and the consternation of
the fleet, and then, with three cheers for Morgan, rode rapidly to
rejoin their comrades.
Cavalry was sent in pursuit, but was left far behind. Captain
Morgan went straight across the country to the Murfreesboro’
pike. As he gained it he encountered a small body
of Federal cavalry, attacked and drove it into town. He lost
only one man, but he was a capital soldier, Peter Atherton by
name.
He got back to La Vergne about twelve at night. After the
thorough and final evacuation of Murfreesboro’, Captain Morgan
withdrew to that place with his command. He almost directly
afterward sent the bulk of it to the Shelbyville and Nashville
road, with instructions to encamp about twenty miles from
Nashville, and picket and scout the adjacent country, and all the
neighboring roads. He retained with him at Murfreesboro’,
about forty of his own men, and some fifty of Colonel Wirt
Adams’ regiment of cavalry, under command of Lieutenant
Colonel Wood, of that regiment. This officer was exceedingly
fond of the sort of service which Morgan was performing, and
had been with him constantly for ten or twelve days. He preferred
to remain with and report to him, although his superior
in rank, rather than accompany his own regiment on the retreat
of the army, and see no active work.
A day or two after he had made this disposition of this command,
Captain Morgan taking with him thirty-two of the men
he had kept at Murfreesboro’, penetrated by bridle paths and
traces through the woods, to the immediate vicinity of the enemy’s
encampments at the Lunatic Asylum.
At this time, Mitchell’s entire brigade was encamped there.[Pg 126]
Stationing his men in the thickets along the road, at various
points, Captain Morgan went systematically to work to catch
every thing that should come into sight. There was, of course,
a great deal of passing to and from the headquarters of the
commanding officers and between the various camps. No one
anticipated danger there, and stragglers, couriers, escorts, and
guards, went carelessly and unsuspectingly along, into the same
bag. In the course of an hour or two eighty odd prisoners
were taken. Colonel Wood went off with twenty-eight of them,
and, by some oversight, sixty were started to Murfreesboro’,
later, guarded by only ten men. A number of wagons had
been also captured and burned. The teams were used to mount
the prisoners. One staff officer was captured and sent off with
the large hatch of prisoners. Captain Morgan remained behind
with one man, after he had sent off all the others. This sort of
service always gave him great pleasure, and he was loth to give
it up. As the number of passengers fell off, he rode down the
road with his companion, dressed like himself in a blue overcoat,
to a point where a guard of ten men were stationed under a
Sergeant for some purpose. He placed himself between them
and their guns, made his follower put his pistol to the head of
the Sergeant and began to rate them for neglect of duty. He
represented himself as a Federal officer of high rank and reminded
them sternly and reproachfully that such careless guard
as they were then keeping had enabled Morgan to play all of his
tricks. They had been careless and were overwhelmed with just
shame and mortification at his rebuke. He at length ordered
them all under arrest, and taking the Sergeant’s weapons from
him and leaving the guns stacked—he could not have carried
them off without entrusting them to the prisoners—he marched
the whole party away. They were under the impression that
they were going to Mitchell’s headquarters, but he got them
mounted and carried them to Murfreesboro’. In the meantime
the smoke from the wagons which were burned within half a
mile of Mitchell’s headquarters, attracted attention and led to[Pg 127]
inquiry, and it was not long before what was going on was discovered.
Troops were at once dispatched to put a stop to the
mischief and beat off or follow the perpetrators. The Fourth
Ohio got on the track of the party guarding the sixty prisoners,
and, as its progress was necessarily slow, it was soon overtaken.
Nothing could be done but release the prisoners and run for it,
and the whole escort went off in rapid flight. One prisoner had,
by a strange mistake, been allowed to retain a loaded gun. As
one of the guard who had been in the extreme rear of the column
dashed past this man, the latter fired and grazed his face.
The other turned in his saddle, fired and shot his unexpected
assailant dead. The pursuers had gotten close before they had
been perceived, and they pressed the chase vigorously. Over
fences and gulches, through fields and thickets, as hard as their
horses could go, fled the one party and followed the other for
ten miles. One of our men was killed, two or three wounded,
and as many captured. Thirty-eight prisoners were secured by
Morgan—twenty-eight brought off by Wood, and ten captured
and escorted by himself. On the evening of the same day a
party of eighteen men were dispatched from the camp on the
Shelbyville road to push as close to Nashville as possible, and
learn the position of the Federal troops in that quarter. I was
myself in command of the party, and had an accurate knowledge
of the points at which guards and pickets had been previously
stationed. On arriving in the vicinity of these points—around
which, without creating an alarm, it was desirable to pass, in
order to get near to the encampments and observe them closely—they
were found unoccupied. The party moved some three
miles further down the road without coming upon an enemy,
although a day or two before the picket posts had been thick
in this quarter.
It was apparent that some plan for our benefit had caused
this change, and unusual caution became necessary. I had
hoped to find some officers quartered at the houses well in the
rear of the reserve pickets, where they would believe themselves[Pg 128]
secure, and to capture them, but I now approached the houses,
not with the expectation of making prisoners, but of getting information.
None of the citizens in that neighborhood had ever
seen any man in my party, and they would tell nothing, but their
alarm at seeing us, and evident anxiety to get rid of us, showed
plainly that they knew of the proximity of danger. At length,
when in about six hundred yards of the Cross-roads near “Flat
Rock,” I think it is called, four miles from Nashville, and where
it was confidently reported by our informants that McCook’s
division was encamped, I halted and secreted men and horses
in the thick brush on the right hand side of the road, and, with
the guide, went forward on foot about a quarter of a mile, until
I suddenly heard the challenge of a picket. I judged from the
words I caught that it was the officer of the day making his
rounds. Soon a negro came down the road toward us, whom we
caught and questioned. He answered very glibly, and evinced
too little fear, not to excite suspicion that he came out to be
captured with a made-up tale. He said that there were ten
men on picket at the Cross-roads. As a large encampment was
only a few hundred yards on the other side of this point, his
story did not seem credible. However, we had at last found
an enemy.
Leaving five men to take care of the horses, in the thicket
where they were already concealed I carried the others through
a wide meadow on the right of the road which we had traveled
(the Shelbyville and Nashville pike) to the road which crossed
it at “Flat Rock,” striking the latter about two hundred yards
from the point of intersection. I was convinced that the withdrawal
of the pickets was part of a plan to entrap just such
scouting parties as ours, and that a strong force was in ambush
at the Cross-roads. There was little hope of accomplishing the
objects of the expedition, but the trap could, at least, be sprung,
and there was a chance of surprising the ambuscade. My men
were armed with shot-guns and pistols, the proper weapons for
such an affair. I ordered them to follow me in single-file in the[Pg 129]
direction of the enemy, instructing them to hold their fire until
we were challenged, and to then discharge their weapons, and,
without stopping to reload, make their way back to the horses.
The moon had just gone down as we began to move slowly down
the road. We made little noise, and were soon convinced by a
chorus of coughing, which broke on our ears as we neared them,
that a pretty good crowd was before us. When we had almost
reached the point where the roads cross, a Sergeant, with five or
six men at his back, sprang up, so near to us that I could have
touched him by making another step, and ordered “halt,” in a
low voice, evidently taking us for friends. Our answer was a
shot, and he fell dead. His comrades returned our fire, and at
once a line of men rose from the fence corners on the opposite
side of the road which we had just descended—we had passed them
unseen in the darkness. Many of them must have been asleep
until alarmed by the firing. The bulk of the force, however,
was stationed upon the other road, and, as they sprang up at
the sudden uproar, and aimed at the blaze of the guns, they endangered
their own friends more than us. My men sank at
once upon their knees, and the enemy firing wildly and high,
did not touch one of them. They pointed their shot-guns low,
and every flash was followed by a groan, and, by the quick vivid
light, we could see the men we hit writhing on the ground.
The curses and commands of the officers, shouts of the combatants,
and yells of the wounded were mingled together. The
breadth of the road, only, separated us, and the blaze from the
guns met. When our weapons were emptied, we sprang over
the fence and ran at top speed for our horses. A chain picket
which had been posted on the left of the Shelbyville road, a
short distance from it, rushed forward and opened upon us, and
the enemy we had just bidden farewell redoubled his fire.
When we regained the horses, we were nearly surrounded.
Parties had come out from the woods behind us, as we passed
down the road, and our retreat by the way we had come was
blocked. Our signals to call in the laggards, as we prepared to[Pg 130]
leave, were answered from every direction by the enemy. But
the woods befriended us, as they had often done before, and we
escaped under its shelter. On that same night a similar adventure
befell some Confederates (I think of Starne’s command) on
the Franklin pike, and some pickets were killed on the side of
Nashville entirely opposite to that into which all of these roads
(which have been mentioned) run. Of course every thing was
attributed to Morgan, and the Federals were puzzled and uncertain,
whether to believe him really ubiquitous, or the commander
of two or three thousand men.
A day or two after these occurrences, Morgan went with a flag
of truce to Mitchell’s encampment to endeavor to exchange
some of his prisoners for his own men who had been captured.
Colonel Wood, who was with him, was asked confidentially how many
men Morgan had, and was told that the mischief he
was doing could only be accounted for upon the supposition that
he had control of a large force. Wood answered, also in confidence,
that although he had co-operated with Morgan for two or
three weeks, he was entirely ignorant of the strength of his command.
That he knew, only, that Morgan was controlling the
motions of men whom he (Morgan) rarely saw; and that, although
he himself was intimately cognizant of all that occurred under
Morgan’s immediate supervision, he was frequently astonished
by hearing from the latter, accounts of enterprises which had
been accomplished by his orders in quarters very remote from
where he was in person operating. Wood saw the impression
which prevailed, and shaped his answers to confirm it. In reality,
there were not in the vicinity of Nashville, at that time,
on all sides, more than three hundred Confederate soldiers. Of
this number, Morgan could control only his own three companies
and the fifty men with Wood, although the others, who were
stragglers, and furloughed men from the Texas Rangers, Starne’s,
McNairy’s and other cavalry regiments, often joined him upon
his expeditions.
Many of the Federal soldiers killed around Nashville, and[Pg 131]
whose deaths were, charged to Morgan’s men, were killed by the
independent partisans, most of them men who lived in the neighboring
country, and had obtained leave to linger, for a while,
about their homes. Great zeal and activity, however, was displayed
by all parties.
When the flag of truce party mentioned above got to the
picket line, it was met by an expedition consisting of cavalry, artillery
and infantry, riding in wagons, en route for Murfreesboro’,
with the expectation of capturing Morgan’s entire band. General
Mitchell was very angry when the arrival of the flag was
announced, and complained that Morgan had taken that method
of defeating his plans, that otherwise would have been assuredly
successful. This charge created a good deal of amusement, when
Morgan told the story later to his brother officers of Johnson’s
array. Even if Morgan (as Mitchell thought), had known that
an expedition was on foot for his capture, he still would have had a
perfect right to transact at that time—if listened to—any matter
of business which required to be done under flag of truce. It is
legitimate to send them even while battles are going on.
During the entire war, both sides used to send flags of truce
for quite other purposes than the ostensible ones. Morgan was
the commanding Confederate officer in all that region, and had
a right to send flags of truce for any purpose whatever, so long
as he observed the usages which govern them. The flag of truce
need not have stopped the expedition.
It was Mitchell’s own fault if it was allowed to go far enough to
see what he wished to conceal. It is the right and positive duty of
an officer in charge of a flag, to go as far as he is permitted. General
Mitchell could have refused to receive it, and have ordered it
back. Morgan’s friends somewhat doubted whether this expedition
(even if it had not been met and checked by the flag of
truce), would have resulted in Morgan’s capture. General
Mitchell was a profound strategist, but he was going to travel
by daylight through a country full of Morgan’s friends, and
upon a road constantly watched by his scouts, to surprise Mor[Pg 132]gan.
At any rate, it may be safely asserted that the fond hope
which General Mitchell cherished, could never have been realized,
after Morgan had gotten such timely information of an
expedition intended for his capture, that he was able to meet it
with a flag of truce as it was just setting out.
The country around Nashville, in which Morgan did the service,
which I have attempted to describe, is one admirably
adapted to it. It is one of the most fertile and wealthy portions
of Middle Tennessee, a region unsurpassed in productiveness.
Yet teeming as it is with every crop which the farmer wishes,
one would think, in riding along the fine turnpikes which
enter Nashville upon all sides, that a comparatively small proportion
of the land is cultivated. A dense growth of timber,
principally cedar, stretches, sometimes for miles, along the
roads, and runs back from them, occasionally, to considerable
distances. The cedar glades, are, some of them, of great extent,
and are penetrated in all directions by roads. Springs,
and small watercourses, are frequent. It is indeed a beautiful
country, and the paradise of partisan cavalry, who can find in
it, every where, supplies for men and horses, shelter to hide them,
going against and escaping from an enemy, and, stop where
they will, all that makes a camp happy.
The people who live in this country are worthy to possess it.
They are brave, frank, generous and hospitable—true to their
friends, kind to the distressed. They are just and honorable,
and uphold through all trials and evils, the right, as they understand
it, and their plighted word. Come what will upon this
country, may God bless the people of Middle Tennessee.
Two or three days after the flag of truce affair, Morgan determined
upon an expedition to a different quarter from that in
which he had been hitherto employed. It was high time that,
in accordance with the instructions he had received, he followed
and rejoined the army, and he desired to leave an impression
upon the enemy of his “ubiquity,” which would be useful, after
he himself was gone.[Pg 133]
Upon the north side of the Cumberland, and about eight
miles from it in a direct line, is the little town of Gallatin, in
Sumner County, Tennessee. It is situated on the Louisville and
Nashville road, about thirty miles from Nashville. This place
was one of no military importance at that time, but it was right
upon the line of communication between Louisville and Nashville—the
roads running from Kentucky, as well as the railroad,
all passing through it—and the line of telegraph. This place is
about fifty miles from Murfreesboro’, by the most direct route.
Morgan resolved to hold this place for a day or two, and get
the benefit of the “communication” himself. He left Murfreesboro’
about midday, passed through Lebanon that evening, and
encamped for the night near that place. Crossing the Cumberland
next morning at Canoe-branch ferry, he reached Gallatin
about ten o’clock. He found the town ungarrisoned, two or
three clerks to take care of unimportant stores, and a telegraph
operator, constituting all the force there was to oppose him.
The citizens of this place were always strongly attached to the
Confederate cause, and devoted friends of Morgan and his
command—for which they subsequently suffered no little—and
they received him enthusiastically. This neighborhood was
always noted for good cheer, and, on this occasion, dainties of all
kinds appeared as if by magic, and bouquets were showered by
the score. Desiring the latest information from Nashville,
Morgan, accompanied by Colonel Wood, went straight to the
telegraph office, where they were kindly received by the operator,
to whom they introduced themselves as Federal officers just
from the interior of Kentucky. The operator immediately placed
himself in communication with Nashville and got the last news
for their benefit. The conversation then turned on Morgan.
“The clerk of the lightning” said that he had not yet disturbed
them at Gallatin, but that he might be expected any day:
“However,” he continued, “let him come, I, for one, am ready
for him.” He told the story of Morgan’s coming to Mitchell’s
lines with the flag of truce (which, it seems, had raised great[Pg 134]
excitement), and declared that he ought to have been shot then
and there. “Had I been there,” said he, fiercely, and brandishing
his revolver, “the scoundrel would have never left alive.”
“Give me that pistol,” Morgan said quietly; and, taking it,
much to the fellow’s surprise, “I am Morgan.”
The consternation of the operator was extreme, and his
apology, when he found his tongue, polite. It was accepted, and
so was he and placed under guard. He was badly scared, at
first, but he was treated kindly, and in a few days became
domesticated and even playful. An engine and a few cars,
found standing at the depot, were taken possession of—the cars
were immediately burned. Morgan got on the engine with two
or three companions, and run some miles up the railroad to visit
two or three points of interest. He desired especially to ascertain
if the tunnel could readily be destroyed, but found that it
would be a work of more time than he had to spare. While
he was absent, several Federal officers and soldiers came into
the town and were made prisoners. When he returned, the
engine was run off the track, over a steep bank, and destroyed.
On the next morning he sent the bulk of his command across
the river again, with instructions to remain near and guard the
ferry. He, himself, with ten or fifteen men, remained at Gallatin
two days longer with the hope of catching some of the
trains. He was disappointed, the news got around and none
came. Twenty or thirty wagons which were coming from
Scottsville, under a small guard, were also turned back—the
escort getting the alarm after he had made all his preparations
to capture them—so that his expedition was more barren of
the spoils of war than he had hoped. But his main object—to
persuade the enemy that they could never safely count upon his
being “gone”—was perfectly accomplished. While his men on
the south side of the river were waiting for him, six transports,
loaded with troops from Monticello, passed down toward Nashville.
The men on the boats did not know who the cavalry
were, and our men were afraid to fire upon them, lest they[Pg 135]
might endanger Captain Morgan and their comrades with him,
on the other side. Immediately after his return to Murfreesboro’,
he set out to rejoin the army, and met at Shelbyville that
portion of his command which had been encamped on the
Shelbyville and Nashville road, and which, in obedience to his
orders, had also repaired to the former place.
Here we remained for two or three days and then marched on
in the track of the army. While at Shelbyville, the first and
only causeless stampede of our pickets and false alarm to the
camps which occurred during our squadron organization, took
place. Ten or fifteen men were posted on picket some eight
miles from the town toward Nashville, near a small bridge, at
the southern end of which the extreme outpost vidette stood.
From tales told by the citizens, these pickets had conceived the
idea that the enemy contemplated an attack to surprise and capture
them, and (perhaps for the very reason that they had so
often played the same game themselves) they became very nervous
about it. Late in the night, two men came down the road
from toward Nashville in a buggy, and drove rapidly upon the
bridge without heeding the vidette’s challenge—he, taking them
to be the enemy, shot both barrels of his gun at them and fled
to alarm the other videttes and his comrades at the base. The
whole party became so alarmed by his representation of the immense
number and headlong advance of the enemy, that, without
stopping to fight or reconnoiter, they all came in a hand-gallop
to camp. The officer in charge sent the vidette who had given
the alarm, in advance, to report to me. I immediately got the
command under arms and then questioned him. He stated that
the enemy’s cavalry came on, at the charge, in column of fours,
that they paid no attention to his challenge, and that when he
fired, they dashed at him, making the air ring with their yells
and curses. He said that “the road seemed perfectly blue for
more than half a mile,” so great was their number.
It was a moonless night, and a slight rain was falling, making
the darkness intense. I asked him if he might not have been[Pg 136]
deceived and if he was not scared. “No, sir,” said he, “not a
bit, but I was somewhat arrytated.”
Leaving Shelbyville, we marched through Fayetteville to
Huntsville; every where along the route the people flocked to
see Morgan, and his progress was one continual ovation. When
we reached Huntsville, the most beautiful town in Alabama (and
now that Columbia is in ashes) perhaps in the entire South, we
were received with the kindness and hospitality which characterize
that generous, warm-hearted population. Huntsville, the
birth-place of Morgan, greeted him like a mother indeed. For
ten days we remained there; every man in the command the
recipient of unwearying attention. It was very injurious to
good soldierly habits, but served, as many other such instances
did, to show the men that they were fighting for a people who
loved to be grateful, and to prove it—and unavailing as the
struggle was, it is still a thought of pride and satisfaction, that
the labors and sacrifices were made for a people worthy of
them all.
Crossing the Tennessee river at Decatur and marching just
in the track of the army, we reached Byrnesville, a few
miles from Corinth, on the third of April, and found
there the division of General Breckinridge, to which we
were attached. The whole army was then astir, and forming
to march to attack the enemy who lay at Pittsburg Landing on
the southern bank of the Tennessee some twenty miles from
Corinth.
Morgan’s services were much talked of, and he was complimented
by General Johnson in terms that were very grateful to
him. He was given the commission of Colonel, to take effect
from the fourth of April, and he received (what he valued much
more highly) an assurance, or what he construed to be such, that
he would be permitted to act independently again, and follow
his favorite service with a stronger force and upon a
larger scale.[Pg 137]
None among the many ardent and high-strung men who went
with so much zeal into that fight, felt more hope and enthusiasm
than Morgan, for he saw beyond it, a career of excitement,
success, and glory, that might satisfy the most energetic and
most daring nature.
CHAPTER VII
On the 3rd of April, the army, leaving its cantonments around
Corinth, commenced its advance, and the heads of the columns
were directed toward Pittsburg, on the Tennessee river, where,
unconscious of the gathering storm, lay the Federal host under
General Grant, which had conquered at Donelson. Flushed
with that victory and insolent with triumph, the enemy rested
for the long march of invasion which he believed would lead him
(unchecked, even if opposed) to easy, speedy and decisive conquest.
No thought of danger to himself, disturbed these pleasant
anticipations.
The suggestion that an attack from the Confederate forces
at Corinth was imminent, would have been dismissed as the idlest
and weakest of apprehensions. The different corps moved from
their respective positions, on the railroads which enter Corinth,
by the most direct roads to the point indicated for their concentration.
General Johnson had declared, some weeks previously, with
prophetic judgment, that upon that very spot, “the great battle
of the Southwest would be fought.”
Breckinridge’s division, to which Morgan’s squadron was now
attached, moved from Byrnesville. The roads were narrow and
miry, and were not improved by a heavy rain which fell during
the march, and by the passage of successive trains of wagons
and batteries of artillery. The march was slow and toilsome.
The infantry labored along with mud-clogged feet, casting sour
looks and candid curses at the cavalry and couriers, who bespattered
them. The artillery often stuck fast, and the struggling
horses failed to move the pieces, until the cannoneers applied
themselves and pushed and strained at the heavy wheels.[Pg 139]
On the 5th, about three or four in the afternoon, every thing
was concentrated upon the ground, where General Johnson proposed
to establish his line, and the disposition of the forces, in
accordance with the plan of battle, was at once commenced. On
account of some accident, or mistake, this concentration was
effected one day later than had been contemplated, causing a
corresponding delay in the attack. It has frequently been
asserted that this was occasioned by the failure of General Polk’s
corps to arrive at the appointed time.
General Polk’s report demonstrates the injustice of this statement,
and it is probable that the condition of the roads was the
sole cause of the delay.
A want of promptness upon the part of General Polk, no
doubt would have produced a suspension of the attack. A
corps so strong and efficient, could have been ill-spared from an
army, already inferior in numbers to the antagonist it was about
to assail, and the absence of the brave old Bishop from the field,
would have been, of itself, a serious loss. This delay was the
cause of grave apprehensions to many of the Confederate Generals,
and, as matters were managed, was really unfortunate.
It was known that Buell was marching rapidly to the support
of Grant, and General Johnson wished to crush the latter before
their junction was effected.
General Beauregard was of opinion that the attack, having been
so long delayed, ought to be abandoned altogether; that it would
now be extremely hazardous, and that the safety of the army
would be compromised if it did not retire promptly to Corinth.
General Johnson listened courteously to every argument, but
was moved by none to relinquish his plan. His resolution to
fight, after placing his army in front of the enemy, was fixed.
He believed, “the offensive once assumed, ought to be maintained
at all hazards.” He trusted that vigor and audacity
would enable him to accomplish victory on the first day, before
the fresh troops came, and his designs were too profoundly considered,
his gallant faith in his soldiers, too earnest, for his[Pg 140]
purpose to be shaken. In answer to an anxious inquiry from
his aide, Colonel William Preston, he said, quietly, “I would
fight them were they a million.”
The ground selected for battle was that inclosed between Owl
and Lick creeks, which run nearly parallel with each other, and
empty into the Tennessee river. The flanks of the two armies
rested upon these little streams, and the front of each was just
the distances, at their respective positions, between the two
creeks. The Confederate front was, consequently, a little more
than three miles long. The distance between the creeks widens
somewhat, as they approach the river, and the Federal army had
more ground upon which to deploy. The position which the
enemy occupied next morning, is five or six miles from the
river, and his advance camp was perhaps a mile southward of
Shiloh Church. He had, as yet, established no line; the attack
next morning took him completely by surprise, and he formed
after the fight had commenced.
General Johnson’s effective strength, including all the forces
available for that battle, was about thirty-five thousand men.
That of the enemy was, perhaps, forty-five thousand men. The
advantages of attack and surprise would, General Johnson
thought, more than counterbalance his numerical inferiority.
If Buell brought reinforcements to his opponents, by forced
marches, in advance of his army, he would feel their effect
only in a stronger line, and more stubborn resistance upon the
front—his flanks would be safe in any event. The array of
his forces evinced a resolution to break through and crush,
at any cost, whatever should confront him in the narrow space
where the whole conflict would be crowded.
The troops were bivouacked that night upon the ground
which it was intended that they should occupy in line of battle.
No disposition which could be made that evening was
delayed; every precaution was taken to guard against a further
procrastination of the attack. The men laid down to
sleep in the order in which they were to rush upon the enemy.[Pg 141]
General Hardee had command of the first line, General Bragg
of the second, and General Polk of the third. General Hardee’s
line extended from the one creek to the other, and as his corps
(fully deployed) could not properly occupy the entire distance,
he was reinforced by a fine brigade under Brigadier General
Gladden. To Hardee was given the honor of commencing the
battle, and he was ordered to push his whole line rapidly forward,
at early dawn. General Bragg’s line was formed similarly
to General Hardee’s, and about a quarter of a mile in its rear.
Bragg was ordered to advance simultaneously with Hardee, and
to support him when he needed assistance. Then, at the distance
of eight hundred yards, came General Polk’s corps, not deployed,
but formed in column of brigades. General Breckinridge’s
division (over six thousand strong) constituted the reserve, and
was close in the rear of Polk’s corps. The cavalry was promiscuously
disposed—indeed, no one in authority seemed to think
it could win the battle. Morgan’s squadron was formed with
the Kentucky troops, and occupied the extreme left of Breckinridge’s
division. This disposition of the forces and the energetic
conduct of the Confederate commanders, explain the
striking features of the battle, which have been so often
remarked—the methodical success of the Confederates, upon
the first day, the certainty with which they won their way
forward against the most determined resistance; the “clock-like”
regularity of their advance, the desperate struggle, the
Federal retreat, repeated again and again through the day.
Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the
collision occurred, military savants will, some day, demonstrate
that success ought, with mathematical certainty, to have resulted
from the tactics of General Johnson. An army moving to attack
(an enemy, surprised and unprepared), in three lines, supported
by a reserve, and with its flanks perfectly protected, ought to
have delivered crushing and continuous blows. Such a formation,
directed by consummate skill and the finest nerve in a[Pg 142]
commander, of troops who believed that to fight would be to
win, promised an onset well nigh irresistible.
The afternoon wore away and no sign in the enemy’s camps
indicated that he had discovered our presence. The night fell,
and, the stern preparations for the morrow, having been all
completed, the army sank to rest. The forest was soon almost
as still as before it had been tenanted with the hosts of war.
But, before the day broke, the army was astir; the bugles
sounded the reveille on all sides, and the long lines began to
form. About five o’clock, the first gun rang on the front—another
and another, succeeding, as our skirmishers pressed on,
until the musketry grew into the crackling, labored sound, which
precedes the roar of real battle. The troops seemed excited to
frenzy by the sound. It was the first fight in which the majority
of them had ever been engaged, and they had, as yet, seen and
suffered nothing to abate the ardor with which the high-spirited
young fellows panted for battle. Every one who witnessed
that scene—the marshaling of the Confederate army for attack
upon the morning of the sixth of April—must remember more
distinctly than any thing else, the glowing enthusiasm of the men,
their buoyancy and spirited impatience to close with the enemy.
As each regiment formed upon the ground where it had bivouacked,
the voice of its commander might be heard as he spoke
high words of encouragement to his men, and it would ring
clearer as he appealed to their regimental pride, and bade them
think of the fame they might win. When the lines began to
advance, the wild cheers which arose made the woods stir as if
with the rush of a mighty wind. No where was there any
thought of fear—every where were the evidences of impetuous
and determined valor.
For some distance the woods were open and clear of undergrowth,
and the troops passed through, preserving their array
with little difficulty; but as the point, where the fight between
the pickets had commenced, was neared, the timber became
dwarfed into scrubby brush, and at some places dense thickets[Pg 143]
impeded the advance. The ground, too, grew rugged and difficult
of passage in unbroken line. Frequent halts to reform
and dress the ranks became necessary, and at such times General
Johnson’s magnificent battle order was read to the regiments,
and its manly, heroic language was listened to with the
feeling it was intended to evoke. The gray, clear morning was,
ere long, enlivened with a radiant sunrise. As the great light
burst in full splendor above the horizon, sending brilliancy over
the scene, many a man thought of the great conqueror’s augury
and pointed in exultation and hope to the “Sun of Shiloh.”
Breckinridge’s division went into the fight last, and, of course,
saw or heard a great deal of it, before becoming itself actively
engaged. Not far off, on the left and center, the fight soon grew
earnest, as Hardee dashed resolutely on; the uneasy, broken
rattle of the skirmishers gave way to the sustained volleys of
the lines, and the artillery joined in the clamor, while away on
the right, the voice of the strife swelled hoarser and angrier,
like the growl of some wounded monster—furious and at bay.
Hardee’s line carried all before it. At the first encampment it
met not even the semblance of a check. Following close and
eager upon the fleeing pickets, it burst upon the startled inmates
as they emerged, half clad, from their tents, giving them no time
to form, driving them in rapid panic, bayoneting the dilatory—on
through the camp swept, together, pursuers and pursued.
But now the alarm was thoroughly given, the “long roll” and
the bugle were calling the Federals to arms; all through their
thick encampments they were hastily forming.
As Hardee, close upon the haunches of the foe he had first
started, broke into another camp, a long line of steel and flame
met him, staggering, and for a little while, stopping his advance.
But his gallant corps was still too fresh for an enemy, not yet recovered
from the enervating effects of surprise, to hold it back
long. For a while it writhed and surged before the stern barrier
suddenly erected in its front, and then, gathering itself,
dashed irresistibly forward. The enemy was beaten back, but[Pg 144]
the hardy Western men who filled his ranks (although raw and
for the first time under fire) could not be forced to positive
flight. They had once formed, and at this stage of the battle,
they could not be routed. They had little discipline, but plenty
of staunch courage. Soon they turned for another stand, and
the Confederates were, at once, upon them. Again they gave
way, but strewed the path of their stubborn retreat with many
a corpse in gray as well as in blue. At half past seven the
first lines began to give signs of exhaustion, and its march over
the rough ground while struggling with the enemy, had thinned
and impaired it. It was time for Bragg’s corps to come to the
relief, and that superb line now moved up in serried strength.
The first sign of slackening upon the part of the Confederates
seemed to add vigor to the enemy’s resistance. But bravely as
they fought, they never recovered from the stun of the surprise.
Their half of the battle was out of joint at the beginning, and
it was never gotten right during that day. They were making
desperate efforts to retrieve their lost ground when Bragg’s disciplined
tornado burst upon them. The shock was met gallantly
but in vain. Another bloody grapple was followed by another
retreat of the Federals, and again our line moved on.
Those who were in that battle will remember these successive
contests, followed by short periods of apparent inaction, going
on all the day. To use the illustration of one well acquainted
with its plan and incidents: “It went on like the regular stroke
of some tremendous machine.” There would be a rapid charge
and fierce fight—the wild yell would announce a Confederate
success—then would ensue a comparative lull, broken again in
a few minutes, and the charge, struggle and horrible din would
recommence.
About half past ten Polk’s corps prepared to take part in the
fight. He had previously, by order personally given by General
Johnson (who was all the time in the front), sent one brigade
to reinforce General Bragg’s right, where the second line had
been most hotly engaged. He had also sent, by order of Gen[Pg 145]eral
Beauregard, one brigade to the left. The fight at this time
was joined all along the line, and urged with greater fury, than at
any period of the day. Almost immediately after parting with
these two brigades, General Polk became engaged with the remainder
of his corps. The enemy had, now, disposed his entire
force for resistance—the men fought as if determined not to accept
defeat—and their stern, tenacious leader was not the man
to relinquish hope, although his lines had been repeatedly broken
and the ground was piled with his slain. The corps of Hardee,
Bragg and Polk, were now striving abreast, or mingled with each
other.
In reading the reports of the Confederate Generals, frequent
allusion will be found to regiments and brigades fighting without
“head or orders.” One commander would sometimes direct
the movements of troops belonging to another. At this phase
of the struggle, the narrative should dwell more upon “the
biographies of the regiments than the history of the battle.”
But the wise arrangement of the lines and the instructions given
subordinate commanders, ensured harmonious action and the
desired result.
Each brigade commander was ordered (when he became disengaged),
to seek and attack the nearest enemy, to press the
flank of every stubborn hostile force which his neighbors could
not move, and at all hazards to press forward. General Johnson
seemed to have adopted the spirit of the motto, “When
fighting in the dark, strike out straight.” He more than once
assumed command of brigades which knew not what to do, and
led them to where they could fight with effect. Our successes
were not won without costly sacrifices, and the carnage was lavish
upon both sides.
While all this was going on in front, Morgan’s squadron moved
along with Breckinridge’s division, and we listened to the hideous
noise, and thought how much larger the affair was than the
skirmishes on Green river and around Nashville. We soon
learned to distinguish when the fight was sharp and hotly con[Pg 146]tested,
and when our lines were triumphantly advancing, and we
wondered if those before us would finish the business before we
got in.
We had not marched far, before we saw bloody indications of
the fierce work that had been done upon the ground over which
we were passing. The dead and the wounded were thick in the
first camp, and, thence, onward. Some of the corpses (of men
killed by artillery), showed ghastly mutilation. In getting up
our glowing anticipation of the day’s programme, we had left
these items out of the account, and we mournfully recognized
the fact, that many who seek military distinction, will obtain it
posthumously, if they get it at all. The actual sight of a corpse
immensely chills an abstract love of glory. The impression
soon wears off, however, and the dead are very little noticed.
Toward ten or eleven o’clock we wandered away from the infantry
to which we had been attached, and getting no orders or
instructions, devoted ourselves to an examination of the many
interesting scenes of the field, which we viewed with keen
relish.
The camps whence the enemy had been driven, attracted especial
and admiring attention. There was a profusion of all
the necessaries, and many of the luxuries of military life. How
we wondered that an army could have ever permitted itself to be
driven away from them.
While we were curiously inspecting the second or third encampment,
and had gotten closer, than at any time previously,
to the scene of the fighting, a slight incident interrupted, for a
moment, the pleasure of the investigation. Some of the enemy’s
shells were bursting over our heads, and as we were practically
ignorant of artillery, we were at first puzzled to know what they
were. In the general thunder of the fight, no special reports
could be heard, to lead to a solution of the particular phenomena.
Suddenly a short yell of mingled indignation and amazement,
announced that one of the party had some practical information
on the subject. He had been struck by a fragment on the[Pg 147]
shoulder, inflicting a severe gash and bruise. Not knowing how
the missile had reached him, he seemed to think himself a very
ill-treated man.
Just as Breckinridge’s division was going into action, about
12 p.m., we came upon the left of it, where the Kentucky troops
were formed. The bullets were beginning to fly thick about us.
Simultaneously, the squadron and the regiment nearest to us,
struck up the favorite song of the Kentuckians, “Cheer Boys,
Cheer”—the effect was animating beyond all description.
About this time our advance was receiving its first serious
check. While the right and the left were advancing, the left-center
was repulsed before a strong position which the enemy
held in force. They were posted upon an eminence, in front
of which were thickets and underbrush. Plenty of artillery
strongly supported, crowned this eminence, and Hardee’s utmost
efforts to carry it had been foiled. So furiously played the batteries
of the enemy, that nothing could be seen of the position, but
sheets of flame and clouds of smoke. When an advance was
attempted against it, a shower of minnie balls would be felt. It
was finally taken, after the impetus given the line by the arrival
of the reserve under Breckinridge, had sent our forces forward
on both sides so far, that it was completely flanked. While the
advance, at this point, was thus suspended, the squadron happened
to approach, and General Hardee sent an aide to know
“what cavalry that was?” Upon learning that it was Morgan’s,
he expressed himself much pleased, and said that he would use
it to “take that battery.” When informed of this truly gratifying
compliment, the men bore themselves with becoming sobriety,
and as they formed for the charge, which we were told would be
immediately ordered, they indulged in no unseemly or extravagant
expressions of joy. Indeed, it is an historical fact, that
while we were ready enough to go, we were not so sanguine of
the result as General Hardee seemed to be. The General sat
on his horse near Schoup’s gallant battery which was replying,
but ineffectually, to the vicious rain of grape and shell which[Pg 148]
poured from the hill. He seemed indifferent to the terrible volleys,
and only anxious to capture the guns.
The order, we were expecting, was never given us. At the
first slackening of the fire from the hill, some of the infantry
regiments, which were lying down, dashed forward, but the enemy
left the position because he was in danger of being surrounded.
Many of the guns were abandoned.
The right was now checked, meeting the fiercest resistance.
The left and center bore rapidly forward.
From a passage in General Bragg’s report, it would seem that
it had been part of the plan to press more strongly upon our
right and drive the enemy down the river, “leaving the left
open for him to escape.” But it was already apparent that he
was being hemmed in and forced from all sides, toward Pittsburg
Landing.
General Hardee, at this time, ordered Colonel Morgan to take
his command to the extreme left, and “charge the first enemy
he saw.” Colonel Morgan immediately proceeded in the direction
indicated as rapidly as his column could gallop. The left
of our line was moving so swiftly to the front that, leaving to go
some distance by a bridle path in the rear, before turning to overtake
it, we did not reach it until nearly one o’clock in the afternoon.
Just as we approached, we saw, on the extreme left, a body of
men dressed in blue uniforms, going through with some strange
evolutions. Their dress was much like that of the enemy, but
there were troops, evidently Confederate, not far from them that
were paying them no attention. Colonel Morgan ordered a
platoon of Company A, to dismount and approach them cautiously,
to fire into them if satisfied that they were the enemy,
and it was his intention to then charge them. We drew very
near to them unnoticed. A little man flourishing a portentous
saber, was directing their movements with off-hand eloquence.
We forbore to fire, because, although we did not understand
what he said, we thought from the emphasis of the speaker, his
volubility, and the imprecatory sound of the language, that it[Pg 149]
was French, and that his party were Louisianians. This surmise
was correct. They were members of Colonel Mouton’s
fine regiment, the Eighteenth Louisiana. Their uniform cost
them dearly before the fight was over. They were frequently
fired into by Confederate regiments, and received, in that way,
smart loss. At length they retaliated whenever they received
a volley. This caused some complaint, but it is related that the
Louisianians gave sound military reasons for their conduct, saying:
“We fire at any body, what fire at us—G-d d-m.” Shortly
after we made this discovery, we saw this regiment and a portion
of the Kentucky brigade, charge across a wide field on the extreme
left of our line. Here a ravine which had protected our
left flank suddenly terminated, and when the line had dashed
across this field and had entered the woods beyond, it was entirely
uncovered. A strong force of the enemy was formed in
the middle of this field (where one of the camps was situated),
and the Confederates rushed so closely upon them, that it seemed
as if the bayonets must cross, before they gave way. The
volume of musketry in this charge was tremendous, and drowned
the crash of the artillery. When the Federals turned to retreat
they still preserved their array, and went off in perfect order.
They frequently faced about to fire on their pursuers, who
poured continuous volleys into them, and thus fighting they disappeared
in the woods. Our squadron and the Texian rangers—Eighth
Texas—were following behind the infantry, and had
been unable to get past them, or (on account of the ravine) to
the left of them. Now, however, an opportunity of actively
participating in the battle occurred, which we had not expected.
As we were pressing across the field, some Federal skirmishers
appeared in the edge of the woods upon the left of the field, not
more than eighty yards from us. They directed their attention
principally to Byrne’s battery, which was also crossing the field,
and prevented the cannoneers from unlimbering the guns. Colonel
Morgan at once ordered the charge, and the squadron
dashed at full gallop into the woods. The skirmishers ran back,[Pg 150]
but as we forced our way in a crowded mass (all line lost)
through the thickets, we came suddenly upon the infantry regiment
to which these skirmishers belonged. Fortunately for us,
this regiment, in scrambling through the brush, had lost the
compactness of its formation. We came close upon them before
the Federals fired—they delivered one stunning volley, the
blaze almost reaching our faces, and the roar rang in our ears
like thunder. The next moment we rode right through them—some
of the men trying to cut them down with the saber, and
making ridiculous failures, others doing real execution with gun
and pistol. We lost only three men killed, but they were noble,
gallant soldiers—Lieutenant James West and privates Samuel
Buckner and James Ghiselin. We lost several others wounded.
Twelve of the enemy were killed and a few made prisoners.
The affair was over directly, and the Federals retreated. The
Texians, as we prepared to charge, asked what we were going
to do. “To go in,” was the answer, “Then we will go in, too,”
they shouted, and galloping down the rear of our line, until
they reached the right of it, they turned short to the left and
charged into the woods. They struck the rest of the brigade
to which the regiment we had met belonged, and drove it back
for some distance. They were never checked until they reached
a high fence, which they could not pass. Their loss was then
severe, and many of their riderless horses came galloping over
the ground where our wounded lay.
Our infantry had pressed on beyond this point, and there was
no Confederate force near except this cavalry. It was impossible
to conjecture how strong the enemy was just here, but
Colonel Morgan, fearing that he might come in force sufficient to
endanger this flank, disposed his command on foot, to make all
possible resistance in such an event. Our skirmishers, thrown
forward, could not find him, and the receding din of the battle
seemed to promise perfect safety against all such dangers.
About half-past one or two o’clock, occurred the great calamity
which rendered unavailing all of the sacrifices and successes[Pg 151]
of the day. General Johnson was killed. He had exposed himself
with almost culpable recklessness. From the commencement
of the fight he had been in the van—cheering the struggling
men—adding fresh spirit to the charge—stimulating to new
energy the battalions that were checked. His clothing had been
torn by balls which were unheeded.
Once he had ridden along the rear of a brave Arkansas Regiment,
which had just recoiled from a terrible fire. “Where
now,” he said, striking some of the men encouragingly upon the
shoulder, “are the Arkansas boys, who boasted that they would
fight with their bowie knives? You have a nobler weapon in
your grasp—will you dare to use it?” He spoke to men who
could not hear such words in vain—they rushed forward and
won the position.
Statham’s magnificent brigade had at length faltered. General
Johnson, bare-headed and with his hand elevated, rode out
in front of the brigade, and called on it to follow. His dress,
majestic presence, imposing gesture and large gray horse, made
him a conspicuous mark. A ball pierced his leg, severing the
artery. He paid no notice to the wound, but continued to follow
the troops, who, incited by his example, had charged successfully.
Suddenly he grew faint and reeled in his saddle.
His staff came to his assistance, but too late. They bore him
into a ravine for shelter, and in a few moments he died. I cannot
venture to speak of General Johnson in the ordinary terms
of eulogy—such applied to him would seem frivolous and profane.
He was too great for it in life—and it would little accord
with the veneration, silent, but profound, with which we, his people,
cherish his memory. If he had lived but a few days more!
Shortly after this great disaster the lines were pressed forward
rapidly again at all points. Our troops were still instinct with
the spirit of the lost leader. His genius had prepared effects,
accomplished after he was gone. The left had swept far around—the
center, where the latest check had been felt, was a little
behind—the right driving everything before it, when, by hard[Pg 152]
fighting the resistance opposed to it at noon had been overcome,
was approaching the river.
Now the word was passed through the army, “Let every
order be forward.” In the last determined stand which the
enemy made, Major General Prentice and two thousand of his
division were captured. His troops stood, until the advancing
Confederates closed in on two sides, and escape had become impossible.
Our army was now near the river, and a victory absolutely
complete and decisive, was just within its grasp. The fighting
had been hard and our success blood-bought but brilliant. For
many miles (through his encampments, piled up with rich spoils)
we had driven the enemy. His brave resistance had at length
been completely broken, and after immense losses, he seemed
ready to yield. It is an indisputable fact, that for an hour, at
least, before the Confederate advance was checked by order of
the Commanding General, it was meeting with no sort of check
from the enemy. The Northern writers, who shortly after the
battle described it, one and all depicted a scene of utter confusion
and consternation as prevailing in the Federal army,
crowded upon the bank of the river. Scarcely a semblance of
resistance (according to these writers), was maintained—while
thousands (all discipline and confidence gone), were prepared to
surrender. Hundreds, unable to force their way upon the boats,
plunged into the river and were drowned.
The head of Buell’s column commenced to arrive late in the
afternoon, and the troops were crossed as rapidly as they came
up. Nelson’s division crossed first. The leading brigade was
compelled to force its way through the mass of fugitives. On
that afternoon, the second chance which the Confederacy had,
to win the war, was thrown away.
All night long, the huge pieces upon the gunboats thundered
at intervals, with a roar which seemed like that of a bursting
firmament. They had been opened during the afternoon, but,
on account of the great elevation necessary to enable them to[Pg 153]
shoot over the bluffs, the shells had gone high in the air. These
huge missiles came screaming louder than a steam whistle, striking
off the tops of trees, and filling the air with dense clouds
of smoke when they burst, but doing no damage.
During the night little was done to reorganize the Confederate
soldiery. Only Bragg’s corps maintained its discipline.
Thousands of stragglers (from the other corps) roamed over the
field to plunder and riot. The Federal Generals strained every
nerve to repair their disaster. The fugitives were collected and
placed again in the ranks. The boats plied steadily, bringing
over Buell’s fresh and undiscouraged forces, and at six o’clock
next morning the victors were in their turn assailed by an army
larger than the one they had confronted on the day before, and
half of which was fresh and unwearied. General Beauregard
disposed his tired troops to receive this storm—and although his
line was thin—weakened (from the superb array of the day before)
by the dead and wounded and those who had straggled
from their colors—it could not be driven.
General Beauregard in his report of the battle, says:
“On his right and center the enemy was repulsed in every
effort he made with his heavy columns in that quarter of the
field. On the left, our line was weakest, and here the enemy
drove on line after line of fresh troops with unremitting fury.”
Our troops stood firm, but General Beauregard feared that they
must eventually break, and at 12 p.m. (all of his scanty reserves
having been put in) he ordered a withdrawal of the line.
After a repulse of a desperate attack the troops began to
retire, and accomplished the movement without trouble. General
Beauregard says: “The lines of troops established to
cover this movement had been disposed on a favorable ridge—commanding
the ground of Shiloh Church, from this position our
artillery played upon the woods beyond, but upon no visible
enemy, and without a reply. Soon satisfied that no serious
pursuit was, or would be attempted, this last line was withdrawn,
and never did troops leave a battlefield in better order.”[Pg 154]
General Breckinridge (whose heroic conduct on both days
had almost repaid the Kentuckians—in their pride in it—for the
loss of the battle) was left as rear guard, just in front of the
intersection of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads—upon the
ground occupied by the army upon Saturday night. On the
next day he was withdrawn three miles to Mickey’s, and remained
there undisturbed for five or six days. Our cavalry
occupied the ground several miles further to the north. Morgan’s
squadron, and other cavalry commands, were posted for
more than a week upon a portion of the field won from the
enemy on the first day, during which time only two or three
trifling skirmishes occurred.
The army marched to Corinth on the 7th and 8th.
It is a point conceded, now, on all sides, that had the Confederate
army pursued its success on the evening of the first day,
the army under General Grant would have been annihilated, and
Buell never could have crossed the river. Had General Johnson
survived, the battle would have been pressed vigorously to
that consummation. Then, what would have been the situation?
The army, remaining upon the banks of the Tennessee for a few
days, would have been reorganized and recovered from the exhausting
effects of the battle. The slightly wounded returning
to the ranks would have made the muster-roll full thirty thousand
effectives.
Price and Van Dorn coming with about fifteen thousand and
the levies from all quarters, which were hastening to Corinth,
would have given General Johnson nearly sixty thousand infantry.
Buell, unable to cross the river or to use it for obtaining
supplies, his communications with Nashville in constant
danger, and hourly interrupted by the five or six thousand cavalry
which General Johnson could have thrown upon them,
would have been suspended without the ability to obtain
foothold or prop anywhere. If nothing else could have made
him retreat, a menace to Nashville, from the troops in East
Tennessee, would have served the purpose. Then General[Pg 155]
Johnson could have crossed the river, and the cavalry have been
pushed on to operate between Nashville and Louisville. General
Buell would not have halted to fight. With the odds against
him, to do that (in the heart of a hostile population and far
from support) would have been too hazardous. But retreat
would have been almost as disastrous as defeat, and, closely
pressed, would have resulted in the partial disintegration of his
army. Military men, who understand the situation, and the
topography of the country, will concur in the opinion that General
Buell could not have halted with safety at Nashville, nor,
indeed, until he had reached Munfordsville.
Gentlemen who were upon General Johnson’s staff, and in his
confidence, state that it was his intention to have attempted no
march into Kentucky, but that if Buell retreated beyond the
Cumberland river, he designed (while keeping his cavalry on
the railroad between Nashville and Louisville) to have marched
his army, rapidly, along the South bank of the Cumberland to
the Ohio river, and, crossing that stream, to have pushed into
Illinois, and (destroying the great trunk lines of railroads) have
marched to Kentucky by way of Ohio. He could have made
the march in less time than troops could have been organized to
oppose him. The plan appeared daring to rashness, but where
were the forces to endanger such a march? The militia could
not have stopped it a moment. General Johnson believed that,
his army would have increased as it advanced, and that vacillation
and disaffection removed from Kentucky and Missouri,
would be transferred to the Northwestern States, and that negotiations
for peace would be entertained by those States separately.
But the battle of Shiloh was, after all, a Confederate success.
The army of invasion was crippled and reduced to a cautious
offensive, little better than inactivity. The Federal arms were
stayed and blunted, and the Southern people, reanimated, prepared
for fresh and vigorous resistance.
When relieved from duty on the field of Shiloh, Colonel Mor[Pg 156]gan
sought and obtained permission to dash into Tennessee,
with a force adequate to important results. While the army
lay in the entrenchments around Corinth, which the Federal
forces under Halleck were tediously approaching, he wished to
pounce upon the rich prizes in their rear. He assembled the
troops, with which he was about to make the contemplated expedition
at Byrnesville, on or about the twenty-third of April.
His own command, Companies A, B and C, respectively commanded
by Lieutenants Sellers, Chadburn and Churchill, had
been augmented by a fourth company, or rather nucleus of a
company, some twenty-five strong, commanded by Captain
Brown—a gallant officer. Detachments from Colonel Wirt
Adams’ regiment and McNairy’s battalion had, also, been assigned
him. These were commanded by his friend, Lieutenant
Colonel Wood, and Captain Harris. The entire force at his disposal
numbered three hundred and twenty-five effectives. Colonel
Morgan was detained at Byrnesville for several days, having
his horses shod, arms put in order, rations cooked, and other
necessary arrangements for the expedition perfected. When all
was ready, the command commenced its march on the 26th.
Extra ammunition and rations were carried on pack mules—one
being allowed to each section, or four to a company.
These mules were led by men, detailed from the section to
which they were attached, and the “train” was placed under
charge of private Frank Leathers—called by courteous reminiscence
of his former rank in the Kentucky militia, and as ex-legislator—Colonel.
This gallant gentleman will pardon me for
complimenting the energy and diligence he displayed, by recording
the grumbling acknowledgment of one of those he “put
in motion,” who declared that “he made a bigger row in
driving his mules than was necessary to align a division of
cavalry for action.”
Passing through Iuka, that day, the command encamped six
miles from the Tennessee river, and reaching it early next
morning, immediately commenced to cross. The river was high,[Pg 157]
and there was nothing with which to effect the crossing, but one
boat—a small horse-ferry, capable of holding ten or twelve.
Efforts were made (unsuccessfully), to cross a portion of the
command at other points. Two days and nights of hard work
were occupied in getting every thing across. One of the men
who was actively engaged in the work, describes an apprehension
which rendered it more disagreeable. “We had,” he says,
“the gunboat fever very badly, at that time, and expected every
minute to see one come in sight, for they were patroling the
river for some miles above this point.”
Leaving the river on the morning of the 30th, Colonel Morgan
reached Lawrenceburg, in Lawrence county, Tennessee, on that
afternoon, and encamped for the night. It was a fertile country,
settled by hospitable people. Rations and forage in abundance
were procured, and a good deal more whisky than was good for
the men. Early on the next morning the march, was resumed,
and about 10 a.m. (not far from Pulaski), Colonel Morgan
learned that four hundred Federal troops had just passed through
on the road to Columbia. They were principally convalescents,
employed in putting up a line of telegraph from Columbia to
Huntsville, Alabama, and other “light work.” Colonel Morgan
determined to relieve them. The command was pressed on to
the town in a gallop. Captain Mitchell (son of the Federal
General of that name), was captured here, and paroled, that he
might effect his exchange for Colonel Morgan’s brother—Captain
Charlton Morgan—who had been wounded at Shiloh,
and captured at Huntsville—whither he had gone to convalesce
in the smiles of the fair ladies of that beautiful place.
Moving on rapidly, Colonel Morgan overtook the enemy a short
distance beyond the town, and at once attacked. Learning his
approach, the Federals had hastily thrown up some slight
breastworks in a field on the side of the road (in which a part of
them were posted)—others occupied a wood on the left of the
road. Colonel Morgan formed his command, and—the ground
permitting—charged on horseback, carrying the entire line.[Pg 158]
Many prisoners were captured, the remnant of the Federal
force rallied after retreating about a mile, leaving wagons.
They were flanked by Co. A, and surrendered.
At this juncture, a body of cavalry appeared, approaching
from the direction of Columbia. Not knowing their strength,
Colonel Morgan engaged them with skirmishers. Finding them
not strong, he ordered Captain Brown to charge them, who
routed and drove them six or seven miles. They were about
fifty strong. Colonel Morgan’s loss in this affair was slight. A
few, only, of the enemy were killed. The prisoners (nearly four
hundred), were taken back to Pulaski. The citizens were enthusiastic
in their reception of Colonel Morgan and his soldiers—the
men were wild with excitement, and the women were in
tears. Colonel Morgan’s celebrated mare, “Black Bess”—came
in for her share of admiration and attention. The ladies
crowded around to caress and feed her with dainties (for which
she had a weakness), and her glossy tresses were in great request.
It is recorded that upon this occasion, for the first and
only time in his life—Colonel Morgan opposed the wishes of his
lady friends. Fearing that Bess would be completely shorn, he
“tore her away,” and sent her to the stable. Guards and pickets
were posted, and the command encamped. Twenty wagons—six
loaded with cotton—were captured, here, and burned. On
the next morning—the 2nd—the officer commanding pickets on
the Huntsville road, reported that a train of wagons was approaching.
The command was drawn up to receive them, but
learning that they were escorted by a strong regiment, Colonel
Morgan decided not to attack. Moving on in the direction of
Murfreesboro’, the command encamped that night in a loyal
neighborhood, and mindful always of a decorous respect for the
opinions of other people, Colonel Morgan made all of his men
“play Union.” They were consequently treated with distinguished
consideration, and some were furnished with fresh horses,
for which they gave their kind friends orders (on the disbursing
officers at Nashville), for their back pay.[Pg 159]
On the 3rd the column reached Harrington—fifteen miles from
Shelbyville. Some lots of cotton were burned on that day.
General Beauregard (in accordance with the instructions of the
War Department) had issued orders that all cotton (likely to
fall into the enemy’s hands) should be burned. The command
remained at Harrington during the night. Over one store the
stars and stripes were floating resplendent. The men were so
much pleased with this evidence of patriotism that they would
patronize no other store in the place. Reaching the vicinity of
Murfreesboro’, on the night of the 4th, Colonel Morgan drove
in all the pickets (next morning) and made a circuit about the
town, striking the Nashville and Murfreesboro’ pike, about five
miles from Stone river. The advance guard captured a few of
the enemy’s videttes on this road.
Some cotton was burned, and the telegraph wires were cut,
after a dispatch had been sent to Nashville to the effect that
Morgan had captured Shelbyville, and Murfreesboro’ wanted reinforcements.
Colonel Morgan (anticipating brilliant feats in
that line in the future) carried a telegraph operator (provided
with a pocket instrument) upon this expedition. That night (at
dark) the column reached Lebanon, in Wilson county. The
entire command was quartered in the town. Companies A,
B and C (of the Squadron) were placed at the college. The
horses were tied in the large yard and the men occupied the
building. The detachments under Colonel Wood, Captain Harris
and Captain Brown were quartered at the livery stables.
Colonel Morgan’s headquarters were at the hotel. Colonel Wood,
who had been left in the vicinity of Murfreesboro’, with a small
party, to observe if the enemy followed, came in, some hours
after nightfall, and reported that all was quiet.
It was Colonel Morgan’s intention to have moved at an early
hour next morning, and to have crossed the Cumberland river
at Canoe-branch ferry, about ten miles from Lebanon. Orders
were issued that the men should saddle their horses at four
o’clock, and that the command should form immediately after[Pg 160]ward.
These orders were not communicated to the company
commanders. The night was rainy and bleak. The enemy,
advancing upon the Murfreesboro’ road, came to the picket
stands a little before daybreak.
The pickets were all at a house. This criminal neglect of
duty was disastrous. Before the videttes discovered the consequences
of their bad conduct, at least one whole regiment had
passed. Then one of them, named Pleasant Whitlow, a brave
and (always before) excellent soldier, declared that he would
retrieve his fault, or die. He was mounted upon a fleet mare,
and dashed at full speed along the road, passing the Federal
column, unstopped. He reached the hotel where Colonel Morgan
was quartered, just as the foremost Federal approached it.
As Whitlow called loudly to alarm the Colonel, the enemy fired
and killed him. The men at the college had just commenced to
saddle, when the enemy approached. They hurriedly formed—Company
C, which was quartered in the part of the grounds
nearest where the enemy entered the town, were attacked and
driven pell-mell through the others, before it was fairly aligned.
The three companies became mingled together, and fell back
into the town and upon the road, across which Company A (extricating
itself from the others) formed, under charge of its cool
and gallant Orderly Sergeant, Zelah Bowyer.
Colonel Morgan soon came up, and his presence reinspirited
the men. He desired to join with the other detachments, but
the enemy occupied the intervening space. A strong column
was approaching Company A. Colonel Morgan ordered the
men to dismount, reserve their fire, and drive it back when they
did open. When the enemy was close, the order to fire was
given. A good many men and horses fell and the column recoiled.
Several Federal officers in the confusion of this fight
rode into the ranks of Colonel Morgan’s command. Colonel
Woolford was made a prisoner in this way. General Dumont,
commanding the entire force, was very nearly made prisoner.
A Chaplain, who made this mistake, asked, upon becoming[Pg 161]
undeceived, that he might be permitted to rejoin his command—”to
pray for his men.” “The h—ll you say,” responded a member
of Co. A; “Don’t you think Morgan’s men need praying
for as well as Woolford’s?” The detachments in the center of the
town were completely surrounded. Colonel Morgan made his
way, with about one hundred men, to the Rome and Carthage
road, upon which he commenced his retreat at a steady gait.
Suddenly his rear was attacked. The enemy dashed upon it,
sabering the men. In the excitement, Colonel Morgan’s mare
broke the curb of her bridle, and he was unable to restrain her,
or reform his men. Two or three taking hold of the reins
strove to hold her in, but uselessly. She went like a tornado.
No effort was made, then, at concerted resistance—a few men
turned and fought, and then resumed their flight. A horse
falling near the center of the column, caused many others to
fall, and added—if any thing could add—to the wild confused
rattling hurricane of flight. Colonel Morgan instructed the
men (by courier, for Black Bess would not let him go in person)
to take to the woods when their horses gave out. Many escaped
in this way. The enemy (Kentucky regiments) were mounted
on fine horses, comparatively fresh, which enabled them to press
the pursuit so vigorously. One man gives a graphic account
of his part in the race. “I was riding,” he says, “a horse captured
from General Dumont, and kept up with the Colonel until
my horse threw his shoes, which put me in the rear. The men
had all passed me with the exception of Ben Drake. When
Ben went by, he said, ‘Tom, Dumont will get his horse.’ I
said, ‘Yes, catch me a horse, Ben.’ About a mile from that
point, I found Bole Roberts’ horse, with the saddle under his
belly, and the stirrups broken off. As I did not have time to
change saddles, I fixed Bole’s saddle, led the horse to the fence,
jumped on, used the spurs, and soon passed Ben again, whose
horse was now played out. I overtook Colonel Morgan, passed
him, and found another horse with a saddle on. I stopped and
changed saddles. When we got to Rome, thirteen miles from[Pg 162]
Lebanon, I traded horses again, and stayed in the rear with
Colonel Morgan, who had gotten Black Bess pulled up. A
short distance from Rome, the Yanks came within about one
hundred yards of us, and told us to stop. I told them ‘to go
to ——.’ The Colonel then told me to ride forward and make
the men push on, as fast as possible. I was the first to reach
the ferry, twenty-one miles from Lebanon. The boat was luckily
on our side of the river. We got into it, as quickly as possible,
and left our horses on the shore. We wanted the Colonel to
take Black Bess, but he said no, if time was allowed he would
send for all.” This magnificent animal has never been mentioned,
as I am aware, in any official report, and she was too completely
identified with Morgan’s early career, to be dismissed
without a description. She was the most perfect beauty I have
ever beheld—even in Kentucky. Not fifteen hands high, the
immense power of her short back, broad tilted loins, and thighs—all
muscle—enabled her to carry Colonel Morgan’s one hundred
and eighty-five pounds as if he were a feather-weight.
Her head was as beautiful as a “poet’s dream”—is popularly
supposed to be. Wide between the eyes, it tapered down, until
her muzzle was small enough to have picked a lady’s pocket.
The way it was set on her matchless throttle, might well
“haunt the imagination for years.” Her straight superbly
proportioned neck, her shoulder and girth, might have fascinated
the eye for ever!—but for her beautiful hind quarters and the
speed and power they indicated! The arch of her back rib,
her flank, her clean legs, with firm, dry muscle, and tendons
like steel wires, her hoofs, almost as small as a clenched fist,
but open and hard as flint, all these utterly baffle description.
Her hide was glossy black, without a hair of white. From her
Canadian sire she had inherited the staunchest constitution, and
her thoroughbred dam dowered her with speed, game, intelligence
and grace. An anchorite might have coveted such an
animal. When Colonel Morgan lost her, on this day, he naturally
hoped that she would be subjected to no ignoble use.[Pg 163]
The civilized world will scarcely credit that a Yankee subsequently
traveled her about the country, showing her at twenty-five
cents a sight. Poor Bess—her spirit must have been
broken, or she would have kicked the brute’s brains out.
Some fifteen men crossed in the ferry-boat. Sergeant Tom
Quirk sprang into a canoe and paddled back to bring the mare
over. When about half way across, the enemy arrived on the
shore to which he was returning, and fired upon him, riddling
the canoe with balls. But he escaped uninjured.
Efforts were made to obtain Colonel Morgan a horse. A fine
one was selected, but an old woman (the owner) stood in the
door-way with an axe, and prevented all attempts “to trade.”
In vain was it represented to her that she should certainly be
paid—she declared that “unless she were first shot, the horse
should not be taken,” and the “assessors” were compelled to
beat a retreat. When Colonel Morgan halted that night, he had
scarcely twenty men with him, and shed tears, as he speculated
upon the probable fate of the rest. Only six men were killed.
A number of others were wounded, and some one hundred and
twenty were captured. The men of the detachments (which
were surrounded in Lebanon) were nearly all made prisoners.
Colonel Wood held out for hours, until the enemy threatened to
burn the town, if he did not surrender. Among the killed was
Captain Brown. The enemy lost more in killed and wounded
than did Colonel Morgan.
On the 6th, Colonel Morgan reached Sparta, Tennessee, and
remained there until the 9th. In those three days a good many
of his men came in. This inspirited and decided him to assume
the offensive. Shoeing the horses and equipping the men as he
best could (under the circumstances) he left Sparta on the 9th
with nearly one hundred and fifty men—for the most part badly
armed. He directed his march toward the territory of his former
service, the country about Bowlinggreen. He hoped to find
points of importance, slenderly guarded, and the garrisons careless,
under the impression that his severe defeat—four days[Pg 164]
previously—had finished him. His forces were miscellaneous.
He had not quite fifty of his own men, but Captains Bledsoe
and Hamilton (commanding companies which operated exclusively
in that district) joined him, and Champ Ferguson reported
as guide with four or five men. The men of Hamilton’s and
Bledsoe’s companies were, either new recruits or had never been
subjected to any sort of discipline. Hamilton’s ferry, sixty
miles from Sparta, was reached that night, and the command
crossing the river, encamped on the northern bank.
Colonel Morgan had no difficulty in traveling expeditiously,
for every inch of the ground, for many miles beyond the river,
was well known to his Tennessee guides, and when their knowledge
failed, he had reached a country familiar to many of his
own men. Marching by roads unfrequently traversed, and bridle
paths, he would have kept his motions perfectly secret but for a
system of communicating intelligence adopted about this time,
by the Home-guards of Southern Kentucky. Conch shells and
horns were blown, all along his route, by these fellows, the sound
of which, transmitted a long distance, traveled faster than his
column.
On the next day, reaching the vicinity of Glasgow, the command
was halted, and John Hines, a clever, daring scout and
native of the place, was sent to Bowlinggreen, to ascertain the
strength of the garrison and condition of affairs there.
Colonel Morgan desired to capture the town and burn the
stores.
Hines returned in a few hours with the information that five
hundred fine troops were in the town, and it was determined not
to attack. Colonel Morgan immediately determined then, to
strike the Louisville and Nashville railroad between Bowlinggreen
and the river, and attack and capture, at all hazards, the
first train which passed. He was not likely to encounter one
with many troops upon it, and the Bowlinggreen garrison would
not come out to fight him. Traveling all night, he passed
through Glasgow, and early next day reached Cave City, twelve[Pg 165]
miles distant—the point elected at which to make his venture.
Going in advance, himself, with five men, he had the good luck
to discover a long train approaching, and immediately took
measures to stop it. It seemed to be loaded with troops, who
turned out, upon capture, to be employees on the road. His
entire command soon arrived. Forty freight cars and a fine
engine were captured in this train, and destroyed.
Colonel Morgan was especially hopeful that he would be able
to catch the train conveying his men—captured at Lebanon—to
prison, but they had been sent off by the river.
In a short time the passenger train from Louisville was heard
coming. A cow-gap was filled with upright beams to stop the
train, and a party was detailed to lie in ambush, some distance
up the road, and throw obstructions on the road as soon as the
train had passed, to prevent its return. Some women notified
the conductor of his danger, but instead of backing, he pressed
on more rapidly. Suddenly becoming aware of the blockade in
front, he checked his train and tried to return, but there was
already a barrier behind him. Some Federal officers were on the
train, among them Majors Coffee and Helveti, of Woolford’s
regiment.
“Major Coffee,” said an eye witness, “came out upon the
platform and opened upon us with a battery of Colt’s pistols.
Ben Bigstaff dismounted and took a shot at him with his minnie
rifle; the bullet struck within an inch of the Major’s head
and silenced his battery.” A great many women were upon the
train, who were naturally much frightened. Colonel Morgan
exerted himself to reassure them. The greatest surprise was
manifested by the passengers when they learned that it was
Morgan who had captured them. It was generally believed that
he had been killed, and his command utterly destroyed.
One officer captured, was accompanied by his wife. The lady
approached Colonel Morgan, weeping, and implored him to spare
her husband. “My dear Madam,” he replied, bowing debonairly,
and with the arch smile which none who knew him can forget,[Pg 166]
“I did not know that you had a husband.” “Yes, sir,” she
said, “I have. Here he is. Don’t kill him.” “He is no
longer my prisoner,” said the Colonel, “he is yours,” and he
released the officer unconditionally, bidding him console his wife.
About eight thousand dollars in greenbacks—Government funds—were
captured. The train was not burned, but Colonel Morgan
begged the ladies to “accept it as a small token,” etc.
After all was over, the men sat down to a fine dinner prepared
at the Cave City Hotel, for the passengers.
Colonel Morgan now directed his march toward the Cumberland
again. He had retaliated, in some degree, for the injury he had
received, and could meet his comrades in the South, fresh from
a success instead of a disaster. The column marched steadily
and encamped at twelve o’clock at night, fifteen miles from
Glasgow. An incident happened at this place well illustrative
of Colonel Morgan’s kindness, and of the manner in which he
could do things which would have been undignified in other
officers and destructive of their authority. It was customary
for each officer of rank, to have his horses attended to by his
negro, and the men were rarely required to perform such duties.
Colonel Morgan’s groom, however, had been captured. “When
we dismounted,” said the man who related to me the story,
“Colonel Morgan gave his horse to Ben Drake, requesting him
to unsaddle and feed him. As Ben had ridden twelve hours
longer than the rest of us, he thought this very unkind, to say
the least, in the Colonel. He, however, paid no attention to
Ben’s sour looks, as the latter took the horse and obeyed the
order. When Ben returned to the house, Colonel Morgan had
reserved a place by the fire for him to sleep in. The next
morning Ben was awakened by the Colonel, who told him to
get up and eat his breakfast, as the command was ready to
move. “Why did you not have me roused sooner, Colonel?”
asked Ben, “my horse has not been fed.” “I wished you to
sleep longer,” answered the Colonel, “and fed, curried and[Pg 167]
saddled your horse, myself.” Would any other Colonel in the
army have done the same for a “poor private”?
Major Coffee was paroled, on condition that he would exert
himself to procure his own exchange for Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood, and that he would report again as prisoner if he failed.
Passing through Burkesville on county-court day, capturing
a few Federals, and making many horse trades, the command
passed on to a ford of the Cumberland, twelve miles from the
little town, and crossed. Sparta was reached on the next day,
where the Tennessee companies were left—and Colonel Morgan
marched on toward Chattanooga, which place he reached by
easy marches. Some twenty or thirty more refugees and survivors
of the “Lebanon races” soon joined him here. Leaving
these men at Chattanooga—to recruit and refit as well as was
possible there, he immediately set out for Corinth to see what
could be effected in the way of obtaining guns and the necessary
equipment for his men, and to obtain permission to make
another expedition into Kentucky—that he might recruit his regiment.
About the middle of May two fine companies of Texas
cavalry, commanded by Captains R.M. Gano and Jno. Huffman,
both native Kentuckians, arrived at Corinth, and requested to
be assigned to Morgan, that they might see service in Kentucky.
Their application was granted, and they at once marched
for Chattanooga.
I had been severely wounded at Shiloh, and left behind when
the command started upon the expedition just described. Upon
my return to Corinth, I collected some thirty men of the squadron
(who for various reasons had not accompanied Colonel
Morgan into Tennessee), and marched with Captain Gano to
Chattanooga. We marched through a country, where the people
were friendly and hospitable, and had no difficulty in supplying
the men and horses. We had a few skirmishes with Federal
troops posted along the Tennessee river, in one of which Captain
Gano took some prisoners, and burned a good deal of cotton,
collected by the Federals for transportation to Huntsville. The[Pg 168]
last two days of our march showed us the grandest and most
beautiful scenery. We traversed the ridgy summit of the mountain
range, which runs just along the southern bank of the Tennessee
and connects with the group of bold mountains around
Chattanooga. At one point the view is exceedingly striking.
From the immense hight we occupied, we could see a vast and
varied expanse of country. In our front and to the right, the
mountains rose like blue domes, piled closely together—a tremendous
gulf—the bottom of which eyesight could not fathom—spread
between the range (where we were), and their hazy,
azure sides. Directly before us “Lookout”—giant chief of all—loomed
high toward heaven.
Sheer down, hundreds of feet beneath us, flowed the Tennessee—I
could almost believe that my horse could leap from
the top of the precipice to the opposite bank of the river. On
the other side the land was low and nearly level. The green
fields ran back from the river’s brink, in a gentle imperceptible
ascent, until miles away, the eye lost them in the horizon. The
noisy cavalrymen were hushed by the scene, and the grand silence
was not disturbed.
CHAPTER VIII
At Chattanooga we found and were welcomed by Colonel
Morgan and our gallant comrades, and never did brothers meet
after separation and danger, with more hearty joy. For the
first time, then, we learned who had been lost, and as we talked
it over, the pleasure and congratulation, so natural at our reunion,
gave way to sadness as we named the dead and counted up the
captives. Although much reduced in numbers, the squadron
was unbroken in spirit and courage; the men who had safely
gone through the dangers of the late expedition, were more
eager than ever for another, and burned to wipe out any stain
that might dim their reputation and to avenge their comrades.
They had completely recovered from the fatigue of the raid, and
their first thought (when they welcomed the accession to the
command that we brought), was of instant march to Kentucky.
Gano and his Texians were greeted with enthusiasm, and were
delighted with the choice they had made of a leader and
brothers-in-arms. The work of reorganization was immediately
commenced. The three companies of the squadron, much depleted,
were filled nearly to the maximum by recruits who came
in rapidly—and became (of course), the three first companies of
the regiment which was now formed.
Some three hundred men of the First Kentucky infantry (which
had been just disbanded in Virginia, their term of service having
expired), came to Chattanooga to join Morgan. A good
many of them went into the old companies, and the remainder
formed companies under officers known to them in their original
regimental organization. Captain Jacob Cassell was appointed
by Colonel Morgan (who now began to exercise in good
earnest the appointing power), to the command of Company A.[Pg 170]
Captain Thomas Allen resigned (on account of extreme ill health),
the Captaincy of Company B. and his brother, John Allen (once
Colonel in Nicaragua under Walker), was appointed to command
it. Captain Bowles remained in command of Company C. John
B. Castleman, who had just come out of Kentucky (fighting as
he came) with a number of recruits, was made Captain of company
D. John Hutchinson, formerly Lieutenant in the First
Kentucky infantry, was made Captain of Company E. Captain
Thomas B. Webber, who had served at Pensacola, under General
Bragg, during the past year, brought with him from Mississippi,
a company of most gallant soldiers, many of them his
former comrades. This company was admitted into the regiment
as Company F., and glad was Colonel Morgan to welcome
it. Captain McFarland, of Alabama, brought with him a few
men, and was promised that so soon as his company was recruited
to the proper standard, it should take its place in the
regiment as Company G.
Thus it will be seen that Morgan’s old regiment was composed
of the men of his old squadron, of veterans from Virginia, and
men (from nearly all the Southern States) who had, with few exceptions,
seen service. These six companies, and the fragment
of the seventh, numbered in all not quite four hundred men.
The field and staff, were immediately organized. I became
Lieutenant Colonel; G.W. Morgan, formerly of the Third Tennessee
infantry, better known as Major Wash, was appointed
Major. Gordon E. Niles once editor of a New York paper, and
a private of Company A., was appointed Adjutant. He was a
gallant soldier, and died, not long afterward, a soldier’s death.
Captain Thomas Allen, formerly of Company B., was appointed
Surgeon—Doctor Edelin, the Assistant Surgeon, performed for
many months the duties of both offices, on account of the illness
of the former. D.H. Llewellyn and Hiram Reese, both members
of the old squadron, were appointed respectively, Quartermaster
and Commissary.
While we were at Chattanooga, General Mitchell came to the[Pg 171]
other side of the river and shelled and sharpshot at the town.
The commandant of the place General Leadbetter, had two or
three guns in battery, and replied—when the gunners, who were
the most independent fellows I ever saw, chose to work the
guns. The defense of the place was left entirely to the individual
efforts of those who chose to defend it; nothing prevented
its capture but the fact that the enemy could not cross the river.
Very little loss was sustained, and the damage done the town
by the shells was immaterial. We tried to keep our men in
camp, but some joined in the fight; one only was hurt. He
volunteered to assist in working one of the guns and had part
of his tongue shot off by a rifleman upon the opposite bank.
About five, p.m., the enemy seemed to be withdrawing. The
artillery was still playing on both sides, and the enemy occupied
the hights where their battery was planted, but the infantry and
sharpshooters had disappeared from the low land, just opposite
to the city. Colonel Morgan (desirous to ascertain certainly if
they had gone) crossed the river in a canoe. I was unwilling to
see him go alone, and, after trying in vain to dissuade him, very
regretfully accompanied him. Several shells flew over the canoe
and one burst just above it, some of the fragments falling in it.
We landed just opposite the wharf, and stole cautiously through
a straggling thicket to the position which the enemy had occupied.
We stood upon the very ground which they had held only
a short time before, and as nothing could be seen of them, we
concluded that they had drawn off entirely. I was very much
relieved by this reflection. Such a situation—without a horse—and
with no means of escape but a canoe, if indeed we could
have gotten back to the river at all—was not to my taste, and I
devoutly thanked Providence that the enemy had left.
As we returned, we met Jack Wilson (the trustiest soldier that
ever shouldered a rifle) who had paddled us over, on his way to
look for us; unable to endure the suspense, he had left the canoe,
over which he had been posted as guard.
After a week or ten days sojourn at Chattanooga, we set out[Pg 172]
for Knoxville. The better-part of the men were mounted, and
those, who were not, had great hopes. When we reached Knoxville,
the Second Kentucky (as our regiment was designated in
the rolls of the War Department) and the Texas squadron were
encamped in close vicinity, and for two or three weeks both were
drilled strictly, twice a day, and mightily distressed by guard-mounting
and dress-parades. These dress-parades presented a
graceful and pleasing spectacle on account of the variegated appearance
of the ranks.
The men were all comfortably clad, but their clothing was
uniform, only, in its variety. Strange as it may seem to the
unexperienced, dress has a good deal to do with the spirit of
soldiers. The morale of troops depends, in a great measure,
upon pride, and personal appearance has something to do with
pride. How awful, for instance, must it be to a sensitive young
fellow, accustomed at home to wear good clothes and appear confidently
before the ladies, when he is marching through a town
and the girls come out to wave their handkerchiefs, to feel that
the rear of his pantaloons has given way in complete disorder.
The cavalryman, in such cases, finds protection in his saddle,
but the soldier on foot is defenseless: and thus the very recognition,
which, if he has a stout pair of breeches, would be his
dearest recompense for all his toils, becomes his most terrible
affliction. Many a time, have I seen a gallant infantryman,
who would have faced a battery double-shotted with grape and
canister with comparative indifference, groan and turn pale in
this fearful ordeal. It was a touching sight to see them seek to
dispose their knapsacks in such a manner that they should serve
as fortifications.
The ideas which the experience of the past eight months had
suggested, regarding the peculiar tactics best adapted to the
service and the kind of fighting we had to do, were now put into
practical shape. A specific drill, different in almost every respect
from every other employed for cavalry, was adopted. It
was based upon a drill taught in the old army for Indian fight[Pg 174]ing, called “Maury’s skirmish tactics for cavalry,” I believe;
but as that drill contemplated the employment of but a very few
men, and ours had to provide for the evolutions of regiments,
and eventually brigades, the latter was necessarily much more
comprehensive. The formation of the company, the method of
counting off in sets, and of dismounting and deploying to the
front, flanks, or rear, for battle, was the same as in Maury’s
tactics; but a great many movements necessary to the change
of front, as the kind of ground or other circumstances required
it to be made in various ways, to the formations from column
into line, and from line into column, the methods of taking
ground to the front, or rear, in establishing or changing line,
the various methods of providing, as circumstances might require,
for the employment of all, or only part of a regiment or
brigade, or for the employment of supports and reserves, all
these evolutions had to be added. It would be uninteresting to
all but the practical military reader, and unnecessary, as well,
to enter into a minute explanation of these matters.
If the reader will only imagine a regiment drawn up in single
rank, the flank companies skirmishing, sometimes on horseback,
and then thrown out as skirmishers on foot, and so deployed as
to cover the whole front of the regiment, the rest of the men
dismounted (one out of each set of four and the corporals, remaining
to hold horses) and deployed as circumstances required,
and the command indicated, to the front of, on either flank, or
to the rear of the line of horses—the files two yards apart—and
then imagine this line moved forward at a double-quick, or
oftener a half run, he will have an idea of Morgan’s style of
fighting.
Exactly the same evolutions were applicable for horseback,
or foot fighting, but the latter method was much oftener practiced—we
were, in fact, not cavalry, but mounted riflemen. A
small body of mounted men was usually kept in reserve to act
on the flanks, cover a retreat, or press a victory, but otherwise
our men fought very little on horseback, except on scouting[Pg 175]
expeditions. Our men were all admirable riders, trained from
childhood to manage the wildest horses with perfect ease; but
the nature of the ground on which we generally fought, covered
with dense woods, or crossed by high fences, and the impossibility
of devoting sufficient time to the training of the horses,
rendered the employment of large bodies of mounted men to
any good purpose, very difficult. It was very easy to charge
down a road in column of fours, but very hard to charge across
the country in extended line, and keep any sort of formation.
Then we never used sabers, and long guns were not exactly the
weapons for cavalry evolutions. We found the method of fighting
on foot more effective—we could maneuver with more certainty,
and sustain less and inflict more loss. “The long flexible
line curving forward at each extremity,” as an excellent
writer described it, was very hard to break; if forced back at
one point, a withering fire from every other would be poured in
on the assailant. It admitted, too, of such facility of maneuvering,
it could be thrown about like a rope, and by simply facing
to the right or left, and double-quicking in the same direction,
every man could be quickly concentrated at any point where it
was desirable to mass them.
It must be remembered that Morgan very rarely fought with
the army; he had to make his command a self-sustaining one. If
repulsed, he could not fall back and reform behind the infantry.
He had to fight infantry, cavalry, artillery; take towns when
every house was a garrison, and attack fortifications with nothing
to depend on but his own immediate command. He was
obliged, therefore, to adopt a method which enabled him to do a
great deal in a short time, and to keep his men always in hand,
whether successful or repulsed. With his support from forty to
five hundred miles distant, an officer had better learn to rely on
himself.
If General Morgan had ever been enabled to develope his plan
of organization as he wished, he would have made his division
of mounted riflemen a miniature army. With his regiments[Pg 176]
armed as he wished them—a battalion of two or three hundred
men, appropriately armed, and attached to each brigade, to be
used only as cavalry, and with his battery of three-inch Parrots,
and train of mountain howitzers, he could have met any contingency.
The ease and rapidity with which this simple drill was
learned, and the expedition with which it enabled all movements
to be accomplished, chiefly recommended it to Morgan, I have
seen his division, when numbering over three thousand men, and
stretched out in column, put into line of battle in thirty minutes.
Regular cavalry can no doubt form with much more dispatch,
but this was quicker than it is often done in this country.
The weapon which was always preferred by the officers and
men of the command, was the rifle known as the “medium Enfield.”
The short Enfield was very convenient to carry, but
was deficient both in length of range and accuracy. The long
Enfield, without any exception the best of all rifles, was unwieldy
either to carry or to use, as sometimes became necessary, on
horseback. The Springfield rifle, nearly equal to the long Enfield,
was liable to the same objections, although in a less degree.
Now that the military world has finally decided in favor of
breech-loading guns, it may seem presumptuous to condemn
them; but, so far as my own experience goes, they are decidedly
inferior. When I say inferior, I mean not so much that they
will not carry far, nor accurately, although a fair trial of every
sort I could lay my hands upon with the Enfield and Springfield,
convinced me of the superiority, in these respects, of the two
latter; but that for other reasons they are not so effective as the
muzzle-loading guns. Of the two best patterns, the Sharp and
the Spencer—for the Maynard is a pop-gun, and the others are
so contrived that, generally, after one shot, the shell of the cartridge
sticks in the chamber—of these two, I have seen the Sharp
do the most execution. It has been the verdict of every officer
of the Western Confederate cavalry with whom I have talked
upon the subject, and it certainly has been my experience, that
those Federal cavalry regiments which were armed with breech-[Pg 177]loading
guns did least execution. The difference in the rapidity
with which men dropped when exposed to the fire of an infantry
regiment, and the loss from that of a cavalry regiment of equal
strength, even when the latter fought well, ought of itself to go far
to settle the question, for the federal infantry were all armed
with muzzle-loading guns.
A close study of the subject will convince any man that the
very fact of having to load his gun will make a soldier comparatively
cool and steady. If he will stay to load at all, and will fix
his mind upon what he is doing, he will become cool enough to
take aim. While if he has only to stick in a cartridge and shoot,
or turn a crank and pull trigger, he will fire fast, but he will fire
wildly. I have seen some of the steadiest soldiers I ever knew,
men who were dead shots with an Enfield, shoot as if they were
aiming at the sun with a Spencer. The Spencer rifle would
doubtless be an excellent weapon for a weak line to hold works
with, where the men were accustomed to note the ground accurately,
and would, therefore, be apt to aim low, and it is desirable
to pour in a rapid, continuous fire to stagger an attacking
line.
It is perhaps a first-rate gun for small skirmishes on horseback,
although for those, our cavalry decidedly preferred the
revolver. But in battle, when lines and numbers are engaged,
accurate and not rapid firing is desirable. If one fiftieth of the
shots from either side were to take effect in battle, the other
would be annihilated. If rapid firing is so desirable, why do the
same critics who advocate it also recommend that troops shall
hold their fire until they can pour in deadly volleys? Why do
they deprecate so much firing, and recommend the use of the
bayonet?
It is folly to talk to men who have seen battles, about the
moral effect of rapid firing, and of “bullets raining around
men’s heads like hail stones.” That is like the straggler’s excuse
to General Lee that he was “stung by a bomb.” Any
man who has ever heard lines of battle engaged, knows that, let[Pg 178]
the men fire fast or slow, the nicest ear can detect no interval
between the shots; the musketry sounds like the incessant, unintermitted
crash of a gong—even cannonading, when one or two
hundred guns are working, sounds like the long roll of a drum—and
the hiss of bullets is perfectly ceaseless. Good troops
will fight well with almost any sort of guns. Mean troops will
not win, no matter how they are armed. If the matter were investigated,
it would probably be found that the regiments which
won most distinction, in the late war on this continent, on both
sides, fired the fewest number of rounds.
At one time—when Morgan’s command was somewhat demoralized—the
men were loud in describing the terrific effect of
the Spencer rifle, when it was notorious that, at that time, it was
an unusual occurrence to lose a man—they subsequently became
ashamed of their panic, and met the troops carrying Spencer
rifles, with more confidence than those armed in any other way.
It would be very convenient to attribute every whipping we ever
got to the use of breech-loading rifles by our antagonists,
but it would be very wide of the truth. It was impossible, however,
to obtain, when we were organizing at Knoxville, the exact
description of guns we wished. One company, was armed
with the long Enfield, another had the medium, and Company A
got the short Enfield. Company C was furnished with Mississippi
rifles and Company B retained the shot-guns which they
had used for nearly a year. Company E was provided with a
gun, called from the stamp upon the barrel, the “Tower gun;”
it was of English make, and was a sort of Enfield carbine. Its
barrel was rather short and bore immense; it carried a ball
larger than the Belgian. Its range and accuracy were first rate.
The roar of this gun was almost as loud as that of a field piece
and the tremendous bullet it carried would almost shatter an
ordinary wall.
It was some months before each company of the regiment was
armed with the same or similar guns. Nearly every man had a
pistol, and some two. Shortly afterward, when they were cap[Pg 179]tured
in sufficient numbers, each man was provided with a pair.
The pistol preferred and usually worn by the men, was the army
Colt furnished to the Federal cavalry regiments—this patent is
far the best and most effective of any I have ever seen. At this
time two mountain howitzers were sent from Richmond for Morgan’s
use. It is unnecessary to describe a piece so well known,
but it may be as well to say, that no gun is so well adapted in
all respects to the wants of cavalry, as these little guns. With
a large command, it is always well enough to have two or four
pieces of longer range and yet of light draught, such as the
three-inch Parrot—but if I were required to dispense with one or
the other, I would choose to retain the former. They can be
drawn (with a good supply of ammunition in the limbers), by
two horses over any kind of road. They can go over ravines,
up hills, through thickets, almost any where, in short, that a
horseman can go; they can be taken, without attracting attention,
in as close proximity to the enemy as two horsemen can
go—they throw shell with accuracy eight hundred yards, quite
as far as there is any necessity for, generally in cavalry fighting—they
throw canister and grape, two and three hundred yards,
as effectively as a twelve pounder—they can be carried by hand
right along with the line, and as close to the enemy as the line
goes—and they make a great deal more noise than one would
suppose from their size and appearance. If the carriages are
well made, they can stand very hard service, and they are easily
repaired, if injured. These little guns were attached to the Second
Kentucky, and the men of that regiment became much
attached to them. They called them familiarly and affectionately,
the “bull pups,” and cheered them whenever they were
taken into a fight. They remained with us, doing excellent service,
until just before the Ohio raid; and, then, when General
Bragg’s ordnance officer arbitrarily took them away from us, it
came near raising a mutiny in the regiment. I would, myself,
have gladly seen him tied to the muzzle of one of them and shot[Pg 180]
off. They were captured by the enemy in two weeks after they
were taken from us.
Just before Morgan left Knoxville to go on the expedition
known as “the First Kentucky raid,” he was joined by a gentleman
“from abroad,” whose history had been a curious and
extraordinary series of exciting adventures, and who now came
to see something of our war. This was Lieutenant Colonel St.
Leger Greenfell, of the English service, and of all the very remarkable
characters who have figured (outside of popular novels)
in this age, he will receive the suffrages of our Western cavalrymen,
for pre-eminence in devil-may-care eccentricity. He
had commenced life (I believe) by running away from his father,
because the latter would not permit him to enter the army, and
in doing so, he showed the good sense that he really possessed,
for the army was the proper place for him—provided they went
to war often enough. He served five years in some French regiment
in Algeria, and then quitting the service, lived for a number
of years in Tangiers, where he did a little business with the
Moorish batteries, when the French bombarded the place. He
served four years with Abd-El-Kader, of whom he always spoke
in the highest terms, as having been every thing that he ought
to have been, except a member of the Church of England.
Having exhausted life in Africa, he looked elsewhere for excitement,
and passed many years of his subsequent life in great happiness
and contentment, amid the pleasant scenes of the Crimean
war, the Sepoy rebellion, and Garibaldi’s South American service.
When the war broke out over here he came of course—and
taking a fancy to Morgan, from what he had heard of him, came
to join him. He was very fond of discussing military matters,
but did not like to talk about himself, and although I talked
with him daily, it was months before he told any thing of his
history. He was a thorough and very accomplished soldier—and
may have encountered something in early life that he feared,
but if so, it had ceased to exist.[Pg 181]
He became Morgan’s Adjutant General and was of great assistance
to him, but sometimes gave trouble by his impracticable
temper—he persisted, among other things, in making out all
papers in the style he had learned in the English service, the
regulations and orders of the War Department “to the contrary
notwithstanding.”
He was always in a good temper when matters were active—I
never saw him hilarious but once—and that was the day after
the battle of Hartsville; he had just thrashed his landlord, and
doubled up a brother Englishman, in a “set-to” about a mule,
and was contemplating an expedition on the morrow, with General
Morgan to Nashville. He was the only gentleman, I ever
knew, who liked to fight with his fists, and he was always cheerful
and contented when he could shoot and be shot at.
After he left Morgan he was made Chief Inspector of Cavalry,
and became the terror of the entire “front.” He would
have been invaluable as commander of a brigade of cavalry,
composed of men who (unlike our volunteers) appreciated the
“military necessity” of occasionally having an officer to knock
them in the head. If permitted to form, discipline, and drill
such a brigade of regular cavalry after his own fashion, he would
have made gaps in many lines of battle, or have gotten his
“blackguards well peppered” in trying.
Sometime in the latter part of June, Colonel Hunt of Georgia
arrived at Knoxville with a “Partisan Ranger” regiment
between three and four hundred strong, to accompany Morgan
upon his contemplated raid.
When the entire force of able bodied and mounted men was
estimated, it was found eight hundred and seventy-six strong.
Hunt’s regiment numbering about three hundred and fifty; mine,
the Second Kentucky, about three hundred and seventy, and
Gano’s squadron making up the balance.
Fifty or sixty men, from all the commands, were left at Knoxville
for lack of horses. Perhaps two hundred men of this force,
with which Morgan commenced the expedition, were unarmed,[Pg 182]
and a much larger number were badly mounted and provided
with the most indifferent saddles and equipments.
The command set out from Knoxville on the morning of the
4th of July, 1862, and took the road to Sparta (a little place
on the confines of the rugged mountainous country which separates
Middle Tennessee from the rich valley of East Tennessee)
in which Knoxville is situated. Sparta is one hundred and four
miles from Knoxville. We reached it, after tolerably hard marching,
for the road was terribly rough, on the evening of the third
day, and encamped five miles beyond it on the road to Livingston.
While traversing the region between Knoxville and Sparta, we
were repeatedly fired upon by bushwhackers, but had only one
man killed by them—a Texian of Gano’s squadron. We made
many unsuccessful attempts to capture them, but they always
chose the most inaccessible points to fire from and we could
never get to them. Frequently they would shoot at us from a
ledge of rocks not forty feet above our heads, and yet to get to
it we would have had to go hundreds of yards—they consequently
always escaped.
At Sparta, Champ Ferguson reported himself as a guide, and
I, for the first time, saw him, although I had often heard of him
before. He had the reputation of never giving quarter, and, no
doubt, deserved it (when upon his own private expeditions), although
when with Morgan he attempted no interference with
prisoners. This redoubted personage was a native of Clinton
county, Kentucky, and was a fair specimen of the kind of characters
which the wild mountain country produces. He was a
man of strong sense, although totally uneducated, and of the
intense will and energy, which, in men of his stamp and mode
of life, have such a tendency to develope into ferocity, when
they are in the least injured or opposed. He was grateful for
kindness, and instinctively attached to friends, and vindictive to
his enemies. He was known as a desperate man before the
war, and ill-treatment of his wife and daughter, by some soldiers[Pg 183]
and Home-guards enlisted in his own neighborhood, made him
relentless in his hatred of all Union men; he killed all the parties
concerned in the outrage upon his family, and, becoming
then an outlaw, kept up that style of warfare. It is probable
that, at the close of the war, he did not himself know how many
men he had killed. He had a brother, of the same character as
himself, in the Union army, and they sought each other persistently,
mutually bent on fratricide. Champ became more widely
known than any of them, but the mountains of Kentucky and
Tennessee were filled with such men, who murdered every prisoner
that they took, and they took part, as their politics inclined
them, with either side. For a long time Ferguson hunted,
or was hunted by, a man of his own order and nearly as notorious
on the other side, namely, “Tinker Dave Beattie.” On the
evening of the 7th, we encamped in the vicinity of Livingston.
Leaving early next morning, by midday we reached the Cumberland
river at the ford near the small village of Selina. Here
Colonel Morgan received positive information of the strength
and position of the enemy at Tompkinsville, eighteen miles from
Selina. He had learned at Knoxville that a Federal garrison
was at this place, and had determined to attack it. One battalion
of the 9th Pennsylvania, under command of Major Jordan,
about three hundred and fifty strong, constituted the entire force.
It was Morgan’s object to surprise and capture the whole of it.
He accordingly sent forward scouts to watch and report every
thing going on at their camp, while he halted the bulk of the
command until nightfall. The men employed the interval of
rest in attention to their horses, and in bathing in the river. At
eleven o’clock the March was resumed; the road was rough and
incumbered at some points with fallen timber, so that the column
made slow progress. When within four or five miles of Tompkinsville,
Gano’s squadron and Hamilton’s company of Tennessee
Partisan Rangers, which had joined us the evening before, were
sent by a road which led to the right to get in the rear of the
enemy and upon his line of retreat toward Glasgow. The rest of[Pg 184]
the command reached Tompkinsville at five o’clock. It was consequently
broad daylight, and the enemy had information of our
approach in time to form to receive us. Colonel Hunt was
formed upon the left, and my regiment upon the right, with the
howitzers in the center. It was altogether unnecessary to form
any reserve, and as our numbers were so superior, our only
care was to “lap around” far enough on the flanks to encircle
the game.
The enemy were posted on a thickly wooded hill, to reach
which we had to cross open fields. They fired, therefore, three
or four volleys while we were closing on them. The Second
Kentucky did not fire until within about sixty yards of them,
and one volley was then enough. The fight did not last ten
minutes. The enemy lost about twenty killed and twenty or
thirty wounded. Thirty prisoners, only, were taken on the
ground, but Gano and Hamilton intercepted and captured a
good many more, including the commander, Major Jordan. Our
force was too much superior in strength for them to have made
much resistance, as we outnumbered them more than two to one.
Our loss was only in wounded, we had none killed. But a
severe loss was sustained in Colonel Hunt, whose leg was shattered
and it was necessary to leave him; he died in a few days
of the wound. Three of the Texians also were wounded in
their chase after the fugitives. The tents, stores, and camp
equipage were destroyed. A wagon train of twenty wagons
and fifty mules were captured and a number of cavalry horses.
Abundant supplies of coffee, sugar, etc., etc., were found in the
camp. The guns captured were useless breech-loading carbines,
which were thrown away.
Leaving Tompkinsville at three o’clock in the afternoon, after
paroling the prisoners, we reached Glasgow about one o’clock
that night. This town was unoccupied by any garrison, and its
people were very friendly to us. Company C, of the old squadron
had been principally recruited here. The command rested
at Glasgow until 9 a.m. next day; during the time, the ladies[Pg 185]
busied themselves in preparing breakfast for us, and before we
left, every man had taken in a three days’ supply. A straggler
captured at Glasgow gave us some “grape vine” intelligence
which annoyed us no little. He stated that McClellan had
taken Richmond. When we left Knoxville, the battle of the
seven days was going on, and we had, of course, heard nothing
after we started. Our prisoner, however, was gravely assured,
just before he was paroled, that a courier had just reached us
with the information that McClellan was in Richmond, but as a
prisoner, and with half his army in the same condition. This fellow,
who represented himself to be an officer, turned out to be one
of the buglers of the Ninth Pennsylvania, and all the information
he gave was as reliable as the McClellan story. A halt of two or
three hours was made at Bear Wallow, to enable Mr. Ellsworth
(popularly known as “Lightning”), the telegraphic operator on
Colonel Morgan’s staff, to tap the line between Louisville and
Nashville, and obtain the necessary information regarding the position
of the Federal forces in Kentucky. Connecting his own instrument
and wire with the line, Ellsworth began to take off the
dispatches. Finding the news come slow he entered into a conversation
with Louisville and obtained much of what was wanted.
He in return communicated such information as Colonel Morgan
desired to have the enemy act upon. One statement, made at
hap hazard, and with no other knowledge to support it, except
that Forrest was in Middle Tennessee, was singularly verified.
Morgan caused Ellsworth to telegraph that Forrest had taken
Murfreesboro’ and had captured the entire garrison. Forrest
did exactly what was attributed to him on that or the next day.
A heavy storm coming on caused them, after several fruitless
efforts to continue, to desist telegraphing.
The column was put in motion again immediately upon Colonel
Morgan’s return, and marching all night got within about fifteen
miles of Lebanon by 11 a.m. next morning. Here Company
B was detached, to push rapidly to the railroad between Lebanon
and Lebanon junction, and ordered to destroy it, so that[Pg 186]
troops might not be thrown into Lebanon in time to oppose us.
The march was not resumed until three or four in the afternoon,
so that when we reached Rolling Fork river, six miles from
Lebanon, it was dark. Colonel Morgan, who was riding with
his staff in front of the advance guard, was fired upon as he
entered the small covered bridge across the stream, by a party
of the enemy stationed at the other end of it. His hat was
shot from his head, but neither he nor any of his staff were
touched. One of the howitzers was immediately run up and a
shell was thrown into the bridge. A platoon of the leading
company was dismounted and carried at a double-quick to clear
it. When they reached it, the enemy, alarmed by the shell,
which had killed one man, had retreated, the bottom of the
bridge was found to have been torn up, and a short time was
spent in repairing it. This was a strong position and one
which the enemy ought, by all means, to have occupied with his
entire force.
There was no ford for six or eight miles above or below; the
bridge was the only means of crossing without a wide detour;
and not twenty yards from the mouth of the bridge (on the side
held by the enemy), and perfectly commanding it, was a steep
bluff (not too high) covered with timber, and affording an admirable
natural fortification. As soon as the bridge was repaired,
the column crossed and pressed on to Lebanon. Within
a mile of the town, skirmishing commenced with the force which
held it. Two companies (E and C of the Second Kentucky)
were thrown out on foot, and advanced at a brisk pace, driving
the enemy before them. Two or three of the enemy were killed;
our loss was nothing. The town was surrendered by its commandant
about ten o’clock; some two hundred prisoners were
taken.
Pickets were immediately posted on every road, and the whole
command encamped in such a manner that it could be immediately
established in line. It was necessary to remain at Lebanon
until the large quantity of stores of all kinds, which were[Pg 187]
there, were disposed of, and, as we were now in the midst of
enemies, no precaution could be omitted. Captain Allen, who,
as has been mentioned, was detached with Company B of the
Second Kentucky to prevent the train from bringing reinforcements
to Lebanon, struck the railroad at New Hope Church and
had just commenced to destroy it, when a train came with a
large number of troops on board for Lebanon. He attacked it,
and a skirmish of a few minutes resulted in the train going
back. The night was very dark, and little loss, if any, was inflicted
on either side.
On the next day, an examination of the stores showed an
abundance of every description. A sufficient number of excellent
guns were gotten to arm every man efficiently, and some
thousands were destroyed. A large building was found to be
filled with cartridges and fixed ammunition. An abundant supply
of ammunition for small arms was thus obtained, and a fresh
supply of ammunition was also gotten for the howitzers. After
taking what was needed, all this was destroyed. There was
also a stone magazine not far from the depot, which was full of
powder. The powder was all taken out of it, and thrown into
the stream near by.
Very large supplies of provisions were found—meat, flour,
sugar, coffee, etc.—which were turned over to the citizens, and
when they had helped themselves, the remainder was burned.
A great deal of clothing had also been collected here, and the
men were enabled to provide themselves with every thing which
they needed in the way of under-clothing. While at Lebanon,
copies of a flaming proclamation, written and published at Glasgow,
were circulated.
After the destruction of the stores had been completed, and
Ellsworth had closed his business at the telegraph office, the
command was again put in motion. It left the town about two
p.m., on the Springfield road. Before leaving Knoxville, Colonel
Morgan, appreciating the necessity of having an advance-guard
which could be thoroughly relied on, and disinclined to trust to[Pg 188]
details, changed every day, for that duty, had organized a body
of twenty-five men, selected with great care from the entire
force under his command, to constitute an advance-guard for the
expedition. So well did this body perform the service assigned
it, that the men composing it, with some additions to make up
the tale as others were taken out, were permanently detailed for
that duty, and it became an honor eagerly sought, and a reward
for gallantry and good conduct second only to promotion, to be
enrolled in “the advance.” The non-commissioned officers
were chosen with the same care, and First Lieutenant Charles
W. Rogers of Company E, formerly of the First Kentucky Infantry,
was appointed to command it. This officer possessed in
an eminent degree the cool judgment, perfect fearlessness, command
of men, and shrewdness of perception requisite for such
an office.
This guard habitually marched at a distance of four hundred
yards in front of the column; three videttes were posted at intervals
of one hundred yards between it and the column. Their
duties were to transmit information and orders between the column
and the guard, and to regulate the gait of the former, so
that it would not press too close on the latter, and, also, to prevent
any straggling between the two. Six videttes were thrown
out in front of the guard—four at intervals of fifty yards, and
with another interval of the same distance from the fourth of
these, two rode together in the extreme front. These two were
consequently at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards in
front of the body of the guard. At first these videttes were
regularly relieved, but it was afterward judged best to keep the
same men always on the same duty. The advance videttes were
required to examine carefully on all sides, and report to the officer
of the guard the slightest indication which seemed suspicious.
When they came to by-roads or cross-roads one or both,
as the case might require, immediately galloped some two or
three hundred yards down them, and remained until relieved by[Pg 189]
men sent for that purpose from the head of the column, when
they returned to their posts.
As soon as they notified the officer of the guard (by calling to
the videttes next behind them), that they were about to leave their
posts, he took measures to supply their places. The two videttes
next to them in the chain galloped to the front, the other two,
also moved up, respectively, fifty yards, and two men were sent
from the guard to fill the places of the last.
When the videttes, regularly in advance returned, the original
disposition was resumed. If an enemy was encountered, men
were dispatched from the guard to the assistance of the videttes,
or the latter fell back on the guard, as circumstances dictated.
If the enemy was too strong to be driven by the advance, the
latter endeavored to hold him in check (and was reinforced if necessary),
until the command could be formed for attack or defense.
Scouting parties were of course thrown out on the front
and flanks, as well as to the rear, but as these parties were often
miles away in search of information, a vigilant advance guard
was always necessary. During an engagement, the advance was
generally kept mounted and held in reserve.
Passing through Springfield without a halt, the column
marched in the direction of Harrodsburg. Late in the evening,
some of the scouts had an engagement at a little place called
Macksville, with a Home-guard organization, in which two or
three were wounded and two captured. During the night, finding
that it would be impossible to ferret out the captors, we negotiated
an exchange of prisoners. On the next morning, about
nine o’clock we entered Harrodsburg, another stronghold of our
friends, and were warmly welcomed.
It was Sunday, and a large concourse of people were in town.
We found that the ladies, in anticipation of our coming, had
prepared the most inviting rations, and the men after attending
to their horses and supplying them with forage, a “superabundance
of which,” to use the old forage-master’s expression,
was stacked close by, fell to themselves, and most of them were[Pg 190]
eating, with short intervals employed in sleeping, until the hour
of departure. Harrodsburg is twenty-eight miles from Lexington,
the headquarters then of the Federal forces of the region.
Gano, with his squadron, was detached at Harrodsburg to go
around Lexington and burn the bridges on the Kentucky Central
Railroad, in order to prevent troops from being thrown into
Lexington from Cincinnati. Captain Allen was sent to destroy
the bridges over Benson and other small streams on the Louisville
and Lexington road, to prevent the transmission of troops
by that road, and also to induce the impression that the command
was making for Louisville. About dark the column
moved from Harrodsburg on the Frankfort pike. It was Morgan’s
wish to induce the belief that he intended to attack Frankfort,
but to suddenly turn to the right and make for Lexington,
capture that place if he could, and if he could not, at least
enjoy the fine country in its vicinity.
At one p.m. that night we encamped at Lawrenceburg, the
county seat of Anderson county, twenty miles from Harrodsburg
and about fifteen from Frankfort. A scouting party was sent
immediately on in the direction of Frankfort, with instructions
to drive in the pickets after daybreak, and to rejoin us at Versailles.
The command had now marched three hundred and odd
miles in eight days, but the men, despite the fatigue usually resulting
from night marching, were comparatively fresh, and in
the most exultant spirits. So far, every thing had gone well;
although encompassed by superior forces, celerity of movement,
and skillful selection of route, had enabled us to elude them; a
good many little affairs had occurred with the Home-guards,
which I have not mentioned, but they had been expected, and
the damage from them was trifling. Leaving Lawrenceburg next
morning at daybreak, the column took the road to Versailles, but
was compelled to halt at Shryock’s ferry, seven miles from Versailles.
On account of the ferry-boat having been sunk, it was
necessary to raise and repair it, so that the howitzers might be
crossed. This delay prevented us from reaching Versailles[Pg 191]
before night fell. It was now deemed good policy to march more
slowly, obtain perfectly accurate information, and increase the
confusion already prevailing by threatening all points of importance.
This policy was not a hazardous one, under the circumstances,
for although the forces surrounding the point where we
now were, were each a superior to our own, yet by getting between
them and preventing their concentration, and industriously
creating the impression to which the people were, at any rate
disposed, that our force was four or five thousand strong, Morgan
had demoralized them, and they were afraid to come out
and meet him. The ease with which he had, hitherto, pressed
right on, without a momentary check, confirmed the belief that
he was very strong.
The command remained encamped at Versailles during the
night. Scouts were sent in every direction, and upon their return
next day reported that a very general consternation prevailed,
as well as uncertainty regarding our movements. The
Home-guards and little detachments of troops were running, on
the one side for Lexington, and on the other for Frankfort.
Leaving Versailles next day about 10 a.m., the column moved
toward Georgetown.
Before leaving Versailles, the scouting parties which had been
dispatched to Frankfort rejoined the command. Frankfort was
by this time relieved of all fear of immediate attack, and Colonel
Morgan became apprehensive that the troops there might be
marched out after him, or that communication might be opened
with Lexington which might lead to a simultaneous attack upon
him by the forces of the two points. He hoped that the detachment
under Captain Allen returning, after the destruction of the
bridge between Frankfort and Louisville, and necessarily marching
close to the former (in doing so), would produce the impression
there, that an attack was again imminent. We reached
Midway (about 12 p.m.), a little town on the railroad, and
equi-distant from Lexington and Frankfort. What took place
at Midway is best described in Ellsworth’s language. He says,[Pg 192]
“At this place I surprised the operator, who was quietly sitting
on the platform in front of his office, enjoying himself hugely.
Little did he suspect that the much-dreaded Morgan was in his
vicinity. I demanded of him to call Lexington and inquire the
time of day, which he did. This I did for the purpose of getting
his style of handling the ‘key’ in writing dispatches. My first
impression of his style, from noting the paper in the instrument,
was confirmed. He was, to use a telegraphic term, a ‘plug’
operator. I adopted his style of telegraphing, and commenced
operations. In this office I found a signal book, which proved
very useful. It contained the calls of all the offices. Dispatch
after dispatch was going to and from Lexington, Georgetown,
Paris and Frankfort, all containing something in reference to
Morgan. On commencing operations, I discovered that there
were two wires on the line along this railroad. One was what
we term a ‘through wire,’ running direct from Lexington to
Frankfort, and not entering any of the way offices. I found
that all military messages were sent over that line. As it did
not enter Midway office I ordered it to be cut, thus forcing Lexington
on to the wire that did run through the office. I tested
the line and found, by applying the ground wire, it made no
difference with the circuit; and, as Lexington was Head-Quarters,
I cut Frankfort off. Midway was called, I answered, and
received the following:
‘Lexington, July 15, 1862.
‘To J.W. Woolums, operator, Midway:
‘Will there be any danger in coming to Midway? Is every
thing right?
‘Taylor—Conductor.’
“I inquired of my prisoner (the operator) if he knew a man
by the name of Taylor. He said Taylor was the conductor. I
immediately gave Taylor the following reply:
‘Midway, July 15, 1862.
‘To Taylor, Lexington:
‘All right; come on. No sign of any rebels here.
‘Woolums.‘
“The operator in Cincinnati then called Frankfort. I answered
and received about a dozen unimportant dispatches. He
had no sooner finished than Lexington called Frankfort. Again
I answered, and received the following message:
‘Lexington, July 15, 1862.
‘To General Finnell, Frankfort:
‘I wish you to move the forces at Frankfort, on the line of the
Lexington railroad, immediately, and have the cars follow and
take them up as soon as possible. Further orders will await
them at Midway. I will, in three or four hours, move forward
on the Georgetown pike; will have most of my men mounted.
Morgan left Versailles this morning with eight hundred and
fifty men, on the Midway road, moving in the direction of
Georgetown.
‘Brigadier-General Ward.‘
“This being our position and intention exactly, it was thought
proper to throw General Ward on some other track. So, in the
course of half an hour, I manufactured and sent the following
dispatch, which was approved by General Morgan:
‘Midway, July 15, 1862.
‘To Brigadier-General Ward, Lexington:
‘Morgan, with upward of one thousand men, came within a
mile of here, and took the old Frankfort road, marching, we
suppose, for Frankfort. This is reliable.
‘Woolums—Operator.’
“In about ten minutes Lexington again called Frankfort,
when I received the following:
‘Lexington, July 15, 1862.
‘To General Finnell, Frankfort;
‘Morgan, with more than one thousand men, came within a
mile of here, and took the old Frankfort road. This dispatch
received from Midway, and is reliable. The regiment from
Frankfort had better be recalled.
‘Brigadier-General Ward.’
[Pg 194]
“I receipted for this message, and again manufactured a
message to confirm the information General Ward received from
Midway, and not knowing the tariff from Frankfort to Lexington,
I could not send a formal message; so, appearing greatly
agitated, I waited until the circuit was occupied, and broke in,
telling them to wait a minute, and commenced calling Lexington.
He answered with as much gusto as I called him. I telegraphed
as follows:
‘Frankfort to Lexington:
‘Tell General Ward our pickets are just driven in. Great
excitement. Pickets say the force of enemy must be two thousand.
‘Operator.‘
It was now two p.m., and General Morgan wished to be off
for Georgetown. I ran a secret ground connection, and opened
the circuit on the Lexington end. This was to leave the impression
that the Frankfort operator was skedaddling, or that Morgan’s
men had destroyed the telegraph.
While at Midway, dispositions were made for the capture of
the trains coming from both ends of the road; but they were
not sent. The command reached Georgetown just at sundown.
A small force of Home-guards had mustered there to oppose us.
Morgan sent them word to surrender, and they should not be
hurt. The leader of this band is said to have made his men a
speech of singular eloquence and stirring effect. If he was reported
correctly, he told them that “Morgan, the marauder and
murderer—the accursed of the Union men of Kentucky,” was
coming upon them. That, in “his track every where prevailed
terror and desolation. In his rear, the smoke of burning towns
was ascending, the blood of martyred patriots was streaming,
the wails of widowed women and orphan children were resounding.
In his front, Home-guards and soldiers were flying.” That
“Tom Long reported him just outside of town, with ten or
twelve thousand men, armed with long beards and butcher-knives;”
and the orator thought that they “had better scatter[Pg 195]
and take care of themselves.” They accordingly “scattered” at
full speed. Several prisoners (Southern sympathizers) were confined
in the court-house; among them, a man whom many Kentuckians
have a lively recollection of—poor Will Webb. He,
upon seeing the Home-guards flee, thrust his body half out of a
window, and pointing to the stars and stripes still flying, apostrophized
the fugitives in terms that ought to have made a sutler
fight. “Are you going to desert your flag?” he said. “Remain,
and perform the pleasing duty of dying under its glorious folds,
and afford us the agreeable spectacle that you will thus present.”
This touching appeal was of no avail.
The geographical situation of Georgetown with relation to the
towns of that portion of Kentucky—especially those occupied
by Federal troops—made it an excellent point for Colonel Morgan’s
purposes. He was in a central position here, nearly equi-distant
from all points of importance, and could observe and
checkmate movements made from any of them. Georgetown is
twelve miles from Lexington, and eighteen from Frankfort, the
two points from which he had chiefly to anticipate attacks. Although
not directly between these two places, Georgetown is so
nearly on a line with them, that its possession enabled him to
prevent communication of any kind between the troops occupying
them.
As the command greatly needed rest, Colonel Morgan remained
here (where he felt more secure, for the reasons I have
mentioned) during two days. He was not entirely idle, however,
during that time. He sent Captain Hamilton, with one company,
to disperse a Home-guard organization at the Stamping
Ground, thirteen miles from Georgetown. Hamilton accomplished
his mission, and burned the tents, and destroyed the
guns. Detachments were kept constantly at or near Midway,
to prevent any communication by the railroad between Lexington
and Frankfort. Captain Castleman was sent to destroy the
bridges on the Kentucky Central Railroad between Lexington
and Paris—which he did; and was instructed to rejoin the com[Pg 196]mand
in three or four days at Winchester, in Clark county.
For other than strategic reasons, Georgetown was an admirable
selection as a resting point. The large majority of the people
throughout this region were, even at that time, strongly Southern
in sentiment and sympathy, and their native inclination to
hospitality was much enhanced by the knowledge that they
were feeding their friends, when we would suddenly descend
upon them. There was a drawback in the apprehension of a
visit from some provost-guards, to investigate the circumstances
of this profuse and practical sympathy with armed rebels. But
they hit upon an expedient which they thought would obviate
all the unpleasant after-claps. They would give nothing of their
own free will and accord; but forced us to “impress” every
thing that we needed. Many a time have I seen an old farmer
unlock all the closets and presses in his house—press the keys
of his meat-house into the hands of the Commissary, point out
to the Quartermaster where forage could be obtained, muster his
negroes to cook and make themselves generally useful, protesting
all the time that he was acting under the cruelest compulsion,
and then stand by, rubbing his hands and chuckling to think
how well he had reconciled the indulgence of his private sympathies
with his public repute for loyalty. The old ladies, however,
were serious obstacles to the establishment of these decorous
records. They wished not only to give but to talk freely,
and the more the husband wisely preached “policy” and an
astute prudence, the more certainly were his cob-webs of caution
torn into shreds by the trenchant tongue of his wife.
Of all the points which we could have reached just at that
time, Georgetown was the one where this sympathy for us was
strongest. There were only a very few Union men living in the
town, and these had run away; and the county (Scott) was the
very hot-bed of Southern feeling. To Owen and Boone we did
not contemplate paying a visit. We had not yet reached Harrison;
but in halting in Scott county and at Georgetown, we
felt that our situation would not need to be improved. A good[Pg 197]
many recruits had been obtained at various points in the State,
and at Georgetown a full company was raised, of which W.C.P.
Breckinridge, a young lawyer of Lexington, was elected Captain.
He had just run the blockade established around the latter
town.
While lying at Georgetown the command was encamped in
line of battle, day and night, and scouting parties were sent
three or four times a day toward Lexington—which were instructed
to clear the road of the enemy’s pickets and reconnoitering
parties. While here, Gano and Allen rejoined the column,
having accomplished their respective missions.
Gano (in making a detour around Lexington) had driven in
the pickets on every road—creating a fearful amount of confusion
in the place among its gallant defenders, and causing the order
that all rebel sympathizers, seen on the streets should be shot,
to be emphatically reiterated. As Gano had approached Georgetown,
after leaving Lexington and on his way to burn the bridges
below Paris, an assemblage of a strange character occurred. He
had formerly lived near Georgetown and knew nearly every man
in the county. He stopped at the house of an intimate personal
friend, who was also a notorious “sympathizer,” who lived four
or five miles from Georgetown, and “forced” him to feed his
men and horses. While there, two or three of the Southern
citizens of Scott, among them Stoddard Johnston (afterward
Lieutenant Colonel on General Breckinridge’s staff) came to the
house, and were immediately and with great solemnity, placed
under arrest.
Shortly afterward the assistant provost marshal of Georgetown
(who was a very clever fellow), came out to protect the
house and grounds from any disorder that the troops might be
inclined to indulge in—thinking (in his simplicity) when he heard
that troops were quartered there, that they must be “Union.”
The owner of the house (of course) interceded for him, and
Gano pleased with the motive which had actuated him, promised
to detain him, only until he himself moved again. In a short[Pg 198]
time another arrival was announced. The most determined,
deeply-pitted, high-colored and uncompromising Union man in
Georgetown, came galloping up the road to the house, and asked
in a loud and authoritative tone for the commander of the detachment.
Gano walked forth and greeted him. “Why how are
you, Dick,” said the new comer, “I didn’t know that you were
in the Union army; I’ve got something for you to do, old fellow.”
Gano assured him that he was delighted to hear it. “Where is
the commander of these men,” continued the “dauntless patriot.”
“I am their commander,” said Gano. “Well then
here’s an order for you,” said the bearer of dispatches handing
him a communication from the Home-guard headquarters, in
Georgetown. Gano read it. “Oliver,” he then said, slowly and
very impressively, “I should be truly sorry to see you injured,
we were school mates, and I remember our early friendship.”
Oliver’s jaw fell, and his intelligent eye grew glassy with a
“wild and maddening” apprehension, but his feelings would not
permit him to speak. “Oliver,” continued Gano after a pause
(and keeping his countenance remarkably) “isn’t it possible that
you may be mistaken in these troops. To which army do you
think they belong?” “Why,” gasped Oliver; “ain’t they
Union?” “Union!” echoed Gano with a groan of horror, “don’t
let them hear you say so, I mightn’t be able to control them.
They are Morgan’s Texas Rangers.” He then led the half
fainting Oliver, who under the influence of this last speech had
become “even as a little child,” to the house, and placed him
with the other prisoners.
Saddest and most inconsolable of these were the sympathizers
who had come purposely to be captured. When the hour drew
near for Gano’s departure, he held a brief conference with the
“secesh,” and then paroled the whole batch, including his host,
binding them not to divulge any thing which they had seen or
heard. All were impressed with the solemn nature of this obligation,
but the melancholy gravity of Johnston (who had suggested
it) was even awful.[Pg 199]
Colonel Morgan finding how strongly Lexington was garrisoned,
gave up all thought of attacking it, but it was high time
that he made his arrangements to return to Dixie. He determined
to make a dash at Cynthiana, the county seat of Harrison
county, situated on the Kentucky Central Railroad, thirty-two
miles from Lexington, and about twenty-two by turnpike from
Georgetown. By moving in this direction, and striking a blow
at this point, he hoped to induce the impression that he was
aiming at Cincinnati, and at the same time thoroughly bewilder
the officer in command at Lexington regarding his real intentions.
When he reached Cynthiana he would be master of three or four
routes, by either of which he could leave Kentucky, completely
eluding his pursuers, and he did not doubt that he could defeat
whatever force might be collected there.
He left Georgetown on the morning of the 18th, having first
dispatched parts of two companies to drive all scouts and detachments
of every kind into Lexington. While moving rapidly
with the bulk of his command toward Cynthiana, these detachments
protected his march and prevented it from being discovered
too soon. Cynthiana was occupied by three or four hundred
men of Metcalfe’s regiment of cavalry, and about the same
number of Home-guards, all under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Landrum, of Metcalfe’s regiment. There was but one
piece of artillery in the town, a brass twelve-pound howitzer.
This was under charge of a company of firemen from Cincinnati,
under command of “Captain Billy Glass of the Fourth Ward,”
and they went to work when the fight opened as if they were
“putting out a fire.” We struck the pickets a mile or two from
the town, and the advance guard chased them in, capturing
three or four. General Morgan had previously determined upon
his dispositions for the attack, well knowing the country, and
they were made immediately after the alarm to the pickets.
Between us and the town was the Licking river, crossed at the
Georgetown pike, which we were traveling, by a narrow, covered
bridge. Just by the side of the bridge, there was a ford about[Pg 200]
waist-deep. Nowhere else, in the then stage of water, was the
river fordable in that immediate vicinity. But above and below
about a mile, respectively, from the bridge, were fords, and to
these were sent, Gano above, and the Georgians below, with instructions
to cross and attack the town upon the respective
quarters by which they approached it. The Second Kentucky
was ordered to attack upon the road by which we had advanced.
The enemy held all the houses upon the opposite bank of the
river, which runs close to the town, and opened a smart fire of
musketry upon the regiment as it advanced. Companies A and
B were deployed upon the right of the road, E and F upon the
left, and C was held in reserve, mounted; the advance-guard
had been sent with Gano. The recruits, most of whom were
unarmed, were also, of course, kept in the rear. The howitzers
were planted near the road, about three hundred and fifty yards
from the bridge, and were opened at once upon the houses, evidently
filled with the enemy.
The enemy’s single piece of artillery swept the bridge and
road, and commanded the position where the howitzers were
stationed. Companies E and F advanced to the river’s edge
and poured such a fire across the narrow stream that they compelled
the troops exposed to it to throw down their guns and
surrender. They were then made to swim the river in order to
join their captors. In the meantime, Company A, after having
been repulsed two or three times in attempting to rush across
the bridge, plunged into the river and, holding their guns and
ammunition above their heads, crossed at the ford above-mentioned,
and effected a lodgment on the other side. For awhile
those first over were compelled to take shelter behind a long
warehouse near the bridge, and even when the entire company
had gotten over, and assistance had been sent to it, it seemed
that the enemy, who concentrated to oppose us here, and redoubled
his fire, would drive all back. The adjacent houses and
yards were filled with sharpshooters, who poured in telling volleys
as the men sought to close with them.[Pg 201]
The lines were at this point not more than forty yards apart,
and most of our loss was sustained here, and by Company A.
The howitzers were brought up, and posted on the corner, but
the close fire drove the gunners away from them. One gunner
named Talbot loaded and fired his piece two or three times by
himself, while the balls were actually striking it. He was afterward
made a Lieutenant. The team of one of the pieces, smarting
with wounds, ran away with the limber, and carried it into
the midst of the enemy. This check did not last more than
three or four minutes. Company C charged across the bridge
and up the principal street, on horseback, losing three or four
men only, and distracting the enemy’s attention. Company B
got a position on the other bank where they could shoot right
into the party which was holding Company A in check. The
latter made a determined rush, at the head of which were Sergeants
Drake and Quirk and private James Moore, of Louisiana,
a little fellow, not yet sixteen years old, who fell with two
severe wounds, but recovered, to make one of the most gallant
officers of our command. In this dash, Sergeant Quirk, out of
ammunition, and seeing his friend, Drake, in imminent peril,
knocked down his assailant with a stone. The enemy then gave
way; the other companies were, in the mean time, brought up
to press them.
Gano came in on the one side, and the Georgians on the
other, each driving all opponents before them. The Texians,
Georgians, and Kentuckians arrived simultaneously at the piece
of artillery, which the enemy had kept busily employed all the
time. It was immediately taken, each claiming its capture.
The enemy immediately evacuated the town, and retreated
eastwardly, but were closely pressed, and the better part captured.
Greenfell headed a charge upon the depot, in which
some of them took refuge. He received eleven bullets through
his horse, person, and clothes, but was only slightly hurt. A
curious little scarlet skull cap, which he used to wear, was perforated.
It fitted so tight upon his head that I previously[Pg 202]
thought a ball could not go through it without blowing his brains
out.
Colonel Landrum was chased eight or ten miles. Little Billy
Peyton, a mere boy (Colonel Morgan’s Orderly), but perfectly
fearless, followed him closely, and exhausted two pistols without
hitting him. The Colonel was riding a superb horse, which
attracted attention to him, but which saved him. The enemy’s
loss was about ninety in killed and wounded; ours was about
forty. Four hundred and twenty prisoners were taken.
It would be an unfair description of this fight if mention were
omitted of the gallant conduct of the recruits. Although the
most of them, as has been stated, were unarmed, they all “went
in” like game cocks. Plenty of fine guns, with ammunition,
were captured; also a large quantity of stores, and two or three
hundred horses.
Cynthiana, like Georgetown and Versailles, was full of our
devoted friends, and we felt satisfied that the wounded we were
obliged to leave behind us would be well taken care of. Two
men who subsequently died of their wounds, privates George
Arnold and —— Clarke, behaved with such conspicuous gallantry,
and were always so noted for good conduct, that their
loss caused universal regret. Arnold was a member of the advance-guard,
and volunteered to accompany Company C in the
charge through the town. He fell with an arm and a thigh
broken. Clarke undertook to carry an order through the enemy’s
line to Gano, who was in their rear, and fell pierced
through the body with five balls. The best men were among
the killed. Private Wm. Craig, of Company A, first to cross
the river, was killed as he mounted the bank. All of the other
officers having been wounded, the command of Company A devolved
upon the Third Lieutenant, S.D. Morgan.
Leaving Cynthiana at one or two p.m., the command marched
for Paris. About five miles from that place, we encountered a
deputation of citizens, coming out to surrender the town. We
reached Paris about sundown, and rested there during the night.[Pg 203]
I have omitted to mention that at Georgetown, Lieutenant Niles
was appointed by Colonel Morgan upon his staff, and P.H.
Thorpe, formerly Captain in the First Kentucky Infantry, was
made Adjutant in his stead. I mention these appointments as
if they were regular and valid, because they were all so in the
end. The War Department made some trouble about them, as
was expected, and perfectly proper, but as the appointees were
borne on the muster and pay rolls as officers, there was nothing
to be done but recognize them.
R.A. Alston, formerly a member of a South Carolina regiment
of cavalry, but a member and private at the time of Company
A, Second Kentucky, had been selected at Knoxville by
Colonel Morgan to perform the duties of Adjutant-General, on
account of his superior fitness for that position. He was permitted
to recruit a company during the raid, in order that he
might obtain the rank of Captain. He got his commission, and
his company was divided between some others, and he was continued
upon staff duty, although Greenfell, immediately after the
conclusion of this raid became Adjutant-General.
The next morning after our arrival at Paris, a large force
came down the Lexington road, and about eight a.m. gave us
strong reasons for resuming our march. This force, about
twenty-five hundred or three thousand men, was commanded by
General G. Clay Smith. Our scouts had notified us of its approach
the previous night, and as the command was encamped
on the Winchester road, the one which we wished to travel,
there was no danger of its cutting us off. It came on very
slowly, and there was at no time any determined effort made to
engage us. If a dash had been made at us when we prepared
to leave, we could have been compelled to fight, for although the
prisoners had all been paroled, we were very much incumbered
with carriages containing wounded men, brought off from Cynthiana
and other points.
Morgan always made it a point to carry off every wounded
man who could be safely moved; in this way he prevented much[Pg 204]
of the demoralization attending the fear the men felt of
falling, when wounded, into the hands of the enemy. I was
once seriously told that a belief prevailed with some people, that
Morgan killed his own wounded to prevent the enemy from
making them prisoners.
The command reached Winchester about 12 p.m. and remained
there until 4 p.m., when the march was taken up again and we
crossed the Kentucky river just before dark. Marching on, we
reached Richmond at 4 the next morning. Here we met with
another very kind reception, and were joined by a company of
recruits under Captain Jennings. It was admitted into the
Second Kentucky as Company K. Leaving Richmond at 4 p.m.
that day we marched toward Crab Orchard, and reached that
place about day break next morning.
It had, at first, been Colonel Morgan’s intention to make a
stand at Richmond, as the whole population seemed inclined to
join him, but his real strength was now known to the enemy,
and they were collecting to attack him in such numbers, that
he concluded that it was too hazardous. He would have had
to have fought three battles at least, against superior forces, and
have won all before he would have been safe.
Clay Smith was following him, Woolford was collecting forces
to the southward to intercept him, and troops were coming from
Louisville and other points to push after him. In the march
from Paris to Crab Orchard, a good many wagons and a large
number of guns were captured, and all—wagons and guns—that
were not needed were burned. The horses captured with the
twelve pounder at Cynthiana gave out and died before we
reached the Kentucky river.
Leaving Crab Orchard at 11 a.m., the command moved toward
Somerset and reached that place about sundown. The telegraph
was again taken possession of, and Colonel Morgan instructed
Ellsworth to countermand all of General Boyle’s orders
for pursuit. At Crab Orchard and Somerset one hundred and
thirty Government wagons were captured and burned. At Som[Pg 205]erset
a great many stores of all kinds, blankets, shoes, etc.,
were found. Several wagons were loaded with as much as could
be conveniently carried away, and the rest were destroyed.
Arms, and ammunition for small arms and artillery, were also
found in abundance, and were destroyed.
From Somerset the column marched to Stagall’s ferry on the
Cumberland river, and crossed there. We reached Monticello
twenty-one miles from the river that night, but all danger was
over when we had gotten safely across the river. The next day we
proceeded leisurely toward Livingston, having a little excitement
with the bushwhackers, but suffering no loss.
For several days after leaving Somerset, and indeed after
reaching Livingston, we suffered greatly for want of rations, as
this country was almost bare of provisions. Colonel Morgan’s
objects in making this raid, viz; to obtain recruits and horses,
to thoroughly equip and arm his men, to reconnoiter for the grand
invasion in the fall, and to teach the enemy that we could reciprocate
the compliment of invasion, were pretty well accomplished.
Enough of spare horses and more than enough of extra
guns, saddles, etc., were brought out, to supply all the men who
had been left behind. A great many prisoners were taken, of
whom I have made no mention. But the results of the expedition
are best summed up in the words of Colonel Morgan’s report—
“I left Knoxville on the 4th day of this month, with about
nine hundred men, and returned to Livingston on the 28th inst.
with nearly twelve hundred, having been absent just twenty-four
days, during which time I have traveled over a thousand miles,
captured seventeen towns, destroyed all the Government supplies
and arms in them, dispersed about fifteen hundred Home-guards
and paroled nearly twelve hundred regular troops. I lost in
killed, wounded and missing of the number that I carried into
Kentucky, about ninety.”
One practice was habitually pursued, on this raid, that may
be remembered by some of our friends in the state for whose[Pg 206]
benefit it was done. Great pains were always taken to capture
the most bitter Union man in each town and neighborhood—the
one who was most inclined to bear down on Southern men—especially
if he were provost marshal. He would be kept, sometimes
a day or two, and thoroughly frightened. Colonel Morgan,
who derived infinite amusement from such scenes, would
gravely assure each one, when brought into his presence, that
one of the chief objects of his raid was to catch him. It was
a curious sight to see the mixed terror and vanity this declaration
would generally excite—even in the agonies of anticipated
death, the prisoner would be sensibly touched by the compliment.
After awhile, however, a compromise would be effected; the
prisoner would be released upon the implied condition that he
was, in the future, to exert himself to protect Southern people.
It was thought better to turn all the captured provost marshals
loose and let them resume their functions, than to carry them
off, and let new men be appointed, with whom no understanding
could be had.
Ellsworth wound up his operations at Somerset, with complimentary
dispatches from Colonel Morgan to General Jerry
Boyle, Prentice, and others, and concluded with the following
general order on his own part to the Kentucky telegraphic
operators:
‘Headquarters, Telegraph Dept. of Ky.,
Confederate States of America.
‘General Order No. 1.
‘When an operator is positively informed that the enemy is
marching on his station, he will immediately proceed to destroy
the telegraphic instruments and all material in his charge. Such
instances of carelessness, as were exhibited on the part of the
operators at Lebanon, Midway, and Georgetown, will be severely
dealt with. By order of
G.A. Ellsworth,
General Military Supt. C.S. Telegraphic Dept.‘
At Livingston Colonel Morgan left the Second Kentucky and
proceeded to Knoxville, taking with him the Georgians, Gano’s[Pg 207]
squadron, and the howitzers—which needed some repairs. After
remaining at Livingston three days, I marched the regiment to
Sparta, where more abundant supplies could be obtained, and
facilities for shoeing horses could be had. While at Livingston,
the men suffered extremely with hunger, and one man declared
his wish to quit a service in which he was subjected to such
privations. He was deprived of his horse, arms, and equipments,
and “blown out” of the regiment; that is, upon dress parade,
he was marched down the front of the regiment (after his offense
and the nature of the punishment had been read by the Adjutant),
with the bugler blowing the “Skedaddle” behind him amid the
hisses of the men, who were thoroughly disgusted with him; he
was then driven away from the camp. At Sparta we found a
better country and the kindest and most hospitable people.
CHAPTER IX
As soon as the Second Kentucky was placed in camp at
Sparta, a much stricter system was adopted than had ever prevailed
before. Camp-guards were regularly posted in order to
keep the men in camp; and as staying in camp closely was
something they particularly disliked, the guard had to be
doubled, until finally nearly one half of the regiment had to be
put on to watch the rest. Guard-mounting, dress-parades, and
drills (company and regimental, on foot and on horseback), were
had daily, much to the edification and improvement of the recruits,
who rapidly acquired instruction, and quite as much to
the disgust of the old hands, who thought that they “knew it all.”
In one respect, however, they were all equally assiduous and diligent
that was in the care of their horses and attention to their
arms and accouterments—no man had ever to be reproved or
punished for neglect of these duties. The regiment now numbered
about seven hundred men, nearly all of the recruits
obtained in Kentucky having joined it.
It was then in the flush of hope and confidence, composed of
the best material Kentucky could afford, and looked forward to
a career of certain success and of glory. The officers were (with
scarcely an exception), very young men; almost every one of
them had won his promotion by energy and gallantry, and all
aspired to yet further preferment. The men were of just such
staff as the officers, and all relied upon (in their turn), winning
promotion.
The character of Kentucky troops was never better illustrated
than in this regiment and at that time. Give them officers that
they love, respect, and rely on, and any thing can be accomplished
with them. While almost irrepressibly fond of whisky,[Pg 209]
and incorrigible, when not on active service, about straggling
through the country and running out of camp, they, nevertheless,
stick to work at the time when it is necessary, and answer to the
roll-call in an emergency unfailingly, no matter what may be the
prospect before them. Aware too that (in quiet times), they
are always behaving badly, they will cheerfully submit to the
severest punishment—provided, always, that it is not of a
degrading nature. They can not endure harsh and insulting
language, or any thing that is humiliating. In this respect they
show the traits which characterize all of their Southern brethren—the
Irish are of a similar disposition. I have frequently
known the efficiency of fine companies greatly impaired by
officers who were offensive in their language to them, and yet
rarely punished, while other officers, who never indulged in such
language, but were accustomed to punish severely, were not only
more promptly obeyed, but were infinitely more liked. While
the regiment was at Sparta, Colonel Jno. Scott also came with
his own fine regiment the First Louisiana, and a portion of our
old friends, the Eighth Texas.
Colonel Scott was one of the most active, efficient, and
daring cavalry officers in the Western Confederate army. He
had performed very successful and brilliant service, during the
spring, in North Alabama, and had lately served with Forrest in
the latter’s dashing operations in Middle Tennessee. While we
were all at Sparta together, Buell’s army began to commence to
concentrate, and a large part of it under Nelson came to
McMinnville.
McMinnville is twenty-eight miles from Sparta, and a force
of infantry, preceded by two or three hundred cavalry, came
one day to the bridge over Calf Killer creek, on the McMinnville
road, within five miles of Sparta. Colonel Scott sent
Major Harrison (afterward Brigadier General), of the Eighth
Texas, with two or three companies of the First Louisiana, and
as many of the Eighth Texas, to drive them back. Harrison
fell on them in his usual style, and they went back immediately.[Pg 210]
One or two of them were killed, and a few prisoners were taken.
I sent Lieutenant Manly, of my regiment, about this time, to
ascertain the disposition of Buell’s forces. He reported, in a
few days, that there were three thousand and six hundred men
at Nashville, a great many of them convalescents, four thousand
at Columbia, three thousand at Pulaski, and three thousand at
Shelbyville. At McMinnville twelve thousand. At points on
the Tennessee river, in Alabama, about two thousand. Generals
Bragg and Smith were then preparing for the invasion of Kentucky.
Bragg lay at Chattanooga with about thirty thousand
men. We confidently expected that he would dash across the
river, while Buell’s army was thus scattered, break through it
and take Nashville, and pick up the fragments at his leisure.
He gave Buell a little time, and the latter concentrated with a
quickness that seemed magical, protected Nashville, and was
ready for the race into Kentucky. Buell’s own friends have
damned him pretty thoroughly, but that one exhibition of energy
and skill, satisfied his enemies (that is, the Confederates) of his
caliber, and we welcomed his removal with gratification. Manly
also reported, that rolling stock was being collected, from all
the roads, at Nashville, and that wagon trains were being gotten
together at convenient points. This indicated pretty clearly
that a concentration was contemplated for some purpose. After
remaining a few days at Sparta, Colonel Scott received orders to
report with his command to General Kirby Smith, whose Headquarters
were at Knoxville. Shortly afterward, Colonel Morgan
reached Sparta, bringing with him Gano’s squadron and Company
G. Gano’s two companies, numbered now, however, only one hundred
and ten effectives; he had left a good many sick at Knoxville,
who did not rejoin us for some time. The howitzers, to our
great regret, were left behind. A day or two after Colonel
Morgan’s arrival, we set out to surprise the Federal garrison at
Gallatin, distant about seventy or eighty miles. Morgan had
received instructions to break the railroad between Louisville
and Nashville, in order to retard Buell’s retreat to Louisville as[Pg 211]
greatly as possible, also to occupy the Federal cavalry, and prevent
them from paying attention to what was going on in other
quarters. Gallatin seemed to him an excellent point at which
to commence operations with all these views. On the way, he
was joined by Captain Joseph Desha (formerly of the First
Kentucky infantry), with twenty or thirty men. Captain
Desha’s small detachment was received into the Second Kentucky,
and he was promised recruits enough to make him a full
company. He soon got them, and his company was duly lettered
L of the regiment. Crossing the Cumberland at Sand
Shoals ford, three miles from Carthage, on the day after we
left Sparta, we reached Dixon Springs, about eight miles from
Gallatin, about 2 or 3 p.m., and, as our coming had been announced
by couriers sent on in advance, we found that the
friendly and hospitable citizens had provided abundant supplies
for men and horses. Crowds of them met to welcome us, bringing
every delicacy. It was a convincing proof of the unanimity
of sentiment in that region, that while hundreds knew of our
march and destination, not one was found to carry the information
to the enemy. Just before dark the march was resumed,
and we reached Hartsville, sixteen miles from Gallatin, about 11
o’clock at night. Pressing on through Hartsville without halting,
the column turned off from the turnpike a few miles from
Gallatin, entirely avoiding the pickets, which were captured by
scouts sent after we had gained their rear. As we entered
Gallatin, Captain Desha was sent forward with a small party to
capture Colonel Boone, the Federal commander, who, as we had
learned, was in the habit of sleeping in town. Desha reached
the house where he was quartered, and found him dressed and
just about to start to camp. It was now about daybreak.
Colonel Morgan immediately saw Boone and represented to him
that he had better write to the officer in command at the camp,
advising him to surrender, in order to spare the “effusion of
blood,” etc. This Boone consented to do, and his letter was at
once dispatched to the camp under flag of truce. It had the[Pg 212]
desired effect, and the garrison fell into our hands without firing
a shot. Two companies had been sent off for some purpose,
and escaped capture. About two hundred prisoners were taken,
including a good many officers. As these troops were infantry,
no horses were captured with them, but during the forenoon, a
train arrived with some eighty very fine ones, en route for
Nashville. Two or three hundred excellent Springfield rifles
were captured, with which all the inferior guns were replaced.
Some valuable stores were also captured, and wagoned off to
Hartsville.
The prisoners were paroled and sent off Northward, during
that and the following day. The Government freight train
seized, numbered nineteen cars, laden with forage for the cavalry
at Nashville. Efforts were made to decoy the train from Nashville
into our possession, but unsuccessfully. Ellsworth was immediately
put in possession of the telegraph office, and went to
work with even more than his ordinary ingenuity. It was the
peculiarity of this “great man” to be successful only in his own
department; if he attempted any thing else he was almost sure
to fail. At Crab Orchard, for instance, on the late raid, he had
taken it into his head to go after a notorious and desperate bushwhacker,
whom our best scouts had tried in vain to capture.
Telling no one of his intention, he took Colonel Greenfell’s
horse, upon which was strapped a saddle that the owner valued
very highly, and behind the saddle was tied a buff coat equally
as much prized, and in the coat was all the gold the Colonel had
brought from Richmond, when he came to join us—and thus
equipped he sallied out with one companion, to take the formidable
“Captain King.”
He went boldly to that worthy’s house, who, seeing only two
men coming, scorned to take to the brush. To Ellsworth’s demand
to surrender, he answered with volleys from shot gun and
revolver, severely wounding the friend and putting Ellsworth
himself to flight. King pressed the retreat, and Ellsworth, although
he brought off his wounded companion, lost horse, sad[Pg 213]dle,
coat and gold. St. Leger was like an excited volcano, and
sought Ellsworth to slay him instantly.
Three days were required to pacify him, during which time,
the great “operator” had to be carefully kept out of his sight.
But when Ellsworth was seated in the telegraph office he was
always “master of the situation.” No man could watch him
at work, see him catch, without a boggle, “signals,” “tariff,”
and all the rest, fool the regular operators, baffle with calm confidence
their efforts to detect him, and turn to his own advantage
their very suspicions, and not unhesitatingly pronounce him a
genius. As if to demonstrate incontestably his own superiority,
he has (since the war closed) invented a plan to prevent just
such tricks, as he used to practice at way stations, from being
played.
When he “took the chair” at Gallatin, he first, in accordance
with Colonel Morgan’s instructions, telegraphed in Colonel
Boone’s name, to the commandant at Bowlinggreen to send him
reinforcements, as he expected to be attacked. But this generous
plan to capture and parole soldiers, who wished to go home
and see their friends, miscarried. Then he turned his attention
to Nashville. The operator there was suspicious and put a good
many questions, all of which were successfully answered.
At length the train he wished sent, was started, but when it
got within six miles of Gallatin, a negro signaled it and gave
the alarm. A railroad bridge between Gallatin and Nashville,
was then at once destroyed, and the fine tunnel, six miles above,
was rendered impassable for months. The roof of the tunnel
was of a peculiar rock which was liable at all times to disintegrate
and tumble down; to remedy this, huge beams, supported
by strong uprights, had been stretched horizontally across the
tunnel, and a sort of scaffolding have been built upon these
beams. A good deal of wood work was consequently put up.
Some of the freight cars were also run into the tunnel and set
on fire when the wood work was kindled. This fire smouldered
on, after it had ceased to burn fiercely, for a long time, and it[Pg 214]
was weeks before any repairs could be attempted, on account
of the intense heat and the huge masses of rock which were
constantly falling. This tunnel is eight hundred feet long.
In the “History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
during the war,” the Superintendent, Mr. Albert Fink, whose
energy to repair, was equal to Morgan’s to destroy, says of the
year commencing July 1, 1862, and ending July 1, 1863,
“the road has been operated for its entire length only
seven months and twelve days.” He says, moreover, “All the
bridges and trestlework on the main stem and branches, with
the exception of the bridge over Barren river and four small
bridges, were destroyed and rebuilt during the year; some of
the structures were destroyed twice, and some three times. In
addition to this, most of the water stations, several depots, and
a large number of cars were burnt, a number of engines badly
damaged, and a tunnel in Tennessee nearly filled up for a distance
of eight hundred feet.” This shows a great activity to
destroy, but wonderful patience and industry to repair. It was
by this road that the Federal army in Tennessee got its supplies
and reinforcements, almost altogether, during the greater part
of the year. In the same report the writer goes on to say:
“General Morgan took possession of the Louisville and Nashville
road at Gallatin, in August, 1862, and this, with other
causes, forced General Buell’s retreat to Louisville.”
Before giving up the wires, and after Colonel Morgan permitted
him to reveal himself, Ellsworth told some first-class romances.
He made Morgan’s force out about four thousand, and did it with
a skill that carried conviction. He would speak, in dispatches to
various well-known Federals, of certain imaginary commands,
under men whom they well knew. He telegraphed Prentice that
Wash. Morgan was at Gallatin, with four hundred Indians,
raised especially to seek for his (Prentice’s) scalp.
Lieutenant Manly, and a few men, were left at Gallatin to
burn the amphitheater at the fair-grounds, where Boone’s regiment
had been quartered. The command left Gallatin about 12[Pg 215]
o’clock at night, and returned to Hartsville. Gallatin was taken
on the 12th of August. We remained encamped at Hartsville
until the 19th. During that time, men and horses were entirely
recruited. The citizens supplied all the rations and forage that
we needed, and frequently we would have whole stacks of hams,
turkeys, chickens, etc. (all cooked) piled up in our camps.
On the 13th of August, the day after we left Gallatin, a Federal
force of about twelve hundred men, with four pieces of artillery,
came there, and drove Lieutenant Manly and his party
away. Manly was killed, and, we learned, after he had surrendered.
Sergeant Quirk, of Company A, was sent, with fifteen
men, on a scout to Gallatin, next day. He found, when he got
there, that this force had left, on the way to Nashville again.
He followed, and overtook it, about three miles from Gallatin,
as it was preparing to get on the cars. He attacked it immediately,
and killed two or three, and captured a few prisoners.
The artillery was opened upon him, with canister, but did him
no damage. He brought his fifteen men upon them through a
cornfield, and got close before he fired. John Donnellan, a soldier
who was always in the extreme front in every fight, exerted
a powerful voice, in issuing orders to the “Texians” to go one
way, the “Indians” another, and “Duke’s regiment” to fall on
their rear, until he had ostensibly and vociferously disposed in
line enough troops to have frightened the “heroes of Marengo.”
On the 19th, Colonel Morgan received information that a force
of some three hundred infantry had come to Gallatin, and on
that evening he started out in pursuit. He had hoped to surprise
them in the town, but learned, on the road, that they had
left at midnight, and were on their way back to Nashville. Captain
Hutchinson, of Company E, of the Second Kentucky, was
sent, with his company, to intercept them, if possible, at a point
seven miles below Gallatin, where a bridge had been burned, on
the railroad, and where it was thought that, probably, a train
would be waiting to take them back. The rest of the command
pushed on to Gallatin, and reached that place about 8 o’clock on[Pg 216]
the morning of the 20th. We found that the enemy had taken
off nearly every male inhabitant of the place above the age of
twelve, and the women were all in terrible distress when we came
in. This had been done on account of the kind reception which
had been given us in the place, on the 12th. We also found the
corpse of one of our men, killed the night before, and the citizens
told us that he had been kicked and cuffed after he was
shot. As we passed out of town, on the Nashville pike, we saw
on the bridge the stain of Manly’s blood. The men became
very much excited, and could scarcely be kept in the ranks. As
we pressed on down the road, we reached the point where Hutchinson
had been directed to intercept the party which had been
to Gallatin. He had failed to do this, but had captured a stockade
garrisoned by forty or fifty men. He came upon the party
after which he started, but they had passed the point at which
he could have checked them.
Another garrison of fifty men was captured at a stockade still
lower down, and we came soon after upon the men we were
looking for. We could not prevent the escape of the greater
portion, who got on hand cars and ran down the road, but we
killed some forty, and released all the prisoners. At Edgefield
junction, First Lieutenant Jas. Smith who reached that point first,
with a part of his Company (A of the Second Kentucky),
attacked the stockade, there, supported by Captain Breckinridge
who shortly afterward arrived. The inmates of the stockade
made fight, and Smith lost three of his men, and was himself shot
through the head, of which wound he soon died. Lieutenant
Niles, of Morgan’s staff, was also killed at this point, shot
through the body with five or six balls. I came up at the time
that these officers were shot and ordered the men back. I saw
no chance of reducing the work, even with great loss, in the
time that would be allowed us.
These stockades were built with heavy upright timber, ten or
twelve feet high. They were surrounded by ditches and pierced
for musketry. Assailants when right at this bases, were as far[Pg 217]
from taking them as ever. There was a plan, which I am
satisfied would have been successful against them, but I never
saw it tried, viz.: to construct bundles of bushwood large enough
to shelter a man and compact enough to stop a musket ball, and
place a sufficient number of them in the hands of the men, who
holding them in front, should advance and press them against
the loop-holes—of course riflemen would have to be posted in
range, to prevent a sally on the bundle-carriers. The fire from
the stockade having been thus stopped, the walls could be
chopped down with axes, or brush, in large quantities, could be
set on fire and tossed over among the defenders, until they concluded
to surrender. This plan, however, would require plenty
of time, and that is just what partisan cavalry have least of on
such occasions.
Colonel Morgan was much attached to both Smith and Niles,
and it was with great difficulty that he could be dissuaded from
continuing to attack until the stockade was taken. Lieutenant
Smith had been one of the best soldiers in the squadron, and had
given universal satisfaction by his conduct as an officer. He
was more than ordinarily brave, intelligent and zealous, and
would certainly have been made a field-officer if he had lived a
few months longer. His men were devotedly attached to him.
The repulse at this stockade made us more than ever regret the
absence of the howitzers. With them we could have battered it
down directly. It was lucky that Hutchinson had caught the
garrison of the first one captured, outside of its walls, and as
they attempted to enter, his men rushed in with them. The
other stockade taken, surrendered without firing a shot. This
was a very exciting day; the chase and succession of skirmishes
made the whole affair very interesting.
Returning to Gallatin, we met the people of the adjacent
country coming with vehicles of every description to convey
their recaptured friends back home. The latter weary and footsore,
were plodding along as best they might, except when our
men would take them behind them or dismount and let them[Pg 218]
ride their horses. There was a scene of wild congratulation in
town, that evening, when they all got in. That night the entire
command encamped in the fair grounds. About 12 o’clock,
Colonel Morgan received information that a formidable Federal
force had passed through Hartsville on the previous afternoon,
and was encamped at Castalian Springs, ten miles from Gallatin.
He ordered the pickets to be strengthened in that direction, and
shrewd scouts were put out to watch their movements closely,
but he did not disturb the command, wishing that it should be
rested for the next day’s work. He had been informed that infantry
and artillery composed this force, as well as cavalry, and
he knew that if the latter waited on the former, he was in no
danger of being forced into a fight that it might be imprudent
to make. In the morning the scouts came in, saying that the
enemy were rapidly advancing. The column was immediately
put in motion, moving toward the enemy, but it was Colonel
Morgan’s intention to decline battle until more positively informed
of the enemy’s strength, and when he reached the junction
of the Hartsville and Scottsville turnpikes, at the eastern
edge of the town, he turned off on the Scottsville pike, which
runs nearly at right angles to the other, and northeast.
The enemy, in the meantime, were pressing on vigorously,
driving in the scouts and pickets. Colonel Morgan and myself
had taken position at the junction of the two roads, as the
column filed past, and fearing that we would be taken in flank,
or that our rear would be attacked after the entire command
had taken the Scottsville road, I advised him to form and
fight, saying that I believed we could whip them. He answered
that he could “get fights enough, but could not easily get such
a command again, if he lost this one.” Immediately afterward,
seeing the enemy come galloping down the road, he added, with
a half smile, “We will have to whip these fellows, sure enough.
Form your men, and, as soon as you check them, attack.
Gano, who was in the extreme rear, was ordered, as soon as his
squadron arrived at the junction of the roads, to charge and[Pg 219]
drive back the enemy’s advance. He did so in his usual dashing,
impetuous style. The enemy’s advance guard was strong
and determined, and met Gano’s charge gallantly. As he led
on his men, the enemy directed their fire principally at him, but
with the good fortune which attended him during four years of
dangerous and incessant service, he escaped unhurt, losing, by
the shots aimed at him, only his hat and a few locks of hair,
which latter was a loss he could well stand, although the other
was a serious matter. After a brief struggle, Gano drove back
the advance, killing and wounding several. Our entire force,
deducting one hundred men used as a guard for the prisoners
taken the day before, and other details, was about seven hundred
strong. That of the enemy was about the same. On the right
of the Hartsville road, as our line faced, was a cornfield. This
was immediately occupied by Companies I and K. On the left
of the Hartsville pike, and just east of the Scottsville road, was
a woodland of some twenty acres. Company D was deployed in
this, and immediately cleared it of the enemy, who had entered
it, and kept it until the line advanced. To the left of this woodland
was a long meadow, five or six hundred yards in extent,
and some three hundred broad; to the left of this, again, was
another cornfield. The column had gotten some distance upon
the Scottsville pike before the command to halt and face toward
the enemy had been transmitted to its head, and when these
companies mentioned had been formed, there was a gap of nearly
two hundred yards opened between them and the others that
were further to the front. Toward this gap the enemy immediately
darted. Believing that we were seeking to escape
upon the Scottsville road, he had thrown the bulk of his force in
that direction, at any rate, and it was formed and advanced
rapidly and gallantly. Throwing down the eastern fence of the
meadow, some three hundred poured into it, formed a long line,
and dashed across it, with sabers drawn, toward the line of
horses which they saw in the road beyond. Companies B, C, E
and F were by this time dismounted, and had dropped on their[Pg 220]
knees behind the low fence on the road-side, as the enemy came
rushing on. They held their fire until the enemy were within
thirty yards, when they opened. Then was seen the effect of a
volley from that long thin line, which looked so easy to break,
and, yet, whose fire was so deadly. Every man had elbow-room
and took dead aim at an individual foe, and, as the blaze left the
guns, two thirds of the riders and horses seemed to go down.
The cavalry was at once broken, and recoiled. Our men sprang
over the fence and ran close up to them, as they endeavored to
retreat rapidly through the gaps in the fence, by which they had
entered, and poured in such another volley that the rout was
completed. However, they reformed and came back, but only
to be repulsed again. By this time the companies on the right
had driven off their opponents in that direction, and had gotten
a position where they could enfilade the enemy’s line as it
strove to advance, and in a little while it was forced back at all
points. Gano charged again, and pressed them closely. After
retreating about half a mile, the enemy halted and reformed
upon a hill which ran for some hundreds of yards parallel with
their former line, and on the crest of which were high fences
and timber.
As we had repulsed them the last time, some interesting incidents
occurred. Captain Leabo, of the Second Indiana, dashed
down upon our line, and, coming on himself after his men turned
back, was made prisoner. Another individual was made prisoner
in the same way, although he did not come with the same intent
which inspired the gallant Captain. The wildest looking fellow
perhaps in the Federal army came rattling down the pike on a
big sorrel horse, which he could not hold, his hair standing on
end, his mouth wide open, his shirt collar flying by one end like
a flag of truce, and his eyes glazed. He was caught by the
greatest wag in the command, and perhaps in the Western
Army—the celebrated Jeff. Sterritt. With a look of appalling
ferocity, the captor exclaimed: “I don’t know whether to kill
you now, or to wait until the fight’s over.” “For God’s sake,”[Pg 221]
said the captive, “don’t kill me at all. I’m a dissipated character,
and not prepared to die.”
Company A and the advance-guard had been held until this
time in reserve on the extreme left. When our whole line was
pressed forward after the retreating enemy, I carried them
rapidly in advance of the rest of the line, and through a woods
which concealed the movement upon the flank of the enemy’s
new line just as it was formed. The effect of their fire, then
delivered at short range, was decisive, and the enemy instantly
broke again, and this time made, at full speed, for the road, and
went off in full retreat. The bulk of the command was too far
from the line of horses to mount and pursue promptly, but Gano
pressed them closely again. Adjutant Wyncoop, son of the
Colonel of that name, was killed in this retreat, as he was trying
to rally his men. His body was removed to the side of the road,
and lay there as we passed, with a coat thrown over his face as
if he were unwilling to look upon the rout of his command.
The enemy fell back about three miles, and halted again.
Their loss had been very heavy, and perhaps two hundred horses
had been killed for them. Nearly all of the men thus dismounted
were made prisoners. Colonel Morgan now learned
that the officer in command of the troops he had been fighting,
was Brigadier-General Johnson, and became satisfied that the
infantry and artillery with which the force had been at first provided
was not in supporting distance. We subsequently learned
that it had been sent back to McMinnville a day or two before.
Just as the horses were brought up and the men were mounted,
a flag of truce came from General Johnson proposing an armistice
in order that he might bury his dead. Colonel Morgan
answered that he could entertain no proposition except unconditional
surrender, but shortly afterward sent offering to parole
officers and men if a surrender were made. General Johnson
replied that “catching came before hanging.” Colonel Morgan
resolved upon immediate and vigorous pursuit, and believing
that in the broken and demoralized condition of the enemy he[Pg 222]
could safely attempt such a plan, he divided his force into three
columns, directing each in a special direction, in order to more
certainly encounter the enemy, who had now more than three
miles the start of us. Five companies were placed upon the
left of the road under Major Morgan. Colonel Morgan himself
kept the road with Gano’s squadron, while I had the right,
with Companies A, B, and E, and the advance-guard, in all
about two hundred and twenty-five men. The road bends to the
left at about the point where General Johnson had last halted,
and as he turned off just there, in order to make for the river,
the other two columns missed him altogether, and mine, pressing
on rapidly in the direction indicated, was so fortunate as to soon
overtake him.
The three companies were formed in parallel columns of fours,
with full distance between them, and the advance-guard, thrown
out as skirmishers in front. When the enemy was neared, the
whole force was thrown into line, and advanced at a gallop.
We were not more than fifty yards from the enemy when this
was done, but there was a high stone wall between us, which our
horses could not leap. This prevented us from closing with
them, and enabled them to get some distance ahead of us. As
we passed the wall, the original formation was resumed, and we
followed at good speed. Soon the advance guard, sent on again
in front, reported that the enemy had halted and formed for a
fight.
A short reconnoisance showed that they were dismounted and
drawn up under a long hill, and about forty yards from its crest,
but their formation was defective, in that, instead of presenting
a straight, uniform line, so that their numbers could tell,
they were formed in the shape of a V, perhaps to meet any
movement to flank them. The hill was one of those gentle undulations
of the blue-grass pastures, which present perfectly
smooth surfaces on either side, and yet rise enough to conceal
from those on the one side what is being done on the other.
The three companies and the advance were immediately[Pg 223]
brought into line and dismounted under cover of the brow of
the hill, and moved to a position which would bring the apex of
the enemy’s formation about opposite the center of our line.
When we, then, charged over the hill, although the enemy had
some advantage in firing upward, it was more than counterbalanced
by the fact that the men upon their flanks could not fire
at us at all, while our whole line could fire without difficulty upon
any portion of their formation. After a short but sharp fight
they gave way again. Our loss in this skirmish was two killed.
We captured General Johnson, his Adjutant General, Major
Winfrey and several other officers and twenty or thirty privates.
In the two engagements the enemy left sixty-four dead on the
field, and a number of wounded. About two hundred prisoners
were taken.
This force had been selected with great care from all the cavalry
of Buell’s army, and placed under General Johnson, regarded
as one of their best and most dashing officers, for the
express purpose of hunting Morgan. It was completely disorganized
and shattered by this defeat. A great deal of censure
was cast at the time upon these men, and they were accused of
arrant cowardice by the Northern press. Nothing could have
been more unjust, and many who joined in denouncing them,
afterward behaved much more badly. They attacked with spirit
and without hesitation, and were unable to close with us on account
of their heavy loss in men and horses. They returned
two or three times to the attack until they found their efforts
unavailing. They could not use their sabers, and they found
their breech-loading carbines only incumbrances. They may
have shown trepidation and panic toward the last, but, to an
enemy (while they were evidently trying to get away) they appeared
resolute although dispirited. I have seen troops much
more highly boasted than these were before their defeat, behave
not nearly so well. Johnson had been very confident. He had
boasted as he passed through Hartsville, that he would “catch
Morgan and bring him back in a band-box.”[Pg 224]
Hearing the day before the fight that Forrest was in his rear,
he had, very properly, pressed on to fight Morgan before the
former came up. His attack was made promptly and in splendid
style, his dispositions throughout the first fight were good,
and he exhibited fine personal courage and energy. I could
never understand his reason for giving battle the second time,
without fresh troops, when his men were already dispirited by
defeat, and pressed by an enemy flushed with recent victory.
He could have gotten off without a fight by a prompt retreat,
immediately after his last message to Morgan, and protected, by
a judicious use of detachments composed of his best men as
rear guards. He was evidently a fine officer, but seemed not to
comprehend the “new style of cavalry,” at all.
Our loss, in both engagements, was seven killed and eighteen
wounded. The conduct of men and officers was unexceptionable.
Captains Cassell and Hutchinson and Lieutenant White,
of the Second Kentucky, and Lieutenant Rogers of the advance
guard, were especially mentioned. Nothing could have exceeded
the dash and gallantry of the officers and men of Gano’s squadron.
The junior Captain Huffman had his arm shattered early
in the action, but went through it all, despite the suffering he
endured, at the head of his men.
Colonel Morgan in his address to his men, thus summed up
the results of the last two days:
“All communications cut off between Gallatin and Nashville;
a body of infantry, three hundred strong, totally cut to pieces or
taken prisoners the liberation of those kind friends arrested by
our revengeful foes, for no other reason than their compassionate
care of our sick and wounded, would have been laurels sufficient
for your brows. But soldiers, the utter annihilation of General
Jonson’s brigade, composed of twenty-four picked companies,
sent on purpose to take us, raises your reputation as soldiers,
and strikes fear into the craven hearts of your enemies. General
Johnson and his staff, with two hundred men taken prisoners,[Pg 225]
sixty-four killed, and one hundred wounded, attests the resistance
made, and bears testimony to your valor.”
Having burned all the bridges the day before that were under
his then immediate supervision, and preferring Hartsville as a
place for a somewhat lengthened encampment, he returned to
that place on the evening of the 21st. A good writer and
excellent officer of Morgan’s old command very truly says, in reference
to the choice of Hartsville in this respect:
“The selection of this little unknown village was a proof of
Morgan’s consummate strategic ability.” It was a point where
it was literally impossible to entrap him. While here, a deserter
taken in arms and fighting, was tried by court-martial, sentenced
and shot in presence of the command. Forrest reached Hartsville
on the 22nd with a portion of his command. He had hurried
on to reinforce Morgan before the latter fought Johnson, fearing
that the entire original force of infantry, artillery and cavalry,
which had left McMinnville with Johnson, would be too much
for us. Learning that he was no longer needed in Sumner
county, he crossed the river without delay, and in a day or two
we heard of his sweeping every thing clean around Nashville.
So demoralizing was the effect of the system of immediately
paroling prisoners, and sending them off by routes which prevented
them from meeting troops of their own army, which had
been instituted and practiced, for some time previously to this
date, that General Buell found it necessary to issue an order on
the subject.
Morgan and Forrest inaugurated the system, and hundreds of
prisoners were induced to fall into their hands, by the facilities
thus offered them of getting home, who, otherwise, would never
have been captured. A man, thus paroled, was lost to the Federal
army for months at least, for, even if not inclined to respect
his parole, it was hard for the authorities to find him. His gun
and equipments, also, became ours. In his order, General Buell
said: “The system of paroles as practiced in this army has run
into an intolerable abuse. Hereafter no officer or soldier belong[Pg 226]ing
to the forces in this district will give his parole not to take
up arms, for the purpose of leaving the enemy’s lines, without
the sanction of the General commanding this army, except when
by reason of wounds or disease, he could not be removed without
endangering his life. Any parole given in violation of this
order will not be recognized, and the person giving it will be required
to perform military duty, and take the risks prescribed by
the laws of war,” etc.
This order was issued on the 8th of August, before the surrender
of Boone. While we were at Hartsville a case of types
and printing press had been found in the deserted room once
occupied as a printing office, and were immediately put to use.
Poor Niles, who had once been an editor, went to work and organized
a corps of assistants from among the practical printers,
of whom there were several in the Second Kentucky, and issued
a small sheet which he called the Vidette. It was printed on
any sort of paper that could be procured, and consequently, although
perfectly consistent in its politics, it appeared at different
times in different colors. Sometimes it would be a drab, sometimes
a pale rose color, and, my recollection is, that Boone’s
surrender was recorded upon a page of delicate pea-green.
Colonel Morgan finding the pleasure that it gave the men,
took great pains to promote the enterprise. The Vidette was
expected with as much interest by the soldiers of the command,
and country people, as the Tribune or News, by the reading
people of New York. General orders were published in it,
promotions announced, and complimentary notices made by
Colonel Morgan of the deserving. Full accounts of all our
operations were published, and the reports of the various
scouting parties filled up the column devoted to “local news.”
The editors indulged in the most profound and brilliant speculations
on the political future, and got off the ablest critiques upon
the conduct of the war. As every thing “good” was published,
some tremendous and overwhelmingly decisive Confederate
victories, of which the official records make no mention, even by[Pg 227]
name, were described in the Vidette, and the horrors of Federal
invasion were depicted in terms which made the citizen reader’s
blood freeze in his veins.
Contemporary papers were encouraged, or rebuked, as the case
might require, with becoming zeal, and the “pestilent opposition
sheets” were attacked with that felicitous but inexorable sarcasm
which distinguishes editorial contests. The rhetorical expression
of contempt or indignation, and the large share which
these passions had in the leading articles, justly entitled the
“Vidette” to an eminent place among the journals of the period.
About this time there had recently been another call for some
hundreds of thousands of men by the Federal Government, and
Morgan hoped to avail himself of the disinclination of the Kentuckians
to be drafted, to increase his own force. He had dispatched
many recruiting agents into the counties of Southern
Kentucky, and had instructed them to inform all young men
who wished to avoid the draft, that the best way to do it effectually,
was to join him. As a great many preferred (of the two
armies) the Confederate, they came, when forced to a decision,
to the latter. Many, too, had long hesitatingly contemplated
“joining Morgan,” and the imminent danger of being placed,
forcibly, in the other army, quickened their wits and resolution,
and they came.
Adam R. Johnson and Woodward, who were at this time operating
very successfully in Southwestern Kentucky, got a large
number of recruits seeking to avoid the draft. A great many
came to Morgan—enough to fill up Desha’s company, and, besides
increasing all the old companies, to add another company
to the regiment. This one was lettered M, and was commanded
by Captain W.H. Jones, who became a fine officer, although he
had then seen no service. To remedy all trouble from the inexperience
of the Captain, Colonel Morgan, in accordance with
his usual policy, appointed, as First and Second Lieutenants,
Sergeants Thomas Quirk and Ben Drake of Company A. Both
had previously distinguished themselves, and both made their[Pg 228]
mark as officers. Henry Hukill, another Sergeant of Company
A, and an excellent soldier, was appointed First Lieutenant of
Company L. Gano, also, recruited another company for his
squadron at this time. It was a large and fine one, and was
commanded by Captain Theophilus Steele, formerly Surgeon of
the Second Kentucky infantry, but he was one of that kind of
Surgeons, who, in war, prefer inflicting wounds to curing them.
A short repose at Hartsville was interrupted by the most
welcome and stirring summons we had ever received. This was
an order from General Kirby Smith to Colonel Morgan, to meet
him at Lexington, Kentucky, on the 2nd of the coming month
(September).
It will be impossible for the men, whose history I am writing,
to ever forget this period of their lives. The beautiful country
in which it was passed, the blue-grass pastures and the noble
trees, the encampments in the shady forests, through which ran
the clear cool Tennessee waters, the lazy enjoyments of the
green bivouacs, changing abruptly to the excitement of the
chase and the action, the midnight moonlit rides amidst the
lovely scenery, cause the recollections which crowd our minds,
when we think of Gallatin and Hartsville, to mingle almost inseparably
with the descriptions of romance. In this country
live a people worthy of it. In all the qualities which win respect
and love, in generosity, honesty, devoted friendship, zealous
adherence to what they deem the right, unflinching support of
those who labor for it, in hospitality and kindliness, the Creator
never made a people to excel them. May God bless and prosper
them, and may they and their children, only, at the judgment
day, “arise from that corner of the earth, to answer for the
sins of the brave.”
CHAPTER X
Bidding our friends at Hartsville farewell, we set out for the
heart of Kentucky on the morning of the 29th. Never were
men in higher and more exultant spirits, and cheer after cheer
rang from the front to the rear of the column, and when these
evidences of enthusiastic joy at length ceased the way was enlivened
with laugh, jest, and song. Passing by the Red Sulphur
Springs, we reached Scottsville, in Allen county, Kentucky,
on that night and encamped at 12 o’clock a few miles beyond.
Stokes’ and Haggard’s regiments of Federal cavalry were reported
to be in that section of the country, and the necessity
for somewhat careful scouting could not be ignored. We saw
nothing of them, however, and resuming our march early the
next morning, reached Glasgow about 10 a.m.
At Glasgow we found rumors prevailing, as yet undefined and
crude, of Kirby Smith’s advance through Southeastern Kentucky.
Our friends in Glasgow welcomed us with their usual kindness
and after enjoying their hospitality for some hours, we marched
off on the Columbia road. Encamping that night at Green river,
we reached Columbia, in Adair county, on the next day about
12 p.m., and remained there until the next morning.
The reason for the slow marching of the last two days, had
been Colonel Morgan’s anxiety to obtain some information of
the two howitzers, which were being escorted from Knoxville,
under charge of his brother and Aide-Campe Captain C.H. Morgan,
with an escort of seventy-five men. This escort was composed
of men who had been granted furloughs, and of convalescent
sick and wounded men, returning to the command. These men
were all well armed, and were under the immediate command
of Captain Allen, who was assisted by several excellent officers.[Pg 230]
When this party reached Sparta, it marched, in accordance with
instructions sent there for its guidance, to Carthage, and thence
to Red Sulphur Springs, following, then, directly in the track
of the column. Stokes’ cavalry heard of them, and pursued.
Once, this regiment came very near falling foul of them. The
party had encamped late at night, and as a measure of precaution,
the horses were taken back some distance into the woods,
and the men were made to lie down in line, concealed by the
brush—the howitzers were planted to sweep the road. No fires
were lighted. Shortly afterward, the regiment in pursuit of
them passed by, moving not more than twenty yards from the
line, without discovering it; whether a discovery would have
benefited the said regiment, will never be known, although
there are many private opinions about the matter.
When the party reached Glasgow—it was in the middle of the
night—Captain Morgan could get no information about the
whereabouts of the command for some time. He was supposed
to be a Federal officer. At last he was recognized and, at once,
got the necessary information.
On the same occasion, an incident occurred, which illustrated
well the coolness and self-possession which characterized the men
of Morgan’s command, in the peculiar service to which they
were inured. A party of some twenty men had been sent, before
Colonel Morgan left Hartsville, to carry dispatches to Johnson
and Woodward, inviting them to co-operate with Morgan.
In returning, this party learned that Colonel Morgan was on the
march for Central Kentucky, and immediately changed route to
join him the more speedily, and this change brought them to
Glasgow at this time. Neither of these parties knew of the
other’s presence, or anticipated any such meeting, until they suddenly
encountered in the streets of Glasgow. Fortunately, the
party coming from the West was under the command of a young
officer of more than ordinary coolness and shrewdness, as well
as daring—Lieutenant Houston Hopkins. Each of these detachments
had every reason to believe that the other was an[Pg 231]
enemy. The bulk of the command had long passed this point,
so long that the rear-guard, scouts, every thing of the kind,
ought to have been gone, and the enemy in considerable numbers
was not far off. Yet, with a sort of instinct, each forbore to
fire, until more positively assured of what the other was. They
came within twenty yards of each other—so close that the officers
of each, could hear the muttered speculations of the others as
to their probable character.
The larger detachment, under Captain Allen, immediately
formed across the road, and advanced slowly, with guns at a
“ready.” The other wheeled rapidly, and fell back about two
hundred yards, halted, and also formed. Lieutenant Hopkins
then rode back to within a short distance of Captain Allen, and
entered into a parley with him, which, of course, soon ended in
recognition. When it is remembered that the first wish and
impulse of both parties, when two hostile detachments meet, is,
generally, to get the first fire, and make the quickest dash, it
will be conceded that on this occasion there was exhibited rare
coolness and discretion.
Captain Morgan had dispatched a courier to his brother, informing
him of his line of march, which courier reached Columbia
soon after the command had gone into camp there. Gano’s
squadron was immediately sent back to reinforce the escort, and
met it shortly after it had left Glasgow. The necessary delay
for the arrival of the guns caused us to remain at Columbia for
two days. Resuming the march on the day after they came, at
an early hour the command moved in the direction of Liberty,
in Casey County. In the vicinity of this place, we saw, in the
brief time that we remained, more active and business-like bushwhacking
than ever before in our entire service. The hills along
the road seemed alive with them, and from behind every fourth
or fifth tree apparently, they were blazing away at us. Every
Southern reader will understand at once what sort of individual
is meant by a “bushwhacker”—that he is a gentleman of leisure,
who lives in a wild and, generally, a mountainous country, does[Pg 232]
not join the army, but shoots, from the tops of hills, or from behind
trees and rocks, at those who are so unfortunate as to differ
with him in politics. It is his way of expressing his opinions.
His style of fighting is very similar to that of the outlying scouts
of partisan cavalry, except that he esteems it a weakness and
an unnecessary inconvenience to take prisoners, and generally
kills his captives. Sometimes, and especially toward the latter
part of the war, these fellows would band together in considerable
numbers, make certain portions of the country impassable,
except to strong detachments, and even undertake expeditions
into neighboring sections.
There were “Union bushwhackers” and “Southern bushwhackers;”
in Kentucky, the former were more numerous. “It
is a gratifying reflection,” to use the language of one of Colonel
Clarence Prentice’s official reports, “that many of them will
‘whack’ no more.” In the Northern mind, bushwhackers and
guerrillas are confounded together, an egregious error in classification.
It is probable that the bushwhacker of this country
would answer exactly to the guerrilla of European warfare; but
the guerrilla of North America is, or rather was (for happily
he is almost, if not quite extinct), an animal entirely distinct
from either. Formerly the Northern press styled all the Southern
cavalry guerrillas, because they traveled about the country
freely, and gave their enemies some trouble. This, however,
was when the Federal cavalry used to still ride with pillows on
their saddles, were put to bed carefully every night by the General
commanding, and encamped on the march in the midst of infantry
regiments, who were instructed to see that their horses did not
hurt them, etc. When the hardy, dashing regiments of the latter
part of the war—after, indeed, the first eighteen months—began
to do real service, the Northern writers found that they
would be called on to record as cavalry operations the very kind
of affairs which they had been accustomed to chronicle as guerrilla
irregularities.
A guerrilla was, properly speaking, a man who had belonged[Pg 233]
to some army, and had deserted and gone to making war on his
private account. He was necessarily a marauder, sometimes
spared his former friend, and was much admired by weak young
women who were afflicted with a tendency toward shoddy romance.
On this march through Casey county, the bushwhackers were
unusually officious. The advance-guard, which for some reason
had gone on some distance in front, reached Liberty about two
hours before the column, and during that time were fairly besieged
in the place. Colonel Morgan himself made a narrow
escape. One fellow, more daring than the others, had come
down from the hills, and had approached within seventy yards
of the road. He fired at Morgan, missing him, but wounded a
little negro boy, his servant, who was riding by his side, receiving
some order. The man, who fired, at once ran back to the
hill, followed by one or two of our fellows from the head of the
column. He was killed by private, afterward Captain Thomas
Franks, who made an excellent shot, hitting the bushwhacker
in the head while he was running at top speed, and Franks himself
was going at a rapid gallop.
That night we reached Houstonville, about fourteen miles
from Danville, and learned there of General Smith’s complete
victory at Richmond, and of the probability that he was already
at Lexington. This news excited the men very much, and sleep
was banished from the camp that night. Early on the next
morning we started for a good day’s march, and reached Danville
about ten a.m., halted there some three hours, and, resuming
the march, reached Nicholasville, twenty-three miles
distant, and twelve from Lexington, at dusk.
On the next day, the 4th of September, the command entered
Lexington about 10 a.m., amid the most enthusiastic shouts,
plaudits, and congratulations. Colonel Morgan (as has been
said) and many of his officers and men, were formerly citizens
of Lexington, and many others came from the vicinity of the[Pg 234]
place; relations and friends, therefore, by the score, were in
the crowd which thronged the streets of the town.
The people of this particular section of Kentucky, known as
the Blue-grass region, had always been strongly Southern in
their views and sympathies, and this occasion, except that of
General Smith’s entrance a day or two before, was the first
chance they had ever had to manifest their political proclivities.
Some of them shortly afterward were very sorry, doubtless, that
they had been so candid. The command, at this time, numbered
about eleven hundred men. The Second Kentucky had been
greatly increased, and, after deducting all losses, was nearly, if
not quite nine hundred strong. Gano’s squadron numbered
about two hundred effectives. The rapidity with which recruits
came to Morgan was astonishing. Captain Breckinridge was
immediately granted authority, by General Smith, to raise a
battalion of four companies, to serve in Morgan’s brigade. He
was permitted to take his own company (I) out of the Second
Kentucky, as a nucleus for his battalion organization, and in a
very short time he had gotten three other large and fine companies,
and he could (if he had been permitted) have recruited a
regiment with as little trouble.
Gano was granted authority to raise a regiment, and in a very
short time had recruited three companies. Active service,
which necessitated rapid and continuous marching, interfered
for a time with the organization of his regiment, but it was
eventually completed. Second Lieutenant Alexander, of Company
E, Second Kentucky, was given permission to raise a
company, in the vicinity of Harrodsburg, Mercer county, and
in four or five days returned with a company of over sixty men,
which was admitted into the Second Kentucky, and lettered H,
a letter which had been in disuse in the regiment, since the partition
of the company which bore Alston into a Captaincy.
Lieutenant S.D. Morgan, of Company A, was also authorized
to recruit a company, and soon did it. It was admitted into[Pg 235]
the Second Kentucky as Company I, in place of Breckinridge’s.
The Second Kentucky now numbered twelve companies, and
nearly eleven hundred effective men. Almost immediately,
upon arriving at Lexington, Captain Desha resigned the Captaincy
of Company L. He was a very fine officer, and we all
regretted to part with him. He received authority to recruit a
regiment of infantry, and had partially succeeded, when the retreat
from Kentucky commenced. He then entered Colonel
Thomas Hunt’s regiment, the Fifth Kentucky infantry. In the
last year of the war he was offered a Brigadier’s commission,
but declined it upon the ground that ill-health would not permit
him to exercise the duties required of him, in such a station,
without delay. Private John Cooper, of Company A, was appointed
Captain in his stead—he had previously been elected
color-bearer of the regiment, when Colonel Morgan had directed
the officers to choose the best man in the regiment to bear a
flag presented to him by the ladies of the State.
Every company of the Second Kentucky was increased by
recruits, during the first week after our arrival. Two gentlemen,
Colonels Cluke and Chenault, were authorized to recruit
regiments for Morgan’s brigade, and immediately went to work
to do so.
As soon as the first greetings had been passed with our
friends, every man was curious to learn the particulars of General
Smith’s march through Southeastern Kentucky, and of the
fight at Richmond. General Smith had collected at Knoxville,
and other points in East Tennessee, some twenty thousand
men, and leaving eight thousand, under General Stephenson, in
front of Cumberland Gap, then occupied by the Federal General
G.W. Morgan, with eight or nine thousand men, he, with twelve
thousand men, and thirty or forty pieces of artillery, pressed
through the Big Creek and Rogers gaps (of the Cumberland
mountains), and marched rapidly for the Blue-grass country.
Master of Lexington, he would have the terminus of the two
railroads, and, indeed, one half of the State of Kentucky. A[Pg 236]
complete defeat of the forces, then in that region, would clear
his path to Louisville, in the one direction, and to Covington in
the other. He would be in no danger, until forces were collected
and organized in sufficient strength at Cincinnati, to
march against and push him away. As for Buell’s army, it was
General Bragg’s duty to take care of that. General Smith had
with his army about one thousand cavalry. This force, under
Colonel John Scott, advancing some distance in his front, fell
upon Metcalfe’s regiment, eleven or twelve hundred strong, on
the Bighill, fifteen miles from Richmond, and thoroughly defeated
and dispersed it. Even after this affair, the Federal
commander remained in ignorance of any force, besides the
cavalry under Scott, having approached in that direction, until
General Smith, having pressed on with wonderful celerity and
secrecy, had gotten within a few miles of Richmond.
Then every available man was concentrated at Richmond and
pushed out to meet the invading column. The collision occurred
on the 29th of August. General Smith had marched so rapidly,
his men had fared so badly (having subsisted for ten days on
green corn), and their badly shod feet were so cut by the rough
stony way, that his column was necessarily somewhat prolonged,
although there was little of what might be called straggling.
Consequently, he could put into the fight only about six thousand
men. Heath was some distance in the rear. He attacked as
soon as he came upon the enemy, drove them, and although
three several stands were made, his advance was never seriously
checked. The last stand, and hardest fight, was made in the
outskirts of the little town of Richmond itself, and when the
enemy was driven from the town, his route was complete. The
Federal commander General Nelson was wounded. The enemy’s
loss was over one thousand in killed and wounded, and six thousand
prisoners were taken and paroled. General Smith’s loss
was nine hundred in killed and wounded.
Scott with the cavalry, pressed the fugitives for many miles.
The route and disintegration of the Federal army was such, that[Pg 237]
perhaps not a single command maintained its organization, and
the stream of fugitives poured through Lexington all Saturday
night and Sunday, toward Louisville and Cincinnati. This decisive
victory finished General Smith’s part of the programme,
and closed his campaign, for the time, with the possession of all
that part of Kentucky. On the 1st of September, General
Smith took possession of Lexington, and on the 2nd or 3rd he
dispatched General Heath with five or six thousand men toward
Covington. General Smith issued the strictest orders for the
maintenance of order and discipline, and the prevention of excesses
or mal-conduct among his troops, of any description.
Such was the state of discipline that he had brought his army to
before, that these orders were little needed. He also went energetically
to work to encourage enlistments in his ranks, to organize
every department, necessary to the subsistence and
equipment of his army, and to collect supplies.
Notwithstanding the efforts that were made to induce the Kentuckians
to enlist as infantry, very few would do so, and those
who did, joined regiments which came in with General Smith;
not a single infantry regiment was raised during the time that
the Confederate army was in the State. All of the Kentuckians
who joined at that time, wanted to ride. As a people, they are
fond of horses, and if they went to war at all, they thought it a
too great tax upon them to make them walk.
A brigadier’s commission was given to Captain Abram Buford
(formerly of the regular army), a man well known and very popular
in this portion of Kentucky, and he was authorized to recruit a
mixed brigade of infantry and cavalry. He got three fine regiments
of cavalry, under Colonels Butler, Smith and Grigsby,
without any trouble, but not an infantryman. The two last of
the above named regiments, were subsequently assigned to Morgan.
One reason why so many enlisted in cavalry (independently
of the decided preference of the Kentuckians for that
branch of the service), was the fact, that companies and regiments
had, in many instances, their men bespoken and ready to enlist with[Pg 238]
them as soon as a favorable opportunity should occur. Many
(also), had made up their minds to join Morgan when he next
came through the country. Men who expected to become soldiers
(under such circumstances), would of course wish to join
the cavalry, and made all their preparations to enlist in that
arm of the service.
Had a decisive battle been fought and won by General Bragg,
there is little doubt but that the majority of that class of men,
who were waiting for that event before they enlisted, would then
have enlisted as infantry. Two or three days after we reached
Lexington, four companies of the Second Kentucky were sent
with the two howitzers, to capture the stockade at the bridge
over Salt river, on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and
burn the bridge. The expedition was under command of Captain
Hutchinson. This officer had some days previously been
made, at my request, Acting Lieutenant Colonel of my regiment
(the Second Kentucky), and he was always afterward addressed
by that title, and was subsequently given the position. Hutchinson
was a singularly active and energetic officer, and possessed
the shrewdness as well as daring which eminently qualified him
for the command of detachments. He made a tremendous march,
and arrived at his destination, before any Federal force, which
could have intercepted him or have marched to prevent his purpose,
heard of his coming.
The garrison of the stockade was some one hundred and fifty
strong. He placed his men in position around it, and planted
his howitzers to command it. He then sent Captain Bowles to
demand the surrender of the garrison, telling him that he would
allow but twenty minutes for the negotiation.
Captain Bowles approached under flag of truce and entered
into a parley with the enemy. They were quite willing to surrender
in less than twenty minutes, provided that one strange
stipulation should be conceded, viz: that the bridge would not
be burned. While Bowles was endeavoring to prove to them
the folly of such a proposition, the twenty minutes expired.[Pg 239]
Hutchinson, who was very literal in observing all that he said,
immediately caused his artillery to open without waiting for the
return of his envoy, and two shells were bursted just above the
stockade, wounding one of the inmates. This might have caused
the death of the bearer of the flag, as the garrison had, then, a
perfect right to shoot him. The effect of it on Bowles, however,
who was one of the very few men I have known, who, I believe,
never felt fear, was to render him indignant that his embassy
should be interrupted, just as he thought that it was about to be
successful, and he came galloping back at full speed, waving his
flag at his own friends, and shouting at the top of his voice,
“don’t shoot any more, they’ll be all right directly.”
The inmates of the stockade at the same time poured out,
without regard to rank, waiving pocket handkerchiefs, portions
of their nether garments hastily torn off, and whatever else, they
could lay hold of, that would serve the purpose. As soon, however,
as the howitzers opened, the skirmishers advanced, in accordance
with Hutchinson’s previous instructions, firing also,
and their fire drove the enemy back into the stockade.
Soon, however, all mistakes were rectified and an amicable
adjustment of the difficulty arrived at. The prisoners were immediately
paroled, the bridge thoroughly destroyed, and the detachment
returned. It was absent only a few days. The bridge
destroyed was four hundred and fifty feet long, and forty-six feet
high.
Almost immediately after Colonel Hutchinson returned to
Lexington, he was sent with Companies B, C, D, E, L and M
to report to General Heath, who had advanced to within five
miles of Covington, and withdrawing, needed cavalry. The utmost
consternation prevailed in Cincinnati during the time that
Heath was in the vicinity of Covington; the city was placed
under martial law, and every citizen was required to report himself
for military duty. So persistent were the detectives in
their search for treason, that all the business houses in the town
had to be shut up, and it became so frequent a matter to con[Pg 240]strue
thoughtless words into expressions of disloyal sentiment,
that it was unsafe to speak any other language than Dutch.
Thousands of respectable citizens, nightly left their comfortable
homes, to cross the river, and shiver and ache with apprehension
and fatigue, in the ditches around Covington. Many a tradesman
torn from his shop, got the manual mixed up with his accounts,
and lost the run of both; and as he sat in a rifle-pit,
with only one pontoon bridge (and that narrow) connecting him
with Cincinnati, he had to console him—the reflection that he
was performing a patriotic, duty, and letting his business go to
the devil.
The most telling maneuver against such an army, would have been to
send emissaries to stir up the street boys in Cincinnati
to an attack on the ungarrisoned shops; in such an event a precipitate
retreat would most probably have occurred from the
Kentucky side of the river.
For several days after Heath was close enough to have made
a dash at Covington, at any hour, there were no other defenders
in the works around the place than these extempore soldiers. A
very few only of their guns mounted were in a condition to be
worked, and the ammunition first provided was not of the proper
caliber. On the first, Gen. Heath came within sight of the works,
that he had prepared to attack, and just before he moved upon
them, received dispatches from Gen. Smith, instructing him not to
do so, but to be prepared to return at short notice. General
Smith expected to be soon called, to reinforce General Bragg,
with his whole force to fight Buell’s army before it reached
Louisville; he therefore wished every thing kept well in hand,
and esteemed the maintenance of the mobility of the troops
under Heath as of more importance than the capture of Cincinnati.
In the course of a few days, however, regular troops
began to arrive at Cincinnati, and they came in rapidly. When
Heath fell back, there was a formidable veteran force, there, of
perhaps twelve or fifteen thousand men. Hutchinson reported
to him at Walton twenty-five miles from Covington, and was at[Pg 241]
once ordered to duty on the front. For some days he was very
actively engaged immediately upon the ground which Heath had
just left. He was engaged in scouting for some distance above
and below Covington, to ascertain if there was any movement
by the river, as well as having to carefully watch all roads leading
out of the place. His various detachments had several
skirmishes, the most successful of which was made by a party
under command of Lieutenant Allensworth, who routed a much
larger body of the enemy and captured a number of prisoners.
Just before General Heath came down into that country, fifteen
young men of Boone county who had long wished to join
Morgan, hearing that Confederate troops might shortly be expected
in their neighborhood, banded together and attacked a
train of twenty-seven wagons guarded by fifty-one Federal soldiers,
dispersed the guard and burned the wagons. This party
with some twenty-five of their friends then equipped themselves
and set out to join us.
They were placed in the new Company I. In the service done
at this time, Hutchinson’s loss was slight, and he inflicted a good
deal upon the enemy. He took a number of prisoners. The
railroad was destroyed—track torn up and bridges burned—for
a good many miles. General Heath continued to fall back toward
Georgetown. After Hutchinson had been in command
upon the Covington front six or seven days, I sent him Company
A, and the next day followed myself with Company I. Colonel
Morgan was ordered to go to Eastern Kentucky and intercept
the Federal General Geo. W. Morgan on his march from Cumberland
Gap to the Ohio river. General Morgan had evacuated
the gap and gained two days march on the force watching it on
the other side. It was General Smith’s desire that Colonel Morgan
should blockade the roads in his front, and use every exertion
to retard his progress. By uniting with General Marshall’s
forces, it was hoped that Colonel Morgan, in the rugged, almost
impassable country, through which the Federal column had to
march, might stop it altogether, until another body of troops[Pg 242]
could be thrown upon its rear, and thus literally starve it into
surrender. As it was, Marshall remained inactive, and Morgan
after felling trees across the road, climbing up and down mountains,
and sticking close to the front of the column for six days,
was compelled to suffer the mortification of seeing it get away
triumphantly.
While Colonel Morgan was employed in the mountains, General
Smith directed me to annoy the enemy as much as possible
in the direction of Covington. On the evening that I arrived at
Walton, where Hutchinson had been encamped, I found him in
retreat, pressed by a superior force of the enemy. We soon
found that we could not efficiently check the enemy’s advance,
and accordingly fell back to Crittenden, a little place
seven miles from Walton. The enemy encamped five miles from
the place. On the next morning we were driven out of Crittenden,
and as the enemy continued to advance, I dispatched
General Heath that I believed it was an advance upon Lexington.
The enemy’s force consisted, as we afterward ascertained, of
about seven thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, or, perhaps
a little more, and eight pieces of artillery. Skirmishers
were thrown out, in strong lines, for a mile or more on each side
of the road. The country was open and easily traversed by troops,
enabling them to strengthen any part of the line that might need
it. We could therefore hope to effect little; and after carefully
reconnoitering, without finding a convenient opening, we recontented
to move slowly in their front, forcing them to keep up
their troublesome precautions.
About 1 or 2 p.m., leaving scouts to observe them, I marched
rapidly to Williamstown. This place is just upon the northern
edge of the rugged Eagle hills. Thence I moved eastwardly to
Falmouth, a small town on the Central Kentucky Railroad,
about forty miles from Covington, and twenty miles from Williamstown—indeed
nearly equi-distant from the Dry-ridge road,
or Cincinnati and Lexington pike (upon which the enemy were
moving), and the Maysville and Lexington pike, which also[Pg 243]
needed some watching. I was then in a position to observe
every movement upon the entire front, and was, so to speak, in
the center of the web commanding all the avenues which should
be guarded. If the enemy continued upon the road upon which
he was then advancing, he would have to force his way through
General Heath’s forces, advantageously posted amid the hills of
the Eagle creek. If he turned to the left to seek a road not so
well defended, he would have to come by Falmouth, and therefore
Falmouth was the point where the cavalry watching him
should be.
On the road, however, and before I reached Falmouth, scouts
brought the information that the enemy had fallen back to Walton,
and also informed me of what his strength apparently was.
It was plain that no force of that size would attempt to march
on Lexington. Shortly afterward, other scouts, which had been
sent to watch the Ohio river, came from Warsaw, a little town
on its banks, and reported that a number of boats laden with
troops had gone down the river toward Louisville. This information
explained every thing. Finding that Heath had withdrawn,
and Cincinnati was no longer threatened, this force,
which had driven us away from Walton, had been sent to clear
the country of troublesome detachments, and also to attract
attention in that direction, and conceal the concentration of
troops at Louisville. Walton is twenty-five miles from Falmouth.
On the day after reaching the latter, I sent a flag of truce to
Walton, with dispatches, which General Smith had instructed
me to forward to Cincinnati. The flag was borne by Captain S.D.
Morgan, who betted with the Aide of the commanding General,
that he (Morgan), would drive in his pickets within forty-eight
hours—he won the wager. The entire strength of the six
companies, which Colonel Hutchinson had taken to this country,
was not quite five hundred men—the two additional companies
A and I, did not swell the total effective to six hundred men.
All of those were large ones, but many men (from four or five
of them) were on furlough. When the flag of truce returned,[Pg 244]
Captain Morgan gave me such an account of the enemy that a
desire, previously conceived, to visit him was greatly increased.
Morgan could, of course, see but little; he was, however, vigilant
and shrewd, and drew accurate inferences from what he saw.
He was satisfied that, while careful and systematic guard was
kept, the troops were all green and could be easily surprised.
He said that so far as he could learn, there was no attempt made
at scouting, and that a total ignorance prevailed among them of
what was going on, a few hundred yards even, beyond the outposts.
This latter information was confirmed by the reports of all my
scouts, and was in accordance with the habits of raw men and
officers. He thought, moreover, from something he had heard,
that cavalry were encamped a mile or two from the infantry,
and the country people, some of whom from that neighborhood
visited us, stated that the cavalry were encamped a mile and a
half from the main body, and nearer Walton. We had tried in
vain to get hold of the cavalry on the day we were driven away
from Walton; it kept carefully behind the infantry.
Moving from Falmouth late in the afternoon, with nearly the
entire command, I marched until about twelve o’clock at night,
and halted at a point on the Independence road, about ten miles
from the enemy’s encampment. Scouts were immediately sent
out to ascertain as nearly as possible the exact location of the
pickets, and the condition of every thing about the encampments.
They were instructed not to fire upon, or in anywise alarm the
pickets, or do anything which might make them suspect our
vicinity.
The scouts observed their instructions closely, and did not
see the pickets at all, but inquired of the people who lived
near the encampment, and were told that no change had occurred
in the last day or two, in any respect, in the posts on the
different roads. After this information I was satisfied that I
would be able to get upon the Georgetown and Covington pike,
upon which the enemy was encamped, by a country road which
runs into it from the Independence pike, without alarming[Pg 245]
the main body. I could then move rapidly to the point where
the cavalry was encamped, and defeat it before the infantry
came to the rescue. The infantry encampment was about two
miles north of Walton, and this by-road comes into the pike
about one thousand yards from the site of the encampment, and
between it and Walton.
The column was accordingly put in motion again at daybreak,
and marched rapidly. Just at sunrise we reached the Georgetown
and Covington pike, and saw standing, in sight of the
point where we would enter, ten cavalry pickets. The column
was at once halted, and arrangements made to capture them.
They had not yet seen us. A brief reconnoisance showed an
infantry regiment on post, some three hundred yards further
down the road. There was now no hope of passing this point
without discovery by the main body, and it only remained to
make the most out of the situation.
Lieutenant Messick, of Company A, was sent with ten men to
take in the cavalry videttes, and Lieutenant Roberts, commanding
the advance-guard, was sent with a portion of it to try the
same game with the infantry. He went right into the midst of
it. The column was moved forward at a gallop, as soon as the
pickets were disturbed, and turned in the direction of Walton;
the rear company, however, being carried at full speed to the
assistance of Lieutenant Roberts. One of the howitzers which
had been brought along, was planted at the point where we entered
the pike, to cover our retreat, if it were pressed. When
I reached the little squad of Lieutenant Roberts with the company
which I took to assist it, I found it, or rather a fragment
of it, in a situation which perhaps was never paralleled daring
the war.
Lieutenant Roberts was still further down the road, and toward
the encampment, with a portion of the detachment, picking
up stragglers. Sergeant Will Hays stood with six men in the
midst of a company of sixty-nine Federal infantry. The infantry
seemed sullen and bewildered, and stood with their rifles[Pg 246]
cocked and at a ready. Hays had his rifle at the head of the
Lieutenant commanding, demanding that he should order his
men to surrender, and threatening to blow his brains out if he
encouraged them to resist. Hays’ six men were grouped around
him, ready to shoot down any man who should raise a gun
against him. I thought it the finest sight I had ever seen. The
arrival of the company decided the infantry to surrender, and
the caps and bayonets having been taken off of their guns, they
were sent off, guarded by the men which had been brought up
to complete their capture. Lieutenant Roberts had gone, with
his mere corporal’s guard, into the infantry regiment, had captured
one company, and run the balance back into camp.
The men of this regiment were very raw and green. Hays
had persuaded them for some time, that he was an officer of their
own cavalry, and it was only when he peremptorily ordered them
to follow him to Walton, that they suspected him. After sending
off the prisoners, four or five of us rode on down the road to
join Lieutenant Roberts, and soon found him, bringing back
more prisoners. We were now farther in toward the encampment,
than the regiment on picket had stood, and had a fair view
of it. We saw the whole force form, and it was a very pretty
sight. The regiments first formed on their respective campgrounds,
and then took their positions in line of battle, at a
double-quick. They were finely drilled, although very raw.
The artillery was run into position, and behind every thing,
peeping over the shoulders of the infantry, were our friends the
cavalry, that we had taken so much pains to see.
While we were looking on, a staff officer came galloping toward
us, evidently not knowing who we were, and taking us for
some of his pickets not yet driven in. He came right up to us;
thinking his capture certain, Captain Morgan, who thought that
he recognized in him, the officer with whom he had made the bet
two days previously, rode forward, saluted him, and told him
he was a prisoner. He, however, did not seem to be of that
opinion for he wheeled his horse, coming so close to us in doing[Pg 247]
so as to almost brush the foremost man, and dashed back at full
speed, despite the shots that were fired at him.
The skirmishers, who were not more than two hundred yards
off, soon induced us to leave, and we galloped after the column.
Eighty or ninety prisoners were taken, and were sent on to Lexington,
as soon as we got back to Falmouth. The enemy did
not know for some hours, that we were entirely gone, and indeed
rather expected during that time to be attacked in force. I
perhaps ought to have attacked, but the disparity of forces, and
the knowledge that the enemy could detect it as I advanced, deterred
me.
On the next day I sent Captain Castleman with Company D,
to Foster’s landing on the Ohio river. He fired upon a Government
transport loaded with troops, but could not bring her to
with his rifles. He captured the regular packet, and was shelled
by one of the river gun boats, suffering no loss.
At this period the Home-guard organizations were disbanding,
or being incorporated into the Federal army. At Augusta,
a town in Bracken county, about twenty-five miles from Falmouth,
and situated on the river, forty odd miles above Cincinnati,
there was a regiment being formed out of some Home-guard
companies. This organization had already begun to give
trouble, and one or two of its scouting parties had even ventured
within a short distance of Falmouth. I was also informed
that all sorts of men, whether willing or not, were being placed
in its ranks. I determined therefore to break it up, before it
became formidable. There was a ford, moreover, just below
Augusta, by which the river could be crossed at that season
without difficulty. I wished to take the town, if possible, with
little loss, and cross into Ohio, and marching toward Cincinnati,
so threaten the city that the troops at Walton would be
hurried back to protect it.
Leaving Falmouth in the morning of one day, I could (if allowed
to cross the river without opposition) have been in the
vicinity of Cincinnati at daylight of the next day. Two days,[Pg 248]
therefore, after the expedition to Walton, I started from Falmouth
with about four hundred and fifty men—leaving Company
D and some details behind to observe the enemy at Walton and
for other purposes.
On the way to Augusta, I came upon a large scouting party
from that place but it dispersed before I could attack—it was
cut off, however, from Augusta and prevented from taking part
in the fight there. We marched through Brookville and about
7 a.m. reached the high ground in the rear of Augusta and
which perfectly commanded the town. Two small stern wheel
boats lay at the wharf, to assist in the defense of the place. A
twelve pounder was mounted on each of them; their sides were
protected by hay bales and they were manned by sharpshooters
in addition to the gunners. These boats commanded the turnpike
which led into the town from Brookville (by which road we
were advancing) but about a mile from the town I turned the
column from the road and approached the hill (upon which I
took position) through the fields. The crest of this hill is perhaps
two hundred feet above the level of the river (at low water)
and about six hundred yards from its bank. The town runs
back to the foot of the hill. From our position on the summit
of this hill we could distinctly see the Home-guards going into
the houses and preparing for fight, but a portion of them were
already ensconced in the houses near the head of the street by
which we entered the town a little while afterward. These latter
kept themselves concealed while we remained on the hill and
our ignorance of their location cost us dearly. Seeing that the
boats commanded the street by which I wished to enter the town,
I determined to drive them away before moving the bulk of the
command from the hill.
Accordingly, having dismounted and formed Companies B, C,
E, I and M, and planted the howitzers on the highest point I
could find, where they could probably chuck every shell into the
boats, I ordered Company A, and the advance-guard to cross
the Germantown pike and take position near the bank of the[Pg 249]
river in the eastern end of the town. Here they would be enabled
to annoy the troops on the boats very greatly with their
rifles and would also be in position to assist in reducing the garrisoned
houses, when the fight in town commenced. In that
part of the town there were no houses occupied by the enemy.
Captain Cassell of Company A, was instructed to dispose of his
own company and the advance-guard in accordance with these
views and to take command of both. I especially charged him
to let no man approach that part of the town where I expected
to have to fight on horseback, but to bring the men on foot when
he heard firing.
As soon as Cassell had gotten into position, the howitzers
were opened upon the boats. Several shells burst near them
and one penetrated the hull of the “Flag Ship,” as I suppose I
may term the boat upon which the Captain commanding both
of them had his quarters. Cassell’s riflemen, also made themselves
very disagreeable, and after firing only three shots, the
“fleet” withdrew. As long as the boats were in range the “Bull
pups” kept after them and they steamed up the river and out
of sight. Having driven off these gun boats, upon which I
knew the officer commanding in the town chiefly relied for the
defense of the place, I believed that I would have no more
trouble and that the garrison would surrender without more
fighting. I immediately entered by the principal street with
Companies B and C. After these two companies had gotten well
into the town and in front of the houses into which the defenders
of the place had gone unseen by us, a sharp fire was suddenly
opened upon them, killing and wounding several. I at
once ordered the men to gather on the right hand side of the
street, although the fire came from both sides, and to take shelter
as they best could.
A fierce fight at once began. I sent for Companies E, I, and
portions of L and M, leaving three sections of each to guard the
road in our rear. I made the men force their way into the
houses, whence they were fired upon. Captain Cassell came to[Pg 250]
join me as soon as he heard the firing, but unfortunately Lieutenant
Roberts forgot, in his ardor, the order that no men should
enter the town mounted, and he dashed up to the scene of the
fight with his men on horseback, greatly increasing the confusion.
The Sergeant, who had charge of the howitzers, opened upon
the town, when he heard the firing, and his shots did us as much
harm as they did the enemy. Lieutenant Roberts was killed
almost instantly, two or three men and several horses of his
guard were also shot, and the crowding of horses into the street
added to the disorder. In a few minutes, however, some method
was restored. Details of men were posted in the middle of the
street in front of every house, to fire at the inmates when they
showed themselves, and prevent them from maintaining an accurate
and effective fire. Other details were made to break in
the doors of the houses and enter them. The artillery was
brought into the town and turned upon the houses in which the
most stubborn resistance was kept up. Planted about ten paces
from a house, aimed to strike about a yard below the sills of the
windows, beneath which the defenders were crouched (except
when taking aim), and double-shotted with grape and canister,
the howitzers tore great gaps in the walls. Two or three houses
from which sharp volleys were kept up were set on fire. Flags
of truce, about this time, were hung out from several windows,
and believing that a general surrender was meant, I ordered the
fires to be extinguished. But only those who shook the white
flags meant to give up, and the others continued to fight. One
or two men putting out the fires were shot. I immediately
ordered that every house from which shots came should be
burned. A good many were soon in flames, and even then the
fighting continued in some of them. My men were infuriated
by what they esteemed bad faith, in a continuance of the fight
after the flags of truce were displayed, and by the loss of their
comrades and of some favorite officers. I never saw them fight
with such ferocity. Few lives were spared in the houses into
which they forced their way. Several savage hand-to-hand[Pg 251]
fights occurred. As private James March, of Company A, was
about to enter a house after battering down the door with the
butt of his rifle, a Home-guard, armed with musket and bayonet,
sprang out and lunged at him. March avoided his thrust,
knocked him down with his clubbed gun, and then seizing the
other’s musket, pinned him to the ground with the bayonet. A
somewhat similar affair happened to a private of Company B.
whose name I have forgotten. As he, also, was forcing his way
into a house, a strong, active fellow bounded out and cut at him
with a large heavy knife, made from a blacksmith’s file, such as
were formerly often seen in Kentucky. He closed quickly with
his assailant, whose blow consequently missed him, and in a
moment they were locked in each other’s arms. The Home-guard
could not use his knife, for his right arm was stretched
over the other’s shoulder in the position in which it had fallen
with the blow. The other wore one of the largest sized, heaviest,
army pistols. He had dropped his gun, and as he drew his
pistol, his enemy clasped the lock with his left hand, and he
could not cock it. Both were powerful men, and fighting for
life, because quarter was not thought of by either. At length
the Confederate raised the pistol to a level with the other’s
head, and although he could strike only by the inflection of the
wrist, inflicted blows with the heavy barrel upon his enemy’s
temple, which stunned him. Then dashing him to the ground,
the Confederate beat in his skull with the butt of his pistol.
The fighting lasted about fifteen or twenty minutes, when Colonel
Bradford, the commander of the organization, surrendered. It
was with great difficulty that his life, or the lives of his men,
could be saved. Fighting in narrow streets, close to their opponents,
the loss in my command was, of course, severe, and a
great many wounds proved mortal, on account of the balls coming
from above, ranging downward.
My loss was twenty-one killed, and eighteen wounded. I had
about three hundred and fifty men engaged. Among the killed
were some matchless officers. Captain Samuel D. Morgan (a[Pg 252]
cousin of Colonel Morgan) killed several men with his own hand
before he fell. He had been a good soldier, and gave promise
of unusual merit as an officer. His gallantry and devotion were
superb, and he was always urgent to be placed on perilous service.
He was a mere boy. Lieutenant Greenberry Roberts had
been made First Lieutenant of Company A after Lieutenant
Smith’s death. He much resembled his predecessor. He had
been placed in command of the advance-guard when Lieutenant
Rogers was compelled to return to his company (E) upon the
promotion of Captain Hutchinson. He was nineteen years old
when killed; gay, handsome, and a universal favorite. His
courage was untempered by any discretion or calculation, and
unless bound by positive instructions, he would go at any thing.
Lieutenant Rogers was a model officer and gentleman. He was
killed while exerting himself to save the inmates of a house from
which the shot which killed him came.
Lieutenant King, a gallant boy, brevet Second Lieutenant of
Company E, fell dead the moment afterward across Rogers’
body, and, a rather singular circumstance, an old man of that
company, devotedly attached to both these officers, private
Puckett (one of the few old men in the regiment) rushed to
raise them and was instantaneously killed, falling upon them.
Captain Kennett, of Company B, just made Captain in the place
of Captain Allen, who was elected Lieutenant-Colonel of Butler’s
regiment, and Lieutenant George White, of the same company,
were mortally wounded, and died very soon. Both were veterans
of the old squadron, and very brave men.
Most of the casualties occurred in the first few minutes of the
street fight, before proper dispositions were made to reduce the
garrisons of the houses, and while the latter were taking deadly
aim.
Captain Cassell’s bold attack on the gunboats saved us much
greater loss. Some of the women came (while the fight was
raging) from the part of the town where they had retired for
safety, to the most dangerous positions, and waited upon the[Pg 253]
wounded, while the balls were striking around them. The majority
of the people of this town, or a large proportion at least,
were Southern sympathizers. The regular members of the
Home-guard regiment were collected from the country for miles
around. A number of the Southern men were also pressed into
the service.
The last house set on fire was that of James Armstrong.
After the garrison in it were disposed of, efforts were made to
save it. The owner bade me “let it burn,” but urged me to collect
and destroy all the arms of the Home-guards, that they
might not give trouble again. During the fight a boat, coming
from Cincinnati, hove in sight of the town, but did not come on.
It was reported, but incorrectly, that she carried troops.
This fight prevented the excursion into Ohio. All of the
ammunition for the howitzers was shot away. I was anxious to
remove my wounded and dead, and had two hundred prisoners
whom I wanted to carry off. About four p.m., employing all
the carriages and light wagons that I could find about the town
and neighborhood to carry the wounded, who could stand transportation,
and the dead bodies, which were not too much mutilated,
I went back toward Falmouth. That night we reached
Brookville after dark, and passed the night there, the gloomiest
and saddest that any man among us had ever known.
Brookville is a little hamlet, nine miles from Augusta, and
eighteen from Maysville. This latter place had been taken by
Gano, a week or two before, without a shot. He left next day,
and the Union men there became belligerent, sent for regular
troops, collected Home-guards, “resolved” that they would
fight, bleed, and die, if they got another chance, and distinguished
themselves very much in that way. News reached Maysville of
the fight at Augusta on the same evening that it occurred, and
about four o’clock next morning troops left there to march to
the relief of Augusta. At seven a.m. of that morning, I sent
off the train of dead and wounded, and all of the prisoners, except
about eighty, whom I intended, to parole. As soon as they[Pg 254]
were fairly started, I ordered Colonel Hutchinson to follow with
the command. I retained Sergeant Hays and ten men of the
advance-guard with me. Most of the prisoners left were Southern
men, who had been forced to fight, and a few others were
men paroled at Armstrong’s request.
About 9 or 10 a.m., while engaged in writing out paroles, I
was informed by my orderly that a force of Federals was coming
into town on the Maysville pike. I had placed no pickets after
the regular detail had been withdrawn upon the march of the
column, and nearly all of the ten men left with me were in the
court-house at the time by my side. We immediately passed
out and mounted our horses. Sargeant Hays formed seven men
and we dashed through the enemy. There were perhaps fifty
or sixty cavalry in the town—they were scattered about, and
had no chance to stop us. Several shots were fired upon both
sides. None of my party were hurt. One of the enemy was
killed and three seized by the bridle reins, as we went through
them, and carried off prisoners. A few men were still unparoled
when the alarm was given. Private Conrade remained and paroled
them all, then followed us through the enemy. He was
subsequently promoted for other instances of the coolest daring.
A recruiting officer had been captured that morning and placed
in charge of Privates Franks and McVae. They were eating
breakfast when the enemy entered the town and were nearly
captured. They placed their prisoner on a bare-backed horse
and carried him off across the country, taking fences and every
thing else at a gallop.
We lost one man taken prisoner, he could not get to his horse.
The enemy’s force was composed of the cavalry which first entered
and about four hundred infantry, with two pieces of
artillery. After we had gotten out of the town, we turned and
galloped back to it again, to create, if possible, a diversion in
favor of the three men I supposed to be still there. The infantry,
however, immediately drove us off. As we then moved rapidly
after the command, we met the rear-guard, which always[Pg 255]
marched a good distance in the rear of the column, coming back
at a gallop to reinforce us. The officer in charge of it, one of
the very best in the regiment—Lieutenant Ash Welsh, had returned
as soon as he heard the firing. His men and himself
were dressed in dark clothing, and I thought when they first
came in sight, that they were a part of the enemy which had cut
us off. They also mistook us for the enemy, and we charged
each other at full speed. When within about fifty yards of each
other and just about to fire, a mutual recognition fortunately
prevented it.
Soon afterward, I met Hutchinson coming with the command,
but I turned him again. The enemy shelled the road after we
were all gone. Learning that Captain Castleman had fallen
back from Falmouth (in anticipation of an advance from Walton),
to Cynthiana, I went to that place also. It turned out that the
rumor of the intended attack upon Falmouth was altogether unfounded.
I placed the command in camp at Cynthiana, and
sent the prisoners and all of the wounded who were not too
much exhausted to travel, to Lexington.
On the next day the funeral of Lieutenant Rogers was celebrated.
He was a native of Cynthiana, and the citizens of that
place had loved him and were proud of his record. They came,
the true, warm-hearted yeomanry, to witness his soldier-burial,
and sympathize in the sorrow of his aged and heart-broken
father. The men remained in camp at Cynthiana from the 30th
of September until the night of the 4th of October. During that
time I made several promotions which were confirmed by an exercise
of General Morgan’s appointing power.
Thomas Franks, private in the Mississippi company and
“member in high standing” of the advance guard, was made
Captain of Company I. He was a worthy successor of Captain
Morgan. By a series of gallant acts and uniform good conduct
and assiduous and thorough discharge of his duty, he had well
won his preferment. Brevet Second Lieutenant William Messick
(of whom a great deal remains to be said), was made First[Pg 256]
Lieutenant of Company A. Privates Parks and Ashbrook were
made respectively First and Second Lieutenants of Company E.
They were gallant, and had fought in the front of every fight
since the organization of the regiment. Sergeant Wm. Hays was
offered his choice of Captaincy of Company B, or the First Lieutenancy
of the same company, with the privilege of commanding
the advance-guard. He choose the latter—like the gallant man
that he was, loving danger honestly encountered and honor
fairly won.
General Morgan unhesitatingly approved all of these appointments—complimenting
the appointees and declared that he
had contemplated their promotion earlier. In pure, unflinching
courage, soldierly desire for personal distinction, devotion to
the interests of the service, pride in the reputation of their own
corps, respect for and zealous obedience to their own commanders,
energy and intelligence—these officers had no superiors.
I have already said that Colonel Morgan had been sent to
Eastern Kentucky, to intercept the Federal General Morgan on
his march to the Ohio river—I can not do better than copy verbatim
a description, given of his operations by an excellent
writer. “Succeeded in collecting about a thousand cavalrymen,
all recruits except Gano’s Texians, Company F, of Duke’s regiment,
and such of our battalion (Breckinridge’s) as had seen
service—many insufficiently armed and not well organized. We
reached Richmond on the morning of the 20th, and received information
that the Federals were moving from Manchester, via
Booneville to Mt. Sterling, so as to strike the Ohio at Maysville.
Morgan concentrated at Irvine on the 21st and moved toward
Proctor, turned to the right, and, the head of his column was
at Campton, Wolfe county. It became necessary to make a
detour, and by rapid marches head them near Hazel Green.
Colonel Ashby and General Stephenson were to press them in
rear; General Humphrey Marshall was to move to Mt. Sterling,
and either stop their march or strike them in flank. Our
part was merely to delay them until Stephenson or Marshall[Pg 257]
could strike. The enemy beat us to Hazel Green; another detour
and night march and we headed them near West Liberty.
“On the afternoon of the 26th, Morgan sent two companies
under Captain Will Jones to strike the flank of the marching
column. He knew that the column must be stretched out, for
some miles; that a vigorous attack would cause the halt of the
leading command, so that the column might close; this delay
would help us. Jones attacked on foot, striking the rear-guard
of the second advance brigade, and utterly surprising them;
killed several, captured some dozen prisoners, scattered a drove
of cattle through the woods, and gave warning of our presence.
Morgan and his staff and Major Breckinridge had ridden along
to see Jones’ fight, though Jones had complete command, and is
entitled to the credit.
“After this little brush was over, Morgan rode with some
others, to the main road to get some information. Doctor Tom
Allen had the wounded (all Federals) moved to a church near
by, to dress their wounds. Morgan, Breckinridge, Alston, and
others rode a few hundred yards forward to where a beautiful
creek crossed the road, and beyond the creek was a short, steep,
wooded hill. With culpable carelessness the whole party stopped
to water the horses, and one or two dismounted, and kneeling
upon rocks were drinking, when suddenly a regiment in line
of battle, made its appearance upon the crest of the hill, not a
hundred yards distant, and fired a full volley at us. Fortunately
the hill was so steep they overshot us. Behind was a long
lane with high fences and cleared fields on each side. Death or
capture seemed inevitable. But with perfect coolness Morgan
shouted. ‘Tell Colonel Breckinridge to advance; Major Jones,
open your guns.’ The regiment fell back over the hill, and we
in greater hurry evacuated those premises. The country being
Union, it was very difficult to get reliable information, which
General Morgan said must be had.
“While we were talking we saw some mountaineers with guns
approaching: Morgan said instantly, ‘I’ll pass for Colonel De[Pg 258]
Courcey’ (a Federal Colonel about Morgan’s size). When the
men came up they asked who we were; Alston said ‘That’s
Colonel De Courcey.’ ‘Why, the boys told us De Courcey’s
brigade was behind, and we were mighty glad to see you.’ It
had been raining, and we had on gum cloths, which assisted the
plan. Morgan asked, ‘Wouldn’t you like to join us?’ ‘Oh
no,’ answered one of the scoundrels, ‘We can do you more
good at home, killing the d——d secesh.’ With a sweet approving
smile, Morgan said, ‘Oh, have you killed many secesh?’
‘I reckon we have. You’d have laughed if you had seen us
make Bill (I have forgotten the last name) kill his brother.’
‘What did you do it for?’ ‘Why you see Bill went South,
and we burned his house, and he deserted; we arrested him, and
said we were going to hang him as a spy: he said he’d do any
thing if we let him off, that his family would starve if we hung
him. Last Wednesday we took him, and made him kill his
brother Jack. He didn’t want to do it, but we told him we’d
kill them both if he didn’t, and we made him do it.’
“Morgan kept his face unchanged, and drew from these murderers
full accounts of other crimes; and from one of them,
who had watched our column, a pretty fair account of our own
strength. They gave us all they knew of the Federal strength,
of the politics of the citizens on the road, and of the roads and
country. After getting from them all he wanted, he said, ‘I
am John Morgan, and I’m going to have you hung.’ Unfortunately,
however, General Morgan’s leniency, which always
got the better of him when he paused to think, induced him to
spare them.”
The writer goes on—”Upon the 27th, another skirmish, and
captured a few prisoners; the enemy evidently waiting for the
column to close up. On the 28th, through the treachery of a
guide, we were led into an ambush, out of which we extricated
ourselves with small loss. Upon the 29th, Company A, Breckinridge’s
battalion, and Company F, Duke’s regiment, under
Major Breckinridge, ambushed the enemy from the side of a[Pg 259]
semicircular bluff, around which the road runs. The column
came to within twenty yards of the line of ambush, and its head
was nearly beyond the extreme flank of the two companies; in
advance were seventeen cavalrymen, some sitting with, their legs
thrown over the pommels of the saddle, some eating pawpaws;
the insignia of rank upon their shoulders could be easily distinguished.
Suddenly over a hundred rifles belched forth death
and fire—again their volley echoed through the mountains;
when the smoke cleared away, the head of the column had disappeared
like a wave broken upon a rock, and before a line
could be formed or a gun unlimbered, we were gone, and laughed
as we marched to the music of their guns shelling the innocent
woods over the mountain from us.
“After this they changed their tactics, and marched with a
heavy line of skirmishers in front and upon both flanks. After
shelling the woods for hours, we fought vigorously with the axe
and torch, felling trees, barricading the road, destroying bridges,
and making every barricade cost a skirmish and time, for with
us time was every thing. The country was not fit for cavalry
operations. The 30th passed away; the 1st of October was
half gone. From the morning of the 26th to noon of the 1st,
over five days, the Federals had marched not over thirty miles,
less than six miles a day. We had done our work, but where
was Marshall or Stephenson? Since the morning of the 29th,
we had been anxiously looking for news from them. Couriers
had been constantly sent to both, and to General Smith. We
knew that the enemy were living on meat alone, for we, in their
front, went without bread for over three days, living on fresh
beef, without salt, half-ripe corn, and the luscious pawpaws. If
Marshall or Stephenson had attacked, the army of the gap
would have been prisoners. Whoever was to blame, let him be
censured. Morgan, with raw recruits, badly armed, accomplished
his part of the task. About noon, October 1st, Morgan received
an order from General Smith to withdraw from George Morgan’s
front, not to attempt further to impede his progress, but rather[Pg 260]
assist him to leave the State, and rejoin the main army at Lexington,
or wherever it might be.”
This writer tells well the story of the campaign in the mountains,
and the reader can derive from it a vivid idea of what it
was like. Toward the latter part of the expedition, the bushwhackers
became very troublesome, and wounded several men.
Little Billy Peyton, the Colonel’s orderly, once rode down on
one of them and tried to scare him into surrender with an empty
pistol. The fellow had two guns—he had just fired one at Peyton,
and the other was loaded. He answered Peyton’s demand
to surrender with a shot from the latter. Throwing himself
along his horse’s side, Billy escaped being killed, but was
slightly wounded. His chief regret, however, was that his assailant
escaped.
On the afternoon of the 4th, Colonel Morgan reached Lexington.
Before he got in, he became satisfied that an immediate
evacuation was imminent, and he was induced to believe that
the enemy were nearer than was actually the case. Anxious to
get his command together again, and learning where I was, he,
with characteristic promptitude, dispatched me a courier, bidding
me keep a careful lookout, and if “cut off, come by way of
Richmond and Lancaster.” He knew that I would be mightily
exercised by such a dispatch. I had heard nothing of the
meditated evacuation of Lexington, and without waiting for
orders from General Smith, I at once moved with my command,
and marched all night. When I reached Lexington, I found
that preparations were being made for its evacuation. I hoped,
as did thousands of others, that it would be only a temporary
one, and that we could return after a decisive victory, which
should give us fast possession of Kentucky. I mentioned this
hope to Colonel Morgan, and I shall never forget his laugh, and
the bitter sarcasm with which he spoke of the retreat, which he
seemed to certainly expect. As he rapidly mentioned the indications
which convinced him that we were going to give up
the stakes without an effort to win them, my faith, too, gave[Pg 261]
way, and my heart sank. He generously defended General
Bragg, however, saying, that his course was perfectly consistent,
inasmuch as he had come into Kentucky to escape a fight, and
was now about to go out for the same reason, and that, moreover,
a commander-in-chief always did well to avoid battle, no
matter what was the spirit of his troops, when he felt demoralized
himself.
On the 6th of October, Colonel Morgan left Lexington on the
track of General Smith’s infantry forces, with Cluke, Gano and
the Second Kentucky. It was thought probable that the enemy
would advance from the direction of Frankfort, and an engagement
in the vicinity of Versailles, where a portion of General
Smith’s infantry were stationed, was anticipated. Morgan,
whose entire force amounted to some fifteen hundred effective
men, was ordered to take position between Versailles and
Frankfort, and attack the enemy if he made his appearance.
The bulk of General Smith’s command was eight or ten miles
farther to the southwest, in the vicinity of Lawrenceburg.
Breckinridge’s battalion had been detached on the 4th, and
was ordered to report first to Buford, then to Wharton, and
finally to Ashby. It was engaged in the skirmishing which the
two latter officers successfully conducted with the enemy, on the
road between Lawrenceburg and Harrodsburg, and Harrodsburg
and Perryville. The movements of Buell had completely mystified
General Bragg, and the latter was not only reduced to the
defensive, but to a state of mind pitiable in the extreme. He
acted like a man whose nerves by some accident or disorder,
had been crazed; he was the victim of every rumor; he was alternately
exhilarated and dejected. If the enemy dallied, or the
distance between them happened to be increased, he became bold
and confident; when a collision was imminent, he could contemplate
nothing but defeat and disaster. Of that kind of fear
which induces provision against dangers which are far in the
future, he knew nothing, and he was equally as ignorant of the
courage which kindles highest when the hour of final issue has[Pg 262]
arrived. General Bragg, had, as a subordinate, no superior in
bravery—he had, as a commander, no bravery at all. While I
shall make no sort of comment upon General Bragg’s character
or his conduct, which I do not thoroughly believe to be correct,
and just and warranted by the record and by the circumstances
of that time and of this—I yet deem it my duty to candidly
warn my readers to receive with due allowance every line written
about Bragg by a Kentuckian.
The wrongs he did Kentucky and Kentuckians, the malignity
with which he bore down on his Kentucky troops, his hatred and
bitter active antagonism to all prominent Kentucky officers,
have made an abhorrence of him part of a Kentuckian’s creed.
There is no reason why any expression of natural feeling
toward him should be now suppressed—he is not dead, nor a
prisoner, nor an exile.
General Bragg came to the western army with a most enviable
reputation. He had already displayed those qualities as an
organizer, a disciplinarian, and a military administrator, in
which he was unrivaled. His dashing conduct at Shiloh, and
the courage and ability (there exhibited in perfection), in which
(as a corps commander), no man excelled him, had made him a
great and universal favorite. The admirable method which
(when second in command at Corinth, and really at the head of
affairs), he introduced into all departments; the marvelous skill
in discipline, with which he made of the “mob” at Corinth a
splendidly ordered, formidable army, and his masterly evacuation
of the place (totally deceiving Halleck in doing so), caused him
to be regarded, almost universally, as the fit successor of Albert
Sydney Johnson, and the coming man of the West.
The plan of retiring altogether from Mississippi, and of suddenly
moving the army, by the Southern railroads, away around
into Tennessee again—losing the slow, dull-scented Halleck—if
conceived by a subordinate, was, at least, attributed to him. It
was brilliant in itself, and was successfully executed. Men
waited, in breathless interest, the consummation of such a career.[Pg 263]
But right there he began to fail, and soon he gave way entirely.
It is almost impossible now to realize that the Bragg of the
spring and the Bragg of the autumn of 1862, are identical.
When he reached Chattanooga, he showed for the first time vacillation
and a disposition to delay. He crossed the river on the
28th of August with twenty-five thousand infantry, beside artillery
and cavalry. He moved over Waldron’s ridge, up the
Sequatchy valley, through Sparta, into Kentucky, seeking to
beat Buell to Munfordsville. The disposition of Buell’s forces
has already been given in a former chapter. His army, about
forty or forty-five thousand strong, was scattered over a wide
extent of territory, in small detachments (with the exception of
the forces at Battle creek and at McMinnville—each about
twelve or fourteen thousand strong).
This disposition was rendered necessary by the difficulty of
obtaining supplies—it was also requisite to a thorough garrisoning
of the country. Had General Bragg, as soon as he crossed
the river, marched straight on Nashville, General Buell could
not possibly have met him with more than twenty thousand men.
General Buell did not issue orders for the concentration of his
troops until the 30th of August, although preparations had been
made for it before. This concentration was effected at Murfreesboro’.
It then became apparent to him that General Bragg
was pushing for central Kentucky, and it became necessary that
Buell, to save his communication, should march into Kentucky
also. General Bragg had the start and the short route, and
reached Glasgow on the 13th of September; then taking position
on the main roads at Cave City, while Buell, with all the expedition
he could use, had gotten only so far as Bowlinggreen, he
cut the latter off from Louisville and the reinforcements awaiting
him there.
General Buell’s army had been decreased by the detachment
of a garrison for Nashville. After an unsuccessful attack (with
the loss of two or three hundred men), by a small Confederate
force upon Munfordsville—the garrison of that place, over four[Pg 264]
thousand strong, subsequently surrendered on the 17th. What
now was to hinder General Bragg, holding the strong position of
Munfordsville, from stopping Buell, calling Kirby Smith, with
his whole force, to his assistance, and out-numbering, crush his
adversary? This question has been asked very often. How
long would the raw troops at Louisville have withstood the attack
of Bragg’s veterans when their turn came? General Bragg
discovered that the country was barren of supplies—that one
of the richest, most fertile regions of Kentucky, could not
support his army for a week, and he withdrew to Bardstown.
Buell finding the road clear, marched on to Louisville. His immense
wagon train, more than twenty miles long and the flank
of his army were exposed, and with impunity by this movement.
It was certainly not expecting too much of General Bragg, as
commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces in Kentucky, to
expect that he would (after this was done) make up his mind
whether he was going to fight or not, without farther delay. If
he did not intend to fight, would it not have been wiser to have
marched back on Nashville, while Buell was marching on Louisville,
to have taken that place and to have established himself
on the banks of the Cumberland with less of loss, fatigue, and
discontent among his troops, than existed when after his long,
harassing, wearying marches through the mountains, he halted
at Murfreesboro’ much later? Kirby Smith could have remained
in Kentucky long enough to collect and secure all the
supplies—he had demonstrated that he could take care of himself,
and if he had been hard-pressed, he could have retreated
more rapidly than any pursuer could follow. If General Bragg
did intend to fight, why did he not concentrate his army and
fight hard?
After Buell marched to Louisville (which he reached on the
29th of September), Bragg took position at and about Bardstown.
Our line, including General Smith’s forces, may be described
as running from Bardstown, on the extreme left, through
Frankfort and Lexington, to Mount Sterling on the right flank.[Pg 265]
It was an admirable one. However threatened on front or
flanks, the troops could be marched to the threatened points, by
excellent roads. The base at Bryantsville was perfectly secure—roads
ran from it in every direction—and it was a place of
immense natural strength. The force available, for the defense
of this line, was quite forty-nine thousand infantry, General
Bragg’s Staff officers represent the force of infantry (which
entered the State with General Bragg) to have been twenty-five
thousand. General Smith’s infantry forces (including Marshall)
numbered twenty-four thousand [so estimated by General Smith
himself]. There were perhaps one hundred and thirty pieces
of artillery in all. The cavalry, all told, was about six thousand
Strong (including Morgan and Buford), making a grand total
of about fifty-six thousand men.
Buell moved out from Louisville on the 1st of October. His
advance was made just as might have been anticipated, and as
many had predicted. Not caring to involve his whole army in
the rough Chaplin and Benson hills, he sent detachments toward
Frankfort and Lawrenceburg, to guard against any movement
on Louisville, and to distract Bragg’s attention from his (Buell’s)
main design, and make him divide his army. In this latter intention
he perfectly succeeded. The bulk of his army marched
through Bardstown and Springfield to Perryville, to get in
Bragg’s rear and upon his line of retreat. The force sent to
Frankfort, five or six thousand strong, under Dumont, broke up
the inaugural ceremonies of the Provisional Government, which
General Bragg, as if in mockery of the promises he had so
lavishly and so confidently made to his own Government, and to
the people of Kentucky, and of the hopes he had excited, had
instituted. He made one of the first and best men of the State,
a man of venerable years and character, held in universal respect
for a long life of unblemished integrity, beloved for his
kind, open, manly nature, and especially honored by the Southern
people of Kentucky for his devotion to the cause—General
Bragg made this old man, who had been unanimously indicated[Pg 266]
as the proper man for Provisional Governor of Kentucky, tell
the people, who crowded to listen to his inaugural address, that
the State would be held by the Confederate army, cost what it
might. At the very time that General Bragg so deceived Governor
Hawes, and made him unwillingly deceive his people, the
Confederate army had already commenced to retreat.
This force, which came to Frankfort, was the same which
General Smith was prepared to fight at Versailles, its real
strength not being at first known. A day or two afterward it
came out upon the Versailles road, and was ambushed by Colonel
John Scott, and driven back with smart loss. General
Smith, hearing that the enemy were advancing in force to Lawrenceburg,
and that they had occupied that place with an advance
guard, ordered Buford to drive them out with his cavalry,
and followed with his whole force. The establishment of the
enemy at Lawrenceburg, and upon the road thence to Harrodsburg,
would have completely cut off General Smith from General
Bragg. The force advancing toward Lawrenceburg, was Sill’s
division, perhaps six or seven thousand strong in effectives.
This division had diverged from the main army at the same
time with Dumont’s.
General Smith’s forces were arranged at Lawrenceburg (which
was not occupied by the enemy) and on the road thence to Harrodsburg
on the 6th. Sill’s division fell back across Salt river
and into the rugged Chaplin hills, pressed by a portion of General
Smith’s infantry, Colonel Thomas Taylor’s brigade in advance.
Several hundred prisoners were taken. The position
of General Smith’s forces was not materially changed during
that day and the next, although they continued to draw nearer
to Harrodsburg. The main body of the enemy had in the mean
time concentrated its marching columns and moved to the vicinity
of Perryville, 58,000 strong, on the evening of the 7th.
The detachments which advanced to Frankfort and toward
Lawrenceburg, were not more than 12,000 strong in all. So
rugged and difficult of passage is the country through which[Pg 267]
these detachments had to pass, that a comparatively small force
could have prevented their junction at Lawrenceburg and held
both at bay, leaving the bulk of the Confederate army free to concentrate
at Perryville. Even had their junction been permitted,
three thousand such cavalry as Bragg had at his disposal could
have retarded their march to Harrodsburg for several days.
They could not have forced their way along the road in less than
two or three days, and as many would have been required to
make a detour and join Buell. In that time the battle of Perryville
could have been decided. But so completely was General
Bragg in the dark about Buell’s movements that, when he first
heard of the advance from Louisville, he supposed it was a movement
of the whole Federal army upon Frankfort, and he ordered
General Polk “to move from Bardstown, by way of Bloomfield,
toward Frankfort, to strike the enemy in flank and rear,” while
General Smith should take him in front. This order was evidently
issued under an unaccountable and entire misapprehension
of the true state of affairs, but showed a nerve and purpose
which promised well. General Bragg must certainly, when he
issued it, have supposed that General Buell’s whole army was
coming from that direction. How strange is it that a commander
who could thus resolve to fight his foes, when he believed
them to be united, should fear to encounter them separately.
Whatever may be the verdict upon General Polk’s disobedience
of orders, whether it was one of those cases in which a subordinate
can rightfully exercise this discretion or not, the fact of
General Bragg’s incompetency looms up in unmistakable proportions.
The most remarkable feature of General Bragg’s conduct was
this strange, unexampled vacillation. There was perhaps never
afforded such an instance of perfect infirmity and fickleness of
purpose. He had, there can be little doubt, resolved to retreat
without delivering battle before the 1st of October. He nevertheless
sought to fight at Frankfort (as has been seen) a few
days afterward. Again, immediately afterward, he did his best[Pg 268]
to avoid battle when it could have been delivered (as all but
himself thought) under far more favorable circumstances. No
one now doubts, I presume, that General Bragg fought at Perryville
with a fragment of his army, not to win a victory, but to
check the enemy and cover his retreat.
After General Polk moved to Perryville, General Bragg, of
course, learned of the advance of the enemy in that direction,
and must have known that it was in strong column, or he would
not have permitted sixteen thousand troops to collect there to
oppose it. He was still in error regarding the other movements,
and left the larger part of his army to confront the forces maneuvering
about Lawrenceburg and Frankfort. One glance at
the map will show the reader that, if the enemy was really advancing
in heavy columns by these different routes, it was clearly
General Bragg’s best policy to have struck and crushed (if he
could) that body threatening him from the south. If he crushed
that his line of retreat would be safe, and he could have fought
the other at his leisure, or not at all, as he chose. He could
have fought (if it had continued to advance) at Bryantsville, or
gone after and attacked it. If, on the contrary, he had concentrated
to fight at Frankfort or Lawrenceburg, defeat, with this
other force on his line of retreat, would have been ruinous.
Even complete and decisive victory would have left him still in
danger, having still another army to defeat or drive away. He
would have been, in either case, between his foes, preventing
their junction, and in a situation to strike them in succession;
but in the one case his rear was safe, and in the other it was
threatened.
With the true trimming instinct, he elected to take a middle
course; he divided his army, and sought to meet both dangers
at the same time. Is it saying too much that he was saved
from utter destruction by the heroic courage, against vast odds,
of that fragment of his army which fought at Perryville? It is
the popular idea that a commander is out-generaled when he is
deceived. Military phraseology can mystify the popular mind,[Pg 269]
but it can not eradicate from it this idea. Buell certainly deceived
Bragg, and by sending detachments, numbering in all
not more than twelve thousand, through a country from which a
mere handful of men could have prevented them from debouching,
he kept thirty thousand men, the bulk of General Bragg’s
army, idle, and rendered them useless until the game was decided.
After the battle of Perryville (where he certainly got the better
of the forces opposed to him)—an earnest of what might
have been done if the whole army had been concentrated—and
after an accurate knowledge had been obtained, of how Sill’s
and Dumont’s detachments had deceived him into the belief
that they were the whole Federal army—General Bragg had his
entire army concentrated at Harrodsburg. The two armies then
fairly confronted each other, neither had any strategic experiments
to fear, on flank or rear, for Sill’s division was making a
wide and prudent circuit to get to Buell, and Dumont was stationary
at Frankfort. It would have been a fair, square, stand
up fight. It is, now, well known that there was not the disparity
in numbers which General Bragg and his friends claimed to
have existed. There was less numerical inequality, between the
armies, than there has been on many battlefields—where the
Confederate arms have been indisputably victorious. Buell’s
strength was less than at any other period of the eight or ten
days that a battle was imminent. Sill had not gotten up—the
Federal army was fifty-eight thousand strong—minus the four
thousand killed and wounded at Perryville, and the stragglers.
Buell had in his army, regiments and brigades, of raw troops,
thirty-three thousand in all. Bragg had not more than five
thousand; most of them distributed among veteran regiments.
There were no full regiments, nor even full companies of recruits
in Bragg’s army, except in the Kentucky cavalry commands.
The two armies faced each other, not more than three
miles apart. The belief was almost universal, in each army,
that next morning we would fight. The troops thought so, and,[Pg 270]
despite the pouring rain, and their uncomfortable bivouacs, were
in high and exultant spirits. I know, for I saw them late in
the night, that some officers of high rank confidently looked for
battle, and were cheerful, and sanguine of victory.
What General Bragg really intended to do that night—perhaps
he himself only knows—and it is quite as probable that even he
does not know. He retreated on the next morning to Bryantsville.
There was no undignified haste about this movement—the
troops moved off deliberately, and in such order, that they
could have been thrown quickly, if it had become necessary,
into line of battle. General Bragg manifested no great anxiety
to get away from the vicinity of his enemy, and Buell certainly
manifested no strong desire to detain him.
On the next day (the 12th), the army remained at Bryantsville,
and took up its march for Lancaster about ten o’clock of
that night. It reached Lancaster on the morning of the 13th,
and divided. General Smith going to Richmond, and over the
Big hill, to Cumberland Gap, General Bragg with the troops
which had come into Kentucky under his immediate command,
passing through Crab Orchard.
It was hoped, and thought probable, that Buell would overtake
and force Bragg to fight at Crab Orchard. He did, indeed,
come very near doing so. Sending one division to Lancaster,
he moved with the bulk of his army toward Crab Orchard. He
failed, however, to intercept Bragg, and the latter moved on out
of Kentucky.
Thus ended a campaign from which so much was expected,
and which, had it been successful, would have incalculably benefited
the Confederate cause. Able writers have exerted all
their skill in apologies for this campaign, but time has developed
into a certainty, that opinion then instinctively held by so many,
that with the failure to hold Kentucky, our best and last chance
to win the war was thrown away.
Let the historian recall the situation, and reflect upon the influences
which in the, then, condition of affairs were likely to[Pg 271]
control the destinies at stake, and he will declare, that with this
retreat the pall fell upon the fortunes of the Confederacy.
All the subsequent tremendous struggle, was but the dying
agony of a great cause, and a gallant people. At that period
the veteran Federal army of the West was numerically much
inferior to what it ever was again; and even after the accession
of the recruits hastily collected at Louisville, it was much less
formidable than it subsequently became.
The Confederate army was composed of the veterans of
Shiloh, and the soldiers formed in the ordeal of Corinth. It
was as nearly equal to the Federal army, in numerical strength,
as there was any chance of it ever being, and the character of
its material more than made up for any inequality in this respect.
No man, who saw it in Kentucky, will doubt that it
would have fought up to its full capacity. Never was there a
more fiery ardor, a more intense resolution pervading an
army, than that one felt, when expecting a battle which should
decide whether they were to hold Kentucky, or march back
again, carrying the war once more with them to their homes and
firesides. Not even on the first day of Shiloh, when it seemed
that they could have charged the rooted hills from their bases,
were those troops in a temper to make so desperate a fight.
But a doting Æolus held the keys which confined the storm. It
will be difficult for any one who will carefully study the history
of this period, to avoid the conclusion that it was the crisis of
the war. First let the military situation be considered. While
at almost every point of subordinate importance the Confederates
were holding their own, they were at those points, where
the war assumed its grand proportions, and the issue was vital,
carrying every thing before them.
The Confederate Government had at length adopted the policy
of massing its troops, and the effect was instantly seen. In
Virginia, General Lee’s onset was irresistible. His army burst
from the entrenchments around Richmond, like the lava from
the volcano, and the host of McClellan, shrank withered, from[Pg 272]
its path. Driving McClellan to his new base, and leaving him
to make explanations to his soldiery, “Uncle Robert” fell
headlong upon Pope, and Pope boasted no more. Forcing the
immense Federal masses disintegrated and demoralized back to
Washington, General Lee crossed the Potomac and pushed into
Maryland. Jackson took Harper’s Ferry, while General Lee
fought the battle of Antietam with forty thousand men, and
again crippled McClellan.
Although the Confederate army recrossed the Potomac on the
18th of September, McClellan did not follow, but remained inactive
and by no means certain (as his dispatches show) that his
great adversary would not return to attack him. It was not
until late in October, that the Federal army again advanced, and
its march was then slow and irresolute. It will be seen then,
that on the 17th, the day on which Bragg took Munfordsville,
General Lee was fighting in Maryland. Ought not General
Bragg to have risked a battle (with his superior force) in Kentucky,
which (if successful), would have ruined the army opposed
to him and have laid the whole Northwest open to him,
unless McClellan had furnished the troops to oppose him, and
have placed himself at the mercy of Lee?
General Bragg did not (of course) know, on the 17th of September,
1862, that the battle of Antietam was being fought, but
he knew that General Lee had achieved great successes, and
that he was marching into Maryland. Again, what effect are
we at liberty to suppose that a decisive victory won by General
Bragg, at Perryville, on the 6th of October, would have had
upon the general result. General Buell, pressed by Bragg’s
entire army, would have had some trouble to cross the Ohio
river, after reaching Louisville; and the defense of the Western
States would have been then intrusted with many misgivings to
his shattered army. And yet the West would have been left
with no other defense, unless the army of the Potomac had (in
the event of such a necessity) been weakened and endangered,
that reinforcements might go to Buell. It may be said that all[Pg 273]
this is hypothetical. Of course it is. But what General ever
yet inaugurated and conducted a campaign, or planned and
fought a battle, and banished such hypotheses altogether from
his calculations? Why then should they be forbidden in the
criticism of campaigns and battles? It is not infallibly certain
that General Bragg could have defeated Buell. Nothing is
positively certain in a military sense, not even the impregnability
of a work built by a West Pointer, and pronounced so by
a committee of his classmates. War is a game of various and
varying chances. What I mean to urge, is, that General Bragg
should, under all the circumstances, have, by all the rules of the
game, risked the chances of a battle. But if there were strong
military reasons why an effort should have been made to accomplish
decisive results in this campaign, there were other and
even stronger reasons for it, to be found in the political condition,
North and South. The Confederacy, alarmed by the reverses
of the winter and spring, had just put forth tremendous
and almost incredible efforts. The South had done all that she
could be made to do by the stimulus of fear. Increased, aye,
even sustained exertion could have been elicited from her people,
only by the intoxication of unwonted and dazzling success.
No additional inducement could have been offered to the soldiers,
whom pride and patriotism had sent into the field, to remain
with their colors, but the attraction of brilliant victories
and popular campaigns. No incentive could have lured into the
ranks the young men who had evaded the conscription and held
out against the sentiment of their people, but the prospect of a
speedy and successful termination of the war. But there are
few among those who were acquainted with the people of Tennessee,
Alabama, and Mississippi, and their temper at that time,
who will not agree with me, that a great victory in Kentucky,
and the prospect of holding the State, perhaps of crossing the
Ohio, would have brought to Bragg’s army more Tennesseeans,
Alabamians and Mississippians, than were ever gotten into the
Confederate service, during the remaining two years and a[Pg 274]
half of the war. Such a victory would have undoubtedly added
more than twenty thousand Kentuckians to the army, for accurate
computation has been made of that many who were ready
to enlist, as soon as Bragg had won his fight. Five thousand
did enlist while it was still uncertain whether the Confederate
army would remain in the State. It is not perfectly certain
that more than five thousand volunteers were ever obtained, in
the same length of time, in any seceded State. All of these
men, too, followed the army away from Kentucky. Some of
General Bragg’s friends have assigned, as one reason, why he
left Kentucky without an effort to hold her, that he was disappointed
in not receiving more recruits from the State. It is
highly probable that such was the case. If an able General
had marched into his enemy’s territory, depending upon fighting
an early and hardly contested battle against a veteran
army, with the assistance of recruits just obtained, and whom
he could not have yet armed, his friends would have concealed
(if possible) his design, or if unable to do so, would have confessed
it a weakness unworthy of their chief, for which they
blushed. But it is not difficult to believe that General Bragg
entertained just such a plan. The Kentuckians had not the
confidence in the ultimate success of the Confederate cause, to
induce them to enlist in the Confederate service, risking every
thing, immediately sacrificing much, as they did so, when they
saw a magnificent Confederate army decline battle with a Federal
force, certainly not its superior. General Bragg was not only a
very shrewd judge of human nature, but even he might have
known that the irresolution and timidity he showed from the
first day he put foot in Kentucky, was not the way to inspire
confidence in any people—it certainly was the worst method he
could have adopted to win the people of Kentucky.
And now, to consider the effect which such a Confederate
success would have in the North: I do not allude to the effect
it would have had upon the wishes and plans of President and
Cabinet, upon the views of the Congress, nor upon the arrange[Pg 275]ments
of politicians and the patch work of their conventions,
but to the direction it might have given the popular mind and
the popular feeling. Men who were then serving in the Confederate
army, know little, of course, of the temper of the
Northern people, at that time, but many were impressed with
the idea, then, strengthened by conversation with Northern men
since, that, if ever the Northern people doubted of subjugating
the South, it was at that period.
Immense efforts had been made, immense sums had been expended,
immense armies had been sent against them, and still
the Southern people were unconquered, defiant, and apparently
stronger than ever. Would it have been possible to strengthen
this doubt into a conviction that the attempt to subdue the
Southern people was hopeless, and the war had better be stopped?
Volunteering was no longer filling the Federal armies. Now,
if the Confederate arms had been incontestably triumphant, from
the Potomac to the Ohio, if Northern territory had been in turn
threatened with general invasion, and if the option of continuing
a war, thus going against them, or making peace, had been submitted
at the critical moment to the Northern people, how would
they have decided? Would they have encouraged their Government
to draft them—or would they have forced the Government
to make peace? The matter was, at any rate, sufficiently
doubtful to make it worth while to try the experiment. When
that scare passed off, it is the firm conviction of more than one
man who “saw the war out” that the last chance of Confederate
independence passed away.
The Northern people then learned, for the first time, their
real strength; they found that bounties, and the draft, and the
freedmen, and importations from the recruiting markets of the
whole world, would keep their armies full, and nothing could
have made them despond again. The war then became merely
a comparison of national resources. Something was undoubtedly
gained by the march into Kentucky, but how little in comparison
with the golden opportunity which was thrown away. Had[Pg 276]
the combatants been equally matched, the result of this campaign
might have been a matter for congratulation; but when
the Confederacy was compelled, in order to cope with its formidable
antagonist, to deal mortal blows in every encounter, or
come out of each one the loser, the prisoners, artillery, and
small arms taken, the recovery of Cumberland Gap and a portion
of Tennessee, and the supplies secured for the army,
scarcely repaid for the loss of prestige to Confederate generalship,
and the renewal of confidence in the war party of the
North.
When Bragg moved out of Kentucky, he left behind him, uncrippled,
a Federal army which soon (having become more formidable
than ever before) bore down upon him in Tennessee.
The inquest of history will cause a verdict to be rendered, that
the Confederacy “came to its death” from too much technical
science. It is singular, too, that the maxims which were always
on the lips of the military savants, were often neglected
by themselves and applied by the unlettered “irregulars.” The
academic magnates declared in sonorous phrase that struck admiration
into the very popular marrow, the propriety of a General
“marching by interior lines, and striking the fragments of
his enemy’s forces with the masses of his own;” while Forrest,
perhaps, after doing that very thing, would make it appear a
very ordinary performance, by describing it as “taking the short
cut, and getting there first with the most men.”
It was a great misfortune to the Confederacy, too, that Fabius
ever lived, or, at least, that his strategy ever became famous.
Every Confederate General who retreated, when he might have
fought successfully, and who failed to improve an opportunity
to punish the enemy, had only to compare his policy to that of
Fabius, and criticism was silenced. Perhaps, if history had
preserved the reports of Hannibal, the “Fabian policy” would
not have become so reputable. At any rate, it is safe to assume
that, had Rome been situated on the same side of the
Mediterranean as Carthage, and had she been a seceded state,[Pg 277]
inferior in wealth, numbers, and resources, which the latter was
trying to “coerce,” Fabius would have been a most injudicious
selection as commander-in-chief. Historians are agreed, I believe,
that if the advice of this classic “Micawber,” to the consuls
Livius and Nero, had been followed by them, the battle of
“The Metaurus” would not have been fought, the two sons of the
“Thunder-bolt” would have effected their junction, and would,
in all probability, have forced the legions to another and final
“change of base.”
This campaign demonstrated conclusively the immense importance
to the Confederacy of the possession of East Tennessee,
and the strategic advantage (especially for offenso-defensive
operations) which that vast natural fortress afforded us.
While that region was firmly in the Confederate grasp, one half
of the South was safe, and the conquests of the Federal armies
of the rest were insecure. It is apparent at a glance that so
long as we held it, communication between the armies of Northern
Virginia and of Tennessee would be rapid and direct; co-operation,
therefore, between them would be secure whenever
necessary. While these two armies could thus practically be
handled almost as if they were one and the same, communication
between the Federal army of the Potomac and that of the Ohio
was circuitous, dilatory, and public. No advance of the enemy
through Tennessee into Georgia or Alabama could permanently
endanger the integrity of the Confederate territory, while the
flank and rear of his army was constantly exposed to sudden
attack by formidable forces poured upon it from this citadel of
the Confederacy.
Not only would the safety of invading armies be compromised,
and their communications (even if confined to the Tennessee
rivers), be liable at any time to be destroyed, but a sudden irruption
from East Tennessee might (unless an army was always
ready to meet it), place the most fertile portions of Kentucky,
perhaps, even a portion of the territory of Ohio, in the hands of
the Confederates. The success clearly attending the Con[Pg 278]federate
strategy in the first part of this campaign, would seem,
too, to establish the fact, that, until the concentration for decisive
battle becomes necessary, an army may (under certain circumstances),
be moved in two or more columns, upon lines entirely
independent of each other, and even widely apart, but which lead
to a common goal—and its operations will be more efficient—than
if it be marched en masse, by one route.
The advantages to be derived from such a disposition (as regards
freedom, and rapidity of movement, and facility of obtaining
supplies), are at once apparent, but certain strategic
advantages besides, may, in some cases, be thus secured. To
attempt it, in moving against a strong enemy, already posted at
the objective point, would be to give him the opportunity of attacking
and crushing the columns separately. But when, as
was the case in this campaign of General Bragg, two armies
make a race for the occupation of a certain territory which is
to be fought for, the army which is divided, while on the march,
if the columns are all kept on the same flank of the enemy, can
be worked most actively and as safely. More can be accomplished
by such a disposition of forces, in the partial engagements
and lighter work of the campaign, and the morale of the
troops will be all the better when the detachments are again
combined. Such campaigns might be made more frequently
than they are, and with success.
When the army was concentrated at Harrodsburg, on the
night of the 10th of October, Colonel Morgan was ordered to
take position about six miles from the town, on the Danville
pike, and picket the extreme left flank. Desirous of ascertaining
what was before him—as he could see the camp-fires of the
enemy stretching in a great semi-circle, in front of Harrodsburg—Colonel
Morgan during the night, sent Captain Cassell to reconnoiter
the ground in his front. The night was rainy and very
dark. The position of both armies, of the main body of each,
at least, was distinctly marked by the long lines of fires which
glared through the gloom, but we had not lighted fires, and[Pg 279]
Morgan thought that any body of the enemy which might be
confronting him, and detailed upon similar duty, would exercise
the same prudence. Cassell returned about daylight, and reported
that he had discovered, exactly in front of our position, and
about a mile and a quarter from it, a small body of cavalry on
picket, and a few hundred yards to their rear, a force of
infantry, perhaps of one regiment. He stated positively, also,
that one piece of artillery had passed along a narrow lane, which
connected the point where the cavalry was stationed with the
position of the infantry. The intense darkness prevented his
seeing the tracks made by the wheels, but he had satisfied himself,
by feeling, that, from the width of the tire, and the depth
to which the wheels had sunk into the soft earth, they could
only have been made by artillery. This report was verified on
the next day, in every particular.
Colonel Morgan, at an early hour, attacked the cavalry, with
a portion of his command, drove them back to the point indicated
by Captain Cassell, as that one where he had seen the
infantry, and sure enough, as he rode down upon it, he received
a volley from a regiment of infantry posted behind a stone fence,
and was opened upon by a single piece of artillery. The perfect
accuracy with which Captain Cassell, under circumstances peculiarly
unfavorable, noted every detail of the enemy’s strength,
position, etc., elicited the admiration of all of his comrades,
and among them, were perhaps, as shrewd, practiced, and daring
scouts as ever lived.
About 1 or 2 p.m., learning that General Bragg was falling
back to Bryantsville, Colonel Morgan sent pickets to Harrodsburg;
these soon sent word that the enemy had entered that
place. About the same time our scouts brought us information
that the enemy were in Danville also—about four miles from
our position. Having an enemy, now, upon three sides of him,
and finding that General Bragg’s rear was unmolested, Colonel
Morgan concluded, in the absence of instructions to fall back
also. He accordingly struck across the country to Shakertown,[Pg 280]
reaching that place, about 4 p.m. Colonel Morgan had always
respected the peaceful and hospitable “Shakers,” and had afforded
them, whenever it became necessary, protection, strictly
forbidding all members of his command to trespass upon them
in any way. We were consequently great favorites in Shakertown,
and on this occasion derived great benefit from the perfect
rectitude of conduct which we had always observed—”in
that part of the country.” The entire community resolved itself
into a culinary committee, and cooked the most magnificent
meal for the command. It was with deep regret that we
tore ourselves away on the next morning.
Colonel Morgan received orders, on the 12th, to proceed to
Nicholasville and remain there until the next day. On the 13th
we followed the army and reached Lancaster about midday. In
the afternoon the enemy, with whom General Wheeler had been
skirmishing all day, advanced upon Lancaster, and opened upon
the troops, collected about the place, with artillery. A little
sharp shooting was also done upon both sides. Two guns belonging
to Rain’s brigade of infantry, which was General Smith’s
rear-guard, were brought back and replied to the enemy’s fire.
One man of this section killed, was the only loss sustained upon
our side. The cannonading was kept up until dark. We held
the town during the night. Only one division of Buell’s army
(as has already been stated), was sent to Lancaster.
On the morning of the 14th, we moved slowly away from
Lancaster, our command forming (with Colonel Ashby’s) the extreme
rear-guard of General Smith’s corps. We were not at
all pressed by the enemy, and on the 15th halted at Gum Springs
twenty-five miles from Richmond. Colonel Morgan obtained
permission from General Smith to select his own “line of retreat”
from Kentucky, with the understanding, however, that he
should protect the rear of the infantry until all danger was
manifestly over. He represented to General Smith that he could
feed his men and horses, and have them in good condition at the
end of the retreat, by taking a different route from that pursued[Pg 281]
by the army, which would consume every thing. He explained,
moreover, how in the route he proposed to take, he would cross
Buell’s rear, taking prisoners, capturing trains, and seriously
annoying the enemy, and that establishing himself in the vicinity
of Gallatin again, he could, before he was driven away, so
tear up the railroad, once more, as to greatly retard the concentration
of the Federal army at Nashville. It was perfectly apparent
to General Smith, that all this could be done, and that,
when Morgan reached the portion of Tennessee which he indicated,
he would be in exactly the proper position to guard one
flank of the line, which Bragg’s army would probably establish.
He accorded him, therefore, the desired permission, and on the
17th, when the infantry had gotten beyond Big Hill and were
more than thirty miles from an enemy, Colonel Morgan turned
over to Colonel Ashby the care of “the rear” and prepared to
leave Kentucky in his own way. Colonel Ashby had proven
himself competent to the successful discharge of even more
important duty.
Colonel Morgan’s force consisted at this time, counting troops
actually with him, of the Second Kentucky (with the exception
of one company), Gano’s regiment (the Third Kentucky), and
Breckinridge’s battalion which had rejoined us at Lancaster—in
all about eighteen hundred men. Cluke’s and Chenault’s
regiments had gone with General Smith. The time and situation
were both propitious to such an expedition as he contemplated.
No such dash was looked for by the enemy who believed
that every Confederate was anxious to get away as rapidly
as possible by the shortest route. The interior of Kentucky
and the route Morgan proposed to take were clear of
Federal troops, excepting detachments not strong enough or
sufficiently enterprising to give him much cause for apprehension.
CHAPTER XI
On the 17th of October, Colonel Morgan marched from Gum
Springs in the direction of Lexington. The command was put
in motion about 1 p.m. Gano and Breckinridge were sent to
the Richmond pike, by which it was intended that they should
approach the town, and full instructions regarding the time and
manner of attack, were given them. Information had been received
that a body of Federal cavalry had occupied Lexington
a day or two previously, and Lieutenant Tom Quirk had been
sent to ascertain some thing about them; he returned on the
evening of the 17th, bringing accurate information of the
strength and position of the enemy. Colonel Morgan accompanied
my regiment (the Second Kentucky), which crossed the
river below Clay’s ferry, and moved by country roads toward
Lexington.
The immediate region was not familiar to any man in the
regiment, nor to Morgan himself, and, as it was strongly
Union, some difficulty was at first anticipated about getting
guides or information regarding the routes. This was obviated
by Colonel Morgan’s address. It was quite dark by the time
the column was fairly across the river, and he rode to the nearest
house, where, representing himself as Colonel Frank Woolford,
of the Federal service, a great favorite in that neighborhood, he
expressed his wish to procure a guide to Lexington. The man
of the house declared his joy at seeing Colonel Woolford, and
expressed his perfect willingness to act as guide himself. His
loyal spirit was warmly applauded, and his offer cordially
accepted. Under his guidance we threaded the country safely,
and reached the Tates-creek pike, at a point about ten miles
from Lexington, a little after midnight. About two o’clock we had[Pg 283]
gotten within three miles of the town, and were not much more
than a mile from the enemy’s encampment. We halted here, for,
in accordance with the plan previously arranged, a simultaneous
attack was to be made just at daylight, and Gano and Breckinridge
had been instructed to that effect.
The guide, now, for the first time, learned the mistake
under which he had been laboring, and his amazement was only
equaled by his horror. All during the night he had been saying
many hard things (to Woolford as he thought), about Morgan,
at which the so-called Woolford had seemed, greatly
amused, and had encouraged him to indulge himself in that way.
All at once, the merry, good-humored “Woolford” turned out
to be Morgan, and Morgan, seemed for a few moments, to be in
a temper which made the guide’s flesh creep. He expected to
be shot, and scalped perhaps, without delay. Soon finding,
however, that he was not going to be hurt, he grew bolder, and
actually assumed the offensive. “General Morgan,” he said, “I
hope you wont take my horse under the circumstances, although
I did make this here little mistake?” He was turned loose,
horse and all, after having been strongly advised to be careful
in future how he confided in soldiers.
The force encamped near Lexington, which we were about to
attack, was the Fourth Ohio cavalry—our old friends. The main
body was at Ashland, about two miles from the town, encamped
in the eastern extremity of the woods, in which the Clay mansion
stands, on the southern side of the Richmond pike. One or two
companies were in town, quartered at the court-house. As daylight
approached, I put my regiment in motion again, detaching
two companies to enter the town, under command of Captain
Cassell, and capture the provost-guard, and to also picket the
road toward Paris. Two other companies, under Captain Bowles,
were sent to take position on the Richmond pike, at a point between
the town and the camp, and about equi-distant from them.
This detachment was intended to intercept the enemy if they
attempted to retreat from Ashland to the town before we could[Pg 284]
surround the encampment, also to maintain communication between
the detachment sent into town and the bulk of the regiment,
in the event of our having to engage other forces than
those we had bargained for.
Quirk had furnished very full and positive information, as has
already been mentioned, but he had also stated that the Federal
General Granger was at Paris (eighteen miles from Lexington),
and it was not impossible that he might have been marching to
Lexington within the past fifteen hours. Colonel Morgan
instructed me to move with the remainder of my regiment, upon
the enemy’s encampment. Just as we entered the woods, and
were within some five hundred yards of the enemy, a smart
firing was heard upon the Richmond pike. It turned out to be a
volley let off at a picket, whom Gano had failed to capture, and
who ran into the camp. We thought, however, that the fight
had begun, and instantly advanced at a gallop. In accordance
with the plan previously arranged, Breckinridge was to attack
on foot, and Gano was to support him, mounted, keeping his
column on the pike. Breckinridge was in line and advancing
(when this firing occurred), directly upon the enemy’s front, and
he opened fire just as my men formed in column of platoons,
came charging upon the rear. I was upon elevated ground,
about one hundred yards from the enemy’s position on one side;
Breckinridge was about the same distance off on the other side,
and the enemy were in a slight depression between us. Consequently,
I got the benefit of Breckinridge’s fire—in great part
at least. I saw a great cloud of white smoke suddenly puff out
and rise like a wall pierced by flashes of flame, and the next
instant the balls came whizzing through my column, fortunately
killing no one. This volley settled the enemy and repulsed me!
Not caring to fight both Yankees and Rebels, I wheeled and
took position further back, contenting myself with catching the
stragglers who sought to escape. Breckinridge, however, did
not enjoy his double triumph long. The howitzers had been
sent to take position on the right of the enemy—to be used[Pg 285]
only in case of a stubborn resistance; they happened, on that
occasion, to be under command of Sergeant, afterward First
Lieutenant Corbett, a capital officer, but one constitutionally
unable to avoid taking part in every fight that he was in hearing
of. About the time that Breckinridge’s men were taking victorious
possession of the encampment, Corbett opened upon it,
and shelled them away. The chapter of accidents was not yet
concluded. While my regiment was watching a lot of prisoners,
and was drawn up in line parallel to the pike, the men sitting
carelessly on their horses, it was suddenly and unaccountably
fired into by Gano’s, which moved down and confronted it.
Again, and this time almost miraculously, we escaped without loss.
Unfortunately, however, one prisoner was shot. Colonel Morgan
rushed in front of the prisoners, and narrowly escaped being
killed in trying to stop the firing. His coat was pierced by several
balls.
The Second Kentucky began to think that their friends were
tired of them, and were plotting to put them out of the way.
Gano’s men stated, however, that shots were first fired at them
from some quarter. My Adjutant, Captain Pat Thorpe, as gallant
a man as ever breathed, came to me after this affair was
over, with a serious complaint against Gano. Thorpe always
dressed with some taste, and great brilliancy, and on this occasion
he was wearing a beautiful Zouave jacket, thickly studded,
upon the sleeves, with red coral buttons. He justly believed
that every man in the brigade was well acquainted with that
jacket. He stated with considerable heat that, while he was
standing in front of the regiment calling, gesticulating, and
trying in every way to stop the firing, Colonel Gano, “an officer
for whom he entertained the most profound respect and
the warmest friendship,” had deliberately shot twice at him. I
bade him not to think hard of it—that it was barely light at the
time, and that, of course, Gano did not know him. “Ah, Colonel,”
he answered, “I held up my arms full in his sight, and
although he might not have recognized my face, he couldn’t[Pg 286]
have failed to know these buttons.” Just before this occurred,
Major Wash Morgan was mortally wounded by the last shot fired
by the enemy. The man who hit him, was galloping toward
town, and fired when within a few paces of him. This man was
killed by one of the Second Kentucky, immediately afterward.
All of the enemy who made their escape from the camp were
intercepted by Bowles. The provost-guard made some show of
fight, but were soon induced to surrender. Our force was too
superior, and our attack, on all sides, too sudden, for much resistance
to be offered, either at the camp or in the town. Between
five and six hundred prisoners were taken, very few were
killed or wounded. The most valuable capture was of army
Colt’s pistols, of which a large supply was obtained. Our horses
were so much better than those which were captured, that few
of the latter were carried off. Such of the men who had not
good saddles, and blankets, provided themselves with both, in
the camp.
Lexington was thrown by this affair into a state of extreme
excitement and equal bewilderment; no one could exactly understand
what it meant. The Union people feared, and our
people hoped that it portended the return of the Confederate
army. There lived (and still lives) in Lexington, an old gentleman,
who was Union and loyal in his politics, but who, to
use his own expression, “never saw any use in quarreling with
either side which held the town.” His kindness and benevolence
made him very popular with people of both sides. As
Colonel Morgan rode into town, this old gentleman stopped
him, and said, with the strong lisp which those who know him
can supply, “Well, John, you are a curious fellow! How are
Kirby Smith and Gracie? Well, John, when we don’t look
for you, it’s the very time you come.”
The previous evening, the loyal people had decorated their
houses with flags and many pretty ornaments, in honor of the
arrival of the Federal troops; and had met them as gayly as
the mythological young women used to dance before Bacchus.[Pg 287]
On the morning of the 18th, all of these symbols of joy were
taken in. The Southern people, in their turn, were jubilant—”which
they afterward wished they hadn’t.”
Resuming our march at 1 p.m., on that day, the brigade
passed through Versailles, and went into camp at Shryock’s
ferry. Gano and Breckinridge crossed the river and encamped
on the southern side; my regiment remained on the other side.
About 1 o’clock at night we were awakened by the bursting of
two or three shells in my camp. Dumont had learned that we
had passed through Versailles, and had started out in pursuit.
He sent his cavalry on the road which we had taken, and
pressed his infantry out from Frankfort to Lawrenceburg.
Shryock’s ferry is four miles from Lawrenceburg; the country
between the two points is very broken and difficult of passage.
Had every thing been kept quiet until the infantry had occupied
Lawrenceburg, our situation would have been critical indeed.
With this disposition in our front, and the road closed
behind us, we would have been forced to take across the country,
and that would have been something like climbing over the
houses to get out of a street. Colonel Morgan had hesitated to
halt there in the first instance, and was induced to do so only by
the fatigue of men and horses after a march of over sixty miles, and
the knowledge that no fit ground for camping was within some
miles. It was a generous act of the officer, who came in our
rear, to shell us, and it saved us a vast deal of trouble, if nothing
worse. He had not even disturbed our pickets, but turning off
of the road, planted his guns on the high cliff which overlooks
the ferry on that side, and sent us an intimation that we had
better leave. Colonel Morgan comprehended his danger at
once, and as he sprang to his feet, instructed one of the little
orderlies, who always slept near him, to gallop to Colonel Gano
and Major Breckinridge, and direct them to move at once to
Lawrenceburg; the one, who formed first, taking the front, and
picketing and holding the road to Frankfort, as soon as the
town was reached. The boys, who were his orderlies, were in[Pg 288]telligent
little fellows, well known, and it was our habit to obey
orders brought by them, as promptly as if delivered by a staff
officer. The officers to whom the orders were sent, were the
promptest of men, and although my regiment formed rapidly,
the others were marching by the time that it was ready to
move. The howitzers were sent across the river first (fortunately
it was shallow fording at that season), and the regiment
immediately followed. The pickets on the road to Versailles
were withdrawn as soon as the regiment was fairly across, and
the officer in charge of them was instructed to make a rear-guard
of his detail. The entire brigade was hurrying to Lawrenceburg,
in less than twenty minutes after the first shell awakened us.
We reached Lawrenceburg a little after 2 o’clock, and passed
through without halting, taking the Bloomfield road. I have
heard since, but do not know if it be true, that General Dumont
reached Lawrenceburg about half an hour after our rear-guard
quitted it. Marching on steadily until 12 or 1 o’clock of the
next day, we reached Bloomfield, a little place whose every
citizen was a warm friend of “Morgan’s men.” They met us
with the utmost kindness, and at once provided supplies of forage
and provisions. We halted only about an hour to enjoy their
hospitality, and then moved on toward Bardstown.
Colonel Morgan, at this time, received information that there
was at Bardstown a force of infantry strong enough to give a
good deal of trouble, if they chose to ensconce themselves in the
houses. They were stationed there to protect sick and wounded
men, and hospital stores. As there was nothing in prospect of
their capture to repay for the delay, and probable loss it would
cost, he determined to make a circuit around the town. This
was done, the column moving within about a mile of the town
(the pickets having been previously driven in), and crossing the
Louisville road, two miles from the town.
We encamped that night not far from the Elizabethtown road,
and some five or six miles from Bardstown. During the night
Lieutenant Sales, with Company E, of the 2nd Kentucky, was[Pg 289]
sent some miles down the Louisville road, and captured one
hundred and fifty wagons, the escort and many stragglers. The
wagons were laden with supplies for Buell’s army. They were
burned, with the exception of two sutlers’ wagons, which Sales
brought in next morning. These wagons contained every thing
to gladden a rebel’s heart, from cavalry boots to ginger-bread.
The brigade moved again at 10 a.m., the next day, the 20th,
and reached Elizabethtown that evening. Here the prisoners
picked up around Bardstown, and upon the march, who had not
been paroled during the day, were given their free papers. The
command went into camp on the Litchfield road, two miles from
Elizabethtown. About 3 o’clock of the next morning a train
of cars came down the railroad, and troops were disembarked
from them. A culvert, three miles from town, had been burned
the night before, in anticipation of such a visit and the train
necessarily stopped at that spot. Our pickets were stationed
there, and the troops were furnished a lively greeting as they
got off of the cars. After a good deal of fussing with the
pickets, these troops entered the town about 5 a.m., and at 6
a.m., we moved off on the Litchfield road.
The brigade encamped at Litchfield on the night of the 21st,
and on the next day “crossed Green river at Morganton and
Woodbury,” almost in the face of the garrison of Bowlinggreen,
“who pretended to try to catch us, and who would have been
very much grieved if they had,” as has been truthfully written.
My regiment was in the rear on the morning of the 23rd, when
we marched away from Morganton, and I placed it in ambush
on the western side of the road, upon which the enemy were
“figuring,” for they could not be said to be advancing.
The road which the rest of the brigade had taken ran at right
angles to this one, and my left flank rested upon it. To my
astonishment, about half an hour afterward, the enemy, also,
went into ambush on the same side of the road, and a few hundred
yards from the right of my line. After they had gotten
snug and warm, I moved off quietly after the column, leaving[Pg 290]
them “still vigilant.” We crossed Mud river that night at Rochester,
on a bridge constructed of three flat boats, laid endwise,
tightly bound together, and propped, where the water was deep,
by beams passing under the bottoms of each one and resting
on the end of the next; each receiving this sort of support they
mutually braced each other. A planking, some five feet wide, was
then laid, and the horses, wagons, and artillery were crossed
without trouble. The bridge was built in about two hours.
On the 24th we reached Greenville; that night a tremendous
snow fell—tremendous, at least, for the latitude and season.
After crossing Mud river, there was no longer cause for apprehension,
and we marched leisurely. Colonel Morgan had found
the country through which he had just passed filled, as he had
expected, with detachments which he could master or evade,
and with trains, which it was pleasant and profitable to catch.
He and his followers felt that they had acquitted themselves
well, and had wittingly left nothing undone. If there was any
thing which they could have “gone for” and had not “gone for,”
they did not know it. A very strong disposition was felt, therefore,
to halt for a few days at Hopkinsville, situated in a rich
and beautiful country, the people of which were nearly all friendly
to us. We knew that we would receive a hospitality which our
mouths watered to think of. Colonel Morgan felt the more inclined
to humor his command in this wish, because he himself
fully appreciated how agreeable as well as beneficial this rest
would be.
Before commencing the long and rapid march from Gum
Spring to Hopkinsville, we had all been engaged in very arduous
and constant service. This last mentioned march was by
no means an easy one, and both men and horses began to show
that fatigue was telling upon them. Many of the men were
then comparatively young soldiers, and were not able to endure
fatigue, want of sleep, and exposure, as they could do subsequently,
when they had become as hardy and untiring as wild
beasts. On this march I saw more ingenious culinary expedi[Pg 291]ents
devised than I had ever witnessed before. Soldiers, it is
well known, never have any trouble about cooking meat; they can
broil it on the coals, or, fixing it on a forked stick, roast it before
a camp fire with perfect ease. So, no matter whether the
meat issued them be bacon, or beef, or pork freshly slaughtered,
they can speedily prepare it. An old campaigner will always
contend that meat cooked in this way is the most palatable.
Indeed it is hard to conceive of how to impart a more delicious
flavor to fresh beef than, after a hard day’s ride, by broiling it
on a long stick before the right kind of a fire, taking care to pin
pieces of fat upon it to make gravy; then with pepper and salt,
which can be easily carried, a magnificent meal can be made, if
enough is issued to keep a man cooking and eating half the
night. Four or five pounds of fresh beef, thus prepared, will
be mightily relished by a hungry man, but as it is easily digested
he will soon become hungry again. It is the bread about which
there is the trouble. Cavalry, doing such service as Morgan’s
did, can not carry hard tack about with them very well, nor was
bread ready cooked generally found in any neighborhood (south
of the Ohio) in sufficient quantities to supply a brigade of soldiers.
Houses were not always conveniently near to the camps
where they could have bread cooked, and as they would have it,
or would not do without it many days in succession, they were
thrown upon their own resources, and compelled to make it
themselves, notwithstanding their lack of proper utensils. I had
often seen bread baked upon a flat rock, or a board, or by
twisting it around a ramrod or stick, and holding it to the fire,
but one method of baking corn bread was practiced successfully
upon this march which I had never witnessed before. It was
invented, I believe, in Breckinridge’s battalion. The men would
take meal dough and fit it into a corn-shuck, tying the shucks
tightly. It would then be placed among the hot embers, and in
a short time would come out beautifully browned. This method
was something like the Old Virginia way of making “ash cake,”
but was far preferable, and the bread so made was much sweeter.[Pg 292]
The trouble of making up bread (without a tray) was very readily
gotten over. Every man carried an oil-cloth (as they were
issued to all of the Federal cavalry), and wheaten bread was
made up on one of these. Corn meal was worked up into dough
in the half of a pumpkin, thoroughly scooped out. When we
were in a country where meat, meal, and flour were readily obtained,
and we were not compelled to march at night, but could
go regularly into camp, we never had trouble in feeding the
men, although on our long marches and raids we never carried
cooking utensils.
At Hopkinsville, Colonel Woodward came to see Morgan; his
command was encamped not far off. He had been doing excellent
service in this section of the State for several months, and
Colonel Morgan was very anxious to have him attached to his
brigade. We remained at Hopkinsville three days, and then resumed
our march.
At “Camp Coleman” we were the guests of Woodward’s regiment,
and their friends, in that neighborhood, brought in whole
wagon loads of provisions, ready cooked—hams, turkeys, saddles-of-mutton
were too common to excite remark—we realized that
we were returning to “Dixie,” and were not far off from Sumner
county, Tennessee. We reached Springfield, Robertson county,
Tennessee, on the 1st or 2nd of November.
We remained here two days. During this stay, a printing
press, type, etc., having been found in the town, the “Vidette”
made its appearance again. A full account of the Kentucky
campaign was published, telling what everybody did, and hinting
what was going to be done next time. Prentice and Horace
Greely were properly reprimanded, and the “London Times”
was commended and encouraged. A heavy mail had been captured,
on the march through Kentucky, containing many letters
denunciatory of Buell—all these were published. We were
glad to do any thing which might push out of the way, the man
we thought the ablest General in the Federal service.
While at Springfield, Gano’s regiment was increased by the[Pg 293]
accessions of two full companies under Captains Dorch and
Page. Captain Walter McLean, of Logan county, Kentucky,
also joined us with some thirty or forty men. This fragment
was consolidated with Company B, of the Second Kentucky, and
McLean was made Captain. He was junior Captain of the regiment
until Lieutenant Ralph Sheldon was promoted to the Captaincy
of Company C, vice Captain Bowles promoted to the
Majority, after Major Morgan’s death.
On the 4th of November, we arrived at Gallatin, and were received
by our friends there with the warmest welcome. We
had been absent two months and a half, and we were now to
perform the same work to retard the return of the Federal army
into Tennessee, as we had previously done to embarrass its
march into Kentucky. While at Hopkinsville, Colonel Gano
had been sent with his regiment to destroy the railroad between
Louisville and Nashville, and also on the Russellville branch.
The bridges over Whippoorwill and Elk Fork, and the bridge
between Russellville and Bowlinggreen, three miles and a half
from Russellville, were burned. Captain Garth of Woodward’s
command joined Gano and was of great assistance to him.
Some portion of the road between Bowlinggreen and Gallatin
was destroyed. Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson burned the
trestle near Springfield, and the two long trestles between
Springfield and Clarksville which finished the work on that end
of the road. On the 31st the trestle at the ridge, and the
three small bridges between the ridge and Goodletsville were destroyed.
So it will be seen that the road was scarcely in running
condition when Morgan got through with it. I have thus
far neglected to mention a circumstance, which should by no
means be omitted from the narration of this period of Morgan’s
history.
A courier came from General Smith, while we were at Lexington,
on the 18th of October, countermanding his permission
previously given Colonel Morgan to go out of Kentucky by the
Western route, on account of an order received from General[Pg 294]
Bragg instructing him to send Morgan to guard the salt works
in Virginia. General Smith regretted it, but he ordered Colonel
Morgan to proceed at once to that point. A staff officer
who saw the order before the courier could deliver it to Colonel
Morgan, pocketed it and dismissed the courier. The officer reasoned
that the salt works were in no danger, that if they were,
it was Marshall’s peculiar province to guard them. That it was
more important to operate upon the railroads, in front of Nashville,
than to look after salt works, and that therefore it was better
not to mention the matter.
Whether it was General Bragg’s intention or not, it is certain
that if we had gotten into Western Virginia, at that time, there
would have been an end to all enterprise upon our part and no
more reputation would have been won by us. We got there soon
enough as it was. No evil consequences followed this breach
of discipline. The salt works were undisturbed until a much
later period.
Colonel Morgan captured nearly five hundred prisoners after
he left Lexington. The railroads were destroyed, as I have related,
and when he reached Gallatin, he was in a position to
picket the right flank of Bragg’s army, then slowly creeping
around to Murfreesboro’.
When we left Hartsville the previous summer, a regiment was
organizing there for Morgan’s brigade, composed principally of
men from Sumner county. This regiment, the Ninth Tennessee
cavalry, became subsequently one of the very best in Morgan’s
command, and won a high reputation, but it met with many mishaps
in the process of organization. It had few arms, and the
enemy would come sometimes and “practice” on it. It was
several times chased all over that country. When we reached
Gallatin, this regiment joined the brigade; it was still in an inchoate
state, but it was anxious to revenge the trouble it had been
occasioned. It was organized with James Bennett as Colonel,
W.W. Ward, Lieutenant Colonel, and R.A. Alston, formerly
Morgan’s Adjutant General, as Major. The senior captain[Pg 295]—the
famous Dick McCann—was scouting around Nashville, holding
high carnival, and behaving himself much as Morgan had
formerly done on the same ground.
Captain McCann had served for some time in infantry, but
found it too slow for him. He accompanied our command in our
first raid into Kentucky, and served with distinction as a volunteer
in our advance-guard, in the operations around Gallatin, of
the summer of 1862. It would be impossible to recount all of his
numerous adventures. He kept himself so busy prowling around
night and day, and so rarely permitted an enemy to venture beyond
the fortifications of Nashville, without some token of his
thoughtful attention, that, in all probability he could not remember
his own history. Just before we arrived at Gallatin, however,
his useful (if not innocent), existence had come very near
being terminated. He had gone on a scout one night with two
men, and Dr. Robert Williams (who frequently accompanied him
upon those “visits,” as he used to term his raids around Nashville,
“to the scenes of his happy childhood),” also went with
him. Not far from the city, they came upon a picket stand, and
McCann sent his two men around to get between the two outpost
videttes and the base, intending then to charge down on
them, with the Doctor, and capture them, as he had taken many
such before. The moon was shining brightly, and, as he stole
closer than was prudent upon the videttes, they discovered him
and fired. One ball struck him upon the brass buckle of his saber
belt, which happened to be stout enough to save his life by
glancing the ball, but the blow brought him from his horse and
convinced him that a mortal wound was inflicted.
“Dick,” said the Doctor, “are you hurt?” “Yes,” groaned
Dick, “killed—deader than a corpse—shot right through the
bowels—Quick, Bob—pass me the bottle before I die.”
Although the men had been accustomed to look forward to
the time of their arrival at Gallatin, as a period when they would
enjoy profound rest, they were not long left quiet after quitting
there. General John C. Breckinridge had just gotten to Mur[Pg 296]freesboro’
with a small force. He was desirous of impressing
the enemy at Nashville with an exaggerated idea of his strength,
so that the army of Buell (or of Rosecrans it was then), might
not be in any too great haste to drive him away from Murfreesboro’,
when it reached Nashville. General Bragg was limping
on so slowly, that it was by no means certain that a swinging
march would not put the enemy in possession of the whole of
Middle Tennessee (with scarcely a skirmish), and shut Bragg
up in East Tennessee. With the instinct, too, which he felt in
common with all men who are born generals, Breckinridge
wished to press upon the enemy and strike him if he discovered
a vulnerable point.
He learned that a large lot of rolling-stock (of the Louisville
and Nashville Railroad), had been collected in Edgefield. There
were, perhaps, three hundred cars in all. If these were burned,
the damage done the enemy, and the delay occasioned him,
would be very great. The cars were collected at a locality commanded
by the batteries on the Capitol hill, and so near the
river, that all the forces in the city could be readily used to protect
them. Breckinridge depended upon Morgan to burn them,
but planned a diversion on the south side of the river, which he
hoped would attract the enemy’s attention strongly, and long
enough, to enable Morgan to do his work.
The day after we arrived at Gallatin, a dispatch was received
from General Breckinridge, communicating his plan. Forrest
was to move on the southeastern side of Nashville, supported
by the Kentucky infantry brigade, and Morgan was instructed
to dash into Edgefield and burn the cars, while Forrest was
making all the racket he could. There was one flaw in this
plan, which no one perceived until all was over. Morgan could
not hope to succeed, unless, by moving all night, he got close
enough to Edgefield, to dash in early in the morning, before his
presence was even suspected. If he marched in the day time,
or remained after daylight in the vicinity of the place, his
presence would certainly be discovered, and preparations would[Pg 297]
be made to receive him. But if he attacked at daylight, he
scarcely allowed time for the troops on the other side to commence
their work, or at any rate, was likely to attack simultaneously
with them; when their attack, rousing every thing,
would, perhaps, do more harm than good. It so turned out.
Our brigade moved all night (of the 5th), and striking
through the woods came upon the northern side of Edgefield.
Just as we struck the pickets, we heard Forrest’s guns on the
other side of the river. The Second Kentucky was in advance,
and as the head of the column was struggling over a very
rough place in the railroad, it was opened upon by a company
of infantry pickets, who came out from behind a small house,
about sixty yards off. I never saw men fight better than these
fellows did. They were forty or fifty strong, and had to retreat
about half a mile, to reach their lines. The timber of the
ground over which they had to retreat had been cut down to
leave the way clear for the play of artillery and we could not
charge them. Few men beside those in the advance guard got
a chance at them. They turned and fought at every step. At
least eight or ten were killed, and only three captured.
I lost three of my advance guard. Conrad of the guard was
riding a large gray horse, which saved his life. He rode close upon
the enemy, and one of them, presenting his gun within a few feet
of his breast, fired; Conrad reined his horse tightly, making
him rear and receive the ball in his chest. The horse fell dead,
pinning his rider to the ground. We pressed on to within a
hundred yards of the railroad embankment, in the bottom near
the river, and quite through Edgefield. Some little time was
required to get all the regiment up, and Hutchinson and I had
just formed it, and the line was advancing, when Colonel Morgan
ordered us back. He had reconnoitered, and had seen a
strong force of infantry behind the embankment; and the fire
slackening on the other side, induced him to suppose that more
infantry, which we could see double-quicking across the pontoon
bridge, was the entire garrison of that side coming to oppose[Pg 298]
him. It turned out that this force coming over the bridge, was
small; but the Sixteenth Illinois and part of another regiment,
were stationed behind the embankment, and among the cars we
wished to burn. We succeeded in burning a few—Lieutenants
Drake and Quirk (who generally hunted together) superintended
the work. A good deal of firing was kept up by the enemy
upon the detail engaged in the work of destruction, but without
effect. So little attention was paid to what Forrest was doing,
that when we drew off altogether, the enemy followed us a mile
or two. As the column filed off from the by-road (by which it
had approached Edgefield) on the Gallatin pike, the enemy drove
back the pickets which had been sent down the pike.
The point at which we entered the pike is about a mile and
a quarter from Nashville. For a while there seemed to be great
danger that the enemy would take us in flank, but the column
got fairly out upon the pike before the blue-coats hove in sight.
A few of us remained behind after the rear guard passed to ascertain
the truth of a report the pickets brought, that the enemy
were moving up artillery. The head of an infantry column
had made its appearance on the pike, but halted about three hundred
yards from where we were, and no firing had as yet occurred
on either side. They seemed disposed to reconnoiter,
and we were not anxious to draw their fire.
Hutchinson soon determined to see them closer, and called to
one of the advance guard, whom he had kept with him, to accompany
him. This man was celebrated, not only for his cool,
unflinching courage, but also as the best shot in the Second Kentucky.
Every old “Morgan man” will remember, if he has
not already recognized, Billy Cooper. Breckinridge and I remonstrated
with Hutchinson, and urged that his action would
only precipitate the enemy’s attack and our retreat—that we
would be driven away before we had witnessed all that we
wished to see. There were only seven or eight men in our
party; Gano encouraged him to go—and he declared that he
would go—unless I positively ordered him to remain. He ac[Pg 299]cordingly
started—Cooper with him. There was a considerable
depression in the pike between our position and that of the enemy.
Just as our enterprising friends got down into this hollow,
and about half of the distance they were going, the enemy,
having completed the necessary dispositions, commenced moving
forward. I shouted to Hutchinson, informing him of it,
but the noise of his horse’s hoofs drowned my voice; before
he discovered the enemy, he was in thirty paces of their column.
He fired his pistol, and Cooper, rising in his stirrups,
discharged his gun killing a man; both then wheeled and
spurred away at full speed. They got back into the hollow in
time to save themselves, but while we were admiring their rapid
retreat and particularly noticing Hutchinson, who came back
in great glee, whipping his horse with his hat as was his custom
when in a tight place, a volley, intended for them, came rattling
into us. Two or three citizens who had collected to see the fun
fled like deer, although one of them was a cripple—and, to tell
the truth, we left as rapidly.
I shall never forget this occasion, because it was the first and
only time that I ever saw Colonel Richard M. Gano frightened.
He was sitting on his horse, complacently eyeing Hutchinson’s
brisk retreat, and, apparently, not even remotely supposing
that the enemy were likely to fire. One ball pierced a Mexican
blanket which was wrapped around him, sending the red stuff
with which it was lined flying about his head. I thought, and
so did he, that it was his blood. If I had been mortally
wounded, I could not have helped laughing at the injured look
he at once drew on; it was the look of a man who had confided,
and had been deceived. “Why, Duke,” he said, “they’re
shooting at us.” Some one told Major Alston that something
was going on in the rear, “that would do to go in the papers,”
and he joined us, as the enemy fired a second volley, just in
time to get his best horse shot. Although we burned a few
cars, the expedition was a failure—we went to burn all. Returning
to Gallatin that night (the 6th), we found that we were[Pg 300]
not yet to be permitted rest. Our scouts soon began to bring
in news of the approach of Rosecrans’ army, which was
marching by the Louisville and Nashville pike, and the Scottsville
and Gallatin pike, to Nashville. Crittenden’s corps was in
advance, a portion on each road. Colonel Morgan determined
to ambuscade the division marching on the Louisville and Nashville
road, at a point near Tyree Springs. He selected two
hundred men for the expedition. So much excitement was anticipated
upon it, that all of his field officers begged to go.
After a good deal of solicitation, he permitted Gano and myself
to accompany him, leaving Hutchinson in command of the remainder
of the brigade at Gallatin. The party detailed for this
expedition, reached the neighborhood of the proposed scene of
ambush late at night, and on the next morning (the 8th), at
daybreak, took position.
The Federal troops had encamped at Tyree Springs the night
before. First one or two sutlers’ wagons passed, which were
not molested, although when we saw one fellow stop, and deliberately
kill and skin a sheep and throw it into his wagon, a
general desire was felt to rob him in his turn. After a little
while, an advance guard of cavalry came, and then the infantry
rolled along in steady column, laughing and singing in the fresh
morning air. As soon as the head of the column approached
our position, our line arose and fired. We were within seventy-five
yards of the road, on a hill, which told against our chances
of doing execution, but the men had been cautioned to aim low.
The column, unprepared for such an entertainment, recoiled,
but soon rallied and charged the hill. Artillery was brought
up and opened upon us. We did not stay long. Our loss was
one man killed. I have never been able to learn satisfactorily
what was the enemy’s loss. Many reports were received about
it, some of which must have been greatly exaggerated. Colonel
Morgan immediately moved rapidly to get in the rear of this
column. He accordingly struck the road again, some three
miles north of Tyree Springs. Posting the bulk of his force in[Pg 301]
a woods on the side of the road, he, himself, with Lieutenant
Quirk and two or three others, went some distance up the pike,
and occupied themselves in picking up stragglers, which he
would send back to the main body, where they would be placed
under guard. In this way some forty or fifty prisoners were
taken. Suddenly Stokes’ regiment came up the road from
toward Tyree Springs, and drove the detachment immediately
upon the road, consisting of about fifty men, back to the main
body, thus cutting off Colonel Morgan and his party. Couriers
were immediately sent to Colonel Morgan to warn him of his
danger, but they did not reach him. He was returning, however,
about that time, and quickened his pace when he heard a
few shots fired. He was bringing back some ten or twelve
prisoners. He, Lieutenant Quirk, and one or two men, forming
the head of a column, of which the prisoners composed the
body. Suddenly he rode right into this Federal regiment. He
was, of course, halted and questioned. He stated that he was a
Federal Colonel, that his regiment was only a short distance off,
and that the prisoners with him were men he had arrested for
straggling. His questioners strongly doubted his story, and
said that his dress was a very strange one for a Federal Colonel,
that rebels often wore blue clothes, but they had never heard
of their officers wearing gray. The prisoners, who knew him,
and never doubted that he would be now captured in his turn,
listened, grinning, to the conversation, but said nothing. He
suddenly pretended to grow angry, said that he would bring his
regiment to convince them who he was, and galloped away.
Quirk followed him. Before an effort could be made to stop
them, they leaped their horses over the fence, and struck, at
full speed, across the country. In the course of an hour they
rejoined the rest of us, and relieved our minds of very grave
apprehensions.
It is probable that no other man than Colonel Morgan would
have escaped (in such a situation) death or capture. But his
presence of mind and address, in the midst of a great and im[Pg 302]minent
danger, were literally perfect. I have known many
similar escapes, where the chances were not so desperate; but
in each case but this, there was some circumstance to intimidate,
or to contribute to mystify the enemy. On this occasion every
circumstance was adverse to him. He could expect no rescue
from his friends, for we had managed so badly, that the enemy
had gotten between him and us. He was dressed in full Confederate
uniform. The enemy knew that the Confederate forces
were near by, and it was reasonable to suppose that he was attached
to them. The prisoners were there to tell on him. He
had nothing to depend upon but the audacity and address which
never failed him, and a quality even higher than courage—I can
describe it only as the faculty of subjecting every one to his
will, whom he tried to influence; it was almost mesmeric. The
prisoners fifty or sixty in number, were paroled in the course
of the day and started back to Kentucky by a route which would
enable them to avoid meeting detachments of their own army.
Our party encamped that night about seven miles from Gallatin.
Colonel Morgan when he started upon this expedition, knew
that Wood’s and Van Cleve’s divisions were marching toward
Gallatin, and he cautioned Hutchinson not to make a fight, if
during his absence the enemy approached the town, simultaneously,
upon more than two roads. He knew that Hutchinson
would be vigilant, but he feared that his indisposition to avoid
fighting would induce him to engage a larger force of the enemy
than he could repulse. Early in the morning of the day succeeding
that on which the events I have just described occurred, the
enemy marched into Gallatin. They had threatened the place on
three sides during the night, but Hutchinson hoping to repulse
them, would not retire.
In the morning, however, they demonstrated in such strength,
as to convince him that he had better not fight—and so, sending
the brigade on the Lebanon road to cross the Cumberland, he
retained only the advance-guard of the Second Kentucky, and
the howitzers, to salute the enemy as they entered. His guns[Pg 303]
were planted upon the eminence on the Lebanon road, just
outside of town, and, as the head of a column of infantry turned
into that road, they were opened, causing it to recoil. Several
good shots were made, but as the little pieces were limbered up
to move off, a line of infantry was discovered drawn up across
the road in the rear of the party—it had taken position very
quietly, while they were amusing themselves cannonading the
troops in town.
Hutchinson, Breckinridge, Alston, and nearly every field and
staff officer of the brigade, were in the trap. They tried to escape
upon another road, and found that also blockaded. Finally,
sending the howitzers and the advance-guard across a pasture
into the Springfield road, Hutchinson, with the numerous
“officials” in his train, made the best of his way across the
country, and rejoined the brigade. The advance-guard and the
howitzers dashed gallantly past a large body of the enemy, but
were neither checked nor injured. The retreat of the others,
diverted (as was intended) attention from them to some extent,
and they rattled on down the pike at a brisk canter, confident,
now (that they were not surrounded), that they could whip a
moderate sized brigade.
About three miles from town, they met our detachment of
two hundred men; at first (thinking us a party of the enemy
sent to enter the town by that road), they prepared to attack
and route us, but finding out who we were, let us off with the
scare. We had already learned that the enemy had entered
Gallatin, and I was especially rejoiced to find the “bull pups,”
and my advance-guard—the flower of my regiment—all safe.
Colonel Morgan learned directly from the officer in command of
this party, the particulars of the affair, and was satisfied that all
had gotten away. We at once turned toward the river, and
marching, until we reached it, through the woods and fields,
crossed at a ford, some miles lower down than that which the
brigade had crossed. We reached Lebanon on the same afternoon,
and found our fugitive friends there. Colonel Morgan[Pg 304]
formally congratulated Hutchinson upon his “improved method
of holding a town.”
This was the 9th, and the bulk of the brigade went into camp,
four miles from Lebanon, on the Murfreesboro’ pike. As Rosecrans’
army came pouring into Nashville, the commandant there
manifested a strong disposition to learn how matters stood outside.
On the night of the 9th, a force of the enemy came down
the Nashville and Lebanon pike to Silver Springs, seven miles
from Lebanon. Scouts were sent to examine this force, and
returned, reporting that it manifested no disposition to move.
Almost immediately after the scouts came back to Lebanon, the
enemy came, too, having moved just behind the scouts. There
was no force in Lebanon to meet them, and they held the place
until Hine’s company, of Breckinridge’s battalion, was sent to
drive them out. That night Breckinridge’s entire battalion was
sent to the town, supported by Bennett’s regiment. On the
evening of the 11th, they were both driven away, by a heavy
force of infantry and cavalry, but, reinforced by Gano, checked
the enemy a short distance from the town. When the enemy
retreated, Gano pressed them, taking one hundred and fifty-eight
prisoners, and a number of guns. On the 13th or 14th,
the enemy returned, and Breckinridge drove them away, following
them eleven miles on the Hartsville pike. On this occasion
a very handsome feat was performed by a scouting party under
command of Sergeant McCormick, of Breckinridge’s battalion.
Billy Peyton, who had killed an officer and brought off his horse
and pistol, a day or two before, went with him as “military adviser.”
Major Breckinridge sent this scouting party to find
where the enemy halted. It went through the woods and found
the enemy encamped on the river bank, fifteen miles from
Lebanon. Returning by the road, the party stumbled upon a
vidette, stationed about a half mile from the camp, and between
it and a picket base, which he said was a short distance off.
He also informed them that all the pickets had been notified
that a scouting party would shortly leave camp, and pass[Pg 305]
through them on that road. The idea at once occurred to
McCormick to represent that scouting party with his; so, carrying
the prisoner with him, he rode through the pickets at the
head of his men, receiving and returning their salutes. John
Haps, of Company F, Second Kentucky, tightly gripping the
prisoner’s throat, meanwhile, to prevent inopportune disclosures.
Just as the party got clear of the base, they were discovered,
and one man’s horse falling, he was made prisoner. On the
15th, Breckinridge and Bennett were sent to Baird’s mill, eight
miles from Lebanon, and eleven from Murfreesboro’, where the
Second Kentucky had been encamped since the 10th. During
that time it had been operating in the direction of Nashville,
the most successful expedition having been made by Major
Bowles, who defeated a body of the enemy superior in numbers
to his own detachment, killing several and taking some prisoners.
About this time a large force of the enemy took position
at Jefferson, seven miles from Baird’s mill. This force
required constant watching, and scouts were kept in sight of
the encampment at all hours of the twenty-four, with instructions
to fire upon the pickets as often as each detail was relieved.
Spence’s battery was sent from Murfreesboro’ to Baird’s mill,
to reinforce us. On the 16th, Gano, who had remained at
Lebanon, was driven away by a large force of cavalry and two
brigades of infantry. One of the latter got in his rear, and
gave him a good deal of trouble. After making a gallant fight,
he fell back to Baird’s mill; and then carried Breckinridge,
Bennett, and the Second Kentucky, back to Lebanon to attack
the enemy there. Colonel Morgan had been at Black’s shop,
four miles nearer to Murfreesboro’, for several days, and I had
gone to Murfreesboro’ on that day, the 16th. When I returned
to Baird’s mill, I found every thing gone, but a few pickets, and
the scouts reported indications of an advance from Jefferson.
When I reached Gano, I found him just taking position to fight
(he thought), and planting his battery (Spence’s) to shell the
camp, the fires of which we could plainly see. I dissuaded him[Pg 306]
from opening with artillery, for I did not wish to fight at Lebanon,
when there seemed such an imminent prospect of an attack
upon Baird’s mill. Gano was not satisfied to return until
an examination showed the camp deserted. The enemy had
moved off, leaving their fires burning. Gano had hurried from
Baird’s mill, with his reinforcements, so rapidly, that he had
not given his scouts time to reconnoiter. I immediately carried
the brigade back to Baird’s mill. The saddles were kept upon
the horses all night, and the men lay down in line of battle, but
the enemy did not attack. Two or three days after this,
Hutchinson was sent, with a portion of the Second Kentucky,
to watch the Nashville and Lebanon pike, between Stone river
and Silver Springs, at which latter place a strong force of the
enemy was encamped. Information had been received that
foraging parties of the enemy had been habitually resorting to
that particular neighborhood, and it was thought that some of
them could be caught. Hutchinson missed the foragers, but
captured a picket detail thirty or forty strong, at Stone river,
and brought his prisoners and their horses into camp. A little
later Major Steele, with a detachment from his regiment, went
on an expedition to Hartsville. Just as his column had crossed
the river, and ascended the bank, it was attacked by a portion
of Woolford’s regiment. Major Steele was forced to recross
the river and return, but before doing so, beat off his first assailants.
On the 23rd, Hutchinson, with Company A, of Breckinridge’s
battalion, and a detail from the Second Kentucky, in
all, two hundred men, and the howitzers, attacked the enemy
encamped at Gallatin, landing on the southern side, and drove
them out of their encampment and across the river. A good
many other scouts and expeditions were made, replete with
personal adventures, the details of which have escaped my
memory.
It was a very busy season, and a good many prisoners were
taken; they were brought in from some quarter every day.
Our own loss was slight. Colonel Morgan believed that, with[Pg 307]
enemies so near him, in so many quarters, he could defend himself
only by assuming the offensive.
General Bragg’s army did not get to Murfreesboro’ until the
20th or 21st. During that time, General Breckinridge had some
four thousand infantry. Rosecrans’ army must have been concentrated
in Nashville by the 12th. Two days’ marching would
have brought them to Murfreesboro’. General Breckinridge
could not have repulsed it; of course it could have been subsisted
for a week off of the country, or its foragers had lost
their cunning. In that time General Bragg would have been
forced, in all probability, to return to East Tennessee, without
a chance to deliver battle with a rational hope of success.
His army was footsore, weary, and could not have been readily
concentrated. Buell was removed because he was thought to
be “slow,” and dull to perceive and seize favorable opportunities.
There will always be a difference of opinion about which
opportunities were the safest to seize. A very prevalent opinion
obtained in “Morgan’s cavalry” (who thought that they appreciated
Buell), that had he been in command at Nashville, on
the 12th of November, 1862, he would have marched without delay
on Murfreesboro’. It is not too much to claim that Morgan’s
destruction of the railroads delayed, not only the concentration
at Nashville, but the movement thence to Murfreesboro’.
The activity of Morgan, Forrest and the other Confederate
cavalry commanders, in November, and the firm attitude of
Breckinridge, also contributed to prevent it.
In the latter part of November, Colonels Cluke and Chenault
rejoined the brigade. Their regiments were not improved by the
trip through the mountains, and the list of absentees from each
was large. Major Stoner also brought a battalion to Morgan,
transferred from Marshall’s brigade. About the same time, the
men of the “Old Squadron,” who had been captured at Lebanon,
came to us. They had been exchanged a month or two
previously, but had been unable to get to the brigade sooner.
We were glad to welcome them back. They had been only[Pg 308]
seven months away, and they returned to find the command
they had last seen as less than half a regiment, now grown to
a brigade of five regiments and two battalions.
These men were organized by Colonel Morgan, into a company
of scouts, to be attached to no regiment. Lieutenant
Thomas Quirk was appointed to command them, and Lieutenant
Owens, who had been captured and exchanged with them, was
made their First Lieutenant. Lieutenant Sellers, who had been
also captured at Lebanon, was assigned to one of Bennett’s
companies; the scouts were at once armed, equipped and
mounted—the company numbered about sixty, total effective,
and was a very fine one. On the 24th, the Second Kentucky,
under command of Hutchinson, and Breckinridge’s battalion,
were sent to Fayetteville, Lincoln county, Tennessee, to rest
men and horses; and the other regiments of the brigade were
less severely worked than during the past two or three weeks.
Rosecrans seemed extremely anxious to shut us out from the
country around Gallatin and Hartsville—perhaps on account of
the supplies of meat which could be obtained there, and which
the sympathy of the people enabled us to obtain, if we could
readily communicate with them. Strong garrisons were established
at Gallatin and Castalian Springs, about six or eight
miles from Hartsville, and at the latter place. The fact that
any force of Confederates marching to attack these garrisons,
unless they made a wide detour eastward, would expose its
flank and rear to attack from Nashville—not to consider the resistance
of the garrisons themselves—seemed to insure that
country from Confederate intrusion.
But it was right hard to keep Morgan out of Sumner county—he
had a great affection for it. He persistently applied for
permission to attack the force stationed at Hartsville, and it
was at length granted him. He was allowed to select two
regiments from the Kentucky infantry brigade, and to take
also Cobb’s battery, a very fine one, attached to that brigade.
The “Kentucky brigade” was commanded by Colonel Roger[Pg 309]
W. Hanson, who had been only a short time before exchanged,
with his gallant regiment, the Second Kentucky infantry, which
had been captured at Donelson. One of the colonels of the
brigade, was Thomas H. Hunt, a very superior officer, who, with
his regiment, the Ninth Kentucky, one of the best in the Confederate
service, had seen arduous and hazardous service at Shiloh,
Corinth and Baton Rouge. Colonel Morgan asked that this officer
(his uncle) should command the infantry regiments, which
were to form part of his force for the expedition; and Colonel
Hunt selected his own regiment and the Second Kentucky (infantry).
On the morning of the 7th of December, Colonel Morgan set
out on this expedition. The cavalry force was placed under
my command, and consisted of Gano’s, Bennett’s, Cluke’s and
Chenault’s regiments, and Stoner’s battalion—in all numbering
about fifteen hundred men. Hanson’s brigade was encamped
at Baird’s mill. Here the infantry detachment joined us, seven
hundred strong; the full strength of neither regiment was taken.
Quirk’s “scouts” and other scouting parties were sent to reconnoiter
in the direction of Hartsville, to watch the enemy at
Castalian Springs, and the fords of the river, and to picket the
Nashville and Lebanon pike. The “combined forces” left
Baird’s mill about 11 a.m., and passed through Lebanon about
2 p.m., taking the Lebanon and Hartsville pike. The snow lay
upon the ground and the cold was intense.
The infantry had been promised that they should ride part of
the way, and, accordingly, a few miles beyond Lebanon a portion
of the cavalry gave up the horses to them. This, however,
was an injudicious measure. The infantry had gotten their feet
wet in trudging through the snow, and, after riding a short
time, were nearly frozen and clamored to dismount. The cavalrymen
had now gotten their feet saturated with moisture, and
when they remounted, suffered greatly in their turn. There
was some trouble, too, in returning the horses to the proper
parties (as this last exchange was effected after dark), and the[Pg 310]
infantrymen damned the cavalry service with all the resources
of a soldier’s vocabulary.
The infantry and Cobb’s battery reached the ferry where it
was intended that they should cross, about ten o’clock at night,
and were put across in two small leaky boats, a difficult and
tedious job. When the cavalry reached the ford, where Colonel
Morgan had directed me to cross, I found that the river had
risen so much since the last reconnoisance that it was past
fording at that point, and I had to seek a crossing further
down. The ford (where I decided to cross) was so difficult to
come at, that the operation of crossing was made very slow.
The men could reach the river bank only by a narrow bridle
path which admitted only one man at a time. They were then
compelled to gather their horses and leap into the river, over
the bluff about four feet high. Horse and man would generally
be submerged by the plunge—a cold bath very unpleasant in
such weather. The ascent on the other side was nearly as difficult.
In a little while the passage of the horses rendered the
approach to the river even more difficult. The ford was not
often used, and the unbeaten path became cut up and muddy.
It grew worse and worse. The cold (after the ducking in the
river) affected the men horribly; those who got across first built
fires, at which they partially warmed themselves while the others
were crossing. Only fifteen, however, were frozen so stiff that
they had to be left.
Finding, as the night wore on, that day would appear before
all got across, and fearing that I would detain Colonel Morgan,
I moved (with those already on the northern bank) about three
o’clock, leaving a great part of my column still on the southern
side of the river. I posted pickets to watch the roads by which
they could be attacked, and instructed the officers to hurry on
to Hartsville as soon as practicable. I had about five miles to
march to rejoin Colonel Morgan, and found him at the point he
had designated, some three miles from Hartsville. He decided
not to wait for the remainder of the cavalry, fearing that infor[Pg 311]mation
would be taken to Castalian Springs (where six thousand
Federal troops were encamped), and he would be himself attacked.
He, therefore, moved forward at once. Just at daylight
the cavalry, who were marching in front, came upon a
strong picket force, about half a mile from the encampment,
who fired and retreated. We were thus prevented from surprising
the enemy before they formed. Colonel Morgan did
not, however, expect to do so, for he had no certain plan of
capturing the pickets without giving the alarm.
Bennett’s regiment was immediately sent around the encampment,
and into the town of Hartsville. Colonel Morgan ordered
me to form Cluke’s and Chenault’s regiments opposite the right
flank of the line the enemy were establishing, and partially outflanking
it. The enemy was encamped in wooded ground,
slightly elevated above the surrounding fields. The left flank
of the line they formed rested upon open ground near the
river. Opposite their right flank and center was a large meadow,
between which and the woods was a slight depression, which
gradually deepened toward the southward, until from a valley it
became a ravine, and when it approached the river was perhaps
ten feet deep, and its banks were almost precipitous. Colonel
Morgan had intended to let the infantry of his command form
in this ravine and attack from it, but the enemy’s line was established
so near to it that this was not attempted.
When we came in sight of the enemy and saw them forming,
it was at once plain that the force there was much stronger than
it had been represented to be. Instead of fifteen hundred men,
as Colonel Morgan had estimated it to be from the reports of
his spies, it was more than twenty-five hundred strong. I said
to him, “You have more work cut out for you, than you bargained
for.” “Yes,” he answered, “you gentleman must whip
and catch these fellows, and cross the river in two hours and a
half, or we’ll have six thousand more on our backs.” Cluke’s and
Chenault’s regiments after deducting horse-holders, numbered
four hundred and fifty men, between them. I formed Cluke[Pg 312]
opposite the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio Infantry, eight
hundred strong, and formed Chenault obtusely to Cluke (on the
latter’s left), with his (Chenault’s) left flank inclining toward the
enemy, and outflanking him. The infantry were shortly afterward
formed opposite the center of the enemy—Cobb’s battery
confronted the enemy’s left flank. Our entire force in the fight
(Bennett having been sent to Hartsville to prevent the escape
of the enemy in that direction) was twelve hundred and fifty
men. I have neglected to state that Stoner’s battalion had
been sent, with the “Bull pups,” down the Hartsville and Lebanon
pike to take position opposite the enemy’s encampment.
Stoner was instructed to maneuver in sight of the enemy, and
shell away at them briskly. Colonel Morgan knew that the
little pieces could not reach the encampment, but he wished the
enemy’s attention attracted to that quarter.
Stoner succeeded so well that the two Parrot guns which the
enemy had were engaged with him, when we took position, and
we were spared the annoyance they could have inflicted while
we were forming. As I have said we failed to surprise the
Federal force in its camp—and the only advantage which our
sudden appearance gave us, was the partial demoralization which
is apt to assail all troops, when unexpectedly and promptly attacked.
The enemy naturally thought that we were in overwhelming
force, or that we would not have incurred such risks.
One good sign was, that, as we formed in sight of each other,
our ringing shouts were answered by the feeblest of cheers.
Cluke and Chenault having formed at a gallop, immediately dismounted
their men and advanced. The enemy’s line was about
four hundred yards distant. A line of skirmishers occupied the
hollow, posted behind a fence, whose fire did us some little damage.
These two regiments had never been under fire before
(with the exception of a slight skirmish which Cluke’s had witnessed
in Kentucky) and I was not at first certain that they
would drive their part of the line. But they moved on with
perfect steadiness, halting (after having advanced about a hun[Pg 313]dred
yards) to discharge a volley which dislodged the skirmishers,
and then, after reloading, pressed on at a swift run. The
enemy fired by rank, each volley passing over our heads, for the
men had reached the hollow. No time was given them to reload.
When within sixty yards our fellows opened, Cluke
pressing right upon the front, and Chenault having swept so far
round, and then closed in, that the two regiments were firing
almost into each other’s faces.
The open cavalry formation not only enabled us with a smaller
force, to cover the entire front of the enemy opposed to us, but
while exposing us to less loss, made our fire more deadly. The
One Hundred and Fourth Ohio backed about twenty steps, the
men striving to reload their guns, and it then broke and ran in
perfect disorder. Cluke and Chenault moved on, swinging
around to the right, until they were formed at right angles to
the original direction of their line, and the force confronting
them was lapped back upon the rest of the enemy’s line. This
lasted about twenty minutes. By that time Colonel Hunt had
formed his infantry, and he sent them in, in echelon, the Second
Kentucky in advance. Cobb’s battery had not been idle, and
had gotten one caisson blown up by a shell from one of the enemy’s
Parrots.
The infantry had marched quite thirty miles, over slippery
roads, and through the chilling cold, and I saw some of them
stumble (as they charged), with fatigue and numbness, but the
brave boys rushed in as if they were going to a frolic. The Second
Kentucky dashed over the ravine, and as they emerged in
some disorder, an unfortunate order was given them, to halt and
“dress.” There was no necessity for it—the regiment was
within fifty yards of the enemy, who were recoiling and dropping
before their fire. Several officers sprang to the front and
countermanded the order—it was a matter of doubt who gave it—and
Captain Joyes, seizing the colors, shouted to the men to
follow him.
The regiment rushed on again, but in that brief halt, sus[Pg 314]tained
nearly all of its loss. Just then, the Ninth Kentucky
came to its support—the men yelling and gliding over the
ground like panthers. The enemy gave way in confusion, and
were pressed again on their right and rear by Cluke and Chenault,
who were at this juncture reinforced by seventy-five men
of Gano’s regiment, who came up under Lieutenant Colonel Huffman,
commanding the regiment in Gano’s absence, and Major
Steele, and at once went into the fight. A few minutes then sufficed
to finish the affair. The enemy were crowded together in
a narrow space, and were dropping like sheep. The white flag
was hoisted in an hour after the first shot was fired. Our loss
in killed and wounded was one hundred and twenty-five, of
which the Second Kentucky lost sixty-five, the Ninth, eighteen;
the cavalry thirty-two, and Cobb’s battery, ten. Lieutenant Colonel
Coleman, a gallant and accomplished officer, was seriously
wounded. His regiment, the Eighth Kentucky (Cluke’s), was
devotedly attached to him, and could ill afford to lose his valuable
services. Some fine officers were lost by the infantry regiments.
A loss which was deeply regretted by Morgan’s entire command,
was that of little Craven Peyton. Colonel Morgan invariably selected
as his orderlies bright, intelligent, gentlemanly little
fellows from among the boys of his command. They were not
required to perform the ordinary services of an orderly, but
were treated more like staff officers, and were assigned such duties,
as are usually required of an aide.
This was an excellent method of spoiling young soldiers—but
Colonel Morgan permitted himself such luxuries. Of all these,
Craven Peyton was the most celebrated and popular. His integrity
and sense was such, that officers of the command would not
hesitate to act upon an order which he bore, although unwritten,
and he possessed the most remarkable daring and determination.
Exposing himself in this fight with his usual recklessness, he received
a wound, which disabled him so much that he could not
be removed. He was made prisoner, and in a few days fretted
himself to death. The enemy’s loss, in killed and wounded, was[Pg 315]
over four hundred, and two thousand and four prisoners were
carried off to Murfreesboro’. If there ever was a fight to which
the time honored phrase, so frequent in official reports, was applicable,
viz.: “That where all behaved so well,” etc.,—it was
this one. It would indeed be difficult to assign the palm.
Every officer and man seemed inspired with the most perfect
confidence and the most dauntless resolution. Every regiment
and company rushed recklessly and irresistibly upon every
thing confronting it, and the sudden discovery, at the beginning
of the fight, that the enemy were so much stronger than we
had supposed them to be, seemed only to increase their courage.
They had literally made up their minds not to be beaten, and I
firmly believe, that five thousand more could not have beaten
them. The tents, and every thing which could not be carried
off, were burned; a number of captured wagons were loaded
with arms and portable stores, and hurried over the river—four
or five wagons which did not cross the river, were driven into
the woods and their contents secreted. Some of the most
valuable captures, were in boots and shoes—for many of the
men (especially of Cluke’s and Chenault’s regiments) had no
other covering for their feet than old rags.
The prisoners were gotten across the river as rapidly as possible—and
the infantry were taken over behind the cavalrymen.
Some of the prisoners were made to wade the river, as the enemy
from Castalian Springs began to press upon us so closely
that we could not “stand upon the order of transportation.”
Cluke’s regiment was posted upon the Gallatin road to hold
the enemy in check—Quirk’s scouts having already retarded
their advance. Gano’s regiment was sent as soon as it got up
to support Cluke. Nothing but the rapid style in which the
fight had been conducted and finished saved us. We had no
sooner evacuated the ground than the enemy occupied it, and
our guns which opened upon them from the southern shore,
were answered by their batteries.
No pursuit was attempted, and we marched leisurely back[Pg 316]
through Lebanon, regaining our camps late in the night. Two
splendid pieces of artillery were among the trophies—which did
good service in our hands, until they were recaptured upon the
“Ohio raid.” This expedition was justly esteemed the most
brilliant thing that Morgan had ever done, and was referred to
with pride by every man who was in it.
General Bragg in his congratulatory order issued to the army
on account of it, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of
the troops—especially of the remarkable march of the infantry,
and he says: “To Brigadier General Morgan and to Colonel
Hunt the General tenders his thanks, and assures them of the
admiration of his army. The intelligence, zeal and gallantry
displayed by them will serve as an example and an incentive to
still more honorable deeds. To the other brave officers and men
composing the expedition the General tenders his cordial thanks
and congratulations. He is proud of them and hails the success
achieved by their valor as but the precursor of still greater
victories. Each corps engaged in the action will in future bear
upon its colors the name of the memorable field.”
CHAPTER XII
The victory of Hartsville brought Colonel Morgan his long-expected
and long-delayed commission of Brigadier-General.
He had long been styled General by his men, and had been of
late habitually so addressed in official communications from array
headquarters. Many and urgent applications had been made
by influential parties and officers of high rank for his promotion.
General Smith had strongly urged it, General Bragg concurring,
but while Brigadiers were being uttered as rapidly almost as
Confederate money, he remained a simple Colonel. President
Davis happened to visit Murfreesboro’ a few days after the Hartsville
affair, and gave him his commission, making Hanson, also,
a Brigadier of even date. This promotion of my chief made
me a Colonel, and Hutchinson a Lieutenant-Colonel, thus illustrating
that many felicitous consequences will sometimes flow
from one good act. The latter had occupied a very anomalous
position; while really a Captain, he had acted us, and been styled
Lieutenant-Colonel. Being a most excellent officer, who had
seen a great deal of service, and acting as second in command
of an unusually large regiment, he was placed frequently upon
detached service, and in very responsible situations, and frequently
commanded Lieutenant-Colonels of legitimate manufacture,
just as Morgan, while only a General “by courtesy,” commanded
floating Brigadiers who came within his vortex. It
proved more agreeable to men, who were really modest, to take
rank by the virtue of commissions rather than by the force of
impudence, and the example was better. General Hardee urged
that the commission should be made out as Major-General, but
Mr. Davis said, “I do not wish to give my boys all of their sugar
plums at once.”[Pg 318]
At Bryantsville, in Kentucky, Colonel Joseph Wheeler had been
appointed Chief of Cavalry, and Morgan, Scott, Ashby—all of
the cavalry commanders had been ordered to report to him.
Colonel Wheeler was a very dashing officer, and had done excellent
service, but he had neither the experience nor the record
of Morgan, and the latter did not fancy having to serve under
him. He was with Wheeler so little, however, in Kentucky,
that he found not much inconvenience from having a “Chief of
cavalry” to superintend him. Morgan was, of course, perfectly
independent upon his retreat out of Kentucky, and in his operations
afterward in North Middle Tennessee—indeed, with the
exception of having to report to General Breckinridge, while
the latter was in command at Murfreesboro’, and afterward to
the Commander-in-chief, he was perfectly independent until a
period even later than that of his promotion. But this is a subject
for a later chapter. A great many injudicious friends of
Morgan were inclined to attribute the delay of his promotion to
prejudice upon the part of Mr. Davis, against him in particular,
and Kentuckians in general.
There is no doubt but that General Morgan’s free and easy
way of appointing his own officers and of conducting all of his
military affairs, as well as his intense aversion to subordinate
positions, had excited much official disapprobation and some indignation
against him at Richmond. He had been careless and
dilatory, too, in making out and forwarding the muster-rolls of
his regiment, an omission which was undoubtedly censurable,
and unpardonable in the eyes of the Pundits of the War Department,
with whom such papers were the gospels of military government.
General Morgan paid too little attention to matters
of this kind, essential to the transaction of military business,
and the proper conduct of the affairs of the army, and the authorities
resented a neglect that looked a good deal like contumacious
disrespect. He was, however, unlucky in this respect,
to some extent, for when he appreciated, which was not until
after he had raised the greater portion of his brigade, the ne[Pg 319]cessity
and the propriety of making full, formal, and prompt
returns, he met with delays and accidents in transmitting them
to Richmond, which were frequent and extraordinary. The
officers, who acted as his Adjutant Generals at different periods
previously to his promotion, will remember and can affirm, that
returns and rolls of his regiments and battalions composing his
brigade, were sent into them, and forwarded by them to Richmond.
Officers were especially detailed to go to Richmond
and look after these papers. And, yet, to every application
made for the appointment of bonded officers (or rather for their
commissions, for Morgan could manage appointments), by commanders
of the oldest regiments in his brigade, the Secretary
of War would politely inform the Colonel that his regiment was
unknown “in the records of this office.” Judging from the
frequency of this reply, and the nature of some promotions that
were made for that quarter, it would appear that the War Department
at Richmond, and the cavalry on the western front,
had no acquaintance in common. That all the evil might be
cured, papers of formidable size and appearance, nearly square
(I should say an acre by an arpent), were carefully made out, and
forwarded to Richmond, showing the date of the organization
of each regiment, the officers originally upon its rolls, all
changes, and how they occurred, up to the date of the making
out of the compendious document, the names of the officers
serving in it at the time, and the manner in which they obtained
their rank, whether by appointment, election, or promotion, and
by whom appointed, when such was their status.
Notwithstanding the work expended upon the accursed things,
and the perspiration, and, I regret to say, blasphemy, which
they elicited from some of our officers, they did no good in the
world; and after more labor and tribulation, ten to one, than
an advance of the whole Federal army would have cost us, we
found ourselves as much outsiders as ever. It must be
distinctly understood, that nothing here written is intended
as an insinuation against Mr. Davis; I will not do that[Pg 320]
which I would join in condemning in another man, whose
antecedents are like my own. The profound respect I feel for
him, prevents any attempt, upon my part, at even such criticism
of his action as may seem legitimate; and unkind and carping
reflections upon him are more becoming in the mouths of non-combatant
rebels, than from ex-Confederate soldiers, whom self-respect
should restrain from any thing of the kind. But there
were certain officers at Richmond, who, if their souls had been
tied up with red tape, indorsed in accordance with the latest
orders, and stuffed into pigeon holes, would have preferred it to
a guarantee of salvation. I honestly believe that these gentlemen
thought, that when an officer made out a muster-roll, and
forwarded it to them, he had done his full duty to his country,
had gotten through with his part of the war, and might go to
sleep without putting out pickets. It was said of a certain
Confederate General, of high rank, that he would rather have
from his subordinates “a neat and formal report of a defeat,
than a slovenly account of a victory.” It might have been said
of the war office gentry, with equal propriety, that they would
have preferred an army composed of Fallstaffian regiments, all
duly recorded, to a magnificent soldiery unticketed at Richmond.
With this class Morgan was always unpopular; not that a
stronger personal dislike was felt for him, in the official bosom,
than for other men of the same stamp and style, but all such
men were gravely disliked by this class. Such men were developing
new ideas, not to be found in the books which the
others had studied, and were in the habit of consulting. They
were managing cavalry and winning fights in a thoroughly irregular
and revolutionary manner; there was grave cause for
apprehension that, if they were given high rank and corresponding
command, they would innovate upon established infantry
tactique, in the same unprecedented and demoralizing style.
Mr. Davis did not dislike Morgan, but simply entertained no
particular fancy for him, and did not believe that he was really[Pg 321]
a superior, although a successful officer; in fact, he knew very
little about him.
To say Mr. Davis disliked Kentuckians, is absurd. The
Kentucky vanity is as irritable, although not as radical, as the
Virginian, and sees a slight in every thing short of a caress.
He appointed some fifteen general officers from Kentucky, and
he permitted the Kentucky loafers to secure their full share of
“soft places.” General Bragg, doubtless, was entirely free
from any blinding affection for Kentuckians, and few of them
felt a tenderness for him. Despite the terrors of his stern rule,
they let few occasions escape of evincing their feeling toward
him. It was said, I know not how truly, that at a later date
General Bragg told Mr. Davis that “General Morgan was an
officer who had few superiors, none, perhaps, in his own line,
but that he was a dangerous man, on account of his intense desire
to act independently.”
When Morgan received this rank, his brigade was quite
strong, and composed of seven regiments, Breckinridge’s and
Stoner’s battalions were consolidated, and formed a regiment
above the minimum strength. Breckinridge became Colonel,
and Stoner Lieutenant Colonel. Shortly after the Hartsville
fight, Colonel Adam R. Johnson reached Murfreesboro’ with his
regiment. It had been raised in Western Kentucky, and was
very strong upon the rolls, but from losses by capture, and
other causes, had been reduced to less than four hundred effective
men. It was a fine body of men, and splendidly officered.
Martin, the Lieutenant Colonel, was a man of extraordinary
dash and resolution, and very shrewd in partisan warfare.
Owens, the Major, was a very gallant man, and the disciplinarian
of the regiment.
On the 14th of December, an event occurred which was
thought by many to have materially affected General Morgan’s
temper, and subsequent fortunes. He was married to Miss
Ready, of Murfreesboro’, a lady to whom he was devotedly attached,
and who certainly deserved to exercise over him the[Pg 322]
great influence which she was thought to have possessed. The
marriage ceremony was performed by General Polk, by virtue of
his commission as Bishop, but in full Lieutenant General’s
uniform. The residence of the Honorable Charles Ready, father
of the bride, held a happy assembly that night—it was one of a
very few scenes of happiness which that house was destined to
witness, before its olden memories of joy and gayety were to
give place to heavy sorrow and the harsh insolence of the invader.
The bridegroom’s friends and brothers-in-arms, and the Commander-in-Chief,
and Generals Hardee, Cheatham and Breckinridge
felt called upon to stand by him on this occasion.
Greenfell was in a high state of delight; although he had
regretted General Morgan’s marriage—thinking that it would
render him less enterprising—he declared, that a wedding, at
which an Episcopal bishop-militant, clad in general’s uniform
officiated, and the chief of an army and his corps commanders
were guests, certainly ought not to soften a soldier’s temper.
On his way home that night he sang Moorish songs, with a
French accent, to English airs, and was as mild and agreeable as
if some one was going to be killed.
The seven regiments which composed the brigade, represented
an aggregate force of over four thousand in camp—when they
were gotten together, which was about the 18th, the Second
Kentucky returning then from Fayetteville. Several hundred
men, however, were dismounted, and totally unarmed and unequipped.
This force was so unwieldy, as one brigade, that
General Morgan determined to divide it into two parts, which
should be organized in all respects as two brigades, and should
lack but the sanction of the General commanding (which he
hoped to obtain), to be such in reality. He accordingly indicated
as the commanders of the two brigades (as I shall call
them for the sake of convenience), Colonel Breckinridge and myself.
There was no doubt of Colonel A.R. Johnson’s seniority
to all the other colonels, but, for some reason, he positively de[Pg 323]clined
to accept the command of either brigade, and signified
his willingness to serve in a subordinate capacity.
Instances of senior officers waiving rank, and consenting to
serve under their juniors, were not unfrequent at that period, and
continued to occur in Morgan’s command. Such conduct was
generous, and prompted by the manliest and most patriotic motives;
but I can not help thinking that it is an unsafe practice,
and one that may lead to very great injuries to the service in
which it commonly obtains. The spirit which prompted many
officers (for instance, who outranked General Morgan), to serve
subordinately to him, because of the influence upon the troops
of his high reputation, and because of his recognized skill, was
perhaps, a proper as well as a chivalric one. But, except where
the talent, character and influence of the junior, are as rare as
acknowledged, and as commanding as in the case of Morgan or
of Forrest, it is better for the senior to assume his legal position.
No bad effects ever resulted from this practice in our command,
partly, because it was one which had a “genius and constitution”
of its own, but, chiefly because (I do not think I am
speaking too highly of my old comrades), it was officered by a
class of men of remarkable intelligence, and singular directness
as well as strength of character. But, supposing this custom
to prevail, generally, how apparent are the results prejudicial to
discipline and efficiency, which may be naturally expected to
flow from it.
The senior officer who “waives his rank,” may do it in perfect
good faith, and believing that the junior whom he consents to
serve under, is, for certain reasons, the most proper man to command—and
yet, if things go wrong, he may not unnaturally
complain or advise with an emphasis and a freedom that may
embarrass the commander to whom it is addressed, and create
the most improper feeling among other subordinates and the
men. Or if matters do not go so far as this, there may yet
arise a regret, in the mind of the officer who has relinquished
his right to command, when he sees, or thinks he sees, evidences[Pg 324]
of incompetency in the conduct of the other—and a corresponding
jealousy may be thus awakened in the mind of the junior commanding—and
that harmony which is so necessary to efficiency
may become impaired. Independently of these considerations,
there is the fact that this condition is abnormal and highly irregular.
The men and subaltern officers will recognize it to be so,
and it may become more difficult to maintain the requisite subordination
and respect for rank. It is a great deal better than to
follow this practice—to adopt and run almost to extremes, the
system of rapid promotion for merit and distinguished conduct.
The probable evils of the one practice, which have been indicated,
can prevail under no system where every man fills his legitimate
place. There was some discussion as to whether Cluke or Breckinridge
should command one of the brigades, after Johnson declined.
It was a mooted question, whether Cluke’s rank as Colonel
dated from the period at which he received his commission
to raise a regiment, or from the period at which his regiment
became filled. In the former case, he would rank
Breckinridge; in the latter, he would not. None of us, then,
(with the exception of Johnson), had received our commissions,
although our rank was recognized.
There was no wrangle for the position, however, between
these officers, as might be inferred from my language. On the
contrary, each at first declined, and urged the appointment of
the other. General Morgan settled the matter by appointing
Breckinridge.
The first brigade (mine) was composed of the Second Kentucky,
Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson, commanding; Gano’s regiment,
the Third Kentucky, Lieut.-Colonel Huffman commanding
(Gano was absent on furlough); Cluke’s regiment, the Eighth
Kentucky, Colonel Leroy S. Cluke commanding; Palmer’s battery
of four pieces (two twelve-pounder howitzers, and two six-pounder
guns,) was attached to this brigade. The second brigade (Breckinridge’s)
was composed of his own regiment, the Ninth Kentucky,
Lieutenant-Colonel Stoner commanding; Johnson’s regiment,[Pg 325]
the Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Johnson commanding; Chenault’s
regiment, the Eleventh Kentucky, Colonel Chenault commanding;
and Bennett’s regiment, the Fourteenth Tennessee, Colonel
Bennett commanding. To this brigade was attached one three-inch
Parrot, commanded by Captain White, and the two mountain
howitzers under Lieutenant Corbett.
On the 21st of December, the division was in camp at and
around Alexandria. The first brigade was reviewed on that
day, and numbered, of cavalry, eighteen hundred effective men.
There were in its ranks more men than that number. The
Second Kentucky mustered seven hundred and forty, and the
other two regiments about six hundred each. There were in this
brigade, however, nearly two hundred men unarmed but mounted.
The entire strength of the brigade, of armed and unarmed men,
including Palmer’s battery, was very little short of two thousand
and one hundred men. The second brigade was, including artillerists,
about eighteen hundred strong, but it, too, had some
unarmed men in its ranks. These fellows without guns were
not so useless as might be imagined, for (when it was satisfactorily
ascertained that it was not their own fault that they were
unarmed, and that they could be trusted) they were employed
as horse-holders. The division, therefore, including Quirk’s
“scouts,” reporting to division headquarters, numbered quite
three thousand and nine hundred. In General Morgan’s report
of the expedition undertaken into Kentucky immediately after this
organization, the strength of the division is estimated at thirty-one
hundred armed men. This was a mistake upon the part of
his Adjutant-General, which I sought to correct at the time.
The proportion of men without guns was nothing like so large.
Just before the march was taken up for Kentucky from Alexandria,
Colonel Greenfell, still acting as General Morgan’s Adjutant-General
up to that date, resigned his position and declined
to accompany him upon the expedition. The cause of his dissatisfaction
was the appointment of Breckinridge to the command
of the second brigade. A great many believed and said that[Pg 326]
he was disappointed at not obtaining command of the brigade himself,
but I am satisfied that such was not the case. It is difficult to
understand how a practical man can behave as he did on that
occasion, unless his own interests, or those of a friend, are involved,
and there is, consequently, a general disposition to attribute
such conduct to interested motives. I talked to Greenfell,
and believe that he had, from some cause, conceived a violent
dislike for Breckinridge, and, moreover, he had come to regard
an interference in the affairs of the command as his right. At
any rate when General Morgan declined to accept his suggestions
upon the subject, and requested him to desist from agitating it,
he became so thoroughly disgusted that he declined to act longer
with the command. As he was not regularly in the Confederate
service, there was nothing to be done but let him go when and
where he pleased.
Captain W.M. Maginis, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General
of the second brigade, was immediately appointed in his stead.
This officer was very young, but had seen a great deal of arduous
service. He had served in the infantry for more than a year;
he had seen Belmont, Shiloh, Farmington, and Perryville, had
behaved with the greatest gallantry, and had won the encomiums
of his chiefs. He had been assigned to staff duty just
before he came to us, and had acted in the capacity of ordnance
officer, I believe, for General Walthall, an officer who, of the first
class himself, would have only the same sort about him. He
had been assigned upon General Morgan’s application (at my
urgent request) to his command, and, as has been stated, was
on duty with the first brigade, when General Morgan suddenly
stood in need of an Assistant Adjutant-General, and took him,
intending to keep him temporarily. He was so much pleased
with him that, upon his return from this expedition, he procured
his commission in the Adjutant and Inspector General’s Department,
and his assignment to him. He remained with General
Morgan until his death.
On the morning of December 22nd, the division took up its[Pg 327]
march for Kentucky. General Bragg desired that the roads
which Rosecrans had repaired in rear should again be broken,
and the latter’s communications with Louisville destroyed. The
service was an important one; it was meet that, for many reasons,
the expedition, the first Confederate movement into Kentucky
since Bragg’s retreat, should be a brilliant one. General
Morgan had under his command at that time the largest force
he ever handled, previously or afterward, and he would not have
permitted them to have stopped him. A writer from whom I have
frequently had occasion to quote, gives a description of the commencement
of the march, so spirited and so graphic, that it will
serve my purpose better than any that I can write myself. He
says:
“The regiments had been carefully inspected by the Surgeons
and Inspectors, and every sick soldier and disabled horse had
been taken from their regiments, and the stout men and serviceable
horses only were permitted to accompany the expedition.
The men were never in higher spirits or more joyous humor;
well armed, well mounted, in good discipline, with perfect confidence
in their commander, and with hearts longing for the hills
and valleys, the blue-grass and woods of dear old Kentucky;
they made the air vocal with their cheers and laughter and songs
and sallies of wit. The division had never operated together
before the brigades had first been organized, therefore every
regiment was filled with the spirit of emulation, and every man
was determined to make his the crack regiment of Morgan’s
cavalry. It was a magnificent body of men—the pick of the
youth of Kentucky. No commander ever led a nobler corps—no
corps was ever more nobly led. It was splendidly officered
by gallant, dashing, skillful men in the flush of early manhood;
for of the seven Colonels who commanded those seven regiments,
five became brigade commanders—the other two gave their lives
to the cause—Colonel Bennett dying early in January, 1863,
of a disease contracted while in the army, and Colonel Chenault
being killed on July 4, 1863, gallantly leading his men in a[Pg 328]
fruitless charge upon breastworks at Green river bridge. This
December morning was a mild, beautiful fall day; clear, cloudless
sky; bright sun; the camps in cedar evergreens, where the
birds chirped and twittered; it felt and looked like spring. The
reveille sounded before daybreak; the horses were fed, breakfast
gotten. Very early came the orders from General Morgan
announcing the organization of the brigades, intimating the objects
of the expedition, and ordering the column to move at
nine o’clock. Duke in advance. As the order was read to a
regiment the utmost deathless silence of disciplined soldiers
standing at attention was broken only by the clear voice of the
Adjutant reading the precise but stirring words of the beloved
hero-chieftain; then came the sharp word of command dismissing
the parade; and the woods trembled with the wild hurrahs
of the half crazy men, and regiment answered regiment, cheer
re-echoed cheer, over the wide encampment. Soon came Duke,
and his staff, and his column—his own old gallant regiment at
the head—and slowly regiment after regiment filed out of the
woods into the road, lengthening the long column.
“After some two hours march, a cheer began in the extreme
rear and rapidly came forward, increasing in volume and enthusiasm,
and soon General Morgan dashed by, with his hat in his
hand, bowing and smiling his thanks for these flattering cheers,
followed by a large and well mounted staff. Did you ever see
Morgan on horseback? If not, you missed one of the most impressive
figures of the war. Perhaps no General in either army
surpassed him in the striking proportion and grace of his person,
and the ease and grace of his horsemanship. Over six feet
in hight, straight as an Indian, exquisitely proportioned, with
the air and manner of a cultivated and polished gentleman, and
the bearing of a soldier, always handsomely and tastefully
dressed, and elegantly mounted, he was the picture of the superb
cavalry officer. Just now he was in the hight of his fame
and happiness; married only ten days before to an accomplished
lady, made Brigadier justly but very tardily; in command of[Pg 329]
the finest cavalry division in the Southern army; beloved almost
to idolatry by his men, and returning their devotion by an extravagant
confidence in their valor and prowess; conscious of
his own great powers, yet wearing his honors with the most admirable
modesty, and just starting upon a carefully conceived
but daring expedition, he was perhaps in the zenith of his fame,
and though he added many a green leaf to his chaplet, many a
bright page to his history, yet his future was embittered by the
envy, jealously, and hatred that then were not heard.”
Marching all day the column reached Sand Shoals ford on the
Cumberland just before dark. The first brigade crossed, and
encamped for the night on the northern bank of the river. The
second brigade encamped between the Caney Fork and the Cumberland.
On the next day, moving at daylight, a march of some thirty
miles was accomplished; it was impossible to march faster than
this, and keep the guns up. On the 24th, the division went into
camp within five miles of Glasgow. Breckinridge sent Captain
Jones of Company A, Ninth Kentucky to discover if all was
clear in Glasgow, and I received instructions to support him
with two companies under Major Steele of the Third Kentucky
who was given one of the little howitzers. Jones reached the
town after dark, and just as he entered it a Michigan battalion
came into it also from the other side. Captain Jones encountered
this battalion in the center of the town, and in the skirmish
which ensued he was mortally wounded. He was an excellent
officer and as brave as steel. Poor Will Webb was
also mortally wounded—only a private soldier, but a cultivated
and a thorough gentleman; brave, and kindly, and genial. A
truer heart never beat in a soldier’s bosom, and a nobler soul
was never released by a soldier’s death. First Lieutenant Samuel
O. Peyton was severely wounded—shot in the arm and in
the thigh. He was surrounded by foes who pressed him hard,
after he was wounded, to capture him. He shot one assailant,
and grappling with another, brought him to the ground and cut[Pg 330]
his throat with a pocket knife. Lieutenant Peyton was by birth,
education, and character a thorough gentleman. Perfectly
good natured and inoffensive—except when provoked or attacked—and
then—he dispatched his affair and his man in a
quiet, expeditious and thorough manner. The Federal cavalry
retreated from the town by the Louisville pike.
On the next morning—Christmas—the division moved by the
Louisville pike. Captain Quirk, supported by Lieutenant Hays
with the advance-guard of the first brigade, fifty strong, cleared the
road of some Federal cavalry, which tried to contest our advance,
driving it so rapidly, that the column had neither to delay its
march, nor make any formation for fight. In the course of the
day, Quirk charged a battalion, dismounted, and formed across
the road. He went through them, and as he dashed back again,
with his head bent low, he caught two balls on the top of it,
which, singularly (coming from different directions), traced a neat
and accurate angle upon his scalp.
Although the wounds were not serious at all, they would have
stunned most men; but a head built in County Kerry, with especial
reference to shillelagh practice, scorned to be affected by
such trifles. Breckinridge sent Johnson’s regiment during the
day toward Munfordsville, to induce the belief that we were
going to attack that place. Colonel Johnson executed his mission
with perfect success. That night we crossed Green river.
The first brigade being in advance had little trouble comparatively,
although Captain Palmer had to exert energy and skill to
get his battery promptly across; but the second brigade reaching
the bank of the river late at night had great difficulty in getting
across.
The division encamped in the latter part of the night at Hammondsville.
A day before, just upon the bank of the river, the
most enormous wagon, perhaps, ever seen in the State of Kentucky,
was captured. It was loaded with an almost fabulous
amount and variety of Christmas nicknacks; some enterprising
settler had prepared it for the Glasgow market, intending[Pg 331]
to make his fortune with it. It was emptied at an earlier date,
in shorter time, and by customers who proposed to themselves a
much longer credit than he anticipated. There was enough in
it to furnish every mess in the division something to eke out a
Christmas supper with.
On the next day the column resumed its march amid the
steadily pouring rain, and moved through mud which threatened
to ingulf every thing, toward the Louisville and Nashville railroad.
Hutchinson was sent, with several companies of the
Second Kentucky, and the Third Kentucky, to destroy the
bridge at Bacon creek. There was not more than one hundred
men, at the most, in the stockade which protected the bridges,
and he was expected to reduce the stockade with the two pieces
of artillery, which he carried with him, but there was a large
force at Munfordsville, only eight miles from Bacon creek,
and General Morgan gave him troops enough to repulse any
movement of the enemy from Munfordsville to save the bridge.
A battalion of cavalry came out from Munfordsville, but was
easily driven back by Companies B and D, of the Second Kentucky,
under Captain Castleman. Although severely shelled,
the garrison held out stubbornly, rejecting every demand for
their surrender. Hutchinson became impatient, which was his
only fault as an officer, and ordered the bridge to be fired at all
hazards—it was within less than a hundred yards of the stockade,
and commanded by the rifles of the garrison. It was partially
set on fire, but the rain would extinguish it unless constantly
supplied with fuel. Several were wounded in the attempt, and
Captain Wolfe, of the Third Kentucky, who boldly mounted the
bridge, was shot in the head, and lay unconscious for two hours,
every one thinking him dead, until the beating rain reviving
him, he returned to duty, suffering no further inconvenience.
Some of the men got behind the abutment of the bridge, and
thrust lighted pieces of wood upon it, which the men in the
stockade frequently shot away. At length General Morgan arrived
upon the ground, and sent a message to the garrison in[Pg 332]
his own name, offering them liberal terms if they would surrender.
As soon as they were satisfied that it was indeed
Morgan who confronted them, they surrendered. This was a
very obstinate defense. A number of shells burst within the
stockade. Some shots penetrated the walls and an old barn,
which had been foolishly included within the work, was knocked
to pieces, the falling timbers stunning some of the men.
The stockade at Nolin surrendered to me without a fight.
The commandant agreed to surrender if I would show him a
certain number of pieces of artillery. They were shown him,
but when I pressed him to comply with his part of the bargain,
he hesitated, and said he would return and consult his officers.
I think that (as two of the pieces shown him were the little
howitzers, which I happened to have temporarily) he thought he
could hold out for a while, and gild his surrender with a fight.
He was permitted to return, but not until, in his presence, the
artillery was planted close to the work, and the riflemen posted
to command, as well as possible, the loop-holes. He came to
us again, in a few minutes, with a surrender. The Nolin bridge
was at once destroyed, and also several culverts and cow-gaps
within three or four miles of that point.
The division encamped that night within six miles of Elizabethtown.
On the morning of the 27th, the division moved
upon Elizabethtown. This place was held by about six hundred
men, under a Lieutenant Colonel Smith. As we neared the
town, a note was brought to General Morgan, from Colonel
Smith, who stated that he accurately knew his (Morgan’s)
strength, had him surrounded, and could compel his surrender,
and that he (Smith) trusted that a prompt capitulation would
spare him the disagreeable necessity of using force. The missive
containing this proposal—the most sublimely audacious I
ever knew to emanate from a Federal officer, who, as a class,
rarely trusted to audacity and bluff, but to odds and the concours
of force—this admirable document was brought by a
Dutch Corporal, who spoke very uncertain English, but was[Pg 333]
positive on the point of surrender. General Morgan admired
the spirit which dictated this bold effort at bluffing, but returned
for answer an assurance that he knew exactly the strength of
the Federal force in the town, and that Lieutenant Colonel
Smith was in error, in supposing that he (Smith) had him
(Morgan) surrounded; that, on the contrary, he had the honor
to state, the position of the respective forces was exactly the
reverse. He concluded by demanding him to surrender. Colonel
Smith replied that it was “the business of an United States
officer to fight, and not to surrender.” During the parley, the
troops had been placed in position. Breckinridge was given
the left of the road, and the first brigade the right. I dismounted
Cluke’s regiment, and moved it upon the town, with its
left flank keeping close to the road. I threw several companies,
mounted, to the extreme right of my line, and the rear of the
town. Breckinridge deployed his own regiment, under Lieutenant
Colonel Stoner, immediately on the left of the road,
stretching mounted companies also to his left, and around the
town.
The bulk of both brigades was held in reserve. The Parrot
gun was placed in the pike; it was opened as soon as the last
message from Colonel Smith was received; and, as suddenly as
if its flash had ignited them, Palmer’s four guns roared out
from the hill on the left of the road, about six hundred yards
from the town, where General Morgan himself was superintending
their fire. Cluke moved warily, as two or three stockades
were just in his front, which were thought to be occupied. When
he entered the town, he had little fighting to do, and that on the
extreme right. Stoner dashed in on the left with the Ninth
Kentucky, at a swift run. He burst into the houses occupied by
the enemy at the edge of the town, and with slight loss, compelled
the inmates to surrender. The enemy had no artillery,
and ours was battering the bricks about their heads in fine style.
Palmer, who was a capital officer—cool and clearheaded—concentrated
his fire upon the building where the flag floated, and[Pg 334]
the enemy seemed thickest, and moved his six pounders into the
very edge of the town. I sent for one of the howitzers, and
when it came under Lieutenant Corbett, it was posted upon the
railroad embankment, where it crossed the road. Here it played
like a fire engine upon the headquarters building. Breckinridge
posted Company A, of his regiment, to protect the howitzer,
making the men lie down behind the embankment.
The enemy could not well fire upon the gunners from the windows,
on account of the situation of the piece, but after each discharge
would rush out into the street and open upon them.
Then the company lying behind the embankment would
retaliate on the enemy in a style which took away their appetite
for the game. It happened, however, that a staff officer of General
Morgan, passed that way, and conceiving that this company
was doing no good, ordered it, with more zeal than discretion, to
charge. The men instinctively obeyed. As they ran forward,
they came within fair view of the windows, and a heavy volley
was opened upon them, fortunately doing little damage. Their
officers, knowing that the man who gave the order, had no right
to give it, called them back, and they returned in some confusion,
the enemy seized the moment, and flocking out of the
houses poured a sweeping fire down the street. The gunners
were driven away from the howitzers, and two or three hit.
Lieutenant Corbett, however, maintained his place, seated on the
carriage, while the bullets were actually hopping from the reinforce
of the piece. He soon called his men back, and resumed
his fire.
It was as fine an exhibition of courage as I ever saw. Shortly
after this, there seemed to be a commotion among the garrison,
and the white flag was shown from one of the houses. Major
Llewellyn, Division Quartermaster, immediately galloped into
the town, reckless of the firing, waving a white handkerchief.
Colonel Smith was not ready to surrender, but his men did not
wait on him and poured out of the houses and threw down their
arms. Among the fruits of this victory, were, six hundred fine[Pg 335]
rifles, more than enough to arm all of our men who were without
guns. The entire garrison was captured. Some valuable
stores were also taken. On the next day, the 28th, the command
moved leisurely along the railroad, destroying it thoroughly. The
principal objects of the expedition, were the great trestle works
at Muldraugh’s hill, only a short distance apart. The second brigade
captured the garrison defending the lower trestle six hundred
strong; the first brigade captured the garrison of the upper trestle
two hundred strong. Both of the immense structures were
destroyed and hours were required to thoroughly burn them.
These trestles were, respectively, eighty or ninety feet high—and
each, five hundred feet long.
Cane Run bridge, within twenty-eight miles of Louisville, was
destroyed by a scouting party. Two bridges on the Lebanon
branch, recently reconstructed, were also burned. Altogether,
General Morgan destroyed on this expedition, two thousand two
hundred and fifty feet of bridging, three depots, three water stations,
and a number of culverts and cattle-guards. The impression
which prevails in some quarters, that General Morgan left
the road on account of the pursuit of Colonel Harlan, is entirely
erroneous. With the destruction of the great trestles at Muldraugh’s
hill, his contract with the road expired and he prepared
to return. He would have liked to have paid the region about
Lexington another visit, but General Bragg had urged him not
to delay his return. Harlan was moving slowly after us; but for
the delay consequent upon the destruction of the road, he would
never have gotten near us and, but for an accident, he would
never have caught up with any portion of the column, after we
had quitted work on the railroad.
On the night of the 28th, the division had encamped on the
southern bank of the Rolling fork. On the morning of the
29th, it commenced crossing that stream, which was much
swollen. The bulk of the troops and the artillery were crossed
at a ford a mile or two above the point at which the road from
Elizabethtown to Bardstown along which we had been encamped,[Pg 336]
crosses the Rolling fork. The pickets, rear-guard, and some detachments,
left in the rear for various purposes, in all about
three hundred men, were collected to cross at two fords—deep
and difficult to approach and to emerge from. Cluke’s regiment,
with two pieces of artillery, had been sent under Major Bullock
to burn the railroad bridge over the Rolling fork, five miles below
the point where we were. A court-martial had been in
session for several days, trying Lieutenant Colonel Huffman, for
alleged violations of the terms granted by General Morgan to
the prisoners at the surrender of the Bacon creek stockade.
Both brigade commanders, and three regimental commanders,
Cluke, Hutchinson, and Stoner, were officers or members of this
court. Just after the court had finally adjourned, acquitting
Colonel Huffman, and we were leaving a brick house, on the
southern side of the river and about six hundred yards from
its bank, where our last session had been held, the bursting
of a shell a mile or two in the rear caught our ears. A few
videttes had been left there until every thing should have
gotten fairly across. Some of them were captured; others
brought the information that the enemy was approaching.
This was about eleven a.m. We knew that a force of infantry
and cavalry was cautiously following us, but did not know that
it was so near. It was at once decided to throw into line the
men who had not yet crossed, and hold the fords, if possible,
until Cluke’s regiment could be brought back. If we crossed
the river leaving that regiment on the southern side, and it did
not succeed in crossing, or if it crossed immediately and yet
the enemy pressed on vigorously after us, beating it to Bardstown—in
either event it would be cut off from us, and its capture
even would be probable. No one knew whether there was
a ford lower down at which it could cross, and all feared that if
we retreated promptly the enemy would closely follow us. I,
therefore, sent a message to General Morgan, informing him of
what was decided upon, and also sent a courier to Major Bullock,
directing him to return with the regiment as soon as possible.[Pg 337]
The ground on which we were posted was favorable to the kind
of game we were going to play. Upon each flank were thick
woods extending for more than a mile back from the river. Between
these woods was a large meadow, some three hundred
yards wide, and stretching from the river bank for six or eight
hundred yards to a woods again in the back ground, and which
almost united the other two. In this meadow and some two
hundred yards from the river was a singular and sudden depression
like a terrace, running straight across it. Behind this the
men who were posted in the meadow were as well protected as
if they had been behind an earthwork. On the left the ground
was so rugged as well as so wooded that the position there was
almost impregnable. There was, however, no adequate protection
for the horses afforded at any point of the line except the
extreme left.
The Federal force advancing upon us consisted of nearly five
thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and several pieces of
artillery. This force, which, if handled vigorously and skillfully,
if its march had even been steadily kept up, would have, in spite
of every effort we could have made, swept us into the turbid
river at our backs, approached cautiously and very slowly.
Fortunate as this was for us—indeed, it was all that saved us—the
suspense yet became so sickening, as their long line tediously
crept upon us and all around us, that I would almost have preferred,
after an hour of it had elapsed, that Harlan had made a
fierce attack.
We were not idle during this advance, but the skirmishers
were keeping busy in the edges of the woods on our flanks, and
the men in the meadow were showing themselves with the most
careful regard to an exaggerated idea being formed of their
numbers. When the enemy reached the edge of the woods which
fringed the southern extremity of the meadow, and had pressed
our skirmishers out of it and away from the brick-house and its
out-buildings, the artillery was brought up and four or five guns
were opened upon us. Just after this fire commenced, the six-[Pg 338]pounders
sent with Bullock galloped upon the ground, and a
defiant yell a short distance to the right told that Cluke’s regiment,
“The war-dogs,” were near at hand. I was disinclined to
use the six-pounders after they came, because I know that they
could not effectively answer the fire of the enemy’s Parrots,
and I wished to avoid every thing which might warm the affair
up into a hot fight, feeling pretty certain that when that occurred,
we would all, guns and men, “go up” together. Major
Austin, Captain Logan, and Captain Pendleton, commanding
respectively detachments from the Ninth, Third, and Eighth
Kentucky, had conducted the operations of our line up to this
time with admirable coolness and method.
The guns were sent across the meadow rapidly, purposely
attracting the attention of the enemy as much as possible, to
the upper ford. A road was cut through the rough ground for
them, and they were crossed with all possible expedition. Cluke
threw five companies of his regiment into line; the rest were
sent over the river. We now wished to cross with the entire
force that was on the southern side, but this was likely to prove
a hazardous undertaking with an enemy so greatly out-numbering
us lying just in our front. A courier arrived just about that
time from General Morgan with an order to me to withdraw. In
common with quite a number of others, I devoutly wished I could.
The enemy’s guns—the best served of any, I think, that I ever
saw in action—were playing havoc with the horses (four were
killed by one shell), and actually bursting shells in the lower
ford with such frequency as to render the crossing at it by a
column out of the question.
Our line was strengthened by Cluke’s five companies to nearly
eight hundred men, but when the enemy moved upon us again,
his infantry deployed in a long line, strongly supported, with a
skirmish line in front, all coming on with bayonets glistening, the
guns redoubling their fire, and the cavalry column on the right
flank (of their line) apparently ready to pounce on us too, and
then the river surging at our backs, my blood, I confess, ran cold.[Pg 339]
The final moment seemed at hand when that gallant rear-guard
must give way and be driven into the stream, or be
bayoneted on its banks. But not one fear or doubt seemed to
trouble for a moment our splendid fellows. They welcomed the
coming attack with a glad and defiant cheer and could scarcely
be restrained from rushing to meet it. But we were saved by
the action of the enemy.
The advancing line was withdrawn (unaccountably to us) as
soon as it had come under our fire. It did not recoil—it perhaps
had not lost a man. It was at once decided that a show
of attack, upon our part, should be made on the center, and I
ordered Captain Pendleton to charge upon our left, with three
companies, and silence a battery which was annoying us very
greatly; under cover of these demonstrations we had determined
to withdraw. Just after this arrangement was made, I
was wounded in the head by the explosion of a shell, which
burst in a group of us true to its aim. The horse of my acting
Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Moreland, was killed by a fragment
of it. Colonel Breckinridge at once assumed command, and
energetically and skillfully effected the safe withdrawal of the
entire force. Pendleton accomplished by his charge all that
was expected. He killed several cannoneers and drove all from
the guns, silencing them for a quarter of an hour. He, himself,
was badly wounded by the fragment of a shell which burst
short.
Aided by this diversion and the one made upon the front,
every thing was suddenly thrown into columns and dashed
across the river, leaving the army on the other side cheated of
its prey which it ought to have secured. The troops were
gotten across the more readily because of the discovery of a
third ford in the rear of Cluke’s position. It was accidentally
found at the last moment. Our loss was very slight, except in
horses. The enemy did not attempt pursuit. No eulogium
could do justice to the conduct of the men engaged in this affair—nothing
but their perfect steadiness would have enabled any[Pg 340]
skill to have rescued them from the danger. Captains Pendleton,
Logan, Page, and Hines, and Major Austin, deserved the warmest
praise. Cluke acted, as he did always where courage and
soldierly conduct were required, in a manner that added to his
reputation. Breckinridge’s skill and vigor, however, were the
chief themes of conversation and praise.
On that night the division encamped at Bardstown. Colonel
Chenault, on the same day, destroyed the stockade at Boston,
and marched on after the division at Bardstown.
Leaving that place on the 30th, the column reached Springfield
at 3 p.m. “Adam Johnson had been ordered to move
rapidly in advance, and attack the pickets in front of Lebanon;
which he had executed with such vigor as to make Colonel
Hoskins believe he intended to attack him, and he called in a
regiment of cavalry stationed near New Market, thereby opening
the way for us to get out without a fight.”
At Springfield General Morgan learned that his situation was
hazardous, and one that would elicit all of his great powers of
strategy and audacity. The enemy had withdrawn the bulk of
his troops from the Southern part of the State, and had concentrated
them at Lebanon, only eight miles distant from his then
position, and right in his path. This force was nearly eight
thousand strong and well supplied with artillery. He had also
received intelligence that a large force was marching from Glasgow
to intercept him at Columbia, should he succeed in evading
the force at Lebanon. Harlan was not so far in his rear that
he could afford to dally. “In this emergency,” he said, “I determined
to make a detour to the right of Lebanon, and by a
night march to conceal my movements from the enemy, outstrip
the column moving from Glasgow to Columbia, and cross the
Cumberland before it came within striking distance.” Shortly
before midnight, therefore, on the night of the 30th, the column
moved from Springfield, turning off from the pike on to a little,
rarely traveled, by-road, which passes between Lebanon and
St. Mary’s. Numerous fires were built in front of Lebanon,[Pg 341]
and kept up all night to induce the belief that the division was
encamped there and would attack in the morning. The night
was intensely dark and bitterly cold, the guides were inefficient,
and the column floundered along blindly; the men worn out and
half frozen, the horses stumbling at every step—nothing preserved
organization and carried the column along but the will
of the great Captain in the front and the unerring sagacity
which guided him. It is common to hear men who served in
Morgan’s cavalry through all of its career of trial and hardship,
refer to the night march around Lebanon as the most trying
scene of their entire experience.
Morning found the column only eight miles from Springfield,
and two and a half from Lebanon. At that place, however, the
garrison were drawn up, confidently expecting attack from
another direction. By 1 p.m., of the 31st, the column reached
the top of Muldraugh’s hill, on the Lebanon and Columbia road,
and soon after nightfall was in Campbellsville.
Just after the column had crossed the hill, a hand-to-hand
fight occurred between Captain Alexander Treble and Lieutenant
George Eastin, on the one side, and Colonel Halisey, of the
Federal cavalry, and one of the latter’s Lieutenants, on the
other. Treble and Eastin had, for some purpose, fallen behind
the rear-guard and were chased by Halisey’s regiment, which
was following us to pick up stragglers. Being both well
mounted, they easily kept ahead of their pursuers, until, looking
back as they cantered down a long straight stretch in the road,
they saw within three hundred yards, perhaps, of them, four
men who were far in advance of the rest of the pursuers.
Treble and Eastin were both high-strung men and they did
not like to continue to run from that number of enemies. So
as soon as they reached a point in the road where it suddenly
turned, they halted a few yards from the turn. They expected
to shoot two of the enemy as soon as they came in sight and
thought that they would then have little trouble with the others.
But it so happened that only two, Halisey and his Lieutenant,[Pg 342]
made their appearance; the other two, for some reason, halted;
and what was stranger, Treble and Eastin, although both
practiced shots, missed their men. Their antagonists dashed
at them and several shots were fired without effect. The
combatants soon grappled, man to man, and fell from their
horses. Treble forced the head of his man into a pool of
water just by the side of the road and, having half drowned
him, accepted his surrender. Eastin mastered Halisey and,
putting his pistol to his head, bade him surrender. Halisey did
so, but, still retaining his pistol, as Eastin let him arise, he fired,
grazing the latter’s cheek, who immediately killed him. Eastin
brought off his saber, which he kept as a trophy.
In Campbellsville, luckily, there was a large supply of commissary
stores, which were immediately issued to the division.
Leaving early on the next morning, the 1st of January, 1863,
the column reached Columbia at three p.m. All that day the
roaring of artillery was distinctly heard by many men in the
column. There was no cannonading going on—at least, in the
volume which they declared that they heard—except at Murfreesboro’,
far distant, where the battle between the armies of Bragg
and Rosecrans was raging; but it seems incredible that even
heavy guns could have been heard at that distance.
Just before night fall, the column moved from Columbia and
marched all night—a dark, bitter night and a terrible march—to
Burkesville. The Cumberland was crossed on the 2nd and
the danger was over. The division then moved leisurely along,
through Livingston, crossing Caney Fork at Sligo Ferry, and
reached Smithville on the 5th. Here it halted for several days
to rest and recruit men and horses, both terribly used up by the
raid.
The results of this expedition were the destruction of the
railroads which has been described, the capture of eighteen hundred
and seventy-seven prisoners, of a large number of stores,
arms, and government property of every description. Our loss[Pg 343]
was only twenty-six in killed and wounded (only two killed),
and sixty-four missing.
During our absence, the sanguinary battle of Murfreesboro’
was fought, ending in the withdrawal of Bragg to Tullahoma,
much, it is claimed, to the surprise of his adversary. General
Bragg had sent officers to Morgan (who never reached him until
it was too late) with instructions to him to hasten back, and attack
the enemy in the rear. It was unfortunate that these orders
were not received. To do General Bragg justice, he managed
better than almost any commander of the Confederate armies to
usefully employ his cavalry, both in campaigns and battles. In
the battle of Murfreesboro’, he made excellent use of the cavalry
on the field. Wharton and Buford, under command of Wheeler,
three times made the circuit of the Federal army and were
splendidly efficient; at one time Wheeler was master of all between
the immediate rear of Rosecrans and Nashville.
Perhaps Morgan’s raid was delayed a little too long, as well
as that of Forrest into Western Tennessee (undertaken about the
same time, and in prisoners, captures of all sorts, and interruption
of the enemy’s communications, as successful as Morgan’s);
but these expeditions drew off and kept employed a large number
of troops whose presence in the great battle would have
vastly aided Rosecrans.
The Confederate Congress thought this expedition worthy of
recognition and compliment, and passed a joint resolution of
thanks, as follows:
“Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America:
That the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby tendered to
Gen. John H. Morgan, and the officers and men of his command,
for their varied, heroic, and invaluable services in Tennessee
and Kentucky, immediately preceding the battle before Murfreesboro’—services
which have conferred upon their authors
fame as enduring as the records of the struggle which they have
so brilliantly illustrated. Approved May 17, 1863.”
CHAPTER XIII
After the battle of Murfreesboro’, and the retreat of the
arms to Tullahoma, at which place General Bragg’s headquarters
were established, the infantry went into winter quarters,
and General Bragg protected the front and flanks of his army
with the fine cavalry corps of Van Dorn and Wheeler. The
former was assigned to the left, making headquarters at Columbia,
and guarding the lines far to the west, while Wheeler
had the right. This latter corps was composed of the divisions
of Morgan, Wharton, and Martin.
Although the armies were idle for months after this disposition
was made, the cavalry was never so. General Wheeler
had been placed in command of his corps by General Bragg,
probably more on account of the dislike entertained by the latter
to certain other officers, than because of the partiality he felt
for him. The reputation of this officer, although deservedly
high, hardly entitled him to command some of the men who
were ordered to report to him. He became subsequently a
much abler commander than he was at the time of his preferment,
but he always exhibited some very high qualities. He
was vigilant and energetic, thoroughly instructed in the duties
of his profession, and perfectly conversant with the elaborate
details of organization and military business. While he did not
display the originality and the instinctive strategical sagacity
which characterized Morgan and Forrest, he was perhaps better
fitted than either for the duties which devolve upon the commander
of large bodies of cavalry, permanently attached to the
army and required to conform, in all respects, to its movements
and necessities.
Thus, it was often said of him, that “he is not a good raider,
[Pg 346]but there is no better man to watch the front of the army.”
General Wheeler possessed in an eminent degree, all of the attributes
of the gentleman. He was brave as a Paladin, just, high-toned,
and exceedingly courteous. He was full of fire and
enterprise, but, while thoroughly impressed with the necessity
of order and discipline, was singularly unfortunate in maintaining
them—perhaps, because he did not keep strict enough rule
with his officers immediately next him in rank. He labored
under great disadvantages, on account of the violent and unjust
prejudices excited against him by General Bragg’s preference
for him and his rapid promotion. General Morgan said to him,
when first ordered to report to him, that he (Morgan), had
wished to be left free, acting independently of all orders except
from the Commander-in-Chief, but that since he was to be subordinate
to a corps commander, he would prefer him to any other.
General Morgan always entertained this opinion, and I have
reason to believe that General Wheeler reluctantly assumed
command of his division.
The history of the command, for the winter of 1863, properly
commences at the date of the return from the raid into Kentucky,
described in the last chapter. The entire division reached
Smithville upon the 4th of January, and remained in the vicinity
of that little town and at Sligo ferry until the 14th. Upon the
14th, the division was marched to McMinnville, and encamped
around that place—where General Morgan’s headquarters were
then established. The first brigade lay between McMinnville
and Woodbury, at which latter point Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson
was stationed with the Second Kentucky. The weather was
intensely cold, and all of the men who were unprovided with the
means of adequately sheltering themselves, suffered severely.
Their ingenuity was taxed to the utmost to supply the lack of
cooking utensils, and it frequently happened that they had very
little to cook.
Fortunately, a great many blankets had been obtained upon
the last raid, and almost every man had gotten a gum cloth.[Pg 347]
These latter were stretched over the rail shanties which each
mess would put up; and thus covered the sloping, shed-like
structures (built of the fence rails), made very tolerable substitutes
for tents, and with the help of the rousing fires, which were
built at the front of them, were by no means uncomfortable.
Very little system was observed in the “laying out” of the encampment—men
and horses were all huddled together, for the
men did not fancy any arrangement which separated them by the
slightest distance from their horses, and the latter were always
tied close to the lairs of their masters.
Notwithstanding the lack of method and the apparently inextricable
confusion of these camps, their inmates could be gotten
under arms and formed in line of battle, with a celerity that
would have appeared marvelous to the uninitiated.
Colonel Chenault was ordered, in the latter part of January,
to Clinton county, Kentucky, to picket against a dash of the
enemy from that direction. On the 23rd of January, Colonel
Breckinridge was ordered to move to Liberty, eleven miles from
Smithville and about thirty from McMinnville, with three regiments—the
Third Kentucky, under Lieutenant Colonel Huffman,
the Ninth Kentucky, under Lieutenant Colonel Stoner, and the
Ninth Tennessee, under Colonel Ward, who had come to the
command of it after Colonel Bennett’s death, Colonel Adam
R. Johnson was already in the vicinity of that place with his regiment,
the Tenth Kentucky. Captain Quirk preceded these
regiments with his company, and shortly after his arrival at
Liberty and before he could be supported, he, was driven away
by the enemy. He returned next morning, the enemy having
retreated. The three regiments, under Colonel Breckinridge,
occupied the country immediately in front of Liberty, picketing
all of the roads thoroughly. The enemy were in the habit of
sending out strong foraging parties from Readyville toward
Woodbury, and frequent skirmishes occurred between them and
Hutchinson’s scouts.
Upon one occasion, Hutchinson, with less than one hundred[Pg 348]
men, attacked one of these parties, defeating it with smart loss,
and taking nearly two hundred prisoners and forty or fifty
wagons. For this he was complimented in general orders from
army headquarters. It led, however, in all probability, to disastrous
consequences, by inducing the enemy to employ many
more troops in that quarter than he would otherwise have sent
there. This affair occurred a short time previously to the occupation
of Liberty by the force under Colonel Breckinridge, and
a much brisker condition of affairs began to prevail all along the
line. Rosecrans was determined to make his superior numbers
tell, at least, in the immediate vicinity of his army. He inaugurated
a system, about this time, which resulted in the decided
improvement of his cavalry. He would send out a body of
cavalry, stronger than any thing it was likely to encounter, and
that it might never be demoralized by a complete whipping, he
would back it by an infantry force, never far in the rear, and
always ready to finish the fight which the cavalry begun. This
method benefited the latter greatly. On the 24th, the Second
Kentucky was attacked at Woodbury by a heavy force of the
enemy, and a gallant fight ensued, ending by an unhappy loss for
us, in the death of Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson.
From various causes the regiment had become much depleted,
and on this day it was reduced (by the sending off of detachments
for necessary duties), to less than four hundred men.
The enemy advanced, over three thousand strong, principally
infantry, but Hutchinson determined not to give up his position
without a hard fight. He posted his men advantageously upon
the brow of a hill in front of the village, sheltering a portion of
his line behind a stone wall. The enemy preceded his attack
with a smart fire of artillery, to which Hutchinson could make
no reply, but was forced to take it patiently. But when the
infantry moved up and came within range of our riflemen, the
tables were (for a little while) completely turned, and they fell
fast under a fire that rarely failed to do deadly execution. The
unequal contest lasted more than an hour; during that time the[Pg 349]
stone wall was carried by the enemy, but was retaken by Captain
Treble and Lieutenant Lea, charging at the head of their
gallant companies. Much as he needed men, Hutchinson kept
one of his companies idle and out of the fight, but, nevertheless,
producing an effect upon the enemy. He caused Captain Cooper
to show the head of his company, just upon the brow of the hill,
so that the enemy could see it but could not judge correctly of
its strength, and might possibly think it a strong reserve.
Constantly exposed to the fire of artillery and small arms
throughout the fight, this company never flinched, nor moved
from its position until it was ordered to cover the retreat. Then
it filed to the left, as if moving to take the enemy in flank, and
when the column had passed, wheeled into the rear, under cover
of the hill. Colonel Hutchinson, at length, yielded to the conviction
that he could not hold his ground against such odds.
The arrival of a fresh company enabled him to retreat with
greater security, and he ordered the line to retire. A portion
of it was pressed hard as it did so, and he rode to the point of
danger to encourage the men by his presence. He had exposed
himself during the action with even more than his usual recklessness,
but with impunity. Just as all seemed over, however, and
he was laughing gleefully at his successful withdrawal, a ball
struck him upon the temple, and he fell dead from his horse.
Lieutenant Charles Allen, the gallant acting Adjutant of the regiment,
and Charles Haddox (his orderly), threw his body upon
his horse and carried it off under the hot fire.
Captain Castleman at once assumed command, and successfully
conducted the retreat. The supply of ammunition entirely gave
out just after the retreat was commenced.
Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson was, beyond all comparison,
the best field officer in Morgan’s division, and indeed that I ever
saw. Had he lived and been placed in situations favorable to
the development of his talent, he would, I firmly believe, have
become competent to any command. He had more natural military
aptitude, was more instinctively the soldier; than any man[Pg 350]
I have ever known. He did not exhibit a marked partiality and
gift for a particular class of military duties, so much as a capacity
and fitness for all. He could make himself thorough in
every thing which the service required. All that a soldier ought
to know, he seemed to learn easily—all the proper feelings of a
soldier seemed his natural impulses. General Morgan felt a
warm and manly admiration for him, and reposed an implicit
confidence in his character and ability. His brother officers
loved to enhance his reputation, his men idolized him. Hutchinson
had the frank generous temper, and straight forward, although
shrewd, disposition which wins popularity with soldiers.
While watchful and strict in his discipline, he was kind to his
men, careful of their wants, and invariably shared their fare,
whatever it might be. He was born to be a soldier and to
rank high among soldiers. He loved the excitement of the game
of war. He loved honor, as a western man loves the free air
of the prairies—it was his natural element. It may seem to the
general reader that I have extravagantly eulogized him, but his
old-comrades will, perhaps, think that I have said too little.
When killed he was barely twenty-four, but the effects of exposure
and the thoughtful expression of his eye made him appear
several years older. His great size and erect, soldierly
bearing made him a conspicuous figure at all times, and in battle
he was superb. Taller than all around him, his form, of immense
muscular power, dilated with stern excitement—always
in the van—he looked, as he sat upon his colossal gray charger,
like some champion of an age when one man could stay the
march of armies. There was some thing in his look which told
his daring nature. His aquiline features, dark glittering eye,
close cropped black hair, and head like a hawk’s, erect and alert,
indicated intense energy and invincible courage. Hutchinson’s
death cast a deep gloom over his regiment and (as Major Bowles,
who then became Lieutenant Colonel, was absent when it occurred)
an unfortunate quarrel broke out between two of the
officers respecting seniority and the right to command it. This[Pg 351]
quarrel was espoused by their respective friends, and a state
of feeling was induced which greatly impaired the efficiency of
the regiment, until it was settled by the appointment of Captain
Webber to the Majority. Webber had nothing to do with the
dispute, but a committee appointed by General Morgan to investigate
and decide the claims of all the Captains to seniority, pronounced
him senior to both the contestants.
On the 14th of February, Colonel Cluke was sent into Eastern
and Central Kentucky, for purposes which will be explained in
the account which will be given of his operations. He took
with him his own regiment, two companies under Major Steele—Company
A, of the Second, and Companies C and I of the Third
Kentucky—and about seventy men of the Ninth Kentucky
under Lieutenant Colonel Stoner.
These detachments weakened the effective strength of the
command at a time when it was engaged in service which tasked
its energies to the utmost. That portion of “the front” which
General Morgan was expected to protect, may be described as
extending from Woodbury, in Tennessee, to Wayne county, in
Kentucky, in an irregular curved line more than one hundred
and twenty miles in length. It was exceedingly important that
this entire line should be well picketed and closely watched, but
it was necessary to give especial attention to that section of it
in Tennessee (which was immediately confronted by formidable
numbers of the enemy) and here, consequently, the greater part
of the division was employed.
While it was necessary to keep strict ward at Woodbury, upon
the left flank of this line, and a force adequate to the thorough
picketing and scouting of that region was always kept there—the
chief interest centered at Liberty, for here the efforts of the
enemy to break the line and drive back the forces guarding it,
were most frequently and energetically directed. This little
hamlet is situated twenty-nine miles from Murfreesboro’, by the
turnpike, and almost due Northeast of it. A line drawn from
Carthage to Woodbury would pass through Liberty, and the[Pg 352]
latter is distant some eighteen miles from each. Carthage is a
little east of north, Woodbury a little west of south, from
Liberty. About twenty-one or two miles from Liberty, and
west of south, is Readyville—where was stationed at the time
of which I write, a strong Federal force. Readyville is ten
miles from Murfreesboro’, and about the same distance northwest
of Woodbury. Lebanon, twenty-six miles from Liberty
by the turnpike which runs through Alexandria, and northwest
of it, was at this time, permanently occupied by neither side,
but both Federal and Confederate troops occasionally held it.
Carthage, far upon the flank and virtually in the rear of the
forces at Liberty, was occupied by a Federal garrison, which
varied in strength, as the plans of the Federal Generals required.
It could be reinforced and supplied from Nashville by the river,
upon which it is situated, and it was well fortified.
A direct advance upon Liberty from Murfreesboro’ promised
nothing to the attacking-party but a fight in which superior
numbers might enable it to dislodge the Confederates, and force
them to retreat to Smithville; thence, if pressed, to McMinnville
or Sparta. If such a movement were seconded by a cooperative
one from Carthage, the effect would be only to hasten
the retreat, for the country between Carthage and Smithville is
too rugged for troops to traverse it with ease and dispatch, and
they would necessarily have to march directly to Liberty, or to
a point but a very short distance to the east of it. It may be
stated generally that the result would be the same were an advance
made upon Liberty by any or all of the routes coming in
upon the front, and the enemy at Carthage was dangerous only
when the Confederates exposed their rear by an imprudent advance.
A rapid march through Woodbury upon McMinnville
might bring the enemy at any time entirely between Liberty
and the army at Tullahoma, or if he turned and marched through
Mechanicsville, dash and celerity might enable him to cut off
the force at Liberty entirely.
When it is remembered that about the only point of import[Pg 353]ance
outside of Murfreesboro’ and Nashville, and short of the
line I have described (with the exception of Lebanon), whether
north or south of the river, was occupied by a Federal garrison
large enough to undertake the offensive, and that the country
was traced in every direction by innumerable practicable roads,
it will be clear that sleepless vigilance and the soundest judgment
were necessary to the protection of the Confederate forces
stationed in it. The three regiments encamped in the vicinity
of Liberty numbered about one thousand effectives, and the other
regiments under Colonel Gano, including all which were not detached
in Kentucky, under Colonels Cluke and Chenault, were
posted in the neighborhood of Woodbury and McMinnville, and
were about the same aggregate strength.
During the latter part of January and in February and March,
the entire command was kept constantly and busily employed.
Scouts and expeditions of all kinds—dashes at the enemy and
fights between reconnoitering parties were of almost daily occurrence,
and when Colonels Gano and Breckinridge were not
harassing the enemy, they were recipients of like attention from
him. Perhaps no period in the history of Morgan’s cavalry of
equal duration can be cited, in which more exciting and arduous
service was performed. I regret that my absence from
it at that time, and consequent want of familiarity with these
events, renders it impossible that I shall describe them with the
minuteness and accuracy which belong only to the personal observer.
It has been said, in allusion to this period and the action
then of Morgan’s command, “If all the events of that winter
could be told, it would form a book of daring personal adventures,
of patient endurance, of great and continued hardship,
and heroic resistance against fearful odds.” The narration of
these scenes in the simple language of the men who were actors
in them, the description by the private soldiers of what they
dared then, and endured, the recital of men (unconsciously telling
their own heroism) would be the proper record of these stirring and
memorable months. They could tell how, worn out[Pg 354]
with days and nights of toil, the brief repose was at length welcome
with so much joy. Frequently the rain and sleet would
beat in their faces as they slept, and the ice would thicken in
their very beds. Happy were the men who had blankets in
which to wrap their limbs, other than those which protected
their horses’ backs from the saddle. Thrice lucky those who
could find something to eat when they lay down, and another
meal when they arose. It oftenest happened that before the
chill, bleak winter’s day had broken, the bugle aroused them
from comfortless bivouacs, to mount, half frozen and shivering,
upon their stiff and tired horses and, faint and hungry, ride
miles to attack a foe, or contest against ten-fold odds every foot
of his advance.
Some of the personal adventures, so frequent at that time,
will perhaps be found interesting. An expedition undertaken
by General Morgan himself, but, unlike most of those in which
he personally commanded, unsuccessful, is thus related: “Upon
January 29th, General Morgan, accompanied by Major Steele,
Captain Cassell, and a few men, came to Liberty to execute a dangerous
plan. It was to take fifty picked men, dressed in blue
coats, into Nashville, burn the commissary stores there, and in the
confusion of the fire, make their escape. He had an order written,
purporting to be from General Rosecrans, to Captain Johnson,
Fifth Kentucky cavalry, to proceed from Murfreesboro’ to Lebanon,
thence to Nashville, arrest all stragglers, make all discoveries,
etc. I can not recollect now from what commands the
fifty men were selected, but know that Steele, Cassell, and Quirk
went along. The plan was frustrated by an accident. As General
Morgan rode up to Stewart’s ferry, over Stone river, a
Captain of a Michigan regiment, with some twenty men, rode
up to the other side. Morgan immediately advanced a few feet
in front of his command, touched his hat, and said, “Captain,
what is the news in Nashville?”
Federal Captain—”Who are you?”
“Captain Johnson, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, just from Mur[Pg 355]freesboro’,
via Lebanon, going to Nashville by General Rosecrans’
order—what is your regiment?” “—— Michigan.”
Morgan then asked: “Are you going further?”—”No.”
“Have you any news of Morgan?” With perfect self possession
Morgan answered: “His cavalry are at Liberty—none
closer.” He then said to Quirk: “Sergeant, carry as many
men over at a load as possible, and we will swim the horses. It
is too late to attempt to ferry them over.”
“The Michigan Captain started to move on when Morgan asked
him to wait and they would ride to Nashville together. When
he consented, most of his men got down and tried to warm
themselves by walking, jumping, etc. Quirk pushed across with
about a dozen men, reached the bank, and started the boat back;
unfortunately, as his men climbed the bank, their gray pants
showed, the Michiganders became alarmed, and Quirk had to
attack forthwith. The Captain and some fifteen men surrendered
immediately; the remainder escaped and ran to Nashville,
giving the alarm. Morgan declared that if he had succeeded
in capturing them all, he would have gone immediately into
Nashville. Those who knew him best, will most readily believe
it.”
A short time after the fight at Woodbury, Lieutenant Colonel
Bowles, with the greater part of the Second Kentucky, and
supported by a battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Malone
(Alabama), engaged a large force of the enemy at Bradyville.
Attacking the advance-guard of this force (before he became
aware of the strength of the main body), Colonel Bowles drove
it in confusion and rout, into the town, and even forced back
for some distance (so impetuous was his charge), the regiments
sent to its support.
In reckless, crushing attack, Colonel Bowles had no superior
among the officers of the division. His dauntless and rash
bravery gave great weight to a charge, but, unluckily, he was
perfectly indifferent about the strength of the enemy whom he
charged. On this occasion greatly superior forces closed in on
both flanks of his command, and a part of the enemy driving[Pg 356]
away Malone’s battalion, gained his rear before he could disentangle
himself. Quick fighting and fast running alone saved the
regiment, but it was a “hard party” to capture, and it got away
with a very slight loss in prisoners. Several men in the extreme
rear were sabered, but, of course, not killed. One man of Company
K, who had an axe strapped on his back, was collared by
a Federal Captain, who struck him on the head with his saber.
The “old regular” deliberately unstrapped his axe, and with
one fierce blow shivered his assailant’s skull.
The sloughs and mud holes were frequent and deep. Some
of the men declared that they would “dive out of sight at one
end of them and come up at the other.” Lieutenant Colonels
Huffman and Martin were especially enterprising during the
early part of February, in the favorite feat of wagon catching,
and each attacked with success and profit large foraging parties
of the enemy. They some times ran into more difficult situations
than they had bargained for, and it must be recorded that
each had, on more than one occasion, to beat a hasty and not altogether
orderly retreat. But these mishaps, invariably repaired
by increased vigor and daring, served only to show that officers
and men possessed one of the rarest of soldierly qualities, the
capacity to receive a beating and suffer no demoralization from
it. I have heard an incident of one of these dashes of Martin,
related and vouched for by reliable men who witnessed it, which
ought to be preserved. Martin had penetrated with a small
force into the neighborhood of Murfreesboro’, and upon his return
was forced to cut his way through a body of the enemy’s
cavalry. He charged vigorously, and a melee ensued, in which
the combatants were mixed all together. In this confused hand-to-hand
fight, Captain Bennett (a dashing young officer, whose
coolness, great strength and quickness had made him very successful
and celebrated in such encounters), was confronted by
an opponent who leveled a pistol at his head, and at the same
time Bennett saw one of the men of his company just about to
be shot or sabered by another one of the enemy. Bending low[Pg 357]
in his saddle to avoid the shot aimed at himself, Captain Bennett
first shot the assailant of his follower and then killed his own
foe. Upon one occasion, Captain Quirk in one of his many
daring scouts got into a “tight place,” which is thus briefly narrated
by one familiar with the affair:
“On the same day, Captains Quirk and Davis (the latter of
South Carolina), Colonel Breckinridge’s aide, started for a sort
of fancy trip toward Black’s shop. Below Auburn they met
Federal cavalry and charged; the enemy had prepared an ambuscade,
which Quirk’s men saw in time to avoid—but not so
Quirk, Davis and Tom Murphy, who being splendidly mounted,
were ahead. Into it, through it they went. Quirk unhurt—Davis
wounded and captured, and Tom Murphy escaping with
what he described ‘a hell of a jolt,’ with the butt of a musket in
the stomach. Davis some how managed to escape, and reached
our lines in safety, but with a severe flesh wound in the thigh.”
Captain Davis became afterward Assistant Adjutant General of
the first brigade.
The following report of what was justly entitled “one of the
most dashing and brilliant scouts of the war,” will give an idea
of how this force, so small and so constantly pressed, yet
managed to assume the offensive, and of how far it would strike:
REPORT OF CAPTAIN T.H. HINES,
Liberty, Tennessee, March 3, 1863.
Colonel William C.P. Breckinridge, commanding 2nd Brigade,
General Morgan’s Division, Sir: Having been detailed
with a detachment of thirteen men and one Lieutenant, J.M.
Porter, of my company, to proceed to Kentucky, south of Barren
river, for the purpose of destroying the Federal transports
from plying between Bowlinggreen, Kentucky, and Evansville,
Indiana, I have the honor of submitting my report. The detachment
left this point at twelve o’clock, February 7th; on
the evening of the 8th, crossed the Cumberland river at Gran[Pg 358]ville,
Tennessee. The night of the 11th, reached the vicinity
of Bowlinggreen, but unfortunately our presence, force and design
becoming known to the Federal authorities by the capture
of Doctor Samuel Garvin, who had volunteered to accompany
us, we were under the necessity of altering materially the plan
of operations. We disbanded to meet on the night of the 20th,
twelve miles south of Bowlinggreen. On the morning of the
21st, we burned the depot and three cars at South Union, on
the Louisville and Memphis railroad, all stored with Federal
property. At 12 o’clock, p.m., on the 25th, captured the steamer
“Hettie Gilmore,” in the employ of the Federal Government,
and heavily laden with stores for the Army of the Cumberland,
all of which we destroyed, paroling the boat. Made a circuit
of forty miles, destroyed a train of twenty-one cars and an engine
at Woodburn, on the Louisville and Nashville railroad, at
6 o’clock, p.m., February 26th. The whole amount of Federal
property destroyed on the 21st, 25th and 26th, inclusive, can
not fall short of half a million of dollars. In conclusion, Colonel,
we have been twenty-one days, one hundred and fifty miles
within the enemy’s lines, traveled in thirty-six hours one hundred
miles, injured the Federal Government half a million dollars,
caused him to collect troops at points heretofore unprotected,
thereby weakening his force in front of our army. After destroying
the train at Woodburn, and being closely pursued by
the enemy, we swam an angry little stream known as Drake’s
creek, in which attempt Corporal L.H. McKinney was washed
from his horse and drowned. He was indeed a gallant soldier
and much beloved by his comrades. Too much praise can not
be given to Lieutenant Porter and the brave, true men who accompanied
me on this trip, bearing all the fatigue and danger
incident to such a scout without a murmur. I have the honor
to be with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
T. Henry Hines, Capt. Comd’g Scouts.
Sometime during February two fine regiments, the Fifth and[Pg 359]
Sixth Kentucky were added to the division. These regiments
were commanded respectively, by Colonels D.H. Smith and
Warren Grigsby. They had been recruited while General
Bragg occupied Kentucky, for Buford’s brigade, but upon the
dissolution of that organization they were assigned at the request
of their Colonels, to General Morgan’s command. The material
composing them was of the first order and their officers were
zealous and efficient.
Sometime in the same month an order was issued from army
headquarters, regularly brigading Morgan’s command. The
Second, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee,
were placed in one brigade, the first. The Third, Eighth, Eleventh
and Tenth Kentucky, composed the second brigade. Colonels
Smith and Grigsby were both the seniors of the other
Colonels of the first brigade, but each refused to take command,
on account of their recent attachment to the command, and
Colonel Breckinridge was assigned to the temporary command
of it. Colonel Adam Johnson was senior Colonel of the division,
but was absent during the greater part of the winter, and Colonel
Gano took command of the second brigade. The regiments,
however, were so disposed and scattered, that the brigades
were not practically organized for some time after the order
was issued.
The history of the Ninth Tennessee regiment illustrates
how much can be done by the efforts of an intelligent, zealous
and firm officer, however discouraging may appear the prospect
when he undertakes reforms. The men of this regiment, recruited
principally in Sumner and Smith counties of Middle
Tennessee, were capable, as the result showed, of being made
excellent soldiers, but their training had commenced under the
most inauspicious circumstances. They were collected together
(as has been previously related) in August, 1862, in a camp at
Hartsville, and their organization was partially effected in the
neighborhood of a strong enemy, while they were entirely without
arms or any support and protecting force. Several times[Pg 360]
during this period, they were attacked by the enemy and scattered
in all directions—the fact that they always reassembled
promptly demonstrating their excellent character.
When General Morgan returned from Kentucky, this regiment
joined him at Gallatin. Its commander, Colonel Bennett, was
deservedly popular for many genial and noble qualities. He
was high minded, brave and generous, but neglected to enforce
discipline among his men, and his regiment was utterly without
it. Upon his death, Colonel William Ward succeeded to the
command, and a marked change and improvement was at once
perceptible. He instituted a far stricter discipline, and enforced
it rigidly; he constantly drilled and instructed his men, and requiring
a higher standard of efficiency in the officers, greatly
improved them. At the same time he exercised the utmost care
and industry in providing for all the wants of his regiment. In
a very short time, the Ninth became, in all respects, the equal
of any regiment in Morgan’s division.
Colonel Ward’s first exploit, with his regiment thus reformed,
was to attack and completely defeat a foraging party, capturing
several wagons and seventy-five prisoners. He then performed,
with great ability, a very important duty, that of harassing
General Crook’s command, which had been stationed opposite
Carthage, on the south side of the Cumberland. Colonel Ward,
avoiding close battle, annoyed and skirmished with this force
so constantly, that it never did any damage, and finally recrossed
the river. From this time, the Ninth Tennessee did its fair
share of dashing and successful service.
But some account should be given of the operations of Colonel
Chenault, in Clinton and Wayne counties, Kentucky, and of
Colonel Cluke, in the interior of the State. I can best describe
the service of the first named of these commands by copying,
verbatim, from the diary of a gallant field officer of the regiment.
He says: “The regiment started” (January 15th) “in a pelting
rain for Albany, Kentucky—we marched through mud, rain
and snow for five days, swimming both Collins and Obie rivers,[Pg 361]
and reached Albany on the morning of the 22nd of January,
1863, all much exhausted, and many men dismounted. We find
Albany a deserted village. It was once a flourishing village of
five hundred inhabitants, and is the county seat of Clinton
county. It is now tenantless and deserted, store houses, hotel,
lawyers’ offices, churches, dwelling houses and court house unoccupied
and going to decay. Where was once joy, peace,
prosperity and busy bustling trade, wicked war has left nought
but desolation, ruin and solitude. We camped in the town, and
were surrounded with a country teeming with good rations and
abundance of forage.
“January 24th. With one hundred men I went on a scout to
Monticello, distant twenty-five miles from Albany, drove a
Yankee company, commanded by Captain Hare, out of Monticello
and across the Cumberland river—captured two prisoners.
From this date until the 15th February, we scouted and picketed
the roads in every direction, and had good rations and forage,
with comfortable quarters, but heavy duty, the whole regiment
being on duty every two days. ‘Tinker Dave’ annoyed us so
much that we had to establish a chain picket every night around
the entire town. Colonel Jacob’s Yankee regiment is at Creelsboro’,
twelve miles distant, and Woolford’s brigade is at Burkesville,
fourteen miles distant. Our little regiment is one hundred
and twenty miles from support, and it is only by vigilance
and activity that we can save ourselves. An order was received
yesterday from the War Department forever fixing our destiny
with Morgan.
“Learning from newspapers, that our Scouts brought in, that
Woolford would make a speech in Burkesville on the 12th day
of February, I started from Albany, with two companies, early
that morning, and forming my men behind a hill, I watched
from the bushes near the river the assembling of the crowd at
the court house. At 1 o’clock the bell rang. A short time
before that, the guard at the ferry, in four hundred yards of the
court house, composed almost entirely of soldiers, and after[Pg 362]
speaking commenced I charged on foot to a school house immediately
on the banks of the river, and from there drove the
pickets, that had dismounted, away from their horses, and also
broke up the speaking in tremendous disorder. We killed a
number of horses, and the killed and wounded among the Yankees
were seven. The boys christened the school house Fort
McCreary, but it did not last long, for the night after we left
the Yankees crossed the river and burned it.
“February 19th. Colonel Cluke passed within a few miles of
us, and sent an order from General Morgan for two companies.
Companies D and E, Captains Dickens and Terrill, were sent
him.
“March 4th. By order of General Morgan I moved with three
companies from Albany to Monticello to-day; am camping in
the town. The citizens are hospitable and polite. Woolford,
with a very large force, is around Somerset. I am kept very
busy picketing and scouting; it is General Morgan’s object to
occupy all the country this side of the Cumberland until Cluke’s
return from Kentucky.
“March 10th. To-day the balance of the regiment under
Colonel Chenault arrived at Monticello. We have raised one
company of new recruits since coming to Kentucky.
“March 20th. I crossed Cumberland river with twenty-six
men last night in a horse trough, and then marched on foot two
miles to capture a Yankee picket. The force at the picket base
fled, but I captured two videttes stationed at the river. The
trip was very severe. I lost one man.
“April 1st. General Pegram’s brigade arrived to-day en
route for Kentucky on a raid. The brain fever has killed seventeen
of our regiment up to this date, among them Captain
Sparr and Lieutenant Covington.
“April 11th. Pegram captured Somerset, and moved on to
Danville, and thence commenced his retreat; was compelled to
fight at Somerset and was defeated; Colonel Chenault moved[Pg 363]
our regiment to the river and helped him to cross. His forces
were much scattered, and many were captured.
“April 8th. Cluke returned to-day from Kentucky; the two
companies that went from this regiment were much injured.
What is left reported to-day. Captain Terrill and Lieutenant
Maupin both severely wounded at the Mt. Sterling fight, and left
behind.
“April 29th. River being fordable, the enemy crossed in
heavy force both at Mill Springs and mouth of Greasy Creek.
Tucker met them on Mill Spring road, and I met them on Greasy
Creek road; Chenault with part of the regiment remained at
Monticello. The enemy was in large force, and we were compelled
to evacuate Monticello at eleven o’clock to-night, and fell
back in the direction of Travisville. Finding on the 1st day of
May that the enemy was not pressing us, we returned to Monticello,
and skirmished heavily with him; reinforcements to the
enemy having arrived, we were compelled to fall back to the
Obie River.”
The “brain fever,” to which the writer alluded, was a very
singular disease. The patient attacked with it suffered with a
terrible pain in the back of the head and along the spine; the
extremities soon became cold, and the patient sank into torpor.
It was generally fatal in a few hours. I recollect to have heard
of no recovery from it.
As has already been mentioned, Colonel Cluke was dispatched
to Central Kentucky on the 4th of February. The force under
his command, in all seven hundred and fifty effectives, was his
own regiment, the Eighth Kentucky, under the immediate command
of Major Robert S. Bullock, seventy-eight men of the
Ninth Kentucky and two companies of the Eleventh, under command
of Lieut. Colonel Robert G. Stoner—entitled the First Battalion;
and two Companies C and I, of the Third Kentucky, and
Company A, of the Second Kentucky, under command of Major
Theophilus Steele—styled the Second Battalion. The two
mountain howitzers (“Bull Pups”) were also attached to his[Pg 364]
command, under charge of Lieutenant C.C. Corbett. This force
was ably officered, every company having excellent commanders.
Colonel Cluke was supplied also with an efficient staff, Captains
C.C. and C.H. Morgan (of the General’s own staff) accompanied
him. Lieutenant Moreland (a staff officer of the first brigade)
attended him as aide, and was eminently fitted (on account
of his earnest and serious turn of mind) to act as adviser in
an expedition wherein so many delicate and difficult questions
might arise for solution, although his extreme gravity of temper
and taciturn manner made the younger and more mercurial
officers of the staff somewhat impatient of his society.
Colonel Cluke had no officer regularly detailed as A.A.A.
General. Sergeant Lawrence Dickerson, clerk of the Adjutant’s
office of the first brigade, and thoroughly competent, performed
all the duties of one.
The advance guard was commanded by Lieutenant Shuck of
the Eighth Kentucky, and the scouts were commanded by
Lieutenant Hopkins, of the Second, and Lieutenant S.P. Cunningham,
of the Eighth. One hundred rounds of ammunition
and six days’ rations were issued to the men upon the morning
that the command marched. The weather was inclement and
intensely cold, when this expedition was commenced. A march
through sleet, rain, and snow, and over terrible roads, brought
Colonel Cluke to the Cumberland river on the evening of the
18th. Lieut.-Colonel Stoner and Lieutenant Hopkins crossed
the river, with a few men, in a canoe, surprised and captured
the Federal pickets posted to guard the ferry, at which Colonel
Cluke wished to cross, and brought over flatboats and a coal
barge, by means of which the entire command was crossed, the
horses being made to swim. So bitter was the cold that eight
horses chilled to death immediately upon emerging from the
stream.
On the 19th the column reached Somerset. A strong force
of the enemy had been stationed there, but fell back to Danville
on learning of Colonel Cluke’s approach. The greater part of[Pg 365]
the stores collected there fell into Cluke’s hands. Pressing on,
Cluke compelled the surrender of a detachment of Federal troops
at Mt. Vernon, and did not halt until within fifteen miles of
Richmond. Wretched roads and a blinding snow storm rendered
this march harassing and tedious. The scouts moved to
within ten miles of Richmond, and Lieutenant Hopkins halting
with a portion of them, Lieutenant Cunningham went on three
miles further with eight men. He found a picket post of the
enemy, where four videttes were stationed. He answered their
challenge by declaring himself and party friends, and, advancing
to the post, persuaded the Federals that they were an advance
party of Woolford’s regiment, which they represented to be returning
from Tennessee to Kentucky to assist in repelling an
anticipated raid. Lieutenant Cunningham stated that all the
various Federal forces in that region were to be immediately
concentrated at Lexington, as certain information had been obtained
that General Breckinridge had entered the State at the
head of ten thousand infantry. The sergeant of the post then
gave Lieutenant Cunningham a statement of the location and
strength of all the Federal commands in the vicinity, and invited
him to go to a house a short distance off, where the picket
detail to which he belonged made base. Cunningham, finding
this detail twenty-four strong, made an excuse to send back two
of his own men and one of the Federals, thus calling Hopkins
to his aid, who, in an hour or two, arrived with the other eight
men of the scouts.
A skirmish immediately ensued between the parties. One
Federal was killed and two wounded—the rest were made prisoners.
They were completely deceived and surprised. The
whole affair was as clever a piece of strategy as can be found
in the annals of partisan service. Learning that two hundred
and fifty of the enemy were at Richmond, Cluke broke camp at
an early hour and marched rapidly in hopes to capture them.
They started to Lexington, however, before he got to Richmond.
The rumor (which had been industriously circulated) that Breck[Pg 366]inridge
had entered the State, was accomplishing its work.
Major Steele was immediately dispatched, with three companies
under his command. He overtook the rear-guard at Comb’s
ferry, and drove it in upon the column—a brisk skirmish and
chase ensuing—Steele driving them into Lexington. He came
very near being killed shortly afterward. Leaving his command
halted, he rode to a picket post some distance off, with one or
two men, and essayed to capture the videttes. One of them
(after signifying that he would surrender) suddenly placed his
rifle to the Major’s breast and fired. A thick Mexican blanket
wrapped tightly in many folds about his body, saved his life;
yet the bullet pierced the blanket and entered his breast, breaking
a rib. This wound disabled him, at a time when his services
were most needed, for several days.
On the same night, Captain C.H. Morgan and Lieutenant
Corbett, while reconnoitering near Lexington and seeking highly
important information, were captured. Colonel Cluke moved
on the night of the 22nd (crossing the Kentucky river at Boonsboro’)
to Winchester, reaching that place on the 23rd. He then
sent detachments in various directions to excite and bewilder
the enemy as thoroughly as possible. Major Bullock advancing
toward Lexington, Lieutenant Colonel Stoner was sent to Mt.
Sterling, and Lieutenant Cunningham was sent toward Paris.
The most intense excitement prevailed and reports were rife and
believed that rebels were flocking into the State from all directions.
Cluke finding that he had reduced the enemy to inaction,
and could do so safely, permitted men who lived in the
neighboring counties to visit their homes and thus gave greater
currency to these rumors. This had been one of the objects
of the expedition. The other ends had in view, in undertaking
it, to-wit: to obtain and keep a thorough understanding of the
condition of affairs in Kentucky during the winter, and to enable
the men to procure horses and clothing, were perfectly accomplished.
Lieutenant Cunningham demonstrated successfully in
the direction of Paris, confining the troops there to the town.[Pg 367]
Lieut. Colonel Stoner moved rapidly on Mt. Sterling and found
the enemy, which had been stationed there under Colonel Wadsworth,
just evacuating the town. Stoner immediately attacked
and completely routed his enemy. The road by which the latter
retreated, was strewn for miles with overcoats, guns, wrecked
wagons, and all the debris of routed and fleeing troops. Stoner
captured many prisoners and several wagons.
On the 24th, the entire command was concentrated at Mt.
Sterling, and the day was spent in collecting and distributing
horses, equipments, etc. The enemy at Lexington having recovered
by this time from the fright given them on the 21st, by
Major Steele, and learning the falsity of the rumors of a heavy
Confederate advance, now came out in search of Cluke. On
the morning of the 25th, a brigade dashed into Mt. Sterling.
The command was much weakened, not only by the detachments
which had again been sent out, but by furloughs allowed men
who lived in the immediate vicinity. It was at once driven out
of the town but retreated, unpursued, only a short distance. It
has been said that the men came in so quickly, that the command
was increased from two hundred to six hundred, before “the
echoes of the enemy’s artillery had died away.” This brigade
which had driven out Cluke, established itself at Mt. Sterling.
Cluke now successfully inaugurated a strategy which has been
greatly and justly admired by his comrades. Lieutenant Cunningham
was sent with a few picked men to the vicinity of Lexington
and directed to spy thoroughly upon the officials there.
Ascertaining enough to make the project feasible, the Lieutenant
sent a shrewd fellow (disguised in Federal uniform) to the
headquarters of the officer commanding, upon some pretended
business which enabled him to hang about the office. While
there this man purloined some printed blanks and brought them
out with him. One of these was filled up with an order (purporting
to come from Lexington to the officer in command at
Mt. Sterling), instructing him to march at once to Paris to repel
a raid threatening the Kentucky Central railroad. He was di[Pg 368]rected
to leave his baggage under a small garrison at Mt. Sterling.
A courier properly dressed bore this order to Mt. Sterling,
and dashed in with horse reeking with sweat and every indication
of excited haste. He played his part so well that the
order was not criticized and induced no suspicion. This courier’s
name was Clark Lyle—an excellent and daring scout.
As soon as the necessary preparations were made, the Federals
marched to Paris and Cluke re-entered the town, capturing
the garrison and stores. He remained until the 8th of March,
his scouts harassing the enemy and keeping him informed of
their every movement.
Another heavy advance of the enemy induced Colonel Cluke
to retreat beyond Slate into the hills about Howard’s mill.
Three companies were left in the vicinity of Mount Sterling,
under Captain Cassell. One stationed upon the North Middletown
pike, was so closely pressed by the enemy, that it was
forced to cross Slate, below Howard’s mill. The other two were
also hotly attacked and driven back to Colonel Cluke’s encampment,
sustaining, however, but slight loss. Falling back to
Ficklin’s tan yard, where it was posted in ambush, and failing
to entice the enemy into the snare, Colonel Cluke marched to
Hazelgreen, determining to await there the arrival of General
Humphrey Marshall, who was reported to be approaching (from
Abingdon), with three thousand men.
Captain Calvin Morgan volunteered to carry a message to
Marshall, and traveled (alone), the wild country between Hazelgreen
and Pound Gap, a country infested with a crowd of ferocious
bushwhackers. About this time, Cluke’s whole force must
have been badly off, if the language of one of his officers be not
exaggerated, who (in an account of the encampment at Hazelgreen)
declares that, “the entire command was prostrated by a
severe attack of erisipelas.”
After the effects of this “attack” had somewhat worn off,
Lieutenant Colonel Stoner was sent back to Montgomery, and
maintained himself there for several days, with skill and gallantry.[Pg 369]
Threatening demonstrations from the enemy induced Cluke to
retreat from Hazelgreen and still further into the mountains.
He established himself on the middle fork of Licking, near
Saliersville. On the 19th, he found himself completely surrounded.
Fifteen hundred of the enemy had gained his rear,
ten hundred advancing from Louisa, were on his right, and
eight hundred were at Proctor, on his left. In his front was the
garrison of Mt. Sterling, five hundred strong, but likely at any
time to be reinforced by the forces then in Central Kentucky.
The roads in all directions were so well observed that he could
not hope to escape without a fight.
His command was reduced to about three hundred effectives—the
rest were suffering from the erisipelas. In this emergency,
Colonel Cluke conceived a determination at once bold,
and exceedingly judicious. He resolved to march straight on
Mount Sterling and attack it, at any hazard. He trusted that
the enemy would send no more troops there, but would rather
(anticipating that he would seek to escape southward), send all
that could be collected to intercept him in that quarter.
A tremendous march of sixty miles in twenty-four hours, over
mountains and across swollen streams, brought him to McIntyre’s
ferry of the Licking, thirty miles from Mt. Sterling. Crossing
on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st, Major
Steele was sent with his battalion via, Owingsville (in Bath
county), to take position on the Winchester pike, beyond Mount
Sterling, that he might give timely information of the approach
of reinforcements to the garrison. Colonel Cluke moved with
the rest of his command through Mud Lick Spring, directly to
Mount Sterling. Colonel Cluke at the head of a body of men
entered the town from the east, while Lieutenant Colonel Stoner
with the two companies from the Eleventh Kentucky, the men
of the Ninth under Captain McCormick, and Hopkins’ scouts,
charged in from the northwest.
The enemy fell back and shut themselves up in the court-house.
Stoner charged them, but was driven back by a terrible[Pg 370]
fire from the windows—the garrison was stronger than the force
he led against them. A detachment of thirty men were then
ordered to advance on the street into which the Winchester pike
leads, and burn the houses in which the Federals had ensconced
themselves. With torch, axe and sledge hammer these men
under McCormick and Cunningham forced their way into the
heart of the town. As they reached the “Old Hotel,” which
was occupied by a body of the Federals, and used also as a hospital,
a flag of truce was displayed. McCormick, Cunningham,
and six others entered, and were coolly informed by some forty
or fifty soldiers that the sick had surrendered, but they (the soldier)
had not, and threatened to fire upon them, from the upper
rooms, if they tried to escape from the building. At the suggestion
of Lieutenant Saunders, the eight Confederates forced the sick
men to leave the house with them, in a mingled crowd, thus rendering
it impossible for the Federals to fire without endangering
the lives of their comrades. Before quitting the house, they set
it on fire. In a short time the entire Federal force in the town
surrendered, and victors and vanquished went to work together
to extinguish the flames.
Colonel Cluke took four hundred and twenty-eight prisoners,
two hundred and twenty wagons laden with valuable stores, five
hundred mules, and nearly one thousand stand of arms. Captain
Virgil Pendleton, a most gallant and valuable officer was killed
in this affair. Captain Ferrill and Lieutenant Maupin were seriously
wounded. Cluke’s loss was three killed, and a few wounded.
The enemy’s but little greater.
The Union men of Mount Sterling were much mortified by
this last capture of their town. The previous evening bets were
running high that Cluke would be made prisoner. Cluke immediately
evacuated the town, and was attacked some five miles to
the eastward of it, by a force of Federal cavalry, preceding a
body of infantry which were approaching to relieve the place.
An insignificant skirmish resulted, and Cluke marched to
Owingsville unpursued. On the next day he encamped at Mc[Pg 371]Intyre’s
ferry, and collected his entire command, now convalescent.
Marshall marching from Pound Gap, about this time,
dispersed the forces which had gone to capture Cluke at Saliersville.
On the 25th, Major Steele was sent across the Kentucky
river to join General Pegram, who had advanced with a brigade
of Confederate cavalry to Danville. Major Steele reached him
much further south. As he was retreating from the State, General
Pegram halted near Somerset to fight a strong force of the
enemy which was following him and was defeated. Major
Steele’s battalion was highly complimented for the part it took
in the action, and in covering the subsequent retreat. On the
26th, Colonel Cluke again advanced, and encamped in the vicinity
of Mount Sterling. He received orders soon after from
General Morgan to return, and marched southward accordingly.
Colonel Cluke had good right to be proud of this expedition. He
had penetrated into the heart of Kentucky, and maintained himself,
for more than a month, with inferior forces—always fighting
and never defeated, the enemy at last did not drive him out.
He recrossed the Cumberland at the same point, and was stationed
with Colonel Chenault, in the vicinity of Albany.
Colonel Cluke’s command was stronger by eighteen men when
he returned than when he set out upon his raid.
In order to trace properly the history of the division, during
this period, it is necessary that I disregard chronological arrangement,
and return to the winter in Tennessee. In the latter
part of February a new regiment was formed of Major Hamilton’s
battalion and some loose companies which had long been
unattached, and some which had recently been recruited for
General Morgan. Colonel R.C. Morgan (brother of the General),
was assigned to the command of this regiment, and Major
Hamilton became Lieutenant Colonel. A month or two later, a
valuable addition was made to it in Quirk’s scouts. Colonel
Morgan was an excellent officer and had acted as Assistant Adjutant
General to Lieutenant General A.P. Hill through all the
stern battles and glorious campaigns, in which his chief had[Pg 372]
figured so conspicuously. Becoming tired of staff duty, and
anxious to exchange the infantry service for the less monotonous life
in the cavalry, he naturally chose his brother’s command,
and obtained a transfer to it. He became a dashing
cavalry officer, and as an essential preliminary relaxed the
rigidity of some of his military notions acquired while serving
on the staff. He soon gave in to the prevalent cavalry opinion
that horses were, or at least ought to be, “common carriers.”
During this winter, more prisoners were taken than there were
effective men in the division, or men actively at work. The loss
in killed and wounded which it inflicted was also severe, and the
captures of stores, munitions, etc., were valuable and heavy.
The exertions made to equip and supply the command, by
the division Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence,
Majors Llewellyn and Elliott, ought to be mentioned, if for no
other reason than the injustice which has been done them and
the unmerited censures which have been showered upon them.
Even now, there are, doubtless, few officers or men of the former
Confederate army who can so far overcome the prejudice deeply
rooted against men who served in those departments, that they
can speak with any sort of commendation of Quartermasters
and Commissaries. It has rarely happened that even the most
industrious, efficient and honest of these officers have escaped
the severest denunciation. I can testify that both of these gentlemen
strove hard to provide for the wants of the division, although
the tender attention they paid to their own, prevented
them getting credit for it. They might have done better it is
true, and the same can be said of all of us—but they certainly
did a great deal. Major Elliott was never himself except when
encompassed by difficulties—when there was really some excuse
for failure, when supplies were really hard to obtain, then he
became great. The avalanche of curses which invariably descend
upon a Commissary, at all times, never disturbed his equanimity,
except when he was in a barren country—then he would
display Napoleonic resources.[Pg 373]
Once a large lot of meat stored at Smithville took fire. He
issued cooked hams to the troops, and the loss was scarcely felt.
Once he lost all of his papers, accounts, receipts; vouchers, memoranda
all went down on abstract, L., as the Quartermaster
said of himself, who was picked off by a sharpshooter. The
loss did not disturb him for a moment. He declared he could
supply every paper from memory, and produced an entirely new
set, which he claimed to be identical in substance with the originals.
Of course every one laughed at him, but in the course
of time, the old papers turned up, and, sure enough, there was
not a dollar’s difference between them and the new.
The great lack of supplies necessary to the comfort of troops,
required to do constant and severe duty in such weather, told
injuriously upon the discipline of the command. It was impossible
to obtain clothing, shoes, etc., in quantities at all adequate
to the demand and the greatest efforts of energy and enterprise
upon the part of the subaltern officers, never make up for the
deficiency in the regular supply of these articles from the proper
sources.
Pay was something the men scarcely expected, and it benefited
them very little when they received it. If the Confederate Government
could have made some provision, by which its soldiers
would have been regularly paid, the men would have been far
better satisfied, for there is something gratifying to human nature
in the receipt of money even when it is smartly depreciated.
Certainly, if comfortable clothing and good serviceable
boots and shoes had been issued, as they were needed, and the
rations had been occasionally improved by the issue of coffee, or
something which would have been esteemed a delicacy, the discipline
and efficiency of all the troops would have been vastly
promoted. It is hard to maintain discipline, when men are required
to perform the most arduous and harassing duties without
being clothed, shod, paid or fed. If they work and fight they
will have little time to provide for themselves. But they certainly
will not starve, and they object, decidedly, to doing with[Pg 374]out
clothing if by any means and exertions they can obtain it.
Then the converse of the proposition becomes equally true, and
if they provide for themselves, they will have little time to work
and fight. With cavalry, for instance, the trouble of keeping
men in camp who were hungry and half frozen, and who felt
that they had done good service, was very great. The infantryman,
even if equally destitute, could not well straggle, but the
cavalry soldier had his horse to take him, although the distance
was great and the road was rough.
When men once commenced running about, they became incorrigible
in the habit. Hunger might draw them out at first,
but whisky would then become an allurement, and a multitude
of seductive inducements would cause them to persist in the
practice. In nine cases out of ten, when a man became an inveterate
straggler, he was no loss if he were shot. These seem
truisms, too palpable to need mention, but for three years they
were dinned into the ears of certain officials, and not the slightest
impression was made. These gentlemen preferred to attribute
all evils, of the peculiar class which have just been mentioned,
to the inherent and wicked antipathy to discipline, which
the cavalry (they declared) entertained. They declared, moreover,
that these articles could not be procured. This excuse
passed current until the latter part of the war, when Federal
raids and dashes disclosed the fact (by destroying or cutting
them off from our use) unknown to all but the officials and employees,
that hoarded and stored them away, at the very time that
the Confederate armies were melting away for the lack of them.
It is no answer to the charge of incompetency or malfeasance
upon the part of men charged with their distribution to say, that
there was not enough to supply the demand. They should have
been made to go as far as they would. It is difficult for one
unfamiliar with the workings of these departments and the obstacles
in the way of procuring supplies, to suggest a remedy
for these shortcomings, but it is certain that the Confederacy
owned cotton and tobacco and could have gotten more; that[Pg 375]
blockade running was active and could have been stimulated.
An abstinence from certain luxurious but costly experiments
might have enabled the Confederacy to buy more clothing, shoes,
and meat. The opinion is hazarded with diffidence, and is
that of one who was naturally prone to attach more importance
to the sustenance of the military than of the naval power of the
Confederacy, but would it not have been better to have expended
upon the army the money paid for the construction of
those fine and high-priced iron-clads, which steamed sportively
about for a day or two after they left the stocks, and were then
inevitably scuttled?
The winter wore away, and the condition of affairs in Tennessee,
as described in the first part of this chapter, continued
unchanged. Three times the enemy advanced in heavy force
(cavalry, infantry, and artillery) to Liberty. Upon each occasion,
the regiments stationed there under Colonel Breckinridge,
after skillfully and courageously contesting his advance
for many miles to the front of Liberty, fell back to Snow’s Hill,
three miles to the east of it, and returned to press hard upon
the enemy’s rear when he retired. At length, upon the 19th
of March, when Colonel Ward was absent with his regiment reconnoitering
in the direction of Carthage, and the force at Liberty
was weakened by other detachments, until it was scarcely
more than six hundred strong, information was received that
the enemy were advancing and were near Milton, a small village
about eighteen miles from Liberty. General Morgan had,
the day before, notified Colonel Breckinridge of his intention to
be at Liberty on the 19th. Colonel Breckinridge, when it became
clear that the enemy was certainly pressing, posted his command
in a good position upon the Murfreesboro’ pike, and sent a
courier to Gano with a request that the latter would promptly
join him with his entire effective force. Colonel Breckinridge
says of this disposition of his command: “To delay the enemy
and give Gano time to come up, the pickets were strengthened
and thrown forward. The enemy, being infantry, came on[Pg 376]
slowly but gradually drove our pickets nearly in. The peculiar
formation of the ground gave the brigade great advantage, and
admirably concealed its weakness. The enemy made demonstrations,
but made no attack, and before nightfall bivouacked in
line in sight of our skirmishers. Just at dark Morgan rode
upon the ground, and was received with deafening cheers; and
soon afterward Colonel Gano came up. Under cover of night
the enemy withdrew to Auburn.”
General Morgan, in his official report of the fight which ensued
on the next day at Milton, says: “On the evening of the
19th inst. I reached Liberty, Tenn., and learned that the Federals
were moving upon that place from Murfreesboro’, their numbers
being variously reported at from two thousand to four thousand
infantry, and two hundred cavalry, with one section of artillery.
At the time I reached my videttes on the Milton road, the enemy
was within five miles of Liberty; it being near night, they fell
back to Auburn, and encamped. Determining to attack them
next morning, I ordered Colonels Breckinridge and Gano, who
were in command of brigades, to move within four miles of the
enemy, and hold themselves in readiness to move at any moment.
In the meantime, I sent the ‘scouts’ to watch the movements
of the enemy and to report, and to see if any reinforcements
came up; also, to send me information when the enemy
moved, for I was determined not to make the attack at Auburn, as
they held a very strong position, and I was desirous they should
move beyond a gorge in the mountains before the attack was
commenced; for, if they had been permitted to take position
there, it would have been impossible to dislodge them. After
daylight, one of the scouts returned, bringing intelligence that the
enemy was moving. Captain Quirk was ordered to move forward
with his company, and attack the enemy’s rear when they
passed the mountain, and retard their progress until the main
column arrived. When within a mile of Milton, Captain Quirk
came up with their rear guard and commenced a vigorous attack
upon them. The enemy immediately halted, deploying their[Pg 377]
skirmishers to the rear, and, bringing their pieces into position,
commenced shelling Captain Quirk’s men and the road upon
which they had advanced. In a short time I arrived upon the
ground. Finding that the main column of the enemy was still
falling back, and their artillery was unsupported by any troops
(with the exception of their skirmishers) I determined, if possible,
to capture it. I, therefore, ordered Lieutenant Colonel
Martin to move to the left with his regiment, and Colonel
Breckinridge to send one to the right—to go forward rapidly
and when within striking distance, to move in and cut off the
pieces. Having two pieces of artillery, I ordered them to go
forward on the road, supported by Colonel Ward’s regiment,
dismounted, and the remainder of the command to move in column
in supporting distance.
“Just before the two regiments which had moved to the right
and left reached the proper place to move upon the artillery, the
enemy’s skirmishers and artillery fell back rapidly upon their
main column, which occupied a steep hill covered with cedars.
They placed their battery on a line, with their column on the
road immediately upon their right. To reach this position we
would have to pass through a cedar brake, the ground being very
rough and broken. A few of the enemy’s skirmishers were
thrown forward to that point. I ordered my two pieces of
artillery to move upon the left of the road until they reached a
point within four hundred yards of the enemy’s artillery and
then to silence their guns.
“They went forward gallantly, supported by a part of Ward’s
regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Martin who still occupied his position
on the left was ordered forward to threaten the right of the
enemy. At the same time, I ordered the command under Colonel
Gano to move up, dismount and attack the enemy, vigorously,
immediately in the front. Colonel Breckinridge was ordered to
move to the right with his command and attack their extreme
left. Captain Quirk, in the meantime, had been ordered to get
upon the pike, immediately in the rear of the enemy, which he[Pg 378]
did in a most satisfactory manner, capturing fifteen or twenty
prisoners.
“He remained in the rear of the enemy until reinforcements
came to them from Murfreesboro’ (being only thirteen miles distant),
when he was driven back. When our artillery opened,
the whole command moved forward. Colonel Martin charged up
in most gallant style, and had a number of his horses killed with
canister, as the guns of the enemy were turned upon him. The
remainder of the command was moved up to within one hundred
yards of the main column of the Federals and dismounted.
Moving rapidly to the front, they drove in the enemy’s skirmishers,
and pushed forward in the most gallant manner upon
the hill occupied by the enemy, which was about sixty yards
from the cedar brake alluded to. Colonel Breckinridge who
commanded our extreme right, had his men dismounted, and went
boldly up, the enemy’s artillery being at this time moved from
the pike to a position upon the top of the hill immediately in
their center; but this was not accomplished until it came near
being captured by Colonel Grigsby, who was within fifty yards
of it and moving rapidly upon it, when his ammunition giving
completely out, he was forced to halt, and the battery was saved.
It was near this point that Colonel Napier was severely
wounded while cheering and leading his men up. Colonel
Grigsby was also wounded while in front of his command and
encouraging his men. At the same time the firing from the
center of the line nearly ceased; a few scattering shots, now
and then, gave evidence that nearly all of the ammunition was
exhausted. Two more rounds would have made our victory
complete, and two thousand Federals would have been the result
of the day’s fighting.”
Finding his ammunition completely gone, General Morgan
ordered a withdrawal, and his forces fell back to Milton, the
enemy neither firing upon nor pursuing them. Here he found an
ordnance train and four pieces of artillery which had been sent
from McMinnville. He was encouraged to renew the attack,[Pg 379]
hoping to capture the entire opposing force. “Martin was placed
in the same position which he had previously occupied, and
Gano, whose entire command had by this time arrived, was sent to
the right.
The artillery took position in about eight hundred yards of
the enemy’s battery, and commenced a rapid and severe fire
upon them. They had again taken position upon the pike, from
which they were soon driven by Lieutenant Lawrence, who was
in command of my battery. Our pieces were served with the
greatest precision and coolness, and the men stood by their guns
like veterans. Although they had but few men in the fight,
the casualties were two killed and eighteen wounded, showing
the determination with which they held their position. Too
much praise can not be awarded to Lieutenant Lawrence. Three
times the enemy had to change the position of their battery, and
were silenced until reinforced by additional guns. While this
artillery duel was progressing, my men were moving to the front
and were about dismounting, when Captain Quirk was driven
from the rear by a large force of the enemy which had just arrived
in time to save the force in our front. I immediately
ordered my entire command to fall back to Milton, and from
thence to Liberty. The enemy did not follow.”
General Morgan expressed his perfect satisfaction with the
conduct of the officers and men in this fight, and complimented
his brigade commanders and his personal staff.
One reason of the want of success in the first onset was the
fatigue of men and horses by the long and rapid ride to Auburn,
and thence to the position taken by the enemy. In the stretching
gallop down the road, which General Morgan ordered in his
impatience to overtake the enemy, and apprehensive lest they
should get away, the column necessarily became prolonged, the
men scattered, and many (their horses falling) dropped out entirely.
But few men, consequently, were available when the
attack commenced. As the detached portions of regiments,
divided by this speedy march, came up, there was, necessarily,[Pg 380]
some confusion, and some difficulty in putting them, at once,
promptly and smoothly into the fight.
For these reasons, and on account of the usual details for
horse holders, perhaps not more than one thousand men were
engaged on our side, and these (as has been just explained)
could not be handled as effectively as was necessary to force
a strong position, held by superior numbers. Colonel Ward’s
regiment is frequently alluded to in General Morgan’s report,
but it should be stated that the bulk of that regiment was absent,
only sixty men (one of its companies), under Captain Cates,
were present. The scanty supply of ammunition, however,
and its failure at the critical moment, was the principal cause
of the repulse, or rather withdrawal of our troops. All who
have given any account of this battle concur in praising the
conduct of the combatants. It was fought with the utmost determination,
and with no flinching on either side.
One incident is thus described by an eye-witness:
“Just here Martin performed one of those acts of heroic, but
useless courage, too common among our officers. When his
regiment wavered and commenced to fall back, he halted until
he was left alone; then at a slow walk, rode to the pike, and
with his hat off rode slowly out of fire. He was splendidly
mounted, wore in his hat a long black plume, was himself a
large and striking figure, and I have often thought that it was
the handsomest picture of cool and desperate courage I saw in
the war.”
Our loss in this fight was very heavy, especially in officers.
The list of wounded officers was large. Captains Sale, Marr,
Cooper and Cossett, and a number of other officers, were killed.
Captain Sale was the third Captain of Company E, Second
Kentucky, who was killed. Captain Cossett, of the Ninth Tennessee,
was under arrest at the time, for charges of which he
was acquitted after death. He was killed, fighting with his
musket, as a volunteer. General Morgan’s clothing was torn
with balls.[Pg 381]
About this time an impression prevailed at General Bragg’s
Headquarters, that the enemy was about to evacuate Murfreesboro’
and, perhaps, Nashville. General Morgan had come to
Liberty on the 19th, in order to reconnoiter with reference to
ascertaining the truth of this rumor.
Upon the day before, Colonel Breckinridge had been ordered
to move to Lebanon with his brigade, and a section of
Byrne’s battery, and was informed that he would be supported
by Gano. In the order he was told: “The object of these
demonstrations is to discover, if possible, whether the rumored
evacuation of Murfreesboro’ by the Federals is true, and if so,
to what point they are moving their forces. In the event that
they are falling back to Nashville, the command will move from
Lebanon, cross the river and attack and harass them. At Lebanon,
or within twenty-four hours after your arrival at that
point, certain information can be obtained as to what is taking
place on the enemy’s lines. In the event your pickets or scouts
report an advance from Readyville or Murfreesboro’, you will
not leave your present position.”
Upon the 19th the following dispatch came from General
Bragg’s Headquarters to Wheeler:
“To Major General James Wheeler, McMinnville, Tennessee:
“Ascertain what direction the enemy takes after leaving
Gallatin.
[Signed] “Geo. Wm. Brent, A.A. Gen’l.”
This proved conclusively that General Bragg believed that
Nashville and the whole of Middle Tennessee was about to be
evacuated by the Federal army.
General Morgan did not believe so, nor did Colonel Breckinridge,
who was charged with the scouting of all the extreme
right flank. The latter officer says: “It is true, that, at this
time, General Rosecrans ordered back his sick, his surplus
baggage, camp followers, increased his guard at every station
in his rear, displayed greater vigilance at his pickets, vailed his[Pg 382]
movements in greater secrecy, and became stringent in his rules
about passes to and from his camps and lines. All our scouts
reported these movements, and our Generals concluded he
meant a retreat. Morgan believed otherwise,” etc.
General Morgan, in reality, believed that these were all the
indications of an advance rather than of retreat, and he confidently
anticipated the former in the early part of April. On
the 3rd of April there was an advance, which, although not of
the entire Federal army, yet comprehended so large a part of
it, as to completely rid the country, in which our command had
been wintering, of their presence for a short time.
This force approached Liberty on the 2nd of April, causing the
concentration there of both brigades, with the exception of the
detachments necessarily sent to observe different important
points. The entire command, after some skirmishing, took
position near Liberty, but to the east of it, and encamped in
line of battle, on the night of the 2nd.
The enemy retreated about a mile and bivouacked. Scouts
were sent through his camp that night and discovered that behind
the cavalry, was a heavy infantry force. Other scouts also
reported that Hazen was advancing from Readyville and Crook
from Carthage. Colonel Ward was sent to watch the Carthage
roads, and all the rest were disposed to resist the advance of the
enemy directly in front. Colonel Gano was senior officer and
leaving Breckinridge to conduct the retreat to “Snow’s hill,”
he took charge of the preparations for defense there.
“Snow’s hill” was regarded by the majority of the officers
(who had served about Liberty) as a very strong position, but, I
believe, that they all agreed subsequently that the opinion
was a mistaken one. As a defensive position against attack
from an enemy who came through Liberty, it possessed no strong
features at all—in reality the advantages were all on the side
of the attacking party if he possessed a numerical strength
which would enable him to occupy all the approaches to the position
and maintain a connected line. It is a long slope, or[Pg 383]
rather collection of sloping ridges, which, beginning at the table
land eastward of the valley in which Liberty is situated, point
due westward.
The road from Liberty to Smithville runs through the center
of the position upon Snow’s hill, which was selected for defense,
but bends and curves according to the necessities of the grade.
The ridges all point toward Liberty and are parallel to the general
direction of the road. They can not be called rugged and
inaccessible, for although their northern and southern sides are
somewhat precipitous, the back-bone of each is comparatively
smooth and the ascent is by no means abrupt or difficult from the
points where they subside into the valley to their summit at the
eastern ends. The ravines between these ridges can be readily
traversed by troops and the bluffs at the eastern extremity of
each, or where they “head,” can be easily climbed. It is true,
that the conformation of the ground presents at one side, a serious
obstacle to an attacking force. The base of these ridges,
which have been described, or the parent hill, of which they
seem to be offshoots, is separated from the level ground to the
eastward by a singular and deep gulf, some two or three hundred
yards wide and I know not how long. This abyss (it may be
called) is crossed by a sort of natural wall, or what would be
termed in railroad parlance, “fill,” the sides of which are very
abrupt and steep. It is not more than thirty or forty feet wide,
and the road runs along it. To the southward of this deep,
long chasm, is a gap in the hill through which ran a road by
which the rear of the entire position could be gained. If this
gap had been occupied and the narrow road across the wide,
deep chasm had been adequately commanded by earthworks
which could protect the defenders from artillery planted on the
tops of the hills, the position would have been impregnable, perhaps,
from attack against its front, and the enemy could have
carried it only by marching far around upon one or the other
flank. But the position always selected by our forces, stationed
there, for fight, was about half way down the ridges toward[Pg 384]
Liberty. Here the enemy’s artillery had full play at them, his
infantry marching up the ravines and ridges had an equal chance
with them, for there was no cover and all were equally exposed;
the regiments defending the position were necessarily separated
from each other and could not act in concert, their horses embarrassed
them, unless carried a long distance to the rear, and
their every movement was completely apparent to the enemy.
The left flank was, also, always in danger, and if turned by cavalry,
the retreat would be necessarily compromised.
During the night of the 2nd, the Sixth Kentucky and Quirk’s
scouts were posted to watch the enemy, and the rest of the command
was withdrawn to the eastward of Liberty and took position
upon the hill. Two guns of Byrne’s battery were planted,
to sweep the road, a few hundred yards from the town. At
daylight the enemy’s cavalry charged the force in front of the
town and drove it back. Major Bullitt, commanding Sixth Kentucky,
held them back for a while, but their numbers and the
dash with which they came told, and they forced him to rapid
retreat. Soon their close pursuit brought the enemy within the
range of the guns, and their fire made them call a halt, and
Bullitt and Quirk charged in their turn. The Confederates,
however, were borne steadily backward.
To the eastward of Liberty the enemy met with another check
at the long covered bridge over Dry creek about a mile from the
town. The guns were planted to command the bridge and
masked; when the enemy had crowded it full, Byrnes opened
and burst his shells right in their midst. In a short time answering
artillery drove the Confederates away.
Established on Snow’s hilt, the line was not able to remain
long in position under the heavy fire of artillery and the attack
of the infantry. A long column of cavalry moved up Dry creek,
and turning upon the left flank, came through the gap which
has been mentioned. Lieutenant Colonel Huffman was sent
with the Third Kentucky, to check them, but, unluckily, did not
reach the gap in time. He prevented, however, their further[Pg 385]
advance until the troops under Colonel Breckinridge (which
about the same time began to retreat) had passed the point
where this force could have cut them off.
I came up to the rear, about this time, in company with
Colonel Smith—we had ridden from McMinnville together and
had heard cannonading, and learned that there was a fight going
on. We saw nothing of it, however, but it’s effects upon the
stragglers and “bummers,” who seemed to have unaccountably
increased. I had been absent from the command for more than
two months, but knew of the gallant service it had done, and
took for granted that its morale was unimpaired. Colonel
Smith, who had left Liberty only two or three days before, was
more surprised than myself at the stream of stragglers which we
met. The moral condition of the men was the most singular I
ever witnessed. There was no panic, no running, jostling, wild
fear. They rode along quietly, talked rationally, seemed utterly
free from any lively and immediate apprehension, but “just
couldn’t be made to fight,” and yet quiet and “serene” as
seemed to be their timidity, it made some of them go clear off,
swim unfordable streams, and stay away for days. We were
unprovided with a guard, and although we could stop these
fellows, until the road was packed and jammed with them, it
was utterly impossible to make them turn back. At length, in
disgust, we gave up the attempt, and rode on to see what was
the condition of affairs nearer the scene of actual fighting.
Colonel Smith hastened to his regiment, and I went in quest of
Colonels Gano and Breckinridge, and kept a watch for the
Second Kentucky.
I met the column of Colonel Breckinridge retreating, but in
excellent order; the ranks were depleted by the stragglers, but
the men who were left were as firm and cool as ever. The
same was true of that portion of Colonel Gano’s brigade which
I saw. The men were occasionally cheering, and seemed perfectly
ready to return, if necessary, to fight. When Lieutenant
Colonel Huffman, in accordance with orders sent him by Colonel[Pg 386]
Gano, undertook to withdraw from his position upon the left,
his men became crowded and confused, on account of the peculiar
conformation of the ground. The enemy, taking advantage
of this confusion, charged him. The Fourth Regulars came
vigorously upon his rear, and did smart damage. The regiment
recoiled in disorder for some distance. At length, Gano, with
some thirty or forty men, charged the Fourth Regulars, and
checked them. Quirk dashed to his assistance with about the
same number of men, and the enemy was driven completely
away. No further pursuit was attempted, and the column retreated
toward Smithville. On the way Lieutenant Colonel
Martin was sent with a few men to watch the roads leading from
the ground in possession of the enemy, to the Smithville and
McMinnville road, in order to prevent any effort of the enemy
to surprise us upon that road. The wagon train had been previously
ordered to move through Smithville to McMinnville by
this same road. Some of Martin’s men (dressed in blue overcoats)
came out upon the road, suddenly, in front of the train.
The teamsters took them to be Yankees, and the wildest stampede
ensued. The teamsters and wagon attachees ran in every
direction, crazy with fright. Some turned their teams and put
back to Smithville, others floundered off of the road and tried to
drive through thickets that a child’s toy cart could scarcely have
been hauled through. Many wagons were, consequently,
smashed up before the panic could be abated.
That night we encamped some fourteen miles from McMinnville.
At this date Colonel Gano’s connection with the command
ceased, and we lost the benefit of his character as an
officer and man. No officer had won more and better merited
distinction, and his popularity was justly very great. Functional
disease of the heart, brought about by exposure, hard
work and intense excitement, compelled him to withdraw, for a
time, from active service, and when he returned, with re-established
health, to the field, it was to win new laurels and accomplish
brilliant work in the Trans-Mississippi.[Pg 387]
The division received more injury from this affair than I
would have supposed a hard fight and serious defeat would have
done it. Nearly two weeks were required to collect the fugitives.
General Morgan, on his way to join us on the night of the
3rd, met a straggler, wandering loosely about, and demanded
sternly why he was absent from his regiment, “Well, General,”
answered the fellow, ingenuously, “I’m scattered.”
CHAPTER XIV
On the 5th, the command under General Morgan, in person,
moved to Liberty, which the enemy had by this time evacuated.
Scouts and pickets were thrown out, but although the enemy
were reported to be still at Alexandria in large force, there was
no collision even with his videttes. After remaining at Liberty
a few hours, General Morgan withdrew, moving about ten o’clock
at night, to Smithville again. He had no desire to attack the
enemy, if in any such force as he was represented to be, nor
was he willing to await an attack in the then condition of his
command. A report, too, had reached him, which turned out
to be unfounded, that McMinnville had been taken, that afternoon,
by another expedition from Murfreesboro’.
We remained at Smithville until the 7th, and then returned
to Liberty, in accordance with orders from General Wheeler, who
had reached Alexandria on the same evening, with Wharton’s
division. Two or three days subsequently, General Wheeler
proceeded to Lebanon with all of the troops at his disposal, and
sending, thence, five hundred men to La Vergne, under Lieutenant
Colonel Ferril, of the Eighth Texas, to intercept and
capture railroad trains, he moved with the remainder of his
forces to the “Hermitage,” on the Nashville and Lebanon pike,
twelve miles from Nashville. Here he left all of his command,
except one regiment, to repel any advance from Nashville—and
proceeded with that regiment and two or three pieces of artillery
to the river—distant about four miles—and fired across it with
artillery at a train of cars, knocking the engine off the track.
No movement was made by the enemy from Nashville, and on
the same evening General Wheeler returned to Lebanon. The
next day, the party sent to La Vergne returned also. Colonel[Pg 389]
Ferril had captured a train, taking a number of prisoners, released
some men of our division captured at Snow’s hill and on
their way to Nashville, and he had gotten, besides, nearly forty
thousand dollars in greenbacks—Quartermaster’s funds. This
money, General Wheeler appropriated to buying fresh horses
for the men who had captured it.
General Wheeler remained at Lebanon three days. During
that time, the enemy advanced once from Murfreesboro’, but retreated
before reaching our pickets. Upon our return from
Lebanon, a portion of the forces, only, were sent to Alexandria;
more than half, under command of General Wheeler, passed
through Rome, to the immediate vicinity of Carthage. Remaining
here during the night, General Wheeler, just at daylight, fell
back toward Alexandria, reaching that place about 1 or 2 p.m.
Wharton’s division was again encamped here, and Morgan’s division,
under my command, was sent to Liberty, except Smith’s
regiment which was stationed near Alexandria.
General Morgan on the night of the 5th, had returned to
McMinnville, and had not since rejoined us. Two or three days
after this, the enemy moved out from Carthage, so far as New
Middleton, ten miles from Alexandria, where General Wheeler
attacked them and drove them back to Carthage. On the 19th or
20th, the enemy advanced upon McMinnville with a strong force
of infantry, cavalry and artillery. There was no cavalry force
at the place at all, except General Morgan’s escort (forty or
fifty strong), but there was some ninety infantry, under command
of Major Wickliffe of the Ninth Kentucky infantry, stationed
there. After a good deal of preliminary reconnoitering
and some skirmishing with the men of the escort, the enemy’s
cavalry dashed into the town, eight abreast, driving out General
Morgan and several officers, who happened to be collected at
McMinnville upon sick leave, or on special duty of some sort.
Among them were Colonel Cluke, Lieutenant Colonel Martin,
and Major McCann. Exchanging a few shots with the cavalry,
this party retreated upon the Sparta road—McCann’s horse was[Pg 390]
shot in the melee and fell, bringing him to the ground. He sprang
to his feet and standing in front of the charging column, shouted
“You have got the old chief at last,” seeking to produce the
impression that he was General Morgan and so favor the latter’s
escape. He was ridden over, severely sabered, and captured;
but having been placed in an old stable, and allowed a canteen
of apple brandy, he got the guard drunk and dug out under the
logs, during the night, effecting his escape. Lieutenant Colonel
Martin received a bad wound through the lungs, but sat on his
horse and escaped. All of the others escaped uninjured. The
infantry retreated, in perfect order, to the mountains two or three
miles distant. The enemy pursued, but were driven back by
the volleys given them whenever they pressed closely.
When the news of this affair reached General Wheeler’s
headquarters, General Wharton urged that the entire force
should be withdrawn from Alexandria and Liberty, and concentrated
at Smithville. He believed that the enemy, in withdrawing
from McMinnville, would come by Liberty—the infantry
moving through Mechanicsville, and the cavalry through Smithville.
This route, they might calculate, would remove them from
all danger of molestation by any infantry force sent after them
from our army, and would bring them right upon the flank of
our cavalry, which could annoy their rear if they retreated
through Woodbury, but would, perhaps, be driven off by the
movement upon Liberty. Then, a good pike conducted them to
Murfreesboro’, and their cavalry, coming on from Smithville,
protected their rear.
A concentration of our whole force at Smithville, would not
only make us secure, but would enable us to punish the cavalry
severely, if the movement was made as Wharton anticipated.
We remained, however, in the same positions, picketing and
scouting vigilantly. The enemy moved exactly as Wharton had
foreseen that they would do, and the troops at Liberty fell back
to Alexandria, whence, both divisions retreated across Caney
Fork, to Buffalo valley.[Pg 391]
The road by which we moved was a rough and bad one, and
the ford at which we crossed, execrable, making it a tedious affair.
A demonstration was made, on the same day, from Carthage,
but too late to interfere with our retreat. Morgan’s division,
during these operations, on account of heavy detachments
having been made from it, and pretty heavy straggling,
was very much reduced.
During a week or ten days’ stay in Buffalo valley, the stragglers
were collected and the regiments were gotten into pretty
good order again. Cluke’s, Chenault’s, and Morgan’s regiments
were still stationed upon the Cumberland, in Wayne, Clinton
and Cumberland counties. The latter regiment was driven away
from Celina, some time in the early part of May; it had been
posted there to protect the collection of commissary stores for
Wheeler’s corps. After taking the town of Celina, the Federal
forces burned it and took position along the Cumberland, on the
northern side, confronting our forces on the southern. Pegram’s
brigade was also stationed at Monticello, in Wayne county, Kentucky.
It was attacked and driven away on the 28th of May.
General Morgan after these affairs occurred, was ordered to
move with his division to Wayne county, and drive the enemy
from the region south of the Cumberland; or if he found him
too strong to be driven, and he manifested an intention (which
was somewhat feared) of pressing into East Tennessee, to at
least retard his advance.
When General Morgan reached Monticello, which the enemy
had evacuated shortly after the affair with Pegram, he found
Cluke, with his own regiment and Chenault’s, lying in front of
a superior Federal force in Horseshoe bottom on Greasy creek,
in the western end of Wayne county. Cluke had been skirmishing
with them for two or three days. General Morgan sent
couriers to hasten the march of his other regiments—the Second,
Third, Fifth and Sixth Kentucky, and Ninth Tennessee, and of
his artillery.
Notwithstanding that the utmost expedition was used, we did[Pg 392]
not arrive upon the ground until after 3 p.m., although the
order arrived at 9 or 10 a.m. During the day, Cluke and
Chenault were fighting with the enemy, at intervals, neither
losing nor gaining ground. When we arrived, these regiments
had almost entirely expended their ammunition, and averaged
but two cartridges per man. The rough road over which we had
marched, and the rapidity with which the march was made, had
not only caused the Artillery to be left far in the rear, but had
told severely on the column. Several horses dropped dead.
Many gave out so completely that they had to be left. The
strength of the five regiments was reduced to eight hundred
men, when they arrived upon the field.
One instance of uncommon gallantry, upon the part of a
private soldier—Theodore Bybee of Company C, Second Kentucky—ought
to be related. His horse fell dead beneath him,
and he caught the stirrup of a comrade, and ran thus eight or
ten miles to the scene of the fighting. As soon as we arrived,
General Morgan ordered us to form for attack. No one in the
command was familiar with the ground, and the disposition of
the line was made with reference only to what could be seen.
On the left of our position, was a deep ravine, with which the
road ran parallel, and about one hundred yards distant. The
whole ground was covered, in every direction, with thick timber,
except for perhaps ten or fifteen acres directly in front
of the line formed by Cluke’s and Chenault’s regiments. In
this open space, which was an old field and orchard, and nearly
square, was situated a small house. Just on the other side of
it, and in the edge of the woods, the enemy were posted. The
road ran through the center of it, and, immediately after entering
the woods at the northern extremity, turned to the left,
crossing the ravine.
The mistake General Morgan made in supposing that the road
continued to run straight, and thus inducing him to make no inflection
of his line on the right of the road, toward the enemy’s
left flank, prevented his capturing a good many prisoners, and[Pg 393]
perhaps the enemy’s artillery. Cluke’s and Chenault’s regiments
were, together, not more than three hundred and fifty
strong, upon the field. The Fifth Kentucky, and Ninth Tennessee
were formed about one hundred yards in the rear of Cluke
and Chenault, and were placed under command of Colonel
Smith. The Third and Sixth Kentucky, were formed about
two hundred yards in the rear of Colonel Smith’s line and a
little further to the right. The Second Kentucky, and Colonel
Morgan’s regiment, which had also arrived, were held in reserve,
the former on foot, the latter mounted. All of the horses were
placed on the left of the road. Just as these dispositions were
completed, the enemy opened upon us with two pieces of artillery,
which did no damage, except to the horses, several of which
were killed. As no artillery had been used previously, General
Morgan thought that its appearance upon the field betokened
the arrival of reinforcements to the enemy, perhaps in considerable
numbers, and he thought, for a moment, of withdrawing
his troops. In this view, every officer about him at the time,
concurred, except Colonel Morgan.
A few seconds of time elapsing, it was demonstrated that before
we could retreat, we would be forced to repulse the enemy.
At the roar of the guns, they came charging across the open
ground, yelling like devils, or rebels. The crash of musketry,
for a minute, in the limited space, was quite heavy. Cluke’s
line quickly discharged all of its ammunition, and then gave
back before the enemy’s determined rush, without, however,
losing its formation, or any of the men turning their faces from
the enemy. These two regiments were exceedingly reliable in
battle.
After this line had backed some twenty-five paces, Smith’s
line came to its support, and the men in the latter, passing
through the intervals between the files of the former, poured
into the faces of the Federals, at that time almost mingled with
the men of Cluke’s and Chenault’s regiments, a volley which
amazed and sent them back. As our line pressed after them[Pg 394]
across the open ground, the artillery, only a short distance off,
told severely on it and continued its fire until our foremost were
close upon the guns.
The enemy made a stand at the point where the road crosses
the ravine, to enable the guns to escape, but the Third and Sixth
Kentucky coming up, they were again driven. So dense was
the woods, that pursuit was almost impossible. Colonel Morgan
dashed down the road, but secured only a few prisoners. The
enemy conducted the retreat with the most perfect coolness.
About three hundred yards from the point where the last stand
was made, one company halted and picketed the road, while all
the rest (as we afterward ascertained) continued to rapidly retreat
to the river. Our loss in this skirmish, which lasted about
half an hour, was, in the first brigade, ten killed and sixteen
wounded, and in the second five or six killed and wounded.
The enemy lost, I believe, twenty-one killed, and a smaller
number of wounded. His loss was in all, as nearly as I remember,
thirty-one or two. Very few prisoners were taken.
General Morgan, despairing of being able to surround or rush
over the enemy, in the rugged, wooded country, sent a flag of
truce, proposing a surrender. Captain Davis, Assistant Adjutant
General of the first brigade (who bore the flag), was detained
until communication could be had with Colonel Jacobs,
who commanded all the United States forces in that immediate
region. Colonel Jacobs was some distance off, on the other side
of the river, and it was growing dark. General Morgan sent
another message, demanding the release of Captain Davis, and
declaring his intention of advancing as soon as that was done.
Immediately upon the return of Captain Davis, the column was
moved forward. The pickets saluted the advance guard with a
volley, and gracefully fell back, and although we pressed on
close to the river, we saw nothing more of them. As late as
the close of the war, no answer had been received from Colonel
Jacobs, although that officer was distinguished for his courtesy
as well as gallantry.[Pg 395]
The division remained on the line of the Cumberland, picketing
from Stagall’s ferry to Celina for nearly three weeks. The
headquarters of the first brigade was at Albany, county seat of
Clinton county, that of the second at Monticello, county seat of
Wayne. In that time the ranks filled up again, nearly all absentees,
with or without leave, returning. The horses were
grazed on the rich grass and carefully attended to, and got in
excellent condition again. Several scouting expeditions were
undertaken, during this period, against the enemy on the north
side of the river, the most successful of which were under command
of Captain Davis and Captain Thomas Franks, of the
Second Kentucky. Each of these officers, with two companies,
penetrated far into the enemy’s lines, and attacking and routing
the forces that they met, with small loss to themselves, brought
off prisoners, horses, and captured property of various kinds.
These expeditions were not only of essential use in annoying
the enemy, but were absolutely necessary to the maintenance
of a proper spirit and energy among our men, whose morale and
discipline were, invariably, sensibly impaired by an indolent
and monotonous life.
This period of the history of Morgan’s cavalry has been generally
esteemed one of entire inaction, upon the part of both
leader and men. It is true that nothing was done in all this
period, which would at all compare with the dashing, enterprising
career of the previous year. But a great deal of useful, if
not brilliant service, was performed, and a vast deal of hard
work was cheerfully gone through with. The public had become
so accustomed to expect “raids” and “dashes” from
Morgan, that they thought his command idle and useless, when
engaged in the performance of regular routine duty. It should
be remembered that, at the very time when Morgan’s division
was thought to be so inactive, it was constantly occupied with
exactly the kind of service at which the other cavalry, except
Forrest’s, were always engaged.
During the winter and spring of 1863, and until nearly the[Pg 396]
middle of the summer, our command was guarding and picketing
a long front, and scouting thoroughly a great extent of country
besides. For six months the country about Liberty, Alexandria
and Lebanon, and that about Monticello and Albany, was in a
great measure committed to Morgan’s care. This gave him a
front of quite one hundred and fifty miles to watch and guard,
and at least half of the time he had to do it single-handed.
Then there was a great portion of Middle Tennessee, and of
Southern, Central and Eastern Kentucky, which his scouts constantly
traversed. It is fair to say that from January to July
1863, inclusive, the period of the supposed inaction, during
which time Morgan made no “raid,” nor achieved any very
brilliant success, that in all that time, our division was as constantly
serving, fought and won as many skirmishes, guarded
and scouted as great an extent of country, captured as many
prisoners, and gave the Confederate Government as little trouble
on the subject of supplies, as any other cavalry division in the
Confederate army.
But, in this year, the glory and the prestige began to pass
away from the Southern cavalry. It was not that their opponents
became their superiors in soldiership, any more than in
individual prowess. Although the Federal cavalry had greatly
improved, had become formidable for its enterprise and fighting
capacity, it can yet be said that the Confederate cavalry, when
in proper condition, still asserted its superiority upon every
field where there was an equality of forces. But it was daily
becoming more and more difficult to keep the Confederate cavalry
in good condition. An impression prevailed, no doubt a
correct one, that as for the great efforts of war, the infantry
was so much more useful and necessary, a far greater care ought
to be taken of it than of the cavalry; and, then, an idea obtained
that, inasmuch as our cavalry supplied itself so often, and
occasionally so well, by its own captures, it ought to do so all
the time. A corollary resulted from these two propositions,
which played the wild with the cavalry, viz: that it was highly[Pg 397]
improper to issue anything which the Government had to furnish
to that arm of the service. So it happened that, while to the
cavalry were entrusted the most responsible and important duties,
scarcely any encouragement or assistance was afforded
it; and, on the contrary, a tone and conduct were adopted toward
it apparently expressly intended to disgust it. I speak in reference
to Western cavalry and Western affairs altogether, for I
served at no time with the Army of Northern Virginia, and know
nothing of it but the bare outline of its glorious and unequaled
record. Cavalry officers, after long and arduous service, and a
thorough initiation into all the mysteries of their craft, were rewarded
and encouraged by having some staff officer, or officer
educated to shoot heavy artillery, run steamships, or mix chemical
preparations, promoted over their heads; and were expected
to be delighted with him, although he might not practically know
whether a horse-shoe was put on with nails or with hooks and
eyes, and whether pickets were posted to look out for an enemy,
or to show Brigadier-Generals the way to their headquarters
when they were lost.
Cavalry which was expected to be constantly engaging the
enemy, and upon whose efficiency and success a vast deal depended,
were grudgingly provided with or altogether denied
arms and ammunition, unless they could be captured from the
enemy. Hard and constant as was the service the cavalryman
performed, exposed as he was to the severity of all sorts of
climate, without shelter, and often without the means of building
the fire which stood him in stead of tent, and sometimes had to
furnish him the strength and cheer of the food he lacked, he was
yet snubbed mercilessly, and Generals commanding stared aghast
if he presumed to ask for anything. The infantryman, lying
snug and idle in camp, was given his blanket and his tent, good
clothing (if it could possibly be had) and stout shoes (I speak,
of course, in a Confederate sense); all was done for him to get
him in condition for the day of battle; they fattened him for
the sacrifice. But the cavalryman, had it not been for his own[Pg 398]
exertions, and the energy with which he indemnified himself for
his Government’s neglect of him, would not have been worth
killing. When I reflect upon the privations I have seen the
men endure, and remember that they well knew that there was no
escape from them, except by taking what they wanted wherever
they found it; and remember, further, the chances that were offered,
I am lost in astonishment at their honesty and forbearance.
I am aware that our “distant brethren” of the North, or those,
rather, who will be our brethren, it is inferred, when an amendment
to the Constitution decides who and what we are—it is a
matter perfectly well understood that they will concede no such
honesty to us, and naturally enough. It is a stale, but all the
more certain-on-that-account fact, that they have discovered
that “the earth belongs to the saints,” and that they “are the
saints.” Therefore, to take anything (upon this continent, at
least), in any manner, is to rob the “saints;” and, while a man may
pardon a fellow who robs his neighbor, it is not in reason that
he should forgive the rogue who robs him.
One special cause of the degeneracy of the Southern cavalry,
in the latter part of the war, was the great scarcity of horses and
the great difficulty of obtaining forage within the Confederate
lines, and consequently, of keeping the horses which we had in
good condition. Morgan’s men had the reputation, and not unjustly,
of procuring horses with great facility and economy.
Adepts as we were, in the art of “horse-pressing,” there was
this fact nevertheless to be said in favor of the system which we
adopted: while making very free with the horse-flesh of the
country into which we would raid, there was never any wanton
waste of the article. We did not kill our tired stock, as did the
Federal commanders on their “raids,” when we got fresh ones.
The men of our command were not permitted to impress horses
in a friendly country. It is true that horses were sometimes
stolen from people who were most devoted to our cause, and who
lived within our lines, but such thefts did not often occur, and
the perpetrators were severely punished. The witty editors of[Pg 399]
Yankee-land would doubtless have explained our rebuke of this
practice, by an application of the old saying that “there is honor
among thieves,” which would have been very just and apposite.
The difference between our thieves and those on the other side
was, that the latter were entirely destitute of every sort of honor.
General Morgan took fresh horses to enable his command to
make the tremendous marches which ensured so much of his success,
and to prevent his men from falling into the hands of the
enemy, but he hedged around the practice with limitations which
somewhat protected the citizen. He required that, in every instance
where a man desired to exchange his tired horse for a
fresh one, he should have his horse inspected by his company
commander, who should certify to the condition of the horse and
the necessity of the exchange. If the company commander certified
that his horse was unfit for service, the man obtained from
his regimental commander permission to obtain a fresh one,
which had also, before it was valid, to be approved by the
brigade commander. Whenever it was practicable, the exchange
was required to be made in the presence of a commissioned
officer, and, in every case, a horse, if the soldier had it,
was ordered to be left in the place of the one impressed. When
a man was without a horse, altogether, his company commander
could impress one for him. No doubt, this seems to the unmilitary
reader, only systematic robbery—but is not that going on
all the time, all over the world? Is it not, too, a great comfort
to the citizen, to know that (when he is robbed), there are laws
and the “proper papers” for it!
When men or officers were detected with led horses, they
were punished, and the horses were taken away from them, unless
they could prove that they were entitled to them. Morgan’s
men were habitually styled “horse-thieves” by their enemies,
and they did not disclaim the title—I should like to see a statistical
report showing the number of horses stolen in Kentucky
by the respective belligerents—we would lose some
laurels. The Confederate Government could not, and did not[Pg 400]
attempt to supply the cavalry of its armies with horses. The
cavalry soldier furnished his own horse, and (if he lost him), had
to make the best shift he could for another. The cavalryman
was not subjected to the rigid discipline of the infantryman, for
the reason that he was harder to catch. It is more difficult to
regulate six legs than two. For the very reason that it
was outside of the pale of regular discipline and the highest
military civilization, it was more necessary to give to the
cavalry officers who practically understood that sort of service,
as well as were men of controlling character. Such men could
make of the cavalryman, a soldier—with an inferior officer or
one who was awkward at cavalry business over him, he became
an Ishmael.
There existed among the infantry, not exactly a prejudice
against cavalry (for they all wanted to join it), but that sort of
feeling against it, which is perhaps natural upon the part of the
man who walks against the man who rides. When the “web-feet”
called us “buttermilk rangers,” we did not get angry with
them, for we knew that they were gallant fellows and that much
walking tries the temper—but we did not admire the official
prejudice against us, and thought an affected contempt of our
arm in very bad taste, upon the part of Generals who not only
never won battles but who never tried to win them.
In the spring and summer of 1863, supplies could be obtained
for neither men nor horses of the cavalry of Bragg’s army, without
the greatest difficulty and great oppression of the citizens.
It was not the custom to issue (out of army supplies), rations to
the men, or forage to the horses of the cavalry commands—they
were required to provide for themselves in these respects. It
was impracticable, too, to supply them from the stores collected
for army use. Certain regions, therefore, in which, for the proper
protection of the lines, it was absolutely necessary to keep large
bodies of cavalry—sections of country not fertile and at no time
abounding in supplies—were literally stripped of meat, grain and
every thing edible. All that would feed man or horse disap[Pg 401]peared,
as if a cloud of Titanic and omniverous locusts had settled
upon the land—and after the citizens were reduced to the
extremity of destitution and distress, the soldiers and their
horses suffered, also, with slow famine.
One instance of the kind will serve to show how destructive
of the efficiency of cavalry was service under such circumstances.
When the division was ordered to Wayne and Clinton counties,
Kentucky, the Ninth Kentucky, one of the best regiments in
the cavalry of the West, was sent to Woodbury to picket that
immediate section of country. For many miles around this
little place, the country had been exhausted of provisions and
forage by the constant requisition upon it during the winter and
spring. The men of the Ninth Kentucky suffered severely for
want of rations, but they esteemed their own sufferings lightly,
compared with those of their horses. Long forage (oats, fodder,
etc.) could not be procured at all; and corn had to be hauled a
distance of over thirty miles, from a region whence other cavalry
commands were also drawing supplies of forage, or else it
could only be gotten from Tullahoma out of the forage stored
there for army consumption. Consequently, corn was rare at that
time at Woodbury; two or three ears per day to each horse was
the usual issue. Upon some days none was issued. Every
blade of grass in the vicinity of the camp was eaten, and the
trees were barked by the poor animals as high as they could
reach.
The men stood picket on foot; all of the stock was rendered
utterly unserviceable, and one fourth of it died. By such usage
(necessary, however,) this regiment was made unfit for active
and efficient service for months, and its discipline and morale
were seriously, although only temporarily, impaired. More
than half—at any rate, a large proportion of the cavalry of
General Bragg’s army were suffering, at that time, precisely as
this regiment was. In this condition of things is to be found the
explanation of the apparent degeneracy of the Confederate cavalry,
in the latter part of the war.[Pg 402]
Another fact, too, should not be lost sight of. In common
with every other arm of the service, our cavalry became very
greatly reduced in numbers as the war wore on. We could not
fill up our regiments as easily as the Federals could fill their
wasted organizations. Those who wonder why well known Confederate
regiments, brigades, and divisions did not accomplish
as much in the latter as in the early part of the war, do not
know, or do not reflect, that it was because they were reduced
to a fourth or a fifth of their original strength. This, however,
was not the case at the period of which I write. It was, too,
in the summer of 1863 that serious doubt of the successful establishment
of Southern independence began to gain ground
among the masses of the Southern people; and a lukewarmness
first, and next a feeling almost of disaffection to the Confederate
Government and cause widely prevailed. This indifference was
very unlike the strange absence of anxiety and solicitude about the
result of the war, which characterized its early stages. The latter
feeling proceeded from a blind and overweening confidence, and
those who entertained it were not the less intensely patriotic
and devoted to the cause. Nor was this species of disaffection,
which began to influence so many, characterized by the slightest
tendency toward treachery or renegadeism. Hundreds of citizens,
who were fiercely opposed to the administration, and cordially disliked
Mr. Davis, who had even lost much of their interest in the
Confederate army and its fortunes, nevertheless hated the Northern
people, the Federal Government, and the invading army, with
a hatred immeasureably more thorough, rabid, and ineradicable,
than at the beginning of the war, ere they knew practically what
invasion was like. With a strange inconsistency, these men
would have done any thing to have injured the enemy, even
when averse to making further sacrifices for the benefit of the
Confederacy. So far from renegading and pandering to Federal
rule and success, the large majority of this class would have
pawned their souls for power to crush the Federal arms. This is
why the Southern renegade is regarded by the Southern people[Pg 403]
with loathing, scorn, and hatred, burning and inextinguishable.
Although destitution and suffering were not general, at this
time, in the South, they had prevailed, and to a fearful extent, in
many sections; and everywhere a solemn and well-founded apprehension
was felt upon the subject. Still it took two years
more of disaster—of an invasion which probed every nook and
corner of the South, and a condition of almost famine, to finally
break the spirit of the Southern people, and make them, in the
abjectness of their agony, actually welcome a peace which heralded
subjugation as a relief from the horrors of war. It was
the submission of the people which took the steel out of the
army.
It is the fashion, with a certain class of Southern writers, to
denounce Mr. Davis as the author of this condition of things,
and to revile the Southern people because of their ultimate despair
and surrender. Many and great blunders were committed
in the conduct of the civil and military affairs of the Confederacy,
and doubtless Mr. Davis was responsible for some of
them.
In an affair of such magnitude, as was the Southern movement
and the consequent war, errors would have characterized,
in all probability, the administration of the most practiced and
skillful military and political chiefs—how then could the administration
of men, unschooled in the practical arts of managing
revolutions and wars, be free from them? The wonder is, not
that blunders were made, but that the bad effect of so many
was partially repaired. The faults, which marred our fortunes,
were the natural concomitants of a state of prolonged and constant
warfare, and the latter weakening of our people was the
inevitable result of a struggle against adverse circumstances and
superior numbers and resources. The only way to have lessened
the number of the former, and to have prevented the latter,
would have been to fight, not a waiting, but a quick war.
On the 26th, the division was ordered back to Liberty and
Alexandria. That country had been occupied and picketed,[Pg 404]
just before our return from Albany and Monticello, by a brigade
of Wharton’s division, commanded by Colonel (afterward Brigadier
General) Harrison, of the Eighth Texas, a gallant and
highly esteemed officer. Breckinridge’s regiment (the Ninth
Kentucky) was still kept at Woodbury. About this time Colonel
A.R. Johnson returned from Texas, and was immediately
assigned, by General Morgan, to the command of the second
brigade—his rank entitled him to be second in command. This
brigade had been ably commanded, since Gano’s absence, by
Cluke. Colonel Johnson retained none of the former brigade
staff, except Lieutenant Sidney Cunningham, a brave and efficient
officer, who was afterward Lieutenant Colonel of the Fifteenth
Kentucky. The effective strength of the division, at this
time, was twenty-eight hundred men. The horses were in better
condition, and the men were better provided for in every respect,
than at any period since the “December raid.” New and
excellent clothing had been issued them while on the Cumberland—a
thing unprecedented in the history of the command—and
their general equipment was much superior to what it had
been at the close of the winter. All were well armed, and with
the kind of guns which were always preferred in Morgan’s
cavalry. The Second Kentucky had managed to get rid of a
great many guns, during the latter part of the winter and early
part of the spring. The men of this regiment were styled by
General Morgan his “Regulars,” on account of their veteranship
and proficiency in drill, etc., and, yet, notwithstanding its excellent
reputation, this unsoldierly practice of losing and throwing
away guns, had prevailed to such an extent in the regiment,
that, at one time, nearly one half of its members were unarmed.
The men did not seem to do it, to escape duty, or going into
battle, for they all remained in camp and answered to the bugle—it
seemed to be a fashion which they had suddenly adopted.
This practice is one of the few, for which officers, inclined to be
lenient in most particulars, may well be willing to have their
men shot. Except that I have seen it prevail, at times, among[Pg 405]
troops of unquestionable bravery and fidelity, I would say that
the most cowardly and treacherous spirit induces it. The Second
Kentucky was a regiment which never had its superior—it possessed,
not only courage and steadiness, but the highest “dash”
and inflexible constancy, and yet, at one period, the practice
which has been mentioned, prevailed in it to an extraordinary
extent. Major Webber, commanding it at the time, made every
man lacking a gun, after punishment in other ways, carry a
heavy fence rail upon his shoulder, until he procured an Enfield
or Springfield rifle. The facility with which the men found the
required arms at the country houses, induced a suspicion that
many of them had previously deposited the same guns where
they subsequently got them. They were also threatened with
being left behind on the next expedition to Kentucky, and with
being sent to the infantry, if they did not speedily arm themselves,
both of which intimations had an excellent effect.
The first brigade made headquarters at Alexandria. The
regiments composing it, and Morgan’s regiment (ordered to
temporarily report to it) were encamped on the Lebanon pike,
and the roads to Carthage and Statesville. The second brigade,
with its headquarters at Auburn, was disposed upon the road to
Murfreesboro’, and between Auburn and Statesville. One regiment
was posted at Statesville, which little place was nearly
equi-distant from Auburn and Alexandria. The country around
was picketed and scouted thoroughly in every direction, and the
disposition of the regiments gave us such command of all the
roads, that we could have concentrated without difficulty, and as
the exigency might require, at Auburn, Alexandria, or Liberty.
The period that we remained here was passed in assiduous and
diligent instruction of the troops. Drills, dress-parades, inspections,
etc., were constantly had—we had never before had
so much time for those duties, when the division was so nearly
concentrated. The strictest vigilance was maintained in our
camps, to prevent the passage through them of Federal spies,
who, at this period and at this quarter of our lines, were un[Pg 406]usually
numerous, cunning, and audacious. The strict guard
and watch maintained to frustrate and detect these parties,
operated favorably upon our own men, who were necessarily
restricted, by the unusual precautions adopted, of much of the
liberty they had previously enjoyed. The division was, perhaps,
never in as high and salutary a state of discipline as at
this time.
The enemy came near us but once during this, our last sojourn
in this country. Colonel Morgan had been sent to Baird’s
mill, and returning, halted all night at Lebanon. The enemy
advanced upon him at Lebanon, and as he fell back slowly toward
Alexandria, followed him. I reinforced him with the
Second Kentucky, and believing that it was a large force,
formed my brigade in front of Alexandria, and requested Colonel
Johnson to reinforce me with his brigade. He immediately
set out to do so, leaving pickets to watch the Murfreesboro’
pike. While we were awaiting his arrival, Colonel Morgan,
Major Brent, (whom I should have stated was with him, in command
of a small detachment of the Fifth Kentucky), and a portion
of the Second Kentucky under Captain Franks, were skirmishing
with the enemy, who continued slowly but steadily to
advance, until reaching a locality called Watertown, he halted.
Nothing had been learned definitely of his strength, but we believed
it to be large, simply because every force previously sent
against us, in this quarter, had greatly outnumbered us. When
Colonel Johnson arrived (about 1 p.m.,) we at once moved forward
to attack, but had proceeded only a short distance, when
Colonel Morgan reported that the enemy were again in motion,
pressing briskly upon him, and apparently determined to fight.
This information induced me to return to the position I had just
left—an admirable one, both to receive and return an attack—it
was about three quarters of a mile to the rear of the head of
the column, which had not yet gotten clear of it. This was a
mistake greatly to be regretted, and prevented the fight. The
enemy came within a mile of the position, maneuvered a little[Pg 407]
while, and fell back. By this time it was getting late. We
followed him with two companies and two pieces of artillery,
skirmished with and shelled him.
That night, while we still doubted their strength and intentions—they
went off entirely. I learned, then, that they were not
more than eighteen hundred strong, while we were at least
twenty-five hundred. This affair would not be worth mentioning,
except that it illustrated how a lack of enterprise, and a too
great fancy for “good positions” will sometimes prevent excellent
opportunities from being improved. If I had attacked,
promptly, the whole force, in all likelihood, would have been
captured. The enemy for some reason conceived a very exaggerated
idea of our strength. Shortly after this, it was reported
in Murfreesboro’, if the papers we captured spoke truth, that
Wheeler’s entire corps and some infantry were stationed at
Alexandria and Liberty, harvesting the magnificent wheat crop,
with which the adjacent country teemed.
On the 10th of June, General Morgan arrived at Alexandria,
and orders were at once issued to prepare the division to march
on the next day. It soon became known to all the officers at
least, that he was about to undertake an expedition which he had
long contemplated, and which he had often solicited permission
to make. This was the greatest of all his “raids,” the one
known as the “Ohio raid.” Although it resulted disastrously to
his own command, it had a great influence upon the pending
campaign between Bragg and Rosecrans, and greatly assisted
the former. It was beyond all comparison the grandest enterprise
he ever planned, and the one which did most honor to his
genius.
The military situation in Tennessee, at that time, may be
briefly described:
General Bragg’s army lay around Tullahoma, his cavalry
covering his front and stretching far out upon both wings.
General Buckner was in East Tennessee, with a force entirely
inadequate to the defense of that important region. General[Pg 408]
Bragg, confronted by Rosecrans with a vastly superior force,
dared not detach troops to strengthen Buckner. The latter
could not still further weaken his small force by sending aid to
General Bragg—if the latter should need it. General Burnside
was preparing (in Kentucky), a force, variously estimated, at
from fifteen to more than thirty thousand men, for the invasion
of East Tennessee. With this force he could easily drive out
Buckner. It was estimated that at various points in Southern
Kentucky, Bowlinggreen, Glasgow, and along the Cumberland
river—and at Carthage in Tennessee, and other points in that
vicinity, there were from eight to twelve thousand Federal troops—the
greater part of them under the command of a General
Judah, whose headquarters were at Glasgow. Of these forces,
some five thousand were excellent cavalry. General Judah’s
official papers (captured on the Ohio raid), gave the exact
strength of his forces, but I have forgotten it.
There was perfect unanimity of opinion (among the Confederate
officers), about the plan and method of the anticipated
Federal movement. Rosecrans (all believed), would press hard
upon General Bragg—Burnside, simultaneously, or as soon afterward
as was practicable, would move against Buckner.
Judah’s force could be used to keep open direct communication
between these two armies, and also as a reserve. When the advance
was fairly inaugurated, Judah, who in the meantime might
guard against the raids of our cavalry, could be concentrated
and moved through Burkesville, Livingston and Sparta—turning
then, if General Bragg staid to fight, upon the right flank of
the army at Tallahoma—or, if General Bragg retreated, pressing
down through the Sequatchie valley to Chattanooga. A junction
of all these forces, it was thought, would be made, and the
Confederate army would then confront a host too formidable to
be beaten.
This was the belief which prevailed in our army regarding the
intentions of the enemy. It may have been incorrect—the
feature, which we of Morgan’s cavalry especially dwelt upon, to-[Pg 409]wit,
the part, in the supposed programme, to be played by Judah,
may have been altogether uncontemplated—perhaps he was
not a man capable of having executed it. But whatever may
have been the Federal plan of the campaign, it is certain that
terrible dangers menaced the army of General Bragg, and all
the salient points of his department.
General Bragg regarded the peril with just apprehension—he
took in its full proportions. He decided and (as was conceded
by all who understood the situation), with good and sufficient
reasons, to retreat beyond the Tennessee river, and then somewhere
near Chattanooga, turning upon his foes, fight the battle
which had to be delivered for the protection of his department.
But that retreat would be very hazardous. He was right in the
path of the avalanche, and the least movement upon his part
might precipitate it upon him. The difficulty and danger of
crossing the Tennessee, with Rosecrans hard upon his rear, would
be greatly augmented, if these other Federal forces were poured
down upon his flank.
General Bragg, it may be repeated, knew how to use, and invariably
used, his cavalry to good purpose, and in this emergency
he resolved to employ some of it to divert from his own
hazardous movement, and fasten upon some other quarter, the
attention of a portion of the opposing forces. He hoped, not
only to give them enough to do, to prevent them from annoying
and endangering his retreat, but, also, to draw off a part
of their forces from the great battle which he expected to fight.
He selected Morgan as the officer who should accomplish this
design.
In the conference between them, General Morgan expressed
a perfect confidence in his ability to effect all that was desired
of him, but dissented from General Bragg in one important particular.
The latter wished him to confine himself to Kentucky—giving
him carte blanche to go wherever he pleased in that State,
and urging him to attempt the capture of Louisville. General Morgan
declared, that, while he could by a dash into Kentucky and[Pg 410]
a march through that State, protect General Bragg’s withdrawal
from the position his army then held, he could not thus accomplish
the other equally important feature of the plan, and draw
off troops which would otherwise strengthen Rosecrans for the
decisive battle.
A raid into Kentucky would keep Judah busy, and hold Burnside
fast until it was decided, but, he contended it would be
decided very soon, and he would be driven out or cut to pieces
in a few days, leaving the Federal forces so disposed that they
could readily commence their previously determined operations.
A raid into Indiana and Ohio, on the contrary, he contended,
would draw all the troops in Kentucky after him, and keep them
employed for weeks. Although there might be sound military
reasons why Judah and Burnside should not follow him, but
should stick to what the Confederate officers deemed the original
programme of Rosecrans, General Morgan urged, that the scare
and the clamor in the States he proposed to invade, would be so
great, that the military leaders and the administration would be
compelled to furnish the troops that would be called for. He
thought that, even if he lost his command, he could greatly
benefit General Bragg by crossing the Ohio river and only in
that way.
General Bragg refused him permission to make the raid as he
desired to make it and ordered him to confine himself to Kentucky.
I was not present at the interview between them, but
General Morgan told me that General Bragg had ordered him
to operate in Kentucky, and further stated that he intended, notwithstanding
his orders, to cross the Ohio. I do not mean to
justify his disobedience of orders, but simply to narrate the
facts as I learned them, and to explain General Morgan’s ideas
regarding the movement, which were definite and fixed. This
expedition into the Northwestern States had long been a favorite
idea with him and was but the practical development of his theory
of the proper way to make war, to-wit: by going deep into
the country of the enemy. He had for several weeks foreseen[Pg 411]
the necessity of some such diversion in General Bragg’s behalf,
and believed that the period for the accomplishment of his great
desire was at hand.
He had ordered me, three weeks previously, to send intelligent
men to examine the fords of the upper Ohio—that at Buffington
among them—and it is a fact, of which others, as well
as myself, are cognizant, that he intended—long before he
crossed the Ohio—to make no effort to recross it, except at
some of these fords, unless he found it more expedient, when
he reached that region, to join General Lee, if the latter should
still be in Pennsylvania.
Never had I been so impressed with General Morgan’s remarkable
genius—his wonderful faculty of anticipating the exact
effect his action would have upon all other men and of calculating
their action—his singular power of arriving at a correct estimate
of the nature and capacities of a country, which he knew only by
maps and the most general description—and the perfect accuracy
with which he could foretell the main incidents of a march
and campaign—as when he would briefly sketch his plan of that
raid. All who heard him felt that he was right in the main,
and although some of us were filled with a grave apprehension,
from the first, we felt an inconsistent confidence when listening
to him. He did not disguise from himself the great dangers he
encountered, but was sanguine of success. As it turned out,
only the unprecedented rise in the Ohio caused his capture—he
had avoided or had cut his way through all other dangers.
On the 11th of June, the division marched from Alexandria
to the Cumberland and crossed the river not far from the little
town of Rome. General Morgan desired to attack the Federal
force stationed at Carthage, and strongly fortified. General
Bragg had authorized him to do so.
The division encamped two or three miles from the northern
bank of the river, and not far from the turnpike which runs from
Carthage to Hartsville. Information had been received that the
mail passed on this road twice or three times a week, guarded[Pg 412]
by a small escort, and that comfortably lined sutlers’ wagons
sometimes accompanied the cavalcade for the benefit of the protection
the escort afforded. Colonel Ward was sent, with two
or three companies of his regiment, to a point on the pike some
eight miles from Carthage, and two or three from our encampment.
He reached it just before sundown, and shortly afterward
the mail train, accompanied by several sutlers’ wagons,
and under charge of an escort eighty or a hundred strong, came
by, no one apparently suspecting the slightest danger, and all
keeping careless watch. When the procession came opposite to
where Colonel Ward had posted his men (some seventy yards from
the road), the Colonel gave the order to fire in a loud voice.
At the unexpected command, which so suddenly indicated danger,
mail-carriers, sutlers, and guard halted in amazement, and
when the answering volley broke upon them, they went in every
direction in the wildest confusion. Not a shot was fired in return,
but the escort manifested plainly that it felt a very inferior
degree of interest in the integrity of postal affairs.
Few prisoners were taken, but the mail and the wagons were
secured. In one of the latter, a corpulent sutler was found,
wedged in a corner, and much alarmed. He was past speaking
when drawn out, but faintly signed that a bottle he had in his
pocket should be placed to his lips.
That evening a staff officer arrived from General Bragg with
orders to General Morgan. He was instructed to make no attack
upon Carthage, but to march as rapidly as possible to Monticello,
and strive to intercept a Federal raiding party which
had broken into East Tennessee, under Brigadier General Saunders,
and was threatening Knoxville. Upon the next morning,
consequently, we recrossed the Cumberland and marched in the
direction ordered. After passing through Gainesboro’, we got
into a very rugged country and upon the very worst roads. At
Livingston we were overtaken by a tremendous rain, which
lasted for two or three days, and rendered the road almost impassable
for artillery. This retarded our march very greatly,
[Pg 413]and we arrived at Albany three days later than we would otherwise
have done, to learn that the enemy had already passed out
of East Tennessee by way of Jamestown.
The second brigade was encamped in Turkey-neck Bend of[Pg 414]
the Cumberland river, some fifteen miles in direct line from
Burkesville. The first brigade was encamped along the river,
from a point opposite Burkesville to Irish Bottom. The division
remained here for three or four days, awaiting the return of
General Morgan, who had left us at the recrossing of the Cumberland
to go to McMinnville and hurry forward some supplies
and ammunition. These stores were hauled to our camp in six
wagons, which had nearly not gotten to us at all. The heavy
rains which had so retarded the march of the division to Albany,
had made the roads which these wagons had traveled perfect
quagmires. When they reached the Obie and Wolf rivers,
which are six miles apart at the points where the road from
Sparta to Monticello crosses them, they met with a very discouraging
sight. These little rushing mountain streams were
much swollen and too deep for any kind of fording. General
Morgan instructed his Acting Inspector, Captain D.R. Williams,
an officer of great energy, to have the wagons taken to
pieces, and stowed, with their contents, in canoes, and so ferried
across. In this manner, all were crossed in a single night. The
mules were made to swim.
On the 2nd of July, the crossing of the Cumberland began,
the first brigade crossing at Burkesville and Scott’s ferry, two
miles above, and the second crossing at Turkey-neck Bend.
The river was out of its banks, and running like a mill-race.
The first brigade had, with which to cross the men and their accouterments,
and artillery, only two crazy little flats, that seemed
ready to sink under the weight of a single man, and two or three
canoes. Colonel Johnson was not even so well provided. The
horses were made to swim.
Just twelve miles distant upon the other side, at Marrowbone,
lay Judah’s cavalry, which had moved to that point from Glas[Pg 415]gow,
in anticipation of some such movement upon Morgan’s
part as he was now making. Our entire strength was twenty-four
hundred and sixty effective men—the first brigade numbering
fourteen hundred and sixty, the second one thousand. This,
however, was exclusive of artillery, of which we had four pieces—a
section of three-inch Parrots attached to the first brigade,
and a section of twelve-pound howitzers attached to the second.
Videttes, posted at intervals along the river bank, would have
given General Judah timely information of this bold crossing,
and he would have been enabled to strike and crush or capture
the whole force. But he depended on the swollen river to deter
Morgan, forgetting that Morgan invariably did that which was
least expected of him. As soon as the latter learned of the strange
supineness and lack of vigilance of his foe, he commenced and
hastened the work of crossing the river. About two or three
p.m., the enemy began to threaten both brigades, but did not
advance with determination. The Sixth Kentucky and Ninth
Tennessee had all been gotten across at Burkesville by this
time, and portions of the other regiments were also across, as
well as two pieces of artillery. General Morgan formed this
entire force, and led it to attack the enemy threatening Burkesville.
He placed a portion of it in ambush at a point about a
mile from the town, and, when the head of the enemy’s column
approached, fired such a volley into it as made it at once recoil.
Then charging, he drove the enemy back in confusion and at
full speed, never letting them halt until they reached the encampment
at Marrowbone. He pursued the force which he had
routed into the camp, but was repulsed in an attack upon the
latter by the artillery and reserve forces there.
The effect of this bold dash, was to draw back the force
threatening Johnson, also, and allow him to cross without molestation.
Our loss was very slight—among other gallant fellows
who were hurt, Captain Quirk was so severely wounded in
the arm that he could go no further upon the expedition.
Several prisoners were taken. The enemy, after this hint not[Pg 416]
to interfere, remained shut up in his encampment until we were
no longer in any danger.
The division encamped that night about ten miles from the
river, on the road to Columbia. A large party of Commissaries
of Subsistence were with us, sent by General Bragg to collect
supplies north of the Cumberland and bring them to Tullahoma,
escorted by one of Morgan’s regiments. A variety of causes
conspired to prevent these gentlemen from returning at the
time, and in the manner contemplated by General Bragg. In
the first place, we learned, immediately after we had crossed
the Cumberland, by men who came from the rear, that General
Bragg had already commenced his retreat—this would considerably
lengthen the distance which the Commissaries would have
to drive their cattle. Secondly, General Morgan came to the
conclusion that he had use for all of his troops, and that he
would not detach the regiment which was to have guarded the
cattle. This resolution not only prevented the cattle from being
driven to General Bragg, but also decided the Commissaries not
to return immediately. The country through which they would
have had to pass, was infested by a set of bushwhackers, in
comparison with whose relentless ferocity, that of Bluebeard
and the Welch giants sinks into insignificance. Chief among
them was “Tinker Dave Beattie,” the great opponent of Champ
Ferguson. This patriarchal old man lived in a cove, or valley
surrounded by high hills, at the back of which was a narrow
path leading to the mountain. Here, surrounded by his clan,
he led a pastoral, simple life, which must have been very fascinating,
for many who ventured into the cove never came away
again. Sometimes Champ Ferguson, with his band, would enter
the cove, harry old Dave’s stock and goods, and drive him to his retreat
in the mountain, to which no man ever followed him. Then,
again, when he was strong enough, he would lead his henchmen
against Champ, and slay all who did not escape. But it must not
be understood that he confined his hostility to Captain Ferguson
and the latter’s men: on the contrary, he could have had, had[Pg 417]
he so chosen, as many scalps drying in his cabin as ever rattled
in the lodge of a Camanche war-chief, and taken with promiscuous
impartiality. There were not related of Beattie so many
stories, illustrative of his personal strength and bull-dog courage,
as of Champ Ferguson. I have heard of the latter having gone,
on one occasion, into a room where two of his bitter enemies
lay before the fire, both strong men and armed, and, throwing
himself upon them, he killed both (after a hard struggle) with
his knife. But Beattie possessed a cunning and subtlety which
the other, in great measure, lacked. Perhaps he was more
nearly civilized. Both of these men were known to have spared
life on some rare occasions, and perhaps none were so much
astonished, thereat, as themselves. On one occasion, Ferguson
was called upon to express an opinion regarding the character
of a man who had been arrested near a spot where bushwhackers
had just fired upon the party he (Ferguson) was with, and,
from several suspicious indications, this man was thought to be
one of them. By way of giving him a chance, it was decided
that Ferguson, who knew every man in that country, should declare
his doom, influenced by his previous knowledge of him.
Ferguson, somewhat to the astonishment of the tribunal, begged
that he should be released, saying, that he knew he was a Union
man, but did not believe that he was a bushwhacker. The man
was released. Subsequently, Ferguson said, after a long fit of
silence, “I have a great notion to go back and hunt that man.
I am afraid I have done wrong, for he is the best shot in this
part of the State, and, if he does turn bushwhacker, he will kill
a man at every shot.” Such extreme nicety of conscience was
not attributed to Beattie, nor was he said to be as faithful to his
friends as was Ferguson.
Such were the kind of men whom our friends, of the Subsistence
Department, would have had to encounter, if they had
gone back. There were, at the time, no Confederate troops in
that country, and Champ Ferguson was resting in inglorious
ease at Sparta. Dave Beattie had broken out of his cove, and[Pg 418]
was ready to hold “bloody assizes” as soon as he secured his
victims. Our friends were not accustomed to “raiding” and to
cavalry habits, but, after thorough reflection, they resolved, with
a heroism that would have done honor to the heavy artillery
service, not to return, but to face all the hardships and dangers
of the expedition. They were gallant men, and endured the
tremendous fatigue, and shared the hardships as cheerfully as if
they had come legitimately by them.
The chief of this party, Major Highley (from Mobile), was as
full of dash and as fond of adventure, as a man could be. He
sought the front on all occasions, and soon became a thorough
cavalryman in all respects. General Morgan placed him upon
his staff and he proved a very efficient officer, and seemed much
gratified that his commissaries had been cut off.
There was one case of almost abduction, however, which excited
universal regret and commiseration:
An old gentleman, from Sparta, had come with the division to
Burkesville to get a barrel of salt—as there was none to be had
at Sparta. His benevolent virtues had endeared him to all who
knew him, and, so, when it became apparent that he must go
back, leaving behind him his purchase, and at the risk of fearful
dangers, or follow us through the whole raid, he received much
and unaffected condolence. He perfectly realized his situation.
He knew that, if he fell into “Tinker Dave’s” hands, he would
be pickled without salt, and he had not the slightest idea of trying
it on. And yet he felt a natural sorrow at going so far
away from home. Some two weeks later, when we were in
Ohio, and being peppered by the militia, he said to an officer of
the first brigade with tears in his eyes, and a touching pathos in
his voice: “Captain, I would give my farm in White county,
Tennessee, and all the salt in Kentucky (if I had it), to stand
once more—safe and sound—on the banks of the Calf-killer
creek.”
On the morning of the 3rd, the division resumed its march,
pushing on to Columbia. Colonel Morgan’s regiment, although[Pg 419]
included in the field return of the first brigade, was detached and
used as an advance-guard for the column. In the afternoon, as
we neared Columbia, this regiment came upon the enemy
moving out from the town. In the skirmish which ensued, Colonel
Morgan lost a few wounded—among the number Captain J.T.
Cassell, who was shot in the thigh as he was charging with
his accustomed gallantry. He was placed in an ambulance and
went, in that way, through the raid, and escaped capture. Captain
Cassell had been ordered to report to Colonel Morgan with
his Company, a few weeks previously, and was acting as second
in command of the advance-guard. Captain Franks of the
Second Kentucky was ordered to report to Colonel Morgan, to
fill the position left vacant by the disabling of Captain Cassell.
After this skirmish had lasted a short time, the Second Kentucky
was ordered up to support Colonel Morgan. Major Webber
dismounted his men and attacked with great vigor. The enemy
did not stand a moment—were driven back into the town, fought
a short time from the houses, and were soon dislodged and
driven pell-mell out of the town. Major Webber lost two men
killed. The enemy’s loss was also slight. It was a detachment
of Woolford’s regiment, and retreated toward Jimtown. Some
disgraceful scenes occurred in Columbia as the troops were
passing through. One or two stores were broken into and plundered.
General Morgan immediately went to the spot, arrested
the marauders, punished them, and compelled the restitution of
the goods.
On that evening the division encamped six or eight miles
from Columbia. A regiment of Federal infantry was stationed
at Green river bridge, where the road from Columbia to Campbellsville
and Lebanon crosses the Green river. General Morgan
sent Captain Franks to watch them, who reported that,
during the entire night, he heard the ringing of axes and the
crash of falling timber. The next morning we learned what it
meant. Early on the 4th the column was put in motion, and the
second brigade (marching in front), soon came upon the enemy.[Pg 420]
Colonel Moore, the officer commanding the Federal force (a
Michigan regiment), had selected the strongest natural position,
I ever saw, and had fortified it with a skill equal to his judgment
in the selection. The Green river makes here a tremendous and
sweeping bend, not unlike in its shape to the bowl of an immense
spoon. The bridge is located at the tip of the bowl, and about
a mile and a half to the southward, where the river returns so
nearly to itself that the peninsula (at this point) is not more
than one hundred yards wide—at what, in short, may be termed
the insertion of the handle—Colonel Moore had constructed an
earthwork, crossing the narrow neck of land, and protected in
front by an abattis. The road upon which we were advancing,
runs through this position. The peninsula widens again, abruptly,
to the southward of this extremely narrow neck, and just
in front of the skirt of woods, in which the work and abattis
was situated, is an open glade, about two hundred yards in extent
in every direction. Just in front of, or south of this plateau
of cleared ground, runs a ravine deep and rugged, rendering
access to it difficult, except by the road. The road runs not directly
through, but to the left of this cleared place. All around
it are thick woods, and upon the east and west the river banks
are as steep and impassable as precipices. At the southern extremity
of the open ground, and facing and commanding the
road, a rifle-pit had been dug, about one hundred and twenty
feet long—capable of containing fifty or sixty men, and about
that number were posted in it. When Colonel Johnson’s brigade
neared the enemy, he sent Cluke with his own regiment
and the Tenth Kentucky, then greatly reduced in numbers, to
cross the river at a ford upon the left of the road, and take position
on the northern side of the river, and commanding the
bridge.
This was intended to prevent the retreat of the enemy and
keep off reinforcements that might approach from the northward.
A flag of truce was then sent to Colonel Moore, demanding the
surrender of his command. He answered, “It is a bad day for[Pg 421]
surrenders, and I would rather not.” Captain Byrnes had planted
one of the Parrots, about six hundred yards from the rifle-pit,
and skirmishers had been thrown out in front of it. As soon
as the bearer of the flag returned, Byrnes opened with the gun.
He fired a round shot into the parapet thrown up in front of the
trench, knocking the fence rails, with which it was riveted, into
splinters, and probing the work. One man in the trench was
killed, by this shot, and the rest ran (just as our skirmishers
dashed forward) and retreated across the open ground to the
work in the woods beyond. Now the serious business commenced.
Artillery could not be used to dislodge them from the
position which was meant to be defended in earnest. This open
ground, between the points where were constructed the rifle-pit
(which was only a blind) and the strong work where Moore intended
to fight, is the flat summit (for crest, properly speaking,
it has none) of a hill, or rather swell of land, which slopes
gently away on both the northern and southern sides. Guns
planted anywhere, except upon this plateau, and near its center,
could not have borne upon the enemy’s position at all—and, if
they had been planted there, every cannoneer would have been
killed before a shot could have been fired. The only way to
take the work was by a straight forward attack upon it, and
Colonel Johnson moved against it his brigade, or rather the
two regiments of it, left on the southern side of the river. The
men, gallantly led, dashed across the open ground and plunged
into the woods beyond.
The Federal force, some four hundred strong, was disposed
behind the work and abattis, holding a line not much more than
a hundred yards long. The first rush carried the men close to
the work, but they were stopped by the fallen timber, and dropped
fast under the close fire of the enemy. Colonel Chenault
was killed in the midst of the abattis—his brains blown out as
he was firing his pistol into the earthwork and calling on his men
to follow. The second brigade had started with an inadequate
supply of ammunition, and the fire of the attacking party soon[Pg 422]
slackened on that account. General Morgan ordered me to send
a regiment to Colonel Johnson’s assistance, and I sent the Fifth
Kentucky. Colonel Smith led his men at a double-quick to the
abattis, where they were stopped as the others had been, and
suffered severely. The rush through a hundred yards of undergrowth,
succeeded by a jam and crowding of a regiment into
the narrow neck, and confronted by the tangled mass of prostrate
timber and the guns of the hidden foe—was more than the men
could stand. They would give way, rally in the thick woods,
try it again, but unsuccessfully. The fire did not seem, to those
of us who were not immediately engaged, to be heavy. There
were no sustained volleys. It was a common remark that the
shots could almost be counted—but almost every shot must have
taken effect.
Our loss in less than half an hour’s fighting, and with not
over six hundred men engaged, for only portions of the regiments,
sent into the fight, were engaged, was thirty-six killed,
and forty-five or six wounded. Twenty, or more of the wounded
were able to ride, and in a few days returned to duty. The loss
of the enemy (according to the most authoritative account) was
nine killed, and twenty-six wounded.
Many fine officers were included in our list of casualties.
Colonel Chenault, whose death has been described—an officer
who had no superior in bravery and devotion to the cause he
fought for—was a noble gentleman. Major Brent, of the Fifth
Kentucky, was killed. He was an officer who was rapidly
taking—in reputation and popularity—the place among the field
officers of the division which Hutchinson had held. He was recklessly
brave, and possessed a natural military aptitude, and a
resolution in exacting duty from his subordinate officers and
men, which made him invaluable to his regiment. Captain
Treble, who a short time previously had been transferred from
the Second to the Eleventh Kentucky (Chenault’s regiment) was
also killed. He displayed, in this his last battle, the same high
courage which ever animated him. Lieutenant Cowan, of the[Pg 423]
Third Kentucky, and Lieutenants Holloway and Ferguson, of
the Fifth Kentucky—all very fine officers were also among the
killed. Among the wounded officers, of the Fifth Kentucky, was
the gallant and efficient Adjutant, Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar.
When General Morgan learned that the men were falling fast,
and that no impression was being made upon the enemy, he ordered
their withdrawal. He had not been fully aware, when the
attack commenced, of the exceeding strength of the position,
although he knew it to be formidable, and he thought it probable
that the garrison would surrender to a bold attack. It was
his practice to attack and seek to capture all, but the strongest,
of the forces which opposed his advance upon his raids, and this
was the only instance in which he ever failed of success in this
policy. He believed that the position could have been eventually
carried, but (as the defenders were resolute) at a cost of time and
life which he could not afford. Colonel Moore ought to have
been able to defend his position, against direct attacks, had an
army been hurled against him. But this does not detract from
the credit of his defense. His selection of ground showed admirable
judgment; and, in a brief time, he fortified it with singular
skill. He deliberately quitted a strong stockade, near the
bridge (in which other officers would, probably have staid) and
which our artillery would have battered about his ears directly,
to assume the far better position; and his resolute defense,
showed he appreciated and meant to hold it to the last. We
expected to hear of his promotion—men had been promoted for
beatings received from Morgan.
Crossing the river at the same ford at which Cluke had previously
crossed, the division marched toward Campbellsville.
Our wounded and dead were left under the charge of Surgeons
and Chaplains, who received every assistance, that he could furnish,
from Colonel Moore, who proved himself as humane as he
was skillful and gallant. We passed through Campbellsville
without halting. On that evening a horrible affair occurred.
A certain Captain Murphy took a watch from a citizen who was[Pg 424]
being held, for a short time, under guard, to prevent his giving
information of our approach and strength to the garrison at
Lebanon. Captain Magenis, Assistant Adjutant General of the
division, discovered that this theft had been perpetrated, and
reported it to General Morgan, who ordered Murphy to be arrested.
Murphy learned that Magenis had caused his arrest,
and persuaded the guard (who had not disarmed him) to permit
him to approach Magenis. When near him, Murphy drew and
cocked a pistol, and denounced the other furiously, at the same
time striking him. Captain Magenis attempted to draw his
saber, and Murphy fired, severing the carotid artery and producing
almost instant death. Murphy made his escape on the
night that General Morgan had ordered a court-martial to try
him—the night before we crossed the Ohio. The wretch ought
to have been butchered in his tracks, immediately after the
murder had been committed. There was no officer in the entire
Confederate army, perhaps, so young as he was, who had
evinced more intelligence, aptitude and zeal, than had Captain
Magenis. Certainly, there was not among them all a more
true-hearted, gallant, honorable gentleman. General Morgan
deeply regretted him. His successor, Captain Hart Gibson,
was in every way qualified to discharge, with ability and success,
the duties of the position, doubly difficult in such a command
and under such circumstances.
On the night of the 4th, the division encamped five miles from
Lebanon, upon the ground whence we drove the enemy’s pickets.
Lebanon was garrisoned by Colonel Hanson’s regiment, the
Twentieth Kentucky, and not far off, on the road to Harrodsburg,
two Michigan regiments were stationed. On the morning
of the 5th, the division approached the town, and a demand for
its surrender was made, which was declined. The first brigade
was formed on the right of the road, with two regiments in reserve.
The second was assigned the left of the road. The artillery
was planted in the center, and at once opened upon the
slight works which were thrown up, south of the town. As the[Pg 425]
regiments in the front line advanced, the enemy retreated into
the town. Both brigades lost slightly in effecting this, and
succeeded, immediately afterward, in dislodging the enemy from
the houses in the edge of the town, both on the left and on the
right. The enemy, then, mainly concentrated in the large depot
building upon the railroad; a few sought shelter in other
houses. Grigsby’s and Ward’s regiments, of the first brigade,
held the right of the town and the houses looking upon the depot
in that quarter. From these houses they kept up a constant
fire upon the windows of the depot. Cluke’s and Chenault’s
regiments, the latter under command of Lieutenant Colonel
Tucker, were as effectively located and employed upon the left.
Our artillery, although under able officers, proved of little use
to us in this affair. On account of the situation of the depot in
low ground, the shots took effect in the upper part of the building
(when they struck at all), doing the occupants little damage.
Lieutenant Lawrence, however, at length posted one of his guns—the
Parrots—on a hill immediately overlooking the building,
and, greatly depressing it, prepared to fire into it at an
angle which threatened mischief. But the sharpshooters prevented
his men from working the guns effectively. This state
of affairs lasted for two or three hours. The Michigan regiments,
before mentioned, drew near and threatened interference,
and General Morgan, who had sought to reduce the garrison
without storming their stronghold, in order to save his own men,
at length ordered it to be carried by assault. Smith’s regiment,
at first held in reserve in the first brigade, had, previously to
this determination upon the part of the General, been engaged,
but the Second Kentucky was still in reserve. Major Webber
was now ordered to bring that regiment forward, enter the town
and storm the buildings occupied by the enemy. The Second
Kentucky had tried that sort of work before, and advanced with
serious mien, but boldly and confidently. Major Webber skillfully
aligned it and moved it forward. The heavy volley it
poured into the windows of the depot, drove the defenders away[Pg 426]
from them before the regiment reached the building, and Colonel
Hanson surrendered. The other houses occupied by the enemy
were surrendered shortly afterward.
At the last moment of the fight, a sad loss befell us. Lieutenant
Thomas Morgan, younger brother of the General, was
killed just before the enemy surrendered. He was first Lieutenant
of Company I, of the Second Kentucky, but was serving
at the time of his death upon my staff. He habitually sought
and exposed himself to danger, seeming to delight in the excitement
it afforded him. He had repeatedly been remonstrated
with on that day, regarding his reckless exposure of his person,
and General Morgan had once ordered him to leave the front.
He was stricken by the fate which his friends feared for him.
When the Second Kentucky advanced, he rushed in front of it,
and, while firing his pistol at the windows of the depot, was shot
through the heart. He exclaimed to his brother Calvin, that he
was killed, and fell (a corpse) into the latter’s arms. He was
but nineteen when killed, but was a veteran in service and experience.
The first of six brothers to join the Confederate army,
he had displayed his devotion to the cause he had espoused in
the field and the prison. I have never known a boy of so much
genius, and of so bright and winning a temper. His handsome,
joyous face and gallant, courteous bearing made him very popular.
He was the pet and idol of the Second Kentucky. General
Morgan (whose love for the members of his family was of the
most devoted character) was compelled to forego the indulgence
of his own grief to restrain the Second Kentucky, furious at the
death of their favorite. When his death became generally
known, there was not a dry eye in the command.
Although our loss in killed and wounded was not heavy in
numbers, it included some valuable officers and some of our best
men. We lost eight or nine killed, and twenty-five or thirty
wounded. In the early part of the fight, Captain Franks led a
party of the advance guard to the southern end of the depot,
and set it on fire. He was severely wounded in doing this,[Pg 427]
making the third officer, occupying the position of second in
command of the advance guard, wounded in four days. The
loss in the guard fell principally upon members of the “Old
Squadron.” Of these were killed Lieutenant Gardner and private
Worsham; and Sergeant William Jones and privates Logwood
and Hawkins were badly wounded, all very brave men and
excellent soldiers. A gallant deed was performed, on that day,
by private Walter Ferguson, one of the bravest men I ever
knew; poor fellow, he was hung by Burbridge afterward. His
friend and messmate Logwood lay helpless not far from the
depot, and Ferguson approached him under the galling fire from
the windows, lifted and bore him off. Several men were lost out
of the Second Kentucky; among them Sergeant Franklin, formerly
Captain of a Mississippi company in the Army of Northern
Virginia.
A large quantity of ammunition, many fine rifles, an abundant
supply of medicines, and a field full of ambulances and wagons
were the fruits of this victory. The prisoners were double-quicked
to Springfield, eight miles distant, for the dilatory
Michiganders had at length began to move, and there was no
reason for fighting, although we could have whipped them. At
Springfield the prisoners were paroled. Company H, of the
Second Kentucky, was detached here, and a company of the
Sixth Kentucky went off without leave or orders. Company H
was sent to Harrodsburg to occupy the attention of Burnside’s
cavalry. The division marched all night, reaching Bardstown
at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 6th. During the night Lieut.-Colonel
Alston (acting chief of staff to General Morgan) lay down
to sleep in the porch of a house, and awakened to find himself in
the hands of the enemy.
At Bardstown, Captain Sheldon, of Company C, Second Kentucky,
detached at Muldraugh’s hill to reconnoiter toward Louisville,
and rejoin us at Bardstown, was patiently watching a party
of twenty Federal soldiers, whom he had penned up in a stable.
The tramp of the column marching through the town alarmed[Pg 428]
them, and they surrendered. Leaving Bardstown at ten a.m.
on the 6th, the division marched steadily all day. Just at dark
the train from Nashville was captured at a point some thirty
miles from Louisville. A little of Ellsworth’s art applied here
discovered for us the fact that Morgan was expected at Louisville,
confidently and anxiously, but that an impression prevailed
that he would meet with a warm reception. He had no idea of
going to receive it.
We marched during the entire night, and on the next morning,
after crossing the bridge over Salt river, halted for two or
three hours. Captains Taylor and Merriwether, of the Tenth
Kentucky, were sent forward to capture boats to enable us to
cross the Ohio, and went about their errand in good earnest.
On the afternoon of that day, Captain Davis, A.A. General of
the first brigade, was selected by General Morgan to undertake
a service very important to the success of the expedition. He
was directed to proceed, with Company D of the Second Kentucky,
and Company A, of Cluke’s regiment, to cross the river
at Twelve Mile Island, seize boats and cross the river, keep the
militia of lower Indiana employed in watching their own “firesides,”
chicken coops, and stables, so that the column might be
comparatively free from molestation, in at least one direction,
and to rejoin the division at Salem, Indiana. These two companies,
the two detached at Springfield—or rather one detached
there; the other marched off without leave—and Captain Salter’s
company detached near Columbia, to attract Burnside’s attention
to the country around Crab Orchard, Stanford, etc., (whither
he at once hastened and did splendid service, keeping the enemy
as busily employed as an ordinary-sized brigade might have
done), these companies made five, in all, which were permanently
detached from the division.
On the afternoon of the 7th, the column halted at Garnettsville,
in Hardin county, and went into camp. It has been frequently
surmised, in the North, that Morgan crossed the Ohio
river to escape from Hobson. Of all the many wildly and ut[Pg 429]terly
absurd ideas which have prevailed regarding the late war,
this is, perhaps, the most preposterous. It is difficult to understand
how, even the people whose ideas of military operations
are derived from a vague rendition of the newspaper phrases of
“bagging” armies, “dispositions made to capture,” “deriving
material advantages,” when the derivers were running like
scared deer, it is hard to comprehend how even such people, if
they ever look upon maps, or reflect for a moment upon what
they read, can receive, as correct, such assertions as the one
under consideration. Hobson was from twenty-four to thirty-six
hours behind us. He was pursuing us, it should be stated,
with the cavalry of Judah’s corps—he was, at any rate, a good
fifty miles in our rear, and could learn our track only by following
it closely. General Morgan, if anxious to escape Hobson,
and actuated by no other motive, would have turned at Bardstown,
and gone out of Kentucky through the western part of
the State, where he would have encountered no hostile force
that he could not have easily repulsed. It was not too late to
pursue the same general route when we were at Garnettsville.
Roads, traversable by artillery and excellent for cavalry, ran
thence in every direction. Hobson would have had as little
chance to intercept us, as a single hunter has to corner a wild
horse in an open prairie. To rush across the Ohio river, as a
means of escape, would have been the choice of an idiot, and
yet such conduct has been ascribed to the shrewdest, most wide-awake,
most far-seeing Captain (in his own chosen method of
warfare), the greatest master of “cavalry strategy,” that ever
lived. That military men in the North should have entertained
this opinion, proves, only, that in armies so vast, as that which
the United States put into the field, there must necessarily be
many men of very small capacity. General Morgan certainly
believed that he could, with energy and care, preserve his command
from capture after crossing the Ohio, but he no more believed
that it would be safer, after having gained the Northern[Pg 430]
side of the river, than he believed that it was safer in Kentucky
than south of the Cumberland.
The division marched from Garnettsville, shortly after midnight,
and by 9 or 10 a.m. we were in Brandenburg, upon the
banks of the river. Here we found Captains Samuel Taylor
and Clay Merriwether, awaiting our arrival. They had succeeded
in capturing two fine steamers; one had been taken at
the wharf, and, manning her strongly, they cruised about the
river until they found and caught the other. We were rejoined
here by another officer, whose course had been somewhat eccentric,
and his adventure very romantic. This was Captain
Thomas Hines, of the Ninth Kentucky, then enjoying a high
reputation in our command for skill, shrewdness, and exceeding
gallantry, but destined to become much more widely celebrated.
While the division was lying along the Cumberland in May,
Captain Hines had been sent to Clinton county, with the men
of the Ninth Kentucky, whose horses were especially unserviceable,
to place them where, with good feeding, rest and attention,
the stock might be recruited—to establish, in other words, what
was technically known as a “convalescent camp,” and in regimental
“slang,” a “dead horse camp.” Captain Hines established
his camp and put it into successful operation, but then
sought permission to undertake more active and exciting work.
He was not exactly the style of man to stay quiet at a “convalescent
camp;” it would have been as difficult to keep him
there, as to confine Napoleon to Elba, or force the “Wandering
Jew” to remain on a cobbler’s bench. He obtained from General
Morgan an order to take such of his men as were best
mounted, and scout “north of the Cumberland.” He, therefore,
selected thirty or forty of his “convalescents,” whose horses
were able to hobble, and crossed the river with them. Immediately
exchanging his crippled horses for good, sound ones, he
commenced a very pleasant and adventurous career, which lasted
for some weeks. He attacked and harassed the marching columns
of the enemy, and kept the smaller garrisons constantly[Pg 431]
in fear, and moved about with such celerity that there was no
getting at him, occasionally interluding his other occupations
by catching and burning a railroad train. He once came very
near being entirely destroyed. The enemy succeeded, on one
occasion, in eluding his vigilance and surprising him. While
he and his men were peacefully bathing in a creek, molesting
no one, they were suddenly attacked. Several were captured
and the rest were dispersed, but Hines collected them, again, in
a day or two.
After a while, finding Kentucky grow warm for him, and not
wishing to return to the command to be remanded to the “convalescent
camp,” he determined to cross over into Indiana and
try and stir up the “copperheads.” He thought that (according
to the tenor of his instructions), he had the right to do so.
The order did not specify when he should return from his scout,
and Indiana was certainly “north of the Cumberland.” He accordingly
crossed into Indiana—made his presence known to the
people of the State in various ways—and penetrated as far into
the interior of the State, as Seymour, at the junction of the
Ohio and Mississippi and Cincinnati and Indianapolis Railroads.
He here effected a junction with a greatly more numerous
body of militia, which induced him to retrace his steps rapidly
to the Ohio (which he recrossed), and arrived at Brandenburg on
the very day that we got there. We found him leaning against
the side of the wharf-boat, with sleepy, melancholy look—apparently
the most listless, inoffensive youth that was ever imposed
upon. I do not know what explanation he made General Morgan
(of the lively manner in which he had acted under his order),
but it seemed to be perfectly satisfactory, and he was ordered to
report to Colonel Morgan to assume the position left vacant by
the wounding of Captain Franks.
Just before the crossing of the river was commenced, an unexpected
fusillade was delivered, from the Indiana shore, upon
the men who showed themselves in the little town and upon the
boats, which was soon followed by the sharp report of a rifled-[Pg 432]cannon.
The river at this point is some eight hundred or a
thousand yards wide—and the musketry produced no effect.
The shell, however, from the piece of artillery pitched into a
group on the river bank, scattering it, and wounding Captain
Wilson, Quartermaster of the First Brigade. The mist, hanging
thick over the river, had prevented us from seeing the parties who
directed this firing, take position. Soon the mist lifted or was
dispersed by the bright sun, and disclosed a squad of combatants
posted behind one or two small houses, a clump of hay stacks,
and along the brink of the river on the other side. Apparently,
from the mixture of uniforms and plain clothes, which could be
discovered by the glass, this force was composed of militia and
some regular troops. Several shots were fired from the gun
while we were getting our pieces in readiness to reply—but as
soon as Lawrence opened upon them with his Parrots, a manifest
disposition to retire was seen among our friends who had shown
themselves so anxious to give us a warm and early welcome.
They attempted to carry the piece of artillery off with them, but
were induced by Lawrence to relinquish it. It was mounted
upon the wheels of a wagon from which the body had been removed,
and, as they moved it by hand, its transportation was
difficult and tedious and very disagreeable under fire.
Leaving the piece, they fell back to a wooded ridge five or six
hundred yards from the river bank and parallel with it. The
Second Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee were immediately put
across the river, leaving their horses on the Kentucky shore,
and were formed under the bluff bank. As they ascended the
bank they were greeted by a volley from the enemy which did
no damage, and Colonel Ward and Major Webber at once pressed
them on toward the ridge. Scarcely had the boats returned, and
while yet the two regiments on the other side were moving
across the open fields between the river and the ridge, when a
small boat which had for some minutes been in sight, steaming
rapidly down the river, began to take a part in the affair. We
had watched her with great interest, and were inclined to think,[Pg 433]
from her bold unhesitating advance, that she was a river gunboat,
and when she came within a mile of the town all doubts
upon the subject were dispelled. Suddenly checking her way,
she tossed her snub nose defiantly, like an angry beauty of the
coal-pits, sidled a little toward the town, and commenced to scold.
A bluish-white, funnel-shaped cloud spouted out from her left-hand
bow and a shot flew at the town, and then changing front
forward, she snapped a shell at the men on the other side. The
ridge was soon gained by the regiments, however, the enemy
not remaining to contest it, and they were sheltered by it from
the gunboat’s fire. I wish I were sufficiently master of nautical
phraseology to do justice to this little vixen’s style of fighting,
but she was so unlike a horse, or a piece of light artillery, even,
that I can not venture to attempt it. She was boarded up tightly
with tiers of heavy oak planking, in which embrasures were cut
for the guns, of which she carried three bronze twelve-pounder
howitzers, apparently. Captain Byrnes transferred the two
Parrots to an eminence just upon the river and above the town,
and answered her fire. His solid shot skipped about her, in
close proximity, and his shells burst close to her, but none
seemed to touch her—although it was occasionally hard to tell
whether she was hit or not. This duel was watched with the
most breathless interest by the whole division; the men crowded
in intense excitement upon the bluffs, near the town, to witness
it, and General Morgan exhibited an emotion he rarely permitted
to be seen.
Two of his best regiments were separated from him by the
broad river, and were dismounted, a condition which always appeals
to a cavalryman’s strongest sympathies; they might at any
moment, he feared, be attacked by overwhelming forces, for he
did not know what was upon the other side, or how large a
swarm Hines had stirred up in the hornet’s nest. He himself
might be attacked, if delayed too long, by the enemy that he
well knew must be following his track. Independently of all
considerations of immediate danger, he was impatient at delay[Pg 434]
and anxious to try his fortune in the new field he had selected.
There were many with him who could appreciate his feelings.
Behind us two broad States separated us from our friends—a
multitude of foes, although we thought little of them, were
gathering in our rear.
On the other side of the great river were our comrades
needing our aid, perhaps never to be received. When we, too,
were across, we would stand face to face with the hostile and
angry North—an immense and infuriated population, and a soldiery
out-numbering us twenty to one, would confront us. Telegraph
lines, tracing the country in every direction, would tell
constantly of our movements; railways would bring assailants
against us from every quarter, and we would have to run this
gauntlet, night and day, without rest or one moment of safety,
for six hundred miles. As we looked on the river, rolling before
us, we felt that it divided us from a momentous future, and
we were eager to learn our fate. After an hour perhaps had
elapsed, but which seemed a dozen, the gunboat backed out and
steamed up the river. Her shells had nearly all burst short,
doing no damage. The boats were put to work again without a
moment’s delay, to ferry the command over. First, the horses
of the men on the other side were carried to them, affording
them exquisite gratification. Although no time was lost, and
the boats were of good capacity, it was nearly dark before the
first brigade was all across. The gunboat returned about five
p.m., accompanied by a consort, but a few shots from the Parrots,
which had been kept in position, drove them away without
any intermission having occurred in the ferriage. The second
brigade and the artillery were gotten across by midnight. One
of the boats, which was in Government employ, was burned; the
other was released.
The first brigade encamped that night about six miles from
the river. “A great fear” had fallen upon the inhabitants of
that part of the State of Indiana. They had left their houses,
with open doors and unlocked larders, and had fled to the[Pg 435]
thickets and “caves of the hills.” At the houses at which I
stopped, every thing was just in the condition in which the fugitive
owners had left it, an hour or two before. A bright fire
was blazing upon the kitchen hearth, bread half made up was in
the tray, and many indications convinced us that we had interrupted
preparations for supper. The chickens were strolling
before the door with a confidence that was touching, but misplaced.
General Morgan rode by soon afterward, and was induced
to “stop all night.” We completed the preparations, so
suddenly abandoned, and made the best show for Indiana hospitality
that was possible under the disturbing circumstances.
On the next day, the 9th, the division marched at an early
hour, the second brigade in advance. At the little town of
Corydon, Colonel Morgan’s advance guard found a body of
militia posted behind rail barricades. He charged them, but
they resolutely defended their rail piles, killing and wounding
several men, among the latter Lieutenant Thorpe, of Company
A, Second Kentucky, Colonel Morgan’s acting Adjutant, and a
very fine young officer. A demonstration was made upon the
flank of the enemy, by one regiment of the second brigade, and
Colonel Morgan again advanced upon their front, when, not understanding
such a fashion of fighting upon two or three sides
at once, the militia broke and ran, with great rapidity, into the
town, their progress accelerated (as they got fairly into the
streets) by a shot dropped among them from one of the pieces.
Passing through Corydon, we took the Salem road, and encamped
some sixteen or eighteen miles from the latter place. On
the morning of the 10th, we set out for Salem. Major Webber was
ordered to take the advance, and let nothing stop him. He accordingly
put his regiment at the head of the column, and struck
out briskly. Lieutenant Welsh, of Company K, had the extreme
advance with twelve men. As he neared Salem, he saw
the enemy forming to receive him, and, without hesitation,
dashed in among them. The party he attacked was about one
hundred and fifty strong, but badly armed and perfectly raw,[Pg 436]
and he quickly routed them. He pursued as they fled, and soon,
supported by Captain W.J. Jones’ company, drove them pell-mell
into the town. Here some two or three hundred were collected,
but, as the Second Kentucky came pouring upon them,
they fled in haste, scattering their guns in the streets. A small
swivel, used by the younger population of Salem to celebrate
Christmas and the Fourth of July, had been planted to receive
us: about eighteen inches long, it was loaded to the muzzle,
and mounted in the public square by being propped against a
stick of fire wood. It was not fired, however, for the man deputed
to perform that important duty, somewhat astounded by
the sudden dash into the town, dropped the coal of fire with
which he should have touched it off, and before he could get another
the rebels captured the piece. The shuddering imagination
refuses to contemplate the consequences had that swivel
been touched off. Major Webber might have had some trouble
with this force, which was being rapidly augmented, but for the
promptness and vigor of his attack. He made favorable mention
of Captain Cooper, of Company K, and Lieutenant West,
of Company I, for gallant and judicious conduct.
A short halt was made in Salem to feed men and horses, and
during that time several railroad bridges were burned. The
Provost guard had great difficulty in restraining the men from
pillaging, and was unsuccessful in some instances, Major
Steele, of the Third Kentucky, had been appointed Provost
Marshal of the division, and was assisted by picked officers
and men from each of the brigades. Major Steele was a most
resolute, vigilant, energetic officer, and yet he found it impossible
to stop a practice which neither company nor regimental
officers were able to aid him in suppressing. This disposition
for wholesale plunder exceeded any thing that any of us had
ever seen before. The men seemed actuated by a desire to
“pay off” in the “enemy’s country” all scores that the Federal
army had chalked up in the South. The great cause for apprehension,
which our situation might have inspired, seemed[Pg 437]
only to make them reckless. Calico was the staple article of
appropriation—each man (who could get one) tied a bolt of it
to his saddle, only to throw it away and get a fresh one at the
first opportunity. They did not pillage with any sort of method
or reason—it seemed to be a mania, senseless and purposeless.
One man carried a bird-cage, with three canaries in it, for two
days. Another rode with a chafing-dish, which looked like a
small metallic coffin, on the pummel of his saddle, until an officer
forced him to throw it away. Although the weather was
intensely warm, another, still, slung seven pairs of skates around
his neck, and chuckled over his acquisition. I saw very few
articles of real value taken—they pillaged like boys robbing an
orchard. I would not have believed that such a passion could
have been developed, so ludicrously, among any body of civilized
men. At Piketon, Ohio, some days later, one man broke
through the guard posted at a store, rushed in (trembling with
excitement and avarice), and filled his pockets with horn buttons.
They would (with few exceptions) throw away their plunder
after awhile, like children tired of their toys.
Leaving Salem at one or two o’clock, we marched rapidly and
steadily. At nightfall we reached Vienna, on the Indianapolis
and Jeffersonville railroad. General Morgan placed Ellsworth
in the telegraph office here, the operator having been captured
before he could give the alarm. Ellsworth soon learned all the
news to be had from Louisville and Indianapolis, some of it
valuable to us. General Morgan ascertained also that orders
had been issued to the militia to fell timber and blockade all of
the roads we would be likely to travel—our rapid marching had,
hitherto, saved us this annoyance. That night we went into
camp near Lexington, a little place six or seven miles from
Vienna. General Morgan slept in the town with a small escort,
and during the night a party of Federal cavalry entered the
town and advanced as far as the house in which he slept, but
retired as suddenly as they came. We moved at an early hour
on the road to Paris—Colonel Smith was detached to feint[Pg 438]
against Madison, in order to hold there troops who might
prove troublesome if they came out. The division moved
quietly through Paris, and in the afternoon arrived in sight
of Vernon. Here Colonel Smith rejoined us. A strong
force was posted in Vernon, which General Morgan did not care
to attack. Fortunately, there were men in the command who
knew the country, and the General was enabled to carry the
division around the place to the Dupont road. Skirmishers
were thrown out on the road, leading into the town which we
had left, and also upon the other road, while this movement was
being executed. General Morgan sent a demand for the surrender
of the place, which was declined, but the officer commanding
asked two hours to remove the non-combatants, which
reasonable request General Morgan granted. Humane considerations
are never inopportune. By the time that the non-combatants
were safely removed, the column had become
straightened out on the new road, and the skirmishers, after
they had burned a bridge or two, were withdrawn.
We encamped that night at 12 p.m., and moved next morning
at 3. The fatigue of the marches, from the date of the crossing
of the Ohio to the period of the close of the raid, was tremendous.
We had marched hard in Kentucky, but we now averaged
twenty-one hours in the saddle. Passing through Dupont a
little after daylight, a new feature in the practice of appropriation
was developed. A large meat packing establishment was
in this town, and each man had a ham slung at his saddle.
There was no difficulty at any time in supplying men and horses,
in either Indiana or Ohio—forage and provisions were to be
had in abundance, stop where we would. There is a custom
prevailing in those States, which is of admirable assistance to
soldiery, and should be encouraged—a practice of baking bread
once a week in large quantities. Every house is full of it.
The people were still laboring under vast apprehensions regarding
us, and it was a rare thing to see an entire family remaining
at home. The men met us oftener in their capacity of[Pg 439]
militia than at their houses, and the “Copperheads” and “Vallandighammers”
fought harder than the others. Wherever we
passed, bridges and depots, water-tanks, etc., were burned and
the railroads torn up, but I knew of but one private dwelling
being burned upon the entire raid, and we were fired upon from
that one. The country, for the most part, was in a high state
of cultivation, and magnificent crops of wheat, especially, attracted
our notice on all sides.
What was peculiarly noticeable, however, to men who were
fighting against these people, and just from thinned out “Dixie,”
was the dense population, apparently untouched by the demands
of the war. The country was full, the towns were full, and the
ranks of the militia were full. I am satisfied that we saw often
as many as ten thousand militia in one day, posted at different
points. They would frequently fight, if attacked in strong position,
but could be dispersed by maneuvering. Had they come
upon us as the fierce Kentucky Home-guards would have done,
if collected in such numbers, we could not have forced our way
through them.
In this immediate country had been recruited the regiment
which burned the homes of Company F, the Mississippi company
of the Second Kentucky. Colonel Grigsby was detached with
his regiment to press on and burn the bridges near Versailles.
He dashed into the town, where several hundred militia were collected
devising the best means of defending the place, and broke
up the council. He captured a large number of horses, rather
better stock than had hitherto been procured in Indiana.
Marching on steadily all day and the greater part of the next
night, we reached a point on the Ohio and Mississippi road,
twenty-five miles from Harrison, called Summansville. Here
twenty-five hundred militia lay loaded into box cars. We halted
to rest, and, unconscious of our presence, although we were close
upon them, they moved off in the morning toward Cincinnati.
Moving at 5 a.m., we reached Harrison by one o’clock of the
13th. Here General Morgan began to maneuver for the benefit[Pg 440]
of the commanding officer, at Cincinnati. He took it for granted
(for it was utterly impossible moving as rapidly as we were
forced to do, and in the midst of a strange and hostile population,
to get positive information regarding any matter), that there
was a strong force of regular troops in Cincinnati. Burnside
had them not far off, and General Morgan supposed that they
would, of course, be brought there. If we could get past Cincinnati
safely, the danger of the expedition, he thought, would
be more than half over. Here he expected to be confronted by
the concentrated forces of Judah and Burnside, and he anticipated
great difficulty in eluding or cutting his way through them.
Once safely through this peril, his escape would be certain, unless
the river remained so high that the transports could carry
troops to intercept him at the upper crossings. The cavalry
following in his rear could not overtake him as long as he kept
in motion, and the infantry could not be transported so rapidly
by rail to the eastern part of the State that it could be concentrated
in sufficient strength to stop him. His object, therefore,
entertaining these views and believing that the great effort to
capture him would be made as he crossed the Hamilton and
Dayton railroad, was to deceive the enemy as to the exact point
where he would cross this road, and denude that point as much
as possible of troops. He sent detachments in various directions,
seeking, however, to create the impression that he was
marching to Hamilton.
After two or three hours’ halt at Harrison, the division moved
directly toward Cincinnati, the detachment coming in in the
course of that afternoon. Hoping that his previous demonstrations
would induce the sending of the bulk of the troops up the
road, and that if any were left at Cincinnati his subsequent threatening
movements would cause them to draw into the city, remain
on the defensive, and permit him to pass around it without
attacking him, he sought to approach the city as nearly as possible
without actually entering it and involving his command in a
fight with any garrison which might be there. He has been
sometimes accused of a lack of enterprise in not capturing Cincinnati.
It must be remembered that Cincinnati was not the
objective point of this raid; it was not undertaken to capture
that city. General Morgan knew nothing, and, in the nature of
things, could know nothing of the condition of affairs in the city,
or whether it was weakly or strongly garrisoned.
Starting that morning from a point fifty miles distant from
Cincinnati, and reaching the vicinity of the city after nightfall,[Pg 442]
he must have possessed more than human means of obtaining
information, had he known these things then, and he did not
have a rapping medium on his staff. Moreover, of the twenty-four
hundred and sixty effectives with which he had started, he
had not two thousand left. He could get fights enough to employ
this force handsomely, without running into a labyrinth of
streets, and among houses (each one of which might be made a
fortification), with the hope that the town might be unoccupied
with troops, or that it might be surrendered. Our “Copperhead
friends,” who could have given us the necessary information,
were too loyal, or too busy dodging Burnside’s Dutch corporals
to come out.
The men in our ranks were worn down and demoralized with the
tremendous fatigue, which no man can realize or form the faintest
conception of until he has experienced it. It is as different
from the fatigue of an ordinary long march, followed by some
rest, as the pain given by an hour’s deprivation of water is unlike
the burning, rabid thirst of fever. Had the city been given
up to us, and had the least delay occurred in getting boats with
which to cross the river, the men would have scattered to all
quarters of the city, and twenty-four hours might have been required
to collect them. In that time the net would have been
drawn around us. But it must be borne in mind (independently
of all these considerations) that General Morgan had given himself
a particular work to accomplish. He determined, as has
been stated, to traverse Ohio.
To have recrossed the river at Cincinnati, would have short[Pg 443]ened
the raid by many days, have released the troops pursuing
us, and have abandoned the principal benefits expected to be derived
from the expedition.
In this night march around Cincinnati, we met with the greatest
difficulty in keeping the column together. The guides were
all in front with General Morgan, who rode at the head of the
second brigade then marching in advance. This brigade had no
trouble consequently. But the first brigade was embarrassed
beyond measure. Cluke’s regiment was marching in the rear of
the second brigade, and if it had kept closed up, we would have
had no trouble, for the entire column would have been directed by
the guides. But this regiment, although composed of superb
material, and unsurpassed in fighting qualities, had, from the period
of its organization, been under lax and careless discipline,
and the effect of it was now observable. The rear companies
straggled, halted, delayed the first brigade, for it was impossible
to ascertain immediately, whether the halt was that of the brigade
in advance, or only of these stragglers, and when forced to
move on, they would go off at a gallop. A great gap would be
thus opened between the rear of one brigade and the advance of
the other, and we who were behind were forced to grope our
way as we best could. When we would come to one of the many
junctions of roads which occur in the suburbs of a large city, we
would be compelled to consult all sorts of indications in order to
hit upon the right road. The night was intensely dark, and we
would set on fire large bundles of paper, or splinters of wood to
afford a light. The horses’ tracks (on roads so much traveled),
would give us no clue to the route which the other brigade had
taken, at such points, but we could trace it by noticing the direction
in which the dust “settled,” or floated. When the night
is calm, the dust kicked up by the passage of a large number of
horses will remain suspended in the air for a considerable length
of time, and it will also move slowly in the same direction that
the horses which have disturbed it have traveled. We could also
trace the column by the slaver dropped from the horses’ mouths.[Pg 444]
It was a terrible, trying march. Strong men fell out of their
saddles, and at every halt the officers were compelled to move
continually about in their respective companies and pull and haul
the men who would drop asleep in the road—it was the only way
to keep them awake. Quite a number crept off into the fields
and slept until they were awakened by the enemy. The rear of
the first brigade was prevented from going to pieces, principally
by the energetic exertions of Colonel Grigsby. Major Steele
was sent in the extreme advance to drive pickets, scouts, and
all parties of the enemy which might be abroad from the road.
He was given a picked body of men, and executed the mission in
fine style.
At length day appeared, just as we reached the last point
where we had to anticipate danger. We had passed through
Glendale and across all of the principal suburban roads, and were
near the Little Miami Railroad. Those who have marched much
at night, will remember that the fresh air of morning almost invariably
has a cheering effect upon the tired and drowsy, and
awakens and invigorates them. It had this effect upon our men
on this occasion, and relieved us also from the necessity of groping
our way.
We crossed the railroad without meeting with opposition, and
halted to feed the horses in sight of Camp Dennison. After a
short rest here, and a picket skirmish, we resumed our march,
burning in this neighborhood a park of Government wagons.
That evening at 4 p.m. we were at Williamsburg, twenty-eight
miles east of Cincinnati, having marched, since leaving Summansville,
in Indiana, in a period of about thirty-five hours, more
than ninety miles—the greatest march that even Morgan had
ever made.
Feeling comparatively safe here, General Morgan permitted
the division to go into camp and remain during the night. One
great drawback upon our marches, was the inferiority of the Indiana
and Ohio horses for such service. After parting with our
Kentucky stock, the men were compelled to exchange constantly.[Pg 445]
Sometimes three or four times in twenty four hours. The horses
obtained were, not only unable to endure the hard riding for a
reasonable length of time, but they were also unshod and grew
lame directly. After leaving Williamsburg, we marched through
Piketon (Colonel Morgan was sent with his regiment by way of
Georgetown), Jackson, Vinton and Berlin (at which latter place
we had a skirmish with the militia), and several towns whose
names I have forgotten, as well as the order in which they came.
In the skirmish at Berlin, Tom Murphy, popularly known as
the “Wild Irishman,” and technically described by his officers as
the “goingest man” (in the advance-guard), was severely
wounded. Small fights with the militia were of daily occurrence.
They hung around the column, wounding two or three
men every day and sometimes killing one. We captured hundreds
of them daily, but could only turn them loose again after
destroying their guns.
On one occasion a very gallant fellow of the Second Kentucky,
Charlie Haddox, came upon five of them, who had made
some of the command prisoners. He captured them, in turn,
and brought them in. The prisoners who could be taken by
such men hardly deserved to be released. Two men distinguished
themselves very much as advance videttes, privates Carneal
Warfield and Burks. The latter frequently caused the capture
of parties of militia, without blood-shed on either side, by boldly
riding up to them, representing himself as one of the advance
guard of a body of Federal cavalry, and detaining them in conversation
until the column arrived. But it is impossible to recount
the one tenth part of the incidents of this nature which
occurred. At Wilkesville we halted again before nightfall, and
remained until 3 o’clock next morning. The militia, about this
time, turned their attention seriously to felling trees, tearing
up bridges, and impeding our progress in every conceivable
way. The advance guard was forced to carry axes to cut away
the frequent blockades. In passing near Pomeroy, on the 18th,
there was one continual fight, but, now, not with the militia[Pg 446]
only, for some regular troops made their appearance and took
part in the programme. The road we were traveling runs for
several miles at no great distance from the town of Pomeroy,
which is situated on the Ohio river. Many by-roads run from
the main one into the town, and at the mouths of these roads
we always found the enemy. The road runs, also, for nearly
five miles through a ravine, and steep hills upon each side of it.
These hills were occupied, at various points, by the enemy, and
we had to run the gauntlet. Colonel Grigsby took the lead
with the Sixth Kentucky, and dashed through at a gallop, halting
when fired on, dismounting his men and dislodging the
enemy, and again resuming his rapid march. Major Webber
brought up the rear of the division and held back the enemy,
who closed eagerly upon our track.
About 1 o’clock of that day we reached Chester and halted,
for an hour and a half, to enable the column to close up, to
breathe the horses, and also to obtain a guide, if possible (General
Morgan declaring that he would no longer march without
one). That halt proved disastrous—it brought us to Buffington
ford after night had fallen, and delayed our attempt at crossing
until the next morning.
Before quitting Ohio, it is but just to acknowledge the kind
hospitality of these last two days. At every house that we approached,
the dwellers thereof, themselves absent, perhaps unable
to endure a meeting that would have been painful, had left
warm pies, freshly baked, upon the tables. This touching attention
to our tastes was appreciated. Some individuals were
indelicate enough to hint that the pies were intended to propitiate
us and prevent the plunder of the houses.
We reached Portland, a little village upon the bank of the
river, and a short distance above Buffington Island, about 8 p.m.,
and the night was one of solid darkness. General Morgan
consulted one or two of his officers upon the propriety of at
once attacking an earthwork, thrown up to guard the ford.
From all the information he could gather, this work was manned[Pg 447]
with about three hundred infantry—regular troops—and two
heavy guns were mounted in it. Our arrival at this place after
dark had involved us in a dilemma. If we did not cross the
river that night, there was every chance of our being attacked
on the next day by heavy odds. The troops we had seen at
Pomeroy were, we at once and correctly conjectured, a portion
of the infantry which had been sent after us from Kentucky,
and they had been brought by the river, which had risen several
feet in the previous week, to intercept us. If transports could
pass Pomeroy, the General knew that they could also run up
to the bar at Buffington Island. The transports would certainly
be accompanied by gunboats, and our crossing could
have been prevented by the latter alone, because our artillery
ammunition was nearly exhausted—there was not more than
three cartridges to the piece, and we could not have driven off
gunboats with small arms. Moreover, if it was necessary, the
troops could march from Pomeroy to Buffington by an excellent
road, and reach the latter place in the morning. This they did.
General Morgan fully appreciated these reasons for getting
across the river that night, as did those with whom he advised,
but there were, also, very strong reasons against attacking the
work at night; and without the capture of the work, which
commanded the ford, it would be impossible to cross. The
night, as I have stated, was thoroughly dark. Attacks in the
dark are always hazardous experiments—in this case it would
have been doubly so. We knew nothing of the ground, and
could not procure guides. Our choice of the direction in which
to move to the attack would have been purely guess work. The
defenders of the work had only to lie still and fire with artillery
and musketry directly to their front, but the assailants would
have had a line to preserve, and would have had to exercise
great care lest they should fall foul of each other in the obscurity.
If this is a difficult business at all times, how much is
the danger and trouble increased when it is attempted with
broken-down and partially demoralized men?[Pg 448]
General Morgan feared, too, that if the attacking party was
repulsed, it would come back in such disorder and panic that
the whole division would be seriously and injuriously affected.
He determined, therefore, to take the work at early dawn and instantly
commence the crossing, trusting that it would be effected
rapidly and before the enemy arrived. By abandoning the long
train of wagons which had been collected, the wounded men,
and the artillery, a crossing might have been made, with little
difficulty, higher up the river at deeper fords, which we could
have reached by a rapid march before the enemy came near
them. But General Morgan was determined (after having already
hazarded so much) to save all if possible, at the risk of losing
all. He ordered me to place two regiments of my brigade in
position, as near the earthwork as I thought proper, and attack
it at daybreak. I accordingly selected the Fifth and Sixth
Kentucky, and formed them about four hundred yards from the
work, or from the point where I judged it to be located. Lieutenant
Lawrence was also directed to place his Parrots upon a
tongue of land projecting northward from a range of hills running
parallel with the river. It was intended that he should
assist the attacking party, if, for any reason, artillery should
be needed. Many efforts were made, during the night, to find
other fords, but unsuccessfully.
As soon as the day dawned, the Fifth and Sixth Kentucky
were moved against the work, but found it unoccupied. It had
been evacuated during the night. Had our scouts, posted to
observe it, been vigilant, and had this evacuation, which occurred
about two p.m., been discovered and reported, we could
have gotten almost the entire division across before the troops
coming from Pomeroy arrived. The guns in the work had been
dismounted and rolled over the bluff. I immediately sent Gen.
Morgan information of the evacuation of the work, and instructed
Colonel Smith to take command of the two regiments and move
some four or five hundred yards further on the Pomeroy road,
by which I supposed that the garrison had retreated. In a few[Pg 449]
minutes I heard the rattle of musketry in the direction that the
regiments had moved, and riding forward to ascertain what occasioned
it, found that Colonel Smith had unexpectedly come
upon a Federal force advancing upon this road. He attacked
and dispersed it, taking forty or fifty prisoners and a piece of
artillery, and killing and wounding several. This force turned
out to be General Judah’s advance guard, and his command was
reported to be eight or ten thousand strong, and not far off.
Among the wounded was one of his staff, and his Adjutant-General
was captured. I instructed Colonel Smith to bring the
men back to the ground where they had been formed to attack
the work, and rode myself to consult General Morgan and receive
his orders. He instructed me to hold the enemy in check,
and call for such troops as I might need for that purpose. This
valley which we had entered the night before, and had bivouacked
in, was about a mile long, and perhaps eight hundred yards
wide at the southern extremity (the river runs here nearly due
north and south), and gradually narrows toward the other end,
until the ridge, which is its western boundary, runs to the water’s
edge. This ridge is parallel with the river at the southern end
of the valley, but a few hundred yards further to the northward
both river and ridge incline toward each other. About half
way of the valley (equi-distant from either end) the road, by
which we had marched from Chester, comes in.
Colonel Smith had posted his men, in accordance with directions
given him, at the southern extremity of the valley, with
the ridge upon his right flank. At this point the ridge, I should
also state, bends almost at right angles to the westward. As I
returned from consultation with General Morgan, I found both
of the regiments under Colonel Smith in full retreat. When
the main body of the enemy (which was now close upon us) appeared,
an order had been issued by some one to “rally to horses.”
While doing this, the line was charged by the enemy’s cavalry,
of which they had three regiments, two of them, the Seventh
and Eighth Michigan, were very fine ones. A detachment of[Pg 450]
the Fifth Indiana (led by a very gallant officer, Lieutenant
O’Neil) headed this charge. The men rallied and turned, as
soon as called on to do so, and had no difficulty in driving back the
cavalry, but a portion of the Fifth Kentucky was cut off by this
charge, and did not take part in the fight which succeeded. These
two regiments were not more than two hundred and fifty strong
each, and they were dismounted again, and formed across the
valley. The Parrot guns had been captured, and, although our
line was formed close to them, they were not again in our possession.
I sent several couriers to General Morgan, asking for
the Second Kentucky, a portion of which I wished to post upon the
ridge, and I desired to strengthen the thin, weak line with the
remainder. Colonel’s Johnson’s rear videttes (still kept during
the night upon the Chester road) had a short time previously
been driven in, and he had formed his brigade to receive the
enemy coming from that direction. Colonel Johnson offered
me a detachment of his own brigade with which to occupy the
part of the ridge immediately upon my right—the necessity of
holding it was immediately apparent to him. Believing that
the Second Kentucky would soon arrive, I declined his offer.
The force advancing upon the Chester road was General Hobson’s,
which our late delays had permitted to overtake us.
Neither Judah nor Hobson was aware of the other’s vicinity,
until apprised of it by the sound of their respective guns. We
could not have defeated either alone, for Judah was several
thousand strong, and Hobson three thousand. We were scarcely
nineteen hundred strong, and our ammunition was nearly exhausted—either
shot away or worn out in the pouches or cartridge-boxes.
The men, had on an average, not more than five
rounds in their boxes. If, however, either Judah or Hobson had
attacked us singly, we could have made good our retreat, in
order, and with little loss.
The attack commenced from both directions, almost simultaneously,
and at the same time the gunboats steamed up and
commented shelling us without fear or favor. I heartily wished[Pg 451]
that their fierce ardor, the result of a feeling of perfect security,
could have been subjected to the test of two or three shots
through their hulls. They were working, as well as I could
judge, five or six guns, Hobson two, and Judah five or six.
The shells coming thus from three different directions, seemed
to fill the air with their fragments. Colonel Johnson’s line, confronting
Hobson, was formed at right angles to mine, and upon
the level and unsheltered surface of the valley, each was equally
exposed to shots aimed at the other. In addition to the infantry
deployed in front of my line, the ridge upon the right of it was
soon occupied by one of the Michigan regiments, dismounted
and deployed as skirmishers. The peculiar formation we were
forced to adopt, exposed our entire force engaged to a severe
cross fire of musketry. The Second Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee,
of the first brigade, were not engaged at all—nor the
Eight and Eleventh Kentucky, of the second brigade. These
regiments, however, were as completely under fire, in the commencement
of the action, as were the others which were protecting
the retreat.
The scene in the rear of the lines engaged, was one of indescribable
confusion. While the bulk of the regiments, which
General Morgan was drawing off, were moving from the field in
perfect order, there were many stragglers from each, who were
circling about the valley in a delirium of fright, clinging instinctively,
in all their terror, to bolts of calico and holding on to led
horses, but changing the direction in which they galloped, with
every shell which whizzed or burst near them. The long train
of wagons and ambulances dashed wildly in the only direction
which promised escape, and becoming locked and entangled with
each other in their flight, many were upset, and terrified horses
broke lose from them and plunged wildly through the mass.
Some of them in striving to make their way out of the valley, at
the northern end, ran foul of the section of howitzers attached
to the second brigade, and guns and wagons were rolled headlong
into the steep ravine. Occasionally a solid shot or shell[Pg 452]
would strike one and bowl it over like a tumbled ten-pin. All
this shelling did little damage, and only some twenty-odd men
were killed by the musketry—the enemy lost quite as many—but
the display of force against us, the cross fire, and our lack of
ammunition, seriously disheartened the men, already partially
demoralized by the great and unremitted fatigue.
The left flank of my line, between which and the river there
was an interval of at least three hundred yards, was completely
turned, and the Sixth Kentucky was almost surrounded. This
regiment (under the command of Major William Bullitt, an
officer of the calmest and most perfect bravery), behaved nobly.
It stood the heavy attack of the enemy like a bastion. At
length seeing that General Morgan had gotten out of the valley
with the rest of the division, Colonel Johnson and myself, upon
consultation, determined to withdraw simultaneously. We had
checked this superior force for more than half an hour—which,
as much as our assailants boasted of their victory, was quite as
good as an equal number of the best of them could have done
against such odds.
The men were remounted without confusion, and retreated in
column of fours from right of companies, and for quite a mile
in perfect order. The Sixth Kentucky formed to the “rear into
line” three times, and with empty guns, kept the pursuing
cavalry at bay. But when we neared the other end of the valley
and saw that there were but two avenues of escape from it—the
men broke ranks and rushed for them. In a moment, each was
blocked. The gunboats sought to rake these roads with grape—and
although they aimed too high to inflict much injury, the
hiss of the dreaded missiles increased the panic. The Seventh
Michigan soon came up and dashed pell-mell into the crowd of
fugitives. Colonel Smith, Captain Campbell, Captain Thorpe,
and myself, and some fifty other officers and men, were forced
by the charge of this regiment into a ravine on the left of the
road and soon afterward captured. Captain Thorpe saved me
from capture at an earlier date, only to ultimately share my fate.[Pg 453]
He had acted as Adjutant General of the First Brigade, since the
detachment of Captain Davis, and had performed all of his
duties with untiring assiduity and perfect efficiency. On this
day, there was allowed opportunity for the display of courage
only, and for that he was ever distinguished.
About seven hundred prisoners were taken from us in this
fight. Among the officers captured were Colonels Ward and
Morgan, Lieutenant Colonel Huffman, who was also severely
wounded, and Majors Bullock and Bullitt.
On the next day, the 20th, we were marched down the river
bank some ten miles to the transport which was to take us to
Cincinnati, and she steamed off as soon as we were aboard of
her. A portion of the Ninth Tennessee had been put across the
river, in a small flat, before the fight fairly commenced, and
these men, under command of Captain Kirkpatrick, pressed
horses and made their escape. Colonel Grigsby and Captain
Byrnes also crossed the river here, and succeeded in escaping.
Between eleven and twelve hundred men retreated with General
Morgan, closely pursued by Hobson’s cavalry—the indefatigable
Woolford, as usual, in the lead. Some three hundred of
the command crossed the river at a point about twenty miles
above Buffington. Colonel Johnson and his staff swam the river
here and got safely ashore, with the exception of two or three
of the latter, who were drowned in the attempt.
The arrival of the gun boats prevented the entire force from
crossing. General Morgan had gained the middle of the river,
and, having a strong horse, could have gained the other shore
without difficulty, but seeing that the bulk of his command would
be forced to remain on the Ohio side, he returned to it. At this
point, a negro boy named Box, a great favorite in the Second
Kentucky, thorough rebel and deeply impressed with a sense
of his own importance, entered the river and started across;
General Morgan called to him to return, fearing that he would
be drowned. “Marse John,” said Box, “If dey catches you,
dey may parole you, but if dis nigger is cotched in a free State[Pg 454]
he ain’t a gwine to git away while de war lasts.” He swam
the river safely although nearly run down by a gun boat. From
this time, for six days, it was a continual race and scramble.
That men could have endured it, after the previous exhausting
marches, is almost incredible.
The brigades were reorganized. Colonel Cluke was placed in
command of the second, Major Webber of the first, each was a
little more than four hundred strong. “The bold Cluke” had
need of all of his audacity and vigor during these six days of
trial. It is impossible for the reader to appreciate the true condition
in which these brave men were placed. Worn down by
tremendous and long sustained exertion, encompassed by a multitude
of foes, and fresh ones springing up in their path at every
mile, allowed no rest, but driven on night and day; attacked,
harassed, intercepted at every moment, disheartened by the disasters
already suffered—how magnificent was the nerve, energy
and resolution which enabled them to bear up against all this
and struggle so gallantly to the very last against capture.
Major Webber had long been suffering from a painful and exhausting
disease, and when he started upon the raid he could not
climb into his saddle without assistance. But he could not endure
the thought of being absent from such an expedition. He
was one of the very best officers in the Confederate cavalry, and
his ideas of duty were almost fanatical. All through the long
march to Buffington, he rode at the head of the “old regulars,”
without a murmur escaping his lips to tell of the pain which
paled his brave, manly face, but could not bend his erect form.
Of his conduct after the Buffington disaster, General Morgan,
and his comrades spoke in enthusiastic praise—one officer in describing
his unflinching steadiness called him the “Iron man.”
No description could do justice to these six days, and I will not
attempt one. One incident will serve to show how constantly
the enemy pressed the command. Once, when there seemed
leisure for it, General Morgan called a council of his officers.
While it was in session, the enemy were skirmishing with the[Pg 455]
advance and rear-guards of the column, and were upon both
flanks. A bullet struck within two inches of the General’s head,
while he was courteously listening to an opinion. When the
council was closed, General Morgan moved the column back toward
“Blennerhassett’s Island,” where he had previously attempted
to cross the river. Clouds of dust marked his march
(although he quitted the main road) and also the track of his
enemies, and in that way the exact position of all the columns
was known to each. That night he halted with a bold mountain
upon one side of him and the enemy on the other three. His
pursuers evidently thought that the morning would witness his
surrender, for they made no effort to force him to yield that
evening. But when night had fairly fallen and the camp fires
of his foes were burning brightly, he formed his men, partially
ascended the mountain, stole noiselessly and in single file along
its rough slope and by midnight was out of the trap, and again
working hard for safety.
Here is a description from Major Webber’s diary, of how
General Morgan eluded the enemy posted to ensnare him when
he should cross the Muskingum. He had been compelled to
drive off a strong force in order to obtain a crossing; after he
had crossed he found himself thus situated. “The enemy had
fallen back on all of the roads—guarding each one with a force
in ambush much larger than ours—and to make our way through
seemed utterly impossible; while Hobson had made his appearance
with a large force on the opposite bank of the Muskingham
so that to retrace our steps would be ruin. Finding every
road strongly guarded, and every hill covered with troops, it
would have been impossible for any one except Morgan to have
led a column out of such a place, and he did it by what the citizens
tell us, is the only place which a horse can go; and that
down a narrow pass leading up a narrow spring branch hundreds
of feet below the tops of the hills, the perpendicular sides of
which pressed closely on our horses as we passed in single file.
And then we went up another hill, or rather mountain side, up[Pg 456]
which nobody but a Morgan man could have carried a horse.
Up that hill, for at least one thousand feet, we led our tired
horses, where it seemed that a goat couldn’t climb, until we
reached the plain, and were soon in the rear of the enemy and
on our road again. Colonel Cluke who was in the rear lost two
men killed.
In looking around for a place to carry the column, Adjutant
S.F. McKee and two of our men ran into an ambuscade, and
were fired on, about thirty yards distant, by three hundred
men, without striking either of them or their horses.” But all
this brave, persistent effort, was unavailing. General Morgan
maintained his high spirit to the last, and seemed untouched by
the weariness which bore down every one else, but he was forced
at last to turn at bay, and a fresh disaster on the 26th, reducing
his command to two hundred and fifty men, and a fresh swarm
of enemies gathering around this remnant, left him no alternative
(in justice to his men) but surrender. I may be permitted
to mention (with natural pride), that the last charge made upon
this expedition, was made by Company C, of my old regiment,
the Second Kentucky, the “Regulars.” This company had
maintained its organization and discipline without any deterioration,
although greatly reduced in numbers. In this last fight,
it was ordered to charge a body of Federal cavalry, who were
dismounted and lay behind a worm fence, firing upon the column
with their Spencer rifles. Led by its gallant Captain, Ralph
Sheldon, one of the best of our best, officers, this company dashed
down upon the enemy. The tired horses breasted the fence,
without being able to clear it, knocking off the top rails. But
with their deadly revolvers our boys soon accomplished the
mission upon which they were sent.
General Morgan surrendered in a very peculiar manner. He
had, many days before, heard of the retreat of General Lee,
after Gettysburg, from Pennsylvania, and of the fall of Vicksburg.
In at least twenty towns through which we had passed,
in Indiana and Ohio, we had witnessed the evidences of the[Pg 457]
illuminations in honor of these events. He feared that, in consequence
of the great excess of prisoners thus coming in Federal
possession, the cartel (providing for the exchange of prisoners
and the paroling of the excess upon either side, within a
short period after their capture) would be broken. He was
anxious, therefore, to surrender “upon terms.” Aware that he
was not likely to get such terms as he wished, from any officer
of the regular troops that were pursuing him, unless he
might happen to hit upon Woolford, who was as noted for generosity
to prisoners (if he respected their prowess) as for vigor
and gallantry in the field, he looked around for some militia
officer who might serve his turn. In the extreme eastern part
of Ohio (where he now was), he came into the “district” of a
Captain Burbeck, who had his militia under arms. General
Morgan sent a message to Captain Burbeck, under flag of truce,
requesting an interview with him. Burbeck consented to meet
him, and, after a short conference, General Morgan concluded a
treaty with him, by which he (Morgan) engaged to take and
disturb nothing, and do no sort of damage in Burbeck’s district,
and Burbeck, on his part, covenanted to guide and escort Morgan
to the Pennsylvania line. After riding a few miles, side by
side, with his host, General Morgan, espying a long cloud of
dust rolling rapidly upon a course parallel with his own (about
a mile distant), and gaining his front, thought it was time to act.
So he interrupted a pleasant conversation, by suddenly asking
Burbeck how he would like to receive his (Morgan’s) surrender.
Burbeck answered that it would afford him inexpressible satisfaction
to do so. “But,” said Morgan, “perhaps you would not
give me such terms as I wish.” “General Morgan,” replied
Burbeck, “you might write your own terms, and I would grant
them.” “Very well, then,” said Morgan; “it is a bargain. I
will surrender to you.” He, accordingly, formally surrendered
to Captain Burbeck, of the Ohio militia, upon condition that
officers and men were to be paroled, the latter retaining their
horses, and the former horses and side-arms. When General[Pg 458]
Shackleford (Hobson’s second in command, and the officer who
was conducting the pursuit in that immediate region) arrived,
he at once disapproved this arrangement, and took measures to
prevent its being carried into effect. Some officers who had
once been Morgan’s prisoners, were anxious that it should be
observed, and Woolford generously interested himself to have it
done. The terms of this surrender were not carried out. The
cartel (as Morgan had anticipated) had been repudiated, and the
terms for which he had stipulated, under that apprehension,
were repudiated also.
Although this expedition resulted disastrously, it was, even
as a failure, incomparably the most brilliant raid of the entire
war. The purposes sought to be achieved by it were grander
and more important, the conception of the plan which should
regulate it, was more masterly, and the skill with which it was
conducted is unparalleled in the history of such affairs. It was
no ride across a country stripped of troops, with a force larger
than any it should chance to encounter.
It was not an expedition started from a point impregnably
garrisoned, to dash by a well marked path to another point occupied
by a friendly army. It differed from even the boldest of
Confederate raids, not only in that it was vastly more extended,
but also in the nerve with which the great natural obstacles
were placed between the little band with which it was
undertaken and home, and the unshrinking audacity with which
that slight force penetrated into a populous and intensely hostile
territory, and confidently exposed itself to such tremendous
odds, and such overwhelming disadvantages. Over one hundred
thousand men were in arms to catch Morgan (although not all
employed at one time and place), and every advantage in the
way of transporting troops, obtaining information, and disposing
forces to intercept or oppose him, was possessed by his enemy,
and yet his wily strategy enabled him to make his way to the
river, at the very point where he had contemplated recrossing
it when he started from, Tennessee; and he was prevented from
recrossing and effecting his escape (which would then have been
certain) only by the river having risen at a season at which it
had not risen for more than twenty years before.
The objects of the raid were accomplished. General Bragg’s
retreat was unmolested by any flanking forces of the enemy, and[Pg 460]
I think that military men, who will review all the facts, will
pronounce that this expedition delayed for weeks the fall of East
Tennessee, and prevented the timely reinforcement of Rosecrans
by troops that would otherwise have participated in the battle
of Chickamauga. It destroyed Morgan’s division, however, and
left but a remnant of the Morgan cavalry. The companies in
Kentucky became disintegrated—the men were either captured
or so dispersed that few were ever again available. Captain
Davis crossed into Indiana, with the two companies assigned
him, but failed to rejoin the division, and was surrounded by
overwhelming numbers, and himself and the greater part of his
command captured. Some of the men in those companies escaped—the
majority of them returned to the South, others
remained in Kentucky to “guerrilla.” Two fine companies of
the Ninth Tennessee, under Captains Kirkpatrick and Sisson,
crossed the river at Buffington; two companies of the Second
Kentucky, under Captains Lea and Cooper, effected a crossing a
day or two later. Besides these organized bodies of men, there
were stragglers from all the regiments to the number of three
or four hundred, who escaped. These men were collected by
Colonels Johnson and Grigsby, and marched through Western
Virginia to Morristown, in East Tennessee, where all that was
left of Morgan’s command was rendezvoused.
Although the consequences were so disastrous, although upon
the greater part of those who followed Morgan in this raid
was visited a long, cruel, wearisome imprisonment, there are
few, I imagine, among them who ever regretted it. It was a
sad infliction upon a soldier, especially upon one accustomed
to the life the “Morgan men” had led, to eat his heart in
the tedious, dreary prison existence, while the fight which he[Pg 461]
should have shared was daily growing deadlier. But to have,
in our turn, been invaders, to have carried the war north of the
Ohio, to have taught the people, who for long months had been
pouring invading hosts into the South, something of the agony
and terror of invasion—to have made them fly in fear from their
homes, although they returned to find those homes not laid in
ashes; to have scared them with the sound of hostile bugles,
although no signals were sounded for flames and destruction—these
luxuries were cheap at almost any price. It would have
been an inexpiable shame if, in all the Confederate army, there
had been no body of men found to carry the war, however
briefly, across the Ohio, and Morgan by this raid saved us, at
least, that disgrace.
One of the many articles which filled the Northern papers,
upon the disastrous termination of this expedition, prophetically
declared the true misfortune which would result to Morgan himself
from his ill-success to-wit: the loss of his unexampled prestige—hitherto
of itself a power adequate to ensure him victories,
but never to be recovered. This writer more sagacious, as well
as more fair than others of his class, said:
“The raid through Indiana and Ohio has proved an unfortunate
business to him and his command. His career, hitherto has
been dashing and brilliant, and but few rebel commanders had
won a higher reputation throughout the South. He had been
glorified by rebels in arms everywhere, but this last reckless adventure
will doubtless rob his name of half its potency. The
prestige of success is all powerful, while a failure is death to
military reputation. It would now be a difficult matter to rally
to his standard as many enthusiastic and promising young men,
who infatuated and misguided, joined him during the period of
his success. Many of them blindly seemed to entertain the opinion
that no reverse could befall him, and all he had to do was
to march along, and victory after victory would perch upon his
banner. They couldn’t even dream of a disaster or an end to
his triumphs. Many of them have already sadly and dearly paid[Pg 462]
for their infatuation, while others are doomed to a similar fate.
This remarkable raid, certainly the most daring of the war, is
about at an end. Morgan is trapped at last and his forces scattered,
and if he escapes himself it will only be as a fugitive. The
race he has run since crossing the Cumberland river, eluding the
thousands of troops which have been put upon his track, proved
him a leader of extraordinary ability. The object of the raid is
yet a mystery. Time alone will develop the plan, if plan there
was. Moving on with such a force, far from all support—at the
very time, too, that Bragg’s army was falling back and scattering—makes
the affair look like one of simple bravado, as if the
leader was willing to be captured, provided he could end his career
in a blaze of excitement created by his dash and daring.
But it is useless to speculate now. Broken into squads, some
few of his men will doubtless escape across the river, and make
their way singly to the Confederacy, to tell the story of their
long ride through Indiana and Ohio; but the power of the noted
partisan chieftain and his bold riders is a thing of the past.”
CHAPTER XV
The prisoners taken at Buffington were carried to Cincinnati
as rapidly as the low stage of water, and the speed of the little
boat, upon which we were placed, would permit. We were some
three days in making the trip. Fortunately for us, the officers
and men appointed to guard us, were disposed to ameliorate our
condition as much as possible. Our private soldiers, crowded
on the hurricane decks, were, of course, subjected to inconvenience,
but the wish of the guards was evidently to remedy it as
much as possible. This crowding enabled a number of them to
make their escape by leaping into the river at night, as the sentries
could not possibly detect or prevent their efforts at escape.
Captain Day, General Judah’s inspector, who was in immediate
charge of us, while he was rigidly careful to guard against
escape, showed us the most manly and soldierly courtesy. As
the only acknowledgment we could make him, the officers united
in requesting him to accept a letter which we severally signed,
declaring our appreciation of his kindness. We trusted that,
if he should ever be so unfortunate as to become a prisoner
himself, this evidence of his consideration for our situation
would benefit him.
It was habitually remarked that, in the first two years of the
war at least, there was a prevalent disposition among the men
of both armies who served in “the front,” to show courtesy to
prisoners. The soldiers who guarded us from Buffington to
Cincinnati were characterized by this spirit in an unusual degree,
and carried out this practice, which even those who neglect
it, approve, more thoroughly, I must say, than any troops I
had ever seen. We met with treatment so different, afterward,
that we had occasion to remember and compare. For my own
part, I was more than once compelled, during my long and[Pg 464]
chequered imprisonment, to express my sense of courteous and
considerate treatment; and, as I believe, that a gentleman ought
not to say, at any time or in any event, that which he can not
unhesitatingly confirm, however changed may be the circumstances
(every legitimate ruse-de-guerre, being, of course, an
exception), I shall take great pains, in the course of this chapter,
to specify wherein and by whom such treatment was accorded
me, or my comrades. I am aware that this is not customary,
and the contrary habit, may have become an established canon
of this sort of literature, the violation of which will occasion
grave criticism. But my own people will appreciate my explanation.
I should have accepted no kindness at the hands of
my captors; I ought to have repelled every courtesy offered me,
if clearly prompted by a generous and manly spirit; if I were
capable of altogether omitting mention of such acts, in a description,
purporting to be truthful and accurate, of my prison experience.
In all else, my readers may rest assured that the rule shall be
observed. He would be a poor-spirited prisoner, who would not
tell all the mean things he knows about his jailors, and since
Wirtz was hung, at any rate, such gentry have become fair
game.
When we arrived at Cincinnati, we met with a grand ovation.
The fact that none of the citizens had come out to meet us, when
we marched around the city, had caused us to conceive a very
erroneous impression regarding them. They pressed closely
upon the guard of soldiers who were drawn up around us, as
we were marched through the streets to the city prison, and
attempted many demonstrations of their feeling toward us.
There seemed to be little sympathy between the soldiers and the
populace. The former muttered pretty strong expressions of
disgust for the previous tameness and present boldness of the
latter, and once or twice when jostled, plied their bayonets. The
privates were immediately sent to camps Morton and Douglass.
The officers were kept at the city prison in Cincinnati for three[Pg 465]
days. During that time, we were reinforced by a good many
others, taken in the two or three days which, succeeded Buffington
fight.
On the last day of our sojourn here, we learned of General
Morgan’s capture. We had hoped and almost felt confident,
that he would escape.
We were removed from this prison on the second of July (or
within a day or two of that date), and taken to Johnson’s Island.
At every station on the railroad, from Cincinnati to Sandusky,
large and enthusiastic crowds assembled to greet us. The
enthusiasm, however, was scarcely of a nature to excite agreeable
emotions in our bosoms. There seemed to be “universal
suffrage” for our instant and collective execution, and its propriety
was promulgated with much heat and emphasis. A
change seemed to have come over the people of Ohio in the
past two weeks. In our progress through the State, before our
capture, the people left their homes—apparently from a modest
disinclination to see us. But, now, they crowded to stare at us.
When we reached Sandusky, we were transferred to a small
steam tug, and, in twenty minutes, were put across the arm of
the lake which separates Johnson’s Island from the main land.
We were marched, as soon as landed, to the adjutant’s office,
and after roll-call, and a preliminary scrutiny to ascertain if we
had money or weapons upon our persons, although it was, perhaps,
the strict rule to search—the word of each man in our
party was taken—we were introduced into the prison inclosure.
It was the custom, in those days, in the various prisons for the
older inmates to collect about the gates of the “Bull-pen” when
“Fresh fish,” as every lot of prisoners just arrived were termed,
were brought in, and inspect them. We, consequently, met a
large crowd of unfortunate rebels, when we entered, in which were
not a few acquaintances, and some of our own immediate comrades.
The first man I saw, or, at least, the first one to whom
my attention was attracted, was First Lieutenant Charles Donegan,
of the Second Kentucky. He had been a private in the[Pg 466]
heroic Fourth Alabama, and, when his term of service had
expired in that regiment, he “joined Morgan,” becoming a
private in Company A, of the “old squadron.” When the
Second Kentucky was organized, he was made a non-commissioned
officer, and was shortly afterward promoted to First
Lieutenant for gallantry, excellent conduct, and strict attention
to duty. In the prison he met with his old comrades of the Army
of Northern Virginia, and was prompt to welcome all of the
“Morgan men” who “happened in,” and to initiate them in the
art of making life in a prison endurable. A few months before,
I had visited his father, one of the most hospitable men in
Huntsville, famed for that virtue, and he charged me with a
message to “Charlie,” which I delivered in the barracks at
Johnson’s Island. Lieutenant Donegan remained in prison
more than twenty months—one of those men whose patient
heroism will never be justly appreciated.
It is only by citing personal instances of this kind, that the
history of the Southern soldiery can be written so that it will
be understood.
The Gettysburg prisoners had arrived, only a few days before,
and from them we heard the first intelligible account of the
great battle. Not a whit was the courage and fire of these
gallant representatives of the army of heroes abated. They
seemed to have perfect faith in the invincibility of their comrades,
and they looked for the millenium to arrive, much sooner,
than for serious discomfiture to befall “Uncle Robert.”
Johnson’s Island was the most agreeable prison I ever saw—which
is much as if a man were to allude to the pleasantest dose
of castor oil he ever swallowed. However, there is little doubt
but that it would have been pleasant (for a short time), if it had
not been a prison. The climate in the summer is delightful, and
the prospect highly gratifying—except to a man who would like
to escape and can not swim. The winters, there, are said to have
been very severe—but then the barracks were open and airy.
We, who were shortly afterward transferred to the Ohio Peniten[Pg 467]tiary,
thought and spoke of Johnson’s Island as (under the circumstances),
a very “desirable location.” The rations were
good, and we were permitted to purchase any thing we wished
from the sutler. As we were there only four days, however, it
is possible that some others who remained nearly two years,
may be right in contending that the regime (in process of
time), underwent some change.
It was not uncommon to hear men say, that they would rather
be sent to that locality which is conceded by all sects to be exceedingly
uncomfortable, than go again to Johnson’s Island—but
a shuddering recollection of the bitter winter weather, evidently
induced the preference. After remaining at Johnson’s
Island four days, some forty of us were called for one morning,
and bidden to prepare for departure—whither we were not informed.
But our worst fears were realized, when we were taken
off of the cars at Columbus and marched to the penitentiary.
The State of Ohio claimed Morgan and his officers, as her peculiar
property—because we had been captured on her soil by
Michiganders, Kentuckians, etc., and demanded us, that we might
be subjected to the same treatment which she inflicted upon her
felons. It was rumored, also, that Colonel Streight, an Ohio
officer, captured by Forrest, had been placed in the penitentiary
in Georgia, and we were told that we were being penitentiaried in
retaliation. It turned out subsequently that Colonel Streight was
treated precisely as the other prisoners in the South, but the
Governor of Ohio having gotten hold of a batch of Confederate
soldiers, captured for him by troops from other States, was disposed
to make the most of them, and would not consent to let
them out of his hands.
Two men figured in the “Ohio raid” and the subsequent
treatment of the raiders, with a peculiar eclat. The Commander-in-Chief
of the department, who prepared to flee from the city
where his headquarters were established, upon the approach of
two thousand wearied men, whom with an army of fine troops he
could not stop—was one of them. The other was the Governor[Pg 468]
of a State he could not defend; but who could torture if he could
not fight. Burnside turned us over to Todd—but instructed
that, “these men shall be subjected to the usual prison discipline.”
He could part with his prisoners and enjoin, in doing
so, that they be treated as convicted felons. But his name would
blister the tongue of a brave man, and I should apologize for
writing it.
When we entered this gloomy mansion of “crime and woe,”
it was with misery in our hearts, although an affected gaiety of
manner. We could not escape the conviction, struggle against
it as we would, that we were placed there to remain while the
war lasted, and most of as believed that the war would outlast
the generation. We were told, when we went in, that we “were
there to stay,” and there was something infernal in the gloom
and the massive strength of the place, which seemed to bid us
“leave all hope behind.” While we were waiting in the hall, to
which we were assigned, before being placed in our cells, a convict,
as I supposed, spoke to me in a low voice from the grated
door of one of the cells already occupied. I made some remark
about the familiarity of our new friends on short acquaintance,
when by the speaker’s peculiar laugh I recognized General Morgan.
He was so shaven and shorn, that his voice alone was recognizable,
for I could not readily distinguish his figure. We
were soon placed in our respective cells and the iron barred
doors locked. Some of the officers declared subsequently, that
when left alone, and the eyes of the keepers were taken off of
them, they came near swooning. It was not the apprehension
of hardship or harsh treatment that was so horrible; it was the
stifling sense of close cramped confinement. The dead weight
of the huge stone prison seemed resting on our breasts. On the
next day we were taken out to undergo some of the “usual
prison discipline,” and were subjected to a sort of dress-parade.
We were first placed man by man, in big hogsheads filled with
water (of which there were two), and solemnly scrubbed by a
couple of negro convicts. This they said was done for sanitary[Pg 469]
reasons. The baths in the lake at Johnson’s Island were much
pleasanter, and the twentieth man who was ordered into either
tub, looked ruefully at the water, as if he thought it had already
done enough for health. Then we were seated in barber chairs,
our beards were taken off, and the officiating artists were ordered
to give each man’s hair “a decent cut.” We found that
according to the penitentiary code, the decent way of wearing
the hair was to cut it all off—if the same rule had been adopted
with regard to clothing, the Digger Indians would have been
superfluously clad in comparison with (what would have been),
our disheveled condition. Some young men lost beards and
moustaches on this occasion, which they had assiduously cultivated
with scanty returns, for years. Colonel Smith had a
magnificent beard sweeping down to his waist, patriarchal in all
save color—it gave him a leonine aspect that might have awed
even a barber. He was placed in the chair, and in less time,
perhaps, than Absalom staid on his mule after his hair brought
him to grief, he was reduced to ordinary humanity. He felt his
loss keenly. I ventured to compliment him on features which I
had never seen till then, and he answered, with asperity, that it
was “no jesting matter.”
When we returned to the hall, we met General Morgan, Colonel
Cluke, Calvin Morgan, Captain Gibson, and some twenty-six
others—our party numbered sixty-eight in all. General Morgan
and most of the officers who surrendered with him, had been
taken to Cincinnati and lodged in the city prison (as we had
been), with the difference, that we had been placed in the upper
apartments (which were clean), and he and his party were confined
in the lower rooms, in comparison with which the stalls of
the Augean stables were boudoirs. After great efforts, General
Morgan obtained an interview with Burnside, and urged that
the terms upon which he had surrendered should be observed,
but with no avail. He and the officers with him, were taken directly
from Cincinnati to the Ohio Penitentiary, and had been
there several days when we (who came from Johnson’s Island),[Pg 470]
arrived. It is a difficult thing to describe, so that it will be
clearly understood, the interior conformation of any large building,
and I will have to trust that my readers will either catch a
just idea of the subject from a very partial and inadequate description,
or that they will regard it as a matter of little importance
whether or no they shall understand the internal plan and
structure of the Ohio State Prison. For my purpose, it is only
necessary that the architecture of one part of it shall be understood.
Let the reader imagine a large room (or rather wing of
a building), four hundred feet in length, forty-odd in width, and
with a ceiling forty-odd feet in hight. One half of this wing,
although separated from the other by no traverse wall, is called
the “East Hall.”
In the walls of this hall are cut great windows, looking out
upon one of the prison yards. If the reader will further
imagine a building erected in the interior of this hall and reaching
to the ceiling, upon each side of which, and between its walls
and the walls of the hall, are alleys eleven feet wide and running
the entire length of the hall, and at either extremity of this
building, spaces twenty feet in width—he will have conceived a
just idea of that part of the prison in which General Morgan and
his officers were confined. In the interior building the cells are
constructed—each about three feet and a half wide and seven
feet long. The doors of the cells—a certain number of which
are constructed in each side of this building—open upon the
alleys which have been described. At the back of each, and of
course separating the ranges of cells upon the opposite sides of
the building, is a hollow space reaching from the floor to the
ceiling, running the whole length of the building, and three or
four feet wide. This space is left for the purpose of obtaining
more thorough ventillation, and the back wall of every cell is
perforated with a hole, three or four inches in diameter, to admit
the air from this passage.
We were placed in the cells constructed in that face of the
building which looks toward the town. No convicts were quar[Pg 471]tered
in the cells on that side, except on the extreme upper
tiers, but the cells on the other side of the building were all occupied
by them. The cells are some seven feet in hight, and
are built in ranges, or tiers, one above the other. They are
numbered, range first, second, third, and so on—commencing at
the lower one. The doors are grates of iron—the bars of which
are about an inch and a quarter wide, and half an inch thick, and
are, perhaps, two inches apart, leaving, as they are placed upright
and athwart, open spaces of two inches square between
them. In front of each range of cells were balconies three feet
wide, and ladders led from each one of these to the other just
above it.
We were permitted to exercise, during the day, in the alley
in front of our cells, although prohibited from looking out of the
windows. Twice a day we were taken to meals, crossing (when we
went to breakfast) a portion of the yard, before mentioned, and
passing through the kitchen into the large dining-hall of the institution.
Here, seated at tables about two feet wide and the
same distance apart, a great many prisoners could be fed at the
same time. We were not allowed to breakfast and dine with
the convicts, or they were not allowed to eat with us—I could
never learn exactly how it was. We crossed the yard, on the
way to breakfast, for the purpose of washing our faces, which
was permitted by the prison regulations, but a certain method
of doing it was prescribed. Two long troughs were erected and
filled with water. The inhabitants of the First Range washed
in one trough, and those of the Second Range used the other.
We soon obtained permission to buy and keep our own towels.
In returning from breakfast, and in going to and returning from
dinner, we never quitted the prison building, but marched through
a wing of the dining-room back to the long wing, in one end of
which was our hall.
At seven p.m. in summer (earlier afterward), we were required
to go to our respective cells at the tap of the turnkey’s
key on the stove, and he passed along the ranges and locked us[Pg 472]
in for the night. In a little while, then, we would hear the
steady, rolling tramp of the convicts, who slept in the hall at
the other end of the wing, as they marched in with military
step and precision, changing after awhile from the sharp clatter
of many feet simultaneously striking the stone floor to the hurried,
muffled rattle of their ascent (in a trot) of the stairways.
Then when each had gained his cell, and the locking-in commenced,
the most infernal clash and clang, as huge bolts were
fastened, would be heard that ever startled the ear of a sane man.
When Satan receives a fresh lot of prisoners, he certainly must
torture each half by compelling it to hear the other locked into
cells with iron doors.
The rations furnished us for the first ten days were inferior
to those subsequently issued. The food allowed us, although
exceedingly coarse, was always sufficiently abundant. After
about ten days the restriction, previously imposed, preventing
us from purchasing or receiving from our friends articles edible,
or of any other description, was repealed, and we were allowed
to receive every thing sent us. Our Kentucky friends had been
awaiting this opportunity, and for fear that the privilege would
be soon withdrawn, hastened to send cargoes of all sorts of food
and all kinds of dainties. For a few days we were almost surfeited
with good things, and then the trap fell. When piles of
delicacies were stacked up in his office, the Warden of the prison,
Captain Merion, confiscated all to his own use, forbade our receiving
any thing more, and rather than the provisions should
be wasted, furnished his own table with them.
For several weeks one or two soldiers were habitually kept
in the hall with us, during the day. The turnkey, who was the
presiding imp in that wing—the ghoul of our part of the catacombs—was
rarely absent, but passed back and forth, prying
and suspicious. Scott (familiarly Scotty) was the name of the
interesting creature who officiated as our immediate keeper, for
the first four months of our confinement in this place. He was
on duty only during the day. At night a special guard went[Pg 473]
the rounds. The gas-burners, with which each cell was furnished,
were put into use as soon as we were locked up, and we
were allowed (for a time) to burn candles for an hour after the
hour for which the gas was turned on had expired. We were
permitted to buy books and keep them in our cells, and for some
weeks were not restricted in the number of letters which we
might write. Indeed for a period of nearly three months our
condition was uncomfortable only on account of the constant
confinement within the walls of the prison—the lack of exercise,
and sun-light, and free air, and the penning up at night in the
close cells. To a man who has never been placed in such a situation,
no words can convey the slightest idea of its irksomeness.
There was not one of us who would not have eagerly
exchanged for the most comfortless of all the prisons, where he
could have spent the days in the open air, and some part of the
time have felt that the eyes of the gaolers were not upon him.
Every conceivable method of killing time, and every practical
recreation was resorted to. Marbles were held in high estimation
for many days, and the games were played first, and discussed
subsequently with keen interest. A long ladder, which
had been left in the hall, leaning against the wall, was a perfect
treasure to those who most craved active exercise. They practiced
all sorts of gymnastics on this ladder, and cooled the fever
in their blood with fatigue. Chess finally became the standard
amusement, and those who did not understand the game watched
it nevertheless with as much apparent relish as if they understood
it. Chess books were bought and studied as carefully as
any work on tactics had ever been by the same men, and groups
would spend hours in discussing this gambit and that, and an
admiring audience could always be collected at one end of the
hall to hear how Cicero Coleman had just checkmated an antagonist
at the other, by a judicious flank movement with his
“knight,” or some other active and effective piece.
In spite, however, of every effort to sustain health and spirits,
both suffered. The most robust could not endure the life to[Pg 474]
which we were condemned, without injury. I am satisfied that
hard labor—furnishing at once occupation and exercise—alone
prevents the inmates of these prisons (sentenced to remain so
many years, as some of them are) from dying early. The effect
of this confinement is strange, and will doubtless appear inconsistent.
It affected every man of our party with (at the same
time) a lethargy and a nervousness. While we were physically
and mentally impaired by it—and every faculty was dulled, and
all energy was sapped—every man was restless without aim or
purpose, and irritable without cause or reason. These effects
of imprisonment became far more apparent and difficult to repress,
after a few months had elapsed.
The method adopted in the Ohio Penitentiary, for punishing
the refractory and disobedient, was to confine them in cells
called the “dungeons”—and dungeons indeed they were. Captain
Foster Cheatham was the first man, of our party, who explored
their recesses. His private negotiations, with one of
the military guard, for liquids of stimulating properties (which
he thought would benefit his health) were not only unsuccessful,
but were discovered by the “Head-devil,” and the Captain was
dragged to a “loathsome dungeon.” He remained twenty-four
hours and came out wiser, on the subject of prison discipline,
and infinitely sadder than when he went in. The next victim
was Major Higley. One of the keepers was rough to him, and
Higley used strong language in return. Disrespectful language
to, or about, officials was not tolerated in the institution, and
Higley “came to grief.” He also remained in the dungeon for
the space of a solar day. He was a man of lean habit and excitable
temperament, when in his best state of health—and he
returned from the place of punishment, looking like a ghost of
dissipated habits and shattered nervous system. Pale and shaking—he
gave us a spirited and humorous account of his interview
with the superior gaolers, and his experience in the dark
stifling cell.
It was claimed that while punishment was invariably inflicted[Pg 475]
for violation of the rules, those rules were clearly defined. That
no man need infringe the regulations—that every one could (if
he chose) avoid punishment. An incident happened which did
not strongly corroborate this beautiful theory. Shortly after
Major Higley’s misfortune, Captain Cheatham was again honored
with an invitation to inspect the dungeons, and take up his
quarters in one of them. He, with great modesty, protested
that he had done nothing to deserve such a distinction, but his
scruples were overruled and he was induced to go. The offense
charged was this: An anonymous letter had been picked up in
the hall—in which the prison officials were ridiculed. Merion
fancied that the handwriting of this letter resembled Cheatham’s—there
was no other evidence. So far as the proof went,
there was as much right to attribute it to one of the prison
corps as to one of the prisoners, and to any other one of the
prisoners as to Cheatham. After he was placed in the dungeon,
where he remained forty-eight hours, and it became known upon
what charge, and that he denied it, General Morgan first, and
soon many others, demanded that, if another prisoner had written
the letter, he should own it and suffer for it. There was
not a man in the sixty-eight of our party (with four exceptions)
who would have permitted a comrade to be punished for an offense
committed by himself.
It was never known who wrote the letter. Captain Cheatham
always denied having done so. So justice was not always so
impartially administered in the sacrificial temple of the Ohio
law, and the governed had it not always in their power to escape
punishment.
After we had been in the penitentiary some three or four
weeks, Colonel Cluke and another officer were taken out and
sent to McLean barracks, to be tried by court-martial upon the
charge of having violated some oath, taken before they entered
the Confederate service. They were acquitted and Colonel
Cluke was sent to Johnson’s Island, where during the ensuing[Pg 476]
winter he died of diphtheria. He was exceedingly popular in the
division, and was a man of the most frank, generous and high-toned
nature. But he possessed some high soldierly qualities.
In the field, he was extremely bold and tenacious—and when
threatened by a dangerous opponent, no one was more vigilant
and wary. He displayed great vigor and judgment on many
occasions, both as a regimental and brigade commander.
The news of his death excited universal sorrow among his comrades.
Shortly before Colonel Cluke’s removal, Major Webber and
Captains Sheldon and McCann had been brought to the penitentiary
from Camp Chase. They, of course, declined the tonsorial
ceremonies and were remanded to Camp Chase. In the course
of two or three weeks Captains Bennett and Merriwether, of
the Tenth Kentucky, were sent from Camp Chase to the penitentiary,
for having attempted to make their escape, and with
them came Captain Sheldon again, for the same offense. This
time no questions were asked, but hair and beards came off.
Somewhat later, Major Webber was sent back also. He was
placed in solitary confinement, in a cell in a remote part of the
prison, and permitted to hold no intercourse with the rest of us.
The reason of his receiving this treatment, was that he had
written a letter in which occurred the following passage: “I
can’t say how long I will be a prisoner. Until the end of time;
yes, until eternity has run its last round, rather than that our
Government shall acknowledge the doctrine of negro equality,
by an exchange of negro soldiers. I wish that all negroes, and
their officers captured with them, will be hung, I am willing to
risk the consequences.” Webber unhesitatingly confirmed this
language, stating that he had, from the commencement of the
war, entertained such sentiments, and that he felt his right to
express them as a prisoner of war, as well as in any other condition.
He claimed that the very fact that the letters of all
prisoners were examined, and suppressed if disapproved by the[Pg 477]
officer appointed to examine them, gave the prisoners a right to
use such language as they chose. If the language was thought
improper, the letter could be burned, and no one but the examiner
would be any the wiser. This would seem to be the correct
and manly view to take of the matter. If a prisoner were
detected in clandestine correspondence, it was, perhaps, right
and fair that he should be punished, but I do not believe that in
any army whose officers are, for the most part gentlemen, a
man would be countenanced, who would cause prisoners to send
letters to his office for perusal, with the understanding that they
should be suppressed if disapproved, and would then punish the
prisoner who wrote sentiments which did not accord with his own.
There were officers in position at Camp Chase, when I was
sent there some months afterward, who, I believe, could have
been induced by no combination of influences to do such a thing,
or to tolerate the man who would do it.
Major Webber’s description of his initiation into prison usages
is very graphic, and as many of my readers know him, it will
be highly amusing to them, although any thing but amusing to
the Major. He says: “In the office of the penitentiary, I was
stripped of my clothing and closely searched. Everything in
the way of papers, knife, money, toothpick, and even an old
buckeye, which I had carried in my pocket all through the war,
at the request of a friend, were taken from me. I was then
marched to the wash-room, stripped again, and placed in a tub
of warm water, about waist deep, where a convict scrubbed me
with a large, rough, horse brush and soap; while a hang-dog
looking scoundrel, and the deputy-warden Dean, urged the convict
to ‘scrub the d—d horse-thief,’ and indulged in various
demoniacal grins and gesticulations of exultation at my sufferings
and embarrassment.” The Major describes “his feelings,”
in the strong language of which he never lacked command; but
it is unnecessary to quote from him farther—there is no man,
so devoid of imagination, that he can not divine what the
patients’ feeling must have been under such treatment.[Pg 478]
When two or three months had elapsed, General Morgan’s
impatience of the galling confinement and perpetual espionage
amounted almost to frenzy. He restrained all exhibition of his
feelings remarkably, but it was apparent to his fellow prisoners
that he was chafing terribly under the restraint, more irksome
to him than to any one of the others.
The difficulty of getting letters from our families and friends in
the South, was one of the worst evils of this imprisonment; and if a
letter came containing anything in the least objectionable, it was,
as likely as not, destroyed, and the envelope only was delivered
to the man to whom it was written. Generally, the portion of
its contents, which incurred Merion’s censure, having been erased,
it was graciously delivered, but more than once a letter which
would have been valued beyond all price, was altogether withheld,
and the prisoner anxiously expecting it, was mocked, as I
have stated, with being given the envelope in which it came, as
evidence that he was robbed of it. The reader can imagine the
feelings of a man, whose wife and children were in far off
“Dixie,” while he lay in prison tortured with anxiety to hear
from them, and who, when the letter which told of them at last
came, should be deprived of it because it contained some womanly
outburst of feeling, and should be tantalized with the evidence
of his loss.
The introduction of newspapers was strictly forbidden,
except when Merion, as a great favor, would send in some outrageously
abusive sheet, in which was published some particularly
offensive lie. If the newspapers, which the convicts who occasionally
passed through our hall in the transaction of their
duties, some times smuggled into us, were discovered in any
man’s hands or cell, woe be unto him—a first class sinner could
be easier prayed out of purgatory, than he could avoid the
dungeon.
Captain Calvin Morgan was once reading a newspaper, that
had “run the blockade,” in his cell at night, and had become[Pg 479]
deeply interested in it, when the “night guard,” stealing along
with noiseless step, detected him.
The customary taps (by the occupants of the other cells who
discovered his approach and thus telegraphed it along the
range) had been (this time) neglected. “What paper is that,”
said the guard. “Come in and see,” said Morgan. “No,” said
the guard, “you must pass it to me through the bars.” “I’ll
do nothing of the kind,” was the answer. “If you think that
I have a paper which was smuggled into me, why unlock the
door, come in, and get it.” The fellow apparently did not like
to trust himself in the cell with Captain Morgan, who was much
the more powerful man of the two, and he hastened off for reinforcements.
During his absence Morgan rolled the paper up
into a small compass, and, baring his arm, thrust it far up into
the ventillator at the back part of the cell. Fortunately there
was in the cell a newspaper given him that day by one of the
sub-wardens named Hevay—a very kind old man. Morgan unfolded
this paper and was seated in the same attitude (as when
first discovered) reading it, when the guard returned. The latter
brought Scott with him and unlocked the door. “Now give me
that paper,” he said. “There it is,” said Morgan handing it to
him, “Old man Hevay gave it to me to-day.” The guard inspected
it closely and seemed satisfied. “Why did you not give
it to me before,” he asked. “Because,” returned Captain Morgan,
“I thought you had no right to ask it, and I had, moreover
no assurance that you would return it.” With a parting
injunction to do so no more, or the dungeon would reveal him its
secrets, the guard after a thorough search to find another paper
(if there should have been a deception practiced upon him) left
the cell. He examined the ventillator, but Morgan’s arm being
the longer the paper was beyond his reach. Captain Morgan’s
literary pursuits were suspended, however, for that night.
When the news of the battle of Chickamauga was coming in,
and we were half wild with excitement and eagerness to learn
the true aversion of the reports that prevailed—for every thing[Pg 480]
told us by the prison officials was garbled—we by good luck got
in two or three newspapers containing full accounts of the battle.
I shall never forget listening to them read, in General Morgan’s
cell, while four or five pickets (regularly relieved) were posted
to guard against surprise. These papers were read to the whole
party in detachments—while one listened, the succeeding one
awaited its turn in nervous impatience. As I have said, General
Morgan grew more restless under his imprisonment, every
day, and finally resolved to effect his escape, at any hazard, or
labor.
Several plans were resolved and abandoned, and at length one
devised by Captain Hines was adopted. This was to “tunnel”
out of the prison—as the mode of escape by digging a trench,
to lead from the interior to the outside of the prisons, was technically
called. But to “tunnel” through the stone pavement
and immense walls of the penitentiary—concealing the tremendous
work as it progressed—it required a bold imagination to
conceive such an idea. Hines had heard, in some way, a hint
of an air chamber, constructed under the lower range of cells—that
range immediately upon the ground floor. He thought it
probable that there was such a chamber, for he could account in
no other way for the dryness of the cells in that range. At the
first opportunity he entered into conversation with Old Hevay,
the deputy-warden mentioned before. This old man was very
kind-hearted, and was also an enthusiast upon the subject of the
architectural grandeur of that penitentiary. Hines led the conversation
into that channel, and finally learned that his surmise
was correct. If, then, he could cut through the floor of his cell
and reach this air chamber, without detection, he would have, he
saw, an excellent base for future operations. He communicated
his plan to General Morgan, who at once approved it. Five
other men were selected (whose cells were on the first range)
as assistants.
The work was commenced with knives abstracted from the
table. These knives—square at the end of the blade instead of[Pg 481]
pointed—made excellent chisels, and were the very best tools
for the inauguration of the labor. Putting out pickets to prevent
surprise, they pecked and chiseled away at the hard floor,
which was eighteen inches thick of stone cement and brick—concealing
the rubbish in their handkerchiefs and then throwing
part of it into the stoves, and hiding the rest in their beds.
They soon dug a hole in the floor large enough to permit the
body of a man to pass. The iron bedsteads, which stood in
each cell, could be lifted up or let down at pleasure. Hines
would prop his up, each morning, sweep out his cell (in which
the aperture had been cut) and throw a carpet sack carelessly
over the mouth of the shaft he had sunk, and when the guard
would come and look in, every thing would appear so neat and
innocent, that he would not examine further. One kick given
that hypocritical carpet bag (with its careless appearance) would
have disclosed the plot, at any time from the date of the inception
of the work to its close. After the air chamber was
reached, a good many others were taken into the secret, in order
that the work might go constantly on.
The method adopted, then, was for two or three to descend
and go to work, while the others kept watch; in an hour or two
a fresh relief would be put on, and the work would be kept up
in this way throughout the day, until the hour of locking up arrived,
except at dinner time, when every man who was absent
from the table had to give a reason for his absence. The work,
conducted underground, was tedious and difficult, but all labored
with a will. The candles which had been purchased and hoarded
away, now did good service. Without them it would have been
almost impossible to finish the task. A code of signals was invented
to meet every possible contingency. By pounding a
bar of wood upon the stone floor, those above communicated to
those underneath information of every danger which threatened,
and called on them to come forth, if necessary. The walls of
the air chamber were two or three feet thick, and built of huge
stones. Two or three of these stones were removed, and a tun[Pg 482]nel
was run straight to the outer wall of the hall. Fortune
favored the workmen, at this juncture, and threw in their way
an adequate tool with which to accomplish this part of their
work. Some one had discovered lying in the yard through which
we passed on our way to breakfast, an old rusty spade with a
broken handle. It was at once determined that the said spade
must be secured. Accordingly men were detailed and instructed
in their proper parts, and at the first opportunity the spade was
transferred to the air chamber, and put to work in digging the tunnel.
This is the manner in which that valuable, that priceless,
old, rusty, broken spade was gotten: One man was selected to
secrete the spade about his person—him I will call No. 1. He
wore, for the occasion, a long, loose sack coat. Six or seven
other men were his accomplices. It was a usual occurrence for
those who were awaiting their turns at the washing troughs, to
romp and scuffle with each other in the yard. The conspirators
were, this morning, exceedingly frolicsome. At length No. 1
fell, apparently by an accident, upon the spade, his accomplices
tumbled in a heap upon him. No. 1 dexterously slipped the
spade under his coat, and buttoned it up. He went into breakfast
with it, and sat wonderfully straight, and carried it safely
into the hall and down into the air chamber.
When the main wall of the hall was reached, the heavy stones
of its foundation were removed in sufficient number to admit of
the passage of a man. But it was then discovered that the tunnel
led right under an immense coal pile. It was necessary that
this difficulty should be remedied; but how? Without a view
of the ground just outside of the wall, no one could calculate
how far, or in what direction to run the tunnel, so that when it
was conducted to the surface, all obstructions might be avoided.
In this emergency, General Morgan engaged Scott in conversation
about the remarkable escape of some convicts, which had
occurred a year or two previously, and which Scott was very
fond of describing. These convicts had climbed by the balconies,
in front of the ranges of cells, to the ceiling, and had passed out[Pg 483]
through the skylight to the roof of the prison. Scott declared
his belief that there were no two other men on the continent
who could perform the feat of ascending by the balconies.
“Why,” says General Morgan, “Captain Sam. Taylor, small
as he is, can do it.”
Thereupon a discussion ensued, ending by Scott’s giving Taylor
permission to attempt it. Taylor, who, although very small,
was as active as a squirrel, immediately commenced the ascent,
and sprang from one to the other of the balconies, until he
reached the top one. He was one of the men who had been selected
to escape with General Morgan, and comprehended immediately
the latter’s object in having him attempt this feat. It
would afford him a chance to glance out of the windows at the
ground just beyond the wall. As he leisurely swung himself
down, he studied “the position” carefully, and his observations
enabled them to direct the tunnel aright. Once during the
tunneling, while Captain Hockersmith (another of the projectors
of the plan) was at work underground, Scott called for him
and seemed anxious to find him at once. General Morgan’s
presence of mind prevented a discovery, or, at least, a strong
suspicion of the plot from at once resulting from Hockersmith’s
absence. The General said to Scott, “Hockersmith is lying
down in my cell; he is sick,” and he requested Scott to examine
and give his opinion upon a memorial which he (the General)
held in his hand, and which he proposed forwarding to Washington.
It was something regarding our removal to a military
prison. Scott (highly flattered by this tribute to his judgment)
took the memorial, looked at it attentively for some minutes,
and returned it, saying, “I think it will do first rate.” It did
do. In the mean time, Hockersmith had been signaled, and had
“come up,” and he made his appearance complaining of a serious
indisposition.
While the work was going on, General Morgan and those who
were to escape with him habitually slept with their faces covered
and their hands concealed. This was done to accustom the[Pg 484]
night guard to take their presence in the cells for granted, by
the appearance of the bulk upon the beds, without actually seeing
them. This guard went the rounds at the expiration of
every two hours during the night, and he would place his lantern
close to each cell door, in order that the light should fill
the cell and show the occupant. General Morgan used to say
that a peculiar shuddering and creeping of the flesh would assail
him whenever this man approached. He would frequently
creep about with list slippers on his feet, and he moved then
without the slightest noise. He used to remind me of a sly,
cruel, bloated, auspicious, night-prowling spider.
When the tunneling approached its completion, all the other
necessary preparations were made. The prison yard, into which
they would emerge from the tunnel, was surrounded by a wall
twenty-five feet high, and means for scaling that had to be provided.
There was an inner wall running from the corner of the
“East Hall” to a smaller building, in which some of the
female convicts were imprisoned, but it was comparatively
low, and they anticipated little difficulty in getting over it.
The coverlids of several beds were torn into strips, and the
strips were plaited into a strong rope nearly thirty feet in
length. A strong iron rod, used for stirring the fires in the
stoves, was converted into a hook, and the rope was attached to
it. Rope and hook were taken down into the air-chamber,
where all the “valuables” were stored.
General Morgan had managed to get a suit of citizen’s clothing,
and the six men who were going to escape with him, were
similarly provided. The Warden had prohibited the introduction
into the prison of uniform clothing, but occasionally allowed plain
suits to be received. The General had also gotten a card of
the schedule time on the Little Miami Railroad, and knew when
the train left Columbus, and when it arrived in Cincinnati—for
this he paid fifteen dollars, the only money used in effecting his
escape.
Despite the strict search instituted, when we first entered the[Pg 485]
penitentiary, several of the party had managed to secrete money
so that it was not found. This was now divided among the
seven who were to escape. These were, besides General Morgan,
Captains Thomas H. Hines, Ralph Sheldon, Sam Taylor,
Jacob Bennett, James Hockersmith, and Gustavus McGee. It
is plain that, as each man was locked in a separate cell, and
could not get out of it by the door, without an interview with the
night-guard, it was necessary to cut an opening into the air-chamber,
through the floor of each cell, from which each one of
the seven would escape. If these apertures were cut from the
top of the floors of the cells, the risk of detection would be proportionally
increased; so an accurate measurement of the distance
between the cells was taken, and with Hines’ cell as a
point of departure, it was easy to calculate where to commence
cutting from underneath, in order that the floors of all these
particular cells should be perforated. A thin crust, only, of the
cement was left, but to all outward appearance, the floor was as
sound as ever.
By means of an arrangement which had been perfected for
obtaining all absolutely necessary articles, each one of the party
about to escape had procured a stout, sharp knife—very effective
weapons in case of surprise and an attempt to stop their escape.
When every thing was ready, they waited several nights for rain—trusting
to elude the vigilance of the guards more easily in the
obscurity of such a night—and taking the chance, also, that the
dogs which were turned loose every night in the yard, would be
driven by the rain into their kennels, which were situated on the
other side of the yard from that where they would emerge. Two
or three days before the effort was made, General Morgan received
a letter from an Irishwoman in Kentucky, warning him
not to attempt to make his escape, from which, she predicted,
great evils to him would result. She alluded to his kindness to
the poor in Lexington, and claimed that she was informed of the
future in some supernatural manner.
On the 26th of November, General Morgan learned that there[Pg 486]
had been a change of military commandants at Columbus. Well
knowing that this would be followed by an inspection of the
prison and a discovery of the plot, he determined that the effort
should be made that very night. His own cell was in the second
range, from which it was impossible to reach the air-chamber
and tunnel, but the cell of his brother, Colonel Richard Morgan,
had been prepared for him, and when Scott tapped, as usual, on
the stove, as a signal for each man to retire to his cell, the
exchange was effected. There was a sufficient resemblance between
them to deceive a man who would not look closely—especially
when they were seated with their faces turned away from
the door.
At any rate, Scott and the night-guard, were both deceived,
and efforts were made by the occupants of the cells near to both
of those, where close inspection would have been dangerous, to
attract to themselves the attention of the guard when he went
the rounds. As it was especially necessary, on this occasion, to
know certainly when the night-guard approached, small bits of
coal had been sprinkled, just before the hour for locking up on
the floor of the first range, so that (tread as lightly as he would),
the slinking cur could not help making loud noise.
It had been arranged that, just after the twelve o’clock visit
from the guard, Captain Taylor should descend into the air-chamber
and give the signal underneath the floor of each cell.
Fortunately, the only man who was vile enough to have betrayed
the plan, was absent in the hospital. Six hours elapsed after
the locking-in; regularly during that time the night-guard went
his rounds, making an awful crackling as he passed along the
lower range. Sixty-odd men lay awake, silent and excited—with
hearts beating louder and blood rushing faster through their
veins than the approach of battle had ever occasioned. Perhaps
the coolest of all that number, were the seven who were about to
incur the risk.
Twelve o’clock struck, and the clang of the bell seemed to be
in the hall itself—the guard passed with his lantern—a few[Pg 487]
minutes elapsed (while the adventurers lay still lest he should
slip back), and then at the signal they sprang from their beds;
hastily stuffed flannel shirts with material prepared beforehand,
and made up bundles to lie in their beds and represent them.
Then stamping upon the floor above the excavations, the thin
crust of each gave way and they descended into the air-chamber.
They passed one by one along the tunnel, until the foremost
man reached the terminus, and with his knife cut away the sod
which had of course been left untouched. Then they emerged
into the open air and inner yard.
The early part of the night had been bright and clear, but
now it was cloudy, and rain was falling. They climbed the low
wall and descended into the large yard. The rain had caused
the sentries to seek shelter, and had driven the dogs to their
kennels. They moved cautiously across the yard—if detected,
their knives must have saved or avenged them. Discovery
would have been hard upon them, but it would have, also, been
unhealthy for the discoverer. They were resolved to be free—they
were powerful and desperate men—and if they failed, they
were determined that others, besides themselves, should have
cause for sorrow. But they reached and climbed the outer wall
in safety. There was a coping upon it which they grappled
with the hook, and they climbed, hand over hand, to the top.
When all had ascended, the hook was grappled upon the inner
shelf of the coping, and they let themselves down. When they
were all on the ground, they strove to shake the hook loose,
but it held fast and they were forced to leave the rope hanging.
That circumstance caused the detection of their escape
two hours sooner than it would otherwise have happened, for the
rope was discovered at day light, and the alarm was given. But
time enough had been allowed the fugitives to make good their
escape. They at once broke into couples.
General Morgan and Hines went straight to the depot. Hines
bought tickets to Cincinnati, and when the train came they got
on it.[Pg 488]
General Morgan was apprehensive that they would be asked
for passes or permits to travel, and arrested for not having
them. He saw an officer of field rank, seated in the car which
he entered, and it occurred to him that if he were seen in familiar
conversation with this officer, he would not, perhaps, be
asked for a pass. He spoke to Hines and they seated themselves
near this officer and courteously addressed him—he replied
as suavely. After a short conversation, General Morgan
produced a liquor flask, they were very generally carried then,
and invited the officer to take a drink of brandy, which invitation
was gracefully accepted. Just then the train moved past
the penitentiary. “That is the hotel at which Morgan stops I
believe,” said the officer. “Yes,” answered the General, “and
will stop, it is to be hoped. He has given us his fair share of
trouble, and he will not be released. I will drink to him. May
he ever be as closely kept as he is now.”
This officer was a pleasant and well informed gentleman, and
General Morgan passed the night in an agreeable and instructive
conversation with him—asking many questions and receiving
satisfactory replies.
When the suburbs of Cincinnati were reached, a little after
daylight, it was time to get off. General Morgan pulled the
bell rope and moved to one platform; Hines went to the other,
and they put the brakes down with all their strength. The
speed of the train slackened and they sprang off.
Two or three soldiers were sitting on a pile of lumber, near
where General Morgan alighted. “What in the h—ll are you
jumping off the train for?” asked one of them. “What in the
d—l is the use of a man going on to town when he lives out
here?” responded the General. “Besides what matter is it to
you?” “Oh nothing,” said the soldier, and paid him no further
attention. Reaching the river, which runs close to this point,
they gave a little boy two dollars to put them across in a skiff.
In Newport, Kentucky, they found friends to aid them, and
before the telegraph had given to Cincinnati the information[Pg 489]
of his escape, he was well on his way to Boone county—sure
asylum for such fugitives. In Boone fresh horses, guides,
and all that was necessary were quickly obtained. He felt no
longer any apprehension; he could travel from Boone to Harrison,
or Scott counties, thence through Anderson to Nelson,
and thence to the Tennessee line; and, during all that time, no
one need know of his whereabouts but his devoted friends, who
would have died to shield him from harm.
A writer who described his progress through Kentucky, shortly
after it occurred, says, truly: “Everybody vied with each
other as to who should show him the most attention—even to
the negroes; and young ladies of refinement begged the honor
of cooking his meals.” He assumed more than one disguise,
and played many parts in his passage through Kentucky—now
passing as a Government contractor buying cattle, and again as
a quartermaster or inspector.
When he reached the Little Tennessee river, his serious difficulties
began; in passing through a portion of Tennessee, he
had met friends as truly devoted to him as any of those who
had assisted him in Kentucky.
In portions of Middle Tennessee, he was so constantly recognized,
that it was well for him that he was so universally popular
there. One day he passed a number of citizens, and one woman
commenced clapping her hands and called out, “Oh I know
who it is,” then suddenly catching herself, turned away. The
region in which he struck the Little Tennessee river, was
strongly Union, and the people would have betrayed him to a
certainty, if they had discovered who he was. The river was
guarded at every point, and there was no boat or raft upon it,
which was not in possession of the enemy. He was, in this
vicinity, joined by some thirty nomadic Confederates, and they
set to work and constructed a raft for him to cross upon.
When it was finished, they insisted that he and Hines should
cross first—the horses were made to swim. While General
Morgan was walking his horse about, with a blanket thrown[Pg 490]
over him, to recover him from the chill occasioned by immersion
in the cold water—he suddenly (he subsequently declared) was
seized with the conviction that the enemy were coming upon
them, and instantly commenced to saddle his horse, bidding
Hines do the same. Scarcely had they done so, when the enemy
dashed up in strong force on the other side and dispersed the
poor fellows who were preparing to cross in their turn. He and
Hines went straight up the mountain at the foot of which they
had landed. It grew dark and commenced to rain—he knew
that if he remained all night on the mountain, his capture would
be a certain thing in the morning, and he determined to run the
gauntlet of the pickets, at the base of the mountain, on the opposite
side, before the line was strengthened. As he descended,
leading his horse, he came immediately upon one of the pickets.
As he prepared to shoot him, he discovered that the fellow slept,
and stole by without injuring or awakening him.
At the house of a Union man not far from the base of the
mountain, the two tired and hunted wanderers found shelter and
supper, and General Morgan, representing himself as a Federal
Quartermaster, induced the host, by a promise of a liberal supply
of sugar and coffee, to guide them to Athens. Every mile
of his route through this country was marked by some adventure.
Finally Hines became separated from him. The General
sent him, one evening, to a house, to inquire the way to a certain
place, while he himself remained a short distance off upon
the road. In a few minutes he heard shots and the tramp of
several horses galloping in the opposite direction, and he knew
at once that Hines was cut off from him. That night he narrowly
escaped being shot—that fate befell a man mistaken for
him. At length, after hazard and toil beyond all description, he
reached the Confederate lines. Hines was captured by the party
who pursued him from the house, and he was confined in a little
log hut that night, in which his captors also slept. He made
himself very agreeable—told a great many pleasant stories,
with immense effect. At length the sentry, posted at the door,[Pg 491]
drew near the fire, at the other end of the room, to hear the
conclusion of a very funny anecdote. Hines seized the opportunity
and sprang through the door—bade the party good night,
and darted into the bushes. He effected his escape and reached
Dixie in safety.
When the escape of General Morgan, and the others, was discovered
on the morning after it was effected—there was an extraordinary
degree of emotion manifested by the penitentiary
officials. The rope, hanging upon the wall, was seen by some
one at day light; it was apparent that some body had escaped,
the alarm was given to the warden, and his suspicion at once
turned toward the prisoners of war.
About 6 a.m., a detachment of guards and turnkeys poured
into the hall and began running about, unlocking doors and calling
on various men by name, in the wildest and most frantic
manner. For some time they were puzzled to determine who
had escaped. Colonel Morgan was still taken for the General,
and the “dummies” in the cells, which had been vacated, for
a while, deceived them into the belief that those cells were still
occupied. But at length, a more careful and calm examination
revealed the fact and the method of the escape, and then the
hubbub broke out afresh. In the midst of it Captain Bennett
called out, “Well gentlemen, I like a moderate stir, but you are
going it too brash,” an expression of opinion which, to judge
from the unanimous shout of approval from the prisoners and
the laughter they could no longer restrain, met with their cordial
indorsement.
It was generally feared that Colonel Morgan would be severely
dealt with, and he expected a long term of service in the dungeon;
but to the surprise and gratification of all of us, it was
announced that he was thought no more guilty than the rest,
and should be punished no more harshly. The first step taken
was to remove all of the first range men to the third range.
Then a general and thorough search was instituted. Every cell
was carefully examined, every man was stripped and inspected,[Pg 492]
every effort was made, after the bird was flown, to make the
cage secure.
It was the desire of every prisoner, to secure General Morgan’s
escape—that was of paramount importance. We were
willing to trust to his efforts to effect our release. We were now
constantly locked up in our cells, night and day, except when
we were marched to our meals and straight back. The cells
were, I have already said, very small, and the bed took up half
of each. The only method we had of exercising, was to step
sideways from one end of the cells to the other. The weather
was intensely cold, and when the stone flooring of the hall was
removed and a deep trench cut, in order that the damage done
by the tunneling might be repaired, the chill arising from the
damp earth was terrible.
Every thing which we had been allowed in the way of luxuries
was now forbidden, except books. We were forbidden to
speak while at the table, to speak aloud in our cells after the
gas was lit at night, to address one of the convicts, even those
who frequented the hall in which we were confined, no matter
what the necessity might be. It would be difficult to enumerate
the restrictions which were now imposed upon us, confinement
in the dungeon being the inevitable penalty attached to the violation
of any of these rules. These dungeons were really very
unpleasant places in which to spend even the hours of a penitentiary
life—hours which (without the proper experience)
might have appeared unsusceptible of additional embitterment.
I saw the inside of one of them during my stay in the “Institution,”
and speak advisedly when I say that the pious stock
company which proposed “to build a hell by subscription” for
the especially heretical, could have found no better model for
their work than it. These cells were rather smaller than the
cells in which we were habitually confined, and the doors were
half a foot thick, with sheet-iron nailed on the outside, and so
contrived that (extending beyond the edges of the door) it excluded
every ray of air and light. In all seasons, the air within[Pg 493]
them was stagnant, foul, and stifling, and would produce violent
nausea and headache. In summer, these places were said to
be like heated ovens, and in winter they were the coldest
localities between the South Pole and Labrador. The rations allowed
the inmates of them were a piece of bread about the size
of the back of a pocket account book (and perhaps with as much
flavor) and half a tin-cup full of water, repeated twice a day. If
a man’s stomach revolted at the offer of food (after the foul reek
of the dungeon) the crop-eared whelp of a she-wolf (who was
boss-inquisitor) would pronounce him sulky and double his term
of stay.
Merion, the Warden, would about realize the Northern ideal
of a Southern overseer. He was an obstinate man, and his
cruelty was low, vulgar, and brutal like his mind. He would
have been hypocritical, but that his character was too coarse-grained
to be pliant enough for successful dissimulation. The
members of the Board of Directors (with one or two exceptions)
were men of much the same stamp as the Warden—with rather
more cultivation perhaps, and less force. He entirely controlled
them all. He knew enough of medicine to pronounce quinine
“a luxury,” but he directed the treatment of the sick, as he did
all else.
After some three weeks of close confinement, we were permitted
to exercise in the hall for four hours during the day, and
were locked in for the rest of the time. The nervous irritability
induced by this long and close confinement, sometimes showed
itself in a manner which would have amused a man whose mind
was in a healthy condition. Just as soon as we were permitted
to leave our cells in the morning and meet in the hall, the most
animated discussions, upon all sorts of topics, would begin.
These would occasionally degenerate into clamorous and angry
debates. The disputants would become as earnest and excited
over subjects in which perhaps they had never felt the least interest
before, as if they had been considering matters of vital
and immediate importance. A most heated, and finally acri[Pg 494]monious
dispute once arose regarding General Joseph E. Johnston’s
hight. One party asserted positively that his stature was
just five feet nine inches and a quarter. The other affirmed,
with a constancy that nothing could shake, that he was no taller
than five feet eight inches and a half. Numerous assertions
were made by as many men, that they had frequently stood near
him, and that he was about their hight. If these declarations
were all as true as they were dogmatic, the General’s stature
must have varied in a remarkable manner, and his tailor could
have had little peace of mind. Warm friendships, of long standing,
were interrupted by this issue for entire days, until happily
a new question was sprung, and parties were reorganized. A
grave and radical difference of opinion arose as to whether Selma
was on the east or the west bank of the Alabama river. Two
intimate friends got into an argument regarding the relative excellence
of the ancients and moderns in material civilization and
the mechanical arts. The discussion lasted three weeks; during
its continuance each alluded (in support of his position) to architectural
and engineering triumphs, which the most learned encyclopedist
might in vain consult his books or torture his memory
to verify. It was at last dropped, unsettled. But for months
the most casual reference by either to the Egyptian Pyramids,
or the bridge over the Menai Straits, would produce a coolness
between them. The battle of Waterloo was an inexhaustible
theme of contention. Wellington did not wish for night on the
day itself half as cordially as he would have wished for it, if he
had been a prisoner at the penitentiary and condemned to listen
to the conflicting opinions about his strategy.
Exchange and escape, however, were the topics of most earnest
and constant thought. One or the other was the first
thought which came into our minds in the morning, and the last
that occupied them at night. Victor Hugo has, in his wonderful
book, “Les Miserables,” daguerreotyped the thoughts and the
feelings of a prisoner. That book was a great favorite with the
inmates of our hall and the admiration it excited was so general[Pg 495]
and honest, that (it is a literal fact) there was not more than
one or two disputes about it. Two of the officers who escaped
with General Morgan, Captains Sheldon and Taylor, were recaptured,
and brought back to the penitentiary. They ventured
into Louisville, where they were well known, were recognized,
and arrested.
After General Morgan’s escape, the treatment we received
was not only more rigorous, but the sneaking, spying instincts
of the keepers seemed stimulated. It was, of course, to be expected
that they would be suspicious (especially after the lesson
they had received), but these creatures evinced suspicion, not as
I had been accustomed to see men show it—they stole and pried
about, eaves-dropping, creeping upon and glaring at us (when
they thought they could do so undetected) like cellar-bred, yellow-eyed,
garbage-fed curs. Their manner gave one an impression
of cold cruelty and slinking treachery that is indescribable,
it was snakish.
A military guard was placed at the prison immediately after
the General’s escape, and for some time sentinels (with bayonets
fixed) paced the hall. None of us had imagined that we could
welcome the presence of Federal soldiers with so much satisfaction.
The difference in the tone and manner of the soldiers
from that of the convict-drivers, made it a relief to have any
thing to say to the former. They were evidently disgusted with
their associate goalers. There was a sergeant with this guard
(named Lowe, I think,) who, while he rigidly discharged his
duty, seemed desirous to avoid all harshness.
In February I was removed, at the solicitation of friends, to
Camp Chase. Having made no application for this removal,
nor having heard that one had been made in my behalf, I was
surprised when the order for it came, and still more surprised
when I learned at Camp Chase that I was to be paroled. I was
permitted to go freely where I pleased within the limits of the
camp, excellent quarters were assigned me, and my condition
was, in all respects, as comfortable as that of the officers on duty[Pg 496]
there. Colonel Richardson, the commandant, was a veteran of
the army of the Potomac, and had accepted the charge of the
prison after he had been disabled by wounds. If the treatment
which I received at his hands, was a fair sample of his conduct
toward prisoners generally, it is certain that none had a right to
complain of him, and it would have been a fortunate thing if
just such men had been selected (upon both sides) to be placed
over those whose condition depended so entirely upon the will
and disposition of the officers in charge of them. Finding that
my parole was not likely to result in my exchange, and that
there was no other Confederate officer similarly indulged, I applied
to be sent back to the penitentiary. Enough had reached
my ears to convince me that others would be granted paroles in
order to tempt them to take the oath, and I did not care to be
caught in such company.
When I left Camp Chase, where every one had been uniformly
polite and respectful in demeanor, and I had enjoyed privileges
which amounted almost to liberty, the gloom of the penitentiary
and the surly, ban-dog manner of the keepers were doubly distasteful,
and the feeling was as if I were being buried alive. I
found that, during my absence, the prisoners had been removed
from the hall, which they had all the time previously occupied, to
another in which the negro convicts had formerly slept, and this
latter was a highly-scented dormitory. The cause of the removal
was that (desperate at their long confinement and the treatment
they were receiving) a plan had been concocted for obtaining
knives and breaking out of the prison by force. A thorough knowledge
of the topography of the entire building was by this time
possessed by the leaders in this movement. They had intended
to secure Merion, and as many as possible of the underlings, by
enticing them into the hall upon some pretext, and then gagging,
binding, and locking them up in the cells. Then giving the
signal for the opening of the doors, they expected to obtain possession
of the office and room where the guns were kept. One
of the party was to have been dressed in convict garb, to give[Pg 497]
the necessary signal, in order that all suspicion might have been
avoided. It is barely possible that, with better luck, the plan
might have succeeded, but it was frustrated by the basest
treachery.
Among the sixty-eight prisoners of war confined in the penitentiary,
there were four whose nerves gave way and they took
the oath of allegiance to the United States in other words, they
deserted. One of this four betrayed the plan to the warden.
Men were sometimes induced “to take the oath” by a lack of
pride and fortitude, and absence of manly stamina, who would
have done nothing else prejudicial to the cause which they abandoned,
or that would have compromised their former comrades.
Their were men, however, who added treachery to apostacy,
and this man was one of that infamous class. The four were so
fearful of exciting the suspicion of the other prisoners, and so
well aware of the bitter scorn and resentment which their conduct
would raise against them, that they carefully concealed
their design to the last moment. It was not until our release
from prison, that the proofs of the utter and base treachery of
the spying and informing villain were obtained.
There is a reason why the name of this wretch should not be
given here. Enough know of his crime to damn him forever in
the estimation of all honorable men, and gallant and devoted
men, than whom no truer gentlemen and braver soldiers served
under the Confederate banner, bear the same name. His relatives
(who fought throughout the war and quit with records upon
which there are no stains), must not see the name (which they
made honorable), associated with his shame.
Search was at once made for the knives which the prisoners
had obtained and for other evidence which might corroborate
the informer’s report. Fifteen knives had been introduced into the hall, and were in the hands
of as many prisoners. The search was inaugurated secretly and conducted
as quietly as possible, during the time that the prisoners were locked
in the cells, but information was gotten along the ranges that it was
going on, and only seven knives were discovered. The remaining eight[Pg 498]
were hidden, so ingeniously, that, notwithstanding the strict hunt after
every thing of the kind, they were not found. Merion’s fury at the idea
of any danger threatening him was like that of some great cowardly beast
which smells blood and is driven mad with fear. All of the party were at
once closely confined again, and the seven who were detected with the
knives, were sent to the dungeons, where they were kept seven days,
until the surgeon declared that a longer stay would kill them.
They passed the period of their confinement in almost constant motion
(such as the limits of the cell would permit), and said that they had no
recollection of having slept during the whole time. When they came out
they were almost blind and could scarcely drag themselves along.
One of the party, Captain Barton, was so affected, that the blood
streamed from under his finger nails. When I returned (after a month
passed at Camp Chase), I was startled by the appearance of those, even,
who had not been subjected to punishment in the dungeon. They had the
wild, squalid look and feverish eager impression of eye which lunatics
have after long confinement.
At last, in March 1864, all were removed to Fort Delaware, and the
change was as if living men, long buried in subterranean vaults, had
been restored to upper earth. About the same time one hundred and ten
officers of Morgan’s division, who had been confined in the Pennsylvania
Penitentiary, were transferred to Point Lookout. These officers
described the treatment which they received as having been much better
than that adopted toward us, yet one of their number had become insane.
All that I have attempted to describe, however, must have been ease and
luxury compared with the hardship, hunger and harsh cruelty inflicted
upon the Confederate private soldiers imprisoned at Camps Morton and
Douglass and at Rock Island. These men would often actually pick up and
devour the scraps thrown out of the scavenger carts. Some of them froze[Pg 499]
to death—insufficient fuel was furnished, when it was furnished at
all, and the clothing sent them by friends was rarely given them. The
men of my regiment told me of treatment, inflicted upon them at Camp
Douglass, which if properly described and illustrated with engravings,
and if attributed to Confederate instead of Federal officials, would
throw the whole North into convulsions. Many of these men, of this
regiment, had escaped in the first two or three months of their
imprisonment, and a bitter hatred was then excited against the less
fortunate. They were, in some instances, tied up and beaten with the
belts of the guards, until the print of the brass buckles were left on
the flesh; others were made to sit naked on snow and ice, until palsied
with cold; others, again were made to “ride Morgan’s mule” (as a
scantling frame, of ten or twelve feet in hight, was called), the
peculiar and beautiful feature of this method of torture, was the very
sharp back of “the mule.” Sometimes, heavy blocks, humorously styled
spurs, were attached to the feet of the rider. As for the shooting of
men for crossing the “dead line” (upon which, so much stress has been
laid in accounts of Andersonville), that was so well understood, that it
was scarcely thought worthy of mention. But an elaborate description of
life in the Federal prisons is unnecessary.
The eighty thousand Confederate prisoners of 1864 and 1865, or rather
the survivors of that host, have already told it far better than I can,
in their Southern homes, and we have had sufficient experience of the
value of sympathy away from home, to make no effort for it. Moreover, a
contest with the Yankee journalists is too unequal—they really write so
well, and are so liberal in their ideas regarding the difference between
fact and falsehood, have so little prejudice for, or against either,
that they possess, and employ, a tremendous advantage. And then the
pictorials—a special artist has only to catch a conception, in a
Philadelphia or New York hospital, and straightway he works off an
“Andersonville prisoner,” which carries conviction to those who can not
read the essay, upon the same subject, by his co-laborers with the pen.[Pg 500]
What chance has a Southern writer against men who possess such
resources? At Fort Delaware, General Schoeff, the commandant, placed
some eighteen or twenty of us in the rooms built in the casemates of the
fort, and allowed us, for some time, the privilege of walking about the
island, upon our giving him our paroles not to attempt escape.
General M. Jeff. Thompson, of Missouri, was the only Confederate officer
at that prison, before our party arrived, but many others from Camp
Chase, came about the same time. General Thompson’s military career, is
well known to his countrymen, but only his prison companions know how
kind and manly he can be under circumstances which severely try the
temper. His unfailing flow of spirits kept every one else, in his
vicinity cheerful and his hopefulness was contagious. He possessed,
also, an amazing poetical genius. He wrote with surprising fluency, and
his finest compositions cost him neither trouble nor thought. Shut him
up in a room with plenty of stationery, and in twenty-four hours, he
would write himself up to the chin in verse. His muse was singularly
prolific and her progeny various. He roamed recklessly through the realm
of poesy. Every style seemed his—blank verse and rhyme, ode and epic,
lyrical and tragical, satiric and elegiac, sacred and profane, sublime
and ridiculous, he was equally good at all. His poetry might not perhaps
have stood a very strict classification, but he produced a fair,
marketable sample, which deserved (his friends thought) to be quoted at
as liberal figures as some about which much more was said. General
Thompson would doubtless have been more successful as a poet, if he had
been a less honest and practical business man. He persisted in having
some meaning in all that he wrote, and only a first class poet can
afford to do that.
The cunning New England method is also the safest in the long run—when
a versifier suspects that he lacks the true inspiration, he had better
try the confidence game, and induce the public to admire by writing that
which no one can understand. It would seem, too, that writing poetry[Pg 501]
and playing on the fiddle have this much in common, that a true genius
at either is fit for nothing else. The amateurs can take care of
themselves, but the born-masters display an amiable worthlessness for
every thing but their art. Now General Thompson was thoroughly
wide-awake and competent in all practical matters.
At Fort Delaware the prevailing topic of conversation was exchange; men
who were destined to many another weary month of imprisonment, sustained
themselves with the hope that it would soon come. At last a piece of
good fortune befell some of us. It was announced that General Jones, the
officer in command at Charleston, had placed fifty Federal officers in a
part of the city where they would be exposed to danger from the
batteries of the besiegers. An order was issued that fifty Confederate
officers, of corresponding rank, should be selected for retaliation.
Five general and forty-five field officers were accordingly chosen from
the different prisons, Fort Delaware furnishing a large delegation for
that purpose. The general officers selected were Major General Frank
Gardner, the gallant and skillful commander of Port Hudson;
Major-General Edward Johnson, one of the fighting Generals of the army
of Northern Virginia (which is to say one of the bravest of the very
brave), and a true man, whose sterling worth, intelligence and force of
character would win him respect and influence wherever those qualities
were valued; Brigadier-General Stewart, of the Maryland brigade, another
officer who had won promotion in that heroic army of Northern Virginia,
and had identified his name with its deathless fame. There was still
another of these fortunate men—fortunate in having helped to win fields
where Confederate soldiers had immortalized the title—Brigadier-General
Archer was the fourth general officer. A favorite officer of General
A.P. Hill, he was in every respect worthy of a hero’s friendship and
confidence. The fifth was Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson. Among the
field officers who went were seven of the penitentiary prisoners—Colonels[Pg 502]
Ward, Morgan, and Tucker, Majors Webber, Steele, and Higley and myself.
We left our comrades with a regret, felt for their bad fortune, for we
felt assured that our apparent ill-luck would terminate in an exchange.
Colonel Coleman, who had been confined in the Fort with the party of
which so many were sent on this “expedition,” was bitterly disappointed
at being left behind, and we regretted it equally as much. Three of our
companions through so many vicissitudes, we never saw again—three of
the worthiest—Captains Griffin, Mullins, and Wardour died shortly
afterward.
On the 26th of June, we were put on board of a steamer, and puffed away
down the Delaware river. It was confidently affirmed that we were going
to be placed on Morris Island, where the Charleston batteries would have
fair play at us, so that our friends (blissfully unconscious of how
disagreeable they were making themselves) might speedily finish us. The
prospect was not absolutely inviting, but after the matter was talked
over, and General Gardner, especially, consulted (as he had most
experience in heavy artillery), we felt more easy. General Thompson, who
had fought that way a good deal, said that “a man’s chance to be struck
by lightning was better than to be hit by a siege gun.” This consoled me
very little, for I had all my life been nervously afraid of lightning.
However, we at last settled it unanimously that, while we would perhaps
be badly frightened by the large bombs, there was little likelihood of
many being hurt, and, at any rate, the risk was very slight compared
with the brilliant hope of its resulting in exchange.
After we got fairly to sea, very little thought was wasted on other
matters. The captain of the vessel, said that there was “no sea on,” or
some such gibberish, and talked as if we were becalmed, at the very time
that his tipsy old boat was bobbing about like a green rider on a
trotting horse. It is a matter of indifference, what sort of metal
encased the hearts of those who first tempted the fury of the seas, but
they must have had stomachs lined with mahogany. It is difficult to
believe men, when they unblushingly declare that they go to sea for[Pg 503]
pleasure. There has been a great deal of pretentious declamation about
the poetry and beauty of the ocean.
Some people go off into raptures about a “vast expanse” of dirty salt
water, which must, in the nature of things, be associated in every one’s
mind with sick stomachs and lost dinners. The same people get so tired
of their interminable view of poetry, that they will nearly crowd each
other overboard, to get sight of a stray flying fish, or porpoise, or
the back fin of a shark sticking out of the water. This trip to Hilton
Head came near taking the poetry out of General Thompson.
Ten of us were lodged in a cabin on the upper deck, where we did very
well, except that for one half of the time we were too sick to eat any
thing, and for the other half we were rolling and tumbling about in such
a manner that we could think of nothing but keeping off of the cabin’s
roof. The others were stowed away “amidships,” or in some other place,
down stairs, and as all the ports and air-holes were shut up, when the
steamer began to wallow about, they were nearly smothered, and their
nausea was greatly increased. They were compelled to bear it, for they
could not force their way on deck and they had nothing with which to
scuttle the ship. One western officer declared to me afterward, that he
seriously thought, at one time, that he had thrown up his boot heels.
When we reached Hilton Head, we were transferred to the brig “Dragoon”
(a small vessel lying in the harbor), and she was then anchored under
the guns of the frigate Wabash. Here we remained five weeks. The weather
was intensely hot. During the day we were allowed to go on deck, in
reliefs of twenty-five each, and stay alternate hours, but at night we
were forced to remain below decks. A large stove (in full blast until
after nightfall), at one end of the hold in which we were confined, did
not make the temperature any more agreeable. The ports were kept shut
up, for fear that some of the party would jump out and swim eight miles
to the South Carolina shore. As there were fifty soldiers guarding us[Pg 504]
and three ship’s boats (full of men), moored to the vessel, there was
little reason to apprehend any thing of the kind.
The sharks would have been sufficient to have deterred any of us from
attempting to escape in that way. There was a difference of opinion
regarding their appetite for human flesh, but no man was willing to
personally experiment in the matter. A constant negotiation was going on
during these five weeks, between the authorities at Hilton Head and
Charleston, which seemed once or twice on the point of being broken off,
but fortunately managed each time to survive.
We were never taken to Morris’ Island, although our chances for that
situation, seemed more than once, extremely good. Subsequently a party
of six hundred Confederate officers were taken there, and quartered
where they would have the full benefit of the batteries. None, however,
were injured by the shells, but three fourths of them were reduced to a
condition (almost as bad as death), by scurvy and other diseases,
brought about by exposure and bad food. At last, on the 1st of August,
it was authoritatively announced that we were to be taken on the next
day to Charleston to be exchanged. Only those who have themselves been
prisoners, can understand what our feelings then were—when the hope
that had become as necessary to our lives as the breath we drew, was at
length about to be realized. That night there was little sleep among the
fifty—but they passed it in alternate raptures of congratulation at
their good luck, or shivering apprehension lest, after all, something
might occur to prevent it.
But when the next day came and we were all transferred to a steamer, and
her head was turned for Charleston, we began to master all doubts and
fears. We reached Charleston harbor very early on the morning of the
3rd, lay at anchor for two or three hours, and then steamed slowly in
toward the city, until we passed the last monitor, and halted again. In
a short time, a small boat came out from Charleston, with the fifty
Federal prisoners on board and officers of General Jones’ staff,[Pg 505]
authorized to conclude the exchange. When she came alongside, the final
arrangements were effected, but not until a mooted point had threatened
to break off the negotiation altogether. Happily for us, we knew nothing
of this difficulty until it was all over, but we were made very nervous
by the delay. When all the details were settled, we were transferred to
the Confederate boat, and the Federal officers were brought on board of
the steamer which we left; then touching hats to the crew we parted
from, we bade our captivity farewell.
Twelve months of imprisonment, of absence from all we loved, was over at
last. No man of that party could describe his feelings intelligibly—a
faint recollection of circumstances is all that can be recalled in such
a tumult of joy. As we passed down the bay, the gallant defenders of
those works around Charleston, the names of which have become immortal,
stood upon the parapets and cheered to us, and we answered like men who
were hailing for life. The huge guns, which lay like so many grim watch
dogs around the city, thundered a welcome, the people of the heroic city
crowded to the wharves to receive us. If anything could repay us for the
wretchedness of long imprisonment and our forced separation from
families and friends, we found it in the unalloyed happiness of that
day.
General Jones had then (and has now), the profound gratitude of fifty of
his comrades. Ever doing his duty bravely and unflinchingly, he had,
now, ransomed from the enemy, men who would have consented to undergo
any ordeal for that boon. The citizens of Charleston hastened to offer
us the traditional hospitality of their city. General Jones had informed
them of the names of our party, and they had settled among themselves
where each man was to be taken care of. If that party of “ransomed
sinners” shall ever become “praying members” the Charlestonians will
have a large share in their petitions.
But the recollection of our gallant comrades left behind would intrude
itself and make us sad, ever in the midst of our good fortune. Some of[Pg 506]
them were not released until the summer after the close of the war.
No men deserve more praise for constancy than the Confederate prisoners,
especially the private soldiers, who in the trials to which they were
subjected steadfastly resisted every inducement to violate the faith
they had pledged to the cause.
A statistical item may not come amiss, in concluding this chapter. There
were, in all during the war, 261,000 Northern prisoners in Southern
prisons, and 200,000 Confederate prisoners in Northern prisons; 22,576
Northern prisoners died, and 22,535 Confederate prisoners died; or two
Federals died out of every twenty-three, and two Confederates died out
of every fifteen.
CHAPTER XVI
The men who made their escape from Ohio, after the disastrous fight at
Buffington, marched for many a weary mile through the mountains of
Virginia. At last, worn down and half famished, they gained the
Confederate lines, and first found rest at the beautiful village of
Wytheville, in Southwestern Virginia.
Thence they passed leisurely down the fair valley, not then scarred by
the cruel ravages of war, to the vicinity of Knoxville. Colonel Adam R.
Johnson then endeavored to collect and organize them all. “On the—of
August, 1863,” says an officer who was a valuable assistant in this
work, “Colonel Johnson issued orders, under instructions from General
Buckner, Department Commander, for all men belonging to Morgan’s command
to report to him (Colonel J.) at Morristown, in East Tennessee. These
orders were published in the Knoxville papers, and upon it becoming
known that there was a place of rendezvous, every man who had been left
behind when General Morgan started on the Ohio raid now pushed forward
eagerly to the point designated. When that expedition was undertaken,
many had been sent back from Albany as guards for returning trains, and
because their horses were unserviceable. Many, too, had to be left on
account of sickness or disability from wounds. In a week or ten days,
Colonel Johnson had collected between four and five hundred men
(including those who made their escape from Ohio) in his camp at
Morristown. These men were organized into two battalions—one commanded
by Captain Kirkpatrick, representing the first brigade of the division,
and the other commanded by Captain Dortch, representing the second
brigade.
“The camp was well selected, with wood and water in abundance, and
plenty of forage in the neighborhood. Colonel J. was making great[Pg 508]
efforts to have the men paid off, and properly armed, clothed, etc.,
when the enemy moved upon Knoxville. The evacuation of that place by our
troops made it necessary for us to leave our comfortable resting place.
We immediately broke camp at Morristown, and joined General Buckner, who
was moving to reinforce General Bragg in front of Chattanooga. * * * * * At
Calhoun, the men were paid off, and received a scanty supply of
clothing. Many of them had not been paid before for fourteen months.
From Calhoun we were ordered to Lafayette, from Lafayette to Dalton,
thence to Tunnel Hill. On the morning of the 18th of September, the
whole army moved out for battle. Our small force, was ordered to report
to General Forrest, and did so about ten a.m. on the field. We were
immediately deployed as skirmishers, mounted, in front of Hood’s
division, of Longstreet’s Corps, just come from Virginia. As the men
galloped by Forrest, he called to them in language which inspired them
with still higher enthusiasm. He urged them to do their whole duty in
the battle. He spoke of their chief, who had been insulted with a
felon’s treatment, and was then lying in the cell of a penitentiary. He
gave them ‘Morgan’ for a battle-cry, and bade them maintain their old
reputation.
“The infantry objected to having ‘the d—d cavalry’ placed in front of
them in a fight. But they did not easily catch up with ‘the d—d
cavalry.’ After moving briskly forward for perhaps half a mile, through
the tangled undergrowth of pine, the clear crack of rifles told that the
enemy was on the alert. Driving in their pickets, we pushed on and found
a regiment of cavalry in line to receive us. This fled upon the receipt
of the first volley. The undergrowth was too thick for maneuvering on
horseback, and we were dismounted and advanced at double-quick. Our boys
were anxious to drive the enemy and keep them going without letting the
infantry overtake us. The enemy first engaged fell back upon a
supporting regiment. We soon drove both back upon a third. By this time
our small ‘Lay out’ found the fighting rather interesting. Engaging[Pg 509]
three time our number, and attacking every position the enemy chose, was
very glorious excitement, but rather more of it than our mouths watered
for. Yet no man faltered—all rushed on as reckless of the opposing
array of danger as of their own alignment.
“The enemy had formed in the edge of a woods, in front of which was an
open field. This field was fought over again and again, each side
charging alternately, and forced back. At last a charge upon our part,
led by Lieutenant Colonel Martin, was successful. The enemy fell back
still further. We now saw clearly from many indications, and were told
by prisoners, that the Federal line of battle, the main force, was not
far off. We, therefore, moved more cautiously. Just about sundown, we
found the enemy’s cavalry drawn up directly in front of the infantry,
but they made little resistance. After one or two volleys, they fell
back behind the protecting ‘Web-feet.’ Night falling stopped all further
operations for that day. We camped in line of battle, and picketed in
front. On the morning of the 19th, we were ordered to report to Colonel
Scott, and found him engaging the enemy on our extreme right, at the
‘Red House.’ Colonel Scott gave us position, dismounted, and put us in.
The fighting continued at intervals throughout the day.
“Late in the evening Scott made a vigorous charge and drove the enemy
handsomely. We learned from prisoners that we had been fighting a select
body of infantry commanded by General Whitaker of Kentucky, which had
been detailed to guard the ford, here, across the Chickamauga. The
fighting ceased at nightfall and we were again camped in line of battle.
The fighting of the next day was very similar to that of the previous
ones—the enemy falling back slowly with his face toward us. But late in
the evening the retreat became a rout. The army made no attack on the
21st. In the afternoon Colonel Scott was sent with his brigade over
Missionary ridge into the valley, and engaged a few scattered cavalry
and an Illinois regiment of infantry—capturing nearly all of the latter
before they could reach the works around Chattanooga. Forming his[Pg 510]
brigade Colonel Scott sent a portion of our command, on foot, to
reconnoiter the enemy’s position. The reconnoitering party drove in the
pickets, took the outside rifle pits, and forced the enemy to their
breastworks and forts.
“This closed the battle of Chickamauga—Morgan’s men firing the first
and last shot in that terrible struggle.
“General Forrest and Colonel Scott, both complimented our little command
more than once during the battle. Immediately after the battle, the
entire cavalry of the Army of Tennessee was actively employed. The two
battalions of our command were separated. Dortch going with Forrest up
the Chattanooga and Knoxville railroad. Kirkpatrick went with Wheeler on
his raid through Middle Tennessee. Dortch was in the fight (against
Woolford) at Philadelphia—in the skirmishes at Loudon and Marysville,
and was at the siege of Knoxville. Kirkpatrick’s battalion was at the
fights at McMinnville, Murfreesboro’, Shelbyville and Sugar creek. In
the latter fight, Wheeler’s whole force fell back rapidly, and
Kirkpatrick was kept in the rear until we reached the Tennessee river.
When we returned to the army, Kirkpatrick’s battalion was placed on
severe picket duty—its line extending from the mouth of the Chickamauga
up the Tennessee some three miles, where it connected with the line of
the First Kentucky cavalry.
“This duty was exceedingly heavy. The pickets stood in squads of three
every four hundred yards, with mounted patrols to ride the length of the
whole line. One would suppose that men who had ridden through the States
of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia and Georgia, and been in
as many as twenty-five or thirty engagements, in the space of three
months, would be completely worn out, discouraged, and disheartened. Not
so, however, the few left were willing and anxious to thoroughly do
soldier’s duty.”
The writer goes on to narrate how after all these trials, came the order
to dismount Morgan’s men—generous reward for their toil and[Pg 511]
sacrifices. He speaks of Forrest’s gallant stand against it—preventing
the execution of the order, but costing the high-souled chief his own
command, forcing him to seek other fields of enterprise, and with an
organization of conscripts and absentees win fights that a romancer
would not dare to imagine. He speaks, too, of unhappy dissensions among
officers which added to the discouraging condition of the little
command.
But the brave fellows patiently endured all—watching and hoping fondly
for the return of the imprisoned leader. The two battalions were at
length placed in a brigade commanded by Colonel Grigsby; in which were
the Ninth and First Kentucky.
The writer describes the dreary days and long cold nights of that
winter. The arduous duty—men shivering through the dark, dragging
hours, with eyes fixed on the enemy’s signal lights burning on Waldron’s
ridge and Lookout mountain. Then the Federal battalions pouring, one
night, across the river—the bright blaze and quick crash of rifles,
suddenly breaking out along the picket line. The hurried saddling and
rapid reinforcement, but the steady Federal advance driving the cavalry
back. Even amid the snarl of musketry and roar of cannon, could be heard
the splash of the boats plying from shore to shore. Couriers were sent
to army headquarters, with the information, but, losing their way in the
pitch darkness, did not report until day light. Next day came the grand
Federal attack and the terrible and unaccountable “stampede” of the
entire Confederate army from Missionary ridge—that army which a few
weeks before had won the great victory of Chickamauga.
When General Bragg halted at Dalton, this brigade was again posted on
the front and suffered, hungry, half clad (many barefooted), through
that awful winter.
But a great joy awaited them—before the spring came it brought them
relief. General Morgan made his way safely (after his escape) to the
Confederate lines. All along his route through South Carolina and
Georgia, he was met by a series of heart-felt ovations. Crowds flocked[Pg 512]
to congratulate him. All the people united in greeting him. The
officials in all the towns he visited, prepared his reception. The
highest and lowest in the land were alike eager to do him honor. The
recollection of his former career and the romantic incidents of his
escape combined to create a wonderful interest in him. Perhaps no man
ever received such a welcome from the people of his choice. At Richmond,
the interest manifested in him knew no bounds. He was the guest of the
city for weeks—but none others felt the true and earnest satisfaction
at his deliverance and return, which repaid the devoted band of his
followers who had so anxiously looked for him. The Morgan men felt, in
the knowledge that their idolized leader was safe, a consolation for all
that they had endured.
General Morgan’s first care, upon arriving at Richmond, was to strongly
urge measures which he thought would conduce, if not to the release, at
least to a mitigation of the rigorous treatment of his officers and men
in prison. He repeatedly brought the subject to the notice of the
Confederate authorities, but perfect indifference was manifested
regarding it. The officials found nothing in their soft berths at
Richmond which could enable them to realize the discomforts of a prison,
and the chances of their own captivity appeared so remote that they
really could not sympathize with those who had the ill-luck to be
captured. Just before leaving Richmond, General Morgan addressed a
letter to President Davis, dated the 24th of March, in which he declared
that, while imperatively summoned by a sense of duty to place himself at
the head of the remnant of his old division, which was still in the
field, he desired to earnestly press the claims of those who were
captive to the best offices of their Government. No men, he said, better
deserved than his own “the proud title of Confederate soldiers,” and
none had a better right to expect that every effort would be made by
their countrymen in their behalf. He stated that in his entire service,
“not one act of cruelty was ever committed by men of my command, but[Pg 513]
prisoners of war met with uniform good treatment at our hands.” In
response to all this, Commissioner Ould made a public protest against
the treatment of the officers confined in the penitentiaries, and was
assured that their condition was good enough and would not be bettered.
General Morgan was naturally desirous of having all of the men of his
old command assigned him, but in this he was grievously disappointed.
Breckinridge’s regiment, the Ninth Kentucky, was positively refused him;
nor was he permitted to have Dortch’s battalion, although it was
composed of men from more than one regiment of his old division, the
bulk of which was in prison. Kirkpatrick’s battalion petitioned to be
assigned to him, immediately that the news of his arrival within the
Confederate lines was known. General Morgan was, in this respect, the
victim of an utterly absurd policy regarding organization and
discipline, which was prevalent about this time among the military sages
at Richmond. Some other equally insane idea having just gone out of
date, this one was seized on with all the enthusiasm with which
theorists adopt fancies costing them nothing but the exercise of a crazy
imagination. It is hard to combat a fantasy. Three years of warfare had
elapsed, and the red-tape and closet warriors suddenly discovered and
gravely declared a reform which was to produce a military millenium. All
officers were to be removed from the commands with which they had served
during these three years, and placed elsewhere. This reform was to
pervade the army. This separation of officers and men who had learned
mutual trust in each other, was intended to produce a perfect and
harmonious discipline. A commander who had acquired the confidence and
love of his men, was, in the opinion of the Richmond gentry, a dangerous
man—such a feeling between troops and officers was highly irregular and
injurious. They thought that the best way to improve the morale of the
army was to destroy all that (in common opinion) goes to make it.
They said that this policy would make the army “a machine,” and it[Pg 514]
would be difficult to conceive of a more utterly worthless machine than
it would have then been. It is highly probable that, under certain
conditions, the Southern boys can be disciplined. If a few of them were
caught up at a time, and were penned up in barracks for five or six
years, so that a fair chance could be had at them, they might perhaps be
made automatons, as solemn and amenable as the Dutch of the “old army.”
But it was absolutely impossible to so discipline the thousands of
volunteers who were suddenly organized and initiated at once into
campaigns and the most arduous duties of the field. In the lack of this
discipline, it was imperatively necessary to cherish between officers
and men the most cordial relations, and to leave always in command those
officers whose characters and services had inspired love, confidence,
and respect.
In the spring of 1864, General Morgan was sent to take command of the
Department of Southwestern Virginia, and which included also a portion
of East Tennessee.
The forces at his disposal were two Kentucky cavalry brigades and the
militia, or “reserves,” of that region. One of these brigades of cavalry
had been previously commanded by General George B. Hodge, and was
subsequently commanded by General Cosby. The other was commanded by
Colonel Giltner. Both were composed of fine material, and were together
some two thousand or twenty-five hundred strong.
Kirkpatrick’s battalion had passed the latter part of the winter and
early part of spring at Decatur, Georgia, a small village near Atlanta.
Here it enjoyed comparative rest and comfort. The men recovered from the
effects of previous hardships, and the effective strength of the command
was more than doubled by men who escaped from prison, or who, having
been absent upon various pretexts, hurried back as soon as they learned
of General Morgan’s return.
Leaving Decatur in April, the battalion marched leisurely through
Georgia and South and North Carolina—receiving everywhere the greatest
kindness at the hands of the citizens—and reported, in early May, to[Pg 515]
General Morgan at Saltville in Western Virginia. Almost immediately
after its arrival, it was called upon to again confront the enemy.
Upon the 8th or 9th of May, the intelligence was received of the advance
of strong columns of the enemy; the department was threatened,
simultaneously, by a raid upon the salt works, and the approach of a
heavy force of infantry and cavalry to Dublin depot, not far from New
river bridge. The cavalry column advancing upon Saltville was commanded
by General Averill, and the other by General Crook. It was of the utmost
importance to repulse both. The former, if successful, would capture the
salt works, and the lead mines near Wytheville, and the loss of either
would have been a great and irreparable disaster; the latter, if
established at New river, or that vicinity, would entirely cut off
communication with Richmond, prevent the transmission of supplies, from
all the region westward, to General Lee’s army and might do incalculable
damages besides. It was necessary then that battle should be given to
both, and that they should be crippled to some extent, if too strong to
be defeated.
The dismounted cavalry of the department—most of which were men of
Morgan’s old division—about four hundred strong, were sent to reinforce
the troops under General Jenkins. The latter had fallen back before
Crook to Dublin depot. General Morgan prepared with Giltner’s brigade,
and the mounted men of his old command, now formed into two battalions
commanded by Captains Kirkpatrick and Cassell, and about six hundred
strong in all, to fight Averill. The two battalions of Kirkpatrick and
Cassell, or the “Morgan brigade,” as the organization was then called,
were placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alston.
On the 9th, General Morgan became convinced, from reports of his scouts,
that Averill did not intend to attack Saltville but that he was about to
march on Wytheville. Leaving Saltville on the 10th, General Morgan
followed upon the track of the enemy to the junction of the
Jeffersonville and Wytheville and Jeffersonville and Crab Orchard[Pg 516]
roads. Here Averill had taken the Crab Orchard road, designing, General
Morgan believed, to induce a close pursuit.
Had General Morgan followed upon his track, Averill, by the judicious
employment of a comparatively small force, could have held him in check
in the mountains, and could himself have turned upon Wytheville,
captured the provost-guard there, destroyed the military stores, the
lead mines, and torn up the railroad, rendering it useless for weeks.
General Morgan therefore moved directly through Burk’s garden to
Wytheville, thus (taking the shorter road) anticipating his wily
adversary. Reaching Wytheville some hours in advance of his command.
General Morgan placed a small detachment of General Jones’ brigade of
cavalry, which he found there, under Colonel George Crittenden and
ordered that officer to occupy a small pass in the mountain between
“Crocket’s Cave” and Wytheville, through which the enemy would have to
advance upon the town, or else be forced to make a wide detour.
On the afternoon of the 11th, the command reached Wytheville and were
received by the terrified citizens with the heartiest greetings. The
little town had been once captured by the Federals and a portion of it
burned. The ladies clapped their hands and waved their handkerchiefs
joyfully in response to the assurances of the men that the enemy should
not come in sight of the town. Fortunately, while the men were resting
near Wytheville, their attention was attracted by the efforts of a squad
of citizens to handle an old six-pounder which “belonged to the town.” A
good deal of laughter was occasioned by their impromptu method.
General Morgan, having no artillery, at once took charge of it and
called for volunteers to man it. Edgar Davis and Jerome Clark of Captain
Cantrill’s company and practical artillerists came forward and were
placed in command of the piece.
About 3½ p.m., the enemy engaged Colonel Crittenden at the gap. The
column was immediately put in motion and marched briskly in the[Pg 517]
direction of the firing. When near the gap, it filed to the left, and
moving around the mountain and through the skirting woods, was soon in
line, upon the right flank and threatening the rear of the enemy.
Alston’s brigade was formed on the right, occupying an open field,
extending from Giltner’s left to the mountain. The enemy at the first
intimation of this movement had withdrawn from the mouth of the gap and
was advantageously posted upon a commanding ridge. Both brigades were
dismounted, under a smart fire from sharpshooters, and advanced rapidly,
driving in the skirmishers and coming down upon the enemy (before his
formation was entirely completed), they dislodged him from his position.
Falling back about five hundred yards, he took position again around the
dwelling and buildings upon Mr. Crockett’s farm, and maintained it
obstinately for some time. The piece of artillery, well served by the
gallant volunteers, did excellent service here.
General Morgan, himself, assisted to handle it. The enemy were dislodged
from this position also. The fight continued until after nightfall, and
was a succession of charges upon the one side and retreats upon the
other. The Federal troops were well trained and their officers behaved
with great gallantry.
General Morgan’s loss in this engagement, in killed and wounded, was
about fifty. The enemy’s loss was more severe. Nearly one hundred
prisoners were taken and more than that number of horses.
General Morgan was cordial in his praise of the alacrity, courage and
endurance of officers and men.
It was, indeed, a very important affair and a defeat would have been
exceedingly disastrous.
The dismounted men who had been sent under Colonel Smith to reinforce
General Jenkins, were engaged at the hotly contested action at Dublin
depot, and behaved in a manner which gained them high commendation.
Colonel Smith reached Dublin about 10 a.m. on the 10th, and learned[Pg 518]
that the forces under the command of General Jenkins were being hard
pressed by the enemy and that the gallant General was severely wounded.
Colonel Smith immediately marched with his command, about four hundred
strong, toward the scene of the action. After proceeding a short
distance, he found the Confederate forces in full retreat and some
disorder. He pressed on toward the front, through the retreating mass.
Reporting to Colonel McCausland (who assumed command upon the fall of
General Jenkins), and who was bravely struggling with a rear-guard to
check the enemy’s pursuit, Colonel Smith was instructed to form his
command in the woods upon the left of the road and endeavor to cover the
retreat.
This was promptly done, and in a few minutes Colonel Smith received the
pursuing enemy with a heavy and unexpected volley.
Driving back the foremost assailants, Colonel Smith advanced in turn and
pressed his success for an hour. Then the entire hostile force coming
up, he was forced back slowly and in good order to Dublin, which had
already been evacuated by the troops of Colonel McCausland.
Colonel Smith followed thence after Colonel McCausland to New River
bridge, crossing the river just before sunset, and encamping on the
opposite bank.
After some skirmishing on the next morning, the Confederates retreated,
giving up the position. The fight on the 10th was a most gallant
one—highly creditable to the commanding officer, subordinates and men.
Among the killed was C.S. Cleburne (brother of General Pat Cleburne),
one of the most promising young officers in the army. General Morgan had
made him a captain, a short time previously, for unusual gallantry.
In the latter part of May, General Morgan undertook the expedition known
as the “last” or “June raid” into Kentucky. He had many reasons for[Pg 519]
undertaking this expedition. He was impatient to retrieve, in some
manner, the losses of the Ohio raid, by another campaign of daring
conception, and, he hoped, successful execution. He wished to recruit
his thinned ranks with Kentuckians, and to procure horses for the men
who had none. Moreover, there were excellent military reasons for this
movement.
Averill and Cook were not far off, and could pounce down at any moment,
but were supposed to be awaiting reinforcements, without which they
would not return.
These reinforcements were coming from Kentucky under Burbridge and
Hobson, and consisted of all or nearly all the troops in Kentucky,
available for active service.
General Morgan despaired of successfully resisting all these forces if
they united and bore down on the department. But he believed that, if he
could move into Kentucky, and gain the rear of the forces coming thence
before the junction with the other Federal forces was affected, he could
defeat the plan. The Kentucky troops would turn and pursue him, and the
attack upon the department would not be made. In short, he hoped to
avoid invasion and attack by assuming the offensive—to keep the enemy
out of Southwestern Virginia by making an irruption into Kentucky.
He wrote on the 31st of May to General S. Cooper, Adjutant General,
detailing his plan and the information upon which it was based.
In this letter, he said: “While General Buckner was in command of this
department, he instructed me to strike a blow at the enemy in Kentucky.
“As I was on the eve of executing this order, the rapid movement of the
enemy from the Kanawha valley, in the direction of the Tennessee and
Virginia Railroad, made it necessary that I should remain to co-operate
with the other forces for the defense of this section. Since the repulse
of the enemy, I have obtained the consent of General Jones to carry out
the original plan agreed on between General Buckner and myself.”[Pg 520]
“I have just received information that General Hobson left Mt. Sterling
on the 23rd inst., with six regiments of cavalry (about three thousand
strong), for Louisa, on the Sandy. This force he has collected from all
the garrisons in Middle and Southeastern Kentucky. At Louisa there is
another force of about two thousand five hundred cavalry, under a
colonel of a Michigan regiment, recently sent to that vicinity. It is
the reported design of General Hobson to unite with this latter force,
and co-operate with Generals Averill and Crook in another movement upon
the salt works and lead mines of Southwestern Virginia.” “This
information has determined me to move at once into Kentucky, and thus
distract the plans of the enemy by initiating a movement within his
lines. My force will be about two thousand two hundred men. I expect to
be pursued by the force at Louisa, which I will endeavor to avoid. There
will be nothing in the State to retard my progress but a few scattered
provost-guards.”
In the latter part of May, General Morgan commenced the movement
indicated in this letter.
His division consisted of three brigades. The first under command of
Colonel Giltner, was between ten and eleven hundred strong, and was a
magnificent body of hardy, dashing young men, drawn chiefly from the
middle and eastern counties of Kentucky. The second brigade was composed
of the mounted men of the old Morgan division. It consisted of three
small battalions, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Bowles
and Majors Cassell and Kirkpatrick. It was between five and six hundred
strong and was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alston. The third brigade
was composed of the dismounted men of both the other commands, the
greater number, however, being from the second brigade. It was organized
into two battalions, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Martin
and Major Geo. R. Diamond, a brave and exceedingly competent officer of
Giltner’s brigade. The third brigade was about eight hundred strong and
was commanded by Colonel D. Howard Smith. No artillery was taken—it
could not have been transported over the roads which General Morgan
expected to travel. The column reached Pound Gap on the 2nd of June and
found it occupied by a force of the enemy. Colonel Smith was ordered to
clear the path, and pushing his brigade forward, he soon did it. Several
horses were captured, which was accepted as a happy omen.
Sending a scouting party to observe the direction taken by the
retreating enemy, and to ascertain if they joined a larger force and
turned again, General Morgan pressed on, hoping to reach Mt.
Sterling—the general Federal depot of supplies and most important post
in that portion of Kentucky—before General Burbridge could return from
the extreme eastern part of the State. As Burbridge was incumbered with
artillery and would be two or three days in getting the news, General
Morgan confidently believed that he could reach Mt. Sterling first. The
mountainous country of Southeastern Kentucky, so rugged, steep and
inhospitable, as to seem almost impossible of access, had to be
traversed for this purpose. More than one hundred and fifty miles of
this region was marched over in seven days. The dismounted men behaved
heroically. Straining up the steep mountain sides, making their toilsome
way through gloomy and deep ravines, over tremendous rocks and every
formidable obstacle which nature collects in such regions against the
intrusion of man, footsore, bleeding, panting, they yet never faltered
or complained, and richly won the enthusiastic eulogy of their
commander. They marched from twenty-two to twenty-seven miles each day.
This march was terribly severe upon the mounted commands also. The
fatigue and lack of forage caused many horses to break down—and the
dismounted brigade was largely augmented. Colonel Giltner stated that he
lost more than two hundred horses in his brigade.
On the 6th of June, Colonel Smith was transferred to the command of the
second brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Martin was then assigned to command
of the third. On the 7th, finding that he would succeed in anticipating[Pg 522]
Burbridge at Mt. Sterling and that he would not require his whole force
to take the place, General Morgan dispatched Captain Jenkins with fifty
men to destroy the bridges upon the Frankfort and Louisville Railroad to
prevent troops arriving from Indiana for the defense of Lexington and
Central Kentucky. He sent Major Chenoweth to destroy bridges on the
Kentucky Central Railroad to prevent the importation of troops from
Cincinnati, and he sent Captain Peter Everett with one hundred men to
capture Maysville. General Morgan instructed these officers to
accomplish their respective commissions thoroughly but promptly, to
create as much excitement as possible, occasion the concentration of
forces already in the State at points widely apart, to magnify his
strength and circulate reports which would bewilder and baffle any
attempt to calculate his movements and to meet him within three or four
days at Lexington.
When the command emerged from the sterile country of the mountains into
the fair lands of Central Kentucky, the change had a perceptible and
happy effect upon the spirits of the men. Night had closed around them,
on the evening of the 7th, while they were still struggling through the
ghastly defiles or up the difficult paths of the “Rebel trace,” still
environed by the bleak mountain scenery. During the night, they arrived
at the confines of the beautiful “Blue Grass country,” and when the sun
arose, clear and brilliant, a lovely and smiling landscape had replaced
the lowering, stony, dungeon like region whence they had at last
escaped. The contrast seemed magical—the song, jest and laugh burst
forth again and the men drew new life and courage from the scene.
In the early part of the day, the 8th, the column reached the vicinity
of Mt. Sterling, and preparations were made for an immediate attack upon
the place. On the previous day, Captain Lawrence Jones, commanding the
advance-guard, had been sent with his guard to take position upon the
main road between Mt. Sterling and Lexington, and Captain Jackson was
sent with one company to take position between Mt. Sterling and Paris.[Pg 523]
These officers were instructed to prevent communication, by either
telegraph or courier, between Mt. Sterling and the other two places. The
enemy were simultaneously attacked by detachments from the first and
second brigades and soon forced to surrender with little loss on either
side. Major Holliday, of the first brigade, made a gallant charge upon
the encampment which drove them in confusion into the town. Three
hundred and eighty prisoners were taken, a large quantity of stores and
a number of wagons and teams.
Leaving Colonel Giltner to destroy the stores, and provide for the
remounting upon the captured horses of a portion of the dismounted men,
General Morgan marched immediately for Lexington with the second
brigade. Burbridge making a wonderful march—moving nearly ninety miles
in the last thirty hours—reached Mt. Sterling before daybreak on the
9th. Then occurred a great disaster to General Morgan’s plans and it
fell upon the brave boys who had so patiently endured, on foot, the
long, painful march. Some of these men had marched from Hyter’s Gap in
Virginia, to Mt. Sterling, a distance of two hundred and thirty miles in
ten days. Their shoes were worn to tatters and their feet raw and
bleeding, yet on the last day they pressed on twenty-seven miles.
Encamping not far from the town but to the east of it, Colonel Martin
directed Lieutenant Colonel Brent, who had been left with him in command
of some forty or fifty men to act as rear-guard, to establish his guard
at least one mile from the encampment and picket the road whence the
danger might come. Lieutenant Colonel Brent had been assigned to General
Morgan’s command a short time previously to this expedition and was not
one of his old officers. Information which had been received a day or
two before had induced the belief that Burbridge was not near. Scouts
sent by General Morgan to observe his movements had returned, reporting
that he had moved on toward Virginia. This information convinced General
Morgan that he would not arrive at Mt. Sterling for two or three days[Pg 524]
after the 8th—although satisfied that he would come.
Colonel Giltner’s command was encamped some distance from Martin’s and
upon a different road, and was not in a position to afford the latter
any protection. Brent, neglecting the precaution enjoined by Martin,
posted his guard only one or two hundred yards from the encampment of
the dismounted men and extended his pickets but a short distance
further.
On the next morning, about three o’clock, the enemy dashed into the
camp, the pickets giving no warning, and shot and rode over the men as
they lay around their fires. Many were killed before they arose from
their blankets. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of the surprise, the
men stood to their arms and fighting resolutely, although without
concert, soon drove the assailants out of the camp. Being then formed by
their officers, they presented a formidable front to the enemy who
returned, in greater strength as fresh numbers arrived to the attack.
The fight was close and determined upon both sides. Colonel Martin’s
headquarters were at a house near by. He was awakened by the rattling
shots and springing upon his horse, rode toward the camp to find the
enemy between himself and his men. Without hesitation he rode at full
speed through the hostile throng, braving the volleys of both lines, and
rejoined his command. The enemy brought up a piece of artillery, which
was taken by a desperate effort, but was soon recaptured. The poor
fellows undaunted by weariness, the sudden attack upon them, and their
desperate situation fought with unflinching courage for more than an
hour.
At length Colonel Martin fell back, cutting his way through Mt. Sterling
which was occupied by the enemy. Two miles from the town he met Colonel
Giltner, and proposed to the latter that, with their combined forces,
the fight should be renewed. Giltner acceding, it was arranged that he
should attack in front, while Martin, moving around to the other side of
the town again, should take the enemy in the rear. This being done, the[Pg 525]
fight was pressed again with energy, until Martin’s ammunition failing
he was compelled to withdraw. The enemy was too much crippled to pursue.
In this affair, although inflicting severe loss on the enemy, Martin’s
command lost heavily. Fourteen commissioned officers were killed and
forty privates. Eighty were so severely wounded that they could not be
removed, one hundred were captured and more than that number cut off and
dispersed. Colonel Martin was twice wounded.
On the morning of the 10th, General Morgan entered Lexington after a
slight skirmish. He burned the government depot and stables and captured
a sufficient number of horses to mount all of the dismounted men, who
were then returned to their respective companies in the first and second
brigades.
Moving thence to Georgetown, General Morgan sent Captain Cooper with one
company to demonstrate toward Frankfort. Captain Cooper ably executed
his orders, alarming and confining to the fortification around the town
a much superior force of the enemy.
From Georgetown, General Morgan directed his march to Cynthiana,
reaching that place on the morning of the 11th. After a sharp fight the
garrison, four hundred strong, was captured. Unfortunately, a portion of
the town was burned in the engagement, the enemy having occupied the
houses. While the fight was going on in town, Colonel Giltner engaged a
body of the enemy, fifteen hundred strong, under General Hobson. General
Morgan, after the surrender of the garrison, took Cassell’s battalion
and, gaining Hobson’s rear, compelled him also to surrender.
A large quantity of stores were captured and destroyed at Cynthiana.
General Hobson was paroled and sent, under escort of Captain C.C. Morgan
and two other officers, to Cincinnati, to effect, if possible, the
exchange of himself and officers for certain of General Morgan’s
officers then in prison and, failing in that, to report as prisoner
within the Confederate lines. He was not permitted to negotiate the[Pg 526]
exchange and his escort were detained for some weeks.
On the 12th, the command numbering, after all losses, and deducting
details to guard prisoners and wagon train and to destroy the track and
bridges for some miles of the Kentucky Central railroad, some twelve
hundred men, was attacked by a force of infantry, cavalry and artillery
under General Burbridge which General Morgan estimated at five thousand
two hundred strong. Giltner’s command had been encamped on the Paris
road and was first engaged by the enemy. This brigade was almost
entirely out of ammunition. The cartridges captured the day before did
not fit the guns with which it was armed. General Morgan had directed
Colonel Giltner to take, also, the captured guns for which this
ammunition was available, but he was unwilling to abandon his better
rifles and provided his brigade with neither captured guns nor
cartridges. Giltner soon became hotly engaged with the advancing enemy
and although the second brigade moved to his support, their united
strength could oppose no effectual resistance.
General Morgan ordered the entire command to retreat upon the Augusta
road and charged with the mounted reserve to cover the withdrawal. The
action was very disastrous. Colonel Giltner, cut off from the Augusta,
was forced to retreat upon the Leesburg road. Colonel Smith, at first,
doubtful of the condition of affairs, did not immediately take part in
the fight. His gallant and efficient Adjutant, Lieutenant Arthur
Andrews, rode to the scene of the fight, and returning, declared that
Colonel Giltner required his prompt support. Colonel Smith instantly put
his brigade in motion and was soon in front of the enemy.
He says: “My brigade, gallantly led by its battalion commander, attacked
the enemy with great spirit and drove him back along its entire length.
The first battalion moved with more rapidity than the third, doubtless
on account of the better nature of the ground it had to traverse, until
it swung around almost at right angles with the line of the third[Pg 527]
battalion. Hastening to correct this defect, I rode to Colonel Bowles,
but before he could obey my instructions a heavy force was massed upon
him, and after a desperate contest he was forced back. I directed him to
reform his command behind a stone fence on the Ruddle’s Mill road, which
he did promptly and checked the enemy with heavy loss. At this juncture
I looked for Kirkpatrick, who had been holding his line with his usual
energy and determination. I found that his battalion had been
separated—two companies, commanded respectively by Captain Cantrill and
Lieutenant Gardner, had been fighting hard on his left, while the other
two were acting with the first battalion. Captain Kirkpatrick, severely
wounded, was forced to quit the field. About the same time, gallant
Bowles was driven from his second position, strong as it was, by
overpowering numbers. Colonel Smith now retreated through Cynthiana,
seeking to rejoin General Morgan on the Augusta road. He suddenly found
himself intercepted and surrounded on three sides by the enemy, while
upon the other side was the Licking river. Seeing the condition of
affairs, the men became unmanageable and dashed across the river. Having
been reformed on the other side, they charged a body of cavalry which
then confronted them and made good their retreat, although scattered and
in confusion.
Collecting all the men, who could be gathered together upon the Augusta
road, General Morgan paroled his prisoners and rapidly retreated. His
loss in this action was very heavy, and he was compelled to march
instantly back to Virginia. Moving through Flemingsburg and West
Liberty, he passed on over the mountains and reached Abingdon on the
20th of June. On this raid, great and inexcusable excesses were
committed, but, except in two or three flagrant instances, they were
committed by men who had never before served with General Morgan. The
men of his old division and Giltner’s fine brigade were rarely guilty.
General Morgan had accomplished the result he had predicted, in averting
the invasion of Southwestern Virginia, but at heavy cost to himself.
CHAPTER XVII
Upon his return to Southwestern Virginia, General Morgan applied himself
assiduously to collect all of his men, however detached or separated
from him, and correct the organization and discipline of his command. It
was a far less easy task then than ever before. Not only was a
conviction stealing upon the Confederate soldiery (and impairing the
efficiency of the most manly and patriotic) that the fiat had gone forth
against us, and that no exercise of courage and fortitude could avert
the doom, but the demoralizing effects of a long war, and habitude to
its scenes and passions had rendered even the best men callous and
reckless, and to a certain extent intractable to influences which had
formerly been all potent with them as soldiers. Imagine the situation in
which the Confederate soldier was placed: Almost destitute of hope that
the cause for which he fought would triumph and fighting on from
instinctive obstinate pride, no longer receiving from the
people—themselves hopeless and impoverished almost to famine by the
draining demands of the war—the sympathy, hospitality and hearty
encouragement once accorded to him; almost compelled (for comfort if not
for existence) to practice oppression and wrong upon his own countrymen,
is it surprising that he became wild and lawless, that he adopted a rude
creed in which strict conformity to military regulations and a nice
obedience to general orders held not very prominent places? This
condition obtained in a far greater degree with the cavalry employed in
the “outpost” departments than with the infantry or the soldiery of the
large armies. It is an unhappy condition, and destructive of military
efficiency and any sort of discipline, but under certain circumstances
it is hard to prevent or correct. There is little temptation and no[Pg 529]
necessity or excuse for it among troops that are well fed, regularly
paid in good money and provided with comfortable clothing, blankets and
shoes in the cold winter; but troops whose rations are few and scanty,
who flutter with rags and wear ventillating shoes which suck in the cold
air, who sleep at night under a blanket which keeps the saddle from a
sore-backed horse in the day time, who are paid (if paid at all) with
waste paper, who have become hardened to the licentious practices of a
cruel warfare—such troops will be frequently tempted to violate the
moral code. Many Confederate cavalrymen so situated left their commands
altogether and became guerrillas, salving their consciences with the
thought that the desertion was not to the enemy. These men, leading a
comparatively luxurious life and receiving, from some people, a mistaken
and foolish admiration, attracted to the same career young men who (but
for the example and the sympathy accorded the guerrilla and denied the
faithful, brave and suffering soldier) would never had quitted their
colors and their duty. Kentucky was at one time, just before the close
of the war, teeming with these guerrillas. It was of no use to threaten
them with punishment—they had no idea of being caught. Besides,
Burbridge shot all that he could lay hands on, and (for their sins) many
prisoners (guilty of no offense), selected at random, or by lot, from
the pens where he kept them for the purpose, were butchered, by this
insensate blood-hound. Not only did General Morgan have to contend with
difficulties thus arising, but now, for the first time, he suffered from
envy, secret animosity and detraction within his own command. Many
faithful friends still surrounded him, many more lay in prison, but he
began to meet with open enmity in his own camp. It had happened in the
old times that some of his warmest and surest adherents had occasionally
urged strenuous remonstrances against his wishes, but they were dictated
by devotion to his interests; now officers, recently connected with him,
inaugurated a jealous and systematic opposition to him in all matters,
and were joined in it, with ungrateful alacrity, by some men whom he[Pg 530]
had thought his fastest friends. Reports of excesses committed by some
of the troops in Kentucky had reached Richmond and created much feeling.
General Morgan had instructed his Inspector General, Captain Bryant H.
Allen, to investigate the accusations against the various parties
suspected of guilt and to prefer charges against those who should appear
to be implicated. Captain Allen was charged with negligence and lack of
industry in pursuing the investigation and complaints were made that
General Morgan was seeking to screen the offenders. All sorts of
communications, the most informal, irregular and some of them, improper,
were forwarded to Richmond by General Morgan’s subordinates, often
unknown to him because not passing through his office, and they were
received by the Secretary of War, Mr. Seddon, without questioning and
with avidity. It was at length announced that a commission would be
appointed to sit at Abingdon and inquire into these charges, and also
into the charge that General Morgan had undertaken the raid into
Kentucky without orders.
While in daily expectation of the arrival of these commissioners, the
sudden irruption of the enemy into that part of the country which was
occupied by his command, caused General Morgan to proceed to the
threatened points. Colonels Smith and Giltner, and a portion of General
Vaughn’s brigade which was stationed in East Tennessee, under Colonel
Bradford, were driven back to Carter’s Station, on the Wetauga river,
some thirty-five miles from Abingdon. When General Morgan reached that
place, and took command of the troops assembled there, the enemy were
retreating. He followed as closely as possible until he had reoccupied
the territory whence the Confederates had been driven. While at
Granville, a small town upon the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad,
seventy-two miles from Abingdon, and eighteen from Bull’s Gap, where a
portion of his troops was stationed, he had occasion to revoke the
parole, granted a few days previously, to a wounded Federal officer,
assistant adjutant general to General Gillem, who was staying at the[Pg 531]
house of a Mrs. Williams, where General Morgan had made his
headquarters. The daughter-in-law of this lady, Mrs. Lucy Williams, a
Union woman and bitterly opposed to the Confederate cause and troops,
was detected with a letter written by this officer, accurately detailing
the number, condition and position of General Morgan’s forces, which
letter she was to have sent to Colonel Gillem. Dr. Cameron, General
Morgan’s chaplain, discovered the letter in a prayer book, where it had
been deposited by the lady.
This being a clear violation of his parole, General Morgan sent the
officer to Lynchburg, to be placed in prison. The younger Mrs. Williams
(his friend) resented this treatment very much, declaring that in his
condition, it might prove fatal to him.
This incident is related because it has been thought to have had a
direct influence in causing General Morgan’s death. When General Morgan
returned to Abingdon, he found an excitement still prevailing regarding
the investigation, but the members of the commission had not yet
arrived.
I met him, then, for the first time since he had made his escape, or I
had been exchanged. He was greatly changed. His face wore a weary,
care-worn expression, and his manner was totally destitute of its former
ardor and enthusiasm. He spoke bitterly, but with no impatience, of the
clamor against him, and seemed saddest about the condition of his
command. He declared that if he had been successful in the last day’s
fight at Cynthiana, he would have been enabled to hold Kentucky for
months; that every organized Federal force which could be promptly
collected to attack him, could have then been disposed of, and that he
had assurance of obtaining a great number of recruits. He spoke with
something of his old sanguine energy, only when proclaiming his
confidence that he could have achieved successes unparalleled in his
entire career, if fortune had favored him in that fight. But no word of
censure upon any one escaped him. It had never been his habit to charge[Pg 532]
the blame of failure upon his subordinates—his native magnanimity
forbade it; and tried so sorely as he was at this time, by malignant
calumny, he was too proud to utter a single reproach. A letter which he
intended to forward to the Secretary of War, but the transmission of
which his death prevented, shows his sense of the treatment he had
received. This letter was written just after the conversation, above
mentioned, occurred, while he was again confronting the enemy, and
immediately before he was killed. I can not better introduce it than by
first giving the letter of the officer who forwarded it to me (I had
believed it lost), and who was for more than a year Adjutant General of
the Department of Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee, and served
for some months on General Morgan’s staff. He is well known to the
ex-Confederates of Kentucky, as having been an exceedingly intelligent,
competent, and gallant officer, and a gentleman of the highest honor.
“Covington, December —, ——.
“Dear General: In looking over some old papers (relics of the late
war), a few days ago, I discovered one which, until then, I did not
know was in my possession. It is the last letter written by General
Morgan, and, in a measure, may be considered his dying declaration.
I can not recollect how it came into my possession, but believe it
to have been among a bundle of papers that were taken from his body
after he was killed, and forwarded to Department Headquarters; the
letter of Captain Gwynn, which I will also inclose you, leaves
hardly a doubt upon that point.
I have noticed through the press, that you were engaged in writing a
history of “Morgan’s command,” and under the impression that this
paper will be of service to you, I herewith forward it. I am
familiar with the embarrassments that surrounded the General for
some time previously to his death, and in reading this last appeal
to the powers that had dealt with him so unjustly, the remembrance
of them still awakens in my bosom many emotions of regret. If the[Pg 533]
General acted adversely to his own interests, in endeavoring to
adjust quietly the unfortunate affairs that he refers to, those who
understood his motives for so doing would excuse this error of his
judgment when they realized the feelings that prompted it. He saw
his error when it was too late to correct it, and died before
opportunity was given to vindicate his character. I remember
distinctly the last conversation I had with him, only a few days
before his death, and the earnest manner in which he spoke of this
trouble, would have removed from my mind all doubt of the perfect
rectitude of his intentions, if any had ever existed. I remember,
too, my visit to Richmond during the month of August, 1864, on which
occasion, at the General’s request, I called upon the Secretary of
War to lay before him some papers entrusted to my care, and also to
make some verbal explanations regarding them. The excited, I may say
the exasperated manner in which the Honorable Secretary commented
upon the documents, left but one impression upon my mind, and that
was, that the War Department had made up its mind that the party was
guilty and that its conviction should not be offended by any
evidence to the contrary. The determination to pursue and break the
General down was apparent to every one, and the Kentucky expedition
was to be the means to accomplish this end (the reasons for a great
deal of this enmity are, of course, familiar to you). I endeavored
to explain to Mr. Seddon the injustice of the charge that General
Morgan had made this expedition without proper authority (I felt
this particularly to be my duty as I was the only person then living
who could bear witness upon that point), but being unable to obtain
a quiet hearing, I left his office disappointed and disgusted.
* * * *
* * *
With the hope that you may succeed in the work you have undertaken,
believe me,[Pg 534]
Very truly, your friend,
J.L. Sandford.”
“Headquarters Cav. Dep’t, East Tennessee,}
Jonesboro’, Sept. 1, 1864. }
“Sir: I have the honor to ask your early and careful consideration
of the statements herein submitted, and, although I am aware that
the representations which have been made you, concerning the matters
to which these statements relate, have so decided your opinion that
you do not hesitate to give it free expression, I yet feel that it
is due to myself to declare how false and injurious such
representations have been and to protest against the injustice which
condemns me unheard.
You will understand that I allude to the alleged robbery of the Bank
of Mt. Sterling, Kentucky, and other outrages which my command is
charged with having committed during the late expedition into that
State. I will not, myself, countenance a course of procedure against
which I feel that I can justly protest, by citing testimony or
waging my own affirmation in disproof of the accusations which have
been filed against me at your office—but I will demand a prompt and
thorough investigation of them all, and will respectfully urge the
propriety of yourself instituting it.
If, as has been asserted, I have obstructed all examination into the
truth of these imputations, a proper regard for the interests of the
service, as well as the ends of justice requires that some higher
authority shall compel an exposure. Until, very recently, I was
ignorant how the rumors which had already poisoned the public mind,
had been received and listened to in official circles, and I can not
forbear indignant complaint of the injury done my reputation and
usefulness by the encouragement thus given them.
Allegations, directly implicating me in the excesses above referred
to, that I had connived at, if I did not incite them, and that I
have striven to shield the perpetrators from discovery and
punishment—allegations, the most vague and yet all tending to
impeach my character, have obtained hearing and credence at the
department.[Pg 535]
I have not been called on, indeed I may say I have not been
permitted one word in my defense. Permit me to say that an officer’s
reputation may suffer from such causes, in official and public
opinion, and that he may find it difficult, if not impossible, to
vindicate it, unless his superiors assist him by inviting inquiry. I
am informed that communications and documents of various kinds,
relating to the alleged criminal transactions in Kentucky, have been
addressed you by certain of my subordinates, and I have been
profoundly ignorant of their existence, until after their receipt,
and the intended impression had been produced. I have but little
acquaintance with the forms and regulations of your office, and I
would respectfully ask if communications so furnished are not
altogether irregular and prejudicial to good order and proper
discipline? If these parties believe my conduct culpable, is it not
their plain duty to prefer charges against me and bring me before a
court martial? And if failing to adopt measures suggested alike by
law, justice and propriety, they pursue a course which tends to
weaken my authority, impair my reputation and embarrass my conduct,
have I not the right to expect that their action shall be condemned
and themselves reprimanded? Indeed, sir, discipline and
subordination have been impaired to such an extent in my command by
proceedings, such as I have described, that an officer of high rank
quitted a responsible post, without leave and in direct disobedience
to my orders, and repaired to Richmond to urge in person his
application for assignment to duty more consonant with his
inclinations. It is, with all due respect, that I express my regret
that his application was successful.
Permit me again, sir, to urge earnestly, that the investigation,
which can alone remove the difficulties which I now experience,
shall be immediately ordered.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
John H. Morgan.[Pg 536]
To Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War.
On the 28th or 29th of August, General Morgan left Abingdon, and taking
command of the troops at Jonesboro’ on the 31st, immediately prepared to
move against the enemy. Our forces had again been driven away from their
positions at Bull’s Gap and Rogersville, and had fallen back to
Jonesboro’. After two or three days delay for refitment, etc., General
Morgan marched from Jonesboro’ with the intention of attacking the enemy
at Bull’s Gap. If he could drive them from that position, by a sudden
and rapidly executed movement, he would, in all probability, cut off
that force at Rogersville and either force it to surrender or compel it
to retreat into Kentucky. In the latter event, the enemy’s strength
would be so much reduced, that all of East Tennessee, as far down as
Knoxville, would be for some time, in possession of the Confederates.
General Morgan’s strength, including the portions of General Vaughan’s
brigade, was about sixteen hundred and two pieces of artillery. The men
were badly armed and equipped and had been much discouraged by their
late reverses, but reanimated by the presence of their leader, whom they
loved all the more as misfortunes befell them, they were anxious for
battle.
A small frame house upon the left side of the road leading from
Jonesboro’ to Greenville, was often pointed out to me subsequently, as
the spot where General Morgan received (as he rode past the column), the
last cheer ever given him by his men. Reaching Greenville about 4 p.m.
on the 3rd of September, he determined to encamp there for the night and
move on Bull’s Gap the next day. The troops were stationed on all sides
of the place, and he made his headquarters in town, at the house of Mrs.
Williams. The younger Mrs. Williams left Greenville, riding in the
direction of Bull’s Gap at the first rumors of the approach of our
forces, to give, we have always believed, the alarm to the enemy.
The Tennesseeans of Vaughan’s brigade (under Colonel Bradford), were
encamped on the Bull’s Gap road, and were instructed to picket that road
and the roads to the left. Clark’s battalion of Colonel Smith’s brigade[Pg 537]
and the artillery were encamped on the Jonesboro’ road, about five
hundred yards from the town. The remainder of Colonel Smith’s brigade
was encamped on the Rogersville road. Colonel Giltner’s command was also
stationed in this quarter, and the two picketed all the roads to the
front and right flank. The town, had all instructions been obeyed and
the pickets judiciously placed, would have been perfectly protected. It
has been stated, I know not how correctly, that the enemy gained
admittance to the town, unchallenged, through an unaccountable error in
the picketing of the roads on the left. According to this account, the
enemy, who left Bull’s Gap before midnight, quitted the main road at
Blue Springs, equi-distant from Greenville and Bull’s Gap, and marched
by the Warrensburg road, until within one mile and a half of the town.
At this point, a by-road leads from the Warrensburg to the Newport road.
The pickets on the Warrensburg road were not stationed in sight of this
point, while on the Newport road the base of the pickets was beyond the
point where the by-road enters, and there were no rear videttes between
the base and town. The enemy (it is stated), took this little by-road,
and turning off in front of one picket, came in behind the other. At any
rate, about daylight, a body perhaps of one hundred cavalry dashed into
Greenville and were followed in a short time by Gillem’s whole force. It
was the party that came first which killed General Morgan. His
fate, however, is still involved in mystery. Major Gassett, of his staff,
states that they left the house together and sought to escape, but found
every street guarded. They took refuge once in the open cellar of a
house, expecting that some change in the disposition of the Federal
forces would leave an avenue for escape, or that they would be rescued
by a charge from some of the troops at the camps. They were discovered
and pointed out by a Union woman. Gassett succeeded in effecting his
escape. General Morgan made his way back to the garden of Mrs. Williams
house. Lieutenant X. Hawkins, a fearless young officer, charged into[Pg 538]
the town with fifteen men and strove to reach the point where he
supposed the General to be, but he was forced back. General Morgan was
killed in the garden—shot through the heart. It is not known whether he
surrendered or was offering resistance.
His friends have always believed that he was murdered after his
surrender. Certain representations by the parties who killed him, their
ruffianly character, and the brutality with which they treated his body,
induced the belief; and it was notorious that his death, if again
captured, had been sworn. His slayers broke down the paling around the
garden, dragged him through, and, while he was tossing his arms in his
dying agonies, threw him across a mule, and paraded his body about the
town, shouting and screaming in savage exultation. No effort was made by
any one except Lieutenant Hawkins to accomplish his rescue. The three
commands demoralized by General Morgan’s death, became separated and
were easily driven away. The men of his old command declared their
desire to fight and avenge him on the spot, but a retreat was insisted
upon.
Thus, on the 4th of September, 1864, in this little village of East
Tennessee, fell the greatest partisan leader the world ever saw, unless
it were the Irishman, Sarsfield. But not only was the light of genius
extinguished then, and a heroic spirit lost to earth—as kindly and as
noble a heart as was ever warmed by the constant presence of generous
emotions was stilled by a ruffian’s bullet.
As the event is described, the feelings it excited come back almost as
fresh and poignant as at the time. How hard it was to realize that his
time, too, had come—that so much life had been quenched. Every trait of
the man we almost worshiped, recollections of incidents which showed his
superb nature, crowd now, as they crowded then, upon the mind.
When he died, the glory and chivalry seemed gone from the struggle, and
it became a tedious routine, enjoined by duty, and sustained only by[Pg 539]
sentiments of pride and hatred. Surely men never grieved for a leader as
Morgan’s men sorrowed for him. The tears which scalded the cheeks of
hardy and rugged veterans, who had witnessed all the terrible scenes of
four years of war, attested it, and the sad faces told of the aching
hearts within.
His body was taken from the hands which defiled it, by General Gillem,
as soon as that officer arrived at Greenville, and sent to our lines,
under flag of truce. It was buried first at Abingdon, then removed to
the cemetery at Richmond, where it lies now, surrounded by kindred
heroic ashes, awaiting the time when it can be brought to his own
beloved Kentucky—the hour when there is no longer fear that the storm,
which living rebels are sworn to repress, shall burst out with the
presence of the dead chieftain.
The troops again returned to Jonesboro’, the enemy returning after a
short pursuit to Bull’s Gap. Immediately upon learning of General
Morgan’s death, General Echols, then commanding the department, ordered
me to take command of the brigade composed of his old soldiers—the
remnant of the old division. I found this brigade reduced to two hundred
and seventy-three effective men, and armed in a manner that made it a
matter of wonder how they could fight at all. There were scarcely fifty
serviceable guns in the brigade, and the variety of calibers rendered it
almost a matter of impossibility to keep on hand a supply of available
ammunition. They were equipped similarly in all other respects. Every
effort was at once instituted to collect and procure guns, and to
provide suitable equipments. General Echols kindly rendered all the
assistance in his power, and manifested a special interest in us, for
which we were deeply grateful. Our friends at Richmond and throughout
the Confederacy, seemed to experience fresh sympathy for us after
General Morgan’s death.
In this connection it is fitting to speak of a gentleman to whom we were
especially indebted, Mr. E.M. Bruce, one of the Kentucky members of the[Pg 540]
Confederate Congress. It would, indeed, be unjust as well as ungrateful,
to omit mention of his name and his generous, consistent friendship. Not
only were we, of Morgan’s old command, the recipients of constant and
the kindest services from him, but his generosity was as wide as his
charity, which seemed boundless. His position at Richmond was such as to
enable him to be of great assistance to the soldiers and people from his
state, and he was assiduous and untiring in their behalf. The immense
wealth which his skill and nerve in commercial speculations procured
him, was lavished in friendly ministrations and charitable enterprises.
An intelligent and useful member of the Congress, a safe and valuable
adviser of the administration in all matters within the province of his
advice, he was especially known and esteemed as the friend of the
soldiery, the patron of all who stood in need of aid and indulgence. At
one time he maintained not only a hospital in Richmond for the sick and
indigent, but a sort of hotel, kept up at his own expense, where the
Kentucky soldiers returning from prison were accommodated. It is safe to
say that he did more toward furnishing the Kentucky troops with
clothing, etc., than all of the supply department put together. The sums
he gave away in Confederate money would sound fabulous; and, after the
last surrender, he gave thousands of dollars in gold to the Kentucky
troops, who lacked means to take them home. His name will ever be held
by them in grateful and affectionate remembrance.
My command remained encamped near Jonesboro’ for nearly two weeks. The
commands of Vaughan, Cosby (that formerly commanded by General George B.
Hodge) and Giltner were also stationed in the same vicinity, all under
command of General John C. Vaughan.
Upon the 15th of September, I received my commission as Brigadier
General and accepted it—as it has turned out—an unpardonable error.
During the time that we remained near Jonesboro’, the brigade improved[Pg 541]
very much. Fortunately several of the best officers of the old command,
who had escaped capture, were with it at the time that I took command,
Captains Cantrill, Lea and Messick, and Lieutenants Welsh, Cunningham,
Hunt, Hawkins, Hopkins, Skillman, Roody, Piper, Moore, Lucas, Skinner,
Crump and several others equally as gallant and good, and there were
some excellent officers who had joined the command just after General
Morgan’s return from prison. The staff department was ably filled by the
acting adjutants, Lieutenants George W. Hunt, Arthur Andrews, James
Hines and Daniels. These were all officers of especial merit.
Colonels Ward, Morgan and Tucker, and Majors Webber and Steele had been
exchanged at Charleston, and their valuable services were secured at a
time when greatly needed. The gallant Mississippi company, of my old
regiment, was there, all, at least, that was left of it, and Cooper’s
company, under Welsh, as staunch and resolute as ever, although greatly
reduced in numbers. All the old regiments were represented.
Daily drills and inspections soon brought the brigade into a high state
of efficiency and the men longed to return to the debatable ground and
try conclusions, fairly, with the enemy which had boasted of recent
triumphs at their expense. An opportunity soon occurred. In the latter
part of September, General Vaughan moved with all of these commands
stationed about Jonesboro’, in the direction of Greenville. One object
of the movement was to attempt, if co-operation with General John S.
Williams, who was known to be approaching from toward Knoxville, could
be secured, the capture of the Federal forces at Bull’s gap. General
Williams had been cut off, in Middle Tennessee, from General Wheeler who
had raided into that country. His command consisted of three brigades.
One under command of Colonel William Breckinridge was the brigade of
Kentucky cavalry which had won so much reputation in the retreat from
Dalton and the operations around Atlanta. In this brigade were Colonel
Breckinridge’s own regiment, the Ninth Kentucky and Dortch’s battalion.
Another of these brigades was a very fine one of Tennessee troops,[Pg 542]
under General Debrell, an excellent officer. The third commanded by
General Robertson, a young and very dashing officer, was composed of
“Confederate” battalions—troops enlisted under no particular State
organization. General Vaughan learning of General Williams’ approach
dispatched him a courier offering to co-operate with him and advising
that General Williams should attack the rear, while he, Vaughan would
attack it in front.
Passing through Greenville at early dawn upon the second day after we[Pg 544]
left Jonesboro’, the column marched rapidly toward the gap. My brigade
was marching in advance. It was at this time three hundred and
twenty-two strong and was organized into two battalions, the first
commanded by Colonel Ward and the second by Colonel Morgan. About four
miles from Greenville, Captain Messick, whose Company A, of the second
battalion, was acting as advance-guard, encountered a scouting party of
the enemy fifty or sixty strong. Messick immediately attacked, routed
the party and chased it for several miles, taking eight or ten
prisoners. Pressing on again in advance, when the column had overtaken
him, he discovered the enemy in stronger force than before,
advantageously posted upon the further side of a little stream about two
miles from Lick creek. Halting his command here, Captain Messick,
accompanied by Lieutenant Hopkins, galloped across the bridge and toward
the enemy to reconnoiter. Approaching, despite the shots fired at them,
to within forty or fifty yards of the enemy, they were then saluted by a
volley from nearly two hundred rifles. Thinking it impossible, or
impolitic, to procure “further information” they rapidly galloped back.
Upon the approach of the column this party of the enemy fell back to
Lick creek, where it met or was reinforced by some two or three hundred
more. Lick creek is some three miles from Bull’s gap. There were no
fords in the vicinity of the road and it was too deep for wading except
at one or two points. A narrow bridge spanned it at the point where it
crossed the road. On the side that we were approaching there is a wide[Pg 545]
open space like a prairie, perhaps half a mile square. Thick woods
border this opening in the direction that we were coming and wooded
hills upon the left—running down to the edge of the creek.
Perceiving the enemy show signs of a disposition to contest our
crossing, my brigade was at once deployed to force a passage. A portion
of the second battalion was double-quicked, dismounted, across the open
to the thickets near the bank of the creek. Although exposed for the
entire distance to the fire of the enemy, this detachment suffered no
loss. One company of the second battalion was also sent to the right,
and took position near the creek in that quarter. The greater part of
the first battalion was sent, on foot, to the left, and, concealed by
the thickets upon the hills, got near enough the creek without
attracting the attention of the enemy. Lieutenant Conrad was ordered to
charge across the bridge with two mounted companies. As he approached it
at a trot, a battalion of the enemy galloped down on the other side
(close to the bridge) to dispute his passage. The dismounted
skirmishers, who had taken position near the creek, prevented Conrad’s
column from receiving annoyance from the remainder of the Federal force.
When within so short a distance of the bridge that the features of the
Federal soldiers at the other extremity were plainly discernible, Conrad
suddenly halted, threw one company into line, keeping the other in
column behind it, and opened fire upon it, which was returned with
interest. Just then Lieutenant Welsh carried his company across the
creek on the extreme left, followed by Lea (the water coming up to the
men’s shoulders) and attacked the enemy in flank and rear. This shook
their line. General Vaughan, at the same time, brought up a piece of
artillery and opened fire over the heads of our own men. Conrad seized
the moment of confusion and darted across the bridge with the company
which was in column, the other following. It was then a helter-skelter
chase until the enemy took refuge in the gap.
General Vaughn marched on, but hearing nothing of General Williams, and[Pg 546]
knowing the strength of the position, did not attack. He had a brass
band with him, which he made play “Dixie,” in the hope that it would
lure the enemy out; but this strategical banter was treated with
profound indifference. General Williams had marched on the north side of
the Holston river to Rogersville, and thence to Greenville, where we met
him upon our return next day. His command was about two thousand strong,
but a part of it badly armed, and his ammunition was exhausted. It
turned out that his advent in our department was most opportune and
fortunate.
We remained at Greenville several days, and then marched to Carter’s
Station. This withdrawal was occasioned by the unformation of the
approach of Burbridge, from Kentucky, with a heavy force. His
destination was supposed to be the Salt-works, and General Echols judged
it expedient to effect a timely concentration of all the forces in the
department. The system of procuring information from Kentucky, the most
dangerous quarter to the Department, was so well organized that it was
nearly two weeks after the first intimation of danger before Burbridge
entered Virginia. Giltner’s brigade had been moved very early to Laurel
Gap, or some position in that vicinity, between the Salt-works and the
approaching enemy. Leaving General Vaughan with his own brigade at
Carter’s Station, General Echols ordered General Cosby and myself to
Bristol. General Williams, who, with great exertion, had rearmed his
command, moved a few days subsequently to the Salt-works, where the
“reserves” of militia were now, also, collecting. Simultaneously with
Burbridge’s advance, the enemy approached from Knoxville (under Generals
Gillem and Ammon), marching over the same ground which we had traversed
shortly before.
General Vaughan was attacked, and was compelled to divide his brigade,
the greater part remaining at Carter’s Station, and a part being sent,
under Colonel Carter, to Duvault’s ford, five miles below on the
Wetauga, where the enemy sought to effect a passage. Upon the night[Pg 547]
after the first demonstration against General Vaughan, General Cosby and
I were sent to reinforce him, and, marching all night, reached the
position assigned early the next morning. General Cosby was posted where
he could support most speedily whichever point needed it, and I was
instructed to proceed directly to Duvault’s ford. Upon arriving there, I
found Colonel Carter making all the preparations within his power to
repel the attack which he anticipated. About nine a.m., the enemy
recommenced the fight at Carter’s Station, and toward one or two p.m.
made his appearance again upon the other side of the river, opposite our
position. The firing by this time had become so heavy at Carter’s
Station that I feared that General Vaughan would not be able to prevent
the enemy from crossing the river there, and became anxious to create a
diversion in his favor. I thought that if the force confronting us could
be driven off and made to retreat on Jonesboro’, that confronting
General Vaughan would also fall back, fearing a flank attack, or it
would, at least, slacken its efforts. The steep and difficult bank just
in our front forbade all thought of attack in that way, but there was a
ford about a mile and a half below, from which a good road led through
level ground to the rear of the enemy’s position. I instructed Captain
Messick to take fifty picked men, cross at this ford, and take the enemy
in the rear, and requested Colonel Carter to cause one of his battalions
to dash down to the brink of the river, as soon as the firing commenced,
and cross and attack if the enemy showed signs of being shaken by
Messick’s movement.
Captain Messick had crossed the river and gotten two or three hundred
yards upon the other side, when he met a battalion of Federal cavalry
approaching, doubtless to try a flank movement on us. They were marching
with drawn sabers, but foolishly halted at sight of our men. Messick
immediately ordered the charge and dashed into them. The impetus with
which his column drove against them made the Federals recoil, and in a
little while entirely give way. Stephen Sharp, of Cluke’s regiment,
rode at the color-guard, and shooting the color-bearer through the[Pg 548]
head, seized the flag. While he was waving it in triumph, the guard
fired upon him, two bullets taking effect, one in the left arm, the
other through the lungs. Dropping the colors across his saddle, he
clubbed his rifle and struck two of his assailants from their horses,
and Captain Messick killed a third for him. Twelve prisoners were taken,
and ten or fifteen of the enemy killed and wounded. Messick, pressing
the rout, whirled around upon the rear of the position. Colonel Carter
ordered the Sixteenth Georgia to charge the position in front, when he
saw the confusion produced by this dash, and the whole force went off in
rapid retreat, pursued by the detachment of Captain Messick and the
Georgia battalion for four or five miles.
Shortly afterward the demonstration against Carter’s Station ceased.
Lieutenant Roody, a brave and excellent young officer, lost a leg in
this charge. Stephen Sharp, whose name has just now been mentioned, was
perhaps the hero of more personal adventures than any man in Morgan’s
command. He had once before captured a standard by an act of equal
courage. He had made his escape from prison by an exercise of almost
incredible daring. With a companion, named Hecker, he deliberately
scaled the wall of the prison yard, and forced his way through a guard
assembled to oppose them. Sharp was shot and bayoneted in this attempt,
but his wounds were not serious, and both he and his companion got away.
When, subsequently, they were making their way to Virginia through the
mountains of Kentucky, they were attacked by six or seven bushwhackers.
Hecker was shot from his horse. Sharp shot four of his assailants and
escaped. His exploits are too numerous for mention. Although the wounds
he received at Duvault’s were serious, he survived them, to marry the
lady who nursed him.
On the next day, we received orders from General Echols to march at once
to Saltville, as Burbridge was drawing near the place. In a very short
time the energy and administrative skill of General Echols had placed
the department in an excellent condition for defense. But it was the[Pg 549]
opportune arrival of General Williams which enabled us to beat back all
assailants. When we reached Abingdon, we learned that General
Breckinridge had arrived and had assumed command. After a short halt, we
pressed on and reached Saltville at nightfall to learn that the enemy
had been repulsed that day in a desperate attack. His loss had been
heavy.
General Williams had made a splendid fight—one worthy of his very high
reputation for skill and resolute courage. His dispositions were
admirable. It is also positively stated that, as he stood on a superior
eminence midway of his line of battle, his voice could be distinctly
heard above the din of battle, as he shouted orders to all parts of the
line at once. The Virginia reserves, under General Jackson and Colonel
Robert Preston, behaved with distinguished gallantry. Upon the arrival
of our three fresh brigades it was determined to assume the offensive in
the morning. But that night the enemy retreated. General Cosby and I
were ordered to follow him. We overtook his column beyond Hyter’s Gap,
but owing to mistakes in reconnoisance, etc., allowed it to escape us.
General Williams coming up with a part of his command, we pressed the
rear but did little damage. After this, my brigade was stationed for a
few days at Wytheville.
In the middle of October, I was directed to go with two hundred men to
Floyd and Franklin counties, where the deserters from our various armies
in Virginia had congregated and had become very troublesome. In Floyd
county they had organized what they called the “New State” and had
elected a provisional Governor and Lieutenant Governor. I caught the
latter—he was a very nice gentleman, and presented the man who captured
him with a horse. After a little discipline the gang broke up, and some
two hundred came in and surrendered.
Captain Cantrill, of my brigade, was sent with some forty men to Grayson
county, about the same time. In this county the deserters and
bushwhackers had been committing terrible outrages. Upon Cantrill’s[Pg 550]
approach they retreated just across the line into North Carolina, into
the mountains and bantered him to follow. He immediately did so. His
force was increased by the reinforcement of a company of militia to
about eighty men. He came upon the deserters (mustering about one
hundred and twenty-five strong), posted upon the side of a mountain, and
attacked them. Turning his horses loose, after finding that it was
difficult to ascend mounted—he pushed his men forward on foot. The
horses galloping back, induced the enemy to believe that he was
retreating. They were quickly undeceived. Letting them come close to a
belt of brush in which his men were resting, Captain Cantrill poured in
a very destructive fire. The leader of the gang was killed by the first
volley and his men soon dispersed and fled.
Twenty-one men were killed in this affair, and the others were phased
away from the country. They gave no further trouble. Captain Cantrill’s
action justified the high esteem in which his courage and ability were
held by his superiors. Almost immediately after the return of these
detachments, the brigade was ordered back to East Tennessee again.
General Vaughan, supported by Colonel Palmer’s brigade of North Carolina
reserves, had been attacked at Russellville, six miles below Bull’s Gap,
and defeated with the loss of four or five pieces of artillery. General
Breckinridge, immediately upon hearing of this disaster, prepared to
retrieve it. The appointment of General Breckinridge to the command of
the department, was a measure admirably calculated to reform and infuse
fresh vitality into its affairs. He possessed the confidence of both the
people and the soldiery. His military record was a brilliant one, and
his sagacity and firmness were recognized by all. With the Kentucky
troops, who were extravagantly proud of him, his popularity was of
course unbounded. Although this unfortunate department was worse handled
by the enemy after he commanded it than ever before, he came out of the
ordeal, fatal to most other generals, with enhanced reputation. His
great energy and indomitable resolution were fairly tried and fully[Pg 551]
proven. He could personally endure immense exertions and exposure. If,
however, when heavy duty and labor were demanded, he got hold of
officers and men who would not complain, he worked them without
compunction, giving them no rest, and leaving the reluctant in clover.
He could always elicit the affection inspired by manly daring and high
soldierly qualities, and which the brave always feel for the bravest.
Leaving Wytheville on the night of the 19th of October, the brigade
marched nearly to Marion, twenty-one miles distant. A blinding snow was
driving in our faces, and about midnight it became necessary to halt and
allow the half frozen men to build fires. Marching on through Abingdon
and Bristol, we reached Carter’s station on the 22nd. Here General
Vaughn’s brigade was encamped, and on the same day trains arrived from
Wytheville bringing dismounted men of my brigade and of Cosby’s and
Giltner’s. The bulk of these two latter brigades were in the Shenandoah
valley, with General Early. There were also two companies of engineers.
The dismounted men numbered in all between three and four hundred. They
were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alston, who was assisted by Major
Chenoweth, Captain Jenkins and other able officers. Six pieces of
artillery also arrived, commanded by Major Page. On the 23rd, the entire
force was marched to Jonesboro’. From Jonesboro’ two roads run to
Greenville, or rather to within three miles of Greenville, when they
join. These roads are at no point more than three miles apart. My
brigade was ordered to march upon the right hand, or Rheatown, road and
General Vaughan took the other. The dismounted men marched along the
railroad, which runs between them. A short distance beyond Rheatown,
Captain Messick, who was some ten miles in front of the column with the
advance-guard of twenty men, came upon an encampment of the enemy. He
immediately attacked and drove in the pickets. Privates Hi Rogers, Pat
Gilroy, Porter White, and another brave fellow of Ward’s battalion,
followed them into the encampment and came back unhurt. Messick halted[Pg 552]
his guard about four hundred yards from the encampment and awaited the
movements of the enemy. His men were all picked for their daring and
steadiness and could be depended on. In a little while the enemy came
out, but continued, for a while, to fire at long range. Fearing that
arrangements were being made to surround him, Messick began to retreat.
The enemy then pursued him, and a battalion continued the pursuit for
ten miles. Although closely pressed, this gallant little squad
repeatedly turned and fought, sometimes dismounting to fire more
accurately, and repeatedly checked their pursuers. Every round of their
ammunition was exhausted and they were at no time disordered or forced
into flight. Captain Messick lost not a single man captured and only one
wounded.
When the column at length came up, the enemy had abandoned the chase and
returned. That evening we marched through their deserted camp. Passing
through Greenville the next morning, which the enemy had evacuated the
night before, we reached Lick creek about 4 p.m. The enemy showed
themselves on the further side, but did not contest our passage. A mile
or a mile and a half in front of the gap we came upon them again, about
twelve hundred strong. General Breckinridge ordered me to attack. I did
so and in a short time drove them into the gap. They came out twice and
were as often driven back. General Vaughan had been sent to demonstrate
in the rear of the gap, and the dismounted men had not gotten up. After
the third trial outside of the works, the enemy contented himself with
shelling us. I witnessed, then, a singular incident. One man was
literally set on fire by a shell. I saw what seemed a ball of fire fall
from a shell just exploded and alight upon this poor fellow. He was at
once in flames. We tore his clothing from him and he was scorched and
seared from head to foot.
All that night we stood in line upon the ground we occupied when it
fell. The enemy’s pickets were a short distance in our front and fired
at every movement. During the night the artillery arrived and was[Pg 553]
posted upon a commanding position protected by my line. The dismounted
men also arrived during the night.
On the next morning, at day light, the dismounted men and one hundred
and fifty of my brigade, in all some five hundred men, were moved to the
extreme right to assault the gap from that quarter. General Vaughan was
instructed to attack it in the rear, and Colonel George Crittenden was
posted to support the artillery, with one hundred and eighty men, and to
demonstrate in front. The right was the real point of attack. General
Breckinridge hoped to carry the works there, and the other movements
were intended as diversions. The enemy’s force, as shown by captured
field returns, was about twenty-five hundred men.
Climbing up the steep mountain side, the party sent to the right gained
the ridge a little after daybreak. The position to be assaulted was
exceedingly strong. Two spurs of the hill (on which the fortifications
were erected) run out and connect with the mountain upon which we were
formed. Between them is an immense ravine, wide and deep. The summits of
these spurs are not more than forty yards wide, and their sides are
rugged and steep. Across each, and right in the path of our advance,
earthworks were erected, not very formidable themselves, but commanded
by the forts. A direct and cross fire of artillery swept every inch of
the approach. About the time that we reached the top of the mountain,
Major Page opened with his pieces upon the plain beneath, and we
immediately commenced the attack. Colonel Ward crossed the ravine with
the greater part of our column, and I moved upon the left-hand spur with
eighty or a hundred men of my brigade. A good many men of the hastily
organized companies, of the dismounted command, hung back in the ravine
as Colonel Ward advanced, and did no service in the fight.
General Breckinridge personally commanded the assault. Colonel Ward
pressed on vigorously, and despite the hot fire which met him, carried
the line of works upon the right, but was driven out by the fire from[Pg 554]
the fort, which he could not take. He returned repeatedly to the
assault, and could not be driven far from the works. Upon the left we
advanced rapidly, driving in the enemy’s skirmishers, until, when within
thirty yards of the earthwork, the men were staggered by the fire,
halted, and could not be made to advance. Both ridges were completely
swept by the enfilading fire, which each now poured upon us. The enemy
once sprang over the work upon the left and advanced upon us, but was
forced back. The men were much galled by the fire at this point.
Major Webber had but one company of his battalion present. It was
twenty-eight strong, and lost fourteen. After failing to carry the
works, we remained close to them, upon both the ridges, for more than an
hour, replying as effectively as we could to the enemy’s fire. Several
instances of great gallantry occurred. Sergeant James Cardwell, of my
old regiment, finding that the men could not be brought up again to the
attack, walked deliberately toward the enemy, declaring that he would
show them what a soldier’s duty was. He fell before he had taken a dozen
steps, his gallant breast riddled with balls. Gordon Vorhees, a brave
young soldier, scarcely out of his boyhood, was mortally wounded when
Colonel Ward carried the works upon the right. His comrades strove to
remove him, but he refused to permit them to do so, saying that it was
their part to fight and not to look after dying men.
Colonel Crittenden had pressed his slight line and Page’s guns close to
the front of the gap, during our attack, and did splendid service. But
the attack in the rear was not made in time, and almost the entire
Federal force was concentrated on the right, and this, and the strength
of the position, was some excuse for our failure to take it. General
Breckinridge exposed himself in a manner that called forth the almost
indignant remonstrance of the men, and it is a matter of wonder that he
escaped unhurt. He spoke in high terms of the conduct of the men who
pressed the attack, although much disappointed at its failure, and
especially commended Colonel Ward’s cool, unflinching, and determined[Pg 555]
bravery. The latter officer was wounded, and when we withdrew was cut
off from the command, but found his way back safely. Our loss was heavy.
After our retreat, which was not pressed by the enemy, Col. Crittenden
was in a critical situation. It was necessary that he should also
withdraw, and as he did so, he was exposed for more than half a mile to
the Federal artillery. Six guns were opened upon him. The chief aim
seemed to be to blow up Page’s caissons, but, although the shelling was
hot, they were all brought off safely.
That afternoon Colonel Palmer arrived from Ashville, North Carolina,
with four or five hundred infantry. General Breckinridge decided to make
no further attack upon the position, but to march through Taylor’s Gap,
three miles to the west, and get in the rear of the Federals and upon
their line of retreat and communication with Knoxville. Accordingly, we
broke camp and marched about ten o’clock that night. Vaughan, who had
returned, moved in advance. Palmer’s infantry, the dismounted men, and
the artillery, were in the rear.
As we passed through Taylor’s Gap, information was received that the
enemy were evacuating Bull’s Gap, and that an opportunity would be
afforded us to take him in flank. General Breckinridge at once ordered
Vaughan to post a strong detachment at Russellville, in their front, and
to attack with his whole command immediately upon the detachments
becoming engaged. I was ordered to turn to the left before reaching
Russellville, go around the place and cut the enemy off upon the main
road, a mile or two below, or, failing to do this, take him in flank.
The enemy broke through the detachment stationed in his front, but was
immediately attacked by Vaughan. “Fight, d—n you!” yelled a Federal
officer to his men, as the firing commenced; “it’s only a scout.” “No,
I’ll be d—d if it is,” shouted one of Vaughan’s men; “we’re all
here.” The greater part of Gillem’s column and his artillery escaped[Pg 556]
here, but one regiment was cut off and driven away to the right. Moving
very rapidly, my brigade managed to strike the main body again at
Cheek’s Cross Roads, about two miles from the town, and drove another
slice from the road and into the fields and woods. While the column was
scattered and prolonged by the rapid chase, we came suddenly upon the
enemy halted in the edge of a wood, and were received with a smart fire,
which checked us. Captain Gus Magee, one of the best and most dashing
officers of the brigade, commanding the advance guard, charged in among
them. As, followed by a few men, he leaped the fence behind which the
enemy were posted, he was shot from his horse. He surrendered, and gave
his name, and was immediately shot and sabered. He lived a short time in
great agony. One of his men, Sergeant Sam Curd, avenged his death that
night. Curd saved himself when Magee was killed, by slipping into the
Federal line, and in the darkness, he escaped unnoticed. Some twenty
minutes afterward, the murderer of Magee was captured, and Curd,
recognizing his voice, asked him if he were not the man. He at once
sprang upon Curd, and tried to disarm him. The latter broke loose from
his grasp and killed him. Vaughan, after we moved on, kept the road, and
I moved upon the left flank, endeavoring to gain the enemy’s rear, and
intercept his retreat. Colonel Napier, who kept in the advance with a
small detachment, succeeded in this object.
Three or four miles from Morristown, the enemy halted, and, for half an
hour, offered resistance. We, who were moving to take them in flank and
rear, then saw a beautiful sight. The night was cloudless, and the moon
at its full and shedding a brilliant light. The dark lines of troops
could be seen almost as clearly as by day. Their positions were
distinctly marked, however, by the flashes from the rifles, coming thick
and fast, making them look, as they moved along, bending and
oscillating, like rolling waves of flame, throwing off fiery spray. When
my brigade had moved far around upon the left, and had taken position,
obliquing toward the enemy’s rear, it suddenly opened. The Federal line[Pg 557]
recoiled, and closed from both flanks toward the road, in one dense
mass, which looked before the fighting ceased and the rout fairly
commenced, like a huge Catherine wheel spouting streams of fire.
The enemy retreated rapidly and in confusion from this position, pursued
closely by Vaughan’s foremost battalions. At Morristown a regiment, just
arrived upon the cars, and a piece of artillery, checked the pursuit for
a short time, and enabled the enemy to reform. They were again driven,
and making another and a last stand a short distance beyond the town,
abandoned all further resistance when that failed to stop us.
Then the spoils began to be gathered, and were strewn so thickly along
the road that the pursuit was effectually retarded. Major Day, of
Vaughan’s brigade, followed, however, beyond New Market, more than
twenty-five miles from the point where the affair commenced, and the
rest of us halted when day had fairly broken. More than one hundred
ambulances and wagons were captured, loaded with baggage; six pieces of
artillery, with caissons and horses, and many prisoners. The rout and
disintegration of Gillem’s command was complete.
On the next day we moved to New Market, and, when all the troops had
gotten up, proceeded to Strawberry Plains, seven miles beyond. Here the
enemy, posted in strong fortifications, were prepared to contest our
further advance. We remained here three or four days.
Shelling and sharpshooting was kept up during the day, and a picket
line, which required our entire strength, was maintained at night. The
Holston river, deep and swollen, was between us, the enemy held the
bridge and neither of the combatants ventured an attack. Vaughan was
sent across the river at an upper ford and had another brush with
Gillem, who came out from Knoxville with a few of his men whom he had
collected and reorganized. He was easily driven back. General
Breckinridge was called away to Wytheville by rumors of an advance of[Pg 558]
the enemy in another quarter, and we fell back to New Market and shortly
afterward to Mossy creek, eleven miles from Strawberry plains.
Some ten days after our withdrawal from the latter place, reports
reached us that a large force was being collected at Beau’s Station,
upon the north side of the Holston. These reports were shortly
confirmed. We withdrew to Russellville, and subsequently to Greenville.
To have remained further down would have exposed the rest of the
department entirely. Having the short route to Bristol, the enemy could
have outflanked and outmarched us, and getting first to the important
points of the department, which they would have found unguarded, they
could have captured and destroyed all that was worth protecting, without
opposition. General Vaughan took position at Greenville, and my brigade
was stationed, under command of Colonel Morgan, at Rogersville.
Five or six days after these dispositions were made, the enemy advanced
upon Rogersville in heavy force, drove Colonel Morgan away and followed
him closely. He retreated without loss, although constantly skirmishing
to Kingsport, twenty-five miles from Rogersville, and crossing Clinch
river at nightfall, prepared to dispute the passage of the enemy. He
believed that he could do so successfully, but his force was too small
to guard all of the fords, and the next morning the enemy got across,
attacked and defeated him, capturing him, more than eighty men, and all
of our wagons. Colonel Napier took command and retreated to Bristol. I
met the brigade there, and found it reduced to less than three hundred
men.
General Vaughan was hurrying on to Bristol, at this time, but had to
march further than the enemy, who also had the start of him, would be
required to march in order to reach it. On the night of the 13th, the
enemy entered Bristol at 3 or 4 p.m. Vaughan was not closer than twelve
or fifteen miles, and so he was completely separated from the forces
east of Bristol. We now had tolerably accurate information of the
enemy’s strength. Burbridge’s Kentucky troops composed the greater part[Pg 559]
of his force, and Gillem was present with all of his former command,
whom he had succeeded in catching, and one fine regiment, the Tenth
Michigan. General Stoneman commanded. His column numbered in all, as
well as we could judge, between six and seven thousand men.
After the enemy occupied Bristol, I fell back to Abingdon. At Bristol a
large amount of valuable stores were captured by the enemy, and more
clerks and attaches of supply departments caught or scared into
premature evacuation of “bummers'” berths than at any precedent period
of the departmental history. They scudded from town with an expedition
that was truly astonishing to those who had ever had business with them.
Not caring to make a fight, which I knew I must lose, and well aware
that there was hard work before us, I left Abingdon at nightfall, and
encamped about three miles from the town on the Saltville road. At 10
o’clock the enemy entered Abingdon, driving out a picket of thirty men I
had left there and causing another stampede of the clerical detail. The
brigade was at once gotten under arms in expectation of an advance upon
the road where we were stationed, but the enemy moved down the railroad
toward Glade Springs and by the main road in the same direction. After
having ascertained their route, we moved rapidly to Saltville, reaching
that place before 10 a.m. General Breckinridge had already concentrated
there all of the reserves that could be collected, and Giltner’s and
Cosby’s brigades, which had just returned from the valley. Vaughan had
retreated, when he found himself cut off, toward the North Carolina line
and was virtually out of the fight from that time. Our force for the
defense of Saltville was not more than fifteen hundred men, for
offensive operations not eight hundred.
The enemy made no demonstration against Saltville on that day, and at
nightfall General Breckinridge instructed me to move with one hundred
and fifty men of my brigade, through McCall’s Gap, and passing to the
right of Glade’s Springs, where the enemy was supposed to be, enter the[Pg 560]
main stage road and move toward Wytheville. He had received information
that three or four hundred of the enemy had gone in that direction and
he wished me to follow and attack.
Moving as directed, I found the enemy, not at Glade Springs, as was
expected, but at the point at which I wished to enter the main road.
Driving in the pickets, I advanced my whole force to within a short
distance of the road, and discovered convincing proof that the entire
Federal force was there. I did not attack, but withdrew to a point about
a mile distant, and, permitting the men to build fires, and posting
pickets to watch the enemy at the cross-roads, awaited daylight. My
guide had run away when the pickets fired on us, and I could only watch
the movements of the enemy and let mine be dictated by circumstances.
Just at daylight, a force of ten or twelve hundred of the enemy appeared
in our rear, and between us and Saltville. This force had passed through
Glade Springs and far around to the rear. Fortunately the men were lying
down in line and by their horses, which had not been unsaddled. They
were at once formed, and sending to call in the pickets, I moved my line
slowly toward the enemy, who halted. The noise of the pickets galloping
up the road perhaps convinced them that reinforcements were arriving to
us. Not caring to fight when directly between two superior bodies of the
enemy, and but a short distance from either, I wheeled into column, as
soon as the picket detail arrived, and moved toward a wood upon our
right. I was satisfied that I could check pursuit when there, and that
some sort of trace led thence over the mountain to Saltville.
The enemy did not pursue vigorously, and soon halted. Only one shot was
fired, and that by one of my pickets, who killed his man. No one in my
detachment knew the country, but a citizen guided us over an almost
impracticable route to the road which enters Saltville by Lyon’s gap.
Learning that the enemy had crossed at Seven Mile ford and gone on
toward Wytheville, General Breckinridge determined to follow. He wished[Pg 561]
to harass him, and prevent, as well as he could with the limited force
at his command, the waste and destruction, which was the object of the
raid. He accordingly marched out from Saltville on the night of the
16th, with eight hundred men, leaving the reserves and the men belonging
to the cavalry whose horses were unserviceable. The enemy captured
Wytheville without firing a shot, as there was no one there to fire at,
but defeated a detachment of Vaughan’s command not far from the town,
taking and destroying the artillery which was attached to that brigade.
A detachment also took and did serious damage to the lead mines.
On the 17th, Colonel Wycher, who had been sent in advance of the column
commanded by General Breckinridge, attacked a body of the enemy near
Marion, and drove it to Mt. Airy, eight miles from Wytheville, General
Breckinridge pressed on to support him, and when we reached Marion we
found Wycher coming back, closely pursued by a much stronger party of
the enemy. Cosby’s brigade, which was in the front of our column, at
once attacked, and the whole command having been deployed and moved up,
the enemy were easily driven back across the creek, two miles beyond
Wytheville. Giltner and Cosby halted without crossing the creek. My
brigade crossed and pressed the Federals back some distance further on
the right of our line of advance. Night coming on I took a position on a
commanding ridge, which stretches from the creek in a southeasterly
direction. My left flank rested near the ford at which we had crossed,
and my line was at an obtuse angle with that of the other brigades,
which had not crossed, and inclining toward the position of the enemy.
During the night I kept my men in line of battle.
On the next morning, it became soon evident that Stoneman’s entire
force, or very nearly all of it, had arrived during the night and was
confronting us. After feeling the line, commencing on our left, the
enemy apparently became impressed, with the belief that the proper
point to attack was upon our right, and he accordingly made heavy rushes[Pg 562]
in rapid succession upon my position. I had but two hundred and twenty
men, and was reinforced at midday by Colonel Wycher with fifty of his
battalion.
The line we were required to hold was at least half a mile long, and I
say without hesitation, that troops never fought more resolutely and
bravely than did those I commanded on that day. The men were formed in a
single slim skirmish line, with intervals of five or six feet between
the files, and yet the enemy could not break the line or force them
away. We were forced to receive attack where the enemy chose to make it,
not daring, with our limited number and the important responsibility of
holding our position, to attack in turn. Had the position been taken,
the ford would have fallen into the possession of the enemy, and he
would have been master of the entire field. The fire which met the
advancing Federals at every effort which they made was the most deadly I
ever saw. Our ammunition gave out three times, but, fortunately, we were
enabled to replenish it during the lulls in the fighting. The
sharpshooting upon both sides, in the intervals of attack, was
excellent. Charlie Taylor, the best shot in my brigade, and one of the
bravest soldiers, killed a man at almost every shot. I would gladly
mention the names of those who deserved distinguished honor for their
conduct, but it would require me, to do so, to give the name of every
officer and private in the brigade.
About three o’clock, Colonel Napier, who was commanding upon the extreme
left, advanced, and, sweeping down the line, drove back a body of the
enemy immediately confronting his own little battalion, and struck the
flank of another moving to attack the right of the position. But coming
suddenly upon a miscegenated line of white and colored troops, which
rose suddenly from ambush and fired into the faces of his men, his line
fell back. The combatants fought here, for a while, with clubbed guns,
and the negroes, who seemed furious with fear, used theirs as they
would mauls. One unusually big and black darkey seemed to be much[Pg 563]
surprised, when first stumbled upon, and exclaiming “Dar dey is!” almost
let his eyes pop out of their sockets. Soon after this, the most serious
charge of the day was made upon the right and center. The enemy came in
two lines, each twelve or fifteen hundred strong. The front line swung
first one end foremost, then the other, as it came on at the
double-quick, and my line, facing to the right and left, massed
alternately at the threatened points. This time the Federals came up so
close to us that I believed the position lost. Their repulse was chiefly
due to the exertions of Captain Lea and Colonel Wycher, so far as the
efforts of officers contributed to a victory which nothing but the
unflinching courage of the men could have secured.
The first line, after driving us nearly a hundred yards, and completely
turning our right, finally recoiled, and the second ran as early. But
they left many dead behind. Our loss was surprisingly small in this
fight—the enemy fired heavy volleys, but too high.
Receiving a reinforcement of sixty men, just before sundown, I sent it
to get in the enemy’s rear, and attack his horse-holders, expecting
great results from the movement. But the officer in command was timid
and would do nothing.
The enemy made no further attack, and seemed hopeless of fencing us
away.
Late that night, our ammunition having almost entirely given out, we
quitted our position and fell back, through Marion. Marching then
southwardly, through the gorges of the mountain, we reached Rye Valley,
fifteen miles distant, by morning. The enemy did not move during the
night, nor indeed until ten or eleven, a.m., next day, and certain
information had reached him of our retreat.
It can safely be asserted that we were not worsted in this fight,
although for lack of ammunition we quitted the field. Every attack made
by the enemy upon our position was repulsed, notwithstanding our[Pg 564]
greatly inferior numbers. Our loss was slight; his was heavy. General
Breckinridge declared that no troops could have fought better or more
successfully than those which held the right.
From Rye Valley we moved to the main road again, striking it at Mount
Airy, thirteen miles from Marion. Here General Breckinridge learned that
the enemy had marched directly by to Saltville. He entertained grave
fears that the place would be taken, having no confidence in the ability
of the small garrison to hold it. His fears were realized. He instructed
me to collect details, from all the brigades, of men who were least
exhausted, and the most serviceable horses, and follow the enemy as
closely as I could, relieving Saltville, if the garrison held out until
I arrived. I accordingly marched with three hundred men, arriving at
Seven-mile Ford at nightfall on the 19th. I halted until one o’clock at
night, and then pressed on, over terrible roads, and reached the
vicinity of Saltville at daylight. The night was bitterly cold, and the
men were so chilled that they were scarcely able to sit on their horses.
Passing through Lyon’s gap we discovered indication, scarcely to be
mistaken, that Saltville had indeed fallen. Still it was necessary to
make sure, and I moved in the direction of the southern defenses.
Shortly afterward, the sight of the enemy and a skirmish which showed a
strong force in line, convinced me that I could not enter the place.
Scouts, sent to reconnoiter, returned declaring that the enemy held all
the entrances. I lost one man killed. Falling back three miles I went
into camp to await the time when the enemy should commence his retreat.
This he did on the 22nd, and marched toward Kentucky. We immediately
followed. At Hyter’s Gap the forces of the enemy divided. Those under
Gillem moving in the direction of Tennessee, those under Burbridge going
straight toward Kentucky. We followed the latter. There is no word in
the English language which adequately expresses how cold it was. Our
horses, already tired down and half starved, could scarcely hobble.
Those of the enemy were in worse condition, and it is scarcely an[Pg 565]
exaggeration to say that for ten miles a man could have walked on dead
ones. They lay dead and stark frozen in every conceivable and revolting
attitude, as death had overtaken them in their agony. Saddles, guns,
accouterments of all kinds strewed the road like the debris of a rout.
We picked up many stragglers. Some pieces of artillery were abandoned
but burned.
When we reached Wheeler’s ford, fifty-two miles from Saltville, I had
left, of my three hundred, only fifty men. Here we had our last skirmish
with the enemy, and gave up the pursuit. More than one hundred prisoners
were taken, many of them unable to walk. The Federals lost hundreds of
men, whose limbs, rotted by the cold, had to be amputated. Such
suffering, to be conceived, must be witnessed. The raid had accomplished
great things, but at terrible cost. Soon after this, my brigade went
into winter quarters. Forage was scarcely to be had at all in the
department, and I sent my horses, with a strong detail to guard and
attend to them, to North Carolina. The men could scarcely be reconciled
to this parting with their best friends, and feared, too, it preluded
infantry service. In the winter huts built at Abingdon, they were
sufficiently comfortable, but were half famished. The country was almost
bare of supplies. Still they bore up, cheerful and resolute.
In March we were ordered to Lynchburg to assist in defending that place
against Sheridan. He passed by, however, and struck at larger game.
About this time the men who had lain so long, suffered so much, and
endured so heroically in prison, began to arrive. The men who had braved
every hardship, in field and camp, were now reinforced by those who were
fresh from the harsh insults and galling sense of captivity. Six months
earlier this addition to our numbers would have told—now it was too
late.
Our gallant boys would not halt or rest until they rejoined their old
comrades. Then they crowded around with many a story of their prison
life, and vow of revenge—never to be accomplished. All asked for arms,
and to be placed at once in the ranks. Very few, however, had been
already exchanged, and all the others were placed, much against their[Pg 566]
will, in “Parole camp” at Christiansburg. In April, the enemy advanced
again from East Tennessee. Stoneman raided through North
Carolina—tapped the only road which connected Richmond with the
Southern territory still available, at Salisbury, and then suddenly
turned up in our rear, and between us and Richmond. This decided General
Early, who was then commanding the department, to move eastwardly that
he might get closer to General Lee. All the troops in the department
were massed, and we moved as rapidly as it was possible to do. At
Wytheville, Giltner met a detachment of the enemy and defeated it. At
New river, we found the bridge burned by the enemy, who had anticipated
us there, and we marched on toward Lynchburg, on his track. General
Early having fallen ill, the command devolved upon General Echols. This
officer did all that any man could have done, to preserve the morale of
the troops. He was possessed of remarkable administrative capacity, and
great tact, as well as energy. While firm, he was exceedingly popular in
manner and address, and maintained good humor and satisfaction among the
troops, while he preserved order and efficiency.
General Echols had, at this time, besides the cavalry commands of
Vaughan, Cosby, Giltner and mine, some four or five thousand
infantry—the division of General Wharton, and the small brigades
commanded by Colonels Trigg and Preston. My brigade was doing duty as
infantry—the horses having not yet returned. Marching about twenty-five
miles every day, the men became more than ever disgusted with the
infantry service, and their feet suffered as much as their temper. It
was observed that the men just returned from prison, although least
prepared for it, complained least of the hard marching.
We well knew at this time, that General Lee had been at length forced to
evacuate Richmond, but we hoped that followed by the bulk of his army,
he would retreat safely to some point where he could effect a junction
with General Joseph Johnston, and collect, also, all of the detachments[Pg 567]
of troops which had previously operated at a distance from the large
armies. The troops which General Echols commanded, were veterans, and
they understood the signs which were now rife and public. But they were
not altogether hopeless, and were still resolute although their old
enthusiasm was utterly gone. They still received encouragement from the
citizens of the section through which they marched.
It is but justice to the noble people of Virginia to declare that they
did not despair of their country until after it was no more. There were
individual defections among the Virginians—rare and indelibly
branded—but as a people, they were worthy of their traditions and their
hereditary honor. With rocking crash and ruin all around her, the grand
old commonwealth, scathed by the storm and shaken by the resistless
convulsion, still towered erect and proud to the last, and fell only
when the entire land had given away beneath her. Two strange features
characterized the temper of the Southern people in the last days of the
Confederacy. Crushed and dispirited as they were, they still seemed
unable to realize the fact that the cause was utterly lost. Even when
their fate stared them in the face, they could not recognize it.
Again, when our final ruin came, it was consummated in the twinkling of
an eye. We floated confidently to the edge of the cataract, went
whirling over and lying utterly stunned at the bottom, never looked back
at the path we had followed. The Southern people strained every nerve to
resist, and when all efforts failed, sank powerless and unnerved.
The struggle was a hard one. Since the days of Roman conquest the earth
has not seen such energy, persistency and ingenuity in arts of
subjugation. Since Titus encompassed Jerusalem and the Aurelian shook
the east with his fierce legions, a more stubborn, desperate and lavish
resistance has not been witnessed against attack so resolute, systematic
and overwhelming. The Roman eagle never presaged a wider, more thorough[Pg 568]
desolation than that of which the flag of the Union was the harbinger.
For four years the struggle was maintained against this mighty power.
When in the spring of 1865, one hundred and thirty-four thousand
wretched, broken-down rebels stood, from Richmond to the Rio Grande,
confronting one million fifteen thousand veteran soldiers, trained to
all the vicissitudes, equal to all the shocks of war—is it wonderful
that when this tremendous host moved all at once, resistance at length,
and finally ceased. And this struggle had worn down the people as well
as the soldiery. Four years of such bitter, constant, exhausting strife,
racking the entire land, until the foot of the conqueror had tracked it
from one end to the other, accomplished its objects in time. Even the
women, whose heroism outshone any ever displayed upon the battlefield,
whose devoted self-sacrificing charity and benevolence can never be
justly recorded, whose courage had seemed dauntless, were at last
overcome by the misery which surrounded them, and a power which seemed
resistless and inexorable.
While we were marching to join General Lee, and after the news of the
evacuation of Richmond had been confirmed, we heard of an event which
was as ominous as it was melancholy. We learned that a man had been
killed, whose name had so long been associated with the army of Northern
Virginia and its victories, that it almost seemed as if his life must be
identified with its existence. The officer who was the very incarnation
of the chivalry, the big-souled constancy, the glorious vigor of that
army—General A.P. Hill—was dead. He was a hero, and he died like
one. When the lines around Richmond were forced—his gallant corps
overpowered, he was slain in the front still facing the enemy. His
record had been completed, and he gave his life away, as if it were
worthless after the cause to which he had pledged it was lost.
While General Echols was still confident that he would be able to join
General Lee at some point to the south west of Richmond, most probably[Pg 570]
Danville, we learned with a dismay which is indescribable, that he had
surrendered. If the light of heaven had gone out, a more utter despair
and consternation would not have ensued. When the news first came, it
perfectly paralyzed every one. Men looked at each other as if they had
just heard a sentence of death and eternal ruin passed upon all. The
effect of the news upon the infantry was to cause an entire
disorganization. Crowds of them threw down their arms and left, and
those who remained lost all sense of discipline.
On the next day, General Echols called a council of war, announced his
intention of taking all the men who would follow him to General Joseph
E. Johnston, and consulted his officers regarding the temper of the men.
The infantry officers declared that their men would not go, and that it
was useless to attempt to make them.
General Echols then issued an order furloughing the infantry soldiers
for sixty days. He believed that this method would, at the end of that
time, if the war was still going on, secure many to the Confederacy,
while to attempt to force them to follow him would be unavailing and
would make them all bitterly hostile in the future. He issued orders to
the cavalry commanders to be prepared to march at four p.m., in the
direction of North Carolina.
I obtained permission from him to mount my men on mules taken from the
wagons, which were necessarily abandoned. My command was about six
hundred strong. All the men furloughed during the winter and spring had
promptly reported, and it was increased by more than two hundred
exchanged men. Of the entire number, not more than ten (some of these
officers) failed to respond to the orders to continue their march to
General Johnston’s army. The rain was falling in torrents when we
prepared to start upon a march which seemed fraught with danger. The men
were drenched, and mounted upon mules without saddles, and with blind
bridles or rope halters. Every thing conspired to remind them of the
gloomy situation. The dreadful news was fresh in their ears. Thousands[Pg 571]
of men had disbanded around them, two Kentucky brigades had left in
their sight to go home, they were told that Stoneman held the gaps in
the mountains through which they would have to pass. The gloomy skies
seemed to threaten disaster. But braver in the hour of despair than ever
before, they never faltered or murmured. The trial found them true, I
can safely say that the men of my brigade were even more prompt in
rendering obedience, more careful in doing their full duty at this time,
when it was entirely optional with themselves whether they should go or
stay, than they had ever been in the most prosperous days of the
Confederacy. To command such men was the proudest honor that an officer
could obtain.
We moved off in silence, broken by a cheer when we passed Vaughan’s
brigade which was also going on. On the next day we were overtaken by
ninety men from Giltner’s brigade, who came to join us. Colonel Dimond
and Captains Scott, Rogers, Barrett, and Willis, and Lieutenant Freeman,
well known as among the best officers of the Kentucky Confederate
troops, commanded them. These men felt as we did, that disaster gave us
no right to quit the service in which we had enlisted, and that so long
as the Confederate Government survived, it had a claim upon us that we
could not refuse.
The reports that the gaps were occupied by the enemy proved untrue, and
we entered North Carolina without seeing a Federal. At Statesville,
General Echols left us to go to General Johnston’s camp. Vaughan was
instructed to proceed to Morgantown, south of the Catawba river, and I
pushed on toward Lincolnton, where I expected to find Colonel Napier
with the horses. Just after crossing the river, information was received
that a part of Stoneman’s force was marching from the west in the same
direction. I hoped, by moving rapidly, to get to Lincolnton first. The
enemy’s column moved upon a road which approached closely to the one by
which we were marching. Our scouts were fighting, during the afternoon,
upon the by-roads which connected the main ones. When within two miles[Pg 572]
of Lincolnton, videttes came back rapidly to tell me that the enemy had
occupied the town, and were coming out to meet us.
I was unwilling to fight, and knew that to countermarch would be
ruinous. Fortunately an officer had, a little while before, mentioned
that a small road turned off to the left two miles from Lincolnton, and
led to other traces and paths, which conducted to the main road to
Charlotte. The head of the column was just at a road which answered to
the description he had given, and, strengthening the advance guard to
hold the enemy in check, I turned the column into it. It proved to be
the right one, and, pressing guides, we reached, after a march of twelve
or fifteen miles, the Charlotte road, and were between that place and
the enemy. At daybreak next morning we moved on slowly. The enemy
reached the bridge over the Catawba after we had passed and had
partially torn up the bottom. At Charlotte we found a battalion of
General Ferguson’s brigade of Mississippi cavalry.
On the next day, Mr. Davis and his Cabinet arrived, escorted by General
Debrell’s division of cavalry, in which was Williams’ Kentucky brigade,
commanded then by Colonel Breckinridge. In a day or two the town was
filled with unattached officers, disbanded and straggling soldiers, the
relics of the naval forces, fleeing officials and the small change of
the Richmond bureaux.
The negotiations were then pending between Generals Johnston and
Sherman. General Breckinridge, in his capacity of Secretary of War,
assisted at these conferences, but he was impatiently expected by Mr.
Davis. The latter, on the day of his arrival, made the speech which has
been so much commented upon. It was simply a manly, courageous appeal to
the people to be true to themselves. The news of the assassination of
Mr. Lincoln was received, during this period, but was almost universally
disbelieved. When General Breckenridge arrived, he brought the first
authoritative account of the Sherman and Johnston cartel. But two days[Pg 574]
later, General Johnston telegraphed that the authorities at Washington
had repudiated it; that the armistice was broken off, and that he was
preparing to surrender. Then there was another stir and commotion among
the refugees. The greater part chose to remain at Charlotte, and accept
the terms granted General Johnston’s army.
Mr. Davis, accompanied by General Breckinridge and the members of his
cabinet, quitted Charlotte, to march, if possible, to Generals Taylor
and Forrest, in Alabama. The five brigades of Ferguson, Debrell,
Breckinridge, Vaughan, and mine, composed his escort. At Unionville I
found Colonel Napier, with all the forces he had been able to save from
the enemy, and seventy or eighty men. This increased the strength of the
brigade to 751 effectives.
I asked and obtained promotion, well won and deserved, for several
officers. Major Steele was made Colonel; Captains Logan and Messick,
Lieutenant-Colonels; Sergeant Jno. Carter, Captain; Captains Davis and
Gwynn, of my staff, to whom I owed gratitude for inestimable assistance,
were made Majors. I wished for promotion for other officers—indeed they
all deserved it—but was assured that so many commissions could not be
issued at once. Even the gallant officers who had joined us with the
detachment from Giltner’s brigade, could not obtain commissions, which
they would have valued the more highly, because they were soon to
expire.
We moved through South Carolina with great deliberation—so slowly,
indeed, that with the detachments constantly passing them on their way
to surrender, the morale of the troops was seriously impaired. Nothing
demoralizes cavalry more than dilatory movements in time of danger. They
argue that it indicates irresolution on the part of their leaders.
While in South Carolina, an old lady reproached some men of my brigade
very bitterly for taking forage from her barn. “You are a gang of
thieving, rascally, Kentuckians,” she said; “afraid to go home, while
our boys are surrendering decently.” “Madam,” answered one of them,[Pg 575]
“you are speaking out of your turn; South Carolina had a good deal to
say in getting up this war, but we Kentuckians have contracted to close
it out.”
At Abbeville, where we were received with the kindest hospitality, was
held the last Confederate council of war. Mr. Davis desired to know,
from his brigade commanders, the true spirit of the men. He presided
himself. Beside Generals Breckinridge and Bragg, none others were
present than the five brigade commanders. Mr. Davis was apparently
untouched by any of the demoralization which prevailed—he was affable,
dignified and looked the very personification of high and undaunted
courage. Each officer gave in turn, a statement of the condition and
feeling of his men, and, when urged to do so, declared his own views of
the situation. In substance, all said the same. They and their followers
despaired of successfully conducting the war, and doubted the propriety
of prolonging it. The honor of the soldiery was involved in securing Mr.
Davis’ safe escape, and their pride induced them to put off submission
to the last moment. They would risk battle in the accomplishments of
these objects—but would not ask their men to struggle against a fate,
which was inevitable, and forfeit all hope of a restoration to their
homes and friends. Mr. Davis declared that he wished to hear no plan
which had for its object, only his safety—that twenty-five hundred
brave men were enough to prolong the war, until the panic had passed
away, and they would then be a nucleus for thousands more. He urged us
to accept his views. We were silent, for we could not agree with him,
and respected him too much to reply. He then said, bitterly, that he saw
all hope was gone—that all the friends of the South were prepared to
consent to her degradation. When he arose to leave the room, he had lost
his erect bearing, his face was pale, and he faltered so much in his
step that he was compelled to lean upon General Breckinridge. It was a
sad sight to men who felt toward him as we did. I will venture to say
that nothing he has subsequently endured, equaled the bitterness of that
moment.[Pg 576]
At the Savannah river, next day, the men were paid, through the
influence of General Breckinridge, with a portion of the gold brought
from Richmond. Each man got from twenty-six to thirty-two dollars—as he
was lucky. Generals Vaughan and Debrell remained at the river to
surrender. At Washington, Georgia, on the same day, the 7th of May, Mr.
Davis left us, with the understanding that he was to attempt to make his
escape. General Breckinridge had determined to proceed, with all the men
remaining, in an opposite direction, and divert if possible all pursuit
from Mr. Davis. That night, General Ferguson’s brigade went to Macon to
surrender, Ferguson himself going to Mississippi. On the next morning,
some three hundred fifty of my brigade and a portion of William’s
brigade, under Colonel Breckinridge, marched to Woodstock, Georgia.
Many men of my brigade, dismounted and unable to obtain horses, and many
of the paroled men, hoping to be exchanged, had followed us out from
Virginia, walking more than three hundred miles. When at length,
unwilling to expose them to further risk and suffering, I positively
prohibited their coming further, they wept like children. A great
portion of the men with Colonel Breckinridge were from his own regiment,
the Ninth Kentucky, and the former “Morgan men,” so long separated, were
united just as all was lost. The glorious old “Kentucky brigade,” as the
infantry brigade, first commanded by General Breckinridge, then by
Hanson and Helm, was not many miles distant, and surrendered about the
same time. Upon leaving Washington, General Breckinridge, accompanied by
his staff and some forty-five men, personally commanded by Colonel
Breckinridge had taken a different road from that upon which the brigade
had marched. When I arrived at Woodstock I did not find him there as I
had expected.
Hours elapsed and he did not come. They were hours of intense anxiety.
In our front was a much superior force of Federal cavalry—to go[Pg 577]
forward would provoke an engagement, and it could only result in severe
and bloody defeat.
Retreat, by the way we had come, was impossible. Upon the left, if we
escaped the enemy, we would be stopped by the sea.
I could not determine to surrender until I had heard from General
Breckinridge, who was, at once, commander of all the Confederate forces
yet in the field, in this vicinity, and the sole remaining officer of
the Government.
Nor, until he declared it, could I know that enough had been done to
assure the escape of Mr. Davis.
The suspense was galling. At length Colonel Breckinridge arrived with a
message from the General.
While proceeding leisurely along the road, upon which he had left
Washington, General Breckinridge had suddenly encountered a battalion of
Federal cavalry, formed his forty-five men, and prepared to charge them.
They halted, sent in a flag of truce, and parlied.
General Breckinridge saw that he could no longer delay his own attempt
at escape, and while the conference was proceeding; set off with a few
of his personal staff.
After a sufficient time had elapsed to let him get all away, Colonel
Breckinridge marched by the enemy (a flag of truce having been agreed
on), and came directly to Woodstock. General Breckinridge directed him
to say, that he had good reason to believe that Generals Forrest and
Taylor had already surrendered. That if we succeeded in crossing the
Mississippi, we would find all there prepared to surrender. He counseled
an immediate surrender upon our part, urging that it was folly to think
of holding out longer and criminal to risk the lives of the men when no
good could possibly be accomplished. He wished them to return to
Kentucky—to their homes and kindred. He forbade any effort to assist
his escape. “I will not have,” he said, “one of these young men to
encounter one hazard more for my sake.” Bidding his young countrymen
return to the loved land of their birth, he went off into exile.
The men were immediately formed, and the words of the chieftain they[Pg 578]
most loved and honored, repeated to them. They declared that they had
striven to do their duty and preserve their honor, and felt that they
could accept, without disgrace, release from service which they had
worthily discharged. Then the last organization of “Morgan men” was
disbanded. Comrades, who felt for each other the esteem and affection
which brave and true men cherish, parted with sad hearts and dimmed
eyes. There remained of the “old command,” only the recollections of an
eventful career and the ties of friendship which would ever bind its
members together. There was no humiliation for these men. They had done
their part and served faithfully, until there was no longer a cause and
a country to serve. They knew not what their fate would be, and indulged
in no speculation regarding it. They had been taught fortitude by the
past, and, without useless repining and unmanly fear, they faced the
future.
Transcriber’s note: many words, in particular proper names, have a
variety of spellings in the original document, in which case a
consistent spelling has been applied.