CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
C.F. CLAY, MANAGER
LONDON: FETTER LANE, E.C.4

BY

GEORGE EDMUNDSON
D. LITT., F.R.G.S., F.R.HIST.S.

CAMBRIDGE

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1922

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.
BOMBAY }
CALCUTTA} MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
MADRAS }
TORONTO: THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TOKYO: MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL PREFACE

The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern
Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about
the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one
or two cases the story commences at an earlier date; in the case of
the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the
different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is
believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution
and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better
understood and the continuity of historical development more
clearly displayed.

The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to
understand the nature of existing political conditions. ‘The roots
of the present lie deep in the past’; and the real significance of
contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes
which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes it
possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in
considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of
modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will be
useful not only to beginners but to students who have already
acquired some general knowledge of European History. For those who
wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography appended to
each volume will act as a guide to original sources of information
and works of a more special character.

Considerable attention is paid to political geography; and
each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may be
requisite for the illustration of the text.

G.W. PROTHERO.

PROLOGUE

The title, “History of Holland,” given to this volume is fully
justified by the predominant part which the great maritime province
of Holland took in the War of Independence and throughout the whole
of the subsequent history of the Dutch state and people. In every
language the country, comprising the provinces of Holland, Zeeland,
Utrecht, Friesland, Gelderland, Overyssel and Groningen, has, from
the close of the sixteenth century to our own day, been currently
spoken of as Holland, and the people (with the solitary exception
of ourselves) as ‘Hollanders^[1].’ It is only rarely that the
terms the Republic of the United Provinces, or of the United
Netherlands, and in later times the Kingdom of the Netherlands, are
found outside official documents. Just as the title “History of
England” gradually includes the histories of Wales, of Scotland, of
Ireland, and finally of the widespread British Empire, so is it in
a smaller way with the history that is told in the following pages.
That history, to be really complete, should begin with an account
of mediaeval Holland in the feudal times which preceded the
Burgundian period; and such an account was indeed actually written,
but the plan of this work, which forms one of the volumes of a
series, precluded its publication.

The character, however, of the people of the province of
Holland, and of its sister and closely allied province of Zeeland,
its qualities of toughness, of endurance, of seamanship and
maritime enterprise, spring from the peculiar amphibious nature of
the country, which differs from that of any other country in the
world. The age-long struggle against the ocean and the river
floods, which has converted the marshes, that lay around the mouths
of the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt, by toilsome labour and
skill into fertile and productive soil, has left its impress on the
whole history of this people. Nor must it be forgotten how largely
this building up of the elaborate system of dykes, dams and canals
by which this water-logged land was transformed into the Holland of
the closing[pg.viii] decades of the sixteenth century,
enabled her people to offer such obstinate and successful
resistance to the mighty power of Philip II.

The earliest dynasty of the Counts of Holland—Dirks,
Floris, and Williams—was a very remarkable one. Not only did
it rule for an unusually long period, 922 to 1299, but in this long
period without exception all the Counts of Holland were strong and
capable rulers. The fiefs of the first two Dirks lay in what is now
known as North Holland, in the district called Kennemerland. It was
Dirk III who seized from the bishops of Utrecht some swampy land
amidst the channels forming the mouth of the Meuse, which, from the
bush which covered it, was named Holt-land (Holland or Wood-land).
Here he erected, in 1015, a stronghold to collect tolls from
passing ships. This stronghold was the beginning of the town of
Dordrecht, and from here a little later the name Holland was
gradually applied to the whole county. Of his successors the most
illustrious was William II (1234 to 1256) who was crowned King of
the Romans at Aachen, and would have received from Pope Innocent IV
the imperial crown at Rome, had he not been unfortunately drowned
while attempting to cross on horseback an ice-bound marsh.

In 1299 the male line of this dynasty became extinct; and John
of Avennes, Count of Hainault, nephew of William II, succeeded. His
son, William III, after a long struggle with the Counts of
Flanders, conquered Zeeland and became Count henceforth of Holland,
Zeeland and Hainault. His son, William IV, died childless; and the
succession then passed to his sister Margaret, the wife of the
Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. It was contested by her second son
William, who, after a long drawn-out strife with his mother,
became, in 1354, Count of Holland and Zeeland with the title
William V, Margaret retaining the county of Hainault. Becoming
insane, his brother Albert in 1358 took over the reins of
government. In his time the two factions, known by the nicknames of
“the Hooks” and “the Cods,” kept the land in a continual state of
disorder and practically of civil war. They had already been active
for many years. The Hooks were supported by the nobles, by the
peasantry and by that large part of the poorer townsfolk that was
excluded from all share in the municipal government. The Cods
represented the interests of the powerful burgher corporations. In
later times these same principles and interests divided the
Orangist and the States parties, and were inherited from the[pg.ix]
Hooks and Cods of mediaeval Holland. The marriages of Albert’s son,
William, with Margaret the sister of John the Fearless, Duke of
Burgundy, and of John the Fearless with Albert’s daughter,
Margaret, were to have momentous consequences. Albert died in 1404
and was succeeded by William VI, who before his death in 1417
caused the nobles and towns to take the oath of allegiance to his
daughter and only child, Jacoba or Jacqueline.^[2]

Jacoba, brave, beautiful and gifted, for eleven years maintained
her rights against many adversaries, chief among them her powerful
and ambitious cousin, Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy. Her
courage and many adventures transformed her into a veritable
heroine of romance. By her three marriages with John, Duke of
Brabant, with Humphry, Duke of Gloucester, and, finally, with Frans
van Borselen, she had no children. Her hopeless fight with Philip
of Burgundy’s superior resources ended at last in the so-called
“Reconciliation of Delft” in 1428, by which, while retaining the
title of countess, she handed over the government to Philip and
acknowledged his right of succession to the Countship upon her
death, which took place in 1436.

G.E.

November, 1921

CHAPTER I

THE BURGUNDIAN NETHERLANDS

The last duke of the ancient Capetian house of Burgundy dying in
1361 without heirs male, the duchy fell into the possession of the
French crown, and was by King John II bestowed upon his youngest
son, Philip the Hardy, Duke of Touraine, as a reward, it is said,
for the valour he displayed in the battle of Poictiers. The county
of Burgundy, generally known as Franche-Comté, was not
included in this donation, for it was an imperial fief; and it fell
by inheritance in the female line to Margaret, dowager Countess of
Flanders, widow of Count Louis II, who was killed at Crécy.
The duchy and the county were soon, however, to be re-united, for
Philip married Margaret, daughter and heiress of Louis de Male,
Count of Flanders, and granddaughter of the above-named Margaret.
In right of his wife he became, on the death of Louis de Male in
1384, the ruler of Flanders, Mechlin, Artois, Nevers and
Franche-Comté. Thus the foundation was laid of a great
territorial domain between France and Germany, and Philip the Hardy
seems from the first to have been possessed by the ambitious design
of working for the restoration of a powerful middle kingdom, which
should embrace the territories assigned to Lothaire in the
tripartite division of the Carolingian empire by the treaty of
Verdun (843). For this he worked ceaselessly during his long reign
of forty years, and with singular ability and courage. Before his
death he had by the splendour of his court, his wealth and his
successes in arms and diplomacy, come to be recognised as a
sovereign of great weight and influence, in all but name a king.
The Burgundian policy and tradition, which he established, found in
his successors John the Fearless (murdered in 1419) and John’s son,
Philip the Good, men of like character and filled with the same
ambitions as himself. The double marriage of John with Margaret,
the sister of William VI of Holland, and of William VI with
Margaret of Burgundy, largely helped forward their projects of
aggrandisement. Philip the Good was, however, a much abler ruler
than his father, a far-seeing[pg.2] statesman, who pursued his plans with
a patient and unscrupulous pertinacity, of which a conspicuous
example is to be found in his long protracted struggle with his
cousin Jacoba, the only child and heiress of William of Holland,
whose misfortunes and courage have made her one of the most
romantic figures of history. By a mixture of force and intrigue
Philip, in 1433, at last compelled Jacoba to abdicate, and he
became Count of Holland, Zeeland and Hainault. Nor was this by any
means the end of his acquisitions. Joanna, Duchess of Brabant
(1355-1404) in her own right, was aunt on the mother’s side to
Margaret of Flanders, wife of Philip the Hardy. Dying without
heirs, she bequeathed Brabant, Limburg and Antwerp to her
great-nephew, Anthony of Burgundy, younger brother of John the
Fearless. Anthony was killed at Agincourt and was succeeded first
by his son John IV, the husband of Jacoba of Holland, and on his
death without an heir in 1427, by his second son, Philip of St Pol,
who also died childless in 1430. From him his cousin Philip the
Good inherited the duchies of Brabant and Limburg and the
marquisate of Antwerp. Already he had purchased in 1421 the
territory of Namur from the last Count John III, who had fallen
into heavy debt; and in 1443 he likewise purchased the duchy of
Luxemburg from the Duchess Elizabeth of Görlitz, who had
married in second wedlock Anthony, Duke of Brabant, and afterwards
John of Bavaria, but who had no children by either of her
marriages. Thus in 1443 Philip had become by one means or another
sovereign under various titles of the largest and most important
part of the Netherlands, and he increased his influence by securing
in 1456 the election of his illegitimate son David, as Bishop of
Utrecht. Thus a great step forward had been taken for the
restoration of the middle kingdom, which had been the dream of
Philip the Hardy, and which now seemed to be well-nigh on the point
of accomplishment.

The year 1433, the date of the incorporation of Holland and
Zeeland in the Burgundian dominion, is therefore a convenient
starting-point for a consideration of the character of the
Burgundian rule in the Netherlands, and of the changes which the
concentration of sovereign power in the hands of a single ruler
brought into the relations of the various provinces with one
another and into their internal administration. The Netherlands
become now for the first time something more than a geographical
expression for a[pg.3] number of petty feudal states,
practically independent and almost always at strife. Henceforward
there was peace; and throughout the whole of this northern part of
his domains it was the constant policy of Philip gradually to
abolish provincialism and to establish a centralised government. He
was far too wise a statesman to attempt to abolish suddenly or
arbitrarily the various rights and privileges, which the Flemings,
Brabanters and Hollanders had wrung from their sovereigns, and to
which they were deeply attached; but, while respecting these, he
endeavoured to restrict them as far as possible to local usage, and
to centralise the general administration of the whole of the “pays
de par deçà” (as the Burgundian dukes were accustomed
to name their Netherland dominions) by the summoning of
representatives of the Provincial States to an assembly styled the
States-General, and by the creation of a common Court of
Appeal.

The first time the States-General were called together by Philip
was in 1465 for the purpose of obtaining a loan for the war with
France and the recognition of his son Charles as his successor; and
from this time forward at irregular intervals, but with increasing
frequency, the practice of summoning this body went on. The
States-General (in a sense) represented the Netherlands as a whole;
and it was a matter of great convenience for the sovereign,
especially when large levies of money had to be raised, to be
enabled thus to bring his proposals before a single assembly,
instead of before a number of separate and independent provincial
states. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the
States-General had, as such, no authority to act on behalf of these
several provincial states. Each of these sent their deputies to the
General Assembly, but these deputies had to refer all matters to
their principals before they could give their assent, and each body
of deputies gave this assent separately, and without regard to the
others. It was thus but a first provisional step towards unity of
administration, but it did tend to promote a feeling of community
of interests between the provinces and to lead to the deputies
having intercourse with one another and interchanging their views
upon the various important subjects that were brought before their
consideration. The period of disturbance and the weakening of the
authority of the sovereign, which followed the death of Charles the
Bold, led to the States-General obtaining a position of increased
importance; and they[pg.4] may from that time be regarded as
forming a regular and necessary part of the machinery of government
in the Burgundian Netherlands. The States-General however, like the
Provincial States, could only meet when summoned by the sovereign
or his stadholder; and the causes for which they were summoned were
such special occasions as the accession of a new sovereign or the
appointment of a new stadholder, or more usually for sanctioning
the requests for levies of money, which were required for the
maintenance of splendid courts and the cost of frequent wars. For
not only the Burgundian princes properly so-called, but even
Charles V, had mainly to depend upon the wealth of the Netherlands
for their financial needs. And here a distinction must be drawn.
For solemn occasions, such as the accession of a new sovereign, or
the acceptance of a newly appointed governor, representatives of
all the provinces (eventually seventeen) were summoned, but for
ordinary meetings for the purpose of money levies only those of the
so-called patrimonial or old Burgundian provinces came together.
The demands for tribute on the provinces acquired later, such as
Gelderland, Groningen, Friesland and Overyssel, were made to each
of these provinces separately, and they jealously claimed their
right to be thus separately dealt with. In the case of the other
provinces the States-General, as has been already stated, could
only grant the money after obtaining from each province
represented, severally, its assent; and this was often not gained
until after considerable delay and much bargaining. Once granted,
however, the assessment regulating the quota, which the different
provinces had to contribute, was determined on the basis of the
so-called quotisatie or settinge drawn up in 1462 on
the occasion of a tribute for 10 years, which Charles the Bold, as
his father’s stadholder in the “pays de par deçà,”
then demanded. The relative wealth of the provinces may be judged
from the fact that at this date Flanders and Brabant each paid a
quarter of the whole levy, Holland one sixth, Zeeland one quarter
of Holland’s share.

As regards the provincial government the Burgundian princes left
undisturbed the local and historical customs and usages, and each
province had its individual characteristics. At the head of each
provincial government (with the exception of Brabant, at whose
capital, Brussels, the sovereign himself or his regent resided) was
placed a governor, with the title of Stadholder, who was the[pg.5]
representative of the sovereign and had large patronage. It was his
duty to enforce edicts, preserve order, and keep a watchful eye
over the administration of justice. He nominated to many municipal
offices, but had little or no control over finance. The raising of
troops and their command in the field was entrusted to a
captain-general, who might not be the same person as the
stadholder, though the offices were sometimes united. In the
northern Netherlands there was but one stadholder for the three
provinces of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, and one (at a somewhat
later date) for Friesland, Groningen, Drente and Overyssel.

The desire of the Burgundian princes to consolidate their
dominions into a unified sovereignty found itself thwarted by many
obstacles and especially by the lack of any supreme tribunal of
appeal. It was galling to them that the Parlement of Paris
should still exercise appellate jurisdiction in Crown-Flanders and
Artois, and the Imperial Diet in some of the other provinces.
Already in 1428 Philip had erected the Court of Holland at the
Hague to exercise large powers of jurisdiction and financial
control in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland; and in 1473
Charles the Bold set up at Mechlin the body known as the Great
Council, to act as a court of appeal from the provincial courts. It
was to be, in the Netherlands, what the Parlement of Paris
was in France. The Great Council, which had grown out of the Privy
Council attached to the person of the prince, and which under the
direction of the Chancellor of Burgundy administered the affairs of
the government, more particularly justice and finance, was in 1473,
as stated above, re-constituted as a Court of Appeal in legal
matters, a new Chamber of Accounts being at the same time created
to deal with finance. These efforts at centralisation of authority
were undoubtedly for the good of the country as a whole, but such
was the intensity of provincial jealousy and particularism that
they were bitterly resented and opposed.

In order to strengthen the sovereign’s influence in the towns,
and to lessen the power of the Gilds, Philip established in
Holland, and so far as he could elsewhere, what were called “vaste
Colleges” or fixed committees of notables, to which were entrusted
the election of the town officials and the municipal
administration. These bodies were composed of a number of the
richest and most influential burghers, who were styled the
Twenty-four, the Forty, [pg.6] the Sixty or the Eighty, according to
the number fixed for any particular town. These men were appointed
for life and their successors were chosen by co-option, so that the
town corporations gradually became closed hereditary aristocracies,
and the mass of the citizens were deprived of all voice in their
own affairs. The Schout or chief judge was chosen directly
by the sovereign or his stadholder, who also nominated the
Schepens or sheriffs from a list containing a double number,
which was submitted to him.

The reign of Philip the Good was marked by a great advance in
the material prosperity of the land. Bruges, Ghent, Ypres and
Antwerp were among the most flourishing commercial and industrial
cities in the world, and when, through the silting up of the
waterway, Bruges ceased to be a seaport, Antwerp rapidly rose to
pre-eminence in her place, so that a few decades later her wharves
were crowded with shipping, and her warehouses with goods from
every part of Europe. In fact during the whole of the Burgundian
period the southern Netherlands were the richest domain in
Christendom, and continued to be so until the disastrous times of
Philip II of Spain. Meanwhile Holland and Zeeland, though unable to
compete with Brabant and Flanders in the populousness of their
towns and the extent of their trade, were provinces of growing
importance. Their strength lay in their sturdy and enterprising
sea-faring population. The Hollanders had for many years been the
rivals of the Hanse Towns for the Baltic trade. War broke out in
1438 and hostilities continued for three years with the result that
the Hanse League was beaten, and henceforth the Hollanders were
able without further let or hindrance more and more to become the
chief carriers of the “Eastland” traffic. Amsterdam was already a
flourishing port, though as yet it could make no pretension of
competing with Antwerp. The herring fisheries were, however, the
staple industry of Holland and Zeeland. The discovery of the art of
curing herrings by William Beukelsz of Biervliet (died 1447) had
converted a perishable article of food into a marketable commodity;
and not only did the fisheries give lucrative employment to many
thousands of the inhabitants of these maritime provinces, but they
also became the foundation on which was to be built their future
commercial supremacy.[pg.7]

The Burgundian dukes were among the most powerful rulers of
their time—the equals of kings in all but name—and they
far surpassed all contemporary sovereigns in their lavish display
and the splendour of their court. The festival at Bruges in 1430 in
celebration of the marriage of Philip the Good and Isabel of
Portugal, at which the Order of the Golden Fleece was instituted,
excited universal wonder; while his successor, Charles the Bold,
contrived to surpass even his father in the splendour of his
espousals with Margaret of York in 1468, and at his conference with
the Emperor Frederick III at Trier in 1473. On this last occasion
he wore a mantle encrusted all over with diamonds.

The foundation of the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1430 was an
event of great importance, as marking a step forward on the part of
Philip in its assumption of quasi-regal attributes. The title was
very appropriate, for it pointed to the wool and cloth trade as
being the source of the wealth of Flanders. The Order comprised
thirty-one knights, chosen from the flower of the Burgundian nobles
and the chief councillors of the sovereign. The statutes of the
Order set forth in detail the privileges of the members, and their
duties and obligations to their prince. They had a prescriptive
claim to be consulted on all matters of importance, to be selected
for the chief government posts, and to serve on military councils.
The knights were exempt from the jurisdiction of all courts, save
that of their own chapter.

Philip died in 1467 and was succeeded by his son, Charles, who
had already exercised for some years authority in the Netherlands
as his father’s deputy. Charles, as his surname le
Téméraire witnesses, was a man of impulsive and
autocratic temperament, but at the same time a hard worker, a great
organiser, and a brilliant soldier. Consumed with ambition to
realise that restoration of a great middle Lotharingian kingdom
stretching from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, for which his
father had been working during his long and successful reign, he
threw himself with almost passionate energy into the accomplishment
of his task. With this object he was the first sovereign to depart
from feudal usages and to maintain a standing army. He appeared at
one time to be on the point of accomplishing his aim. Lorraine,
which divided his southern from his northern possessions, was for a
short time in his possession. Intervening in Gelderland between the
Duke Arnold of Egmont[pg.8] and his son Adolf, he took the latter
prisoner and obtained the duchy in pledge from the former.
Uprisings in the Flemish towns against heavy taxation and arbitrary
rule were put down with a strong hand. In September, 1474, the
duke, accompanied by a splendid suite, met the emperor Frederick
III at Trier to receive the coveted crown from the imperial hands.
It was arranged that Charles’ only daughter and heiress should be
betrothed to Maximilian of Austria, the emperor’s eldest son, and
the very day and hour for the coronation were fixed. But the
Burgundian had an enemy in Louis XI of France, who was as prudent
and far-seeing as his rival was rash and impetuous, and who was far
more than his match in political craft and cunning. French secret
agents stirred up Frederick’s suspicions against Charles’ designs,
and the emperor suddenly left Trier, where he had felt humiliated
by the splendour of his powerful vassal.

The duke was furious at his disappointment, but was only the
more obstinately bent on carrying out his plans. But Louis had been
meanwhile forming a strong league (League of Constance, March 1474)
of various states threatened by Charles’ ambitious projects. Duke
Sigismund of Austria, Baden, Basel, Elsass, and the Swiss Cantons
united under the leadership of France to resist them. Charles led
an army of 60,000 men to aid the Archbishop of Cologne against his
subjects, but spent eleven months in a fruitless attempt to take a
small fortified town, Neuss, in which a considerable portion of his
army perished. He was compelled to raise large sums of money from
his unwilling subjects in the Netherlands to repair his losses, and
in 1475 he attacked Duke Réné of Lorraine, captured
Nancy and conquered the duchy, which had hitherto separated his
Netherland from his French possessions. It was the first step in
the accomplishment of his scheme for the restoration of the
Lotharingian kingdom. In Elsass, however, the populace had risen in
insurrection against the tyranny of the Burgundian governor, Peter
van Hagenbach, and had tried and executed him. Finding that the
Swiss had aided the rebels, Charles now, without waiting to
consolidate his conquest of Lorraine, determined to lead his army
into Switzerland. At the head of a splendidly equipped force he
encountered the Confederates near Granson (March 2, 1476) and was
utterly routed, his own seal and order of the Golden Fleece, with
vast booty, falling into the[pg.9] hands of the victors. A few months
later, having recruited and reorganised his beaten army, he again
led them against the Swiss. The encounter took place (June 21,
1476) at Morat and once more the chivalry of Burgundy suffered
complete defeat. Charles fled from the field, half insane with rage
and disappointment, when the news that Duke Réné had
reconquered Lorraine roused him from his torpor. He hastily
gathered together a fresh army and laid siege to Nancy. But in
siege operations he had no skill, and in the depth of winter
(January 5, 1477) he was attacked by the Swiss and Lorrainers
outside the walls of the town. A panic seized the Burgundians;
Charles in person in vain strove to stem their flight, and he
perished by an unknown hand. His body was found later, stripped
naked, lying frozen in a pool.

Charles left an only child, Mary, not yet twenty years of age.
Mary found herself in a most difficult and trying situation. Louis
XI, the hereditary enemy of her house, at once took possession of
the duchy of Burgundy, which by failure of heirs-male had reverted
to its liege-lord. The sovereignty of the county of Burgundy
(Franche-Comté), being an imperial fief descending in the
female line, she retained; but, before her authority had been
established, Louis had succeeded in persuading the states of the
county to place themselves under a French protectorate. French
armies overran Artois, Hainault and Picardy, and were threatening
Flanders, where there was in every city a party of French
sympathisers. Gelderland welcomed the exiled duke, Adolf, as their
sovereign. Everywhere throughout the provinces the despotic rule of
Duke Charles and his heavy exactions had aroused seething
discontent. Mary was virtually a prisoner in the hands of her
Flemish subjects; and, before they consented to support her cause,
there was a universal demand for a redress of grievances. But Mary
showed herself possessed of courage and statesmanship beyond her
years, and she had at this critical moment in her step-mother,
Margaret of York, an experienced and capable adviser at her side. A
meeting of the States-General was at once summoned to Ghent. It met
on February 3, 1477, Mary’s 20th birthday. Representatives came
from Flanders, Brabant, Artois and Namur, in the southern, and from
Holland and Zeeland in the northern Netherlands. Mary saw there was
no course open to her but to accede to their demands. Only eight
days after the Assembly met, the charter of Netherland[pg.10]
liberties, called The Great Privilege, was agreed to and signed. By
this Act all previous ordinances conflicting with ancient
privileges were abolished. The newly-established Court of Appeal at
Mechlin was replaced by a Great Council of twenty-four members
chosen by the sovereign from the various states, which should
advise and assist in the administration of government. Mary
undertook not to marry or to declare war without the assent of the
States-General. The States-General and the Provincial States were
to meet as often as they wished, without the summons of the
sovereign. All officials were to be native-born; no Netherlander
was to be tried by foreign judges; there were to be no forced
loans, no alterations in the coinage. All edicts or ordinances
infringing provincial rights were to be ipso facto null and
void. By placing her seal to this document Mary virtually abdicated
the absolute sovereign power which had been exercised by her
predecessors, and undid at a stroke the results of their really
statesmanlike efforts to create out of a number of semi-autonomous
provinces a unified State. Many of their acts and methods had been
harsh and autocratic, especially those of Charles the Bold, but who
can doubt that on the whole their policy was wise and salutary? In
Holland and Zeeland a Council was erected consisting of a
Stadholder and eight councillors (six Hollanders and two
Zeelanders) of whom two were to be nobles, the others jurists.
Wolferd van Borselen, lord of Veere, was appointed Stadholder.

The Great Privilege granted, the States willingly raised a force
of 34,000 men to resist the French invasion, and adequate means for
carrying on the war. But the troubles of the youthful Mary were not
yet over. The hand of the heiress of so many rich domains was
eagerly sought for (1) by Louis of France for the dauphin, a youth
of 17 years; (2) by Maximilian of Austria to whom she had been
promised in marriage; (3) by Adolf, Duke of Gelderland, who was
favoured by the States-General. Adolf, however, was killed in
battle. In Flanders there was a party who favoured the French and
actually engaged in intrigues with Louis, but the mass of the
people were intensely averse to French domination. To such an
extent was this the case that two influential officials, the lords
Hugonet and Humbercourt, on whom suspicion fell of treacherous
correspondence with the French king, were seized, tried by a
special tribunal, and, despite the tears and entreaties of the
duchess,[pg.11] were condemned and beheaded in the
market-place of Ghent. Maximilian became therefore the accepted
suitor; and on August 19, 1477, his marriage with Mary took place
at Bruges. This marriage was to have momentous consequences, not
only for the Netherlands, but for Europe. The union was a happy
one, but, unfortunately, of brief duration. On March 29, 1482, Mary
died from the effects of a fall from her horse, leaving two
children, Philip and Margaret.

CHAPTER II

HABSBURG RULE IN THE NETHERLANDS

Maximilian, on the death of Mary, found himself in a very
difficult position. The archduke was a man of high-soaring ideas,
chivalrous, brave even to the point of audacity, full of expedients
and never daunted by failure, but he was deficient in stability of
character, and always hampered throughout his life by lack of
funds. He had in 1477 set himself to the task of defending Flanders
and the southern provinces of the Netherlands against French
attack, and not without considerable success. In 1482, as guardian
of his four-year old son Philip, the heir to the domains of the
house of Burgundy, he became regent of the Netherlands. His
authority however was little recognised. Gelderland and Utrecht
fell away altogether. Liège acknowledged William de la Marck
as its ruler. Holland and Zeeland were torn by contending factions.
Flanders, the centre of the Burgundian power, was specially hostile
to its new governor. The burghers of Ghent refused to surrender to
him his children, Philip and Margaret, who were held as hostages to
secure themselves against any attempted infringement of their
liberties. The Flemings even entered into negotiations with Louis
XI; and the archduke found himself compelled to sign a treaty with
France (December 23, 1482), one of the conditions being the
betrothal of his infant daughter to the dauphin. Maximilian,
however, found that for a time he must leave Flanders to put down
the rising of the Hook faction in Holland, who, led by Frans van
Brederode, and in alliance with the anti-Burgundian party in
Utrecht, had made themselves masters of Leyden. Beaten in a bloody
fight by the regent, Brederode nevertheless managed to seize Sluis
and Rotterdam; and from these ports he and his daring
companion-in-arms, Jan van Naaldwijk, carried on a guerrilla
warfare for some years. Brederode was killed in a fight at
Brouwershaven (1490), but Sluis still held out and was not taken
till two years later.

Meanwhile Maximilian had to undertake a campaign against
the[pg.13] Flemings, who were again in arms at
the instigation of the turbulent burghers of Ghent and Bruges.
Entering the province at the head of a large force he compelled the
rebel towns to submit and obtained possession of the person of his
son Philip (July, 1485). Elected in the following year King of the
Romans, Maximilian left the Netherlands to be crowned at Aachen
(April, 1486). A war with France called him back, in the course of
which he suffered a severe defeat at Bethune. At the beginning of
1488 Ghent and Bruges once more rebelled; and the Roman king,
enticed to enter Bruges, was there seized and compelled to see his
friends executed in the market-place beneath his prison window. For
seven months he was held a prisoner; nor was he released until he
had sworn to surrender his powers, as regent, to a council of
Flemings and to withdraw all his foreign troops from the
Netherlands. He was forced to give hostages as a pledge of his good
faith, among them his general, Philip of Cleef, who presently
joined his captors.

Maximilian, on arriving at the camp of the Emperor Frederick
III, who had gathered together an army to release his imprisoned
son, was persuaded to break an oath given under duress. He advanced
therefore at the head of his German mercenaries into Flanders, but
was able to achieve little success against the Flemings, who found
in Philip of Cleef an able commander. Despairing of success, he now
determined to retire into Germany, leaving Duke Albert of
Saxe-Meissen, a capable and tried soldier of fortune, as
general-in-chief of his forces and Stadholder of the Netherlands.
With the coming of Duke Albert order was at length to be restored,
though not without a severe struggle.

Slowly but surely Duke Albert took town after town and reduced
province after province into submission. The Hook party in Holland
and Zeeland, and their anti-Burgundian allies in Utrecht, and
Robert de la Marck in Liège, in turn felt the force of his
arm. An insurrection of the peasants in West Friesland and
Kennemerland—the “Bread and Cheese Folk,” as they were
called—was easily put down. Philip of Cleef with his Flemings
was unable to make head against him; and, with the fall of Ghent
and Sluis in the summer of 1492, the duke was able to announce to
Maximilian that the Netherlands, except Gelderland, were pacified.
The treaty of Senlis in 1493 ended the war with France. In the
following year, after his accession to the imperial throne,
Maximilian retired to his[pg.14] ancestral dominions in Germany, and
his son, Philip the Fair, took in his hands the reins of
government. The young sovereign, who was a Netherlander by birth
and had spent all his life in the country, was more popular than
his father; and his succession to the larger part of the Burgundian
inheritance was not disputed. He received the homage of Zeeland at
Roemerswaal, of Holland at Geertruidenburg, and seized the occasion
to announce the abrogation of the Great Privilege, and at the same
time restored the Grand Council at Mechlin.

In Utrecht the authority of Bishop David of Burgundy was now
firmly re-established; and on his death, Philip of Baden, an
obsequious adherent of the house of Austria, was elected. These
results of the pacification carried out so successfully by Duke
Albert had, however, left Maximilian and Philip deeply in debt to
the Saxon; and there was no money wherewith to meet the claim,
which amounted to 300,000 guilders. After many negotiations
extending over several years, compensation was found for Albert in
Friesland. That unhappy province and the adjoining territory of
Groningen had for a long time been torn by internal dissensions
between the two parties, the Schieringers and the
Vetkoopers, who were the counterparts of the Hooks and Cods
of Holland. The Schieringers called in the aid of the Saxon duke,
who brought the land into subjection. Maximilian now recognised
Albert as hereditary Podesta or governor of Friesland on condition
that the House of Austria reserved the right of redeeming the
territory for 100,000 guilders; and Philip acquiesced in the
bargain by which Frisian freedom was sold in exchange for the
cancelling of a debt. The struggle with Charles of Egmont in
Gelderland was not so easily terminated. Not till 1505 was Philip
able to overcome this crafty and skilful adversary. Charles was
compelled to do homage and to accompany Philip to Brussels
(October, 1505). It was, however, but a brief submission. Charles
made his escape once more into Gelderland and renewed the war of
independence.

Before these events had taken place, the marriage of Philip with
Juana, the daughter of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile,
had brought about a complete change in his fortunes. Maximilian,
always full of ambitious projects for the aggrandisement of his
House, had planned with Ferdinand of Aragon a double marriage
between their families, prompted by a common hatred and fear
of[pg.15] the growing power of France. The
Archduke Philip was to wed the Infanta Juana, the second daughter
of Ferdinand and Isabel; the Infante Juan, the heir to the thrones
of Aragon and Castile, Philip’s sister, Margaret. Margaret had in
1483, aged then three years, been betrothed to the Dauphin Charles,
aged twelve, and she was brought up at the French Court, and after
the death of Louis XI (August 30, 1483) had borne the title of
Queen and had lived at Amboise with other children of the French
royal house, under the care of the Regent, Anne de Beaujeu. The
marriage, however, of Charles VIII and Margaret was never to be
consummated. In August, 1488, the male line of the Dukes of
Brittany became extinct; and the hand of the heiress, Anne of
Brittany, a girl of twelve, attracted many suitors. It was clearly
a matter of supreme importance to the King of France that this
important territory should not pass by marriage into the hands of
an enemy. The Bretons, on the other hand, clung to their
independence and dreaded absorption in the unifying French state.
After many intrigues her council advised the young duchess to
accept Maximilian as her husband, and she was married to him by
proxy in March, 1490. Charles VIII immediately entered Brittany at
the head of a strong force and, despite a fierce and prolonged
resistance, conquered the country, and gained possession of Anne’s
person (August, 1491). The temptation was too strong to be
resisted. Margaret, after residing in France as his affianced wife
for eight years, was repudiated and finally, two years later, sent
back to the Netherlands, while Anne was compelled to break off her
marriage with Margaret’s father, and became Charles’ queen. This
double slight was never forgiven either by Maximilian or by
Margaret, and was the direct cause of the negotiations for the
double Spanish marriage, which, though delayed by the suspicious
caution of the two chief negotiators, Ferdinand and Maximilian, was
at length arranged. In August, 1496, an imposing fleet conveyed the
Infanta Juana to Antwerp and she was married to Philip at Lille. In
the following April Margaret and Don Juan were wedded in the
cathedral of Burgos. The union was followed by a series of
catastrophes in the Spanish royal family. While on his way with his
wife to attend the marriage of his older sister Isabel with the
King of Portugal, Juan caught a malignant fever and expired at
Salamanca in October, 1497.[pg.16]

The newly-married Queen of Portugal now became the heiress to
the crowns of Aragon and Castile, but she died a year later and
shortly afterwards her infant son. The succession therefore passed
to the younger sister, Juana; and Philip the Fair, the heir of the
House of Austria and already through his mother the ruler of the
rich Burgundian domain, became through his wife the prospective
sovereign of the Spanish kingdoms of Ferdinand and Isabel. Fortune
seemed to have reserved all her smiles for the young prince, when
on February 24, 1500, a son was born to him at Ghent, who received
the name Charles. But dark days were soon to follow. Philip was
pleasure-loving and dissolute, and he showed little affection for
his wife, who had already begun to exhibit symptoms of that
weakness of mind which was before long to develop into insanity.
However in 1501, they journeyed together to Spain, in order to
secure Juana’s rights to the Castilian succession and also to that
of Aragon should King Ferdinand die without an heir-male.

In November, 1504, Isabel the Catholic had died; and Philip and
his consort at once assumed the titles of King and Queen of
Castile, in spite of the opposition of Ferdinand, who claimed the
right of regency during his life-time. Both parties were anxious to
obtain the support of Henry VII. Already since the accession of
Philip the commercial relations between England and the Netherlands
had been placed on what proved to be a permanently friendly basis
by the treaty known as the Magnus Intercursus of 1496.
Flanders and Brabant were dependent upon the supply of English wool
for their staple industries, Holland and Zeeland for that freedom
of fishery on which a large part of their population was employed
and subsisted. In reprisals for the support formerly given by the
Burgundian government to the house of York, Henry had forbidden the
exportation of wool and of cloth to the Netherlands, had removed
the staple from Bruges to Calais, and had withdrawn the fishing
rights enjoyed by the Hollanders since the reign of Edward I. But
this state of commercial war was ruinous to both countries; and, on
condition that Philip henceforth undertook not to allow any enemies
of the English government to reside in his dominions, a good
understanding was reached, and the Magnus Intercursus, which
re-established something like freedom of trade between the
countries, was duly signed in February, 1496. The treaty was
solemnly renewed in 1501, but shortly afterwards fresh[pg.17]
difficulties arose concerning Yorkist refugees, and a stoppage of
trade was once more threatened. At this juncture a storm drove
Philip and Juana, who had set sail in January, 1506, for Spain, to
take refuge in an English harbour. For three months they were
hospitably entertained by Henry, but he did not fail to take
advantage of the situation to negotiate three treaties with his
unwilling guest: (1) a treaty of alliance, (2) a treaty of marriage
with Philip’s sister, the Archduchess Margaret, already at the age
of 25 a widow for the second time, (3) a revision of the treaty of
commerce of 1496, named from its unfavourable conditions, Malus
Intercursus. The marriage treaty came to nothing through the
absolute refusal of Margaret to accept the hand of the English
king.

Philip and Juana left England for Spain, April 23, to assume the
government of the three kingdoms, Castile, Leon and Granada, which
Juana had inherited from her mother. Owing to his wife’s mental
incapacity Philip in her name exercised all the powers of
sovereignty, but his reign was very short, for he was suddenly
taken ill and died at Burgos, September 25, 1506. His hapless wife,
after the birth of a posthumous child, sank into a state of
hopeless insanity and passed the rest of her long life in
confinement. Charles, the heir to so vast an inheritance, was but
six years old. The representatives of the provinces, assembled at
Mechlin (October 18), offered the regency of the Burgundian
dominions to the Emperor Maximilian; he in his turn nominated his
daughter, Margaret, to be regent in his place and guardian of his
grandson during Charles’ minority, and she with the assent of the
States-General took the oath on her installation as Mambour
or Governor-General of the Netherlands, March, 1507. Margaret was
but 27 years of age, and for twenty-four years she continued to
administer the affairs of the Netherlands with singular discretion,
firmness and Statesmanlike ability. The superintendence and
training of the young archduke could have been placed in no better
hands. Charles, who with his three sisters lived with his aunt at
Mechlin, was thus both by birth and education a Netherlander.

One of the first acts of Margaret was a refusal to ratify the
Malus Intercursusand the revival of the Magnus
Intercursus of 1496. This important commercial treaty from that
time forward continued in force for more than a century. The great
difficulty that Margaret encountered in her government was the lack
of [pg.18] adequate financial resources. The
extensive privileges accorded to the various provinces and their
mutual jealousies and diverse interests made the task of levying
taxes arduous and often fruitless. Margaret found that the granting
of supplies, even for so necessary a purpose as the raising of
troops to resist the raids of Charles of Gelderland, aided by the
French king, into Utrecht and Holland, was refused. She fortunately
possessed in a high degree those qualities of persuasive address
and sound judgment, which gave to her a foremost place among the
diplomatists and rulers of her time. Such was the confidence that
her brilliant abilities inspired that she was deputed both by the
Emperor Maximilian and by Ferdinand of Aragon to be their
plenipotentiary at the Peace Congress that assembled at Cambray in
November, 1508. Chiefly through her exertions the negotiations had
a speedy and successful issue, and the famous treaty known as the
League of Cambray was signed on December 10. By this treaty many of
the disputes concerning the rights and prerogatives of the French
crown in the Burgundian Netherlands were amicably settled; and it
was arranged that Charles of Egmont should be provisionally
recognised as Duke of Gelderland on condition that he should give
up the towns in Holland that he had captured and withdraw his
troops within his own borders.

The extant correspondence between Maximilian and Margaret, which
is of the most confidential character, on matters of high policy,
is a proof of the high opinion the emperor entertained of his
daughter’s intelligence and capacity. In nothing was his confidence
more justified than in the assiduous care and interest that the
regent took in the education of the Archduke Charles and his three
sisters, who had been placed in her charge. In 1515 Charles, on
entering his sixteenth year, was declared by Maximilian to be of
age; Margaret accordingly handed over to him the reins of
government and withdrew for the time into private life. Her
retirement was not, however, to be of long continuance. On January
23, 1516, King Ferdinand of Aragon died, and Charles, who now
became King of Castile and of Aragon, was obliged to leave the
Netherlands to take possession of his Spanish dominions. Before
sailing he reinstated his aunt as governess, and appointed a
council to assist her. This post she continued to hold till the day
of her death, for Charles was never again able to take up his
permanent residence in the Netherlands. During the first years[pg.19]
after his accession to the thrones of Ferdinand and Isabel he was
much occupied with Spanish affairs; and the death of Maximilian,
January 12, 1519, opened out to him a still wider field of ambition
and activity. On June 28 Charles was elected emperor, a result
which he owed in no small degree to the diplomatic skill and
activity of Margaret. Just a year later the emperor visited the
Netherlands, where Charles of Gelderland was again giving trouble,
and his presence was required both for the purpose of dealing with
the affairs of the provinces and also for securing a grant of
supply, for he was sorely in need of funds. Margaret had at his
request summoned the States-General to meet at Brussels, where
Charles personally addressed them, and explained at some length the
reasons which led him to ask his loyal and devoted Netherland
subjects for their aid on his election to the imperial dignity. The
States-General on this, as on other occasions, showed no
niggardliness in responding to the request of a sovereign who,
though almost always absent, appealed to their patriotism as a born
Netherlander, who had been brought up in their midst and spoke
their tongue. Charles was crowned at Aachen, October 23, 1520, and
some three months later presided at the famous diet of Worms, where
he met Martin Luther face to face. Before starting on his momentous
journey he again appointed Margaret regent, and gave to her
Council, which he nominated, large powers; the Council of Mechlin,
the Court of Holland and other provincial tribunals being subjected
to its superior authority and jurisdiction. By this action the
privileges of the provinces were infringed, but Charles was
resolute in carrying out the centralising policy of his ancestors,
the Dukes of Burgundy, and he had the power to enforce his will in
spite of the protests that were raised. And so under the wise and
conciliatory but firm administration of Margaret during a decade of
almost continuous religious and international strife—a decade
marked by such great events as the rapid growth of the Reformation
in Germany, the defeat and capture of Francis I at Pavia, the sack
of Rome by the troops of Bourbon and the victorious advance of the
Turks in Hungary and along the eastern frontier of the
empire—the Netherland provinces remained at peace, save for
the restless intrigues of Charles of Egmont in Gelderland, and
prospered. Their wealth furnished indeed no small portion of the
funds which enabled Charles to face[pg.20] successfully so many
adversaries and to humble the power of France. The last important
act of Margaret, like her first, was connected with the town of
Cambray. In this town, as the representative and plenipotentiary of
her nephew the emperor, she met, July, 1529, Louise of Savoy, who
had been granted similar powers by her son Francis I, to negotiate
a treaty of peace. The two princesses proved worthy of the trust
that had been placed in them, and a general treaty of peace, often
spoken of as “the Ladies’ Peace,” was speedily drawn up and
ratified. The conditions were highly advantageous to the interests
of Spain and the Netherlands. On November 30 of the following year
Margaret died, as the result of a slight accident to her foot which
the medical science of the day did not know how to treat properly,
in the 50th year of her age and the 24th of her regency.

Charles, who had a few months previously reached the zenith of
his power by being crowned with the iron crown of Lombardy and with
the imperial crown at the hands of Pope Clement VII at Bologna
(February 22 and 24, 1530), appointed as governess in Margaret’s
place his sister Mary, the widowed queen of Louis, King of Hungary,
who had been slain by the Turks at the battle of Mohacs, August 29,
1526.

Mary, who had passed her early life in the Netherlands under the
care of her aunt Margaret, proved herself in every way her worthy
successor. She possessed, like Margaret, a strong character,
statesmanlike qualities and singular capacity in the administration
of affairs. She filled the difficult post of regent for the whole
period of twenty-four years between the death of Margaret and the
abdication of Charles V in 1555. It was fortunate indeed for that
great sovereign that these two eminent women of his house should,
each in turn for one half of his long reign, have so admirably
conducted the government of this important portion of his
dominions, as to leave him free for the carrying out of his
far-reaching political projects and constant military campaigns in
other lands. Two years after Mary entered upon her regency Charles
appointed three advisory and administrative bodies—the
Council of State, the Council of Finance and the Privy
Council—to assist her in the government. The Council of State
dealt with questions of external and internal policy and with the
appointment of officials; the Council of Finance with the care of
the revenue and private[pg.21] domains of the sovereign; to the Privy
Council were entrusted the publication of edicts and “placards,”
and the care of justice and police.

When Charles succeeded Philip the Fair only a portion of the
Netherlands was subject to his sway. With steady persistence he set
himself to the task of bringing all the seventeen provinces under
one sovereign. In 1515 George of Saxe-Meissen sold to him his
rights over Friesland. Henry of Bavaria, who in opposition to his
wishes had been elected Bishop of Utrecht, was compelled (1528) to
cede to him the temporalities of the see, retaining the spiritual
office only. Charles thus added the Upper and Lower
Sticht—Utrecht and Overyssel—to his dominions.
He made himself (1536) master of Groningen and Drente after a long
and obstinate struggle with Charles of Gelderland, and seven years
later he forced Charles’ successor, William of Jülich and
Cleves, to renounce in his favour his claims to Gelderland and
Zutphen. During the reign of Charles V the States-General were
summoned many times, chiefly for the purpose of voting subsidies,
but it was only on special and solemn occasions, that the
representatives of all the seventeen provinces were present, as for
instance when Philip received their homage in 1549 and when Charles
V announced his abdication in 1555. The names of the seventeen
provinces summoned on these occasions were Brabant, Limburg,
Luxemburg, Gelderland, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Artois,
Hainault, Namur, Lille with Douay and Orchies, Tournay and
district, Mechlin, Friesland, Utrecht, Overyssel with Drente and
Groningen. The bishopric of Liège, though nominally
independent, was under the strict control of the government at
Brussels. The relations of Charles’ Burgundian domains to the
empire were a matter of no small moment, and he was able to
regulate them in a manner satisfactory to himself. Several times
during his reign tentative attempts were made to define those
relations, which were of a very loose kind. The fact that the head
of the house of Habsburg was himself emperor had not made him any
less determined than the Burgundian sovereigns, his ancestors, to
assert for his Netherland territories a virtual independence of
imperial control or obligation. The various states of which the
Netherlands were composed were as much opposed as the central
government at Brussels to any recognition of the claims of the
empire; and both[pg.22] Margaret of Austria and Mary of
Hungary ventured to refuse to send representatives to the imperial
diets, even when requested to do so by the emperor. At last in
1548, when all the Netherland provinces had been brought under the
direct dominion or control of one sovereign prince, a convention
was drawn up at the diet of Augsburg, chiefly by the exertions of
the Regent Mary and her tried councillors Viglius and Granvelle, by
which the unity of the Netherland territories was recognised and
they were freed from imperial jurisdiction. Nominally, they formed
a circle of the empire,—the Burgundian circle—and
representatives of the circle were supposed to appear at the diets
and to bear a certain share of imperial taxation in return for the
right to the protection of the empire against attacks by France. As
a matter of fact, no representatives were ever sent and no subsidy
was paid, nor was the protection of the empire ever sought or
given.

This convention, which in reality severed the shadowy links
which had hitherto bound the Netherlands to the empire, received
the sanction of the States-General in October, 1548; and it was
followed by the issuing, with the consent of the Estates of the
various provinces, of a “Pragmatic Sanction” by which the inherited
right of succession to the sovereignty in each and every province
was settled upon the male and female line of Charles’ descendants,
notwithstanding the existence of ancient provincial privileges to
the contrary. In 1549 the emperor’s only son Philip was
acknowledged by all the Estates as their future sovereign, and made
a journey through the land to receive homage.

The doctrines of the Reformation had early obtained a footing in
various parts of the Netherlands. At first it was the teaching of
Luther and of Zwingli which gained adherents. Somewhat later the
Anabaptist movement made great headway in Holland and Friesland,
especially in Amsterdam. The chief leaders of the Anabaptists were
natives of Holland, including the famous or infamous John of
Leyden, who with some thousands of these fanatical sectaries
perished at Münster in 1535. Between 1537 and 1543 a more
moderate form of Anabaptist teaching made rapid progress through
the preaching of a certain Menno Simonszoon. The followers of this
man were called Mennonites. Meanwhile Lutheranism and Zwinglianism
were in many parts of the country being supplanted by the sterner
doctrines of Calvin. All these movements[pg.23] were viewed by the
emperor with growing anxiety and detestation. Whatever compromises
with the Reformation he might be compelled to make in Germany, he
was determined to extirpate heresy from his hereditary dominions.
He issued a strong placard soon after the diet of Worms in 1521
condemning Luther and his opinions and forbidding the printing or
sale of any of the reformer’s writings; and between that date and
1555 a dozen other edicts and placards were issued of increasing
stringency. The most severe was the so-called “blood-placard” of
1550. This enacted the sentence of death against all convicted of
heresy—the men to be executed with the sword and the women
buried alive; in cases of obstinacy both men and women were to be
burnt. Terribly harsh as were these edicts, it is doubtful whether
the number of those who Suffered the extreme penalty has not been
greatly exaggerated by partisan writers. Of the thousands who
perished, by far the greater part were Anabaptists; and these met
their fate rather as enemies of the state and of society, than as
heretics. They were political as well as religious anarchists.

In the time of Charles the trade and industries of the
Netherlands were in a highly prosperous state. The Burgundian
provinces under the wise administrations of Margaret and Mary, and
protected by the strong arm of the emperor from foreign attack,
were at this period by far the richest state in Europe and the
financial mainstay of the Habsburg power. Bruges, however, had now
ceased to be the central market and exchange of Europe, owing to
the silting up of the river Zwijn. It was no longer a port, and its
place had been taken by Antwerp. At the close of the reign of
Charles, Antwerp, with its magnificent harbour on the Scheldt, had
become the “counting-house” of the nations, the greatest port and
the wealthiest and most luxurious city in the world. Agents of the
principal bankers and merchants of every country had their offices
within its walls. It has been estimated that, inclusive of the many
foreigners who made the town their temporary abode, the population
of Antwerp in 1560 was about 150,000. Five hundred vessels sailed
in and out of her harbour daily, and five times that number were to
be seen thronging her wharves at the same time.

To the north of the Scheldt the condition of things was not less
satisfactory than in the south, particularly in Holland. The
commercial prosperity of Holland was in most respects
different[pg.24] in kind from that of Flanders and
Brabant, and during the period with which we are dealing had been
making rapid advances, but on independent lines. A manufactory of
the coarser kinds of cloth, established at Leyden, had indeed for a
time met with a considerable measure of success, but had fallen
into decline in the time of Mary of Hungary. The nature of his
country led the Hollander to be either a sailor or a dairy-farmer,
not an artisan or operative. Akin though he was in race to the
Fleming and the Brabanter, his instincts led him by the force of
circumstances to turn his energies in other directions. Subsequent
history has but emphasised the fact—which from the fourteenth
century onwards is clearly evident—that the people who
inhabited the low-lying sea-girt lands of dyke, canal and polder in
Holland and Zeeland were distinct in character and temper from the
citizens of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Brussels or Mechlin, who were
essentially landsmen and artisans. Ever since the discovery of the
art of curing herrings (ascribed to William Beukelsz), the herring
fishery had acquired a great importance to the Hollanders and
Zeelanders, and formed the chief livelihood of a large part of the
entire population of those provinces; and many thousands, who did
not themselves sail in the fishing fleets, found employment in the
ship and boat-building wharves and in the making of sails, cordage,
nets and other tackle. It was in this hazardous occupation that the
hardy race of skilled and seasoned seamen, who were destined to
play so decisive a part in the coming wars of independence, had
their early training. The herring harvest, through the careful and
scientific methods that were employed in curing the fish and
packing them in barrels, became a durable and much sought for
article of commerce. A small portion of the catch served as a
supply of food for home consumption, the great bulk in its
thousands of barrels was a marketable commodity, and the
distribution of the cured herring to distant ports became a
lucrative business. It had two important consequences, the
formation of a Dutch Mercantile Marine, and the growth of
Amsterdam, which from small beginnings had in the middle of the
sixteenth century become a town with 40,000 inhabitants and a port
second only in importance in the Netherlands to Antwerp. From its
harbour at the confluence of the estuary of the Y with the Zuyder
Zee ships owned and manned by Hollanders sailed along the coasts of
France and Spain to bring home the salt[pg.25] for curing purposes
and with it wines and other southern products, while year by year a
still larger and increasing number entered the Baltic. In those
eastern waters they competed with the German Hanseatic cities, with
whom they had many acrimonious disputes, and with such success that
the Hollanders gradually monopolised the traffic in grain, hemp and
other “Eastland” commodities and became practically the
freight-carriers of the Baltic. And be it remembered that they were
able to achieve this because many of the North-Netherland towns
were themselves members of the Hanse League, and possessed
therefore the same rights and privileges commercially as their
rivals, Hamburg, Lübeck or Danzig. The great industrial cities
of Flanders and Brabant, on the other hand, not being members of
the League nor having any mercantile marine of their own, were
content to transact business with the foreign agents of the Hanse
towns, who had their counting-houses at Antwerp. It will thus be
seen that in the middle of the sixteenth century the trade of the
northern provinces, though as yet not to be compared in volume to
that of the Flemings and Walloons, had before it an opening field
for enterprise and energy rich in possibilities and promise for the
future.

Such was the state of affairs political, religious and
economical when in the year 1555 the Emperor Charles V, prematurely
aged by the heavy burden of forty years of world-wide sovereignty,
worn out by constant campaigns and weary of the cares of state,
announced his intention of abdicating and retiring into a
monastery. On October 25, 1555, the act of abdication was solemnly
and with impressive ceremonial carried out in the presence of the
representatives of the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands
specially summoned to meet their sovereign for the last time in the
Great Hall of the Palace at Brussels. Charles took an affecting
farewell of his Netherland subjects and concluded by asking them to
exhibit the same regard and loyalty to his son Philip as they had
always displayed to himself. Much feeling was shown, for Charles,
despite the many and varied calls and duties which had prevented
him from residing for any length of time in the Netherlands, had
always been at pains to manifest a special interest in the country
of his birth. The Netherlands were to him throughout life his
homeland and its people looked upon him as a fellow-countryman, and
not even the constant demands that Charles had made for[pg.26]
financial aid nor the stern edicts against heresy had estranged
them from him. The abdication was the more regretted because at the
same time Mary of Hungary laid down her office as regent, the
arduous duties of which she had so long and so ably discharged. On
the following day, October 26, the Knights of the Golden Fleece,
the members of the Councils and the deputies of the provinces took
the oath of allegiance to Philip, the emperor’s only son and heir;
and Philip on his side solemnly undertook to maintain unimpaired
the ancient rights and privileges of the several provinces.

CHAPTER III

THE PRELUDE TO THE REVOLT

Philip at the time of his accession to the sovereignty of the
Netherlands was already King of Naples and Sicily, and Duke of
Milan, and, by his marriage in 1554 to Mary Tudor, King-consort of
England, in which country he was residing when summoned by his
father to assist at the abdication ceremony at Brussels. A few
months later (January 16, 1556) by a further act of abdication on
the part of Charles V he became King of Castile and Aragon. It was
a tremendous inheritance, and there is no reason to doubt that
Philip entered upon his task with a deep sense that he had a
mission to fulfil and with a self-sacrificing determination to
spare himself no personal labour in the discharge of his duties.
But though he bore to his father a certain physical likeness,
Philip in character and disposition was almost his antithesis.
Silent, reserved, inaccessible, Philip had none of the restless
energy or the geniality of Charles, and was as slow and undecided
in action as he was bigoted in his opinions and unscrupulous in his
determination to compass his ends. He found himself on his
accession to power faced with many difficulties, for the treasury
was not merely empty, it was burdened with debt. Through lack of
means he was compelled to patch up a temporary peace (February 5,
1556) with the French king at Vaucelles, and to take steps to
reorganise his finances.

One of Philip’s first acts was the appointment of Emmanuel
Philibert, Duke of Savoy, to the post vacated by his aunt Mary; but
it was a position, as long as the king remained in the Netherlands,
of small responsibility. Early in 1556 he summoned the
States-General to Brussels and asked for a grant of 1,300,000
florins. The taxes proposed were disapproved by the principal
provinces and eventually refused. Philip was very much annoyed, but
was compelled to modify his proposals and accept what was offered
by the delegates. There was indeed from the very outset no love
lost between the new ruler and his Netherland subjects. Philip had
spent nearly all his life in Spain, where he had received[pg.28]
his education and early training, and he had grown up to manhood,
in the narrowest sense of the word, a Spaniard. He was as
unfamiliar with the laws, customs and privileges of the several
provinces of his Netherland dominions as he was with the language
of their peoples. He spoke and wrote only Castilian correctly, and
during his four years’ residence at Brussels he remained coldly and
haughtily aloof, a foreigner and alien in a land where he never
felt at home. Philip at the beginning of his reign honestly
endeavoured to follow in his father’s steps and to carry out his
policy; but acts, which the great emperor with his conciliatory
address and Flemish sympathies could venture upon with impunity,
became suspect and questionable when attempted by the son. Philip
made the great mistake of taking into his private confidence only
foreign advisers, chief among whom was Anthony Perrenot de
Granvelle, Bishop of Arras, a Burgundian by birth, the son of
Nicholas Perrenot, who for thirty years had been the trusted
counsellor of Charles V.

The opening of Philip’s reign was marked by signal military
successes. War broke out afresh with France, after a brief truce,
in 1557. The French arms however sustained two crushing reverses at
St Quentin, August 129, 1557, and at Gravelines, July 13, 1558.
Lamoral, Count of Egmont, who commanded the cavalry, was the chief
agent in winning these victories. By the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis
peace was concluded, in which the French made many concessions, but
were allowed to retain, at the cost of Philip’s ally, the town of
Calais which had been captured from the English by a surprise
attack in 1558. By the death of Queen Mary, which was said to have
been hastened by the news of the loss of Calais, Philip’s relations
with England were entirely changed, and one of the reasons for a
continuance of his residence in the Netherlands was removed. Peace
with France therefore was no sooner assured than Philip determined
to return to Spain, where his presence was required. He chose his
half-sister Margaret, Duchess of Parma, to be regent in place of
the Duke of Savoy. In July he summoned the Chapter of the Order of
the Golden Fleece—destined to be the last that was ever
held—to Ghent in order to announce his intended departure. A
little later the States-General were called together, also at
Ghent, for a solemn leave-taking. On August 26, Philip embarked at
Flushing, and quitted the Netherlands, never again to return.[pg.29]

Philip’s choice of Margaret as governess-general was a happy
one. She was a natural daughter of Charles V. Her mother was a
Fleming, and she had been brought up under the care of her aunts,
Margaret of Austria and Mary of Hungary. She resembled those able
rulers in being a woman of strong character and statesmanlike
qualities, and no doubt she would have been as successful in her
administration had she had the same opportunities and the same
freedom of action as her predecessors. Philip, however, though
henceforth he passed the whole of his life in Spain, had no
intention of loosening in any way his grasp of the reins of power
or of delegating any share of his sovereign authority. On his
return to Madrid he showed plainly that he meant to treat the
Netherland provinces as if they were dependencies of the Spanish
crown, and he required from Margaret and her advisers that all the
details of policy, legislation and administration should be
submitted to him for supervision and sanction. This necessitated
the writing of voluminous despatches and entailed with a man of his
habits of indecision interminable delays. Margaret moreover was
instructed that in all matters she must be guided by the advice of
her three councils. By far the most important of the three was the
Council Of State, which at this time consisted of five
members—Anthony Granvelle, Bishop of Arras; Baron de
Barlaymont; Viglius van Zwychem van Aytta; Lamoral, Count of
Egmont; and William, Prince of Orange. Barlaymont was likewise
president of the Council of Finance and Viglius president of the
Privy Council. By far the most important member of the Council of
State, as he was much the ablest, was the Bishop of Arras; and he,
with Barlaymont and Viglius, formed an inner confidential council
from whom alone the regent asked advice. The members of this inner
council, nicknamed the Consulta, were all devoted to the
interests of Philip. Egmont and Orange, because of their great
influence and popularity with the people, were allowed to be
nominally Councillors of State, but they were rarely consulted and
were practically shut out from confidential access to the regent.
It is no wonder that both were discontented with their position and
soon showed openly their dissatisfaction.

Egmont, a man of showy rather than of solid qualities, held in
1559 the important posts of Stadholder of Flanders and Artois. The
Prince of Orange was the eldest of the five sons of William,[pg.30]
Count of Nassau-Dillenburg, head of the younger or German branch of
the famous house of Nassau. Members of the elder or Netherland
branch had for several generations rendered distinguished services
to their Burgundian and Habsburg sovereigns. This elder branch
became extinct in the person of Réné, the son of
Henry of Nassau, one of Charles V’s most trusted friends and
advisers, by Claude, sister of Philibert, Prince of
Orange-Châlons. Philibert being childless bequeathed his
small principality to Réné; and Réné in
his turn, being killed at the siege of St Dizier in 1544, left by
will all his possessions to his cousin William, who thus became
Prince of Orange. His parents were Lutherans, but Charles insisted
that William, at that time eleven years of age, should be brought
up as a Catholic at the Court of Mary of Hungary. Here he became a
great favourite of the emperor, who in 1550 conferred on him the
hand of a great heiress, Anne of Egmont, only child of the Count of
Buren. Anne died in 1558, leaving two children, a son, Philip
William, and a daughter. At the ceremony of the abdication in 1555,
Charles entered the hall leaning on the shoulder of William, on
whom, despite his youth, he had already bestowed an important
command. Philip likewise specially recognised William’s ability and
gave evidence of his confidence in him by appointing him one of the
plenipotentiaries to conclude with France the treaty of
Cateau-Cambresis in 1559. He had also made him a Knight of the
Golden Fleece, a Councillor of State and Stadholder of Holland,
Zeeland, Utrecht and Burgundy (Franche-Comté). Nevertheless
there arose between Philip and Orange a growing feeling of distrust
and dislike, with the result that William speedily found himself at
the head of a patriotic opposition to any attempts of the Spanish
king to govern the Netherlands by Spanish methods. The presence of
a large body of Spanish troops in the country aroused the suspicion
that Philip intended to use them, if necessary, to support him in
overriding by force the liberties and privileges of the provinces.
It was largely owing to the influence of Orange that the
States-General in 1559 refused to vote the grant of supplies for
which Philip had asked, unless he promised that all foreign troops
should be withdrawn from the Netherlands. The king was much
incensed at such a humiliating rebuff and is reported, when on the
point of embarking at Flushing, to have charged William with being
the man who had instigated the States thus to thwart him.[pg.31]

Thus, when Margaret of Parma entered upon her duties as regent,
she found that there was a feeling of deep dissatisfaction and
general irritation in the provinces; and this was accentuated as
soon as it was found that, though Philip had departed, his policy
remained. The spirit of the absent king from his distant cabinet in
Madrid brooded, as it were, over the land. It was soon seen that
Margaret, whatever her statesmanlike qualities or natural
inclination might be, had no real authority, nor was she permitted
to take any steps or to initiate any policy without the advice and
approval of the three confidential councillors placed at her side
by Philip—Granvelle, Viglius and Barlaymont. Of these
Granvelle, both by reason of his conspicuous abilities and of his
being admitted more freely than anyone else into the inner counsels
of a sovereign, as secretive in his methods as he was suspicious
and distrustful of his agents, held the foremost position and drew
upon himself the odium of a policy with which, though it was
dictated from Spain, his name was identified.

Orange and Egmont, with whom were joined a number of other
leading nobles (among these Philip de Montmorency, Count of Hoorn,
his brother the lord of Montigny, the Counts of Meghem and
Hoogstraeten and the Marquis of Berghen), little by little adopted
an attitude of increasing hostility to this policy, which they
regarded as anti-national and tending to the establishment of a
foreign despotism in the Netherlands.

The continued presence of the Spanish troops, the severe
measures that were being taken for the suppression of heresy, and a
proposal for the erection of a number of new bishoprics, aroused
popular discontent and suspicion. Orange and Egmont, finding that
they were never consulted except on matters of routine, wrote to
Philip (July, 1561) stating that they found that their attendance
at the meetings of the Council of State was useless and asked to be
allowed to resign their posts. Meanwhile, feeling that the presence
of the Spanish troops was a source of weakness rather than of
strength, Margaret and Granvelle were urging upon the king the
necessity of their withdrawal. Neither the nobles nor the regent
succeeded in obtaining any satisfactory response. Orange and Egmont
accordingly absented themselves from the Council, and Margaret
ventured on her own authority to send away the Spanish
regiments.[pg.32]

The question of the bishoprics was more serious. It was not a
new question. The episcopal organisation in the Netherlands was
admittedly inadequate. It had long been the intention of Charles V
to create a number of new sees, but in his crowded life he had
never found the opportunity of carrying out the proposed scheme,
and it was one of the legacies that at his abdication he handed on
to his son. One of the first steps taken by Philip was to obtain a
Bull from Pope Paul IV for the creation of the new bishoprics, and
this Bull was renewed and confirmed by Pius IV, January, 1560. Up
to this time the entire area of the seventeen provinces had been
divided into three unwieldy dioceses—Utrecht, Arras and
Tournay. The See of Utrecht comprised nearly the whole of the
modern kingdom of the Netherlands. Nor was there any archiepiscopal
see. The metropolitical jurisdiction was exercised by the three
foreign Archbishops of Cologne, Rheims and Treves. Philip now
divided the land into fourteen dioceses (Charles had proposed six)
with three Metropolitans at Mechlin, Utrecht and ‘sHertogenbosch^[3].
Granvelle, who had obtained the Cardinal’s hat, February, 1561, was
appointed Archbishop of Mechlin, and by virtue of this office
Primate of the Netherlands, December, 1561. This new organisation
was not carried out without arousing widespread opposition.

The existing bishops resented the diminution of their
jurisdiction and dignity, and still louder were the protests of the
abbots, whose endowments were appropriated to furnish the incomes
of the new sees. Still more formidable was the hostility of the
people generally, a hostility founded on fear, for the introduction
of so many new bishops nominated by the king was looked upon as
being the first step to prepare the way for the bringing in of the
dreaded Spanish Inquisition. Already the edicts against heretics,
which Charles V had enacted and severely enforced, were being
carried out throughout the length and breadth of the land with
increasing and merciless barbarity. Both papal and episcopal
inquisitors were active in the work of persecution, and so many
were the sentences that in many places the civil authorities, and
even some of the stadholders, declined to carry out the executions.
Public opinion looked upon Granvelle as the author of the new
bishoprics scheme and the instigator of the increased activity of
the persecutors. He was accused of being eager to take any measures
to repress the[pg.33] ancient liberties of the Netherland
provinces and to establish a centralised system of absolute rule,
in order to ingratiate himself with the king and so to secure his
own advancement. That the cardinal was ambitious of power there can
be no question. But to men of Granvelle’s great abilities, as
administrator and statesman, ambition is not necessarily a fault;
and access to the secret records and correspondence of the time has
revealed that the part played by him was far from being so sinister
as was believed. The Bishop of Arras was not consulted about the
bishoprics proposal until after the Papal Bull had been secured,
and at first he was unfavourable to it and was not anxious to
become archbishop and primate. It was his advice which led Margaret
to send away the hated Spanish regiments from Netherland soil; and,
far from being naturally a relentless persecutor, there is proof
that neither he nor the president of the Privy Council, the jurist
Viglius, believed in the policy of harsh and brutal methods for
stamping out heretical opinions. They had in this as in other
matters to obey their master, and allow the odium to fall upon
themselves.

To Orange and Egmont, the two leaders of the opposition to
Granvelle, a third name, that of Philip de Montmorency, Count of
Hoorn and Admiral of Flanders, has now to be added. These three
worked together for the overthrow of the Cardinal, but their
opposition at this time was based rather on political than on
religious grounds. They all professed the Catholic faith, but the
marriage of Orange in August, 1561, with a Lutheran, Anne daughter
of Maurice of Saxony and granddaughter of Philip of Hesse, was
ominous of coming change in William’s religious opinions. In 1562
the discontent of the nobles led to the formation of a league
against the cardinal, of which, in addition to the three leaders,
the Counts of Brederode, Mansfeld and Hoogstraeten were the
principal members. This league, of which Orange was the brain and
moving spirit, had as its chief aim the removal of Granvelle from
office, and then redress of grievances. It found widespread
support. The cardinal was assailed by a torrent of lampoons and
pasquinades of the bitterest description. But, though Margaret
began to see that the unpopularity of the minister was undermining
her position, and was rendering for her the task of government more
and more difficult, Philip was obdurate and closed his ears. The
long distance between Madrid and Brussels and the procrastinating
habits of the Spanish[pg.34] king added immensely to the regent’s
perplexities. She could not act on her own initiative, and her
appeals to Philip were either disregarded or after long delay met
by evasive replies.

The discontented nobles in vain tried to obtain redress for
their grievances. In the autumn of 1562 Montigny was sent on a
special mission to Madrid, but returned without effecting anything.
Orange, Egmont and Hoorn thereupon drew up a joint letter
containing a bold demand for the dismissal of Granvelle, as the
chief cause of all the troubles in the land. The king replied by
asking that one of them should go in person to Spain to discuss the
grievances with him, and suggesting that Egmont should be sent.
Egmont however was averse to the proposal, and another and stronger
letter signed by the three leaders was despatched to Madrid.
Finding that both Margaret and Granvelle himself were in agreement
with Orange, Egmont and Hoorn in their view of the situation,
Margaret advising, with the cardinal’s acquiescence, the necessity
of the minister’s removal from his post, Philip determined at last
that Granvelle should leave the Netherlands. But in accordance with
the counsel of Alva, who was opposed on principle to any
concession, he characteristically employed circuitous and
clandestine means to conceal from the world any appearance of
yielding to the request of his subjects. In January, 1564 he sent a
letter to the Duchess of Parma expressing his displeasure at the
lords’ letter, and saying that they must substantiate their
complaints. The same messenger (Armenteros, the duchess’ secretary)
carried another letter for Granvelle headed “secret,” in which the
cardinal was told that “owing to the strong feeling that had been
aroused against him, he was to ask permission from the regent to go
away for a short time to visit his mother.” About a week after
these letters had reached their destination another courier brought
a reply to the three nobles, which, though written on the same day
as the others, bore a date three weeks later, in which they were
bidden to take their places again in the Council of State, and a
promise was given that the charges against Granvelle after
substantiation should be maturely considered. This letter was
delivered on March 1, after Granvelle had already, in obedience to
the king’s orders, asked for leave of absence to visit his mother
in Franche-Comté. The cardinal actually left Brussels on
March 13, to the great joy of every class of the people, never to
return.[pg.35]

With the departure of Granvelle, the nobles once more took their
seats on the Council of State. The Consulta disappeared, and
the regent herself appeared to be relieved and to welcome the
disappearance of the man whose authority had overshadowed her own.
But the change, though it placed large powers of administration and
of patronage in the hands of Netherlanders instead of foreigners,
did not by any means introduce purer methods of government. Many of
the nobles were heavily in debt; most of them were self-seeking;
offices and emoluments were eagerly sought for, and were even put
up for sale. Armenteros, Margaret’s private secretary (to whom the
nickname of Argenteros was given), was the leading spirit in
this disgraceful traffic, and enriched himself by the acceptance of
bribes for the nomination to preferments. It was an unedifying
state of things; and public opinion was not long in expressing its
discontent with such an exhibition of widespread venality and
greed. All this was duly reported to Philip by Granvelle, who
continued, in his retirement, to keep himself well informed of all
that was going on.

Meanwhile by the efforts of Orange, Egmont and Hoorn, chiefly of
the former, proposals of reform were being urged for the
strengthening of the powers of the Council of State, for the
reorganisation of finance, and for the more moderate execution of
the placards against heresy. While discussion concerning these
matters was in progress, came an order from Philip (August, 1564)
for the enforcing of the decrees of the recently concluded Council
of Trent. This at once aroused protest and opposition. It was
denounced as an infringement of the fundamental privileges of the
provinces. Philip’s instructions however were peremptory. In these
circumstances it was resolved by the Council of State to despatch
Egmont on a special mission to Madrid to explain to the king in
person the condition of affairs in the Netherlands. Egmont having
expressed his willingness to go, instructions were drawn up for him
by Viglius. When these were read at a meeting of the council
convened for the purpose, Orange in a long and eloquent speech
boldly expressed his dissent from much that Viglius had written,
and wished that Philip should be plainly told that it was
impossible to enforce the decrees and that the severity of
religious persecution must be moderated. The council determined to
revise the instructions on the lines suggested by Orange, whose
words had such[pg.36] an effect upon the aged Viglius, that
he had that very night a stroke of apoplexy, which proved
fatal.

Egmont set out for Spain, January 15, 1565, and on his arrival
was received by Philip with extreme courtesy and graciousness. He
was entertained splendidly; presents were made to him, which, being
considerably in debt, he gladly accepted; but as regards his
mission he was put off with evasions and blandishments, and he
returned home with a reply from the king containing some vague
promises of reform in financial and other matters, but an absolute
refusal to modify the decrees against heresy. Rather would he
sacrifice a hundred thousand lives, if he had them, than concede
liberty of worship in any form. For some months however no attempt
was made to carry out active persecutions; and the regent meanwhile
did her utmost to place before the king urgent reasons for the
modification of his policy, owing to the angry spirit of unrest and
suspicion which was arising in the provinces. She begged Philip to
visit the Netherlands and acquaint himself personally with the
difficulties of a situation which, unless her advice were taken,
would rapidly grow worse and pass beyond her control. Philip
however was deaf alike to remonstrance or entreaty. On November 5,
1565, a royal despatch reached Brussels in which the strictest
orders were renewed for the promulgation throughout the provinces
of the decrees of the Council of Trent and for the execution of the
placards against heretics, while the proposals that had been made
for an extension of the powers of the Council of State and for the
summoning of the States-General were refused. As soon as these
fateful decisions were known, and the Inquisition began to set
about its fell work in real earnest, the popular indignation knew
no bounds. A large number of the magistrates refused to take any
part in the cruel persecution that arose, following the example of
Orange, Egmont, Berghen and others of the stadholders and leading
nobles. A strong spirit of opposition to arbitrary and foreign rule
arose and found expression in the action taken by a large number of
the members of the so-called “lesser nobility.” Many of these had
come to Brussels, and at a meeting at the house of the Count of
Culemburg the formation of a league to resist arbitrary rule was
proposed. The leaders were Lewis of Nassau, brother of the Prince
of Orange, Nicolas de Harnes, Philip de Marnix, lord of Sainte
Aldegonde, and Henry, Viscount of Brederode. Other[pg.37]
meetings were held, and a document embodying the principles and
demands of the Confederates was drawn up, known as the
Compromise, which was widely distributed among the nobles and
quickly obtained large and constantly increasing support. The
signatories of the Compromise, while professing themselves to be
faithful and loyal subjects of the king, denounced the Inquisition
in its every form “as being unjust and contrary to all laws human
and divine”; and they pledged themselves to stand by one another in
resisting its introduction into the Netherlands and in preventing
the carrying-out of the placards against heresy, while at the same
time undertaking to maintain the royal authority and public peace
in the land.

At first the great nobles stood aloof, doubtful what course to
pursue. At the instigation of Orange conferences were held, at
which, by his advice, a petition or Request, setting forth
the grievances and asking for redress, should be made in writing
for presentation to the regent. The original draft of this document
was the work of Lewis of Nassau. These conferences, however,
revealed that there was a considerable divergence of views among
the leading nobles. Egmont and Meghem were indeed so alarmed at the
character of the movement, which seemed to them to savour of
treason, that they separated themselves henceforth from Orange and
Hoorn and openly took the side of the government. The duchess after
some demur agreed to receive the petition. A body of confederates
under the leadership of Brederode and Lewis of Nassau marched to
the palace, where they were received by Margaret in person. The
petitioners asked the regent to send an envoy to Madrid to lay
before the king the state of feeling among his loyal subjects in
the Netherlands, praying him to withdraw the Inquisition and
moderate the placards against heresy, and meanwhile by her own
authority to suspend them until the king’s answer had been
received. The regent replied that she had no power to suspend the
Inquisition or the placards, but would undertake, while awaiting
the royal reply, to mitigate their operation.

On the last day of their stay at Brussels, April 8, the
confederates under the presidency of Brederode, to the number of
about three hundred, dined together at the Hotel Culemburg. In the
course of the meal Brederode drew the attention of the company now
somewhat excited with wine to a contemptuous phrase attributed by
common report to Barlaymont. Margaret was somewhat perturbed[pg.38]
at the formidable numbers of the deputation, as it entered the
palace court, and it was said that Barlaymont remarked that “these
beggars” (ces gueux) need cause her no fear. Brederode
declared that he had no objection to the name and was quite willing
to be “a beggar” in the cause of his country and his king. It was
destined to be a name famous in history. Immediately loud cries
arose from the assembled guests, until the great hall echoed with
the shouts of Vivent les Gueux. From this date onwards the
confederates were known as “les gueux,” and they adopted a coarse
grey dress with the symbols of beggarhood—the wallet and the
bowl—worn as the insignia of their league. It was the
beginning of a popular movement, which made rapid headway among all
classes. A medal was likewise struck, which bore on one side the
head of the king, on the other two clasped hands with the
inscription—Fidèles au roy jusques à la
besace.

Thus was the opposition to the tyrannical measures of the
government organising itself in the spring of 1566. It is a great
mistake to suppose that the majority of those who signed “the
Compromise” or presented “the Request” were disloyal to their
sovereign or converts to the reformed faith. Among those who
denounced the methods of the Inquisition and of the Blood Placards
were a large number, who without ceasing to be Catholics, had been
disillusioned by the abuses which had crept into the Roman Church,
desired their removal only to a less degree than the Protestants
themselves, and had no sympathy with the terrible and remorseless
persecution on Spanish lines, which sought to crush out all liberty
of thought and all efforts of religious reform by the stake and the
sword of the executioner. Nevertheless this league of the nobles
gave encouragement to the sectaries and was the signal for a great
increase in the number and activity of the Calvinist and Zwinglian
preachers, who flocked into the land from the neighbouring
countries. Such was the boldness of these preachers that, instead
of being contented with secret meetings, they began to hold their
conventicles in the fields or in the outskirts of the towns. Crowds
of people thronged to hear them, and the authority of the
magistrates was defied and flouted. The regent was in despair.
Shortly after the presentation of the Request it was determined by
the advice of the council to send special envoys to lay before the
king once more the serious state of things. The Marquis of
Berghen[pg.39] and Baron Montigny consented with some
demur to undertake the mission, but for various reasons they did
not reach Madrid till some two months later. They were received
with apparent courtesy, and after several conferences the king, on
July 31, despatched a letter to Margaret in which he undertook to
do away with the Papal Inquisition and offered to allow such
moderation of the Placards as did not imply any recognition of
heretical opinions or any injury to the Catholic faith. He refused
to consent to the meeting of the States, but he sent letters
couched in most friendly terms to Orange and Egmont appealing to
their loyalty and asking them to support the regent by their advice
and influence. These demonstrations of a conciliatory temper were
however mere temporising. He was playing false. A document is in
existence, dated August 9, in which Philip states that these
concessions had been extorted from him against his will and that he
did not regard himself as bound by them, and he informed the Pope
that the abolition of the Papal Inquisition was a mere form of
words.

Meanwhile events were moving fast in the Netherlands. The
open-air preachings were attended by thousands; and at Antwerp,
which was one of the chief centres of Calvinism, disorders broke
out, and armed conflicts were feared. Orange himself, as burgrave
of Antwerp, at the request of the duchess visited the town and with
the aid of Brederode and Meghem succeeded in effecting a compromise
between the Catholic and Protestant parties. The latter were
allowed to hold their preachings undisturbed, so long as they met
outside and not within the city walls. The regent in her alarm was
even driven to make overtures to the confederates to assist her in
the maintenance of order. There was much parleying, in which Orange
and Egmont took part; and in July an assembly of the signatories of
the Compromise was called together at St Trond in the district of
Liège. Some two thousand were present, presided over by
Lewis of Nassau. It was resolved to send twelve delegates to
Margaret to lay before her the necessity of finding a remedy for
the evils which were afflicting and disturbing the land. They
offered to consult with Orange and Egmont as to the best means by
which they could work together for the country’s good, but hinting
that, if no redress was given, they might be forced to look for
foreign aid. Indeed this was no empty threat, for Lewis had already
been in communication with the Protestant leaders both in France
and in[pg.40] the Rhinelands, as to the terms on
which they would furnish armed assistance; and Orange was probably
not altogether in ignorance of the fact. The regent was angry at
the tone of the delegates, whom she received on July 26, but in her
present impotence thought it best to dissemble. She promised to
give consideration to the petition, and summoned a meeting of the
Knights of the Golden Fleece to meet at Brussels on August 18, when
she would decide upon her answer. But, when that date arrived,
other and more pressing reasons than the advice of counsellors
compelled her to yield to the confederates a large part of their
demands. On August 23 she agreed, in return for help in the
restoration of order, to concede liberty of preaching, so long as
those who assembled did not bear arms and did not interfere with
the Catholic places of worship and religious services. Further an
indemnity was promised to all who had signed the Compromise.

The reasons which influenced her were, first the receipt, on
August 12, of the conciliatory letter from the king, to which
reference has already been made, in which he consented to a certain
measure of toleration; and secondly a sudden outburst of
iconoclastic fury on the part of the Calvinistic sectaries, which
had spread with great rapidity through many parts of the land. On
August 14, at St Omer, Ypres, Courtray, Valenciennes and Tournay,
fanatical mobs entered the churches destroying and wrecking,
desecrating the altars, images, vestments and works of art, and
carrying away the sacred vessels and all that was valuable. On
August 16 and 17 the cathedral of Antwerp was entered by infuriated
and sacrilegious bands armed with axes and hammers, who made havoc
and ruin of the interior of the beautiful church. In Holland and
Zeeland similar excesses were committed. Such conduct aroused a
feeling of the deepest indignation and reprobation in the minds of
all right-thinking men, and alienated utterly those more moderate
Catholics who up till now had been in favour of moderation. Of the
great nobles, who had hitherto upheld the cause of the national
liberties and privileges against the encroachments of a foreign
despotism, many now fell away. Among these were Aremberg, Meghem
and Mansfeld. Egmont hesitated. As might have been expected, the
news of the outrages, when it reached Philip’s ears, filled him
with rage and grief; and he is reported to have exclaimed, “It
shall cost them dear. I swear it by the soul of my father.” From
this time forward he was[pg.41] determined to visit with exemplary
punishment not only the rioters and the Protestant sectaries, but
more especially the great nobles on whose shoulders he laid the
whole blame for the troubles that had arisen.

He was in no hurry to act, and announced that it was his
intention to go to the Netherlands in person and enquire into the
alleged grievances. So he told his councillors and wrote to
Margaret. No one seems to have suspected his deep-laid scheme for
allaying the suspicions of his intended victims until the right
moment came for laying his hands upon them and crushing all
opposition by overwhelming force. Orange alone, who had his paid
spies at Madrid, had a presage of what was coming and took measures
of precaution betimes. An intercepted letter from the Spanish
ambassador at Paris to the Regent Margaret, specifically mentioned
Orange, Egmont and Hoorn as deserving of exemplary punishment; and
on October 3 the prince arranged a meeting at Dendermonde to
consider what should be their course of action. In addition to
Egmont and Hoorn, Hoogstraeten and Lewis of Nassau were present.
William and Lewis urged that steps should be taken for preparing
armed resistance should the necessity arise. But neither Egmont nor
Hoorn would consent; they would not be guilty of any act of
disloyalty to their sovereign. The result of the meeting was a
great disappointment to Orange, and this date marked a
turning-point in his life. In concert with his brothers, John and
Lewis, he began to enter into negotiations with several of the
German Protestant princes for the formation of a league for the
protection of the adherents of the reformed faith in the
Netherlands. Now for the first time he severed his nominal
allegiance to the Roman Church, and in a letter to Philip of Hesse
avowed himself a Lutheran.

During these same autumn months Philip furnished his sister with
considerable sums of money for the levying of a strong mercenary
force, German and Walloon. Possessed now of a body of troops that
she could trust, Margaret in the spring of 1567 took energetic
steps to suppress all insurrectionary movements and disorders, and
did not scruple to disregard the concessions which had been wrung
from her on August 23. The confederate nobles, satisfied with her
promises, had somewhat prematurely dissolved their league; but one
of the most fiery and zealous among them,[pg.42] John de Marnix, lord
of Thoulouse, collected at Antwerp a body of some 2000 Calvinists
and attempted to make himself master of that city. At Austruweel he
was encountered (March 13) by a Walloon force despatched by
Margaret with orders to “exterminate the heretics.” Thoulouse and
almost the whole of his following perished in the fight. In the
south at the same time the conventicles were mercilessly suppressed
and the preachers driven into exile.

Margaret now felt herself strong enough to demand that the
stadholders and leading nobles should, on pain of dismissal from
their posts, take an oath “to serve the king and to act for and
against whomsoever His Majesty might order.” Egmont took the oath;
Hoorn, Hoogstraeten and Brederode declined to do so and resigned
their offices. Orange offered his resignation, but Margaret was
unwilling to accept it and urged him to discuss the matter first
with Egmont and Meghem. The three nobles met accordingly at
Willebroek, April 2. William used his utmost powers of persuasion
in an attempt to convince Egmont that he was courting destruction.
But in vain. He himself was not to be moved from his decision, and
the two friends, who had worked together so long in the patriot
cause, parted, never to meet again. Orange saw that he was no
longer safe in the Netherlands and, on April 22, he set out from
Breda for the residence of his brother John at Dillenburg. Here in
exile he could watch in security the progress of events, and be
near at hand should circumstances again require his intervention in
the affairs of the Netherlands.

Orange did not take this extreme step without adequate cause. At
the very time that he left the Netherlands Philip was taking leave
of the Duke of Alva, whom he was despatching at the head of a
veteran force to carry out without pity or remorse the stern duty
of expelling heresy from the provinces and punishing all those, and
especially the leaders, who had ventured to oppose the arbitrary
exercise of the royal authority. He had for some time been
preparing this expedition. He still kept up the pretence that he
was coming in person to enquire into the alleged grievances, but he
never had the slightest intention of quitting Madrid. Alva sailed
from Cartagena (April 27) for Genoa, and proceeded at once to draw
together from the various Spanish garrisons in Italy a picked body
of some 12,000 men. With these he set out in June for his long
march across the Alps and through Burgundy, Lorraine and Luxemburg.
His[pg.43] progress, jealously watched by the
French and Swiss, met with no opposition save for the difficulties
of the route. He entered the Netherlands on August 8, with his army
intact. A number of notables, amongst whom was Egmont, came to meet
him on his way to Brussels. He received them, more particularly
Egmont, with every appearance of graciousness. Alva as yet bore
only the title of Captain-General, but the king had bestowed on him
full powers civil and military; and the Duchess of Parma, though
still nominally regent, found herself reduced to a nonentity.
Alva’s first step was to place strong Spanish garrisons in the
principal cities, his next to get the leaders who had been marked
for destruction into his power. To effect this he succeeded by fair
and flattering words in securing the presence of both Egmont and
Hoorn at Brussels. Under the pretence of taking part in a
consultation they were (September 9) invited to the duke’s
residence and on their arrival suddenly found themselves arrested.
At the same time their secretaries and papers were seized, and
Antony van Stralen, the burgomaster of Antwerp, was placed under
arrest. These high-handed actions were the prelude to a reign of
terror; and Margaret, already humiliated by finding herself
superseded, requested her brother to accept her resignation. On
October 6 the office of Governor-General was conferred upon Alva;
and shortly afterwards the duchess left the Netherlands and
returned to Parma.

Alva had now the reins of power in his hand, and with a
relentless zeal and cold-blooded ferocity, which have made his name
a by-word, he set about the accomplishment of the fell task with
which his master had entrusted him. He had to enforce with drastic
rigour all the penalties decreed by the placards against heretics
and preachers, and to deal summarily with all who had taken any
part in opposition to the government. But to attempt to do this by
means of the ordinary courts and magistrates would consume time and
lead to many acquittals. Alva therefore had no sooner thrown off
the mask by the sudden and skilfully planned arrest of Egmont and
Hoorn, than he proceeded to erect an extraordinary tribunal, which
had no legal standing except such as the arbitrary will of the duke
conferred upon it. This so-called Council of Troubles, which
speedily acquired in popular usage the name of the Council of
Blood, virtually consisted of Alva himself, who was president and
to whose final decision all cases were referred, and two Spanish
lawyers, his[pg.44] chosen tools and agents, Juan de
Vargas and Louis del Rio. The two royalist nobles, Noircarmes and
Barlaymont, and five Netherland jurists also had seats; but, as
only the Spaniards voted, the others before long ceased to attend
the meetings. The proceedings indeed were, from the legal point of
view, a mere travesty of justice. A whole army of commissioners was
let loose upon the land, and informers were encouraged and
rewarded. Multitudes of accused were hauled before the tribunal and
were condemned by batches almost without the form of a trial. For
long hours day by day Vargas and del Rio revelled in their work of
butchery; and in all parts of the Netherlands the executioners were
busy. It was of no use for the accused to appeal to the charters
and privileges of their provinces. All alike were summoned to
Brussels; non curamus privilegios vestros declared Vargas in
his ungrammatical Latin. Hand in hand with the wholesale sentences
of death went the confiscation of property. Vast sums went into the
treasury. The whole land for awhile was terror-stricken. All
organised opposition was crushed, and no one dared to raise his
voice in protest.

The Prince of Orange was summoned to appear in person before the
council within six weeks, under pain of perpetual banishment and
confiscation of his estates. He refused to come, and energetically
denied that the council had any jurisdiction over him. The same
sentence was passed upon all the other leaders who had placed
themselves out of reach of Alva’s arm—Sainte Aldegonde,
Hoogstraeten, Culemburg, Montigny, Lewis of Nassau and others.
Unable to lay hands upon the prince himself, the governor-general
took dastardly advantage of William’s indiscretion in leaving his
eldest son at Louvain to pursue his studies at the university. At
the beginning of 1568 Philip William, Count of Buren in right of
his mother, was seized and sent to Madrid to be brought up at the
court of Philip to hate the cause to which his father henceforth
devoted his life. Already indeed, before the abduction of his son,
Orange from his safe retreat at Dillenburg had been exerting
himself to raise troops for the invasion of the Netherlands. He
still professed loyalty to the king and declared that in the king’s
name he wished to restore to the provinces those liberties and
privileges which Philip himself had sworn that he would maintain.
The difficulty was to find the large sum of money required for such
an enterprise, and it was only by extraordinary efforts that a
sufficient amount was[pg.45] obtained. Part of the money was
collected in Antwerp and various towns of Holland and Zeeland, the
rest subscribed by individuals. John of Nassau pledged his estates,
Orange sold his plate and jewels, and finally a war-chest of
200,000 florins was gathered together. It was proposed to attack
the Netherlands from three directions. From the north Lewis of
Nassau was to lead an army from the Ems into Friesland;
Hoogstraeten on the east to effect an entrance by way of
Maestricht; while another force of Huguenots and refugees in the
south was to march into Artois. It was an almost desperate scheme
in the face of veteran troops in a central position under such a
tried commander as Alva. The last-named French force and that under
Hoogstraeten were easily defeated and scattered by Spanish
detachments sent to meet them. Lewis of Nassau was at first more
successful. Entering Groningen at the head of eight or nine
thousand undisciplined troops he was attacked, May 23, in a strong
position behind a morass by a Spanish force under the Count of
Aremberg, Stadholder of Friesland, at Heiligerlee. He gained a
complete victory. Aremberg himself was slain, as was also the
younger brother of Lewis, Adolphus of Nassau. The triumph of the
invaders was of short duration. Alva himself took in hand the task
of dealing with the rebels. At the head of 15,000 troops he drove
before him the levies of Nassau to Jemmingen on the estuary of the
Ems, and here with the loss of only seven men he completely
annihilated them. Lewis himself and a few others alone escaped by
throwing themselves into the water and swimming for their
lives.

The action at Heiligerlee, by compelling the governor-general to
take the field, had hastened the fate of Egmont and Hoorn. After
their arrest the two noblemen were kept in solitary confinement in
the citadel of Ghent for several months, while the long list of
charges against them was being examined by the Council of
Troubles—in other words by Vargas and del Rio. These charges
they angrily denied; and great efforts were made on their behalf by
the wife of Egmont and the dowager Countess of Hoorn. Appeals were
made to the governor-general and to Philip himself, either for
pardon on the ground of services rendered to the State, or at least
for a trial, as Knights of the Golden Fleece, before the Court of
the Order. The Emperor Maximilian himself pleaded with Philip for
clemency, but without avail. Their doom had been settled in
advance, and the king was inflexible. Alva accordingly
determined[pg.46] that they should be executed before he
left Brussels for his campaign in the north. On June 2, the
council, after refusing to hear any further evidence in the
prisoners’ favour, pronounced them guilty of high treason; and Alva
at once signed the sentences of death. Egmont and Hoorn the next
day were brought by a strong detachment of troops from Ghent to
Brussels and were confined in a building opposite the town hall,
known as the Broodhuis. On June 5, their heads were struck off upon
a scaffold erected in the great square before their place of
confinement. Both of them met their death with the utmost calmness
and courage. The effect of this momentous stroke of vengeance upon
these two patriot leaders, both of them good Catholics, who had
always professed loyalty to their sovereign, and one of whom,
Egmont, had performed distinguished services for his country and
king, was profound. A wave of mingled rage and sorrow swept over
the land. It was not only an act of cruel injustice, but even as an
act of policy a blunder of the first magnitude, which was sure to
bring, as it did bring, retribution in its train.

CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS

The complete failure of the expeditions of Hoogstraeten and of
Lewis of Nassau was a great discouragement to the Prince of Orange.
Nevertheless after receiving the news of Jemmingen he wrote to his
brother, “With God’s help I am determined to go on.” By great
exertions he succeeded in gathering together a heterogeneous force
of German and Walloon mercenaries numbering about 18,000 men, and
with these in the beginning of October he crossed the frontier. But
to maintain such a force in the field required far larger financial
resources than William had at his disposal. Alva was aware of this,
and, as the prince made his way into Brabant, he followed his steps
with a small body of veteran troops, cutting off supplies and
stragglers, but declining battle. The mercenaries, debarred from
plunder and in arrears of pay, could not be kept together more than
a few weeks. In November Orange withdrew into France and disbanded
the remnants of his army. In disguise he managed to escape with
some difficulty through France to Dillenburg. His brothers, Lewis
and Henry, joined the Huguenot army under Coligny and took part in
the battles of Moncontour and Jarnac.

Alva was now apparently supreme in the Netherlands; and crowds
of refugees fled the country to escape the wholesale persecutions
of the Council of Blood. Alva however, like his predecessor and
indeed like all Spanish governors engaged in carrying out the
policy of Philip II, was always hampered by lack of funds. The
Spanish treasury was empty. The governor-general’s troops no less
than those of Orange clamoured for their regular pay, and it was
necessary to find means to satisfy them. The taxes voted for nine
years in 1559 had come to an end. New taxes could only be imposed
with the assent of the States-General. Alva, however, after his
victory at Jemmingen and the dispersion of the army of Orange, felt
himself strong enough to summon the States-General and demand their
assent to the scheme of taxation which he proposed. The
governor-general asked for (1) a tax of five per cent., the[pg.48]
“twentieth penny,” on all transfers of real estate, (2) a tax of
ten per cent., the “tenth penny,” on all sales of commodities.
These taxes, which were an attempt to introduce into the
Netherlands the system known in Castile as alcabala, were to
be granted in perpetuity, thus, as the duke hoped, obviating the
necessity of having again to summon the States-General. In addition
to these annual taxes he proposed a payment once for all of one per
cent., “the hundredth penny,” on all property, real or personal.
Such a demand was contrary to all precedent in the Netherlands and
an infringement of time-honoured charters and privileges; and even
the terror, which Alva’s iron-handed tyranny had inspired, did not
prevent his meeting with strong opposition. The proposals had to be
referred to the provincial estates, and everywhere difficulties
were raised. All classes were united in resistance. Petitions came
pouring in protesting against impositions which threatened to ruin
the trade and industries of the country. Alva found it impossible
to proceed.

The “hundredth penny” was voted, but instead of the other taxes,
which were to provide a steady annual income, he had to content
himself with a fixed payment of 2,000,000 guilders for two years
only. The imposition of these taxes on the model of the
alcabala had been part of a scheme for sweeping away all the
provincial jurisdictions and rights and forming the whole of the
Netherlands into a unified state, as subservient to despotic rule
as was Castile itself. A greater centralisation of government had
been the constant policy of the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers
since the time of Philip the Good, a policy to be commended if
carried out in a statesmanlike and moderate spirit without any
sudden or violent infringement of traditional liberties. The aim of
Philip of Spain as it was interpreted by his chosen instrument, the
Duke of Alva, was far more drastic. With Alva and his master all
restrictions upon the absolute authority of the sovereign were
obstacles to be swept remorselessly out of the way; civil and
religious liberty in their eyes deserved no better fate than to be
suppressed by force. Alva’s experience was that of many would-be
tyrants before and since his day, that the successful application
of force is limited by the power of the purse. His exchequer was
empty. Philip was himself in financial difficulties and could spare
him no money from Spain. The refusal of the provincial estates of
the Netherlands to sanction his scheme of taxation deprived him of
the means for[pg.49] imposing his will upon them. His reign
of terror had produced throughout the land a superficial appearance
of peace. There were at the beginning of 1570 no open disturbances
or insurrectionary movements to be crushed, but the people were
seething with discontent, and the feeling of hatred aroused by the
presence of the Spanish Inquisition and the foreign soldiery and by
the proceedings of the Council of Blood was, day by day, becoming
deeper and more embittered.

This condition of affairs was duly reported to the king at
Madrid; and there was no lack of councillors at his side who were
unfriendly to Alva and eager to make the most of the complaints
against him. Among these enemies was Ruy Gomez, the king’s private
secretary, who recommended a policy of leniency, as did Granvelle,
who was now at Naples. Philip never had any scruples about throwing
over his agents, and he announced his intention of proclaiming an
amnesty on the occasion when Anne of Austria, his intended bride
and fourth wife, set sail from Antwerp for Spain. The proclamation
was actually made at Antwerp by the governor-general in person,
July 16, 1570. It was a limited declaration of clemency, for six
classes of offenders were excepted, and it only extended to those
who within two months made their peace with the Catholic Church and
abjured the Reformed doctrines.

During the years 1570-71 there were however few outward signs of
the gradual undermining of Alva’s authority. There was sullen
resentment and discontent throughout the land, but no attempt at
overt resistance. The iron hand of the governor-general did not
relax its firm grasp of the reins of power, and the fear of his
implacable vengeance filled men’s hearts. He ruled by force, not by
love; and those who refused to submit had either to fly the country
or to perish by the hands of the executioner. Nevertheless during
these sad years the Prince of Orange and Lewis of Nassau, in spite
of the apparent hopelessness of the situation, were unremitting in
their efforts to raise fresh forces. William at Dillenburg exerted
himself to the uttermost to obtain assistance from the Protestant
princes of the Rhineland. With the Calvinists he was, however, as
yet strongly suspect. He himself was held to be a lukewarm convert
from Catholicism to the doctrines of Augsburg; and his wife was the
daughter and heiress of Maurice of Saxony, the champion of
Lutheranism. William’s repudiation of Anne of Saxony for her [pg.50]
repeated infidelities (March, 1571) severed this Lutheran alliance.
The unfortunate Anne, after six years’ imprisonment, died insane in
1577. At the same time the closest relations of confidence and
friendship sprang up between Orange and the well-known Calvinist
writer and leader, Philip de Marnix, lord of Sainte Aldegonde. This
connection with Sainte Aldegonde ensured for William the support of
the Calvinists; and secret agents of the prince were soon busily at
work in the different parts of the provinces promising armed
assistance and collecting levies for the raising of an invading
force. Foremost among these active helpers were Jacob van
Wesenbeke, Diedrich Sonoy and Paul Buys; and the chief scene of
their operations were the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, already
distinguished for their zeal in the cause of freedom. The amount of
cash that was raised was, however, for some time very small. There
was goodwill in plenty, but the utter failure of the prince’s
earlier efforts had made people despair.

These earlier efforts had indeed, on land, been disastrous, but
they had not been confined entirely to land operations. Orange, in
his capacity as a sovereign prince, had given letters of
marque to a number of vessels under the command of the lord of
Dolhain. These vessels were simply corsairs and they were manned by
fierce fanatical sectaries, desperadoes inflamed at once by bitter
hatred of the papists and by the hope of plunder. These “Beggars of
the Sea” (Gueux de mer), as they were called, rapidly
increased in number and soon made themselves a terror in the narrow
seas by their deeds of reckless daring and cruelty. William tried
in vain to restrain excesses which brought him little profit and no
small discredit. It was to no purpose that he associated the lord
of Lumbres in the chief command with Dolhain. Their subordinates,
William de Blois, lord of Treslong, and William de la Marck, lord
of Lumey, were bold, unscrupulous adventurers who found it to their
interest to allow their unruly crews to burn and pillage, as they
lusted, not only their enemies’ ships in the open sea, but churches
and monasteries along the coast and up the estuaries that they
infested. The difficulty was to find harbours in which they could
take refuge and dispose of their booty. For some time they were
permitted to use the English ports freely, and the Huguenot
stronghold at La Rochelle was also open to them as a market. Queen
Elizabeth, as was her wont, had no scruple in conniving at acts of
piracy to the[pg.51] injury of the Spaniard; but at last,
at the beginning of 1572, in consequence of strong representations
from Madrid, she judged it politic to issue an order forbidding the
Sea-Beggars to enter any English harbours. The pirates, thus
deprived of the shelter which had made their depredations possible,
would have been speedily in very bad case, but for an unexpected
and surprising stroke of good fortune. It chanced that a large
number of vessels under Lumbres and Treslong were driven by stress
of weather into the estuary of the Maas; and finding that the
Spanish garrison of Brill had left the town upon a punitive
expedition, the rovers landed and effected an entry by burning one
of the gates. The place was seized and pillaged, and the marauders
were on the point of returning with their spoil to their ships,
when at the suggestion of Treslong it was determined to place a
garrison in the town and hold it as a harbour of refuge in the name
of the Prince of Orange, as Stadholder of Holland. On April 1,
1572, the prince’s flag was hoisted over Brill, and the foundation
stone was laid of the future Dutch republic.

William himself at first did not realise the importance of this
capture, and did not take any steps to express his active approval;
but it was otherwise with his brother Lewis, who was at the time
using his utmost endeavours to secure if not the actual help, at
least the connivance, of Charles IX to his conducting an expedition
from France into the Netherlands. Lewis saw at once the great
advantage to the cause of the possession of a port like Brill, and
he urged the Beggars to try and gain possession of Flushing also,
before Alva’s orders for the strengthening of the garrison and the
defences had been carried out. Flushing by its position commanded
the approach by water to Antwerp. When the ships of Lumbres and
Treslong appeared before the town, the inhabitants rose in revolt,
over-powered the garrison, and opened the gates. This striking
success, following upon the taking of Brill, aroused great
enthusiasm. The rebels had now a firm foothold both in Holland and
Zeeland, and their numbers grew rapidly from day to day. Soon the
whole of the island of Walcheren, on which Flushing stands, was in
their hands with the exception of the capital Middelburg; and in
Holland several important towns hoisted the flag of revolt and
acknowledged the Prince of Orange as their lawful Stadholder. From
Holland the rebellion spread into Friesland. Finally on June 19 an
assembly of the Estates of Holland was, at the instance of
Dordrecht, convened[pg.52] to meet in that town. There was but
one representative of the nobility present at this meeting, whose
legality was more than doubtful, but it included deputies of no
less than twelve out of the fourteen towns which were members of
the Estates. The prince sent Ste Aldegonde as his plenipotentiary.
The step taken was practically an act of insurrection against the
king. William had resigned his stadholdership in 1568 and had
afterwards been declared an outlaw. Bossu had been by royal
authority appointed to the vacant office. The Estates now formally
recognised the prince as Stadholder of the king in Holland,
Zeeland, West Friesland and Utrecht; and he was further invested
with the supreme command of the forces both by land and sea and was
charged with the duty of protecting the country against foreign
oppression or invasion by foreign troops. Ste Aldegonde in the name
of the prince announced his acceptance of the posts that had been
conferred on him and declared that he desired, as a condition of
such acceptance, that the principle of religious freedom and
liberty of worship should be conceded to Catholics and Protestants
alike. To this the Estates assented. Orange took an oath to
maintain the towns in the rights and privileges of which they had
been deprived by Alva and not to enter into any negotiations or
conclude any treaty with Spain without their consent. The Court of
Holland for the administration of justice was reconstituted and a
Chamber of Finance erected. The question of finance was indeed
crucial, for the new stadholder asked for a subsidy of 100,000
crowns a month for the support of the army he had raised for the
invasion of Brabant; and the Estates agreed to take measures for
appropriating certain taxes for the purpose, an undertaking which
had, however, in this time of present distress small likelihood of
effectual result.

The course of events indeed in the months which followed this
historic gathering at Dordrecht was not encouraging to those who
had thus dared somewhat prematurely to brave the wrath of Philip
and the vengeance of Alva. Lewis of Nassau had for some time been
engaged in raising a Huguenot force for the invasion of the
southern Netherlands. The news of the capture of Brill and Flushing
stirred him to sudden action. He had collected only a small body of
men, but, with characteristic impetuosity he now led these across
the frontier, and, before Alva was aware of his presence in
Hainault, had captured by surprise Valenciennes and Mons (May 24).
It was a[pg.53] rash move, for no sooner did the news
reach the governor-general than he sent his son, Don Frederick of
Toledo, at the head of a powerful force to expel the invader. Don
Frederick quickly made himself master of Valenciennes and then
proceeded (June 3) to lay siege to Mons, where Lewis, in hopes that
relief would reach him, prepared for an obstinate defence. These
hopes were not without foundation, for he knew that, beyond the
Rhine, Orange with a considerable army was on the point of entering
the Netherlands from the east, and that the Huguenot leader,
Genlis, was leading another force from France to his succour.
William at the head of 20,000 German and 3000 Walloon mercenaries
actually entered Gelderland (July 7), captured Roeremonde and then
marched into Brabant. Here (July 19) the news reached him of the
complete defeat and annihilation of the raw levies of Genlis by
Toledo’s veteran troops. Hampered by lack of funds William now, as
throughout his life, showed himself to be lacking in the higher
qualities of military leadership. With an ill-paid mercenary force
time was a factor of primary importance, nevertheless the prince
made no effort to move from his encampment near Roeremonde for some
five weeks. Meanwhile his troops got out of hand and committed many
excesses, and when, on August 27, he set out once more to march
westwards, he found to his disappointment that there was no popular
rising in his favour. Louvain and Brussels shut their gates, and
though Mechlin, Termonde and a few other places surrendered, the
prince saw only too plainly that his advance into Flanders would
not bring about the relief of Mons. All his plans had gone awry.
Alva could not be induced to withdraw any portion of the army that
was closely blockading Mons, but contented himself in following
Orange with a force under his own command while avoiding a general
action. And then like a thunderclap, September 5, the news of the
massacre of St Bartholomew was brought to the prince, and he knew
that the promise of Coligny to conduct 12,000 arquebusiers to the
succour of Lewis could not be redeemed. In this emergency William
saw that he must himself endeavour to raise the siege. He
accordingly marched from Flanders and, September 11, encamped at
the village of Harmignies, a short distance from Mons. In the night
six hundred Spaniards, each of whom to prevent mistakes wore a
white shirt over his armour, surprised the camp. The prince himself
was awakened by a little dog that slept in his tent and only
[pg.54]
narrowly escaped with his life, several hundred of his troops being
slain by the Camisaders. He was now thoroughly discouraged
and on the following day retreated first to Mechlin, then to
Roeremonde, where on September 30 the ill-fated expedition was
disbanded. The retirement from Harmignies decided the fate of Mons.
Favourable conditions were granted and Lewis of Nassau, who was ill
with fever, met with chivalrous treatment and was allowed to return
to Dillenburg.

William now found himself faced with something like financial
ruin. Mercenary armies are very costly, and by bitter experience he
had learnt the futility of opposing a half-hearted and badly
disciplined force to the veteran troops of Alva. He resolved
therefore to go in person to Holland to organise and direct the
strong movement of revolt, which had found expression in the
meeting of the Estates at Dordrecht. His agents had long been busy
going about from town to town collecting funds in the name of the
prince and encouraging the people in their resistance to the
Inquisition and to foreign tyranny. William’s declaration that
henceforth he intended to live and die in their midst and to devote
himself with all his powers to the defence of the rights and
liberties of the land met with willing and vigorous support
throughout the greater part of Holland, West Friesland and Zeeland;
and contributions for the supply of the necessary ways and means
began to flow in. It was, however, a desperate struggle to which he
had pledged himself, and to which he was to consecrate without
flinching the rest of his life. If, however, the prince’s resolve
was firm, no less so was that of Alva.

Alva had his enemies at the Spanish court, always ready to
excite distrust against the duke in the mind of the suspicious
king. In July, 1572, the Duke of Medina-Coeli had been sent from
Spain to enquire into the state of affairs in the Netherlands;
probably it was intended that he should take over the
administration and supersede the governor-general. On his arrival,
however, Medina-Coeli quickly saw that the difficulties of the
situation required a stronger hand than his, and he did not attempt
to interfere with Alva’s continued exercise of supreme authority.
The governor-general, on his side, knew well what was the meaning
of this mission of Medina-Coeli, and no sooner was the army of
Orange dispersed than he determined, while the reins of power were
still[pg.55] in his hands, to visit the rebellious
towns of the north with condign vengeance.

At the head of a powerful force, Frederick of Toledo marched
northwards. Mechlin, which had received Orange, was given over for
three days to pillage and outrage. Then Zutphen was taken and
sacked. Naarden, which had, though without regular defences, dared
to resist the Spaniards, was utterly destroyed and the entire
population massacred. Amsterdam, one of the few towns of Holland
which had remained loyal to the king, served as a basis for further
operations. Although it was already December and the season was
unfavourable, Toledo now determined to lay siege to the important
town of Haarlem. Haarlem was difficult of approach. It was
protected on two sides by broad sheets of shallow water, the
Haarlem lake and the estuary of the Y, divided from one another by
a narrow neck of land. On another side was a thick wood. It was
garrisoned by 4000 men, stern Calvinists, under the resolute
leadership of Ripperda and Lancelot Brederode. An attempt to storm
the place (December 21) was beaten off with heavy loss to the
assailants; so Toledo, despite the inclemency of the weather, had
to invest the city. Another desperate assault, January 31,
disastrously failed, and the siege was turned into a blockade. The
position, however, of the besiegers was in some respects worse than
that of the besieged; and Toledo would have abandoned his task in
despair had not his father ordered him at all costs to proceed.
William meanwhile made several efforts to relieve the town. Bodies
of skaters in the winter, and when the ice disappeared, numbers of
boats crossed over the Haarlem lake from Leyden and managed to
carry supplies of food into the town, and resistance might have
been indefinitely prolonged had not Bossu put a stop to all
intercourse between Haarlem and the outside world by convoying a
flotilla of armed vessels from the Y into the lake. Surrender was
now only a question of time. On July 11,1573, after a relieving
force of 4000 men, sent by Orange, had been utterly defeated, and
the inhabitants were perishing by famine, Toledo gained possession
of Haarlem. The survivors of the heroic garrison were all
butchered, and Ripperda and Brederode, their gallant leaders,
executed. A number of the leading citizens were likewise put to
death, but the town was spared from pillage on condition of paying
a heavy fine. The siege had lasted seven months, and the army of
Toledo, which[pg.56] had suffered terribly during the
winter, is said to have lost twelve thousand men.

Alva in his letters to the king laid great stress on the
clemency with which he had treated Haarlem. It had been spared the
wholesale destruction of Zutphen and Naarden, and the duke hoped
that by this exhibition of comparative leniency he might induce the
other rebel towns to open their gates without opposition. He was
deceived. On July 18 Alkmaar was summoned to surrender, but
refused. Alva’s indignation knew no bounds, and he vowed that every
man, woman and child in the contumacious town should be put to the
sword. The threat, however, could not at once be executed. Toledo’s
army, debarred from the sack of Haarlem, became mutinous through
lack of pay. Until they received the arrears due to them, they
refused to stir. Not till August 21 was Don Frederick able to
invest Alkmaar with a force of 16,000 men. The garrison consisted
of some 1300 burghers with 800 troops thrown into the town by
Sonoy, Orange’s lieutenant in North Holland. Two desperate assaults
were repulsed with heavy loss, and then the Spaniards proceeded to
blockade the town. Sonoy now, by the orders of the prince, gained
the consent of the cultivators of the surrounding district to the
cutting of the dykes. The camps and trenches of the besiegers were
flooded out; and (October 8) the siege was raised and the army of
Don Frederick retired, leaving Alkmaar untaken. Within a week
another disaster befell the Spanish arms. Between Hoorn and
Enkhuizen the fleet of Bossu on the Zuyder Zee was attacked by the
Sea-Beggars and was completely defeated. Bossu himself was taken
prisoner and was held as a hostage for the safety of Ste Aldegonde,
who fell into the hands of the Spaniards about month later.

This naval victory, following upon the retreat from Alkmaar,
strengthened greatly the efforts of Orange and gave fresh life to
the patriot cause. It likewise marked the end of the six years of
Alva’s blood-stained rule in the Netherlands. Weary and
disappointed, always hampered by lack of funds, angry at the loss
of the king’s confidence and chafing at the evidence of it in the
presence of Medina-Coeli at his side, the governor-general begged
that he might be relieved of his functions. His request was
granted, October 29. The chosen successor was the Grand Commander,
Don Luis de Requesens, governor of Milan. It was only with
much[pg.57] reluctance that Requesens, finding the
king’s command insistent and peremptory, accepted the charge.

The Grand Commander was indeed far from being a suitable man for
dealing with the difficult situation in the Netherlands, for he was
a Spanish grandee pure and simple and did not even speak French.
Even the loyalists received him coolly. He knew nothing of the
country, and whatever his ability or disposition it was felt that
he would not be allowed a free hand in his policy or adequate means
for carrying it out. That his temper was conciliatory was quickly
shown. An amnesty was proclaimed for political offenders except
three hundred persons (among these Orange and his principal
adherents), and pardon to all heretics who abjured their errors. He
went even further than this by entering into a secret exchange of
views with William himself through Ste Aldegonde as an
intermediary, in the hope of finding some common meeting-ground for
an understanding. But the prince was immovable. Unless freedom of
worship, the upholding of all ancient charters and liberties and
the removal of Spaniards and all foreigners from any share in the
government or administration of the land were granted, resistance
would be continued to the last. These were conditions Requesens had
no power even to consider.

Orange during this time was on his side using all his diplomatic
ability to gain help for the oppressed Netherlanders from France
and England. But Charles IX had his own difficulties and was in too
feeble health (he died May, 1574) to take any decided step, and
Queen Elizabeth, though she connived at assistance being given to
the rebel cause on strictly commercial terms, was not willing
either to show open hostility to Philip or to support subjects in
revolt against their sovereign. William’s position appeared
well-nigh desperate, for at the opening of the year 1574 his
authority was only recognised in a few of the towns of Holland and
in some of the Zeeland islands, and the Spaniards had sent a large
force to invest Leyden. He had, however, made up his mind to cast
in his lot with the brave Hollanders and Zeelanders in their
gallant struggle against overwhelming odds. To identify himself
more completely with his followers, the prince, October, 1573,
openly announced his adhesion to Calvinism. There are no grounds
for doubting his sincerity in taking this step; it was not an act
of pure opportunism. His early Catholicism had probably been little
more[pg.58] than an outward profession, and as
soon as he began to think seriously about religious questions, his
natural bent had led him first to the Lutheran faith of his family,
and then to the sterner doctrines, which had gained so firm a
foothold in the towns of Holland and Zeeland. Nevertheless William,
though henceforth a consistent Calvinist, was remarkable among his
contemporaries for the principles of religious toleration he both
inculcated and practised. He was constitutionally averse to
religious persecution in any form, and by the zealots of his party
he was denounced as lukewarm; but throughout his life he upheld the
right of the individual, who was peaceful and law-abiding, to
liberty of opinion and freedom of worship.

The year 1574 opened favourably. By a remarkable feat of arms
the veteran Spanish commander Mondragon had, October, 1572,
reconquered several of the Zeeland islands. His men on one occasion
at ebb-tide marched across the channel which lies between South
Beveland and the mainland, the water reaching up to their necks.
The patriot forces had since then recovered much of the lost
ground, but Middelburg was strongly held, and so long as the
Spaniards had command of the sea, was the key to the possession of
Zeeland. On January 29, 1574, the Sea-Beggars under Boisot attacked
the Spanish fleet near Roemerswaal and after a bloody encounter
gained a complete victory. The siege of Middelburg was now pressed
and Mondragon surrendered, February 18. The prince at once set to
work to create a patriot government in the province. Four towns had
representatives, Middelburg, Zierikzee, Veere and Flushing. William
himself acquired by purchase the marquisate of Flushing and thus
was able to exercise a preponderating influence in the Provincial
Estates, all of whose members were required to be Calvinists and
supporters of the rebel cause.

The investment of Leyden by the Spaniards threatened however,
now that Haarlem had fallen, to isolate South Holland and Zeeland;
and William did not feel himself strong enough to make any serious
attempt to raise the siege. Lewis of Nassau therefore, with the
help of French money, set himself to work with his usual
enthusiastic energy to collect a force in the Rhineland with which
to invade the Netherlands from the east and effect a diversion. At
the head of 7000 foot and 3000 horse—half-disciplined troops,
partly Huguenot[pg.59] volunteers, partly German
mercenaries—he tried to cross the Meuse above Maestricht with
the intention of effecting a junction with the Prince of Orange. He
was accompanied by John and Henry of Nassau, his brothers, and
Christopher, son of the Elector Palatine. He found his course
blocked by a Spanish force under the command of Sancho d’Avila and
Mondragon. The encounter took place on the heath of Mook (April 14)
and ended in the crushing defeat of the invaders. Lewis and his
young brother, Henry, and Duke Christopher perished, and their army
was completely scattered. The death of his brothers was a great
grief to William. Lewis had for years been his chief support, and
the loss of this dauntless champion was indeed a heavy blow to the
cause for which he had sacrificed his life. He was only thirty-six
years of age, while Henry, the youngest of the Nassaus, to whom the
Prince was deeply attached, was but a youth of twenty-four.

The invasion of Lewis had nevertheless the result of raising the
siege of Leyden; but only for a time. After the victory at Mook the
Spanish troops were free to continue the task of reconquering rebel
Holland for the king. On May 26 a strong force under Valdez
advanced to Leyden and completely isolated the town by surrounding
it with a girdle of forts. The attack came suddenly, and
unfortunately the place had not been adequately provisioned. So
strong was the position of the Spaniards that the stadholder did
not feel that any relieving force that he could send would have any
chance of breaking through the investing lines and revictualling
the garrison. In these circumstances he summoned, June 1, a meeting
of the Estates of Holland at Rotterdam and proposed, as a desperate
resource, that the dykes should be cut and the land submerged, and
that the light vessels of the Sea-Beggars under Boisot should sail
over the waters, attack the Spanish forts and force an entrance
into the town. After considerable opposition the proposal was
agreed to and the waters were allowed to flow out upon the
low-lying fields, villages and farms, which lie between the sea,
the Rhine, the Waal and the Maas. Unfortunately the season was not
favourable, and though the water reached nearly to the higher land
round Leyden on which the Spanish redoubts were erected, and by
alarming Valdez caused him to press the blockade more closely, it
was not deep enough even for the light-draught vessels, which
Boisot had gathered together, to make their way to the town. So the
month of[pg.60] August passed and September began.
Meanwhile the prince, who was the soul of the enterprise, was
confined to his sick-bed by a violent attack of fever, and the
pangs of famine began to be cruelly felt within the beleaguered
town. A portion of the citizens were half-hearted in the struggle,
and began to agitate for surrender and even sent out emissaries to
try to make terms with the Spanish commander. But there were within
Leyden leaders of iron resolution, the heroic Burgomaster Pieter
Adriaanzoon van der Werf; the commandant of the garrison, Jan van
der Does; Dirk van Bronkhorst, Jan van Hout and many others who
remained staunch and true in face of the appalling agony of a
starving population; men who knew the fate in store for them if
they fell into the enemy’s hands and were determined to resist as
long as they had strength to fight. At last in mid-September faint
hopes began to dawn. William recovered, and a fierce equinoctial
gale driving the flood-tide up the rivers gradually deepened the
waters up to the very dyke on which the entrenchments of the
besiegers stood. Urged on by Orange, Boisot now made a great
effort. Anxiously from the towers was the approach of the relieving
fleet watched. The town was at the very last extremity. The people
were dying of hunger on every side. Some fierce combats took place
as soon as the Sea-Beggars, experts at this amphibious warfare,
arrived at the outlying Spanish forts, but not for long. Alarmed at
the rising of the waters and fearing that the fleet of Boisot might
cut off their escape, the Spaniards retreated in the night; and on
the morning of October 3 the vessels of the relieving force, laden
with provisions, entered the town. The long-drawn-out agony was
over and Leyden saved from the fate of Haarlem, just at the moment
when further resistance had become impossible. Had Leyden fallen
the probability is that the whole of South Holland would have been
conquered, and the revolt might have collapsed. In such a narrow
escape well might the people of the town see an intervention of
Providence on their behalf. The prince himself hastened to Leyden
on the following day, reorganised the government of the town and in
commemoration of this great deliverance founded the University,
which was to become in the 17th century one of the most famous
seats of learning in Europe.

The successful relief of Leyden was followed by a mutiny of the
army of Valdez. They were owed long arrears of pay, had endured
great hardships, and now that they saw themselves deprived of
the[pg.61] hope of the pillage of the town, they
put their commander and his officers under arrest and marched under
a leader elected by themselves into Utrecht. Other mutinies
occurred in various parts of the southern provinces, for Requesens
had no funds, and it was useless to appeal to Philip, for the
Spanish treasury was empty. This state of things led to a practical
cessation of active hostilities for many months; and Requesens
seized the opportunity to open negotiations with Orange. These
were, however, doomed to be fruitless, for the king would not hear
of any real concessions being made to the Protestants. The position
of William was equally beset with difficulties, politically and
financially. In the month following the relief of Leyden he even
threatened to withdraw from the country unless his authority were
more fully recognised and adequate supplies were furnished for the
conduct of the war. The Estates accordingly, November 12, asked him
to assume the title of Regent or Governor, with “absolute might,
authority and sovereign control” of the affairs of the country.
They also voted him an allowance of 49,000 guilders a month; but,
while thus conferring on the man who still claimed to be the
“Stadholder of the king” practically supreme power, the
burgher-corporations of the towns were very jealous of surrendering
in the smallest degree that control over taxation which was one of
their most valued rights. The exercise of authority, however, by
the prince from this time forward was very great, for he had
complete control in military and naval matters, and in the general
conduct of affairs he held all the administrative threads in his
own hands. He had become indispensable, and in everything but name
a sovereign in Holland and Zeeland.

The first part of 1575 was marked by a lull in warlike
operations, and conferences were held at Breda between envoys of
Orange and Requesens, only to find that there was no common ground
of agreement. The marriage of the prince (June 24) with Charlotte
de Bourbon, daughter of the Duke of Montpensier, was a daring step
which aroused much prejudice against him. The bride, who was of the
blood-royal of France, had been Abbess of Jouarre, but had abjured
her vows, run away and become a Calvinist. This was bad enough, but
the legality of the union was rendered the more questionable by the
fact that Anne of Saxony was still alive. On all sides came
protests—from Charlotte’s father, from John of Nassau, and
from Anne’s relations in Saxony and Hesse. But William’s
[pg.62]
character was such that opposition only made him more determined to
carry out his purpose. The wedding was celebrated at Brill with
Calvinist rites. The union, whether legitimate or not, was
undoubtedly one of great happiness.

Meanwhile the governor-general, unable to obtain any financial
help from Spain, had managed to persuade the provinces, always in
dread of the excesses of the mutinous soldiery, to raise a loan of
1,200,000 guilders to meet their demands for arrears of pay.
Requesens was thus enabled to put in the late summer a considerable
army into the field and among other successes to gain possession of
the Zeeland islands, Duiveland and Schouwen. On September 27 a
force under the command of the veteran Mondragon waded across the
shallow channels dividing the islands, which fell into their hands.
Zierikzee, the chief town of Schouwen, made a stout resistance, but
had at length to surrender (July, 1576). This conquest separated
South Holland from the rest of Zeeland; and, as Haarlem and
Amsterdam were in the hands of the Spaniards, the only territory
over which the authority of Orange extended was the low-lying
corner of land between the Rhine and the Maas, of which Delft was
the centre.

The situation again appeared well-nigh desperate, and the
stadholder began to look anxiously round in the hope of obtaining
foreign assistance. It was to the interest of both France and
England to assist a movement which distracted the attention and
weakened the power of Spain. But Henry III of France was too much
occupied with civil and religious disturbances in his own country,
and Elizabeth of England, while receiving with courtesy the envoys
both of Orange and Requesens, gave evasive replies to both. She was
jealous of France, and pleased to see the growing embarrassment of
her enemy Philip, but the Tudor queen had no love either for rebels
or for Calvinists. While refusing therefore openly to take the side
of the Hollanders and Zeelanders, she agreed to give them secret
help; and no obstacle was placed in the way of the English
volunteers, who had already since 1572 been enlisting in the Dutch
service. It was at this time that those English and Scottish
Brigades were first formed which remained for nearly two centuries
in that service, and were always to be found in the very forefront
of the fighting throughout the great war of Liberation.

On March 4, 1576, Requesens died; and in the considerable
[pg.63]
interval that elapsed before the arrival of his successor, the
outlook for the patriot cause became distinctly brighter. The
Estates of Holland and Zeeland met at Delft (April 25, 1576); and
the assembly was noteworthy for the passing of an Act of
Federation. This Act, which was the work of Orange, bound the two
provinces together for common action in defence of their rights and
liberties and was the first step towards that larger union, which
three years later laid the foundations of the Dutch Republic. By
this Act sovereign powers were conferred upon William; he was in
the name of the king to exercise all the prerogatives of a ruler.
It required all his influence to secure the insertion of articles
(1) extending a certain measure of toleration to all forms of
religious worship that were not contrary to the Gospel, (2) giving
authority to the prince in case of need to offer the Protectorate
of the federated provinces to a foreign prince. Orange knew only
too well that Holland and Zeeland were not strong enough alone to
resist the power of Spain. His hopes of securing the support of the
other provinces, in which Catholics were in the majority, depended,
he clearly saw, on the numerous adherents to the ancient faith in
Holland and Zeeland being protected against the persecuting zeal of
the dominant Calvinism of those provinces. In any case—and
this continued to be his settled conviction to the end of his
life—the actual independence of the whole or any portion of
the Netherlands did not seem to him to lie within the bounds of
practical politics. The object for which he strove was the
obtaining of substantial guarantees for the maintenance of the
ancient charters, which exempted the provinces from the presence of
foreign officials, foreign tribunals, foreign soldiery and
arbitrary methods of taxation. As Philip had deliberately infringed
all those privileges which he had sworn to maintain, it was the
duty of all patriotic Netherlanders to resist his authority, and,
if resistance failed to bring redress, to offer the sovereignty
with the necessary restrictions to some other prince willing to
accept it on those conditions and powerful enough to protect the
provinces from Spanish attack. In order to grasp the principles
which guided William’s policy during the next few years it is
essential to bear in mind (1) that he sought to bring about a union
of all the Netherland provinces on a basis of toleration, (2) that
he did not aim at the erection of the Netherlands into an
independent State.[pg.64]

On the death of Requesens the Council of State had assumed
temporary charge of the administration. There had for some time
been growing dissatisfaction even amongst the loyalist Catholics of
the southern provinces at the presence and over-bearing attitude of
so many Spanish officials and Spanish troops in the land and at the
severity of the religious persecution. Representations were made to
the king by the Council of State of the general discontent
throughout the country, of the deplorable results of the policy of
force and repression, and urging the withdrawal of the troops, the
mitigation of the edicts, and the appointment of a member of the
royal house to the governorship. To these representations and
requests no answer was sent for months in accordance with Philip’s
habitual dilatoriness in dealing with difficult affairs of State.
He did, however, actually nominate in April his bastard brother,
Don John of Austria, the famous victor of Lepanto, as Requesens’
successor. But Don John, who was then in Italy, had other
ambitions, and looked with suspicion upon Philip’s motives in
assigning him the thankless task of dealing with the troubles in
the Low Countries. Instead of hurrying northwards, he first betook
himself to Madrid where he met with a cold reception. Delay,
however, so far from troubling Philip, was thoroughly in accordance
with the whole bent of his character and policy. For six months Don
John remained in Spain, and it was a half-year during which the
situation in the Netherlands had been to a very large extent
transformed.

The position of Orange and his followers in Holland and Zeeland
in the spring of 1576 had again darkened. In June the surrender of
Zierikzee to Mondragon was a heavy blow to the patriot cause, for
it gave the Spaniards a firm footing in the very heart of the
Zeeland archipelago and drove a wedge between South Holland and the
island of Walcheren. This conquest was, however, destined to have
important results of a very different character from what might
have been expected. The town had surrendered on favourable terms
and pillage was forbidden. Baulked of their expected booty, the
Spanish troops, to whom large arrears of pay were due, mutinied.
Under their own “eletto” they marched to Aalst, where they were
joined by other mutineers, and soon a large force was collected
together, who lived by plunder and were a terror to the country.
The Council declared them to be outlaws, but the revolted
[pg.65]
soldiery defied its authority and scoffed at its threats. This was
a moment which, as Orange was quick to perceive, was extremely
favourable for a vigorous renewal of his efforts to draw together
all the provinces to take common action in their resistance to
Spanish tyranny. His agents and envoys in all parts of the
Netherlands, but especially in Flanders and Brabant, urged his
views upon the more influential members of the provincial estates
and upon leading noblemen, like the Duke of Aerschot and other
hitherto loyal supporters of the government, who were now suspected
of wavering. His efforts met with a success which a few months
earlier would have been deemed impossible. The conduct of the
Spanish troops, and the lack of any central authority to protect
the inhabitants against their insolence and depredations, had
effected a great change in public opinion. In Brussels Baron de
Héze (a god-child of the prince) had been appointed to the
command of the troops in the pay of the Estates of Brabant. De
Héze exerted himself to arouse popular opinion in the
capital in favour of Orange and against the Spaniards. To such an
extent was he successful that he ventured, Sept. 21, to arrest the
whole of the Council of State with the exception of the Spanish
member Roda, who fled to Antwerp. William now entered into direct
negotiations with Aerschot and other prominent nobles of Flanders
and Brabant. He took a further step by sending, at the request of
the citizens of Ghent, a strong armed force to protect the town
against the Spanish garrison in the citadel. In the absence of any
lawful government, the States-General were summoned to meet at
Brussels on September 22. Deputies from Brabant, Flanders and
Hainault alone attended, but in the name of the States-General they
nominated Aerschot, Viglius and Sasbout as Councillors of State,
and appointed Aerschot to the command of the forces, with the Count
of Lalaing as his lieutenant. They then, Sept. 27, approached the
prince with proposals for forming a union of all the provinces. As
a preliminary it was agreed that the conditions, which had been put
forward by William as indispensable—namely, exclusion of all
foreigners from administrative posts, dismissal of foreign troops,
and religious toleration—should be accepted. The proposals
were gladly received by William, and Ghent was chosen as the place
where nine delegates from Holland and Zeeland should confer with
nine delegates nominated by the States-General as representing
the[pg.66] other provinces. They met on October
19. Difficulties arose on two points—the recognition to be
accorded to Don John of Austria, and the principle of
non-interference with religious beliefs. Orange himself had always
been an advocate of toleration, but the representatives of Holland
and Zeeland showed an obstinate disinclination to allow liberty of
Catholic worship within their borders; and this attitude of theirs
might, in spite of the prince’s efforts, have led to a breaking-off
of the negotiations, had not an event occurred which speedily led
to a sinking of differences on the only possible basis, that of
mutual concession and compromise.

The citadel of Antwerp was, during this month of October,
garrisoned by a body of mutinous Spanish troops under the command
of Sancho d’Avila, the victor of Mook. Champagney, the governor,
had with him a body of German mercenaries under a certain Count
Oberstein; and at his request, such was the threatening attitude of
the Spaniards, the States-General sent Havré with a
reinforcement of Walloon troops. On Sunday, November 4, the
garrison, which had been joined by other bands of mutineers, turned
the guns of the citadel upon the town and sallying forth attacked
the forces of Champagney. The Germans offered but a feeble
resistance. Oberstein perished; Champagney and Havré took
refuge on vessels in the river; and the Spaniards were masters of
Antwerp. The scene of massacre, lust and wholesale pillage, which
followed, left a memory behind it unique in its horror even among
the excesses of this blood-stained time. The “Spanish Fury,” as it
was called, spelt the ruin of what, but a short time before, had
been the wealthiest and most flourishing commercial city in the
world.

The news of this disaster reached the States-General, as they
were in the act of considering the draft proposals which had been
submitted to them by the Ghent conference. At the same time tidings
came that Don John, who had travelled through France in disguise,
had arrived at Luxemburg. They quickly therefore came to a decision
to ratify the pact, known as the Pacification of Ghent, and
on November 8 it was signed. The Pacification was really a
treaty between the Prince of Orange and the Estates of Holland and
Zeeland on the one hand, and the States-General representing the
other provinces. It was agreed that the Spanish troops should be
compelled to leave the Netherlands and that the States-General
[pg.67]
of the whole seventeen provinces, as they were convened at the
abdication of Charles V, should be called together to decide upon
the question of religious toleration and other matters of national
importance. Meanwhile the placards against heresy were suspended,
and all the illegal measures and sentences of Alva declared null
and void. His confiscated property was restored to Orange, and his
position, as stadholder in Holland and Zeeland, acknowledged. Don
John was informed that he would not be recognised as
governor-general unless he would consent to dismiss the Spanish
troops, accept the Pacification of Ghent, and swear to maintain the
rights and privileges of the Provinces. Negotiations ensued, but
for a long time to little purpose; and Don John, who was rather an
impetuous knight-errant than a statesman and diplomatist, remained
during the winter months at Namur, angry at his reception and
chafing at the conditions imposed upon him, which he dared not
accept without permission from the king. In December the
States-General containing deputies from all the provinces met at
Brussels, and in January the Pacification of Ghent was confirmed,
and a new compact, to which the name of the Union of Brussels was
given, was drawn up by a number of influential Catholics. This
document, to which signatures were invited, was intended to give to
the Pacification of Ghent the sanction of popular support and to be
at the same time a guarantee for the maintenance of the royal
authority and the Catholic religion. The Union of Brussels was
generally approved throughout the southern provinces, and the
signatories from every class were numbered by thousands. Don John,
who was at Huy, saw that it was necessary to temporise. He was
willing, he declared, to dismiss the foreign troops and send them
out of the country and to maintain the ancient charters and
liberties of the provinces, provided that nothing was done to
subvert the king’s authority or the Catholic faith. Finally, on
February 12, a treaty called “The Perpetual Edict,” a most
inappropriate name, was signed, and the States-General acknowledged
Don John as governor-general. The agreement was principally the
work of Aerschot and the loyalist Catholic party, who followed his
leadership, and was far from being entirely acceptable to Orange.
He had no trust in the good faith of either Philip or his
representative, and, though he recommended Holland and Zeeland to
acquiesce in the treaty and acknowledge Don John as
governor-general, it was with the secret resolve to
[pg.68]
keep a close watch upon his every action, and not to brook any attempt to
interfere with religious liberty in the two provinces, in which he
exercised almost sovereign power and with whose struggles for
freedom he had identified himself.

The undertaking of Don John with regard to the Spanish troops
was punctually kept. Before the end of April they had all left the
country; and on May 1 the new governor-general made his state entry
into Brussels. It was to outward appearances very brilliant. But
the hero of Lepanto found himself at once distrusted by the
Catholic nobles and checkmated by the influence and diplomacy of
the ever watchful William of Orange. Chafing at his impotence, and
ill-supported by the king, who sent no reply to his appeals for
financial help, Don John suddenly left the capital and, placing
himself at the head of a body of Walloon troops, seized Namur.
Feeling himself in this stronghold more secure, he tried to bring
pressure on the States-General to place in his hands wider powers
and to stand by him in his efforts to force Orange to submit to the
authority of the king. His efforts were in vain. William had warned
the States-General and the nobles of the anti-Spanish party in
Brabant and Flanders that Don John was not to be trusted, and he
now pointed to the present attitude of the governor-general, as a
proof that his suspicions were well-founded. Indeed the eyes of all
true patriots began to turn to the prince, who had been quietly
strengthening his position, not only in Holland and Zeeland, where
he was supreme, but also in Utrecht and Gelderland; and popular
movements in Brussels and elsewhere took place in his favour. So
strongly marked was the Orange feeling in the capital that the
States-General acceded to the general wish that the prince should
be invited to come in person to Brussels. Confidence was expressed
by Catholics no less than by Protestants that only under his
leadership could the country be delivered from Spanish tyranny. A
deputation was sent, bearing the invitation; but for a while
William hesitated in giving an affirmative reply. On September 23,
however, he made his entry into Brussels amidst general
demonstrations of joy and was welcomed as “the Restorer and
Defender of the Father-land’s liberty.” Thus, ten years after he
had been declared an outlaw and banished, did the Prince of Orange
return in triumph to the town which had witnessed the execution of
Egmont and Hoorn. It was the proudest day of his life and the
supreme point of his career.

CHAPTER V

WILLIAM THE SILENT

The position of William at Brussels after his triumphant entry,
September 23, 1577, was by no means an easy one. His main support
was derived from a self-elected Council of Eighteen, containing
representatives of the gilds and of the citizens. This Council
controlled an armed municipal force and was really master in the
city. In these circumstances the States-General did not venture
upon any opposition to the popular wishes, in other words to
William, whose influence with the masses was unbounded. The
States-General, therefore, under pressure from the Eighteen,
informed Don John, October 8, that they no longer recognised him as
governor-general; and the Estates of Brabant appointed the prince
to the office of Ruward or governor of the province.
Meanwhile a fresh factor of disturbance had been introduced into
the troubled scene. Certain of the Catholic nobles opposed to
Spanish rule, but suspicious of Orange, had invited the twenty year
old Archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to accept the
sovereignty of the Netherlands. Matthias, who was of an adventurous
spirit, after some parleying agreed. He accordingly left Vienna
secretly, and at the end of October arrived in the Netherlands. Not
content with this counter-stroke, Aerschot went to Ghent to stir up
opposition to the appointment of William as Ruward of Brabant. The
populace however in Ghent was Orangist, and, rising in revolt,
seized Aerschot and a number of other Catholic leaders and threw
them into prison. They were speedily released, but the breach
between the Catholic nobles and the Calvinist stadholder of Holland
was widened. William himself saw in the coming of Matthias a
favourable opportunity for securing the erection of the Netherlands
into a constitutional State under the nominal rule of a Habsburg
prince. By his influence, therefore, the States-General entered
into negotiations with the Archduke; and Matthias finally was
recognised (December 8) as governor on condition that he accepted
the Union of Brussels, He was also induced to place the real power
in the[pg.70] hands of Orange with the title of
Lieutenant-General. Matthias made his state entry into Brussels,
January 18, 1578. His position appeared to be strengthened by a
treaty concluded with the English queen (January 7) by which
Elizabeth promised to send over a body of troops and to grant a
subsidy to the States, for the repayment of which the towns of
Middelburg, Bruges and Gravelines were to be pledges.

The news however of the step taken by Matthias had had more
effect upon Philip II than the despairing appeals of his
half-brother. A powerful army of tried Spanish and Italian troops
under the command of Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, son of the
former regent Margaret, was sent to Flanders. Farnese was Don
John’s nephew, and they had been brought up together at Madrid,
being almost of the same age. Already Philip had determined to
replace Don John, whose brilliance as a leader in the field did not
compensate for his lack of statesmanlike qualities. In Farnese,
whether by good fortune or deliberate choice, he had at length
found a consummate general who was to prove himself a match even
for William the Silent in all the arts of political combination and
intrigue. At Gembloux, January 31, Don John and Parma fell upon the
levies of the States and gained a complete and almost bloodless
victory. Had Philip supplied his governor-general with the money he
asked for, Don John might now have conquered the whole of the
southern Netherlands, but without funds he could achieve
little.

Meanwhile all was confusion. The States-General withdrew from
Brussels to Antwerp; and William, finding that Matthias was
useless, began negotiations with France, England and Germany in the
hope of finding in this emergency some other foreign prince ready
to brave the wrath of Philip by accepting the suzerainty of the
Netherlands. The Duke of Anjou, brother of the French king, was the
favoured candidate of the Catholic party; and William, whose one
aim was to secure the aid of a powerful protector in the struggle
against Spain, was ready to accept him. Anjou at the head of an
army of 15,000 men crossed the frontier at Mons, July 12; and, on
the following August 13, a treaty was agreed upon between him and
the States-General, by which the French duke, with the title of
Defender of the Liberties of the Netherlands, undertook to
help the States to expel the Spaniards from the Low Countries. But,
to[pg.71] add to the complications of the
situation, a German force under the command of John Casimir,
brother of the Elector Palatine, and in the pay of Queen Elizabeth,
invaded the hapless provinces from the east. The advent of John
Casimir was greeted with enthusiasm by the Calvinist party; and it
required all the skill and sagacity of the Prince of Orange to keep
the peace and prevent the rival interests from breaking out into
open strife in the face of the common enemy. But Don John was
helpless, his repeated appeals for financial help remained
unanswered, and, sick at heart and weary of life, he contracted a
fever and died in his camp at Namur, October 1, 1578. His successor
in the governor-generalship was Alexander of Parma, who had now
before him a splendid field for the exercise of his great
abilities.

The remainder of the year 1578 saw a violent recrudescence of
religious bitterness. In vain did Orange, who throughout his later
life was a genuine and earnest advocate of religious toleration,
strive to the utmost of his powers and with untiring patience to
allay the suspicions and fears of the zealots. John Casimir at
Ghent, in the fervour of his fanatical Calvinism, committed acts of
violence and oppression, which had the very worst effect in the
Walloon provinces. In this part of the Netherlands Catholicism was
dominant; and there had always been in the provinces of Hainault,
Artois, and in the southern districts generally, a feeling of
distrust towards Orange. The upholding of the principle of
religious toleration by a man who had twice changed his faith was
itself suspect; and Farnese left no means untried for increasing
this growing anti-Orange feeling among the Catholic nobles. A party
was formed, which bore the name of “The Malcontents,” whose leaders
were Montigny, Lalaing and La Motte. With these the
governor-general entered into negotiations, with the result that an
alliance was made between Hainault, Artois, Lille, Douay and
Orchies (January 6, 1579), called the Union of Arras, for the
maintenance of the Catholic faith, by which these Walloon provinces
and towns expressed their readiness to submit to the king on
condition that he were willing to agree to uphold their rights and
privileges in accordance with the provisions of the Pacification of
Ghent. The Union of Arras did not as yet mean a complete
reconciliation with the Spanish sovereign, but it did mean the
beginning of a breach between the Calvinist north and the Catholic
south, which the[pg.72] statecraft of Parma gradually widened
into an impossible chasm. Before this took place, Anjou, Matthias
and John Casimir had alike withdrawn from the scene of anarchic
confusion, in which for a brief time each had been trying to
compass his own ambitious ends in selfish indifference to the
welfare of the people they were proposing to deliver from the
Spanish yoke. The opening of the year 1579 saw Orange and Parma
face to face preparing to measure their strength in a grim struggle
for the mastery.

In the very same month as witnessed the signing of the Union of
Arras, a rival union had been formed in the northern Netherlands,
which was destined to be much more permanent. The real author
however of the Union of Utrecht was not Orange, but his brother,
John of Nassau. In March, 1578, John had been elected Stadholder of
Gelderland. He, like William, had devoted himself heart and soul to
the cause of Netherland freedom, but his Calvinism was far more
pronounced than his brother’s. From the moment of his acceptance of
the stadholdership he set to work to effect a close union between
Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht with Gelderland and the adjoining
districts which lay around the Zuyder Zee. It was a difficult task,
since the eastern provinces were afraid (and not unjustly) that its
much greater wealth would give Holland predominance in the proposed
confederation. Nevertheless it was accomplished, and an Act of
Union was drawn up and signed at Utrecht, January 29, 1579, by the
representatives of Holland, Zeeland, the town and district
(sticht) of Utrecht, Gelderland and Zutphen, by which they
agreed to defend their rights and liberties and to resist all
foreign intervention in their affairs by common action as if they
were one province, and to establish and maintain freedom of
conscience and of worship within their boundaries. William does not
seem at first to have been altogether pleased with his brother’s
handiwork. He still hoped that a confederation on a much wider
scale might have been formed, comprising the greater part of those
who had appended their signatures to the Pacification of Ghent. It
was not until some months had passed and he saw that his dreams of
a larger union were not to be realised, that he signed, on May 3,
the Act of Union drawn up at Utrecht. By this time he was well
aware that Parma had succeeded in winning over the malcontent
nobles to accept his terms. On May 19 the Walloon provinces, whose
representatives had signed the Union of Arras,
[pg.73]
agreed to acknowledge, with certain nominal reservations, the sovereignty
of Philip and to allow only Catholic worship. In fact the
reconciliation was complete.

Thus, despite the efforts of Orange, the idea of the federation
of all the seventeen provinces on national lines became a thing of
the past, henceforth unattainable. The Netherlands were divided
into two camps. Gradually in the course of 1580 Overyssel, Drente
and the greater part of Friesland gave in their adherence to the
Union of Utrecht, and Groningen and the Ommelanden allied
themselves with their neighbours. In the rest of the Low Countries
all fell away and submitted themselves to the king’s authority,
except Antwerp and Breda in Brabant, and Ghent, Bruges and Ypres in
Flanders. William felt that Parma was constantly gaining ground.
Defection after defection took place, the most serious being that
of George Lalaing, Count of Renneberg, the Stadholder of Groningen.
Negotiations were indeed secretly opened with William himself, and
the most advantageous and flattering terms offered to him, if he
would desert the patriot cause. But with him opposition to Spain
and to Spanish methods of government was a matter of principle and
strong conviction. He was proof alike against bribery and cajolery,
even when he perceived, as the year 1580 succeeded 1579, that he
had no staunch friends on whom he could absolutely rely, save in
the devoted provinces of Holland and Zeeland.

For things had been going from bad to worse. The excesses and
cruelties committed by the Calvinists, wherever they found
themselves in a position to persecute a Catholic minority, and
especially the outrages perpetrated at Ghent under the leadership
of two Calvinist fanatics, De Ryhove and De Hembyze, although they
were done in direct opposition to the wishes and efforts of Orange,
always and at all times the champion of toleration, did much to
discredit him in Flanders and Brabant and to excite bitter
indignation among the Catholics, who still formed the great
majority of the population of the Netherlands. William felt himself
to be month by month losing power. The action he was at last
compelled to take, in rescuing Ghent from the hands of the
ultra-democratic Calvinist party and in expelling De Ryhove and De
Hembyze, caused him to be denounced as “a papist at heart.” Indeed
the bigots of both creeds in that age of intolerance and
persecution were utterly unable to understand his attitude, and
could only attribute[pg.74] it to a lack of any sincere religious
belief at all. Farnese, meanwhile, whose genius for Machiavellian
statesmanship was as remarkable as those gifts for leadership in
war which entitled him to rank as the first general of his time,
was a man who never failed to take full advantage of the mistakes
and weaknesses of his opponents. At the head of a veteran force he
laid siege in the spring of 1579 to the important frontier town of
Maestricht. He encountered a desperate resistance, worthy of the
defence of Haarlem or of Leyden, and for four months the garrison
held out grimly in the hope of relief. But, despite all the efforts
of Orange to despatch an adequate force to raise the siege, at last
(June 29) the town was carried by assault and delivered up for
three days to the fury of a savage soldiery. By the possession of
this key to the Meuse, Parma was now able to cut off communications
between Brabant and Protestant Germany. Had he indeed been
adequately supported by Philip it is probable that at this time all
the provinces up to the borders of Holland might have been brought
into subjection by the Spanish forces.

The position of William was beset with perils on every side. One
by one his adherents were deserting him; even in the provinces of
Holland and Zeeland he was losing ground. He saw clearly that
without foreign help the national cause for which he had sacrificed
everything was doomed. In this emergency he reopened negotiations
with Anjou, not because he had any trust in the French prince’s
capacity or sincerity, but for the simple reason that there was no
one else to whom he could turn. As heir to the throne of France and
at this time the favoured suitor of Queen Elizabeth, his acceptance
of the sovereignty of the Netherlands would secure, so Orange
calculated, the support both of France and England. It was his hope
also that the limiting conditions attached to the offer of
sovereignty would enable him to exercise a strong personal control
over a man of weak character like Anjou. The Duke’s vanity and
ambition were flattered by the proposal; and on September 19, 1580,
a provisional treaty was signed at Plessis-les-Tours by which Anjou
accepted the offer that was made to him, and showed himself quite
ready to agree to any limitations imposed upon his authority, since
he had not any intention, when once he held the reins of power, of
observing them.

The first effect of William’s negotiations with Anjou was to
alienate the Calvinists without gaining over the Catholics.
Anjou[pg.75] was suspect to both. The action of the
Spanish government, however, at this critical juncture did much to
restore the credit of the prince with all to whom the Spanish
tyranny and the memory of Alva were abhorrent. Cardinal Granvelle,
after fifteen years of semi-exile in Italy, had lately been
summoned to Madrid to become chief adviser to the king. Granvelle
spared no pains to impress upon Philip the necessity of getting rid
of Orange as the chief obstacle to the pacification of the
Netherlands, and advised that a price should be placed upon his
life. “The very fear of it will paralyse or kill him” was the
opinion of the cardinal, who ought to have had a better
understanding of the temper and character of his old adversary.
Accordingly at Maestricht, March 15, 1581, “a ban and edict in form
of proscription” was published against the prince, who was
denounced as “a traitor and miscreant, an enemy of ourselves and of
our country”; and all and everywhere empowered “to seize the person
and goods of this William of Nassau, as enemy of the human race.” A
solemn promise was also made “to anyone who has the heart to free
us of this pest, and who will deliver him dead or alive, or take
his life, the sum of 25,000 crowns in gold or in estates for
himself and his heirs; and we will pardon him any crimes of which
he has been guilty, and give him a patent of nobility, if he be not
noble.” It is a document which, however abhorrent or loathsome it
may appear to us, was characteristic of the age in which it was
promulgated and in accordance with the ideas of that cruel time.
The ban was a declaration of war to the knife, and as such it was
received and answered.

In reply to the ban the prince at the close of the year
(December 13) published a very lengthy defence of his life and
actions, the famous Apology. To William himself is
undoubtedly due the material which the document embodies and the
argument it contains, but it was almost certainly not written by
him, but by his chaplain, Pierre L’Oyseleur, Seigneur de Villiers,
to whom it owes its rather ponderous prolixity and redundant
verbiage. Historically it is of very considerable value, though the
facts are not always to be relied upon as strictly accurate. The
Apology was translated into several languages and
distributed to the leading personages in every neighbouring
country, and made a deep impression on men’s minds.

The combined effect of the Ban and the Apology was
to strengthen William’s position in all the provinces where the
patriot party still[pg.76] held the upper hand; and he was not
slow to take advantage of the strong anti-Spanish feeling which was
aroused. Its intensity was shown by the solemn Act of Abjuration,
July 26, 1581, by which the provinces of Brabant, Flanders,
Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Gelderland renounced their allegiance
to Philip II on the ground of his tyranny and misrule. But after
signing this Act it never seems to have occurred to the prince or
to the representatives of the provinces, that these now derelict
territories could remain without a personal sovereign. Orange used
all his influence and persuasiveness to induce them to accept
Anjou. Anjou, as we have seen, had already agreed to the conditions
under which he should, when invited, become “prince and lord” of
the Netherlands. In the autumn of 1581 the position was an
ambiguous one. The States-General claimed that, after the
abjuration of Philip, the sovereignty of the provinces had reverted
to them, as the common representative of a group of provinces that
were now sovereign in their own right, and that the conferring of
that sovereignty on another overlord was their prerogative. The
position of Orange was peculiar, for de facto under one
title or another he exercised the chief authority in each one of
the rebel provinces, but in the name of the States-General, instead
of the king. His influence indeed was so great as to over-shadow
that of the States-General, but great as it was, it had to be
exerted to the utmost before that body could be induced to accept a
man of Anjou’s despicable and untrustworthy character as their new
ruler. William however had committed himself to the candidature of
the duke, through lack of any fitter choice; and at last both the
States-General and the several provincial Estates (Holland and
Zeeland excepted) agreed to confer the sovereignty upon the French
prince subject to the conditions of the treaty of
Plessis-les-Tours.

William himself exercised the powers with which Holland and
Zeeland had invested him in the name of the king, whose stadholder
he was, even when waging war against him. After the Abjuration this
pretence could no longer be maintained. The Estates of Holland and
Zeeland had indeed petitioned Orange to become their count, but he
refused the title, fearing to give umbrage to Anjou. Finding,
however, the two provinces resolute in their opposition to the
Valois prince, he consented, July 24, 1581, to exercise
provisionally, as if he were count, the powers of
[pg.77] “high
supremacy,” which had already been conferred upon him. Meanwhile
Anjou was dallying in England, but on receiving through Ste
Aldegonde an intimation that the States could brook no further
delay, he set sail and landed at Flushing. Lord Leicester and a
brilliant English escort accompanied him; and Elizabeth asked the
States to receive her suitor as “her own self.” At Antwerp, where
he took up his residence, Anjou was (February 19) solemnly invested
with the duchy of Brabant, and received the homage of his new
subjects. He was far from popular, and William remained at his side
to give him support and counsel. On March 18 (Anjou’s birthday) an
untoward event occurred, which threatened to have most disastrous
consequences. As Orange was leaving the dinner-table, a young
Biscayan, Juan Jaureguy by name, attempted his assassination, by
firing a pistol at him. The ball entered the head by the right ear
and passed through the palate. Jaureguy was instantly killed and it
was afterwards found that he had, for the sake of the reward, been
instigated to the deed by his master, a merchant named Caspar
Anastro. Anjou, who was at first suspected of being accessory to
the crime, was thus exculpated. It was a terrible wound and
William’s life was for some time in great danger; but by the
assiduous care of his physicians and nurses he very slowly
recovered, and was strong enough, on May 2, to attend a solemn
service of thanksgiving. The shock of the event and the long weeks
of anxiety were however too heavy a strain upon his wife, Charlotte
de Bourbon, who had recently given birth to their sixth daughter.
Her death, on May 5, was deeply grieved by the prince, for
Charlotte had been a most devoted helpmeet and adviser to him
throughout the anxious years of their married life. During the
whole of the summer and autumn William remained at Antwerp,
patiently trying to smooth away the difficulties caused by the
dislike and suspicion felt by the Netherlanders for the man whom
they were asked to recognise as their sovereign. It was an arduous
task, but William, at the cost of his own popularity, succeeded in
getting the duke acknowledged in July as Lord of Friesland and Duke
of Gelderland, and in August Anjou was solemnly installed at
Bruges, as Count of Flanders. Meanwhile he was planning, with the
help of the large French force which Anjou had undertaken to bring
into the Netherlands, to take the offensive against Parma. The
truth is that he and Anjou were really playing
[pg.78] at
cross-purposes. Orange wished Anjou to be the
roi-fainéant of a United Netherland state of which he
himself should be the real ruler, but Anjou had no intention of
being treated as a second Matthias. He secretly determined to make
himself master of Antwerp by a sudden attack and, this achieved, to
proceed to seize by force of arms some of the other principal
cities and to make himself sovereign in reality as well as in name.
He resented his dependence upon Orange and was resolved to rid
himself of it. With shameless treachery in the early morning of
January 17, 1583, he paid a visit to the prince in Antwerp, and,
with the object of gaining possession of his person, tried to
persuade him to attend a review of the French regiments who were
encamped outside the town. The suspicions of William had however
been aroused, and he pleaded some excuse for declining the
invitation. At midday some thousands of Anjou’s troops rushed into
the city at the dinner-hour with loud cries of “Ville
gagnée! Tue! Tue!” But the citizens flew to arms; barricades
were erected; and finally the French were driven out with heavy
loss, leaving some 1500 prisoners in the hands of the town-guard.
Many French nobles perished, and the “French Fury,” as it was
called, was an ignominious and ghastly failure. Indignation was
wide and deep throughout the provinces; and William’s efforts to
calm the excitement and patch up some fresh agreement with the
false Valois, though for the moment partially successful, only
added to his own growing unpopularity.

The prince in fact was so wedded to the idea that the only hope
for the provinces lay in securing French aid that he seemed unable
to convince himself that Anjou after this act of base treachery was
impossible. His continued support of the duke only served to
alienate the people of Brabant and Flanders. The Protestants hated
the thought of having as their sovereign a prince who was a
Catholic and whose mother and brothers were looked upon by them as
the authors of the massacre of St Bartholomew. The Catholics,
cajoled by Parma’s fair words, and alarmed by the steady progress
of his arms, were already inclining to return to their old
allegiance. The marriage of Orange, April 7, 1583, to Louise,
daughter of the famous Huguenot leader Admiral Coligny, and widow
of the Sieur de Téligny, added to the feelings of distrust
and hostility he had already aroused, for the bride was a
Frenchwoman and both her father and husband had perished on the
fatal St Bartholomew’s day.[pg.79]

Finding himself exposed to insult, and his life ever in danger,
William, at the end of July, left Antwerp and took up his residence
again at Delft in the midst of his faithful Hollanders. They, too,
disliked his French proclivities, but his alliance with Louise de
Téligny seemed to be an additional pledge to these strong
Calvinists of his religious sincerity.

Meanwhile Anjou had already returned to France; and Parma had
now a freer field for his advance northwards and, though sorely
hampered by lack of funds, was rapidly taking town after town. In
the spring of 1584 he took Ypres and Bruges, and a strong party in
Ghent was in traitorous correspondence with him. Many nobles had
fallen away from the patriot cause, among them William’s
brother-in-law, Count van den Berg, who had succeeded John of
Nassau as Stadholder of Gelderland. The hold of Orange upon Brabant
and the Scheldt was, however, still ensured by the possession of
Antwerp, of which strongly fortified town the trusty Ste Aldegonde
was governor.

Meanwhile the prince, who was still striving hard to persuade
the provinces that were hostile to Spanish rule that their only
hope lay in obtaining aid from France through Anjou, was living at
the old convent of St Agatha, afterwards known as the Prinsenhof at
Delft. His manner of life was of the most modest and homely kind,
just like that of an ordinary Dutch burgher. He was in fact deeply
in debt, terribly worried with the outward aspect of things, and
his position became one of growing difficulty, for on June 10,
1584, the miserable Anjou died, and the policy on which he had for
so long expended his best efforts was wrecked. Even his own
recognition as Count of Holland and Zeeland had led to endless
negotiations between the Estates and the various town councils
which claimed to have a voice in the matter; and in July, 1584, he
had, though provisionally exercising sovereign authority, not yet
received formal homage. And all this time, in addition to the other
cares that weighed heavily upon him, there was the continual dread
of assassination. Ever since the failure of the attempt of
Jaureguy, there had been a constant succession of plots against the
life of the rebel leader and heretic at the instigation of the
Spanish government, and with the knowledge of Parma. Religious
fanaticism, loyalty to the legitimate sovereign, together with the
more sordid motive of pecuniary reward, made many eager to
undertake the murderous[pg.80] commission. It was made the easier
from the fact that the prince always refused to surround himself
with guards or to take any special precautions, and was always easy
of access. Many schemes and proposed attempts came to nothing
either through the vigilance of William’s spies or through the lack
of courage of the would-be assassins. A youth named Balthazar
Gérard had however become obsessed with the conviction that
he had a special mission to accomplish the deed in which Jaureguy
had failed, and he devoted himself to the task of ridding the world
of one whom he looked upon as the arch-enemy of God and the king.
Under the false name of Francis Guyon he made his way to Delft,
pretended to be a zealous Calvinist flying from persecution, and
went about begging for alms. The prince, even in his poverty always
charitable, hearing of his needy condition sent to the man a
present of twelve crowns. With this gift Gérard bought a
pair of pistols and on July 10, 1584, having managed on some
pretext to gain admittance to the Prinsenhof, he concealed himself
in a dark corner by the stairs just opposite the door of the room
where William and his family were dining. As the prince,
accompanied by his wife, three of his daughters and one of his
sisters, came out and was approaching the staircase, the assassin
darted forward and fired two bullets into his breast. The wound was
mortal; William fell to the ground and speedily expired. Tradition
says that, as he fell, he exclaimed in French: “My God, have pity
on my soul! My God, have pity on this poor people!” But an
examination of contemporary records of the murder throws
considerable doubt on the statement that such words were uttered.
The nature of the wound was such that the probability is that
intelligible speech was impossible.

Balthazar Gérard gloried in his deed, and bore the
excruciating tortures which were inflicted upon him with almost
superhuman patience and courage. He looked upon himself as a martyr
in a holy cause, and as such he was regarded by Catholic public
opinion. His deed was praised both by Granvelle and Parma, and
Philip bestowed a patent of nobility on his family, and exempted
them from taxation.

In Holland there was deep and general grief at the tragic ending
of the great leader, who had for so many years been the fearless
and indefatigable champion of their resistance to civil and
religious tyranny. He was accorded a public funeral and buried with
great[pg.81] pomp in the Nieuwe Kerk at Delft,
where a stately memorial, recording his many high qualities and
services, was erected to his memory.

William of Orange was but fifty-one years of age when his life
was thus prematurely ended, and though he had been much aged by the
cares and anxieties of a crushing responsibility, his physicians
declared that at the time of his death he was perfectly healthy and
that he might have been spared to carry on his work for many years,
had he escaped the bullets of the assassin. But it was not to be.
It is possible that he should be reckoned in the number of those
whose manner of death sets the seal to a life-work of continuous
self-sacrifice. The title of “Father of his Country,” which was
affectionately given to him by Hollanders of every class, was never
more deservedly bestowed, for it was in the Holland that his
exertions had freed and that he had made the impregnable fortress
of the resistance to Spain that he ever felt more at home than
anywhere else. It was in the midst of his own people that he laid
down the life that had been consecrated to their cause. As a
general he had never been successful. As a statesman he had failed
to accomplish that union of the Netherlands, north and south, which
at one triumphant moment had seemed to be well-nigh realised by the
Pacification of Ghent. But he had by the spirit that he had aroused
in Holland and its sister province of Zeeland created a barrier
against Spanish domination in the northern Netherlands which was
not to be broken down.

CHAPTER VI

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

At the moment of the assassination of William the Silent it
might well have seemed to an impartial observer that the
restoration of the authority of the Spanish king over the whole of
the Netherlands was only a question of time. The military skill and
the statecraft of Alexander Farnese were making slow but sure
progress in the reconquest of Flanders and Brabant. Despite the
miserable inadequacy of the financial support he received from
Spain, the governor-general, at the head of a numerically small but
thoroughly efficient and well-disciplined army, was capturing town
after town. In 1583 Dunkirk, Nieuport, Lindhoven, Steenbergen,
Zutphen and Sas-van-Gent fell; in the spring of 1584 Ypres and
Bruges were already in Spanish hands, and on the very day of
William’s death the fort of Liefkenshoek on the Scheldt, one of the
outlying defences of Antwerp, was taken by assault. In August
Dendermonde, in September Ghent, surrendered. All West Flanders,
except the sea-ports of Ostend and Sluis, had in the early autumn
of 1584 been reduced to the obedience of the king. The campaign of
the following year was to be even more successful. Brussels, the
seat of government, was compelled by starvation to capitulate,
March 10; Mechlin was taken, July 19; and finally Antwerp, after a
memorable siege, in which Parma displayed masterly skill and
resource, passed once more into the possession of the Spaniards.
The fall of this great town was a very heavy blow to the patriot
cause, and it was likewise the ruin of Antwerp itself. A very large
part of its most enterprising inhabitants left their homes rather
than abjure their religious faith and took refuge in Holland and
Zeeland, or fled across the Rhine into Germany. Access to the sea
down the Scheldt was closed by the fleets of the Sea Beggars, and
the commerce and industry of the first commercial port of western
Europe passed to Amsterdam and Middelburg. Meanwhile there had been
no signs of weakness or of yielding on the part of the sturdy
burghers of Holland and Zeeland. On the[pg.83] fatal July 10, 1584,
the Estates of Holland were in session at Delft. They at once took
energetic action under the able leadership of Paul Buys, Advocate
of Holland, and John van Oldenbarneveldt, Pensionary of Rotterdam.
They passed a resolution “to uphold the good cause with God’s help
without sparing gold or blood.” Despatches were at once sent to the
Estates of the other provinces, to the town councils and to the
military and naval commanders, affirming their own determined
attitude and exhorting all those who had accepted the leadership of
the murdered Prince of Orange “to bear themselves manfully and
piously without abatement of zeal on account of the aforesaid
misfortune.” Their calm courage at such a moment of crisis
reassured men’s minds. There was no panic. Steps were at once taken
for carrying on the government in Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.
Stimulated by the example of Holland, the States-General likewise
took prompt action. On August 18 a Council of State was appointed
to exercise provisionally the executive powers of sovereignty,
consisting of eighteen members, four from Holland, three each from
Zeeland and Friesland, two from Utrecht and six from Brabant and
Flanders. Of this body Maurice of Nassau, William’s seventeen
year-old son, was nominated first Councillor, and a pension of
30,000 guilders per annum was granted him. At the same time Louise
de Coligny was invited to take up her residence in Holland and
suitable provision was made for her. William Lewis, son of Count
John of Nassau, was elected Stadholder of Friesland. Count
Nieuwenaar was Stadholder of Gelderland and shortly afterwards also
of Utrecht and Overyssel. Owing to the youth of Maurice the
question as to whether he should become Count of Holland and
Zeeland or be elected Stadholder was left in abeyance until it
should be settled to which of two foreign rulers the sovereignty of
the provinces, now that Anjou was dead, should be offered.

In the revolted provinces the responsible leaders were at this
time practically unanimous in their opinion that any attempt on
their part to carry on the struggle against the power of Spain
without foreign assistance was hopeless; and it was held that such
assistance could only be obtained by following in the footsteps of
William and offering to confer the overlordship of the provinces on
another sovereign in the place of Philip II. There were but two
possible candidates, Henry III of France and Elizabeth of
England.[pg.84]

There were objections to both, but the rapid successes of Parma
made it necessary to take action. The partisans of a French
alliance were in the majority, despite the efforts of a strong
opposition headed by Paul Buys; and an embassy (January, 1585) was
despatched to Paris to offer conditionally to the French king the
Protectorship of Holland and Zeeland and sovereignty over the other
provinces. The negotiations went on for a couple of months, but
Henry III finally declined the offer. Another embassy was sent,
July, 1585, to England, but Elizabeth refused absolutely to accept
the sovereignty. She however was not averse to the proposal that
she should despatch a body of troops to the armed assistance of the
provinces, provided that adequate guarantees were given for the
outlay. She was afraid of Philip II and, though she had no love for
men who were rebels to their lawful sovereign, was quite willing to
use them for her own ends. Her motives therefore were mixed and
purely self-interested; nevertheless it is doubtful if the
negotiations would have led to any definite result, had not the
news of the fall of Antwerp made both parties feel that this was no
time for haggling or procrastination. Elizabeth therefore promised
to send at once 6000 troops under the command of a “gentleman of
quality,” who should bear the title of governor-general. He was to
co-operate with the Council of State (on which two Englishmen were
to sit) in restoring order and in maintaining and defending the
ancient rights and privileges of the provinces. The
governor-general and all other officials were to take an oath of
fealty both to the States-General and to the queen. The towns of
Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens were to be handed
over in pledge to Elizabeth for the repayment of expenses and
received English garrisons. They were known as “the cautionary
towns.”

At the end of October the States were informed that the choice
of the queen had fallen upon her favourite, Robert Dudley, Earl of
Leicester, and that he would shortly set out for the Netherlands.
Holland and Zeeland, ever jealous of foreign interference with
their rights and privileges, resolved now to forestall the arrival
of the English governor-general by appointing Maurice of Nassau,
with the title of “Excellency,” to the offices of Stadholder and
Admiral and Captain-General of both provinces; and the Count of
Hohenlo was nominated (Maurice being still little more than a boy)
to the actual command of the State’s forces. Leicester set sail
from Harwich[pg.85] accompanied by a fleet of fifty
vessels and landed at Flushing on December 19. He met everywhere
with an enthusiastic reception. The States-General were eager to
confer large powers upon him. Practically he was invested with the
same authority as the former regent, Mary of Hungary, with the
reservation that the States-General and the Provincial Estates
should meet at their own instance, that the present stadholders
should continue in office, and that appointments to vacant offices
should be made from two or three persons nominated by the
Provincial Estates. A new Council of State was created which, as
previously agreed, included two Englishmen. On February 4, 1586,
Leicester’s government was solemnly inaugurated in the presence of
Maurice of Nassau and the States-General, and he accepted the title
of “Excellency.” Elizabeth on hearing this was very angry and even
threatened to recall Leicester, and she sent Lord Heneage to
express both to the States-General and the governor-general her
grave displeasure at what had taken place. She bade Leicester
restrict himself to the functions that she had assigned to him, and
it was not until July that she was sufficiently appeased to allow
him to be addressed as “Excellency.”

All this was galling to Leicester’s pride and ambition, and did
not tend to improve his relations with the States. An English
governor would in any case have had a difficult task, and Leicester
had neither tact nor capacity as a statesman, and no pretensions as
a military leader. He possessed no knowledge of the institutions of
the country or the character of the people, and was ignorant of the
Dutch language. The measures he took and the arbitrary way in which
he tried to enforce them, soon brought him face to face with the
stubborn resistance of the Estates of Holland under the leadership
of Oldenbarneveldt. In April, 1586, he issued a very stringent
placard forbidding all traffic with the enemy’s lands and more
especially the supplying of the enemy with grain. He meant it well,
for he had been informed that the cutting-off of this commerce,
which he regarded as illicit, would deprive the Spaniards of the
necessaries of life, and Parma’s position would become desperate.
This carrying trade had, however, for long been a source of much
profit to the merchants and shipowners of Holland and Zeeland;
indeed it supplied no small part of the resources by which those
two provinces had equipped the fleets and troops by which they had
defended themselves against the efforts of the Spanish[pg.86] king.
Two years before this the States-General had tried to place an
embargo on the traffic in grain, but the powerful town-council of
Amsterdam had refused obedience and the Estates of Holland
supported them in their action. The deputies of the inland
provinces, which had suffered most from the Spanish armies, were
jealous of the prosperity of the maritime States, and regarded this
trade with the Spaniard as being carried on to their injury. But
Holland and Zeeland supplied the funds without which resistance
would long since have been impossible, and they claimed moreover,
as sovereign provinces, the right to regulate their trade affairs.
The edict remained a dead-letter, for there was no power to enforce
it.

The governor made a still greater mistake when, in his annoyance
at the opposition of the Hollanders, he courted the democratic
anti-Holland party in Utrecht, which had as its leader the
ultra-Calvinist stadholder, Nieuwenaar, and caused one of his
confidants, a Brabanter, Gerard Prounick, surnamed Deventer, to be
elected burgomaster of Utrecht, although as a foreigner he was
disqualified from holding that office. An even more arbitrary act
was his creation of a Chamber of Finance armed with inquisitorial
powers, thus invading the rights of the Provincial Estates and
depriving the Council of State of one of its most important
functions. To make matters worse, he appointed Nieuwenaar to
preside over the new Chamber, with a Brabanter, Jacques Reingoud,
as treasurer-general, and a Fleming, Daniel de Burchgrave, as
auditor. The Estates of Holland, under the guidance of
Oldenbarneveldt, prepared themselves to resist stubbornly this
attempt to thrust upon them a new tyranny.

As a military leader Leicester was quite unfitted to oppose
successfully such a general as Parma. Both commanders were in truth
much hampered by the preparations that were being made by Philip
for the invasion of England. The king could spare Parma but little
money for the pay of his troops, and his orders were that the
Spanish forces in the Netherlands should be held in reserve and
readiness for embarkation, as soon as the Great Armada should hold
command of the Channel. England was the first objective. When its
conquest was accomplished that of the rebel provinces would
speedily follow. On the other hand Elizabeth, always niggardly, was
little disposed in face of the threatened danger to dissipate her
resources by any needless expenditure. Leicester[pg.87]
therefore found himself at the head of far too small a force to
deal any effective blows at the enemy. He succeeded in capturing
Doesburg, but failed to take Zutphen. It was in a gallant effort to
prevent a Spanish convoy from entering that town that Sir Philip
Sidney met his death at the combat of Warnsfeld (Sept. 22, 1586).
An important fort facing Zutphen was however stormed, and here
Leicester left Sir Robert Yorke with a strong garrison, and at the
same time sent Sir William Stanley with 1200 men to be governor of
Deventer. These appointments gave rise to much criticism that
proved later to be fully justified, for both these officers were
Catholics and had formerly been in the Spanish service. Leicester
had also taken other steps that were ill-judged. West Friesland had
for many years been united to Holland and was known as the
North-Quarter. The governor-general, however, appointed Sonoy
Stadholder of West Friesland, and was thus infringing the rights
and jurisdiction of Maurice of Nassau. Maurice also held the post
of Admiral-General of Holland and Zeeland, but Leicester took it
upon himself to create three distinct Admiralty Colleges, those of
Holland, Zeeland, and the North-Quarter, thus further dividing
authority in a land where greater unity was the chief thing to be
aimed at. Leicester was equally unwise in the part he took in
regard to religious matters. Oldenbarneveldt, Paul Buys and the
great majority of burgher-regents in Holland belonged to the
moderate or, as it was called, the “libertine” party, to which
William the Silent had adhered and whose principles of toleration
he had strongly upheld. Leicester, largely influenced by spite
against Oldenbarneveldt and the Hollanders for their opposition to
his edict about trade with the enemy and to his appointment of
Sonoy, threw himself into the arms of the extreme Calvinists, who
were at heart as fanatical persecutors as the Spanish inquisitors
themselves. These “precisian” zealots held, by the
governor-general’s permission and under his protection, a synod at
Dort, June, 1586, and endeavoured to organise the Reformed Church
in accordance with their strict principles of exclusiveness.

By this series of maladroit acts Leicester had made himself so
unpopular and distrusted in Holland that the Estates of that
predominant province lost no opportunity of inflicting rebuffs upon
him. Stung by the opposition he met and weary of a thankless task,
the governor determined at the end of November to pay a visit[pg.88]
to England. The Council of State was left in charge of the
administration during his absence.

His departure had the very important effect of bringing the
question of State-rights acutely to the front. The dislike and
distrust felt by the Hollanders towards the English
governor-general was greatly increased by the treachery of Yorke
and Stanley, who delivered the fort at Zutphen and the town of
Deventer, with the defence of which they had been charged, into the
hands of the Spaniards. The town of Gelder and the fort at Wouw
were likewise betrayed, and there can be small doubt that, had
Parma at this time been able to take advantage of the dissensions
in the ranks of his adversaries, he would have met with little
effectual resistance to his arms. His whole attention was, however,
centred in preparations for the proposed invasion of England.
Leicester had no sooner left the country than the Estates of
Holland, under the strong leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, took
measures to assert their right to regulate their own affairs,
independently of the Council of State. A levy of troops was made
(in the pay of the province of Holland), who were required to take
an oath to the Provincial Estates and the stadholder. To Maurice
the title of “Prince” was given; and Sonoy in the North-Quarter and
all the commanders of fortified places were compelled to place
themselves under his orders. The States-General, in which the
influence of Holland and its chief representative, Oldenbarneveldt,
was overpoweringly great, upheld the Provincial Estates in the
measures they were taking. As a result of their action the trade
restrictions were practically repealed, the Council of State was
reconstituted, and a strong indictment of Leicester’s conduct and
administration was drawn up in the name of the States-General and
forwarded to the absent governor in England.

Elizabeth was indignant at the language of this document, but at
this particular time the dangers which were threatening her throne
and people were too serious for her to take any steps to alienate
the States. It was her obvious policy to support them in their
resistance, and to keep, if possible, Parma’s forces occupied in
the Netherlands. Accordingly Leicester returned to his post, July
1587, but in an altogether wrong spirit. He knew that he had a
strong body of partisans in Utrecht, Friesland and elsewhere, for
he had posed as the friend of the people’s rights against the
nobles and those burgher-aristocracies in the cities in whose hands
all real[pg.89] power rested, and by his attitude in
religious matters he had won for himself the support of the
Calvinist preachers. His agents, Deventer in Utrecht, Aysma in
Friesland and Sonoy in the North-Quarter, were able men, who could
count on the help of the democracy, whom they flattered. So
Leicester came back with the determination to override the
opposition of the Estates of Holland and compel their submission to
his will. But he found that he only succeeded in making that
opposition more resolute. His attempts to overthrow the supremacy
of the “regents” in Amsterdam, Leyden, Enkhuizen and other towns
were complete failures. Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were supreme in
Holland and Zeeland; and the power of the purse gave to Holland a
controlling voice in the States-General. The position of Leicester
was shaken also by his inability to relieve Sluis, which important
seaport fell after a long siege into Parma’s hands, August 5. Its
capture was attributed by rumour, which in this case had no
foundation, to the treachery of the English governor and garrison.
Moreover it was discovered that for some months secret peace
negotiations had been passing between the English government and
Parma; and this aroused violent suspicions that the Netherlands
were merely being used as pawns in English policy, and alienated
from the governor-general the sympathy of the preachers, who had
been his strongest supporters. Humiliated and broken in spirit,
Leicester, after many bickerings and recriminations, finally left
the Netherlands (December 10), though his formal resignation of his
post did not reach the States-General until the following April.
Lord Willoughby was placed in command of the English troops.

The year 1588 was the beginning of a decade full of fate for the
Dutch Republic. The departure of Leicester left the seven provinces
of the Union of Utrecht weak, divided, torn by factions, without
allies, the country to the east of the Yssel and to the south of
the Scheldt and the Waal already in the hands of the enemy.
Moreover the armed forces of that enemy were far stronger than
their own and under the command of a consummate general. But this
was the year of the Spanish Armada, and Parma’s offensive
operations were, by the strictest orders from Madrid, otherwise
directed. And Elizabeth on her side, though highly offended at the
treatment which her favourite, Leicester, had received from the
Hollanders, was too astute to quarrel at such a[pg.90] moment
with a people whose ships kept a strict blockade in the Scheldt and
before the Flemish harbours. Thus a respite was obtained for the
States at this critical time, which was turned to good account and
was of vital import for their constitutional development. The
Leicestrian period, despite its record of incompetence and failure,
had however the distinction of being the period which for good or
for evil gave birth to the republic of the United Netherlands, as
we know it in history. The curious, amorphous, hydra-headed system
of government, which was to subsist for some two centuries, was in
its origin the direct result of the confused welter of conflicting
forces, which was the legacy of Leicester’s rule. As a preliminary
to a right understanding of the political system, which was now,
more by accidental force of circumstances than by design,
developing into a permanent constitution, it will be necessary to
trace the events of the years which immediately followed the
departure of Leicester, and which under the influence and by the
co-operation of three striking personalities were to mould the
future of the Dutch republic.

Those three personalities were John van Oldenbarneveldt, Maurice
of Nassau and his cousin William Lewis of Nassau, the Stadholder of
Friesland. Born in 1547, Oldenbarneveldt, after studying
Jurisprudence at Louvain, Bourges and Heidelberg, became a devoted
adherent of William the Silent and took part in the defence of
Haarlem and of Leyden. His abilities, however, fitted him to take a
prominent part as a politician and administrator rather than as a
soldier; and his career may be said to have begun by his
appointment to the post of Pensionary of Rotterdam in 1576. In this
capacity his industry and his talent speedily won for him a
commanding position in the Estates of Holland, and he became one of
the Prince of Orange’s confidential friends and advisers. In 1586
he was appointed Advocate of Holland in succession to Paul Buys.
This office included the duties of legal adviser, secretary and
likewise in a sense that of “Speaker” to the Provincial Estates. In
addition to all this he was the mouthpiece in the States-General of
the deputation representing the Provincial Estates, and exercised
in that assembly all the authority attaching to the man who spoke
in the name of Holland. At this time of transition, by his
predominance alike in his own province of Holland and in the
States-General, he was able to secure for the general policy of the
Union,[pg.91] especially in the conduct of foreign
affairs, a continuity of aim and purpose that enabled the
loosely-cemented and mutually jealous confederacy of petty
sovereign states to tide-over successfully the critical years which
followed the departure of Leicester, and to acquire a sense of
national unity.

The brain and the diplomatic skill of the great statesman would,
however, have been of little avail without the aid of the military
abilities of Maurice of Nassau. Maurice was twenty years of age
when Leicester left Holland. He was a man very different from his
father in opinions and in the character of his talents. Maurice had
nothing of his father’s tolerance in religious matters or his
subtle skill in diplomacy. He was a born soldier, but no
politician, and had no wish to interfere in affairs of State. He
had the highest respect for Oldenbarneveldt and complete confidence
in his capacity as a statesman, and he was at all times ready to
use the executive powers, which he exercised by virtue of the
numerous posts he was speedily called upon to fill, for the
carrying out of Oldenbarneveldt’s policy; while the Advocate on his
side found in the strong arm of the successful general the
instrument that he needed for the maintenance of his supremacy in
the conduct of the civil government. Already in 1587 Maurice was
Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland. In 1588 he became
Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union with the control
and supervision of all the armed forces of the Provinces by sea and
by land. The death of Nieuwenaar in the following year created a
vacancy in the stadholderates of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel.
Maurice was in each province elected as Nieuwenaar’s successor. The
Advocate therefore and the Prince, through the close accord which
was for many years to subsist between them, gathered thus into
their hands (except in Friesland) practically the entire
administrative, executive and military powers of the United
Provinces and by their harmonious co-operation with William Lewis,
the wise and capable Stadholder of Friesland, were able to give
something of real unity to a group of states, each claiming to be a
sovereign entity, and to give them the outward semblance of a
federal republic. There was no “eminent head,” but the sovereignty
in reality, if not in name, was vested during the period with which
we have now to deal in this triumvirate.

Circumstances provided a favourable field for the display of
the[pg.92] youthful Maurice’s military abilities.
In 1589 the assassination of Henry III placed Henry of Navarre on
the throne of France. The accession of the brilliant Huguenot
leader led to civil war; and the Catholic opposition was encouraged
and supported by Philip II, who regarded Henry IV as a menace and
danger to the Spanish power. Parma, therefore, whose active
prosecution of the war against the rebel provinces had been so long
hindered by having to hold his army in readiness for the projected
invasion of England, found himself, after the failure and
destruction of the Armada, in no better position for a campaign in
the northern Netherlands. Disappointment and false charges against
him brought on a serious illness, and on his recovery he received
orders to conduct an expedition into France. William Lewis of
Nassau had for sometime been urging upon the States-General that
the time for remaining upon the strict defensive was past, and
that, when the enemy’s efforts were weakened and distracted, the
best defence was a vigorous offensive. At first he spoke to deaf
ears, but he found now a powerful supporter in Maurice, and the two
stadholders prevailed. They had now by careful and assiduous
training created a strong and well-disciplined army for the service
of the States. This army was made up by contingents of various
nationalities, English, Scottish, French and German as well as
Netherlanders. But the material was on the whole excellent, and the
entire force was welded together by confidence in their
leaders.

In 1590 the capture of Breda by a ruse (seventy men hidden
beneath a covering of peat making their entrance into the town and
opening the gates to their comrades outside) was a good omen for
the campaign that was planned for 1591. For the first time Maurice
had an opportunity for showing his genius for war and especially
for siege warfare. By rapid movements he took first Zutphen, then
Deventer and Delfzijl, and relieved the fort of Knodsenburg (near
Nijmwegen). Thus successful on the eastern frontier, the stadholder
hurried to Zeeland and captured Hulst, the key to the land of Waas.
He then turned his steps again to the east and appearing suddenly
before Nijmwegen made himself master of this important city. Such a
succession of brilliant triumphs established Maurice’s fame, and to
a lesser degree that of William Lewis, whose co-operation and
advice were of the greatest service to the younger man. This was
markedly the case in the following year (1592) when the two[pg.93]
stadholders set to work to expel the Spaniards from the two
strongly fortified towns of Steenwijk and Coevorden, whose
possession enabled a strong force under the veteran Verdugo to
retain their hold upon Friesland. The States army was not at its
full strength, for the English contingent under Sir Francis Vere
had been sent to France; and Verdugo was confident that any attempt
to capture these well-garrisoned fortresses was doomed to failure.
He had to learn how great was the scientific skill and resource of
Maurice in the art of beleaguering. Steenwijk after an obstinate
defence capitulated on June 5. Coevorden was then invested and in
its turn had to surrender, on September 12. During this time Parma
had been campaigning with no great success in northern France. In
the autumn he returned to the Netherlands suffering from the
effects of a wound and broken in spirit. Never did any man fill a
difficult and trying post with more success and zeal than Alexander
Farnese during the sixteen years of his governor-generalship.
Nevertheless Philip was afraid of his nephew’s talents and
ambition, and he despatched the Count of Fuentes with a letter of
recall. It was never delivered. Parma set out to meet him, but fell
ill and died at Spa, December 2, 1592. He appointed the Count of
Mansfeld to take his place, until the Archduke Ernest of Austria,
who had been appointed to succeed him, arrived in the
Netherlands.

The campaign of 1593 was marked by the taking of
Geertruidenberg, a fortress which barred the free access of the
Hollanders and Zeelanders to the inland waters. The science which
Maurice displayed in the siege of this town greatly increased his
renown. In the following year the stadholders turned their
attention to the north-east corner of the land, which was still in
the possession of the Spaniards. After a siege of two months
Groningen surrendered; and the city with the surrounding district
was by the terms of the capitulation—known as “The Treaty of
Reduction”—admitted as a province into the Union under the
name of Stad en Landen. William Lewis was appointed
stadholder, and Drente was placed under his jurisdiction. The
northern Netherlands were now cleared of the enemy, and Maurice at
the conclusion of the campaign made a triumphal entry into the
Hague amidst general rejoicing. William Lewis lost no time in
taking steps to establish Calvinism as the only recognised form of
faith in his new government. His strong principles did not allow
him to be tolerant, and to Catholicism he[pg.94] was a convinced foe.
Everywhere throughout the United Provinces the reformed religion
was now dominant, and its adherents alone could legally take part
in public worship.

In January, 1595, Henry IV declared war against Spain and was
anxious for an alliance with the States against the common enemy.
The Archduke Ernest, on whose coming into the Netherlands great
hopes had been placed, found himself now in a difficult position
with hostile armies threatening from both sides and no hope of
efficient financial or other support from Spain. He was instructed
therefore to enter into negotiations at the Hague with a view to
the conclusion of a peace, based upon the terms of the Pacification
of Ghent. But there was never any prospect of an agreement being
reached; and the sudden death of the archduke (February 20,1595)
brought the negotiations to an end. Archduke Ernest was succeeded
by the Count of Fuentes as governor ad interim. Fuentes
proved himself to be a strong and capable commander; and the summer
was marked by a series of successes against the hostile forces both
of the French and the Netherlanders. There was no decisive
encounter, but the Spanish forces foiled the efforts of their
adversaries to effect an invasion or capture any towns.

The Cardinal Archduke Albert arrived at Brussels to replace
Fuentes in January, 1596. Albert was the favourite nephew of King
Philip, and had been brought up at Madrid. Although an
ecclesiastic, he proved himself to be a statesman and soldier of
more than ordinary capacity. It was intended that he should, as
soon as the Pope’s consent could be obtained, divest himself of his
orders and marry his cousin the Infanta Isabel. The bankrupt
condition of Spain prevented Philip from furnishing the archduke
with adequate financial help on entering upon his governorship, but
Albert was provided with some money, and he found in the
Netherlands the well-disciplined and war-tried force of which
Fuentes had made such good use in the previous campaign. He was
anxious to emulate that general’s success, and as the veteran
leaders, Mondragon and Verdugo, had both died, he gave the command
to the Seigneur de Rosne, a French refugee. This man was a
commander of skill and enterprise, and special circumstances
enabled him by two brilliant offensive strokes to capture first
Calais and afterwards Hulst. Hulst was only taken after a severe
struggle, in which De Rosne himself fell.[pg.95]

The special circumstances which favoured these operations were
brought about by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between
France, England and the States. This treaty was the result of
prolonged negotiations; it was of short duration and its conditions
were far from favourable to the United Provinces, but it was of
great importance from the fact that for the first time the
new-fledged republic was recognised by the neighbouring sovereigns
of France and England as an independent state and was admitted into
alliance on terms of equality. It was, however, only with
difficulty and through the insistence of Henry IV that Elizabeth
was induced to acknowledge the independent status of the rebel
provinces. In return the republic was required to keep up a force
of 8000 men for service in the Netherlands, and to despatch 4000
men to act with the French army in northern France—this
auxiliary force to include the five English regiments in the
States’ service. Thus Maurice was deprived of a considerable part
of his army and obliged to act on the defensive. Elizabeth also
insisted upon the carrying out of Leicester’s placard forbidding
trade with the enemy. This clause of the treaty was very
unpalatable to Amsterdam and the Hollanders generally, and only a
sullen acquiescence was given to it. From the first it was
systematically evaded. The English government on their part
undertook to support the French king with a force equal in strength
to that furnished by the Provinces, i.e. 4000 men, but at
the same time a secret treaty was drawn up by which Henry agreed to
a reduction of the English troops by one-half. This piece of
underhand work was in due time discovered by the States, who saw
that their allies were not to be trusted and that they must be on
the watch lest their interests should be sacrificed to the selfish
policy of France. The issue showed that Henry IV was in fact ready
to make terms with Spain, as soon as it was to his advantage to do
so. Meanwhile in 1597 the French king, by advancing in force into
Picardy, drew upon this frontier the chief attention of the
Spaniards; and Maurice seized the opportunity that was offered to
him to conduct an offensive campaign with signal success.

He began the year brilliantly by surprising in January, while
still in its winter quarters, a Spanish force of 4500 near
Turnhout. More than half the force was destroyed. On the side of
the Netherlands eight men only fell. With the spring began a series
of sieges; and, one after the other, Rheinberg, Meurs, Groenloo,
Breedevoort,[pg.96] Enschede, Ootmarsum, Oldenzaal and
Lingen were captured. Gelderland, Overyssel and Drente were
entirely freed from the presence of the enemy. With the opening of
1598 Henry IV and Philip II entered upon negotiations for a peace.
The French king felt the necessity of a respite from war in order
to reorganise the resources of his country, exhausted by a long
continuance of civil strife; and Philip was ill and already feeling
his end approaching. The States strove hard to prevent what they
regarded as desertion, and two embassies were despatched to France
and to England to urge the maintenance of the alliance.
Oldenbarneveldt himself headed the French mission, but he failed to
turn Henry from his purpose. A treaty of peace between France and
Spain was signed at Vervins, May 2, 1598. Oldenbarneveldt went from
Paris to England and was more successful. Elizabeth bargained
however for the repayment of her loan by annual installments, and
for armed assistance both by land and sea should an attack be made
by the Spaniards on England. The queen, however, made two
concessions. Henceforth only one English representative was to have
a seat in the Council of State; and all the English troops in the
Netherlands, including the garrisons of the cautionary towns, were
to take an oath of allegiance to the States.

This year saw the accomplishment of a project on which the
Spanish king had for some time set his heart—the marriage of
the Cardinal Archduke Albert to his cousin the Infanta Isabel Clara
Eugenia, and the erection of the Netherlands into an independent
sovereignty under their joint rule. Philip hoped in this way to
provide suitably for a well-beloved daughter and at the same time,
by the grant of apparent independence to the Netherland provinces,
to secure their allegiance to the new sovereigns. The use of the
word “apparent” is justified, for provision was made in the deed of
cession that the Netherlands should revert to the Spanish crown in
case the union should prove childless; and there was a secret
agreement that the chief fortresses should still be garrisoned by
Spanish troops and that the archdukes, as they were officially
styled, should recognise the suzerainty of the King of Spain.
Philip did not actually live to
carry his plan into execution. His
death took place on September 13, 1598. But all the necessary
arrangements for the marriage and the transfer of sovereignty had
already been made. Albert, having first divested himself of
his[pg.97] ecclesiastical dignities, was married
by proxy to Isabel at Ferrara in November. It was not until the end
of the following year that the new rulers made their joyeuse
entrée into Brussels, but their marriage marks the
beginning of a fresh stage in the history of the Netherlands.
Albert and Isabel were wise and capable, and they succeeded in
gaining the affection and willing allegiance of the southern
provinces. The States-General of the revolted provinces of the
north had, however, already enjoyed for some years a real
independence won by suffering and struggle and they showed no
disposition to meet the overtures of the archdukes. They were
resolved to have no further connection with Spain or with Spanish
rulers, and from this time forward the cleavage in character,
sentiment, and above all in religion, between north and south was
to become, as time went on, more and more accentuated. The Dutch
republic and the Spanish Netherlands were henceforth destined to
pursue their separate course along widely divergent paths.

The ten years which had elapsed between the departure of
Leicester and the advent of Albert and Isabel had witnessed a truly
marvellous transformation in the condition of the rebel provinces,
and especially of Holland and Zeeland. Gradually they had been
freed from the presence of the Spaniard, while at the same time the
Spanish yoke had been firmly riveted upon Flanders and Brabant.
These provinces were now devastated and ruined. The quays of
Antwerp were deserted, the industries of Ghent and Bruges
destroyed. The most enterprising and skilful of their merchants and
artisans had fled over the frontier into Holland or across the sea
into England. Holland and Zeeland were thronged with refugees,
Flemings and Brabanters, French Huguenots and numerous Spanish and
Portuguese Jews, driven out by the pitiless persecution of Philip
II. The Hollanders and Zeelanders had long been a seafaring people,
who had derived the chief part of their wealth from their fisheries
and their carrying trade; and this influx of new and vigorous
blood, merchants, traders, and textile workers, bringing with them
their knowledge, skill and energy, aroused such a phenomenal
outburst of maritime and commercial activity and adventure as the
world had never seen before. The fleets of the Hollanders and
Zeelanders had during the whole of the war of independence been the
main defence of those provinces against Spanish invasion; but,
great as had been the services they had[pg.98] rendered, it was the
carrying-trade which had furnished the rebel states with the sinews
of war, and of this a large part had been derived from that very
trading with the enemy which Leicester had striven in vain to
prevent. The Spaniards and Portuguese were dependent upon the Dutch
traders for the supply of many necessaries of life; and thus
Spanish gold was made to pay for the support of the war which was
waged against the Spanish king. The dues in connection with this
trade, known as licences and convoys, alone furnished large sums to
replenish the war-chest; and it is said that from 25,000 to 30,000
seamen found employment by it.

Amsterdam during this decade had been rapidly growing in
importance and it was soon to be the first seaport in the world. It
had become the emporium of the Baltic trade. In 1601 it is
stated that between 800 and 900 ships left its quays in three days,
carrying commodities to the Baltic ports. They came back laden with
corn and other “east-sea” goods, which they then distributed in
French, Portuguese and Spanish havens, and even as far as Italy and
the Levant. Ship-building went on apace at Enkhuizen, Hoorn and
other towns on the Zuyder Zee; and Zaandam was soon to become a
centre of the timber trade. In Zeeland, Middelburg, through the
enterprise of an Antwerp refugee of French extraction, by name
Balthazar de Moucheron, was second only to Amsterdam as a sea-port,
while Dordrecht and Rotterdam were also busy with shipping.

The energies of the Dutch at this springtide of their national
life were far from being confined to European, waters. Dutch
sailors already knew the way to the East-Indies round the Cape of
Good Hope through employment on Portuguese vessels; and the
trade-routes by which the Spaniards brought the treasures of the
New World across the Atlantic were likewise familiar to them and
for a similar reason. The East-Indies had for the merchants of
Holland and Zeeland, ever keenly on the look-out for fresh markets,
a peculiar attraction. At first the Cape route was thought to be
too dangerous, and several attempts were made to discover a
north-west passage along the coast of Siberia. Balthazar de
Moucheron was the pioneer in these northern latitudes. He
established a regular traffic with the Russians by way of the White
Sea, and had a factory (built in 1584) at Archangel. Through his
instances, aided by those of the famous geographer Petrus Plancius
(likewise a refugee from Antwerp), an expedition was fitted out and
despatched in 1594 to[pg.99] try to sail round northern Asia, but
it was driven back after passing through the Waigat by ice and
storms. A like fate befell a second expedition in the following
year. Discouraged, but still not despairing, a third fleet set out
in 1596 under the command of Jacob van Heemskerk with William
Barendtsz as pilot. Forced to winter in Spitsbergen, after terrible
sufferings, Heemskerk returned home in the autumn of 1597 with the
remnant of his crews. Barendtsz was one of those who perished. This
was the last effort in this direction, for already a body of
Amsterdam merchants had formed a company for trafficking to India
by the Cape; and four ships had sailed, April 2, 1596, under the
command of Cornelis Houtman, a native of Gouda. A certain Jan
Huyghen van Linschoten, who had been in the Portuguese service, had
published in 1595 a book containing a description from personal
knowledge of the route to the East and the character of the
Portuguese commerce. It was the information contained in this work
that led the Amsterdam merchants to venture their money upon
Houtman’s expedition, which Linschoten himself accompanied as
guide. They reached Madagascar, Java and the Moluccas, and, after
much suffering and many losses by sickness, what was left of the
little fleet reached home in July, 1597. The rich cargo they
brought back, though not enough to defray expenses, proved an
incentive to further efforts. Three companies were formed at
Amsterdam, two at Rotterdam, one at Delft and two in Zeeland, for
trading in the East-Indies, all vying with one another in their
eagerness to make large profits from these regions of fabled
wealth, hitherto monopolised by the Portuguese. One expedition sent
out by two Amsterdam companies under the command of Jacob van Neck
and Wybrand van Waerwyck was very successful and came back in
fifteen months richly laden with East-Indian products. The year
1598 was one of great commercial activity. Two-and-twenty large
vessels voyaged to the East-Indies; others made their way to the
coasts of Guinea, Guiana and Brazil; and one daring captain,
Olivier van Noort, sailing through the Straits of Magellan, crossed
the Pacific. It was in this year that Philip II prohibited by
decree all trading in Spain with the Dutch, and all the Dutch ships
in the harbours of the Peninsula were confiscated. But the Spanish
trade was no longer of consequence to the Hollanders and
Zeelanders. They had sought and found compensation elsewhere.[pg.100]

The small companies formed to carry out these ventures in the
far-Eastern seas continued to grow in number, and by the very
keenness of their competition threatened each other’s enterprises
with ruin. In these circumstances the States-General and the
Estates of Holland determined, under the leadership of
Oldenbarneveldt, to take a step which was to be fraught with very
important consequences. The rival companies were urged to form
themselves into a single corporation to which exclusive rights
would be given for trading in the East-Indies. Such a proposal was
in direct contradiction to that principle of free trade which had
hitherto been dear to the Netherlanders, and there was much
opposition, and many obstacles had to be overcome owing to the
jealousies of the various provinces, towns and bodies of merchants
who were interested. But at length the patience and statesmanship
of Oldenbarneveldt overcame all difficulties, and on March 20,1601,
a charter was issued creating the United East-India Company and
giving it a monopoly of the East-India trade (for 21 years) with
all lands east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of
Magellan. The executive control was vested in a College known as
the Seventeen. Extensive sovereign privileges were conferred upon
the company and exercised by the Seventeen in the name of the
States-General. They might make treaties with native rulers and
potentates, erect forts for the protection of their factories,
appoint governors and officials with administrative and judicial
functions, and enlist troops, but these officials and troops were
required to take an oath of allegiance to the States-General. The
States-General themselves became “participants” by investing the
25,000 pounds, which the company had paid them for the grant of the
charter. The capital speedily reached the amount of six and a half
million guilders.

The warlike operations of the year 1599 were uneventful and in
the main defensive, except on the eastern frontier where the
Spanish forces under the command of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza,
captured Wesel and Rheinberg. The new rulers of the Netherlands,
Albert and Isabel, did not make their entry into Brussels until the
end of 1599; and almost before they had had time to organise the
new government and gain firm possession of the reins of power in
the Belgic provinces, they found themselves confronted with a
serious danger. The seaport of Dunkirk had for many years been a
nest of pirates, who preyed upon Dutch commerce[pg.101] in
the narrow seas. The States-General, urged on by Oldenbarneveldt,
resolved in the spring of 1606 to despatch an expedition to besiege
and capture Dunkirk. Both Maurice and William Lewis were opposed to
the project, which they regarded as rash and risky. The
States-General, however, hearing reports of the archduke’s soldiery
being mutinous for lack of pay, persisted in their purpose, and
Maurice, against his better judgment, acquiesced. A body of picked
troops, 12,000 foot and 3000 horse, was assembled on the island of
Walcheren. A succession of contrary winds delaying the sailing of
the force, it was determined to march straight through West
Flanders to Nieuport and then along the shore to Dunkirk. A
deputation of the States-General, of which Oldenbarneveldt was the
leading member, went to Ostend to supervise, much to Maurice’s
annoyance, the military operations. The stadholder, however,
reached Nieuport without serious opposition and proceeded to invest
it. Meanwhile the Archduke Albert had been acting with great
energy. By persuasive words and large promises he succeeded in
winning back the mutineers, and at the head of a veteran force of
10,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry he followed Maurice and, advancing
along the dunes, came on July 1 upon a body of 2000 men under the
command of Ernest Casimir of Nassau, sent by the stadholder to
defend the bridge of Leffingen. At the sight of the redoubtable
Spanish infantry a panic seized these troops and they were routed
with heavy loss. The fight, however, gave Maurice time to unite his
forces and draw them up in battle order in front of Nieuport.
Battle was joined the following afternoon, and slowly, foot by
foot, after a desperate conflict the archduke’s Spanish and Italian
veterans drove back along the dunes the troops of the States. Every
hillock and sandy hollow was fiercely contested, the brunt of the
conflict falling on the English and Frisians under the command of
Sir Francis Vere. Vere himself was severely wounded, and the battle
appeared to be lost. At this critical moment the Spaniards began to
show signs of exhaustion through their tremendous exertions in two
successive fights under a hot sun in the yielding sand-hills; and
the prince, at the critical moment, throwing himself into the midst
of his retreating troops, succeeded in rallying them. At the same
time he ordered some squadrons of cavalry which he had kept in
reserve to charge on the flank of the advancing foe. The effect was
instantaneous. The Spaniards were[pg.102] thrown into confusion,
broke and fled. The victory was complete. The archduke only just
escaped capture, and of his army 5000 perished and a large number
were taken prisoners, among these the Admiral of Aragon. Almost by
a miracle was the States’ army thus rescued from a desperate
position. Maurice’s hard-won triumph greatly enhanced his fame, for
the battle of Nieuport destroyed the legend of the invincibility of
the Spanish infantry in the open field. The victorious general,
however, was not disposed to run any further risks. He accordingly
retreated to Ostend and there embarked his troops for the ports
from which they had started. The expedition had been very costly
and had been practically fruitless. Oldenbarneveldt and those who
had acted with him were deeply disappointed at the failure of their
plans for the capture of Dunkirk and were far from satisfied with
Maurice’s obstinate refusal to carry out any further offensive
operations. From this time there arose a feeling of soreness
between the advocate and the stadholder, which further differences
of opinion were to accentuate in the coming years.

The vigour and powers of leadership displayed by their new
sovereigns in meeting the invasion of Flanders by the States’ army,
though a defeat in the field had been suffered at Nieuport, had
inspired their subjects in the southern Netherlands with confidence
and loyalty. Albert had proved himself a brave commander, and his
efforts had at least been successful in compelling the enemy to
withdraw within his own borders.

Ostend had long been a thorn in the side of the government at
Brussels and energetic steps were soon taken to besiege it. But the
possession of Ostend was important also to Elizabeth, and she
promised active assistance. The larger part of the garrison was,
indeed, formed of English troops, and Sir Francis Vere was governor
of the town. The siege which ensued was one of the memorable sieges
of history, it lasted for more than three years (July 15,1601, to
September 20,1604) and was productive of great feats of valour,
skill and endurance on the part alike of besiegers and besieged.
The States’ army under Maurice, though it did not march to the
relief of Ostend, endeavoured to divert the attention of Albert
from his objective by attacks directed elsewhere. In 1601 the
fortresses of Rheinberg and Meurs on the Rhine were captured, and
an attack made upon Hertogenbosch. In 1602 the important town of
Grave on the Meuse was taken and a raid made into Brabant and
Luxemburg.[pg.103]

Meanwhile the defenders of Ostend had been making a desperate
resistance, and little progress was made by the besiegers, with the
result that a great drain was made upon the finances of the
archdukes and there were threatenings of mutiny among the troops.
But the situation was saved by the intervention of a wealthy
Genoese banker, Ambrosio de Spinola, who offered his services and
his money to the archdukes and promised that if he, though
inexperienced in warfare, were given the command, he would take
Ostend. He fulfilled his promise. Without regard to loss of life he
pressed on the siege, and though as fast as one line of defences
was taken another arose behind it to bar his progress, little by
little he advanced and bit by bit the area held by the garrison
grew less. At last in the spring of 1604, under the pressure of the
States-General, Maurice led an army of 11,000 men into Flanders in
April, 1604, and laid siege to Sluis on May 19. Both Maurice and
William Lewis were still unwilling to run the risk of an attack on
Spinola’s army in its lines, and so the two sieges went on side by
side, as it were independently. Sluis fell at the end of August,
and Ostend was then at its last gasp. Urged now by the deputies of
the States to make a direct effort to relieve the heroic garrison,
Maurice and his cousin, after wasting some precious time in
protesting against the step, began to march southward. It was too
late. What was left of Ostend surrendered on September 20, and
Spinola became the master of a heap of ruins. It is said that this
three years’ siege cost the Spaniards 80,000 lives, to say nothing
of the outlay of vast expenditure. Whether Maurice and William
Lewis were right or wrong in their reluctance to assail Spinola’s
entrenched camp, it is certain that they were better judges of the
military situation than the civilian deputies of the States. In any
case the capture of Sluis was an offset to the loss of Ostend; and
its importance was marked by the appointment of Frederick Henry,
the young brother of the stadholder, as governor of the seaport and
the surrounding district, which received the name of
States-Flanders. The tremendous exertions put forward for the
defence of Ostend had been a very serious drain upon the resources
of the United Provinces, especially upon those of Holland. Taxation
was already So high that Oldenbarneveldt and many other leading
members of the States-General and Provincial Estates began to feel
despondent and to doubt whether it were possible to continue the
war. No[pg.104] longer could the States rely upon
the assistance of England. James I had concluded peace with Spain;
and, though he made professions of friendship and goodwill to the
Dutch, wary statesmen, like the Advocate, did not trust him, and
were afraid lest he should be tempted to deliver up the cautionary
towns into the hands of the enemy. Reverting to the policy of
William the Silent, Oldenbarneveldt even went so far as to make
tentative approaches to Henry IV of France touching the conditions
on which he would accept the sovereignty of the Provinces. Indeed
it is said that such was the despair felt by this great statesman,
who knew better than any man the economic difficulties of the
situation, that he even contemplated the possibility of submission
to the archdukes. Had he suggested submission, there would have
been no question, however, that he could not have retained office,
for Maurice, William Lewis and the military leaders on the one
hand, and on the other the merchants and the adventurous seamen,
whom they employed in the profitable Indian traffic, would not have
listened for a moment to any thought of giving up a struggle which
had been so resolutely and successfully maintained for so many
years. For financially the archdukes were in even worse plight than
the Netherlanders, even though for a short time, with the help of
Spinola, appearances seemed to favour the Belgic attacks on the
Dutch frontier districts. In 1605 the Genoese general, at the head
of a mixed but well-disciplined force in his own pay, made a rapid
advance towards Friesland, and, after capturing Oldenzaal and
Lingen and ravaging the eastern provinces, concluded the campaign
with a brilliant success against a body of the States cavalry
commanded by Frederick Henry, who nearly lost his life. Maurice
with inferior forces kept strictly on the defensive, skilfully
covering the heart of the land from attack, but steadily refusing a
pitched battle. In the following year Spinola with two armies
attempted to force the lines of the Waal and the Yssel, but, though
thwarted in this aim by the wariness of the stadholder and by a
very wet season, he succeeded in taking the important fortresses of
Groll and Rheinberg. Maurice made no serious effort to relieve
them, and his inactivity caused much discontent and adverse
comment. His military reputation suffered, while that of his
opponent was enhanced. But subsequent events showed that Maurice,
though perhaps erring on the side of caution, had acted rightly.
The armies which had[pg.105] threatened the safety of the
Provinces had been raised at the charges of a private individual,
but the financial resources, even of a Spinola, were not capable of
a prolonged effort; there was no money in the State treasury; and
the soldiery, as soon as their pay was in arrears, began once more
to be mutinous. The bolt had been shot without effect, and the year
1607 found both sides, through sheer lack of funds, unable to enter
upon a fresh campaign on land with any hope of definite success.
But though the military campaigns had been so inconclusive, it had
been far different with the fortunes of maritime warfare in these
opening years of the seventeenth century. The sea-power of the
Dutch republic was already a formidable factor which had to be
reckoned with and which was destined to be decisive.

The East-India Company was no sooner founded than active steps
were taken to make full use of the privileges granted by the
Charter. A fleet of 17 vessels was despatched in 1602 under Wybrand
van Waerwyck. Waerwyck visited Ceylon and most of the islands of
the Malay Archipelago, established a factory at Bantam with a staff
of officials for developing trade relations with the natives, and
even made his way to Siam and China. He sent back from time to time
some of his vessels richly laden, and finally returned himself with
the residue of his fleet after an absence of five years in June,
1607. Another expedition of thirteen ships sailed in 1604 under
Steven van der Hagen, whose operations were as widespread and as
successful as those of Waerwyck. Van der Hagen took possession of
Molucca and built factories at Amboina, Tidor and other places in
the spice-bearing islands. On his way back in 1606 with his cargo
of cloves, spices and other products of the far Orient, he
encountered at Mauritius another westward-bound fleet of eleven
ships under Cornelis Matelief. Matelief’s first objective was the
town of Malacca, held by the Portuguese and commanding the straits
to which it gave its name. Alphonso de Castro, the Viceroy of
India, hastened however with a naval force far more powerful than
the Dutch squadron to the relief of this important fortress; and
after a hardly-fought but indecisive action Matelief raised the
siege on August 17. Returning, however, about a month later, the
Dutch admiral found that De Castro had sailed away, leaving only a
detachment of ten vessels before Malacca. Matelief at once attacked
this force, whose strength was about equal to his[pg.106] own,
and with such success that he sank or burnt every single ship of
the enemy with scarcely any loss, September 21, 1606.

These successful incursions into a region that the Spaniards and
Portuguese had jealously regarded as peculiarly their own aroused
both anger and alarm. All available forces in the East (the
Portuguese from the Mozambique and Goa, the Spaniards from the
Philippines) were equipped and sent to sea with the object of
expelling the hated and despised Netherlanders from East-Indian
waters. Paulus van Caerden, Matelief’s successor in command, was
defeated and himself taken prisoner. Nor were the Spaniards content
with attacking the Dutch fleets in the far East. As the
weather-worn and heavily-laden Company’s vessels returned along the
west coast of Africa, they had to pass within striking distance of
the Spanish and Portuguese harbours and were in constant danger of
being suddenly assailed by a superior force and captured. In 1607
rumours reached Holland of the gathering of a large Spanish fleet
at Gibraltar, whose destination was the East-Indies. The directors
of the Company were much alarmed, an alarm which was shared by the
States-General, many of whose deputies were cargo-shareholders.
Accordingly, in April, 1607, a fleet of twenty-six vessels set sail
for the purpose of seeking out and attacking the Spaniards whether
in harbour or on the open sea. The command was given to one of the
most daring and experienced of Dutch seamen, Jacob van Heemskerk.
He found twenty-one ships still at anchor in Gibraltar Bay, ten of
them large galleons, far superior in size and armament to his own
largest vessels. Heemskerk at once cleared for action. Both
Heemskerk and the Spanish commander, d’Avila, were killed early in
the fight, the result of which however was not long doubtful. The
Spanish fleet was practically destroyed. On the Dutch side no
vessel was lost and the casualties were small. Such a disaster was
most humiliating to Castilian pride, and its effect in hastening
forward the peace negotiations, which were already in progress, was
considerable.

The initial steps had been taken by the archdukes. Through the
secret agency of Albert’s Franciscan Confessor, Father John Neyen,
both Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were approached in May, 1606, but
without any result. Early in 1607 however the efforts were renewed,
and negotiations were actively set on foot for the purpose of
concluding a peace or a truce for a term of twelve,[pg.107]
fifteen or twenty years. There were, however, almost insuperable
difficulties in the way. In the first place the stadholders, the
military and naval leaders, the Calvinist clergy, and the great
majority of the traders honestly believed that a peace would be
detrimental to all the best interests of the States, and were
thoroughly distrustful of the motives which had prompted the
archdukes and the Spanish government to make these advances.
Oldenbarneveldt on the other hand thought that peace was necessary
for the land to recuperate after the exhausting struggle, which had
already lasted for forty years; and he found strong support among
the burgher-regents and that large part of the people who were
over-burdened and impoverished by the weight of taxation, and sick
and weary of perpetual warfare. There were, however, certain
preliminary conditions, which all were agreed must be assented to,
and without which it would be useless to continue the negotiations.
The independence of the United Provinces must be recognised,
freedom of trade in the Indies conceded, and the public exercise of
Catholic worship prohibited. After some parleying the archdukes
agreed to treat with the United Provinces “in the quality and as
considering them free provinces and states,” and an armistice was
concluded in April, 1607, for eight months, in order that the
matters in dispute might be referred to the King of Spain and his
views upon them ascertained. Not till October did the king’s reply
arrive at Brussels. He consented to negotiate with the States “as
free and independent” parties, but he required that liberty of
Catholic worship should be permitted during the truce, and no
mention was made of the Indian trade. This was by no means
satisfactory; nevertheless the influence of Oldenbarneveldt
prevailed and the negotiations were not broken off. On February 1,
1608, the archdukes’ envoys, the two leading members being Ambrosio
de Spinola and the president of the Privy Council, Ricardot,
arrived in Holland. They were met at Ryswyck by Maurice and William
Lewis in person, and with much ceremony and splendour a solemn
entry was made into the Hague, the procession with the brilliant
retinues forming a memorable spectacle, as it made its way through
the crowds which lined the roads. The negotiations were conducted
in the Binnenhof. The Special Commissioners to represent the
States-General were William Lewis of Nassau, Walraven, lord of
Brederode, and a deputy from each of the provinces under the
leadership of [pg.108] Oldenbarneveldt. Envoys from France,
England, Denmark, the Palatinate and Brandenburg were present, took
part in the discussions, and acted as friendly mediators.

The question of treating the United Provinces “as free States”
was soon settled. The archdukes, who were aiming at the conclusion
of a truce in which to recuperate and not of a definitive peace,
showed an unexpected complaisance in granting a concession which
they regarded as only temporary. Then came the really serious
questions as to freedom of trade in the Indies and the liberty of
Catholic worship. Of these the first was of most immediate
interest, and showed irreconcilable differences between the two
parties. The Spaniards would never consent to any trespassing in
the closed area, which they regarded as their own peculiar
preserve. The Dutch traders and sailors were fired with the spirit
of adventure and of profit, and their successful expeditions had
aroused an enthusiasm for further effort in the distant seas, which
had hardened into a fixed resolve not to agree to any peace or
truce shutting them out from the Indian trade. For months the
subject was discussed and re-discussed without result. Some of the
foreign delegates left. The armistice was prolonged, in order that
Father Neyen might go to Madrid for further instructions. It was
found, however, that the King of Spain would yield nothing. The
negotiations came to a standstill, and both sides began to make
preparations for a renewal of the war. President Jeannin on behalf
of the French king, by his skilful mediation, in which he was
supported by his English colleague, saved the situation. He
proposed as a compromise a twelve years’ truce, pointing out that
whatever terms were arranged would only be binding for that short
period. He managed to bring about a personal interview between
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice, who had respectively headed the peace
and war parties in the provinces; and henceforth both consented to
work together for this proposal of a limited truce, during which
the trade to the Indies should be open and the religious question
be untouched. The assent of the States-General and of the several
Provincial Estates was obtained. The two most interested, Holland
and Zeeland, were won over, Holland by the arguments and
persuasions of the Advocate, Zeeland, which was the last to agree,
by the influence of Maurice. Jeannin was aware that the finances of
Spain were at their last gasp, and that both the archdukes and
Philip III were most anxious for a respite[pg.109] from the
ever-consuming expense of the war. At last the long and wearisome
negotiations came to an end, and the treaty concluding a truce for
twelve years was signed at the Hague on April 9,1609. The
territorial status quo was recognised. The United Provinces
were treated “as free States over which the archdukes made no
pretensions.” Nothing was said about the religious difficulty nor
about trade in the Indies, but in a secret treaty the King of Spain
undertook not to interfere with Dutch trade, wherever carried on.
Thus access to the Indies was conceded, though to save appearances
the word was not mentioned. This result was due solely to the
diplomatic tact and resource of Jeannin, who was able to announce
to Henry IV that he had accomplished his task “to the satisfaction
of everyone, and even of Prince Maurice.”

CHAPTER VII

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

One of the reasons which influenced the archdukes and the King
of Spain to make large concessions in order to secure the assent of
the States-General to the conclusion of a twelve years’ truce was
their firm belief that the unstable political condition of the
United Provinces must lead to civil discord, as soon as the
relaxing of the pressure of war loosened the bonds which had, since
Leicester’s departure, held together a number of separate
authorities and discordant interests. They were right in their
supposition. In order, therefore, to understand the course of
events in the republic, which had been correctly recognised by the
treaty not as a single state, but as a group of “free and
independent States,” it is necessary to give a brief account of one
of the most strangely complicated systems of government that the
world has ever seen—especially strange because no one could
ever say positively where or with whom the sovereignty really
resided.

Let us take into separate consideration the powers and functions
of (1) the Council of State, (2) the States-General, (3) the
Provincial Estates, (4) the Stadholders, (5) the Advocate (later
the Raad-Pensionarius or Council-Pensionary) of Holland, (6)
the Admiralty Colleges.

The Council of State was not a legislative, but an executive,
body. In the time of Leicester the Council was the executive arm of
the governor-general and had large powers. After his departure the
presence of the English ambassador, who by treaty had a seat in the
Council, caused the States-General gradually to absorb its powers,
and to make its functions subordinate to their own, until at last
its authority was confined to the administration of the affairs of
war and of finance. The right of the English representative to sit
in the Council and take an active part in its deliberations
continued till 1626. The Stadholders were also ex officio
members. The Provinces, since 1588, were represented by twelve
councillors. Holland had three; Gelderland, Zeeland and Friesland
two each;[pg.111] Utrecht, Overyssel and Groningen
(Stad en Landeri) one each. The treasurer-general and the
clerk (Griffier) of the States-General took part in the
deliberations and had great influence. The chief duty of the
Council, during the period with which we are dealing, was the
raising of the “quotas” from the various provinces for the military
defence of the State. The General Petition or War Budget was
prepared by the Council and presented to the States-General at the
end of each year, providing for the military expenses in the
following twelve months. The “quotas” due towards these expenses
from the several provinces were set forth in smaller petitions sent
to the Provincial Estates, whose consent was necessary. The
so-called repartitie fixing the amount of these quotas was
likewise drawn up by the Council of State, and was the subject at
times of considerable haggling and discontent. In 1612 it was
settled that the proportions to be borne by the provinces should be
Holland 57.1 per cent.; Friesland 11.4; Zeeland 11 (afterwards
reduced to 9); Utrecht and Groningen 5.5; Overyssel 3.5. It will
thus be seen that the quota of Holland was considerably more than
half of the whole; and, as the naval expenditure was to an even
larger extent borne by Holland, the preponderating influence of
this province in the Union can be easily understood. The forces of
the republic that were distributed in the several provinces
received their pay from the provinces, but those maintained by the
Council, as troops of the State, were paid by monies received from
the Generality lands, i.e. lands such as the conquered
portions of Brabant and Flanders, governed by the States-General,
but without representation in that body. The Council of State,
though its political powers were curtailed and absorbed by the
States-General, continued to exercise, as a court of justice,
appellate jurisdiction in military and financial questions.

The States-General consisted of representatives of the Estates
of the seven sovereign provinces of Gelderland, Holland, Zeeland,
Utrecht, Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen (Stad en
Landeri) in the order of precedence given above. Gelderland,
having been a duchy, ranked before those that had formerly been
counties or lordships. The provinces sent deputations varying in
number; Holland and Gelderland generally six, the others less. Each
province had but a single vote. The president changed week by week,
being chosen in turn from each province according to their order
of[pg.112] precedence. Holland had nominally no
more weight than the others; its practical influence, however, was
great in proportion to the burden of taxation that it bore and was
increased by the fact that the sessions, which after 1593 were
permanent, were held at the Hague in the same building with the
Estates of Holland, and that the Council-Pensionary of Holland was
the spokesman of the province in the States-General. The
States-General had control of the foreign affairs of the Union. To
them belonged the supreme control of military and naval matters.
The Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union were appointed
by them; and a deputation of the States-General accompanied the
army into the field and the commanders were bound to consult it.
They exercised a strong supervision of finance, and sovereign
authority over the entire administration of the “Generality” lands.
Ambassadors were appointed by them, also the Treasurer-General of
the Union, and numerous other important officials. Yet with all
these attributes and powers the States-General possessed only a
derived, not an inherent, authority. To foreigners the sovereignty
of the republic of the United Netherlands appeared to be vested in
their “High-Mightinesses.” In reality the States-General was, as
already stated, a gathering of deputations from the seven sovereign
provinces. Each deputation voted as a unit; and in all important
affairs of peace and war, treaties and finance, there must be no
dissentient. A single province, however small, could, by obstinate
opposition, block the way to the acceptance of any given proposal.
Moreover the members, despite their lofty designation as
High-Mightinesses, did not vote according to their convictions or
persuasions, but according to the charge they had received from
their principals. The deputation of a province had no right to
sanction any disputable measure or proposal without referring it
back to the Estates of that province for approval or disapproval.
Hence arose endless opportunities and occasions for friction and
dissension and manifold delays in the transaction of the business
of the republic, oftentimes in a manner inimical to its vital
interests.

The Provincial Estates in their turn were by no means
homogeneous or truly representative bodies. In Holland the nobles
had one vote; and eighteen towns, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft,
Leyden, Amsterdam, Gouda, Rotterdam, Gorkum, Schiedam, Schoonhoven,
Brill, Alkmaar, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Edam, Monnikendam, Medemblik[pg.113] and Purmerend, had one each. The
nobles, though they had only one vote, were influential, as they
represented the rural districts and the small towns which had no
franchise, and they voted first. Here again, as in the
States-General, though each of the privileged towns counted equal
in the voting, as a matter of fact their weight and influence was
very different. The opposition of wealthy and populous Amsterdam
was again and again sufficient to override the decision of the
majority, for there was no power to enforce its submission, except
the employment of armed force. For at this point it may be as well
to explain that each one of these municipalities
(vroedschappen) claimed to be a sovereign entity, and yet,
far from being bodies representing the citizens as a whole, they
were close corporations of the narrowest description. The ordinary
inhabitants of these towns had no voice whatever in the management
of their own affairs. The governing body or vroedschap
consisted of a limited number of persons, sometimes not more than
forty, belonging to certain families, which filled up vacancies by
co-option and chose the burgomasters and sheriffs
(schepenen). Thus it will be seen that popular
representation had no place in Holland. The regent-burghers were a
small patrician oligarchy, in whose hands the entire government and
administration of the towns rested, and from their number were
chosen the deputies, who represented the eighteen privileged cities
in the Provincial Estates.

The other provinces do not need such detailed notice. In Zeeland
the Estates consisted of seven members, the “first noble” (who
presided) and six towns. There was but one noble, the Marquis of
Flushing and Veere. William the Silent in 1581 obtained this
marquisate by purchase; and his heirs, through its possession,
continued to exercise great influence in the Provincial Estates. As
Philip William, Prince of Orange, was in Madrid, Maurice sat in the
assembly as “first noble” in his place. In Utrecht the three
Estates were represented, i.e. the nobles, the towns (four
in number) and the clergy. The representatives of the clergy were,
however, chosen no longer from the Chapter but from the possessors
of what had been Church lands and property. They were elected by
the knights and the small towns out of a list drawn up by the
corporation of Utrecht. They necessarily belonged to the Reformed
(Calvinist) faith. Gelderland was divided into three (so-called)
quarters, Nijmwegen, Zutphen and Arnhem. Each of these
quarters[pg.114] had its separate assembly; and there
was also a general diet. The nobles, who were numerous and had
large estates, were here very influential. Friesland was divided
into four quarters, three of which (Oostergoo, Westergoo and
Zevenwolden) were country districts, the fourth a gathering of the
deputies of eleven towns. The Diet of Friesland was not formed of
Estates, the nobles and the town representatives sitting together
in the same assembly, which was elected by a popular vote, all who
had a small property-qualification possessing the franchise, Roman
Catholics excepted. The system of administration and divided
authority was in Friesland a very complicated one, inherited from
mediaeval times, but here again the nobles, being large
land-owners, had much influence. The stadholder presided at the
diet and had a casting vote. The Estates of Groningen were divided
into two parts—town and districts—each with one vote.
The districts were those of Hunsingoo, Fivelingoo and the
West-Quarter. Here also the stadholder had a casting vote. In
Overyssel the Estates, like those of Groningen, consisted of two
members, the nobles from the three quarters, Sallant, Twente and
Vollenhove, and the deputies of the three towns, Deventer, Kampen
and Zwolle.

The ordinary executive and administrative work of Provincial
government was carried out in Holland by a body known as the
Commissioned-Councillors—Gecommitteerde-Raden; in the
other provinces by
Deputed-Estates—Gedeputeerde-Staten. The
Commissioned-Councillors were to the Estates of Holland what the
Council of State was to the States-General. They enjoyed
considerable independence, for they were not appointed by the
Estates but directly by the nobles and cities according to a fixed
system of rotation, and they sat continuously, whereas the Estates
only met for short sessions. Their duty was to see that all
provincial edicts and ordinances decreed by the Estates were
published and enforced, to control the finances and to undertake
the provision and oversight of all military requirements; and to
them it belonged to summon the meetings of the Estates. The
Deputed-Estates in the other provinces had similar but generally
less extensive and authoritative functions.

Such a medley of diverse and often conflicting authorities
within a state of so small an area has no counterpart in history.
It seemed impossible that government could be carried on, or that
there could[pg.115] be any concerted action or national
policy in a republic which was rather a many-headed confederation
than a federal state. That the United Netherlands, in spite of all
these disadvantages, rapidly rose in the 17th century to be a
maritime and commercial power of the first rank was largely due to
the fact that the foreign policy of the republic and the general
control of its administration was directed by a succession of very
able men, the stadholders of the house of Orange-Nassau and the
council-pensionaries of Holland. For a right understanding of the
period of Dutch history with which we are about to deal, it is
necessary to define clearly what was the position of the stadholder
and of the council-pensionary in this cumbrous and creaking
machinery of government that has just been described, and the
character of those offices, which conferred upon their holders such
wide-reaching influence and authority.

The Stadholder or governor was really, both in title and office,
an anomaly in a republic. Under the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers
the Stadholder exercised the local authority in civil and also in
military matters as representing the sovereign duke, count or lord
in the province to which he was appointed, and was by that fact
clothed with certain sovereign attributes during his tenure of
office. William the Silent was Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland at
the outbreak of the revolt, and, though deprived of his offices, he
continued until the time of the Union of Utrecht to exercise
authority in those and other provinces professedly in the name of
the king. After his death one would have expected that the office
would have fallen into abeyance, but the coming of Leicester into
the Netherlands led to a revival of the stadholderate. Holland and
Zeeland, in their desire to exercise a check upon the
governor-general’s arbitrary exercise of his powers, appointed
Maurice of Nassau to take his father’s place; and at the same time
William Lewis of Nassau became Stadholder of Friesland, and
stadholders were also appointed in Utrecht, Gelderland and
Overyssel. In 1609 Maurice was Stadholder in the five provinces of
Holland, Zeeland, Gelderland, Utrecht and Overyssel; his cousin
William Lewis in Friesland and Groningen with Drente. The powers of
the stadholder were not the same in the different provinces, but
generally speaking he was the executive officer of the Estates; and
in Holland, where his authority was the greatest, he had the
supervision of the administration of justice, the appointment of a
large number of[pg.116] municipal magistrates, and the
prerogative of pardon, and he was charged with the military and
naval defence of the province. The stadholder received his
commission both from the Provincial Estates and from the
States-General and took an oath of allegiance to the latter. In so
far, then, as he exercised quasi-sovereign functions, he did it in
the name of the States, whose servant he nominally was. But when
the stadholder, as was the case with Maurice and the other Princes
of Orange, was himself a sovereign-prince and the heir of a great
name, he was able to exercise an authority far exceeding those of a
mere official. The descendants of William the Silent—Maurice,
Frederick Henry, William II and William III—were, moreover,
all of them men of exceptional ability; and the stadholderate
became in their hands a position of almost semi-monarchical dignity
and influence, the stadholder being regarded both by foreign
potentates and by the people of the Netherlands generally as “the
eminent head of the State.” Maurice, as stated above, was
stadholder in five provinces; Frederick Henry, William II and
William III in six; the seventh province, Friesland, remaining
loyal, right through the 17th century, to their cousins of the
house of Nassau-Siegen, the ancestors of the present Dutch royal
family. That the authority of the States-General and
States-Provincial should from time to time come into conflict with
that of the stadholder was to be expected, for the relations
between them were anomalous in the extreme. The Stadholder of
Holland for instance appointed, directly or indirectly, the larger
part of the municipal magistrates; they in their turn the
representatives who formed the Estates of the Province. But, as the
stadholder was the servant of the Estates, he, in a sense, may be
said to have had the power of appointing his own masters. The
stadholders of the house of Orange had also, in addition to the
prestige attaching to their name, the possession of large property
and considerable wealth, which with the emoluments they received
from the States-General, as Captain-General and Admiral-General of
the Union, and from the various provinces, where they held the post
of stadholder, enabled them in the days of Frederick Henry and his
successors to maintain the state and dignity of a court.

The office of Land’s Advocate or Council-Pensionary was
different altogether in character from the stadholderate, but at
times scarcely less influential, when filled by a man of
commanding[pg.117] talents. The Advocate in the time of
Oldenbarneveldt combined the duties of being legal adviser to the
Estates of Holland, and of presiding over and conducting the
business of the Estates at their meetings, and also those of the
Commissioned-Councillors. He was the leader and spokesman of the
Holland deputies in the States-General. He kept the minutes,
introduced the business and counted the votes at the provincial
assemblies. It was his duty to draw up and register the
resolutions. What was perhaps equally important, he carried on the
correspondence with the ambassadors of the republic at foreign
courts, and received their despatches, and conducted negotiations
with the foreign ambassadors at the Hague. It is easy to see how a
man like Oldenbarneveldt, of great industry and capacity for
affairs, although nominally the paid servant of the Estates,
gradually acquired an almost complete control over every department
of administration and became, as it were, a Minister of State of
all affairs. In Oldenbarneveldt’s time the post was held for life;
and, as Maurice did not for many years trouble himself about
matters of internal government and foreign diplomacy, the Advocate
by the length of his tenure of office had at the opening of the
17th century become the virtual director and arbiter of the policy
of the State. After his death the title of advocate and the
life-tenure ceased. His successors were known as
Council-Pensionaries, and they held office for five years only, but
with the possibility of re-election. The career of John de Witt
showed, however, that in the case of a supremely able man these
restrictions did not prevent a Raad-Pensionarius^[4] from
exercising for eighteen years an authority and influence greater
even than that of Oldenbarneveldt.

An account of the multiplied subdivision of administrative
control in the United Provinces would not be complete without some
mention of the Admiralty Colleges in Holland. Holland with Zeeland
furnished the fleets on which the existence and well-being of the
republic depended. Both William the Silent and his son Maurice
were, as stadholders, admirals of Holland and of Zeeland, and both
likewise were by the States-General appointed Admirals-General of
the Union. They thus wielded a double authority over maritime
affairs in the two provinces. In 1574 William had at his side a
Council of Admiralty erected by the Provincial Estates, but
Leicester in 1585 was annoyed by the immediate control of
naval[pg.118] matters being withdrawn from the
governor-general and the Council of State. He succeeded therefore
in obtaining a division of the Council of Admiralty into three
Chambers, shortly afterwards increased to five—Rotterdam,
Hoorn with Enkhuizen, Veere, Amsterdam and Harlingen with Dokkum.
In 1597 it was determined that each Admiralty should consist of
seven members nominated by the States-General. The Admiral-General
presided over each College and over joint meetings of the five
Colleges. The Admiralties nominated the lieutenants of the ships
and proposed a list of captains to be finally chosen by the
States-General. The Lieutenant-Admiral and Vice-Admirals of Holland
and the Vice-Admiral of Zeeland were chosen by the Provincial
Estates. The States-General appointed the Commander-in-Chief. Such
a system seemed to be devised to prevent any prompt action or swift
decision being taken at times of emergency or sudden danger.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TWELVE YEARS’ TRUCE

The first years of the truce were for the United Provinces, now
recognised as “free and independent States,” a period of remarkable
energy and enterprise. The young republic started on its new career
with the buoyant hopefulness that comes from the proud
consciousness of suffering and dangers bravely met and overcome,
and, under the wise and experienced guidance of Oldenbarneveldt,
acquired speedily a position and a weight in the Councils of Europe
out of all proportion to its geographical area or the numbers of
its population. The far-seeing statecraft and practised diplomatic
skill of the Advocate never rendered greater services to his
country than during these last years of his long tenure of power. A
difficult question as to the succession to the Jülich-Cleves
duchies arose at the very time of the signing of the truce, which
called for delicate and wary treatment.

In March, 1609, the Duke of Jülich and Cleves died without
leaving a male heir, and the succession to these important border
territories on the Lower Rhine became speedily a burning question.
The two principal claimants through the female line were the
Elector of Brandenburg and William, Count-Palatine of Neuburg. The
Emperor Rudolph II, however, under the pretext of appointing
imperial commissioners to adjudicate upon the rival claims, aroused
the suspicions of Brandenburg and Neuburg; and these two came to an
agreement to enter into joint possession of the duchies, and were
styled “the possessors.” The Protestant Union at Heidelberg
recognised “the possessors,” for it was all-important for the
balance of power in Germany that these lands should not pass into
the hands of a Catholic ruler of the House of Austria. For the same
reason Brandenburg and Neuburg were recognised by the
States-General, who did not wish to see a partisan of Spain
established on their borders. The emperor on his part not only
refused to acknowledge “the possessors,” but he also sent his
cousin Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau, to intervene by armed
force.[pg.120]
Leopold seized the fortress of Jülich and proceeded to
establish himself.

It was an awkward situation, for neither the United Provinces
nor the archdukes nor the King of Spain had the smallest desire to
make the Jülich succession the cause of a renewal of
hostilities, immediately after the conclusion of the truce. The
eagerness of the French king to precipitate hostilities with the
Habsburg powers however forced their hands. Henry IV had for some
time been making preparations for war, and he was at the moment
irritated by the protection given by the archdukes to the runaway
Princess of Condé, who had fled to Brussels. He had succeeded in
persuading the States to send an auxiliary force into Germany to
assist the French army of invasion in the spring of 1610, when just
as the king was on the point of leaving Paris to go to the front he
was assassinated on May 14. This event put an end to the
expedition, for the regent, Marie de’ Medici, was friendly to
Austria. The States nevertheless did not feel disposed to leave
Leopold in possession of Jülich. Maurice led an army into the duchy
and laid siege to the town. It capitulated on September 1. As might
have been anticipated, however, the joint rule of the “possessors”
did not turn out a success. They quarrelled, and Neuburg asked for
Catholic help. Maurice and Spinola in 1614 found themselves again
face to face at the head of rival forces, but actual hostilities
were avoided; and by the treaty of Nanten (November 12, 1614) it
was arranged that the disputed territory should be divided,
Brandenburg ruling at Cleves, Neuburg at Jülich. Thus, in the
settlement of this thorny question, the influence of
Oldenbarneveldt worked for a temporary solution satisfactory to the
interests of the United Provinces; nor was his successful
intervention in the Jülich-Cleves affair an isolated instance
of his diplomatic activity. On the contrary it was almost
ubiquitous.

The growth of the Dutch trade in the Baltic had for some years
been advancing by leaps and bounds, and now far exceeded that of
their old rivals, the Hanseatic league. Christian IV, the ambitious
and warlike King of Denmark, had been seriously interfering with
this trade by imposing such heavy dues for the passage of the Sound
as on the one hand to furnish him with a large revenue, and on the
other hand to support his claim to sovereign rights over all
traffic with the inland sea. The Hanse towns protested strongly and
sought[pg.121] the support of the States-General in
actively opposing the Danish king. It was granted. A force of 7000
men under Frederick Henry was sent into Germany to the relief of
Brunswick, which was besieged by Christian IV. The siege was
raised; and an alliance was concluded between the republic and the
Hanse towns for common action in the protection of their commercial
interests. Nor was this all. Oldenbarneveldt entered into
diplomatic relations with Charles IX of Sweden and with Russia.
Cornelis Haga was sent to Stockholm; and from this time forward a
close intimacy was established between Sweden and the States. The
seaport of Gotheborg, just outside the entrance to the Sound, was
founded by a body of Dutch colonists under a certain Abraham
Cabelliau, an Amsterdam merchant, and continued to be for years
practically a Dutch town.

Scarcely less important was the enterprise shown in the
establishment of friendly relations with distant Russia. Balthazar
de Moucheron established a Dutch factory at Archangel so early as
1584; and a growing trade sprang up with Russia by way of the White
Sea, at first in rivalry with the English Muscovy Company. But a
Dutch merchant, by name Isaac Massa, having succeeded in gaining
the ear and confidence of the Tsar, Russian commerce gradually
became a Dutch monopoly. In 1614 a Muscovite embassy conducted by
Massa came to the Hague, and access to the interior of Russia was
opened to the traders of Holland and to them only.

In the Mediterranean no less foresight and dexterity was shown
in forwarding the interests of the States. The Advocate’s
son-in-law, Van der Myle, went in 1609 as ambassador to Venice; and
the following year the first Venetian envoy, Tommaso Contarini,
arrived in Holland. In 1612 Cornelis Haga, who had been in Sweden,
was sent to Constantinople to treat with the Turks about commercial
privileges in the Levant and for the suppression of piracy, and he
remained in the East in charge of the republic’s interests for many
years.

More difficult was the maintenance of friendly relations with
England. In 1604 James I had made peace with Spain; and the growing
rivalry upon the seas between the Dutch and English tended to
alienate his sympathies from the rising maritime power of the
republic. He outwardly maintained friendly relations; his
ambassador had a seat on the Council of State; he retained his
garrisons in the cautionary towns; and after the signing of the
truce[pg.122] he bestowed the Garter upon Prince
Maurice. But at this very time, May, 1609, James took a step which
was most hurtful to that industry which had laid the foundation of
the commercial prosperity of Holland—this was the issuing of
an edict imposing a tax on all foreigners fishing in English
waters. Though general in its form, this edict was really directed
against the right heretofore enjoyed by the Netherlanders to fish
on the English coast, a right conferred by a series of treaties and
never challenged since its confirmation by the Magnus
Intercursus of 1496. Dutch public opinion was strongly aroused
and a special embassy was sent to London, April, 1610, to protest
against the edict and endeavour to procure its withdrawal or its
modification. This was by no means an easy matter. The fisheries,
on which a large part of the population of Holland and Zeeland
depended for their livelihood, were of vital importance to the
States. On the other hand their virtual monopoly by the Dutch
caused keen resentment in England. In the latter part of the reign
of Elizabeth that adventurous sea-faring spirit, which was destined
eventually to plant the flag of England on the shores of every
ocean, had come to the birth, and everywhere it found, during this
early part of the 17th century, Dutch rivals already in possession
and Dutch ships on every trading route. The Dutch mercantile marine
in fact far exceeded the English in numbers and efficiency. The
publication of Hugo Grotius’ famous pamphlet, Mare Liberum,
in March, 1609, was probably the final cause which decided James to
issue his Fisheries’ proclamation. The purpose of Grotius was to
claim for every nation, as against the Portuguese, freedom of trade
in the Indian Ocean, but the arguments he used appeared to King
James and his advisers to challenge the dominium maris,
which English kings had always claimed in the “narrow seas.” The
embassy of 1610, therefore, had to deal not merely with the
fisheries, but with the whole subject of the maritime relations of
the two countries; and a crowd of published pamphlets proves the
intense interest that was aroused. But the emergence of the dispute
as to the Jülich-Cleves succession, and the change in the
policy of the French government owing to the assassination of Henry
IV, led both sides to desire an accommodation; and James consented,
not indeed to withdraw the edict, but to postpone its execution for
two years. It remained a dead letter until 1616, although all the
time the wranglings over the legal aspects of the[pg.123]
questions in dispute continued. The Republic, however, as an
independent State, was very much hampered by the awkward fact of
the cautionary towns remaining in English hands. The occupation of
Flushing and Brill, commanding the entrances to important
waterways, seemed to imply that the Dutch republic was to a certain
extent a vassal state under the protection of England.
Oldenbarneveldt resolved therefore to take advantage of King James’
notorious financial embarrassments by offering to redeem the towns
by a ready-money payment. The nominal indebtedness of the United
Provinces for loans advanced by Elizabeth was £600,000; the
Advocate offered in settlement £100,000 in cash and
£150,000 more in half-yearly payments. James accepted the
offer, and the towns were handed over, the garrisons being allowed
to pass into the Dutch service, June 1616. Sir Dudley Carleton,
however, who about this time succeeded Sir Ralph Winwood as English
envoy at the Hague, continued to have a seat in the Council of
State.

Oldenbarneveldt thus, at a time when his dominant position in
the State was already being undermined and his career drawing to an
end, performed a great service to his country, the more so as King
James, in his eagerness to negotiate a marriage between the Prince
of Wales and a Spanish infanta, was beginning to allow his policy
to be more and more controlled by the Count of Gondomar, the
Spanish ambassador at Whitehall. James’ leaning towards Spain
naturally led him to regard with stronger disfavour the increasing
predominance of the Dutch flag upon the seas, and it was not long
before he was sorry that he had surrendered the cautionary towns.
For the fishery rights and the principle of the dominium
marisin the narrow seas were no longer the only questions in
dispute between England and the States. English seamen and traders
had other grievances to allege against the Hollanders in other
parts of the world. The exclusive right to fish for whales in the
waters of Spitsbergen and Greenland was claimed by the English on
the ground of Hugh Willoughby’s alleged discovery of Spitsbergen in
1553. The Dutch would not admit any such claim, and asserted that
Heemskerk was the first to visit the archipelago, and that he
planted in 1596 the Dutch flag on the shores of the island, to
which he gave the name of Spitsbergen. In 1613 James conferred the
monopoly upon the English Muscovy Company, who sent out a fishing
fleet[pg.124] with orders to drive off any
interlopers; and certain Dutch vessels were attacked and plundered.
The reply of the States-General was the granting of a charter,
January 27, 1614, to a company, known as the Northern or Greenland
Company, with the monopoly of fishing between Davis’ Straits and
Nova Zembla; and a fishing fleet was sent out accompanied by
warships. The result was a temporary agreement between the English
and Dutch companies for using separate parts of Spitsbergen as
their bases, all others being excluded. Meanwhile the dispute was
kept open; and despite conferences and negotiations neither side
showed any disposition to yield. Matters reached an acute stage in
1618. English and Dutch fishing fleets of exceptional strength
sailed into the northern waters in the early summer of that year,
and a fierce fight took place, which, as two Dutch war vessels were
present, resulted in the scattering of the English vessels and
considerable loss of life and property.

The rivalry and opposition between the Dutch and English traders
in the East-Indies was on a larger scale, but here there was no
question of the Dutch superiority in force, and it was used
remorselessly. The Dutch East India Company had thriven apace. In
1606 a dividend of 50 per cent, had been paid; in 1609 one of 325
per cent. The chief factory was at Bantam, but there were many
others on the mainland of India, and at Amboina, Banda, Ternate and
Matsjan in the Moluccas; and from these centres trade was carried
on with Ceylon, with Borneo and even with distant China and Japan.
But the position of the company was precarious, until the secret
article of the treaty of 1609 conceded liberty of trade during the
truce. The chief need was to create a centre of administration,
from which a general control could be exercised over all the
officials at the various trading factories throughout the
East-Indian archipelago. It was resolved, therefore, by the Council
of Seventeen to appoint a director-general, who should reside at
Bantam, armed with powers which made him, far removed as he was
from interference by the home authorities, almost a sovereign in
the extensive region which he administered. Jan Pieterszoon Koen,
appointed in 1614, was the first of a series of capable men by
whose vigorous and sometimes unscrupulous action the Dutch company
became rapidly the dominant power in the eastern seas, where their
trade and influence overshadowed those of their European
competitors. The most enterprising of those competitors were
the[pg.125] English. Disputes quickly arose
between the rival companies as to trading rights in the Moluccas,
the Banda group and Amboina; and some islands, where the English
had made treaties with the natives, were occupied by the Dutch, and
the English expelled.

Another grievance was the refusal of the States-General in 1616
to admit English dyed cloths into the United Provinces. This had
caused especial irritation to King James. The manufacture of
woollen cloth and the exportation of wool had for long been the
chief of English industries; and the monopoly of the trade was,
when James ascended the throne, in the hands of the oldest of
English chartered companies, the Fellowship of Merchant
Adventurers. The Adventurers held since 1598 their Court and Staple
at Middelburg in Zeeland. The English had not learnt the art of
finishing and dyeing the cloth that they wove; it was imported in
its unfinished state, and was then dyed and prepared for commerce
by the Dutch. Some thousands of skilled hands found employment in
Holland in this work. James, always impecunious, determined in
1608, on the proposal of a certain Alderman Cockayne, to grant
Cockayne a patent for the creation of a home-dyeing industry,
reserving to the crown a monopoly for the sale of the goods. The
Adventurers complained of this as a breach of their charter; and,
after much bickering, the king in 1615 settled the dispute by
withdrawing the charter. Cockayne now hoped that the company he had
formed would be a profitable concern, but he and the king were
doomed to disappointment. The Estates of Holland refused to admit
the English dyed cloths, and their example was followed by the
other provinces and by the States-General. Cockayne became
bankrupt, and in 1617 the king had to renew the charter of the
Adventurers. James was naturally very sore at this rebuff, and he
resolved upon reprisals by enforcing the proclamation of 1609 and
exacting a toll from all foreign vessels fishing in British waters.
Great was the indignation in Holland, and the fishing fleet in 1617
set sail with an armed convoy. A Scottish official named Browne,
who came to collect the toll, was seized and carried as a prisoner
to Holland. James at once laid hands on two Dutch skippers in the
Thames, as hostages, and demanded satisfaction for the outrage upon
his officer. Neither side would at first give way, and it was not
until after some months that an accommodation was patched up. The
general question of the fishery privileges remained[pg.126]
however just as far from settlement as ever, for the States stood
firm upon their treaty rights. At length it was resolved by the
States to send a special mission to England to discuss with the
king the four burning questions embittering the relations between
the two countries. The envoys arrived in London, December, 1618.
For seven months the parleyings went on without any definite result
being reached, and in August, 1619, the embassy returned. Very
important events had meanwhile been occurring both in the United
Provinces and in Germany, which made it necessary to both parties
that the decision on these trade questions, important as they were,
should be postponed for awhile, as they were overshadowed by the
serious political crises in Holland and in Bohemia, which were then
occupying all men’s attention.

CHAPTER IX

MAURICE AND OLDENBARNEVELDT

The conclusion of the truce did not bring, with material
progress and trade expansion, internal peace to the United
Provinces. The relations between the Prince-stadholder and the
all-powerful Advocate had long been strained. In the long-drawn-out
negotiations Maurice had never disguised his dislike to the project
of a truce, and, though he finally acquiesced, it was a sullen
acquiescence. At first there was no overt breach between the two
men, but Maurice, though he did not refuse to meet Oldenbarneveldt,
was cold and unfriendly. He did not attempt to interfere with the
old statesman’s control of the machinery of administration or with
his diplomatic activities, for he was naturally indolent and took
little interest in politics. Had he been ambitious, he might many
years before have obtained by general consent sovereign power, but
he did not seek it. His passion was the study of military science.
From his early youth he had spent his life in camps, and now he
found himself without occupation. The enemies of Oldenbarneveldt
seized the opportunity to arouse Maurice’s suspicions of the
Advocate’s motives in bringing about the truce, and even to hint
that he had been bribed with Spanish gold. Chief among these
enemies was Francis van Aerssens, for a number of years ambassador
of the States at Paris. Aerssens owed much to the Advocate, but he
attributed his removal from his post at the French court to the
decision of Oldenbarneveldt to replace him by his son-in-law, Van
der Myle. He never forgave his recall, and alike by subtle
insinuation and unscrupulous accusation, strove to blacken the
character and reputation of his former benefactor.

By a curious fatality it was the outbreak of fierce sectarian
strife and dissension between the extreme and the moderate
Calvinists which was eventually to change the latent hostility of
Maurice to Oldenbarneveldt into open antagonism. Neither of the two
men had strong religious convictions, but circumstances brought it
about that they were to range themselves irrevocably on
opposite[pg.128] sides in a quarrel between fanatical
theologians on the subject of predestination and grace.

From early times Calvinism in the northern Netherlands had been
divided into two schools. The strict Calvinists or “Reformed,”
known by their opponents as “Precisians,” and the liberal
Calvinists, “the Evangelicals,” otherwise “the Libertines.” To this
Libertine party belonged William the Silent, Oldenbarneveldt and
the majority of the burgher-regents of Holland. These men regarded
the religious question from the statesman’s point of view. Having
risen in rebellion against the tyranny of the Spanish Inquisition,
they were anxious to preserve their countrymen (only a minority of
whom were Protestants) from being placed under the heel of a
religious intolerance as narrow and bigoted as that from which they
had escaped. The “Reformed” congregations on the other hand, led by
the preachers, were anxious to summon a National Synod for the
purpose of creating a State Church to whose tenets, rigidly defined
by the Heidelberg catechism and the Netherland confession, all
would be required to conform on pain of being deprived of their
rights as citizens. The Libertines were opposed to such a scheme,
as an interference with the rights of each province to regulate its
own religious affairs, and as an attempt to assert the supremacy of
Church over State.

The struggle between the two parties, which had continued
intermittently for a number of years, suddenly became acute through
the appointment by Maurice of Jacob Harmensz, better known as
Arminius, to the Chair of Theology at Leyden, vacated by the death
of Junius in 1602. The leader of the strict Calvinist school, the
learned Franciscus Gomarus, had at the time of the appointment of
Arminius already been a professor at Leyden for eight years. Each
teacher gathered round him a following of devoted disciples, and a
violent collision was inevitable. Prolonged and heated controversy
on the high doctrines of Predestination and Freewill led to many
appeals being made to the States-General and to the Estates of
Holland to convene a Synod to settle the disputed questions, but
neither of these bodies in the midst of the negotiations for the
truce was willing to complicate matters by taking a step that could
not fail to accentuate existing discords. Six months after the
truce was signed Arminius died. The quarrel, however, was only to
grow more embittered. Johannes Uyttenbogaert took[pg.129] the
leadership of the Arminians, and finally, after consultation with
Oldenbarneveldt, he called together a convention of Arminian
preachers and laymen at Gouda (June, 1610). They drew up for
presentation to the Estates a petition, known as the
Remonstratie, consisting of five articles, in which they
defined the points wherein they differed from the orthodox
Calvinist doctrines on the subjects of predestination, election and
grace. The Gomarists on their part drew up a
Contra-Remonstratie containing seven articles, and they
declined to submit to any decision on matters of doctrine, save
from a purely Church Synod. These two weighty declarations gained
for the two parties henceforth the names of Remonstrants and
Contra-Remonstrants. For the next three years a fierce controversy
raged in every province, pulpit replying to pulpit, and pamphlet to
pamphlet. The Contra-Remonstrants roundly accused their adversaries
of holding Pelagian and Socinian opinions and of being Papists in
disguise. This last accusation drew to their side the great
majority of the Protestant population, but the Remonstrants had
many adherents among the burgher-regents, and they could count upon
a majority in the Estates of Holland, Utrecht and Overyssel, and
they had the powerful support of Oldenbarneveldt.

The Advocate was no theologian, and on the doctrinal points in
dispute he probably held no very clear views. He inclined, however,
to the Arminians because of their greater tolerance, and above all
for their readiness to acknowledge the authority of the State as
supreme, in religious as well as in civil matters. He was anxious
to bring about an accommodation which should give satisfaction to
both parties, but he was dealing with fanatics, and the fires of
religious bigotry when once kindled are difficult to quench. And
now was seen a curious object lesson in the many-headed character
of the government of the United Netherlands. A majority of the
provinces in the States-General favoured the Contra-Remonstrants.
The Estates of Holland, however, under the influence of
Oldenbarneveldt by a small majority refused the Contra-Remonstrant
demand and resolved to take drastic action against the Gomarists.
But a number of the representative towns in Holland, and among them
Amsterdam, declined to enforce the resolution. At Rotterdam, on the
other hand, and in the other town-councils, where the Arminians had
the majority, the Gomarist preachers were expelled from their
pulpits; and the Advocate was determined by coercion, if
necessary,[pg.130] to enforce the authority of the
Estates throughout the province. But coercion without the use of
the military force was impossible in face of the growing uprising
of popular passion; and the military forces could not be employed
without the consent of the stadholder. Thus in 1617, with the
question of civil war in Holland trembling in the balance, the
ultimate decision lay with the stadholder; and Maurice after long
hesitation determined to throw the sword of the soldier into the
scale against the influence of the statesman.

Maurice had not as yet openly broken with his father’s old
friend, whose immense services to the republic during the greater
part of four decades he fully recognised. As to the questions now
in dispute the stadholder was to an even less degree than the
Advocate a zealous theologian. It is reported that he declared that
he did not know whether predestination was blue or green. His
court-chaplain, Uyttenbogaert, was a leading Arminian; and both his
step-mother, Louise (see p. 78), to whose opinions he attached much
weight, and his younger brother, Frederick Henry, were by
inclination “libertines.” On the other hand William Lewis, the
Frisian Stadholder, was a zealous Calvinist, and he used all his
influence with his cousin to urge him to make a firm stand against
Oldenbarneveldt, and those who were trying to overthrow the
Reformed faith. Sir Dudley Carleton, the new English ambassador,
ranged himself also as a strong opponent of the Advocate. While
Maurice, however, was hesitating as to the action he should take,
Oldenbarneveldt determined upon a step which amounted to a
declaration of war. In December, 1616, he carried in the Estates of
Holland a proposal that they should, in the exercise of their
sovereign rights, enlist a provincial force of 4000 militia
(waardgelders) in their pay. Thus Holland, though a strong
minority in the Estates was in opposition, declared its intention
of upholding the principle of provincial sovereignty against the
authority of the States-General. The States-General at the instance
of the two stadholders, May, 1617, declared for the summoning of a
National Synod by a vote of four provinces against three. The
Estates of Holland, again with a sharp division of opinion but by a
majority, declined to obey the summons. An impasse was thus reached
and Maurice at last openly declared for the Contra-Remonstrant
side.

On July 23 the Prince, accompanied by his suite, ostentatiously
attended divine service at the Cloister Church at the Hague,
where[pg.131] the Contra-Remonstrants had a
fortnight before, in face of the prohibition of the Estates,
established themselves. This step was countered by decisive action
on the part of Oldenbarneveldt. A proposal was made in the Estates
of Holland, August 4, known as the “Sharp Resolution”—and it
well merited its name, for it was of the most drastic character. It
was a most unqualified declaration of provincial sovereignty, and
yet it was only passed in the teeth of a strong minority by the
exertion of the Advocate’s personal influence. By this resolution
Holland declined to assent to the summoning of any Synod, National
or Provincial, and asserted the supremacy of the Estates in matters
of religion. The municipal authorities were ordered to raise levies
of Waardgelders to keep the peace; and all officials, civil
or military, were required to take an oath of obedience to the
Estates on pain of dismissal. A strong protest was made by the
representatives of the dissenting cities headed by Reinier Pauw,
burgomaster of Amsterdam.

On the plea of ill-health Oldenbarneveldt now left the Hague,
and took up his residence at Utrecht. His object was to keep this
province firm in its alliance with Holland. He did not return till
November 6, but all the time he was in active correspondence with
his party in Holland, at whose head were the three pensionaries of
Rotterdam, Leyden and Haarlem—De Groot, Hoogerbeets and De
Haan. Under their leadership levies of Waardgelders were
made in a number of towns; but other towns, including Amsterdam,
refused, and the total levy did not amount to more than 1800 men.
Meanwhile the majority of the States-General, urged on by Maurice
and William Lewis, were determined, despite the resistance of
Holland and Utrecht, to carry through the proposal for the
summoning of a National Synod. Overyssel had been overawed and
persuaded to assent, so that there were five votes against two in
its favour. All through the winter the wrangling went on, and
estrangement between the contending parties grew more bitter and
acute. A perfect flood of pamphlets, broadsheets and pasquinades
issued from the press; and in particular the most violent and
envenomed attacks were made upon the character and administration
of the Advocate, in which he was accused of having received bribes
both from Spanish and French sources and to have betrayed the
interests of his country. The chief instigator of these attacks was
Oldenbarneveldt’s personal enemy, Francis van Aerssens, whose pen
was never idle. The[pg.132] defenders of the Remonstrant cause
and of the principles of provincial sovereignty were not lacking in
the vigour and virulence of their replies; and the Advocate himself
felt that the accusations which were made against him demanded a
formal and serious rejoinder. He accordingly prepared a long and
careful defence of his whole career, in which he proved
conclusively that the charges made against him had no foundation.
This Remonstratie he addressed to the Estates of Holland,
and he also sent a copy to the Prince. If this document did not at
the time avail to silence the voices of prejudiced adversaries
whose minds were made up, it has at least had the effect of
convincing posterity that, however unwise may have been the course
now deliberately pursued by the Advocate, he never for the sake of
personal gain betrayed the interests of his country. Had he now
seen that the attempt of a majority in the Estates of Holland to
resist the will of the majority in the States-General could only
lead to civil war, and had he resigned his post, advising the
Estates to disband the Waardgelders and yield to superior
force, a catastrophe might have been averted. There is no reason to
believe that in such circumstances Maurice would have countenanced
any extreme harshness in dealing with the Advocate. But
Oldenbarneveldt, long accustomed to the exercise of power, was
determined not to yield one jot of the claim of the sovereign
province of Holland to supremacy within its own borders in matters
of religion. The die was cast and the issue had to be decided by
force of arms.

On June 28, 1618, a solemn protest was made by the Advocate in
the States-General against the summoning of a National Synod in
opposition to the expressed opinion of the Estates of Holland; and
a threat was made that Holland might withhold her contribution to
the general fund. The majority of the States-General (July 9)
declared the raising of local levies illegal, and (July 23) it was
resolved that a commission be sent to Utrecht with Maurice at its
head to demand the disbanding of the Waardgelders in that
town.

The Estates of Holland^[5] impelled by Oldenbarneveldt now
took a very strong step, a step which could not be retrieved. They
resolved also to despatch commissioners to Utrecht to urge the
town-council to stand firm. De Groot, Hoogerbeets and two
others[pg.133] were nominated, and they at once set
out for Utrecht. Maurice, with the deputation from the
States-General and a large suite, left the Hague only a little
later than De Groot and his companions, and reached Utrecht on the
evening of the 25th. This strange situation lasted for several
days, and much parleying and several angry discussions took place.
Matters were further complicated by the news that the dissentient
towns of Holland were also sending a deputation. This news had a
considerable effect upon Colonel Ogle, the commander of the
Waardgelders in Utrecht, and his officers. They were already
wavering; they now saw that resistance to the orders of the
States-General would be useless. The Prince, who had been
collecting a body of troops, now determined on action. His force
entered the city on the evening of the 31st, and on the following
morning he commanded the local levies to lay down their arms. They
at once obeyed, and Maurice took possession of the city. The
Holland commissioners and the members of the town-council fled.
Maurice appointed a new town-council entirely Contra-Remonstrant;
and changes were made in both branches of the Estates, so as to
secure a Contra-Remonstrant majority and with it the vote of the
province in the States-General for the National Synod. Holland now
stood alone, and its opposition had to be dealt with in a fashion
even sterner than that of Utrecht.

The Remonstrant cities of Holland were still for resistance, and
attempts were made to influence the stadholder not to resort to
extreme measures. Maurice had, however, made up his mind. On August
18 the States-General passed a resolution demanding the dismissal
of the Waardgelders in Holland within twenty-four hours. The
placard was published on the 20th and was immediately obeyed. The
Estates of Holland had been summoned to meet on the 21st, and were
at once called upon to deal with the question of the National
Synod. A few days later (August 28) a secret resolution was adopted
by the majority in the States-General, without the knowledge of the
Holland deputies, to arrest Oldenbarneveldt, De Groot, Hoogerbeets
and Ledenburg, the secretary of the Estates of Utrecht, on the
ground that their action in the troubles at Utrecht had been
dangerous to the State. On the following day the Advocate, on his
way to attend the meeting of the Estates, was arrested and placed
in confinement. De Groot, Hoogerbeets and Ledenburg met with
similar treatment. After protesting the Estates adjourned[pg.134] on the 30th until September 12, the
deputies alleging that it was necessary to consult their principals
in this emergency, but in reality because the suddenness of the
blow had stricken them with terror. It was a prudent step, for
Maurice was resolved to purge the Estates and the town-councils of
Holland, as he had already purged those of Utrecht. Attended by a
strong body-guard he went from town to town, changing the
magistracies, so as to place everywhere the Contra-Remonstrants in
power. As a consequence of this action the deputies sent by the
towns were likewise changed; and, when the Estates next met, the
supporters of Oldenbarneveldt and his policy had disappeared. A
peaceful revolution had been accomplished. All opposition to the
summoning of the Synod was crushed; and (November 9) the Estates
passed a vote of thanks to the stadholder for “the care and
fidelity” with which he had discharged a difficult and necessary
duty.

Meanwhile Oldenbarneveldt and the other prisoners had been
confined in separate rooms in the Binnenhof and were treated with
excessive harshness and severity. They were permitted to have no
communication with the outside world, no books, paper or writing
materials; and the conditions of their imprisonment were such as to
be injurious to health. A commission was appointed by the
States-General to examine the accused, and it began its labours in
November. The method of procedure was unjust and unfair in the
extreme, even had it been a case of dealing with vile criminals.
The treatment of Oldenbarneveldt in particular was almost
indecently harsh. The aged statesman had to appear sixty times
before the commission and was examined and cross-examined on every
incident of the forty years of his administration and on every
detail of his private life. He was allowed not only to have no
legal adviser, but also was forbidden access to any books of
reference or to any papers or to make any notes. It was thus hoped
that, having to trust entirely to his memory, the old man might be
led into self-contradictions or to making damaging admissions
against himself. De Groot and Hoogerbeets had to undergo a similar,
though less protracted, inquisition. Such was its effect upon
Ledenburg that he committed suicide.

It was not until February 20, 1619, that the States-General
appointed an extraordinary court for the trial of the accused. It
consisted of twenty-four members, of whom twelve were
Hollanders.[pg.135]

It is needless to say that such a court had no legal status; and
the fact that nearly all its members were the Advocate’s personal
or political enemies is a proof that the proceedings were judicial
only in name. It was appointed not to try, but to condemn the
prisoners. Oldenbarneveldt protested in the strongest terms against
the court’s competence. He had been the servant of the Estates of
the sovereign province of Holland, and to them alone was he
responsible. He denied to the States-General any sovereign rights;
they were simply an assembly representing a number of sovereign
allies. These were bold statements, and they were accompanied by an
absolute denial of the charges brought against him. It was quite
useless. All the prisoners were condemned, first De Groot, then
Hoogerbeets, then Oldenbarneveldt. The trials were concluded on May
1, but it was resolved to defer the sentences until after the close
of the National Synod, which had been meeting at Dordrecht. This
took place on May 9.

Meanwhile strong and influential efforts were made for leniency.
The French ambassador, Aubrey du Maurier, during the trial did his
utmost to secure fair treatment for the Advocate; and a special
envoy, Châtillon, was sent from Paris to express the French
king’s firm belief in the aged statesman’s integrity and patriotism
based on an intimate knowledge of all the diplomatic proceedings
during and after the negotiations for the Truce. But these
representations had no effect and were indeed resented. Equally
unfruitful were the efforts made by Louise de Coligny to soften the
severity of her step-son’s attitude. Even William Lewis wrote to
Maurice not to proceed too harshly in the matter. All was in vain.
The Prince’s heart was steeled. He kept asking whether the Advocate
or his family had sued for pardon. But Oldenbarneveldt was far too
proud to take any step which implied an admission of guilt; and all
the members of his family were as firmly resolved as he was not to
supplicate for grace. Few, however, believed that capital
punishment would be carried out. On Sunday, May 12, however,
sentence of death was solemnly pronounced; and on the following
morning the head of the great statesman and patriot was stricken
off on a scaffold erected in the Binnenhof immediately in front of
the windows of Maurice’s residence. The Advocate’s last words were
a protestation of his absolute innocence of the charge of being a
traitor to his country; and posterity has endorsed the
declaration.[pg.136]

That Oldenbarneveldt had in the last two years of his life acted
indiscreetly and arrogantly there can be no question. His long
tenure of power had made him impatient of contradiction; and,
having once committed himself to a certain course of action, he
determined to carry it through in the teeth of opposition,
regardless of consequences and with a narrow obstinacy of temper
that aroused bitter resentment. His whole correspondence and
private papers were however seized and carefully scrutinised by his
personal enemies; and, had they found any evidence to substantiate
the charges brought against him, it would have been published to
the world. It is clear that not a shred of such evidence was
discovered, and that the Advocate was perfectly innocent of the
treasonable conduct for which a packed court condemned him to
suffer death. Such was the reward that Oldenbarneveldt received for
life-long services of priceless value to his country. He more than
any other man was the real founder of the Dutch Republic; and it
will remain an ineffaceable stain on Maurice’s memory that he was
consenting unto this cruel and unjust sentence.

Sentences of imprisonment for life were passed upon De Groot and
Hoogerbeets. They were confined in the castle of Loevestein. The
conditions of captivity were so far relaxed that the famous jurist
was allowed to receive books for the continuance of his studies.
Through the ingenuity and daring of his wife De Groot contrived to
escape in 1621 by concealing himself in a trunk supposed to be
filled with heavy tomes. The trunk was conveyed by water to
Rotterdam, from whence the prisoner managed to make his way safely
to France.

Concurrently with the political trials the National Synod had
been pursuing its labours at Dordrecht. On November 13 rather more
than one hundred delegates assembled under the presidency of
Johannes Bogerman of Leeuwarden. Fifty-eight of the delegates were
preachers, professors and elders elected by the provincial synods,
fifteen were commissioners appointed by the States-General,
twenty-eight were members of foreign Reformed churches. English and
Scottish representatives took an active part in the proceedings.
The Synod decided to summon the Remonstrants to send a deputation
to make their defence. On December 6 accordingly, a body of twelve
leading Remonstrants with Simon Episcopius at their head took their
seats at a table facing the assembly. Episcopius made a[pg.137] long
harangue in Latin occupying nine sessions. His eloquence was,
however, wasted on a court that had already prejudged the cause for
which he pleaded. After much wrangling and many recriminations
Bogerman ordered the Remonstrants to withdraw. They did so only to
meet in an “anti-synod” at Rotterdam at which the authority of the
Dordrecht assembly to pronounce decisions on matters of faith was
denied. Meanwhile the Contra-Remonstrant divines at Dordrecht
during many weary sessions proceeded to draw up a series of canons
defining the true Reformed doctrine and condemning utterly, as
false and heretical, the five points set forth in the Remonstrance.
On May 1 the Netherland confession and the Heidelberg catechism
were unanimously adopted, as being in conformity with Holy
Scripture, and as fixing the standard of orthodox teaching. The
Synod was dissolved eight days later. The final session was the
154th; and this great assembly of delegates from many lands, the
nearest approach to a general council of the Protestant churches
that has ever been held, came to a close amidst much festivity and
no small congratulation. No time was lost in taking action by the
dominant party against their opponents. Two hundred Remonstrant
preachers were driven into exile; and the congregations were
treated with the same spirit of intolerance as had hitherto been
the lot of the Catholics, and were forbidden the exercise of public
worship.

After the Advocate’s death, except for the persecution directed
against the Remonstrant party, the course of public affairs went on
smoothly. Maurice, who by the death of his brother, Philip William,
had in February, 1618, become Prince of Orange, was virtually
sovereign in the United Provinces. His name appeared in treaties
with eastern potentates and in diplomatic despatches, just as if he
were a reigning monarch; and the people of the Netherlands were
even at times spoken of as his subjects. But Maurice never cared to
trouble himself about the details of politics, and he now left the
management of affairs in the hands of a few men that he could
trust, notably in those of Francis van Aerssens (henceforth
generally known as lord of Sommelsdijk) and Reinier Pauw, the
influential burgomaster of Amsterdam. Aerssens had shown himself
spiteful and vindictive in his conduct towards his earlier patron,
Oldenbarneveldt, but being a clever diplomatist and gifted with
considerable powers of statesmanship, he became henceforth for
many[pg.138] years the trusted adviser and
confidant not only of Maurice, but of his successor Frederick
Henry.

The year 1620 was marked by the sudden death in June of William
Lewis, the Stadholder of Friesland. His loss was much deplored by
Maurice, who had for years been accustomed to rely upon the tried
experience and sound judgment of his cousin both in peace and war.
A few months earlier (March) Louise de Coligny had died at
Fontainebleau. She too had been from his youth the wise adviser of
her step-son, but she was deeply grieved at the fate of
Oldenbarneveldt, and after his execution left the Netherlands to
take up her residence in her native country. By the death of
William Lewis the two stadholderates of Groningen with Drente and
of Friesland became vacant. Maurice succeeded to that of Groningen,
but the Frieslanders remained faithful to the house of
Nassau-Siegen and elected Ernest Casimir, the younger brother of
William Lewis, as their stadholder.

CHAPTER X

FROM THE END OF THE TWELVE YEARS’ TRUCE TO THE PEACE OF MUENSTER
(1621-48). THE STADHOLDERATE OF FREDERICK HENRY OF ORANGE

Civil disturbances and religious persecutions were not the only
causes of anxiety to the political leaders in the United Provinces
during the crisis of 1618-19; foreign affairs were also assuming a
menacing aspect. The year 1618 saw the opening in Germany of the
Thirty Years’ War. The acceptance of the Crown of Bohemia by
Frederick, Elector Palatine, meant that the long-delayed struggle
for supremacy between Catholics and Protestants was to be fought
out; and it was a struggle which neither Spain nor the Netherlands
could watch with indifference. Maurice was fully alive to the
necessity of strengthening the defences of the eastern frontier;
and subsidies were granted by the States-General to Frederick and
also to some of the smaller German princes. This support would have
been larger, but the unexpected refusal of James I to give aid to
his son-in-law made the Dutch doubtful in their attitude. The
States, though friendly, were unwilling to commit themselves. In
the spring of 1620, however, by James’ permission, the English
regiments in the Dutch service under the command of Sir Horace Vere
were sent to oppose Spinola’s invasion of the Rhineland.
Accompanied by a Dutch force under Frederick Henry, they reached
the Palatinate, but it was too late. The fate of the King of
Bohemia was soon to be decided elsewhere than in his hereditary
dominions. Completely defeated at the battle of Prague, Frederick
with his wife and family fled to Holland to seek the protection of
their cousin, the Prince of Orange. They met with the most generous
treatment at his hands, and they were for many years to make the
Hague the home of their exile.

As the date at which the Twelve Years’ Truce came to an end drew
near, some efforts were made to avert war. There were advocates of
peace in the United Provinces, especially in Gelderland and
Overyssel, the two provinces most exposed to invasion.[pg.140]

The archdukes had no desire to re-open hostilities; and
Pecquinius, the Chancellor of Brabant, was sent to the Hague to
confer with Maurice, and was authorised to name certain conditions
for the conclusion of a peace. These conditions proved, however, to
be wholly unacceptable, and the early summer of 1621 saw Maurice
and Spinola once more in the field at the head of rival armies. The
operations were, however, dilatory and inconclusive. The stadholder
now, and throughout his last campaigns, was no longer physically
the same man as in the days when his skilful generalship had saved
the Dutch republic from overthrow; he had lost the brilliant energy
of youth. The deaths in the course of this same year, 1621, of both
the Archduke Albert and Philip III of Spain, were also hindrances
to the vigorous prosecution of the war. In 1622 there was much
marching and counter-marching, and Maurice was successful in
compelling Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, the last
success he was destined to achieve. In the course of this year the
prince’s life was in serious danger. A plot was laid to assassinate
him on his way to Ryswyck, the leading conspirator being William
van Stoutenberg, the younger son of Oldenbarneveldt. Stoutenberg
had, in 1619, been deprived of his posts and his property
confiscated, and he wished to avenge his father’s death and his own
injuries. The plot was discovered, but Stoutenberg managed to
escape and took service under the Archduchess Isabel. Unfortunately
he had implicated his elder brother, Regnier, lord of Groeneveldt,
in the scheme. Groeneveldt was seized and brought to the
scaffold.

From this time nothing but misfortune dogged the steps of
Maurice, whose health began to give way under the fatigues of
campaigning. In 1623 a carefully planned expedition against
Antwerp, which he confidently expected to succeed, was frustrated
by a long continuance of stormy weather. Spinola in the following
year laid siege to Breda. This strongly fortified town, an
ancestral domain of the Princes of Orange, had a garrison of 7000
men. The Spanish commander rapidly advancing completely invested
it. Maurice, who had been conducting operations on the eastern
frontier, now hastened to Breda, and did his utmost by cutting off
Spinola’s own supplies to compel him to raise the blockade. All his
efforts however failed, and after holding out for many months Breda
surrendered. In the spring of 1625 the prince became so[pg.141]
seriously ill that he asked the States-General to appoint his
brother commander-in-chief in his stead. Feeling his end drawing
near, Maurice’s chief wish was to see Frederick Henry married
before his death. Frederick Henry, like Maurice himself, had never
shown any inclination for wedlock and there was no heir to the
family. He had, however, been attracted by the Countess Amalia von
Solms, a lady of the suite of Elizabeth of Bohemia. Under pressure
from the dying man the preliminaries were speedily arranged, and
the wedding was quietly celebrated on April 4. Though thus hastily
concluded, the marriage proved to be in every way a thoroughly
happy one. Amalia was throughout his life to be the wise adviser of
her husband and to exercise no small influence in the conduct of
public affairs. Maurice died on April 23, in the fifty-eighth year
of his age. His forty years of continuous and strenuous service to
the State had made him prematurely old; and there can be but little
doubt that the terrible anxieties of the crisis of 1618-19 told
upon him. Above all a feeling of remorse for his share in the
tragedy of Oldenbarneveldt’s death preyed upon his mind.

The new Prince of Orange succeeded to a difficult position, but
he was endowed with all the qualities of a real leader of men.
Forty-one years old and brought up from boyhood in camps under the
eye of his brother, Frederick Henry was now to show that he was one
of the most accomplished masters of the military art, and
especially siege-craft, in an age of famous generals, for Bernard
of Saxe-Weimar, Torstenson, Turenne, Charles Gustavus and the Great
Elector were all trained in his school. He was, however, much more
than an experienced and resourceful commander in the field. He
inherited much of his father’s wary and tactful statesmanship and
skill in diplomacy. He was, moreover, deservedly popular. He was a
Hollander born and bred, and his handsome face, chivalrous bearing,
and conciliatory genial temper, won for him an influence, which for
some years was to give him almost undisputed predominance in the
State. To quote the words of a contemporary, Van der Capellen, “the
prince in truth disposed of everything as he liked; everything gave
way to his word.”

The offices and dignities held by Maurice were at once conferred
on Frederick Henry. He was elected Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland,
Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel, and was appointed
Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union and head of the
Council[pg.142] of State. During practically the
whole of his life the prince spent a considerable part of the year
in camp, but he was able all the time to keep in touch with home
affairs, and to exercise a constant supervision and control of the
foreign policy of the State by the help of his wife, and through
the services of Francis van Aerssens. The Court of the Princess of
Orange, graced as it was by the presence of the exiled King and
Queen of Bohemia, was brilliant and sumptuous, and gave to the
reality of power possessed by the stadholder more than a semblance
of sovereign pomp. During her husband’s absence she spared no pains
to keep him well-acquainted with all the currents and
under-currents of action and opinion at the Hague, and was not only
able to give sound advice, but was quite ready, when necessity
called, to meet intrigue with intrigue and render abortive any
movements or schemes adverse to the prince’s policy or authority.
The obligations of Frederick Henry to Aerssens were even greater.
The stadholder was at first suspicious of the man, whom he disliked
for the leading part he had taken against Oldenbarneveldt. But he
did not allow personal prejudice to prevent him from employing a
diplomatist of Aerssens’ experience and capacity, and, with
acquaintance, he learned to regard him, not merely as a clever and
wise councillor, but as a confidential friend.

The right conduct of foreign affairs was of peculiar importance
at the moment, when Frederick Henry became stadholder, for a change
of régime took place almost simultaneously both in
France and England. In Paris Cardinal Richelieu had just laid firm
hands upon the reins of power, and the timorous and feeble James I
died in the autumn of 1625. Richelieu and Charles I were both
hostile to Spain, and the republic had reason to hope for something
more than friendly neutrality in the coming years of struggle with
the united forces of the two Habsburg monarchies.

One of the chief difficulties which confronted the new
stadholder was the religious question. The prince himself, as was
well known, was inclined to Remonstrant opinions. He was, however,
anxious not to stir up the smouldering embers of sectarian strife,
and he made no effort to withdraw the placards against the
Remonstrants, but confined himself to moderate in practice their
severity. He recalled from exile Van der Myle, Oldenbarneveldt’s
son-in-law; made Nicholas van Reigersberg, De Groot’s
brother-in-law, a member of the council; and released Hoogerbeets
from his captivity[pg.143] at Loevestein. When, however, De
Groot himself, presuming on the stadholder’s goodwill, ventured to
return to Holland without permission, the prince refused to receive
him and he was ordered to leave the country once more.

The year 1626 was marked by no events of military importance;
both sides were in lack of funds and no offensive operations were
undertaken. Much rejoicing, however, attended the birth of a son
and heir to the Prince of Orange, May 27. The child received the
name of William. Early in the following year Sir Dudley Carleton,
as envoy-extraordinary of King Charles I, invested Frederick Henry
at the Hague with the Order of the Garter. This high distinction
was not, however, a mark of really friendlier relations between the
two countries. The long-standing disputes as to fishing rights in
the narrow seas and at Spitsbergen, and as to trading spheres in
the East Indian Archipelago, remained unsettled; and in the
unfortunate and ill-considered war, which broke out at this time
between England and France, the sympathies of the States were with
the latter. Already those close relations between the French and
the Dutch, which for the next decade were to be one of the
dominating factors in determining the final issue of the Thirty
Years’ War, were by the diplomatic efforts of Richelieu and of
Aerssens being firmly established. France advanced to the States a
large subsidy by the aid of which the stadholder was enabled to
take the field at the head of a really fine army and to give to the
world a brilliant display of his military abilities. Throughout his
stadholderate the persistent aim which Frederick Henry held before
himself was never aggression with a view to conquest, but the
creation of a scientific frontier, covered by strong fortresses,
within which the flat lands behind the defensive lines of the great
rivers could feel reasonably secure against sudden attack. It was
with this object that in 1629 he determined to lay siege to the
town of Hertogenbosch. A force of 24,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry
were gathered together for the enterprise. It was composed of many
nationalities, like all the armies commanded by Maurice and
Frederick Henry, but was admirably disciplined and devoted to its
commander. Four English, three Scottish and four French regiments,
all choice troops, raised by permission of their sovereigns for the
service of the States, formed the backbone of the force. On April
30 the town was invested.[pg.144]

Hertogenbosch, or Bois-le-duc, was strongly fortified, and so
surrounded by marshy ground, intersected by a number of small
streams, that the only way of approach for a besieging force was a
single causeway defended by the forts of St Isabella and St
Anthony. The garrison consisted of 8000 men, and the governor,
Grobendonc, was an experienced and resolute soldier.

The stadholder began by surrounding the town with a double line
of circumvallation. The marshes were crossed by dykes, and two
streams were dammed so as to fill a broad deep moat round the lines
and flood the country outside. Other lines, three miles long,
connected the investing lines with the village of Crèvecceur
on the Meuse, Frederick Henry’s base of supplies, which were
brought by water from Holland. These works completed, approaches
were at once opened against the forts of St Anthony and St
Isabella, the task being entrusted to the English and French
troops. The court of Brussels now began to take serious measures
for relieving the town. At first regarding Bolduc la pucelle
as impregnable, they had been pleased to hear that the prince had
committed himself to an enterprise certain to be a dismal failure.
Then came the news of the circumvallation, and with it alarm. The
Count de Berg was therefore ordered (June 17) at the head of an
army of 30,000 foot and 7000 horse to advance into North Brabant
and raise the siege. But the stadholder was prepared and
ceaselessly on his guard; and the Spanish general, after several
vain attempts, found the Dutch lines unassailable. With the view of
compelling Frederick Henry to follow him, Berg now marched into the
heart of the United Provinces, devastating as he went with fire and
sword, took Amersfoort and threatened Amsterdam. But the prince
confined himself to despatching a small detached force of
observation; and meanwhile a happy stroke, by which a certain
Colonel Dieden surprised and captured the important frontier
fortress of Wesel, forced the Spaniards to retreat, for Wesel was
Berg’s depot of supplies and munitions.

While all this was going on the Prince of Orange had been
pushing forward the siege operations. On July 17 the forts of St
Isabella and St Anthony were stormed. The attack against the main
defences, in which the English regiments specially distinguished
themselves, was now pressed with redoubled vigour. The resistance
at every step was desperate, but at last the moat was[pg.145]
crossed and a lodgment effected within the walls. On September 14
Hertogenbosch surrendered; and the virgin fortress henceforth
became the bulwark of the United Provinces against Spanish attack
on this side. The consummate engineering skill, with which the
investment had been carried out, attracted the attention of all
Europe to this famous siege. It was a signal triumph and added
greatly to the stadholder’s popularity and influence in the
republic.

It was needed. The Estates of Holland were at this time once
more refractory. The interests of this great commercial and
maritime province differed from those of the other provinces of the
Union; and it bore a financial burden greater than that of all the
others put together. The Estates, then under the leadership of
Adrian Pauw, the influential pensionary of Amsterdam, declined to
raise the quota of taxation assigned to the province for military
needs and proceeded to disband a number of troops that were in
their pay. Inconsistently with this action they declined to
consider certain proposals for peace put forward by the Infanta
Isabel, for they would yield nothing on the questions of liberty of
worship or of freedom to trade in the Indies. Their neglect to
furnish the requisite supplies for the war, however, prevented the
prince from undertaking any serious military operations in 1630.
Fortunately the other side were in no better case financially,
while the death of Spinola and the withdrawal of the Count de Berg
from the Spanish service deprived them of their only two competent
generals. This attitude of Holland, though it thwarted the
stadholder’s plans and was maintained in opposition to his wishes,
by no means however implied any distrust of him or lack of
confidence in his leadership. This was conclusively proved by the
passing, at the instigation of Holland, of the Acte de
Survivance (April 19,1631). This Act declared all the various
offices held by the prince hereditary in the person of his
five-year-old son. He thus became, in all but name, a
constitutional sovereign.

An expedition planned for the capture of Dunkirk at this time,
spring 1631, proved too hazardous and was abandoned, but later in
the year the Dutch sailors gave a signal proof of their superiority
at sea. Encouraged by the failure of the attempted attack on
Dunkirk the government at Brussels determined on a counter-stroke.
A flotilla of 35 frigates, accompanied by a large number of smaller
vessels to carry supplies and munitions and having on board a body
of 6000 soldiers, set sail from Antwerp under the command of[pg.146]Count John of Nassau (a cousin of the stadholder) and in the
presence of Isabel herself to effect the conquest of some of the
Zeeland islands. As soon as the news reached Frederick Henry,
detachments of troops were at once despatched to various points;
and about a dozen vessels were rapidly equipped and ordered to
follow the enemy and if possible bring him to action. A landing at
Terscholen was foiled by Colonel Morgan, who, at the head of 2000
English troops, waded across a shallow estuary in time to prevent a
descent. At last (September 12) the Dutch ships managed to come up
with their adversaries in the Slaak near the island of Tholen. They
at once attacked and though so inferior in numbers gained a
complete victory. Count John of Nassau just contrived to escape,
but his fleet was destroyed and 5000 prisoners were taken.

The year 1632 witnessed a renewal of military activity and was
memorable for the famous siege and capture of Maestricht. This
fortress held the same commanding position on the eastern frontier
as Hertogenbosch on the southern; and, though its natural position
was not so strong as the capital of North Brabant, Maestricht,
lying as it did on both sides of the broad Meuse, and being
strongly fortified and garrisoned, was very difficult to invest.
The stadholder, at the head of a force of 17,000 infantry and 4000
horse, first made himself master of Venloo and Roeremonde and then
advanced upon Maestricht. Unfortunately before Roeremonde, Ernest
Casimir, the brave stadholder of Friesland and Groningen, was
killed. He was succeeded in his offices by his son, Henry Casimir.
Arriving (June 10) before Maestricht, Frederick Henry proceeded to
erect strongly entrenched lines of circumvallation round the town
connecting them above and below the town by bridges. Supplies
reached him plentifully by the river. To the English and French
regiments were once more assigned the place of honour in the
attack. All went well until July 2, when Don Gonzales de Cordova
led a superior Spanish force from Germany, consisting of 18,000
foot and 6000 horse, to raise the siege, and encamped close to the
Dutch lines on the south side of the river. Finding however no
vulnerable spot, he awaited the arrival at the beginning of August
of an Imperialist army of 12,000 foot and 4000 horse, under the
renowned Pappenheim. This impetuous leader determined upon an
assault, and the Dutch entrenchments were attacked suddenly with
great vigour at a moment when the prince was laid up with[pg.147] the gout. He rose, however, from his
bed, personally visited all the points of danger, and after
desperate fighting the assailants were at last driven off with
heavy loss. The Spaniards and Imperialists, finding that the
stadholder’s lines could not be forced, instituted a blockade, so
that the besiegers were themselves besieged. But Frederick Henry
had laid up such ample stores of munitions and provisions that he
paid no heed to the cutting of his communications, and pushed on
his approaches with the utmost rapidity. All difficulties were
overcome by the engineering skill of the scientific commander; and
finally two tunnels sixty feet deep were driven under the broad dry
moat before the town walls. The English regiments during these
operations bore the brunt of the fighting and lost heavily,
Colonels Harwood and the Earl of Oxford being killed and Colonel
Morgan dangerously wounded. After exploding a mine, a forlorn hope
of fifty English troops rushed out from one of the tunnels and made
good their footing upon the ramparts. Others followed, and the
garrison, fearing that further resistance might entail the sacking
of the town, surrendered (August 23) with honours of war.

One result of the fall of Maestricht was a renewal on the part
of the Archduchess Isabel of negotiations for peace or a long
truce. On the authority of Frederick Henry’s memoirs the terms
first offered to him in camp were favourable and might have been
accepted. When, however, the discussion was shifted to the Hague,
the attitude of the Belgic representatives had stiffened. The cause
was not far to seek, for on November 6, 1632 the ever-victorious
Gustavus Adolphus had fallen in the hour of triumph in the fatal
battle of Lützen. The death of the Swedish hero was a great
blow to the Protestant cause and gave fresh heart to the despondent
Catholic alliance. The negotiations dragged however their slow
length along, the chief point of controversy being the old dispute
about freedom to trade in the Indies. On this point agreement was
impossible. Spain would yield nothing of her pretensions; and the
Hollanders would hear of no concessions that threatened the
prosperity of the East and West India Companies in which so many
merchants and investors were deeply interested. Any admission of a
Spanish monopoly or right of exclusion would have spelt ruin to
thousands. The diplomatic discussions, however, went on for many
months in a desultory and somewhat futile manner; and
meanwhile[pg.148] though hostilities did not actually
cease, the campaign of 1633 was conducted in a half-hearted
fashion. The death of Isabel on November 29, 1633, shattered
finally any hopes that the peace party in the Provinces (for there
was a strong peace party) might have had of arriving at any
satisfactory agreement. By the decease of the arch-duchess, who had
been a wise and beneficent ruler and had commanded the respect and
regard not only of her own subjects but of many northerners also,
the Belgic provinces reverted to the crown of Spain and passed
under the direct rule of Philip IV. The Cardinal Infante Ferdinand,
fresh from his crushing victory over the Swedes at Nördlingen,
came as governor to Brussels in 1634, at the head of considerable
Spanish forces, and an active renewal of the war in 1635 was
clearly imminent.

In these circumstances Frederick Henry determined to enter into
negotiations with France for the conclusion of an offensive and
defensive alliance against Spain, the common enemy. He had many
difficulties to encounter. The Estates of Holland, though opposed
to the terms actually offered by the Brussels government, were also
averse to taking any step which shut the door upon hopes of peace.
Richelieu on his side, though ready, as before, to grant subsidies
and to permit the enrolment of French regiments for the Dutch
service, shrank from committing France to an open espousal of the
Protestant side against the Catholic powers. The stadholder,
however, was not deterred by the obstacles in his way; and the
diplomatic skill and adroitness of Aerssens, aided by his own tact
and firmness of will, overcame the scruples of Richelieu. The
opposition of the Estates of Holland, without whose consent no
treaty could be ratified, was likewise surmounted. Adrian Pauw,
their leader, was despatched on a special embassy to Paris, and in
his absence his influence was undermined, and Jacob Cats was
appointed Council-Pensionary in his stead. In the spring of 1635 a
firm alliance was concluded between France and the United
Provinces, by which it was agreed that neither power should make
peace without the consent of the other, each meanwhile maintaining
a field force of 25,000 foot and 5000 horse and dividing conquests
in the Southern Netherlands between them. This treaty was made with
the concurrence and strong approval of the Swedish Chancellor,
Oxenstierna, and was probably decisive in its effect upon the final
issue of the Thirty Years’ War.[pg.149]

In the early spring of 1635, therefore, a French force entered
the Netherlands and, after defeating Prince Thomas of Savoy at
Namur, joined the Dutch army at Maestricht. Louis XIII had given
instructions to the French commanders, Châtillon and de
Brézé, to place themselves under the orders of the
Prince of Orange; and Frederick Henry at the head of 32,000 foot
and 9000 horse now entered the enemy’s territory and advanced to
the neighbourhood of Louvain. Here however, owing to the outbreak
of disease among his troops, to lack of supplies and to differences
of opinion with his French colleagues, the prince determined to
retreat. His action was attended by serious results. His adversary,
the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, was a wary and skilful general. He
now seized his opportunity, rapidly made himself master of Diest,
Gennep, Goch and Limburg, and took by surprise the important fort
of Schenck at the junction of the Waal and the Rhine. Vexed at the
loss of a stronghold which guarded two of the main waterways of the
land, the stadholder at once laid siege to Schenck. But the Spanish
garrison held out obstinately all through the winter and did not
surrender until April 26,1636. The Dutch army had suffered much
from exposure and sickness during this long investment and was
compelled to abstain for some months from active operations.
Ferdinand thereupon, as soon as he saw that there was no immediate
danger of an attack from the north, resolved to avenge himself upon
the French for the part they had taken in the preceding year’s
campaign. Reinforced by a body of Imperialist troops under
Piccolomini he entered France and laid the country waste almost to
the gates of Paris. This bold stroke completely frustrated any
plans that the allies may have formed for combined action in the
late summer.

The following year the States determined, somewhat against the
wishes of Frederick Henry, to send an expedition into Flanders for
the capture of Dunkirk. This was done at the instance of the French
ambassador, Charnacé, acting on the instructions of
Richelieu, who promised the assistance of 5000 French troops and
undertook, should the town be taken, to leave it in the possession
of the Dutch. The stadholder accordingly assembled (May 7) an army
of 14,000 foot and a considerable body of horse at Rammekens, where
a fleet lay ready for their transport to Flanders. Contrary winds,
however, continued steadily to blow for many weeks without
affording any opportunity for putting to sea. At last, wearied out
with the long[pg.150] inaction and its attendant sickness
the prince (July 20) suddenly broke up his camp and marched upon
Breda. Spinola, after capturing Breda in 1625, had greatly
strengthened its defences; and now, with a garrison of 4000 men
under a resolute commander, it was held to be secure against any
attack. The siege was a repetition of those of Hertogenbosch and
Maestricht. In vain did the Cardinal Infante with a powerful force
try to break through the lines of circumvallation, which the prince
had constructed with his usual skill. Called away by a French
invasion on the south, he had to leave Breda to its fate. The town
surrendered on October 10.

During the years 1637 and 1638 the ever-recurring dissensions
between the province of Holland and the Generality became acute
once more. The Provincial Estates insisted on their sovereign
rights and refused to acknowledge the authority of the
States-General to impose taxes upon them. This opposition of
Holland was a great hindrance to the prince in the conduct of the
war, and caused him constant anxiety and worry. It was impossible
to plan or to carry out a campaign without adequate provision being
made for the payment and maintenance of the military and naval
forces, and this depended upon Holland’s contribution. Amsterdam
was the chief offender. On one occasion a deputation sent to
Amsterdam from the States-General was simply flouted. The
burgomaster refused to summon the council together, and the members
of the deputation had to return without an audience. All the
prince’s efforts to induce the contumacious city to consider his
proposals in a reasonable and patriotic spirit were of no avail;
they were rejected insultingly. In his indignation Frederick Henry
is reported to have exclaimed, “I have no greater enemy, but if
only I could take Antwerp, it would bring them to their
senses.”

The immense and growing prosperity of Amsterdam at this time was
indeed mainly due to the fall of Antwerp from its high estate. To
reconquer Antwerp had indeed long been a favourite project of
Frederick Henry. In 1638 he made careful and ample preparations for
its realisation. But it was not to be. Misfortune this year was to
dog his steps. The advance was made in two bodies. The larger under
the prince was to march straight to Antwerp. The second, of 6000
men, commanded by Count William of Nassau, was instructed to seize
some outlying defences on the Scheldt before joining the main force
before the town. Count William began well,[pg.151] but, hearing a
false rumour that a fleet was sailing up the Scheldt to intercept
his communications, he hastily retreated. While his ranks were in
disorder he was surprised by a Spanish attack, and practically his
entire force was cut to pieces. On hearing of this disaster the
stadholder had no alternative but to abandon the siege.

Constant campaigning and exposure to the hardships of camp life
year after year began at this time seriously to affect the health
of the stadholder. He was much troubled by attacks of gout, which
frequently prevented him from taking his place in the field. In
1639 there were no military events of importance; nevertheless this
year was a memorable one in the annals of the Dutch republic.

It was the year of the battle of the Downs. A great effort was
made by Spain to re-establish her naval supremacy in the narrow
seas, and the finest fleet that had left the harbours of the
peninsula since 1588 arrived in the Channel in September, 1639. It
consisted of seventy-seven vessels carrying 24,000 men, sailors and
soldiers, and was under the command of an experienced and capable
seaman, Admiral Oquendo. His orders were to drive the Dutch fleet
from the Channel and to land 10,000 men at Dunkirk as a
reinforcement for the Cardinal Infante. Admiral Tromp had been
cruising up and down the Channel for some weeks on the look-out for
the Spaniards, and on September 16 he sighted the armada. He had
only thirteen vessels with him, the larger part of his fleet having
been detached to keep watch and ward over Dunkirk. With a boldness,
however, that might have been accounted temerity, Tromp at once
attacked the enemy and with such fury that the Spanish fleet sought
refuge under the lee of the Downs and anchored at the side of an
English squadron under Vice-Admiral Pennington. Rejoined by
seventeen ships from before Dunkirk, the Dutch admiral now
contented himself with a vigilant blockade, until further
reinforcements could reach him. Such was the respect with which he
had inspired the Spaniards, that no attempt was made to break the
blockade; and in the meantime Tromp had sent urgent messages to
Holland asking the Prince of Orange and the admiralties to strain
every nerve to give him as many additional ships as possible. The
request met with a ready and enthusiastic response. In all the
dockyards work went on with relays of men night and day. In less
than a month Tromp found himself at the head of 105 sail with
twelve fire-ships. They were smaller ships than those of his
adversary,[pg.152] but they were more than enough to
ensure victory. On October 21, after detaching Vice-Admiral Witte
de with 30 ships to watch Pennington’s squadron, Tromp bore down
straight upon the Spanish fleet though they were lying in English
waters. Rarely has there been a naval triumph more complete. Under
cover of a fog Oquendo himself with seven vessels escaped to
Dunkirk; all the rest were sunk, burnt, or captured. It is said
that 15,000 Spaniards perished. On the side of the Dutch only 100
men were killed and wounded. The Spanish power at sea had suffered
a blow from which it never recovered.

Charles I was very angry on learning that English ships had been
obliged to watch the fleet of a friendly power destroyed in English
waters before their eyes. The king had inherited from his father a
long series of grievances against the Dutch; and, had he not been
involved in serious domestic difficulties, there would probably
have been a declaration of war. But Charles’ finances did not
permit him to take a bold course, and he was also secretly
irritated with the Spaniards for having sought the hospitality of
English waters (as written evidence shows) without his knowledge
and permission. Aerssens was sent to London to smooth over the
matter. He had no easy task, but by skill and patience he
contrived, in spite of many adverse influences at the court, so to
allay the bitter feelings that had been aroused by “the scandal of
the Downs” that Charles and his queen were willing, in the early
months of 1640, to discuss seriously the project of a marriage
between the stadholder’s only son and one of the English
princesses. In January a special envoy, Jan van der Kerkoven, lord
of Heenvlict, joined Aerssens with a formal proposal for the hand
of the princess royal; and after somewhat difficult negotiations
the marriage was at length satisfactorily arranged. The ceremony
took place in London, May 12, 1641. As William was but fifteen
years of age and Mary, the princess royal, only nine, the
bridegroom returned to Holland alone, leaving the child-bride for a
time at Whitehall with her parents. The wedding took place at an
ominous time. Ten days after it was celebrated Strafford was
executed; and the dark shadow of the Great Rebellion was already
hanging over the ill-fated Charles. In the tragic story of the
House of Stewart that fills the next two decades there is perhaps
no more pathetic figure than that of Mary, the mother of William
III. At the time this alliance gave added lustre[pg.153] to
the position of the Prince of Orange, both at home and abroad, by
uniting his family in close bonds of relationship with the royal
houses both of England and France.

In 1640, as the Spaniards remained on the defensive, the
stadholder entered Flanders and by a forced march attempted to
seize Bruges. His effort, however, was foiled, as was a later
attempt to capture Hulst, when Frederick Henry and the States
sustained a great loss in the death of the gallant Henry Casimir of
Nassau, who was killed in a chance skirmish at the age of 29 years.
This regrettable event caused a vacancy in the stadholderates of
Friesland and Groningen with Drente. A number of zealous adherents
of the House of Orange were now anxious that Frederick Henry should
fill the vacant posts to the exclusion of his cousin, William
Frederick, younger brother of Henry Casimir. They urged upon the
prince, who was himself unwilling to supplant his relative, that it
was for the good of the State that there should be a unification of
authority in his person; and at last he expressed himself ready to
accept the offices, if elected. The result of the somewhat mean
intrigues that followed, in which Frederick Henry himself took no
part, gave a curious illustration of the extreme jealousy of the
provinces towards anything that they regarded as outside intrusion
into their affairs. The States-General ventured to recommend the
Estates of Friesland to appoint the Prince of Orange; the
recommendation was resented, and William Frederick became
stadholder. The Frieslanders on their part sent a deputation to
Groningen in favour of William Frederick, and Groningen-Drente
elected the Prince of Orange. This dispute caused an estrangement
for a time between the two branches of the House of Nassau, which
was afterwards healed by the marriage of the Friesland stadholder
with Albertine Agnes, a daughter of Frederick Henry. From this
union the present royal family of Holland trace their descent.

The military operations of the years 1641, 1642 and 1643 were
dilatory and featureless. Both sides were sick of the war and were
content to remain on the defensive. This was no doubt largely due
to the fact that in rapid succession death removed from the stage
many of those who had long played leading parts in the political
history of the times. Aerssens died shortly after his return from
his successful mission to England in the autumn of 1641; and almost
at the same time the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, who during
his[pg.154] tenure of the governor-generalship
had shown great capacity and prudence both as a statesman and as a
commander, expired. In 1642, after eighteen years of almost
autocratic rule, Richelieu passed away, his death (December 4,
1642) coming almost half-way between those of his enemy, the
intriguing Marie de’ Medici (July 3,1642), and that of her son,
Louis XIII (May 18, 1643). Anne of Austria, the sister of the King
of Spain, became regent in France; but this did not imply any
change of policy with regard to the United Provinces, for Cardinal
Mazarin, who, through his influence over the regent succeeded to
the power of Richelieu, was a pupil in the school of that great
statesman and followed in his steps. Moreover, during this same
period the outbreak of civil war in England had for the time being
caused that country to be wholly absorbed in its own domestic
concerns, and it ceased to have any weight in the councils of
western Europe. Thus it came to pass that there was a kind of lull
in the external affairs of the United Provinces; and her statesmen
were compelled to take fresh stock of their position in the changed
situation that had been created.

Not that this meant that these years were a time of less
pressure and anxiety to the Prince of Orange. His new relations
with the English royal family were a source of difficulty to him.
Henrietta Maria (March, 1642) came to Holland, bringing with her
the princess royal, and for a whole year took up her residence at
the Hague. She was received with kindliness and courtesy not only
by the stadholder and his family, but by the people of Holland
generally. Her presence, together with that of the Queen of
Bohemia, at the Princess of Orange’s court gave to it quite a regal
dignity and splendour, which was particularly gratifying to Amalia
von Solms. But the English queen had other objects in view than
those of courtesy. She hoped not merely to enlist the sympathies of
Frederick Henry for the royal cause in the English civil war, but
to obtain through his help supplies of arms and munitions from
Holland for King Charles. But in this she did not succeed. The
Parliament had sent an envoy, William Strickland, to counteract the
influence of Henrietta Maria, and to represent to the
States-General that it was fighting in defence of the same
principles which had led to the revolt against Spain. The prince
was far too prudent to allow his personal inclinations to override
his political judgment as a practical statesman. He knew that
public opinion in the United[pg.155]

Provinces would never sanction in any form active support of
King Charles against his parliament, and he did not attempt it.
Intervention was confined to the despatch of an embassy to England
with instructions to mediate between the two parties. When the
unfortunate queen found that all her efforts on behalf of King
Charles were in vain, she determined to leave the safe refuge where
she had been so hospitably entertained and to return to her
husband’s side. She sailed from Scheveningen on March 9, 1643, and
reached the royal camp at York in safety.

In the autumn of this year, 1643, two special envoys were sent
by Cardinal Mazarin to the Hague; and one of the results of their
visit was a renewal of the treaty of 1635 by which France and the
United Provinces had entered upon an offensive and defensive
alliance and had agreed to conclude no peace but by mutual consent.
Nevertheless Frederick Henry, whom long experience had made wary
and far-sighted, had been growing for some little time suspicious
of the advantage to the republic of furthering French
aggrandisement in the southern Netherlands. He saw that France was
a waxing, Spain a waning power, and he had no desire to see France
in possession of territory bordering on the United Provinces. This
feeling on his part was possibly the cause of the somewhat dilatory
character of his military operations in 1641 and 1642. The revolt
of Portugal from Spain in December, 1640, had at first been
welcomed by the Dutch, but not for long. The great and successful
operations of the East and West India Companies had been chiefly
carried on at the expense of the Portuguese, not of the Spaniards.
The great obstacle to peace with Spain had been the concession of
the right to trade in the Indies. It was Portugal, rather than
Spain, which now stood in the way of the Dutch merchants obtaining
that right, for the Spanish government, in its eagerness to stamp
out a rebellion which had spread from the Peninsula to all the
Portuguese colonies, was quite ready to sacrifice these to secure
Dutch neutrality in Europe. The dazzling victory of the French
under the young Duke of Enghien over a veteran Spanish army at
Rocroi (May, 1643) also had its effect upon the mind of the prince.
With prophetic foresight, he rightly dreaded a France too
decisively victorious. In the negotiations for a general peace
between all the contending powers in the Thirty Years’ War, which
dragged on their slow length from 1643 to 1648, the stadholder
became more and more[pg.156] convinced that it was in the
interest of the Dutch to maintain Spain as a counterpoise to the
growing power of France, and to secure the favourable terms, which,
in her extremity, Spain would be ready to offer.

At first, however, there was no breach in the close relations
with France; and Frederick Henry, though hampered by ill-health,
showed in his last campaigns all his old skill in siege-craft. By
the successive captures of Hertogenbosch, Maestricht and Breda he
had secured the frontiers of the republic in the south and
south-east. He now turned to the north-west corner of Flanders. In
1644 he took the strongly fortified post of Sas-van-Gent, situated
on the Ley, the canalised river connecting Ghent with the Scheldt.
In 1645 he laid siege to and captured the town of Hulst, and thus
gained complete possession of the strip of territory south of the
Scheldt, known as the Land of Waes, which had been protected by
these two strongholds, and which has since been called Dutch
Flanders.

Very shortly after the capitulation of Hulst, the ambassadors
plenipotentiary of the United Provinces set out (November, 1645) to
take their places at the Congress of Münster on equal terms
with the representatives of the Emperor and of the Kings of France
and Spain. The position acquired by the Dutch republic among the
powers of Europe was thus officially recognised de facto
even before its independence had been de jure ratified by
treaty. The parleyings at Münster made slow headway, as so
many thorny questions had to be settled. Meanwhile, with the full
approval of the prince, negotiations were being secretly carried on
between Madrid and the Hague with the view of arriving at a
separate understanding, in spite of the explicit terms of the
treaty of 1635. As soon as the French became aware of what was
going on, they naturally protested and did their utmost to raise
every difficulty to prevent a treaty being concluded behind their
backs. The old questions which had proved such serious obstacles in
the negotiations of 1607-9 were still sufficiently formidable. But
the situation was very different in 1646-7. The Spanish monarchy
was actually in extremis. Portugal and Catalonia were in
revolt; a French army had crossed the Pyrenees; the treasury was
exhausted. Peace with the Dutch Republic was a necessity; and, as
has been already said, the vexed question about the Indies had
resolved itself rather into a Portuguese than a Spanish question.
By a recognition of the Dutch conquests[pg.157] in Brazil and in
the Indian Ocean they were acquiring an ally without losing
anything that they had not lost already by the Portuguese
declaration of independence. But, as the basis of an agreement was
on the point of being reached, an event happened which caused a
delay in the proceedings.

The Prince of Orange, who had been long a martyr to the gout,
became in the autumn of 1646 hopelessly ill. He lingered on in
continual suffering for some months and died on March 14, 1647.
Shortly before his death he had the satisfaction of witnessing the
marriage of his daughter Louise Henrietta to Frederick William of
Brandenburg, afterwards known as the Great Elector. He was not,
however, destined to see peace actually concluded, though he
ardently desired to do so. Frederick Henry could, however, at any
rate feel that his life-work had been thoroughly and successfully
accomplished. The services he rendered to his country during his
stadholderate of twenty-two years can scarcely be over-estimated.
It is a period of extraordinary prosperity and distinction, which
well deserves the title given to it by Dutch historians—”the
golden age of Frederick Henry.” The body of the stadholder was
laid, amidst universal lamentation and with almost regal pomp,
besides those of his father and brother in the Nieuwe Kerk at
Delft.

The removal of a personality of such authority and influence at
this critical time was a dire misfortune, for there were many
cross-currents of policy in the different provinces and of
divergence of interests between the seafaring and merchant classes
and other sections of the population. Finally the skill and
perseverance of the two leading Dutch plenipotentiaries, Pauw and
Van Knuyt, and of the Spanish envoys, Peñaranda and Brun,
brought the negotiations to a successful issue. The assent of all
the provinces was necessary, and for a time Utrecht and Zeeland
were obstinately refractory, but at length their opposition was
overcome; and on January 30,1648, the treaty of Münster was
duly signed. Great rejoicings throughout the land celebrated the
end of the War of Independence, which had lasted for eighty years.
Thus, in spite of the solemn engagement made with France, a
separate peace was concluded with Spain and in the interests of the
United Provinces. Their course of action was beyond doubt
politically wise and defensible, but, as might be expected, it left
behind it a feeling of soreness, for the French naturally regarded
it as a breach of faith. The treaty of Münster[pg.158]
consisted of 79 articles, the most important of which were: the
King of Spain recognised the United Provinces as free and
independent lands; the States-General kept all their conquests in
Brabant, Limburg and Flanders, the so-called Generality lands; also
their conquests in Brazil and the East Indies made at the expense
of Portugal; freedom of trading both in the East and West Indies
was conceded; the Scheldt was declared closed, thus shutting out
Antwerp from access to the sea; to the House of Orange all its
confiscated property was restored; and lastly a treaty of trade and
navigation with Spain was negotiated. On all points the Dutch
obtained all and more than all they could have hoped for.

CHAPTER XI

THE EAST AND WEST INDIA COMPANIES. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC
EXPANSION

An account of the foundation, constitution and early efforts of
the Dutch East India Company has been already given. The date of
its charter (March 20, 1602) was later than that of its English
rival (Dec. 31, 1600), but in reality the Dutch were the first in
the field, as there were several small companies in existence and
competing with one another in the decade previous to the granting
of the charter, which without extinguishing these companies
incorporated them by the name of chambers under a common
management, the Council of Seventeen. The four chambers
however—Amsterdam, Zeeland, the Maas (Rotterdam and Delft)
and the North Quarter (Enkhuizen and Hoorn)—though separately
administered and with different spheres, became gradually more and
more unified by the growing power of control exercised by the
Seventeen. This was partly due to the dominating position of the
single Chamber of Amsterdam, which held half the shares and
appointed eight members of the council. The erection of such a
company, with its monopoly of trade and its great privileges
including the right of maintaining fleets and armed forces, of
concluding treaties and of erecting forts, was nothing less than
the creation of an imperium in imperio; and it may be said
to have furnished the model on which all the great chartered
companies of later times have been formed. The English East India
Company was, by the side of its Dutch contemporary, almost
insignificant; with its invested capital of £30,000 it was in
no position to struggle successfully against a competitor which
started with subscribed funds amounting to £540,000.

The conquest of Portugal by Spain had spelt ruin to that unhappy
country and to its widespread colonial empire and extensive
commerce. Before 1581 Lisbon had been a great centre of the Dutch
carrying-trade; and many Netherlanders had taken service in
Portuguese vessels and were familiar with the routes both to
the[pg.160] East Indies and to Brazil. It was
the closing of the port of Lisbon to Dutch vessels that led the
enterprising merchants of Amsterdam and Middelburg to look further
afield. In the early years of the seventeenth century a large
number of expeditions left the Dutch harbours for the Indian Ocean
and made great profits; and very large dividends were paid to the
shareholders of the company. How far these represented the actual
gain it is difficult to discover, for the accounts were kept in
different sets of ledgers; and it is strongly suspected that the
size of the dividends may, at times when enhanced credit was
necessary for the raising of loans, have been to some extent
fictitious. For the enterprise, which began as a trading concern,
speedily developed into the creation of an empire overseas, and
this meant an immense expenditure.

The Malay Archipelago was the chief scene of early activity, and
more especially the Moluccas. Treaties were made with the native
chiefs; and factories defended by forts were established at Tidor,
Ternate, Amboina, Banda and other places. The victories of Cornelis
Matelief established that supremacy of the Dutch arms in these
eastern waters which they were to maintain for many years. With the
conclusion of the truce the necessity of placing the general
control of so many scattered forts and trading posts in the hands
of one supreme official led, in 1609, to the appointment of a
governor-general by the Seventeen with the assent of the
States-General. The governor-general held office for five years,
and he was assisted by a council, the first member of which, under
the title of director-general, was in reality minister of commerce.
Under him were at first seven (afterwards eight) local governors.
These functionaries, though exercising considerable powers in their
respective districts, were in all matters of high policy entirely
subordinate to the governor-general. The first holders of the
office were all men who had risen to that position by proving
themselves to possess energy and enterprise, and being compelled by
the distance from home to act promptly on their own initiative,
were practically endowed with autocratic authority. In consequence
of this the Dutch empire in the East became in their hands rapidly
extended and consolidated, to the exclusion of all competitors.
This meant not only that the Portuguese and Spaniards were ousted
from their formerly dominant position in the Orient, but that a
collision with the English was inevitable.[pg.161]

The first governor-general, Pieter Both, had made Java the
centre of administration and had established factories and posts at
Bantam, Jacatra and Djapara, not without arousing considerable
hostility among the local rulers, jealous of the presence of the
intruders. This hostility was fostered and encouraged by the
English, whose vessels had also visited Java and had erected a
trading-post close to that of the Dutch at Jacatra. Already the
spice islands had been the scene of hostile encounters between the
representatives of the two nations, and had led to many
altercations. This was the state of things when Jan Pieterzoon Koen
became governor-general in 1615. This determined man, whose
experience in the East Indies was of long date, and who had already
served as director-general, came into his new office with an
intense prejudice against the English, and with a firm resolve to
put an end to what he described as their treachery and intrigues.
“Were they masters,” he wrote home, “the Dutch would quickly be out
of the Indies, but praise be to the Lord, who has provided
otherwise. They are an unendurable nation.” With this object he
strongly fortified the factory near Jacatra, thereby arousing the
hostility of the Pangeran, as the native ruler was styled.
The English in their neighbouring post also began to erect defences
and to encourage the Pangeran in his hostile attitude. Koen
thereupon fell upon the English and destroyed and burnt their
factory, and finding that there was a strong English fleet under
Sir Thomas Dale in the neighbourhood, he sailed to the Moluccas in
search of reinforcements, leaving Pieter van der Broeck in command
at the factory. The Pangeran now feigned friendship, and
having enticed Broeck to a conference, made him prisoner and
attacked the Dutch stronghold. The garrison however held out until
the governor-general returned with a strong force. With this he
stormed and destroyed the town of Jacatra and on its site erected a
new town, as the seat of the company’s government, to which the
name Batavia was given. From this time the Dutch had no rivalry to
fear in Java. The conquest of the whole island was only a question
of time, and the “pearl of the Malay Archipelago” has from 1620 to
the present been the richest and most valuable of all the Dutch
colonial possessions. Koen was planning to follow up his success by
driving the English likewise from the Moluccas, when he heard that
the home government had concluded a treaty which tied his
hands.[pg.162]

The position in the Moluccas had for some years been one of
continual bickering and strife; the chief scene being in the little
group known as the Banda islands. The lucrative spice-trade tempted
both companies to establish themselves by building forts; and the
names of Amboina and Pulo Rum were for many years to embitter the
relations of the two peoples. Meanwhile the whole subject of those
relations had been in 1619 discussed at London by a special embassy
sent nominally to thank King James for the part he had taken in
bringing the Synod of Dort to a successful termination of its
labours, but in reality to settle several threatening trade
disputes. Almost the only result of the prolonged conferences was
an agreement (June 2, 1619) by which the East India Companies were
for twenty years to be virtually amalgamated. The English were to
have half the pepper crop in Java and one-third of the spices in
the Moluccas, Amboina and the Banda islands. Forts and posts were
to remain in their present hands, but there was to be a joint
council for defence, four members from each company, the president
to be appointed alternately month by month. Such a scheme was a
paper scheme, devised by those who had no personal acquaintance
with the actual situation. There was no similarity between a great
military and naval organisation like the Dutch Company and a body
of traders like the English, whose capital was small, and who were
entirely dependent on the political vagaries of an impecunious
sovereign, whose dearest wish at the time was to cultivate close
relations with the very power in defiance of whose prohibition the
East India Company’s trade was carried on. The agreement received
indeed a fresh sanction at another conference held in London
(1622-23), but it never was a working arrangement. The bitter
ill-feeling that had arisen between the Dutch and English traders
was not to be allayed by the diplomatic subterfuge of crying peace
when there was no peace. Events were speedily to prove that this
was so.

The trade in spices had proved the most lucrative of all, and
measures had been taken to prevent any undue lowering of the price
by a glut in the market. The quantity of spices grown was carefully
regulated, suitable spots being selected, and the trees elsewhere
destroyed. Thus cloves were specially cultivated at Amboina;
nutmegs in the Banda islands. Into this strictly guarded monopoly,
from which the English had been expelled by the energy of Koen,
they were now by the new treaty to be admitted to a share.[pg.163]

It was only with difficulty that the Dutch were induced to
acquiesce sullenly in the presence of the intruders. A fatal
collision took place almost immediately after the convention
between the Companies, about the trade in the spice islands, had
been renewed in London, 1622-3.

In 1623 Koen was succeeded, as governor-general, by Pieter
Carpentier, whose name is still perpetuated by the Gulf of
Carpentaria on the north of Australia. At this time of transition
the Governor of Amboina, Van Speult, professed to have discovered a
conspiracy of the English settlers, headed by Gabriel Towerson, to
make themselves masters of the Dutch fort. Eighteen Englishmen were
seized, and though there was no evidence against them, except what
was extorted by torture and afterwards solemnly denied, twelve,
including Towerson, were executed. Carpentier admitted that the
proceedings were irregular, and they were in any case unnecessary,
for a despatch recalling Towerson was on its way to Amboina. It was
a barbarous and cruel act; and when the news of the “massacre of
Amboina,” as it was called, reached England, there was loud
indignation and demands for redress. But the quarrel with Spain
over the marriage of the Prince of Wales had driven James I at the
very end of his life, and Charles I on his accession, to seek the
support of the United Provinces. By the treaty of Southampton,
September 17, 1625, an offensive and defensive alliance was
concluded with the States-General; and Charles contented himself
with a demand that the States should within eighteen months bring
to justice those who were responsible “for the bloody butchery on
our subjects.” However, Carleton again pressed for the punishment
of the perpetrators of “the foule and bloody act” of Amboina. The
Dutch replied with evasive promises, which they never attempted to
carry out; and Charles’ disastrous war with France and his breach
with his parliament effectually prevented him from taking steps to
exact reparation. But Amboina was not forgotten; the sore rankled
and was one of the causes that moved Cromwell to war in 1654.

The activity of the Dutch in eastern waters was, however, by no
means confined to Java, their seat of government, or to the
Moluccas and Banda islands with their precious spices. Many trading
posts were erected on the large islands of Sumatra and Borneo.
Trading relations were opened with Siam from 1613 onwards. In 1623
a[pg.164] force under Willem Bontekoe was sent
by Koen to Formosa. The island was conquered and a governor
appointed with his residence at Fort Zelandia. Already under the
first governor-general, Pieter Both, permission was obtained from
the Shogun for the Dutch, under close restrictions, to trade with
Japan, a permission which was still continued, after the expulsion
of the Portuguese and the bloody persecution of the Christian
converts (1637-42), though under somewhat humiliating conditions.
But, with the Dutch, trade was trade, and under the able conduct of
Francis Caron it became of thriving proportions. During the next
century no other Europeans had any access to the Japanese market
except the agents of the Dutch East India Company.

Among the governors-general of this early period the name of
Antony van Diemen (1636-45) deserves special recognition. If Koen
laid the firm foundations of Dutch rule in the East, Van Diemen
built wisely and ably on the work of Koen. Carpentier’s rule had
been noteworthy for several voyages of discovery along the coasts
of New Guinea and of the adjoining shore of Australia, but the
spirit of exploration reached its height in the days of Van Diemen.
The north and north-west of Australia being to some extent already
known, Abel Tasman was despatched by Van Diemen to find out, if
possible, how far southward the land extended. Sailing in October,
1642, from Mauritius, he skirted portions of the coast of what is
now Victoria and New South Wales and discovered the island which he
named after his patron Van Diemen’s land, but which is now very
appropriately known as Tasmania. Pressing on he reached New
Zealand, which still bears the name that he gave to it, and sailed
through the strait between the northern and southern islands, now
Cook’s strait. In the course of this great voyage he next
discovered the Friendly or Tonga islands and the Fiji archipelago.
He reached Batavia in June, 1643, and in the following year he
visited again the north of Australia and voyaged right round the
Gulf of Carpentaria. Even in a modern map of Australia Dutch names
will be found scattered round certain portions of the coast of the
island-continent, recording still, historically, the names of the
early Dutch explorers, their patrons, ships and homes. Along the
shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria may be seen Van Diemen river,
gulf and cape; Abel Tasman, Van Alphen, Nassau and Staten rivers;
capes Arnhem, Caron and Maria (after Francis Caron and[pg.165]
Maria van Diemen) and Groote Eylandt. In Tasmania, with many other
names, may be found Frederick Henry bay and cape, Tasman’s
peninsula and Tasman’s head and Maria island; while the wife of the
governor-general is again commemorated, the northernmost point of
New Zealand bearing the name of Maria van Diemen cape.

To Van Diemen belongs the credit of giving to the Dutch their
first footing (1638) in the rich island of Ceylon, by concluding a
treaty with the native prince of Kandy. The Portuguese still
possessed forts at Colombo, Galle, Negumbo and other places, but
Galle and Negumbo were now taken by the Dutch, and gradually the
whole island passed into their hands and became for a century and a
half their richest possession in the East, next to Java. On the
Coromandel coast posts were also early established, and trade
relations opened up with the Persians and Arabs. At the time when
the Treaty of Münster gave to the United Provinces the legal
title to that independence for which they had so long fought, and
conceded to them the freedom to trade in the Indies, that trade was
already theirs, safe-guarded by the fleets, the forts and the armed
forces of the chartered company. The governor-general at Batavia
had become a powerful potentate in the Eastern seas; and a
succession of bold and able men, by a policy at once prudent and
aggressive, had in the course of a few decades organised a colonial
empire. It was a remarkable achievement for so small a country as
the United Provinces, and it was destined to have a prolonged life.
The voyage round by the cape was long and hazardous, so Van Diemen
in 1638 caused the island of Mauritius to be occupied as a
refitting station; and in 1652 one of his successors (Reinierz)
sent a body of colonists under Jan van Riebeck to form a
settlement, which should be a harbour of refuge beneath the Table
mountain at the Cape itself. This was the beginning of the Cape
colony.

Quite as interesting, and even more exciting, was the history of
Dutch enterprise in other seas during this eventful period. The
granting of the East India Company’s charter led a certain Willem
Usselincx to come forward as an earnest and persistent advocate for
the formation of a West India Company on the same lines. But
Oldenbarneveldt, anxious to negotiate a peace or truce with Spain
and to maintain good relations with that power, refused to lend any
countenance to his proposals, either before or after the truce was
concluded. He could not, however, restrain the spirit of
enterprise[pg.166] that with increasing prosperity was
abroad in Holland. The formation of the Northern or Greenland
Company in 1613, specially created in order to contest the claims
of the English Muscovy Company to exclusive rights in the whale
fishery off Spitsbergen, led to those violent disputes between the
fishermen of the two countries, of which an account has been given.
The granting of a charter to the Company of New Netherland (1614)
was a fresh departure. The voyage of Henry Hudson in the Dutch
service when, in 1610, he explored the coast of North America and
sailed up the river called by his name, led certain Amsterdam and
Hoorn merchants to plan a settlement near this river; and they
secured a charter giving them exclusive rights from Chesapeake bay
to Newfoundland. The result was the founding of the colony of New
Netherland, with New Amsterdam on Manhattan island as its capital.
This settlement was at first small and insignificant, but, being
placed midway between the English colonies on that same coast, it
added one more to the many questions of dispute between the two
sea-powers.

Willem Usselincx had all this time continued his agitation for
the erection of a West India Company; and at last, with the renewal
of the war with Spain in 1621, his efforts were rewarded. The
charter granted by the States-General (June 3, 1621) gave to the
company for twenty-four years the monopoly of navigation and trade
to the coast-lands of America and the West Indies from the
south-end of Newfoundland to the Straits of Magellan and to the
coasts and lands of Africa from the tropic of Cancer to the Cape of
Good Hope. The governing body consisted of nineteen
representatives, the Nineteen. The States-General contributed to
the capital 1,000,000 fl., on half of which only they were to
receive dividends. They also undertook in time of war to furnish
sixteen ships and four yachts, the company being bound to supply a
like number. The West India Company from the first was intended to
be an instrument of war. Its aims were buccaneering rather than
commerce. There was no secret about its object; it was openly
proclaimed. Its historian De Laet (himself a director) wrote,
“There is no surer means of bringing our Enemy at last to reason,
than to infest him with attacks everywhere in America and to stop
the fountain-head of his best finances.” After some tentative
efforts, it was resolved to send out an expedition in great force;
but the question arose, where best to[pg.167] strike? By the advice
of Usselincx and others acquainted with the condition of the
defences of the towns upon the American coast, Bahia, the capital
of the Portuguese colony of Brazil, was selected, as specially
vulnerable. Thus in the West, as in the East, Portugal was to
suffer for her unwilling subjection to the crown of Castile.

The consent of the States-General and of the stadholder being
obtained, some months were spent in making preparations on an
adequate scale. The fleet, which consisted of twenty-three ships of
war with four yachts, armed with 500 pieces of ordnance, and
carrying in addition to the crews a force of 1700 troops, sailed in
two contingents, December, 1623, and January, 1624. Jacob Willekens
was the admiral-in-chief, with Piet Hein as his vice-admiral.
Colonel Jan van Dorth, lord of Horst, was to conduct the land
operations and to be the governor of the town, when its conquest
was achieved. On May 9 the fleet sailed into the Bay of All Saints
(Bahia de todos os Santos) and proceeded to disembark the
troops on a sandy beach a little to the east of the city of San
Salvador, commonly known as Bahia. It was strongly situated on
heights rising sheer from the water; and, as news of the Dutch
preparations had reached Lisbon and Madrid, its fortifications had
been repaired and its garrison strengthened. In front of the lower
town below the cliffs was a rocky island, and on this and on the
shore were forts well provided with batteries, and under their lee
were fifteen ships of war. On May 10 Piet Hein was sent with five
vessels to contain the enemy’s fleet and cover the landing of the
military forces. But Hein, far from being content with a passive
role, attacked the Portuguese, burnt or captured all their ships
and then, embarking his men in launches, stormed the defences of
the island and spiked the guns. Meanwhile the troops had, without
opposition, occupied a Benedictine convent on the heights opposite
the town. But the daring of Piet Hein had caused a panic to seize
the garrison. Despite the efforts of the governor, Diogo de
Mendoça Furdado, there was a general exodus in the night,
both of the soldiery and the inhabitants. When morning came the
Dutch marched into the undefended town, the governor and his son,
who had refused to desert their posts, being taken prisoners. They,
with much booty, were at once sent to Holland as a proof of the
completeness of the victory. Events, however, were to prove that it
is easier for an expeditionary[pg.168] force to capture a
town at such a distance from the home-base of supplies, than to
retain it.

Governor Van Dorth had scarcely entered upon his duties when he
fell into an ambush of native levies near San Salvador and was
killed. His successor, Willem Schouten, was incompetent and
dissolute; and, when the fleet set sail on its homeward voyage at
the end of July, the garrison soon found itself practically
besieged by bodies of Portuguese troops with Indian auxiliaries,
who occupied the neighbouring woods and stopped supplies. Meanwhile
the news of the capture of San Salvador reached Madrid and Lisbon;
and Spaniards and Portuguese vied with one another in their
eagerness to equip a great expedition to expel the invaders. It was
truly a mighty armada which set sail, under the supreme command of
Don Fadrique de Toledo, from the Iberian ports at the beginning of
1625, for it consisted of fifty ships with five caravels and four
pinnaces, carrying 12,566 men and 1185 guns. On Easter Eve (March
29) the fleet entered All Saints’ Bay in the form of a vast
crescent measuring six leagues from tip to tip. The Dutch garrison
of 2300 men, being strongly fortified, resisted for a month but,
shut in by sea and by land and badly led, they capitulated on April
28, on condition that they were sent back to Holland.

That the brilliant success of 1624 was thus so soon turned into
disaster was in no way due to the supineness of the home
authorities. The Nineteen were in no way surprised to hear of great
preparations being made by the King of Spain to retake the town,
and they on their part were determined to maintain their conquest
by meeting force with force. Straining all their resources, three
squadrons were equipped; the first two, numbering thirty-two ships
and nine yachts, were destined for Brazil; the third, a small
flying squadron of seven vessels, was despatched early to watch the
Spanish ports. The general-in-chief of the Brazilian expedition was
Boudewyn Hendrikszoon. Driven back by a succession of storms, it
was not until April 17, 1625, that the fleet was able to leave the
Channel and put out to sea. The voyage was a rapid one and on May
23, Hendrikszoon sailed into the bay in battle order, only to see
the Spanish flag waving over San Salvador and the mighty fleet of
Admiral Toledo drawn up under the protection of its batteries.
Hendrikszoon sailed slowly past the Spaniards, who did not stir,
and perceiving that it would be madness to attack a superior
force[pg.169] in such a position he reluctantly
gave orders to withdraw. On the homeward journey by the West Indies
a number of rich prizes were made, but sickness made great ravages
among the crews, and counted Hendrikszoon himself among its
victims.

The events of the following year seem to show that with audacity
he might have at least inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. For in
1626 the directors, ignorant of his failure, sent out a
reinforcement of nine ships and five yachts under the command of
the redoubtable Piet Hein. Hein sailed on May 21 for the West
Indies, where he learnt that Hendrikszoon was dead and that the
remnant of his expedition had returned after a fruitless voyage of
misadventure. Hein however was not the man to turn back. He
determined to try what he could effect at Bahia by a surprise
attack. He reached the entrance to the bay on March 1, 1627, but
was unluckily becalmed; and the Portuguese were warned of his
presence. On arriving before San Salvador he found thirty ships
drawn up close to the land; sixteen of these were large and armed,
and four were galleons with a considerable number of troops on
board. The Dutch admiral with great daring determined to attack
them by sailing between them and the shore, making it difficult for
the guns on shore to fire on him without injury to their own ships.
It was a hazardous stroke, for the passage was narrow, but entirely
successful. One of the four galleons, carrying the admiral’s flag,
was sunk, the other three struck. Taking to their launches, the
Dutchmen now fiercely assailed the other vessels, and in a very
short time were masters of twenty-two prizes. It was a difficult
task to carry them off at the ebb-tide, and it was not achieved
without loss. Hein’s own ship, the Amsterdam, grounded and
had to be burnt, and another ship by some mischance blew up. The
total loss, except through the explosion, was exceedingly small.
The captured vessels contained 2700 chests of sugar, besides a
quantity of cotton, hides and tobacco. The booty was stored in the
four largest ships and sent to Holland; the rest were burnt.

Hein now made a raid down the coast as far as Rio de Janeiro and
then returned. The “Sea Terror of Delft” for some weeks after this
remained in unchallenged mastery of the bay, picking up prizes when
the opportunity offered. Then he sailed by the West Indies
homewards and reached Dutch waters on October 31, 1627, having
during this expedition captured no less than fifty-five enemy[pg.170] vessels. The value of the booty was
sufficient to repay the company for their great outlay, and it was
wisely used in the equipment of fresh fleets for the following
year.

This next year, 1628, was indeed an annus mirabilis in
the records of the Dutch West India Company. On January 24 two
fleets put to sea, one under Dirk Simonsz Uitgeest for the coast of
Brazil; another under Pieter Adriansz Ita for the West Indies. Both
were successful and came back laden with spoil. It was reserved,
however, for the expedition under Piet Hein to make all other
successes seem small. This fleet, consisting of thirty-one ships of
war, left Holland at the end of May for the West Indies with
instructions to lie in wait for the Spanish Treasure Fleet. Many
attempts had been made in previous years to intercept the galleons,
which year by year carried the riches of Mexico and Peru to Spain,
but they had always failed. After some weeks of weary cruising,
Piet Hein, when off the coast of Cuba, was rewarded (September 8)
by the sight of the Spanish fleet approaching, and at once bore
down upon them. After a sharp conflict, the Spaniards took refuge
in the bay of Matanzas and, running the galleons into shoal-water,
tried to convey the rich cargoes on shore. It was in vain. The
Dutch sailors, taking to their boats, boarded the galleons and
compelled them to surrender. The spoil was of enormous value,
comprising 177,537 lbs. of silver, 135 lbs. of gold, 37,375 hides,
2270 chests of indigo, besides cochineal, logwood, sugar, spices
and precious stones. It brought 11,509,524 fl. into the coffers of
the company, and a dividend of 50 per cent, was paid to the
shareholders. It was a wrong policy thus to deal with the results
of a stroke of good fortune not likely to be repeated. This year
was, however, to be a lucky year unto the end. A fourth expedition
under Adrian Jansz Pater which left on August 15 for the Caribbean
sea, sailed up the Orinoco and destroyed the town of San
Thomé de Guiana, the chief Spanish settlement in those
parts. All this, it may be said, partook of the character of
buccaneering, nevertheless these were shrewd blows struck at the
very source from whence the Spanish power obtained means for
carrying on the war. The West India Company was fulfilling
triumphantly one of the chief purposes for which it was created,
and was threatening Philip IV with financial ruin.

The successes of 1628 had the effect of encouraging the
directors to try to retrieve the failure at Bahia by conquest
elsewhere.[pg.171]

Olinda, on the coast of Pernambuco, was selected as the new
objective. An expeditionary force of exceptional strength was got
ready; and, as Piet Hein, at the very height of his fame,
unfortunately lost his life in the spring of 1629 in an encounter
with the Dunkirk pirates, Hendrik Cornelisz Lonck, who had served
as vice-admiral under Hein at Matanzas bay, was made
admiral-in-chief, with Jonckheer Diederik van Waerdenburgh in
command of the military forces. A considerable delay was caused by
the critical position of the United Provinces when invaded by the
Spanish-Imperialist armies at the time of the siege of
Hertogenbosch, but the capture of that fortress enabled the last
contingents to sail towards the end of the year; and Lonck was able
to collect his whole force at St Vincent, one of the Canary
islands, on Christmas Day to start on their voyage across the
Atlantic. That force consisted of fifty-two ships and yachts and
thirteen sloops, carrying 3780 sailors and 3500 soldiers, and
mounting 1170 guns. Adverse weather prevented the arrival of the
fleet in the offing of Olinda until February 13. Along the coast of
Pernambuco runs a continuous reef of rock with narrow openings at
irregular intervals, forming a barrier against attack from the sea.
Olinda, the capital of the provinces, was built on a hill a short
distance inland, having as its port a village known as Povo or the
Reciff, lying on a spit of sand between the mouths of the rivers
Biberibi and Capibaribi. There was a passage through the rocky reef
northwards about two leagues above Olinda and three others
southwards (only one of which, the Barra, was navigable for
large ships) giving access to a sheet of water of some 18 ft. in
depth between the reef and the spit of sand, and forming a
commodious harbour, the Pozo.

The problem before the Dutch commander was a difficult one, for
news of the expedition had reached Madrid; and Matthias de
Albuquerque, brother of “the proprietor” of Pernambuco, Duarte de
Albuquerque, a man of great energy and powers of leadership, had
arrived in October to put Olinda and the Reciff into a state of
defence. Two forts strongly garrisoned and armed, San Francisco and
San Jorge, defended the entrances through the reef and the neck of
the spit of sand; sixteen ships chained together and filled with
combustibles barred access to the harbour; and the village of the
Reciff was surrounded by entrenchments. Within the fortifications
of Olinda, Albuquerque held himself in readiness to oppose[pg.172] any body of the enemy that should
effect a landing above the town. Lonck, after consultation with
Waerdenburgh, determined to make with the main body of the fleet
under his own command an attempt to force the entrances to the
Pozo, while Waerdenburgh, with the bulk of the military contingent
on sixteen ships, sailed northwards to find some spot suitable for
disembarkation.

The naval attack was made on February 15, but was unavailing.
All the efforts of the Dutch to make their way through any of the
entrances to the Pozo, though renewed again and again with the
utmost bravery, were beaten off. In the evening Lonck withdrew his
ships. He had learnt by an experience, to which history scarcely
offers an exception, that a naval attack unsupported by military
co-operation against land defences cannot succeed. But Waerdenburgh
had used the opportunity, while the enemy’s attention was directed
to the repelling of the assault on the Reciff, to land his army
without opposition. At dawn the Dutch general advanced and, after
forcing the crossing of the river Doce in the teeth of the
resistance of a body of irregular troops led by Albuquerque in
person, marched straight on Olinda. There was no serious
resistance. The fortifications were carried by storm and the town
fell into the hands of Waerdenburgh. The garrison and almost all
the inhabitants fled into the neighbouring forest.

Aware of the fact that the occupation of Olinda was useless
without a harbour as a base of supplies, it was resolved at once
with the aid of the fleet to lay siege to the forts of San
Francisco and San Jorge. Despite obstinate resistance, first San
Jorge, then San Francisco surrendered; and on March 3 the fleet
sailed through the Barra, and the Reciff with the island of Antonio
Vaz behind it was occupied by the Dutch. No sooner was the conquest
made than steps were taken for its administration. A welcome
reinforcement arrived from Holland on March 11, having on board
three representatives sent by the Nineteen, who were to form with
Waerdenburgh, appointed governor, an administrative council, or
Court of Policy. The Reciff, rather than Olinda, was selected as
the seat of government, and forts were erected for its defence. The
position, however, was perilous in the extreme. Albuquerque, who
was well acquainted with the country and skilled in guerrilla
warfare, formed an entrenched camp to which he gave the name of the
Arreyal de Bom Jesus, a position defended by marshes and
thick woods. From this centre,[pg.173] by the aid of large
numbers of friendly Indians, he was able to cut off all supplies of
fresh water, meat or vegetables from reaching the Dutch garrison.
They had to depend for the necessaries of life upon stores sent to
them in relief fleets from Holland. It was a strange and grim
struggle of endurance, in which both Dutch and Portuguese suffered
terribly, the one on the barren sea-shore, the other in the
pathless woods under the glare of a tropical sun, both alike
looking eagerly for succour from the Motherland. The Dutch succours
were the first to arrive. The first detachment under Marten
Thijssen reached the Reciff on December 18, 1630; the main fleet
under Adrian Jansz Pater on April 14, 1631. The whole fleet
consisted of sixteen ships and yachts manned by 1270 sailors and
860 soldiers. Their arrival was the signal for offensive
operations. An expedition under Thijssen’s command sailed on April
22 for the large island of Itamaraca about fifteen miles to the
north of the Reciff. It was successful. Itamaraca was occupied and
garrisoned, and thus a second and advantageous post established on
the Brazilian coast.

Meanwhile the Spanish government had not been idle. After many
delays a powerful fleet set sail from Lisbon on May 5 for
Pernambuco, consisting of fifteen Spanish and five Portuguese ships
and carrying a large military force, partly destined for Bahia, but
principally as a reinforcement for Matthias de Albuquerque. The
expedition was commanded by Admiral Antonio de Oquendo, and was
accompanied by Duarte de Albuquerque, the proprietor of Pernambuco.
After landing troops and munitions at Bahia, the Spaniards wasted
several weeks before starting again to accomplish the main object
of blockading the Dutch in the Reciff and compelling their
surrender by famine. But Pater had learnt by his scouts of the
presence of Oquendo at Bahia, and though his force was far inferior
he determined to meet the hostile armada at sea. The Spanish fleet
was sighted at early dawn on September 12, and Pater at once gave
orders to attack. His fleet consisted of sixteen ships and yachts,
that of the enemy of twenty galleons and sixteen caravels. The
Dutch admiral had formed his fleet in two lines, himself in the
Prins Willem and Vice-Admiral Thijssen in the Vereenigte
Provintien being the leaders. On this occasion the sight of the
great numbers and size of the Spanish galleons caused a great part
of the Dutch captains to lose heart and hang back. Pater and
Thijssen, followed[pg.174] by only two ships, bore down however
on the Spaniards. The Prins Willem with the Walcheren
in attendance laid herself alongside the St Jago, flying the
flag of Admiral Oquendo; the Vereenigte Provintien with the
Provintie van Utrecht in its wake drew up to the St
Antonio de Padua, the ship of Vice-Admiral Francisco de
Vallecilla. For six hours the duel between the Prins Willem
and the St Jago went on with fierce desperation, the captain
of the Walcheren gallantly holding at bay the galleons who
attempted to come to the rescue of Oquendo. At 4 p. m. the St
Jago was a floating wreck with only a remnant of her crew
surviving, when suddenly a fire broke out in the Prins
Willem, which nothing could check. With difficulty the St
Jago drew off and, finding that his vessel was lost, Pater,
refusing to surrender, wrapped the flag round his body and threw
himself into the sea. Meanwhile success had attended Thijssen. The
lagging Dutch ships coming up gradually threatened the convoy of
Spanish transports and drew off many of the galleons for their
protection. The Provintie van Utrecht indeed, like the
Prins Willem, caught fire and was burnt to the water’s edge;
but the vice-admiral himself sank the St Antonio de Padua
and another galleon that came to Vallecilla’s help, and captured a
third. It was a bloody and apparently indecisive fight, but the
Dutch enjoyed the fruits of victory. Oquendo made no attempt to
capture the Reciff and Olinda, but, after landing the troops he
convoyed at a favourable spot, sailed northwards, followed by
Thijssen.

But though relieved the position was still very serious.
Albuquerque, now considerably reinforced from his impregnable post
at the Arreyal de Bom Jesus, cut off all intercourse inland.
The Dutch even abandoned Olinda and concentrated themselves at the
Reciff, where they remained as a besieged force entirely dependent
upon supplies sent from Holland. Several expeditions were
despatched with the hope of seizing other positions on the coast,
but all of them proved failures; and, when Waerdenburgh returned
home in 1633, having reached the end of his three years’ service as
governor, all that could be said was that the Dutch had retained
their foothold on the coast of Pernambuco, but at vast cost to the
company in men, vessels and treasure, and without any apparent
prospect for the future. But pertinacity was to be rewarded. For
the period of success that followed special histories must be
consulted. In the year following the return of Waerdenburgh the
efforts of[pg.175] the Dutch authorities to extend
their possessions along the coast at the various river mouths were
steadily successful; and with the advent of Joan Maurice of Nassau
to the governorship, in 1637, the dream of a Dutch empire in Brazil
seemed to be on the point of realisation. This cousin of the Prince
of Orange was endowed with brilliant qualities, and during the
seven years of his governorship he extended the Dutch dominion from
the Rio Grande in the south to the island of Maranhão on the
north and to a considerable distance inland, indeed over the larger
part of seven out of the fourteen captaincies into which Portuguese
Brazil was divided. On his arrival, by a wise policy of
statesmanlike conciliation, he contrived to secure the goodwill of
the Portuguese planters, who, though not loving the Dutch heretics,
hated them less than their Spanish oppressors, and also of the
Jews, who were numerous in the conquered territory. Under his rule
the Reciff as the seat of the Dutch government was beautified and
enlarged; many fine buildings and gardens adorned it, and the
harbour made commodious for commerce with rows of warehouses and
ample docks. To the new capital he gave the name of
Mauritsstad.

During the earlier part of his governor-generalship Joan Maurice
was called upon to face a really great danger. The year 1639 was to
witness what was to be the last great effort (before the Portuguese
revolt) of the still undivided Spanish monarchy for supremacy at
sea. Already it has been told how a great fleet sent under Antonio
de Oquendo to drive the Dutch from the narrow seas was crushed by
Admiral Tromp at the battle of the Downs. In the same year the most
formidable armada ever sent from the Peninsula across the ocean set
sail for Brazil. It consisted of no less than eighty-six vessels
manned by 12,000 sailors and soldiers under the command of the
Count de Torre. Unpropitious weather conditions, as so often in the
case of Spanish naval undertakings, ruined the enterprise. Making
for Bahia they were detained for two months in the Bay of All
Saints by strong northerly winds. Meanwhile Joan Maurice, whose
naval force at first was deplorably weak, had managed by energetic
efforts to gather together a respectable fleet of forty vessels
under Admiral Loos, which resembled the English fleet of 1588 under
Effingham and Drake, in that it made up for lack of numbers and of
size by superior seamanship and skill in manoeuvring. At length,
the wind having shifted, the Count de[pg.176] Torre put to sea; and
on January 12, 1640, the Dutch squadrons sighted the Spaniards, who
were being driven along by a southerly gale which had sprung up.
Clinging to their rear and keeping the weather-gauge, the Dutch
kept up a running fight, inflicting continual losses on their
enemies, and, giving them no opportunity to make for land and seek
the shelter of a port, drove them northwards in disorder never to
return. By this signal deliverance the hold of the Netherlanders
upon their Brazilian conquests appeared to be assured; and, as has
been already stated, Joan Maurice took full advantage of the
opportunity that was offered to him to consolidate and extend them.
A sudden change of political circumstances was, however, to bring
to a rapid downfall a dominion which had never rested on a sound
basis.

The revolt of Portugal in 1641 was at first hailed in the United
Provinces as the entry of a new ally into the field against their
ancient enemy the Spaniard. But it was soon perceived that there
could be no friendship with independent Portugal, unless both the
East and West India Companies withdrew from the territories they
had occupied overseas entirely at the expense of the Portuguese.
King João IV and his advisers at Lisbon, face to face as
they were with the menacing Spanish power, showed willingness to
make great concessions, but they could not control the spirit which
animated the settlers in the colonies themselves. Everywhere the
Spanish yoke was repudiated, and the Dutch garrisons in Brazil
suddenly found themselves confronted in 1645 with a loyalist
rising, with which they were not in a position to deal
successfully. The West India Company had not proved a commercial
success. The fitting out of great fleets and the maintenance of
numerous garrisons of mercenaries at an immense distance from the
home country had exhausted their resources and involved the company
in debt. The building of Mauritsstad and the carrying out of Joan
Maurice’s ambitious schemes for the administration and organisation
of a great Brazilian dominion were grandiose, but very costly. The
governor, moreover, who could brook neither incompetence nor
interference on the part of his subordinates, had aroused the
enmity of some of them, notably of a certain Colonel Architofsky,
who through spite plotted and intrigued against him with the
authorities at home. The result was that, the directors having
declined to sanction certain proposals made to them by Joan
Maurice, he sent[pg.177] in his resignation, which was
accepted (1644). It must be remembered that their position was a
difficult one. The charter of the company had been granted for a
term of twenty-four years, and it was doubtful whether the
States-General, already beginning to discuss secretly the question
of a separate peace with Spain, would consent to renew it. The
relations with Portugal were very delicate; and a formidable
rebellion of the entire body of Portuguese settlers, aided by the
natives, was on the point of breaking out. Indeed the successors of
Joan Maurice, deprived of any adequate succour from home, were
unable to maintain themselves against the skill and courage of the
insurgent Portuguese leaders. The Dutch were defeated in the field,
and one by one their fortresses were taken. The Reciff itself held
out for some time, but it was surrendered at last in 1654; and with
its fall the Dutch were finally expelled from the territory for the
acquisition of which they had sacrificed so much blood and
treasure.

The West India Company at the peace of Münster possessed,
besides the remnant of its Brazilian dominion, the colony of New
Netherland in North America, and two struggling settlements on the
rivers Essequibo and Berbice in Guiana. New Netherland comprised
the country between the English colonies of New England and
Virginia; and the Dutch settlers had at this time established farms
near the coast and friendly relations with the natives of the
interior, with whom they trafficked for furs. The appointment of
Peter Stuyvesant as governor, in 1646, was a time of real
development in New Netherland. This colony was an appanage of the
Chamber of Amsterdam, after which New Amsterdam, the seat of
government on the island of Manhattan, was named. The official
trading posts on the Essequibo and the Berbice, though never
abandoned, had for some years a mere lingering existence, but are
deserving of mention in that they were destined to survive the
vicissitudes of fortune and to become in the 18th century a
valuable possession. Their importance also is to be measured not by
the meagre official reports and profit and loss accounts that have
survived in the West India Company’s records, but by the much
fuller information to be derived from Spanish and Portuguese
sources, as to the remarkable daring and energy of Dutch trading
agents in all that portion of the South American continent lying
between the rivers Amazon and Orinoco. Expelled[pg.178] from
the Amazon itself in 1627 by the Portuguese from Para, the Dutch
traders established themselves at different times at the mouths of
almost all the rivers along what was known as the Wild Coast of
Guiana, and penetrating inland through a good understanding with
the natives, especially with the ubiquitous Carib tribes, carried
on a barter traffic beyond the mountains into the northern
watershed of the Amazon, even as far as the Rio Negro itself. This
trade with the interior finds no place in the company’s official
minutes, for it was strictly speaking an infringement of the
charter, and therefore illegitimate. But it was characteristically
Dutch, and it was winked at, for the chief offenders were
themselves among the principal shareholders of the company.

No account of Dutch commerce during the period of Frederick
Henry would be complete, however, which did not refer to the
relations between Holland and Sweden, and the part played by an
Amsterdam merchant in enabling the Swedish armies to secure the
ultimate triumph of the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years’ War.
Louis de Geer sprang from an ancient noble family of Liège.
His father fled to Dordrecht in 1595 to escape from the Inquisition
and became prosperous in business. Liège was then, as now, a
great centre of the iron industry; and after his father’s death
Louis de Geer in 1615 removed to Amsterdam, where he became a
merchant in all kinds of iron and copper goods, more especially of
ordnance and fire-arms. In close alliance with him, though not in
partnership, was his brother-in-law, Elias Trip, the head of a firm
reputed to have the most extensive business in iron-ware and
weapons in the Netherlands. The commanding abilities of de Geer
soon gave to the two firms, which continued to work harmoniously
together as a family concern, a complete supremacy in the class of
wares in which they dealt. At this time the chief supply of iron
and copper ore came from Sweden; and in 1616 de Geer was sent on a
mission by the States-General to that country to negotiate for a
supply of these raw materials for the forging of ordnance. This
mission had important results, for it was the first step towards
bringing about those close relations between Sweden and the United
Provinces which were to subsist throughout the whole of the Thirty
Years’ War. In the following year, 1617, Gustavus Adolphus, then
about to conduct an expedition into Livonia, sent an envoy to
Holland for the purpose of securing the good offices of the
States-General[pg.179] for the raising of a loan upon the
security of the Swedish copper mines. The principal contributor was
Louis de Geer. He had, during his visit to Sweden, learnt how great
was the wealth of that country in iron ore, and at the same time
that the mines were lying idle and undeveloped through lack of
capital and skilled workmen. He used his opportunity therefore to
obtain from Gustavus the lease of the rich mining domain of
Finspong. The lease was signed on October 12, 1619, and de Geer at
once began operations on the largest scale. He introduced from
Liège a body of expert Walloon iron-workers, built forges
and factories, and was in a few years able to supply the Swedish
government with all the ordnance and munitions of war that they
required, and to export through the port of Norrköping large
supplies of goods to his warehouses at Amsterdam. His relations
with Gustavus Adolphus soon became intimate. The king relied upon
de Geer for the supply of all the necessaries for his armies in the
field, and even commissioned him to raise troops for the Swedish
service. In 1626 the Dutch merchant was appointed by the king
acting-manager of the copper mines, which were royal property; and,
in order to regularise his position and give him greater facilities
for the conduct of his enterprises, the rights of Swedish
citizenship were conferred by royal patent upon him. It was a
curious position, for though de Geer paid many visits to Sweden,
once for three consecutive years, 1626-29, he continued to make
Amsterdam his home and principal residence. He thus had a dual
nationality. Year after year saw an increasing number of mines and
properties passing into the great financier’s hands, and in return
for these concessions he made large advances to the king for his
triumphant expedition into Germany; advancing him in 1628 50,000
rixdalers, and somewhat later a further sum of 32,000 rixdalers. So
confidential were the relations between them that Gustavus sent for
de Geer to his camp at Kitzingen for a personal consultation on
business matters in the spring of 1632. It was their last
interview, for before that year closed the Swedish hero was to
perish at Lützen.

The death of Gustavus made no difference to the position of
Louis de Geer in Sweden, for he found Axel Oxenstierna a warm
friend and powerful supporter. Among other fresh enterprises was
the formation of a Swedo-Dutch Company for trading on the West
Coast of Africa. In this company Oxenstierna himself invested[pg.180] money. In reward for his many
services the Swedish Council of Regency conferred upon de Geer and
his heirs a patent of nobility (August 4,1641); and as part
repayment of the large loans advanced by him to the Swedish
treasury he obtained as his own the districts containing his mines
and factories in different parts of Sweden, making him one of the
largest landed proprietors in the country. He on his part in return
for this was able to show in a remarkable way that he was not
ungrateful for the favours that he had received.

With Christian IV of Denmark for many years the Swedes and the
Dutch had had constant disputes and much friction. This able and
ambitious king, throughout a long and vigorous reign, which began
in 1593, had watched with ever-increasing jealousy the passing of
the Baltic trade into Dutch hands, and with something more than
jealousy the rapid advance to power of the sister Scandinavian
kingdom under Gustavus Adolphus. Of the 1074 merchant ships that
passed through the Sound between June 19 and November 16, 1645, all
but 49 came from Dutch ports, by far the largest number from
Amsterdam; and from these Christian IV drew a large revenue by the
exaction of harsh and arbitrary toll-dues. Again and again the
States-General had complained and protested; and diplomatic
pressure had been brought to bear upon the high-handed king, but
without avail. Between Sweden and Denmark there had been, since
Gustavus Adolphus came to the throne in 1613, no overt act of
hostility; but smouldering beneath the surface of an armed truce
were embers of latent rivalries and ambitions ready at any moment
to burst into flame. Christian IV was a Protestant, but his
jealousy of Sweden led him in 1639 openly to take sides with the
Catholic powers, Austria and Spain. Fearing that he might attempt
to close the passage of the Sound, the States-General and the
Swedish Regency in 1640 concluded a treaty “for securing the
freedom and protection of shipping and commerce in the Baltic and
North Seas”; and one of the secret articles gave permission to
Sweden to buy or hire ships in the Netherlands and in case of
necessity to enlist crews for the same. Outward peace was
precariously maintained between the Scandinavian powers, when the
seizure of a number of Swedish ships in the Sound in 1643 made
Oxenstierna resolve upon a bold stroke. Without any declaration of
war the Swedish general, Torstensson, was ordered to lead his
victorious army from North Germany into Denmark[pg.181] and
to force King Christian to cease intriguing with the enemy.
Holstein, Schleswig and Jutland were speedily in Torstensson’s
hands, but the Danish fleet was superior to the Swedish, and he
could make no further progress. Both sides turned to the United
Provinces. Christian promised that the grievances in regard to the
Sound dues should be removed if the States-General would remain
neutral. Oxenstierna addressed himself to Louis de Geer. The
merchant on behalf of the Swedish government was instructed to
approach the stadholder and the States-General, and to seek for
naval assistance under the terms of the treaty of 1640; and, if he
failed in obtaining their assent, then he—de
Geer—should himself (in conformance with the secret article
of that treaty) raise on his own account and equip a fleet of
thirty ships for the Swedish service.

De Geer soon discovered that Frederick Henry, being intent on
peace negotiations, was averse to the proposal. The stadholder, and
the States-General acting under his influence, did not wish to
create fresh entanglements by embroiling the United Provinces in a
war with Denmark. De Geer therefore at once began on his own
responsibility to equip ships in the various seaports of Holland
and Zeeland which had been the chief sufferers by the vexatious
Sound dues, and he succeeded in enlisting the connivance of the
Estates of Holland to his undertaking. Before the end of April,
1644, a fleet of thirty-two vessels was collected under the command
of Marten Thijssen. Its first efforts were unsuccessful. The Danish
fleet effectually prevented the junction of Thijssen with the
Swedes, and for a time he found himself blockaded in a narrow
passage called the Listerdiep. Taking advantage of a storm which
dispersed the Danes, the Dutch admiral at last was able to put to
sea again, and early in July somewhat ignominiously returned to
Amsterdam to refit. For the moment King Christian was everywhere
triumphant. On July 11 he gained a signal victory over the Swedish
fleet at Colberg Heath, and he had the satisfaction of seeing
Torstensson compelled by the Imperialists to retreat from Jutland.
But the energy and pertinacity of the Amsterdam merchant saved the
situation. Though the retreat of Thijssen meant for him a heavy
financial loss, de Geer never for a moment faltered in his purpose.
Within three weeks Thijssen again put to sea with twenty-two ships,
and by skilful manoeuvring he succeeded in making his way[pg.182] through the Skagerak and the Sound,
and finally brought his fleet to anchor in the Swedish harbour of
Calmar. From this harbour the united Swedo-Dutch squadrons sailed
out and on October 23, between Femern and Laaland, met the Danish
fleet, and after a desperate conflict completely defeated and
destroyed it. Thus were the wealth and resources of a private
citizen of Amsterdam able to intervene decisively at a critical
moment in the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic between the two
Scandinavian powers. But it is not in the victory won by Marten
Thijssen that de Geer rendered his greatest service to Sweden. As
the Swedish historian Fryxell truly says, “all that was won by the
statesmanship of Oxenstierna, by the sword of Baner, Torstensson
and Wrangel, in a desolated Germany streaming with blood, has been
already lost again; but the benefits which Louis de Geer brought to
Sweden, by the path of peaceful industry and virtue, these still
exist, and bear wholesome fruit to a late posterity.”