An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

by Adam Smith


Contents

INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

BOOK I. OF THE CAUSES OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE PRODUCTIVE
POWERS OF LABOUR, AND OF THE ORDER ACCORDING TO WHICH ITS PRODUCE IS NATURALLY
DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE PEOPLE.
CHAPTER I. OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.
CHAPTER II. OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GIVES OCCASION TO THE
DIVISION OF LABOUR.
CHAPTER III. THAT THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IS LIMITED BY
THE EXTENT OF THE MARKET.
CHAPTER IV. OF THE ORIGIN AND USE OF MONEY.
CHAPTER V. OF THE REAL AND NOMINAL PRICE OF
COMMODITIES, OR OF THEIR PRICE IN LABOUR, AND THEIR PRICE IN MONEY.
CHAPTER VI. OF THE COMPONENT PART OF THE PRICE OF COMMODITIES.
CHAPTER VII. OF THE NATURAL AND MARKET PRICE OF COMMODITIES.
CHAPTER VIII. OF THE WAGES OF LABOUR.
CHAPTER IX. OF THE PROFITS OF STOCK.
CHAPTER X. OF WAGES AND PROFIT IN THE DIFFERENT
EMPLOYMENTS OF LABOUR AND STOCK.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE RENT OF LAND.

BOOK II. OF THE NATURE, ACCUMULATION, AND
EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK.
CHAPTER I. OF THE DIVISION OF STOCK.
CHAPTER II. OF MONEY, CONSIDERED AS A PARTICULAR BRANCH
OF THE GENERAL STOCK OF THE SOCIETY, OR OF THE EXPENSE OF MAINTAINING THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL.
CHAPTER III. OF THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL, OR OF
PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR.
CHAPTER IV. OF STOCK LENT AT INTEREST.
CHAPTER V. OF THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF
CAPITALS.

BOOK III. OF THE DIFFERENT PROGRESS OF OPULENCE IN
DIFFERENT NATIONS
CHAPTER I. OF THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE.
CHAPTER II. OF THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THE
ANCIENT STATE OF EUROPE, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
CHAPTER III. OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF CITIES AND
TOWNS, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
CHAPTER IV. HOW THE COMMERCE OF TOWNS CONTRIBUTED TO THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY.

BOOK IV. OF SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
CHAPTER I. OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMERCIAL OR
MERCANTILE SYSTEM.
CHAPTER II. OF RESTRAINTS UPON IMPORTATION FROM FOREIGN
COUNTRIES OF SUCH GOODS AS CAN BE PRODUCED AT HOME.
CHAPTER III. OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON THE
IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST ALL KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE
BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE DISADVANTAGEOUS.
CHAPTER IV. OF DRAWBACKS.
CHAPTER V. OF BOUNTIES.
CHAPTER VI. OF TREATIES OF COMMERCE.
CHAPTER VII. OF COLONIES.
CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM.
CHAPTER IX. OF THE AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, OR OF THOSE
SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WHICH REPRESENT THE PRODUCE OF LAND, AS EITHER
THE SOLE OR THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF THE REVENUE AND WEALTH OF EVERY COUNTRY.

BOOK V. OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH
CHAPTER I. OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.
CHAPTER II. OF THE SOURCES OF THE GENERAL OR PUBLIC
REVENUE OF THE SOCIETY.
CHAPTER III. OF PUBLIC DEBTS.

INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with
all the necessaries and conveniencies of life which it annually consumes, and
which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what
is purchased with that produce from other nations.

According, therefore, as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears a
greater or smaller proportion to the number of those who are to consume it, the
nation will be better or worse supplied with all the necessaries and
conveniencies for which it has occasion.

But this proportion must in every nation be regulated by two different
circumstances: first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its
labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the
number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are
not so employed. Whatever be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of any
particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must, in
that particular situation, depend upon those two circumstances.

The abundance or scantiness of this supply, too, seems to depend more upon the
former of those two circumstances than upon the latter. Among the savage
nations of hunters and fishers, every individual who is able to work is more or
less employed in useful labour, and endeavours to provide, as well as he can,
the necessaries and conveniencies of life, for himself, and such of his family
or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm, to go a-hunting
and fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably poor, that, from mere
want, they are frequently reduced, or at least think themselves reduced, to the
necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their
infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to
perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts. Among civilized and
thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not
labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a
hundred times, more labour than the greater part of those who work; yet the
produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often
abundantly supplied; and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he
is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and
conveniencies of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire.

The causes of this improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the
order according to which its produce is naturally distributed among the
different ranks and conditions of men in the society, make the subject of the
first book of this Inquiry.

Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which
labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual
supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the proportion
between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and
that of those who are not so employed. The number of useful and productive
labourers, it will hereafter appear, is everywhere in proportion to the
quantity of capital stock which is employed in setting them to work, and to the
particular way in which it is so employed. The second book, therefore, treats
of the nature of capital stock, of the manner in which it is gradually
accumulated, and of the different quantities of labour which it puts into
motion, according to the different ways in which it is employed.

Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity, and judgment, in the
application of labour, have followed very different plans in the general
conduct or direction of it; and those plans have not all been equally
favourable to the greatness of its produce. The policy of some nations has
given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the country; that of
others to the industry of towns. Scarce any nation has dealt equally and
impartially with every sort of industry. Since the down-fall of the Roman
empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufactures,
and commerce, the industry of towns, than to agriculture, the Industry of the
country. The circumstances which seem to have introduced and established this
policy are explained in the third book.

Though those different plans were, perhaps, first introduced by the private
interests and prejudices of particular orders of men, without any regard to, or
foresight of, their consequences upon the general welfare of the society; yet
they have given occasion to very different theories of political economy; of
which some magnify the importance of that industry which is carried on in
towns, others of that which is carried on in the country. Those theories have
had a considerable influence, not only upon the opinions of men of learning,
but upon the public conduct of princes and sovereign states. I have
endeavoured, in the fourth book, to explain as fully and distinctly as I can
those different theories, and the principal effects which they have produced in
different ages and nations.

To explain in what has consisted the revenue of the great body of the people,
or what has been the nature of those funds, which, in different ages and
nations, have supplied their annual consumption, is the object of these four
first books. The fifth and last book treats of the revenue of the sovereign, or
commonwealth. In this book I have endeavoured to shew, first, what are the
necessary expenses of the sovereign, or commonwealth; which of those expenses
ought to be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society, and
which of them, by that of some particular part only, or of some particular
members of it: secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole
society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expenses incumbent on
the whole society, and what are the principal advantages and inconveniencies of
each of those methods; and, thirdly and lastly, what are the reasons and causes
which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this
revenue, or to contract debts; and what have been the effects of those debts
upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land and labour of the society.

BOOK I.
OF THE CAUSES OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE PRODUCTIVE POWERS OF LABOUR, AND OF THE
ORDER ACCORDING TO WHICH ITS PRODUCE IS NATURALLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE
DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE PEOPLE.

CHAPTER I.
OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labour, and the greater
part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which it is anywhere directed,
or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour. The
effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be
more easily understood, by considering in what manner it operates in some
particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in some
very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than
in others of more importance: but in those trifling manufactures which are
destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole
number of workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every
different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse,
and placed at once under the view of the spectator.

In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the
great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work
employs so great a number of workmen, that it is impossible to collect them all
into the same workhouse. We can seldom see more, at one time, than those
employed in one single branch. Though in such manufactures, therefore, the work
may really be divided into a much greater number of parts, than in those of a
more trifling nature, the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly
been much less observed.

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture, but one in
which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of
a pin-maker: a workman not educated to this business (which the division of
labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the
machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour
has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry,
make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in
which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar
trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part
are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire; another straights it;
a third cuts it; a fourth points it; a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving
the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it
on is a peculiar business; to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by
itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin
is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in
some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the
same man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small
manufactory of this kind, where ten men only were employed, and where some of
them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they
were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary
machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about
twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand
pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them
upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a
tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four
thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately
and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this
peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty,
perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and
fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth, part of what they are
at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and
combination of their different operations.

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour are
similar to what they are in this very trifling one, though, in many of them,
the labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a
simplicity of operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can be
introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the
productive powers of labour. The separation of different trades and employments
from one another, seems to have taken place in consequence of this advantage.
This separation, too, is generally carried furthest in those countries which
enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement; what is the work of one
man, in a rude state of society, being generally that of several in an improved
one. In every improved society, the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer;
the manufacturer, nothing but a manufacturer. The labour, too, which is
necessary to produce any one complete manufacture, is almost always divided
among a great number of hands. How many different trades are employed in each
branch of the linen and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and
the wool, to the bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and
dressers of the cloth! The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so
many subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business
from another, as manufactures. It is impossible to separate so entirely the
business of the grazier from that of the corn-farmer, as the trade of the
carpenter is commonly separated from that of the smith. The spinner is almost
always a distinct person from the weaver; but the ploughman, the harrower, the
sower of the seed, and the reaper of the corn, are often the same. The
occasions for those different sorts of labour returning with the different
seasons of the year, it is impossible that one man should be constantly
employed in any one of them. This impossibility of making so complete and
entire a separation of all the different branches of labour employed in
agriculture, is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the productive powers
of labour, in this art, does not always keep pace with their improvement in
manufactures. The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their
neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly
more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former. Their
lands are in general better cultivated, and having more labour and expense
bestowed upon them, produce more in proportion to the extent and natural
fertility of the ground. But this superiority of produce is seldom much more
than in proportion to the superiority of labour and expense. In agriculture,
the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than that of
the poor; or, at least, it is never so much more productive, as it commonly is
in manufactures. The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in
the same degree of goodness, come cheaper to market than that of the poor. The
corn of Poland, in the same degree of goodness, is as cheap as that of France,
notwithstanding the superior opulence and improvement of the latter country.
The corn of France is, in the corn-provinces, fully as good, and in most years
nearly about the same price with the corn of England, though, in opulence and
improvement, France is perhaps inferior to England. The corn-lands of England,
however, are better cultivated than those of France, and the corn-lands of
France are said to be much better cultivated than those of Poland. But though
the poor country, notwithstanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in
some measure, rival the rich in the cheapness and goodness of its corn, it can
pretend to no such competition in its manufactures, at least if those
manufactures suit the soil, climate, and situation, of the rich country. The
silks of France are better and cheaper than those of England, because the silk
manufacture, at least under the present high duties upon the importation of raw
silk, does not so well suit the climate of England as that of France. But the
hardware and the coarse woollens of England are beyond all comparison superior
to those of France, and much cheaper, too, in the same degree of goodness. In
Poland there are said to be scarce any manufactures of any kind, a few of those
coarser household manufactures excepted, without which no country can well
subsist.

This great increase in the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the
division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is
owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in
every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly
lost in passing from one species of work to another; and, lastly, to the
invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour,
and enable one man to do the work of many.

First, the improvement of the dexterity of the workmen, necessarily increases
the quantity of the work he can perform; and the division of labour, by
reducing every man’s business to some one simple operation, and by making
this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increases very much
the dexterity of the workman. A common smith, who, though accustomed to handle
the hammer, has never been used to make nails, if, upon some particular
occasion, he is obliged to attempt it, will scarce, I am assured, be able to
make above two or three hundred nails in a day, and those, too, very bad ones.
A smith who has been accustomed to make nails, but whose sole or principal
business has not been that of a nailer, can seldom, with his utmost diligence,
make more than eight hundred or a thousand nails in a day. I have seen several
boys, under twenty years of age, who had never exercised any other trade but
that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themselves, could make, each
of them, upwards of two thousand three hundred nails in a day. The making of a
nail, however, is by no means one of the simplest operations. The same person
blows the bellows, stirs or mends the fire as there is occasion, heats the
iron, and forges every part of the nail: in forging the head, too, he is
obliged to change his tools. The different operations into which the making of
a pin, or of a metal button, is subdivided, are all of them much more simple,
and the dexterity of the person, of whose life it has been the sole business to
perform them, is usually much greater. The rapidity with which some of the
operations of those manufactures are performed, exceeds what the human hand
could, by those who had never seen them, be supposed capable of acquiring.

Secondly, the advantage which is gained by saving the time commonly lost in
passing from one sort of work to another, is much greater than we should at
first view be apt to imagine it. It is impossible to pass very quickly from one
kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different place, and with
quite different tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a small farm, must lose
a good deal of time in passing from his loom to the field, and from the field
to his loom. When the two trades can be carried on in the same workhouse, the
loss of time is, no doubt, much less. It is, even in this case, however, very
considerable. A man commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one
sort of employment to another. When he first begins the new work, he is seldom
very keen and hearty; his mind, as they say, does not go to it, and for some
time he rather trifles than applies to good purpose. The habit of sauntering,
and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or rather
necessarily, acquired by every country workman who is obliged to change his
work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different
ways almost every day of his life, renders him almost always slothful and lazy,
and incapable of any vigorous application, even on the most pressing occasions.
Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in point of dexterity, this cause
alone must always reduce considerably the quantity of work which he is capable
of performing.

Thirdly, and lastly, everybody must be sensible how much labour is facilitated
and abridged by the application of proper machinery. It is unnecessary to give
any example. I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those
machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have
been originally owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to
discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole
attention of their minds is directed towards that single object, than when it
is dissipated among a great variety of things. But, in consequence of the
division of labour, the whole of every man’s attention comes naturally to
be directed towards some one very simple object. It is naturally to be
expected, therefore, that some one or other of those who are employed in each
particular branch of labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of
performing their own particular work, whenever the nature of it admits of such
improvement. A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in
which labour is most subdivided, were originally the invention of common
workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation,
naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods
of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures,
must frequently have been shewn very pretty machines, which were the inventions
of such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part
of the work. In the first fire engines {this was the current designation for
steam engines}, a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the
communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston
either ascended or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play with his
companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which
opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open
and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself
with his play-fellows. One of the greatest improvements that has been made upon
this machine, since it was first invented, was in this manner the discovery of
a boy who wanted to save his own labour.

All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the
inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements
have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make
them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are
called philosophers, or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any
thing, but to observe every thing, and who, upon that account, are often
capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar
objects in the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like
every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a
particular class of citizens. Like every other employment, too, it is
subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords
occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision
of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves
dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own
peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science
is considerably increased by it.

It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed
society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of
the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of
beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman being exactly
in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own
goods for a great quantity or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a
great quantity of theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have
occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion for,
and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different ranks of the
society.

Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or daylabourer in a
civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of
people, of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in
procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen coat,
for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may
appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The
shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the
scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others,
must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely
production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed
in transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often
live in a very distant part of the country? How much commerce and navigation in
particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must
have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of
by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world? What a
variety of labour, too, is necessary in order to produce the tools of the
meanest of those workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the
ship of the sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let
us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that
very simple machine, the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The
miner, the builder of the furnace for smelting the ore, the feller of the
timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made use of in the smelting-house, the
brickmaker, the bricklayer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the millwright,
the forger, the smith, must all of them join their different arts in order to
produce them. Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the different parts
of his dress and household furniture, the coarse linen shirt which he wears
next his skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which he lies on, and
all the different parts which compose it, the kitchen-grate at which he
prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that purpose, dug
from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him, perhaps, by a long sea and a
long land-carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all the furniture of
his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon which he
serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing
his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets in the heat and the light,
and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requisite
for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which these northern
parts of the world could scarce have afforded a very comfortable habitation,
together with the tools of all the different workmen employed in producing
those different conveniencies; if we examine, I say, all these things, and
consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be
sensible that, without the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the
very meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided, even
according to, what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which
he is commonly accommodated. Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant luxury
of the great, his accommodation must no doubt appear extremely simple and easy;
and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of an European prince
does not always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant, as
the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African king, the
absolute masters of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages.

CHAPTER II.
OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GIVES OCCASION TO THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not
originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that
general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very
slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature, which
has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another.

Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of
which no further account can be given, or whether, as seems more probable, it
be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs
not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found
in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other
species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have
sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her
towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns
her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of
the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that
particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of
one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal, by its
gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am
willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either
of a man, or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion, but to
gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam,
and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of
its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses
the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging
them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and
fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do
this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need
of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is
scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every
other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is
entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance
of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help
of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence
only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in
his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what
he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes
to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want,
is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain
from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in
need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a
beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.
Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed
people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though
this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which
he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has
occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the
same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase.
With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which
another bestows upon him he exchanges for other clothes which suit him better,
or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food,
clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another
the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it
is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the
division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person
makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any
other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison, with his
companions; and he finds at last that he can, in this manner, get more cattle
and venison, than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard
to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his
chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the
frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to
be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with
cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate
himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter.
In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier; a fourth, a tanner or
dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And
thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the
produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for
such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion
for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to
cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent of genius he may possess for
that particular species of business.

The difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality, much less
than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to
distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not
upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour.
The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher
and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from
nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came in to the world,
and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps,
very much alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any
remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed
in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken
notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is
willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to
truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every
necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same
duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have been no such
difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference
of talents.

As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so remarkable
among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which
renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals, acknowledged to be all
of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of
genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place
among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so
different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a grey-hound, or a
grey-hound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd’s dog. Those
different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species are of
scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least
supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the
spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd’s dog. The effects of those
different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter
and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least
contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each
animal is still obliged to support and defend itself, separately and
independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents
with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary,
the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces
of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and
exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may
purchase whatever part of the produce of other men’s talents he has
occasion for.

CHAPTER III.
THAT THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IS LIMITED BY THE EXTENT OF THE MARKET.

As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour,
so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that
power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very
small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one
employment, for want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the
produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for
such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for.

There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried
on nowhere but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find employment and
subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too narrow a sphere for
him; even an ordinary market-town is scarce large enough to afford him constant
occupation. In the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered
about in so desert a country as the highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be
butcher, baker, and brewer, for his own family. In such situations we can
scarce expect to find even a smith, a carpenter, or a mason, within less than
twenty miles of another of the same trade. The scattered families that live at
eight or ten miles distance from the nearest of them, must learn to perform
themselves a great number of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous
countries, they would call in the assistance of those workmen. Country workmen
are almost everywhere obliged to apply themselves to all the different branches
of industry that have so much affinity to one another as to be employed about
the same sort of materials. A country carpenter deals in every sort of work
that is made of wood; a country smith in every sort of work that is made of
iron. The former is not only a carpenter, but a joiner, a cabinet-maker, and
even a carver in wood, as well as a wheel-wright, a plough-wright, a cart and
waggon-maker. The employments of the latter are still more various. It is
impossible there should be such a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote
and inland parts of the highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at the rate of a
thousand nails a-day, and three hundred working days in the year, will make
three hundred thousand nails in the year. But in such a situation it would be
impossible to dispose of one thousand, that is, of one day’s work in the
year. As by means of water-carriage, a more extensive market is opened to every
sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the
sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind
naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till
a long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland parts
of the country. A broad-wheeled waggon, attended by two men, and drawn by eight
horses, in about six weeks time, carries and brings back between London and
Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the same time a ship
navigated by six or eight men, and sailing between the ports of London and
Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six
or eight men, therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring
back, in the same time, the same quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh
as fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by a hundred men, and drawn by four
hundred horses. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by the
cheapest land-carriage from London to Edinburgh, there must be charged the
maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the maintenance and what
is nearly equal to maintenance the wear and tear of four hundred horses, as
well as of fifty great waggons. Whereas, upon the same quantity of goods
carried by water, there is to be charged only the maintenance of six or eight
men, and the wear and tear of a ship of two hundred tons burthen, together with
the value of the superior risk, or the difference of the insurance between land
and water-carriage. Were there no other communication between those two places,
therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be transported from the one
to the other, except such whose price was very considerable in proportion to
their weight, they could carry on but a small part of that commerce which at
present subsists between them, and consequently could give but a small part of
that encouragement which they at present mutually afford to each other’s
industry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the distant
parts of the world. What goods could bear the expense of land-carriage between
London and Calcutta? Or if there were any so precious as to be able to support
this expense, with what safety could they be transported through the
territories of so many barbarous nations? Those two cities, however, at present
carry on a very considerable commerce with each other, and by mutually
affording a market, give a good deal of encouragement to each other’s
industry.

Since such, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural that
the first improvements of art and industry should be made where this
conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every sort of
labour, and that they should always be much later in extending themselves into
the inland parts of the country. The inland parts of the country can for a long
time have no other market for the greater part of their goods, but the country
which lies round about them, and separates them from the sea-coast, and the
great navigable rivers. The extent of the market, therefore, must for a long
time be in proportion to the riches and populousness of that country, and
consequently their improvement must always be posterior to the improvement of
that country. In our North American colonies, the plantations have constantly
followed either the sea-coast or the banks of the navigable rivers, and have
scarce anywhere extended themselves to any considerable distance from both.

The nations that, according to the best authenticated history, appear to have
been first civilized, were those that dwelt round the coast of the
Mediterranean sea. That sea, by far the greatest inlet that is known in the
world, having no tides, nor consequently any waves, except such as are caused
by the wind only, was, by the smoothness of its surface, as well as by the
multitude of its islands, and the proximity of its neighbouring shores,
extremely favourable to the infant navigation of the world; when, from their
ignorance of the compass, men were afraid to quit the view of the coast, and
from the imperfection of the art of ship-building, to abandon themselves to the
boisterous waves of the ocean. To pass beyond the pillars of Hercules, that is,
to sail out of the straits of Gibraltar, was, in the ancient world, long
considered as a most wonderful and dangerous exploit of navigation. It was late
before even the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, the most skilful navigators and
ship-builders of those old times, attempted it; and they were, for a long time,
the only nations that did attempt it.

Of all the countries on the coast of the Mediterranean sea, Egypt seems to have
been the first in which either agriculture or manufactures were cultivated and
improved to any considerable degree. Upper Egypt extends itself nowhere above a
few miles from the Nile; and in Lower Egypt, that great river breaks itself
into many different canals, which, with the assistance of a little art, seem to
have afforded a communication by water-carriage, not only between all the great
towns, but between all the considerable villages, and even to many farm-houses
in the country, nearly in the same manner as the Rhine and the Maese do in
Holland at present. The extent and easiness of this inland navigation was
probably one of the principal causes of the early improvement of Egypt.

The improvements in agriculture and manufactures seem likewise to have been of
very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal, in the East Indies, and in
some of the eastern provinces of China, though the great extent of this
antiquity is not authenticated by any histories of whose authority we, in this
part of the world, are well assured. In Bengal, the Ganges, and several other
great rivers, form a great number of navigable canals, in the same manner as
the Nile does in Egypt. In the eastern provinces of China, too, several great
rivers form, by their different branches, a multitude of canals, and, by
communicating with one another, afford an inland navigation much more extensive
than that either of the Nile or the Ganges, or, perhaps, than both of them put
together. It is remarkable, that neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the
Indians, nor the Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce, but seem all to have
derived their great opulence from this inland navigation.

All the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Asia which lies any
considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the ancient Scythia, the
modern Tartary and Siberia, seem, in all ages of the world, to have been in the
same barbarous and uncivilized state in which we find them at present. The sea
of Tartary is the frozen ocean, which admits of no navigation; and though some
of the greatest rivers in the world run through that country, they are at too
great a distance from one another to carry commerce and communication through
the greater part of it. There are in Africa none of those great inlets, such as
the Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine seas in
both Europe and Asia, and the gulfs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam,
in Asia, to carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great
continent; and the great rivers of Africa are at too great a distance from one
another to give occasion to any considerable inland navigation. The commerce,
besides, which any nation can carry on by means of a river which does not break
itself into any great number of branches or canals, and which runs into another
territory before it reaches the sea, can never be very considerable, because it
is always in the power of the nations who possess that other territory to
obstruct the communication between the upper country and the sea. The
navigation of the Danube is of very little use to the different states of
Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary, in comparison of what it would be, if any of
them possessed the whole of its course, till it falls into the Black sea.

CHAPTER IV.
OF THE ORIGIN AND USE OF MONEY.

When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a
very small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can
supply. He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus
part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own
consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he
has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes, in some
measure, a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a
commercial society.

But when the division of labour first began to take place, this power of
exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its
operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity than he
himself has occasion for, while another has less. The former, consequently,
would be glad to dispose of; and the latter to purchase, a part of this
superfluity. But if this latter should chance to have nothing that the former
stands in need of, no exchange can be made between them. The butcher has more
meat in his shop than he himself can consume, and the brewer and the baker
would each of them be willing to purchase a part of it. But they have nothing
to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their respective
trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which
he has immediate occasion for. No exchange can, in this case, be made between
them. He cannot be their merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of
them thus mutually less serviceable to one another. In order to avoid the
inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of society,
after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have
endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by
him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of
some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to
refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry. Many different
commodities, it is probable, were successively both thought of and employed for
this purpose. In the rude ages of society, cattle are said to have been the
common instrument of commerce; and, though they must have been a most
inconvenient one, yet, in old times, we find things were frequently valued
according to the number of cattle which had been given in exchange for them.
The armour of Diomede, says Homer, cost only nine oxen; but that of Glaucus
cost a hundred oxen. Salt is said to be the common instrument of commerce and
exchanges in Abyssinia; a species of shells in some parts of the coast of
India; dried cod at Newfoundland; tobacco in Virginia; sugar in some of our
West India colonies; hides or dressed leather in some other countries; and
there is at this day a village in Scotland, where it is not uncommon, I am
told, for a workman to carry nails instead of money to the baker’s shop
or the ale-house.

In all countries, however, men seem at last to have been determined by
irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals
above every other commodity. Metals can not only be kept with as little loss as
any other commodity, scarce any thing being less perishable than they are, but
they can likewise, without any loss, be divided into any number of parts, as by
fusion those parts can easily be re-united again; a quality which no other
equally durable commodities possess, and which, more than any other quality,
renders them fit to be the instruments of commerce and circulation. The man who
wanted to buy salt, for example, and had nothing but cattle to give in exchange
for it, must have been obliged to buy salt to the value of a whole ox, or a
whole sheep, at a time. He could seldom buy less than this, because what he was
to give for it could seldom be divided without loss; and if he had a mind to
buy more, he must, for the same reasons, have been obliged to buy double or
triple the quantity, the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or of two or
three sheep. If, on the contrary, instead of sheep or oxen, he had metals to
give in exchange for it, he could easily proportion the quantity of the metal
to the precise quantity of the commodity which he had immediate occasion for.

Different metals have been made use of by different nations for this purpose.
Iron was the common instrument of commerce among the ancient Spartans, copper
among the ancient Romans, and gold and silver among all rich and commercial
nations.

Those metals seem originally to have been made use of for this purpose in rude
bars, without any stamp or coinage. Thus we are told by Pliny (Plin. Hist Nat.
lib. 33, cap. 3), upon the authority of Timaeus, an ancient historian, that,
till the time of Servius Tullius, the Romans had no coined money, but made use
of unstamped bars of copper, to purchase whatever they had occasion for. These
rude bars, therefore, performed at this time the function of money.

The use of metals in this rude state was attended with two very considerable
inconveniences; first, with the trouble of weighing, and secondly, with that of
assaying them. In the precious metals, where a small difference in the quantity
makes a great difference in the value, even the business of weighing, with
proper exactness, requires at least very accurate weights and scales. The
weighing of gold, in particular, is an operation of some nicety in the coarser
metals, indeed, where a small error would be of little consequence, less
accuracy would, no doubt, be necessary. Yet we should find it excessively
troublesome if every time a poor man had occasion either to buy or sell a
farthing’s worth of goods, he was obliged to weigh the farthing. The
operation of assaying is still more difficult, still more tedious; and, unless
a part of the metal is fairly melted in the crucible, with proper dissolvents,
any conclusion that can be drawn from it is extremely uncertain. Before the
institution of coined money, however, unless they went through this tedious and
difficult operation, people must always have been liable to the grossest frauds
and impositions; and instead of a pound weight of pure silver, or pure copper,
might receive, in exchange for their goods, an adulterated composition of the
coarsest and cheapest materials, which had, however, in their outward
appearance, been made to resemble those metals. To prevent such abuses, to
facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and
commerce, it has been found necessary, in all countries that have made any
considerable advances towards improvement, to affix a public stamp upon certain
quantities of such particular metals, as were in those countries commonly made
use of to purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined money, and of those public
offices called mints; institutions exactly of the same nature with those of the
aulnagers and stamp-masters of woollen and linen cloth. All of them are equally
meant to ascertain, by means of a public stamp, the quantity and uniform
goodness of those different commodities when brought to market.

The first public stamps of this kind that were affixed to the current metals,
seem in many cases to have been intended to ascertain, what it was both most
difficult and most important to ascertain, the goodness or fineness of the
metal, and to have resembled the sterling mark which is at present affixed to
plate and bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which is sometimes affixed to
ingots of gold, and which, being struck only upon one side of the piece, and
not covering the whole surface, ascertains the fineness, but not the weight of
the metal. Abraham weighs to Ephron the four hundred shekels of silver which he
had agreed to pay for the field of Machpelah. They are said, however, to be the
current money of the merchant, and yet are received by weight, and not by tale,
in the same manner as ingots of gold and bars of silver are at present. The
revenues of the ancient Saxon kings of England are said to have been paid, not
in money, but in kind, that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts.
William the Conqueror introduced the custom of paying them in money. This
money, however, was for a long time, received at the exchequer, by weight, and
not by tale.

The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with exactness, gave
occasion to the institution of coins, of which the stamp, covering entirely
both sides of the piece, and sometimes the edges too, was supposed to ascertain
not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal. Such coins, therefore, were
received by tale, as at present, without the trouble of weighing.

The denominations of those coins seem originally to have expressed the weight
or quantity of metal contained in them. In the time of Servius Tullius, who
first coined money at Rome, the Roman as or pondo contained a Roman pound of
good copper. It was divided, in the same manner as our Troyes pound, into
twelve ounces, each of which contained a real ounce of good copper. The English
pound sterling, in the time of Edward I. contained a pound, Tower weight, of
silver of a known fineness. The Tower pound seems to have been something more
than the Roman pound, and something less than the Troyes pound. This last was
not introduced into the mint of England till the 18th of Henry the VIII. The
French livre contained, in the time of Charlemagne, a pound, Troyes weight, of
silver of a known fineness. The fair of Troyes in Champaign was at that time
frequented by all the nations of Europe, and the weights and measures of so
famous a market were generally known and esteemed. The Scots money pound
contained, from the time of Alexander the First to that of Robert Bruce, a
pound of silver of the same weight and fineness with the English pound
sterling. English, French, and Scots pennies, too, contained all of them
originally a real penny-weight of silver, the twentieth part of an ounce, and
the two hundred-and-fortieth part of a pound. The shilling, too, seems
originally to have been the denomination of a weight. “When wheat is at
twelve shillings the quarter,” says an ancient statute of Henry III.
“then wastel bread of a farthing shall weigh eleven shillings and
fourpence”. The proportion, however, between the shilling, and either the
penny on the one hand, or the pound on the other, seems not to have been so
constant and uniform as that between the penny and the pound. During the first
race of the kings of France, the French sou or shilling appears upon different
occasions to have contained five, twelve, twenty, and forty pennies. Among the
ancient Saxons, a shilling appears at one time to have contained only five
pennies, and it is not improbable that it may have been as variable among them
as among their neighbours, the ancient Franks. From the time of Charlemagne
among the French, and from that of William the Conqueror among the English, the
proportion between the pound, the shilling, and the penny, seems to have been
uniformly the same as at present, though the value of each has been very
different; for in every country of the world, I believe, the avarice and
injustice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the confidence of their
subjects, have by degrees diminished the real quantity of metal, which had been
originally contained in their coins. The Roman as, in the latter ages of the
republic, was reduced to the twenty-fourth part of its original value, and,
instead of weighing a pound, came to weigh only half an ounce. The English
pound and penny contain at present about a third only; the Scots pound and
penny about a thirty-sixth; and the French pound and penny about a sixty-sixth
part of their original value. By means of those operations, the princes and
sovereign states which performed them were enabled, in appearance, to pay their
debts and fulfil their engagements with a smaller quantity of silver than would
otherwise have been requisite. It was indeed in appearance only; for their
creditors were really defrauded of a part of what was due to them. All other
debtors in the state were allowed the same privilege, and might pay with the
same nominal sum of the new and debased coin whatever they had borrowed in the
old. Such operations, therefore, have always proved favourable to the debtor,
and ruinous to the creditor, and have sometimes produced a greater and more
universal revolution in the fortunes of private persons, than could have been
occasioned by a very great public calamity.

It is in this manner that money has become, in all civilized nations, the
universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all
kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one another.

What are the rules which men naturally observe, in exchanging them either for
money, or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine. These rules
determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of goods.

The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes
expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of
purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may
be called ‘value in use;’ the other, ‘value in
exchange.’ The things which have the greatest value in use have
frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which
have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use.
Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce any thing;
scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has
scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may
frequently be had in exchange for it.

In order to investigate the principles which regulate the exchangeable value of
commodities, I shall endeavour to shew,

First, what is the real measure of this exchangeable value; or wherein consists
the real price of all commodities.

Secondly, what are the different parts of which this real price is composed or
made up.

And, lastly, what are the different circumstances which sometimes raise some or
all of these different parts of price above, and sometimes sink them below,
their natural or ordinary rate; or, what are the causes which sometimes hinder
the market price, that is, the actual price of commodities, from coinciding
exactly with what may be called their natural price.

I shall endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, those three
subjects in the three following chapters, for which I must very earnestly
entreat both the patience and attention of the reader: his patience, in order
to examine a detail which may, perhaps, in some places, appear unnecessarily
tedious; and his attention, in order to understand what may perhaps, after the
fullest explication which I am capable of giving it, appear still in some
degree obscure. I am always willing to run some hazard of being tedious, in
order to be sure that I am perspicuous; and, after taking the utmost pains that
I can to be perspicuous, some obscurity may still appear to remain upon a
subject, in its own nature extremely abstracted.

CHAPTER V.
OF THE REAL AND NOMINAL PRICE OF COMMODITIES, OR OF THEIR PRICE IN LABOUR, AND
THEIR PRICE IN MONEY.

Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to
enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusements of human life. But after
the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small
part of these with which a man’s own labour can supply him. The far
greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he
must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can
command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any commodity,
therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume
it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity
of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour therefore, is the
real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.

The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who
wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing
is really worth to the man who has acquired it and who wants to dispose of it,
or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to
himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money,
or with goods, is purchased by labour, as much as what we acquire by the toil
of our own body. That money, or those goods, indeed, save us this toil. They
contain the value of a certain quantity of labour, which we exchange for what
is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was
the first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things. It
was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world
was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want
to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of
labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.

Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or
succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any
political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him
the means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that fortune does not
necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately
and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing a certain command over
all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market.
His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this
power, or to the quantity either of other men’s labour, or, what is the
same thing, of the produce of other men’s labour, which it enables him to
purchase or command. The exchangeable value of every thing must always be
precisely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner.

But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all
commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is
often difficult to ascertain the proportion between two different quantities of
labour. The time spent in two different sorts of work will not always alone
determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and of
ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be more
labour in an hour’s hard work, than in two hours easy business; or in an
hour’s application to a trade which it cost ten years labour to learn,
than in a month’s industry, at an ordinary and obvious employment. But it
is not easy to find any accurate measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In
exchanging, indeed, the different productions of different sorts of labour for
one another, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however,
not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and bargaining of the market,
according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient
for carrying on the business of common life.

Every commodity, besides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby
compared with, other commodities, than with labour. It is more natural,
therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of some other
commodity, than by that of the labour which it can produce. The greater part of
people, too, understand better what is meant by a quantity of a particular
commodity, than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object;
the other an abstract notion, which though it can be made sufficiently
intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.

But when barter ceases, and money has become the common instrument of commerce,
every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than for any
other commodity. The butcher seldom carries his beef or his mutton to the baker
or the brewer, in order to exchange them for bread or for beer; but he carries
them to the market, where he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges
that money for bread and for beer. The quantity of money which he gets for them
regulates, too, the quantity of bread and beer which he can afterwards
purchase. It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to estimate their
value by the quantity of money, the commodity for which he immediately
exchanges them, than by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he
can exchange them only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to
say that his butcher’s meat is worth three-pence or fourpence a-pound,
than that it is worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of
small beer. Hence it comes to pass, that the exchangeable value of every
commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the
quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in
exchange for it.

Gold and silver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their value; are
sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of
more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity
of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will
exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines
which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. The
discovery of the abundant mines of America, reduced, in the sixteenth century,
the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been
before. As it cost less labour to bring those metals from the mine to the
market, so, when they were brought thither, they could purchase or command less
labour; and this revolution in their value, though perhaps the greatest, is by
no means the only one of which history gives some account. But as a measure of
quantity, such as the natural foot, fathom, or handful, which is continually
varying in its own quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity
of other things; so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own
value, can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities.
Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal
value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength, and spirits;
in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the
same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he
pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he
receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a
greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies,
not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places, that is
dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to
acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour.
Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate
and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and
places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their
nominal price only.

But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the
labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be of
greater, and sometimes of smaller value. He purchases them sometimes with a
greater, and sometimes with a smaller quantity of goods, and to him the price
of labour seems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to him dear
in the one case, and cheap in the other. In reality, however, it is the goods
which are cheap in the one case, and dear in the other.

In this popular sense, therefore, labour, like commodities, may be said to have
a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be said to consist in the
quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given for it;
its nominal price, in the quantity of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is
well or ill rewarded, in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of
his labour.

The distinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities and
labour is not a matter of mere speculation, but may sometimes be of
considerable use in practice. The same real price is always of the same value;
but on account of the variations in the value of gold and silver, the same
nominal price is sometimes of very different values. When a landed estate,
therefore, is sold with a reservation of a perpetual rent, if it is intended
that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of importance to the
family in whose favour it is reserved, that it should not consist in a
particular sum of money. Its value would in this case be liable to variations
of two different kinds: first, to those which arise from the different
quantities of gold and silver which are contained at different times in coin of
the same denomination; and, secondly, to those which arise from the different
values of equal quantities of gold and silver at different times.

Princes and sovereign states have frequently fancied that they had a temporary
interest to diminish the quantity of pure metal contained in their coins; but
they seldom have fancied that they had any to augment it. The quantity of metal
contained in the coins, I believe of all nations, has accordingly been almost
continually diminishing, and hardly ever augmenting. Such variations,
therefore, tend almost always to diminish the value of a money rent.

The discovery of the mines of America diminished the value of gold and silver
in Europe. This diminution, it is commonly supposed, though I apprehend without
any certain proof, is still going on gradually, and is likely to continue to do
so for a long time. Upon this supposition, therefore, such variations are more
likely to diminish than to augment the value of a money rent, even though it
should be stipulated to be paid, not in such a quantity of coined money of such
a denomination (in so many pounds sterling, for example), but in so many
ounces, either of pure silver, or of silver of a certain standard.

The rents which have been reserved in corn, have preserved their value much
better than those which have been reserved in money, even where the
denomination of the coin has not been altered. By the 18th of Elizabeth, it was
enacted, that a third of the rent of all college leases should be reserved in
corn, to be paid either in kind, or according to the current prices at the
nearest public market. The money arising from this corn rent, though originally
but a third of the whole, is, in the present times, according to Dr.
Blackstone, commonly near double of what arises from the other two-thirds. The
old money rents of colleges must, according to this account, have sunk almost
to a fourth part of their ancient value, or are worth little more than a fourth
part of the corn which they were formerly worth. But since the reign of Philip
and Mary, the denomination of the English coin has undergone little or no
alteration, and the same number of pounds, shillings, and pence, have contained
very nearly the same quantity of pure silver. This degradation, therefore, in
the value of the money rents of colleges, has arisen altogether from the
degradation in the price of silver.

When the degradation in the value of silver is combined with the diminution of
the quantity of it contained in the coin of the same denomination, the loss is
frequently still greater. In Scotland, where the denomination of the coin has
undergone much greater alterations than it ever did in England, and in France,
where it has undergone still greater than it ever did in Scotland, some ancient
rents, originally of considerable value, have, in this manner, been reduced
almost to nothing.

Equal quantities of labour will, at distant times, be purchased more nearly
with equal quantities of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than with equal
quantities of gold and silver, or, perhaps, of any other commodity. Equal
quantities of corn, therefore, will, at distant times, be more nearly of the
same real value, or enable the possessor to purchase or command more nearly the
same quantity of the labour of other people. They will do this, I say, more
nearly than equal quantities of almost any other commodity; for even equal
quantities of corn will not do it exactly. The subsistence of the labourer, or
the real price of labour, as I shall endeavour to shew hereafter, is very
different upon different occasions; more liberal in a society advancing to
opulence, than in one that is standing still, and in one that is standing
still, than in one that is going backwards. Every other commodity, however,
will, at any particular time, purchase a greater or smaller quantity of labour,
in proportion to the quantity of subsistence which it can purchase at that
time. A rent, therefore, reserved in corn, is liable only to the variations in
the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchase. But a
rent reserved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in
the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can purchase, but
to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be purchased by any
particular quantity of that commodity.

Though the real value of a corn rent, it is to be observed, however, varies
much less from century to century than that of a money rent, it varies much
more from year to year. The money price of labour, as I shall endeavour to shew
hereafter, does not fluctuate from year to year with the money price of corn,
but seems to be everywhere accommodated, not to the temporary or occasional,
but to the average or ordinary price of that necessary of life. The average or
ordinary price of corn, again is regulated, as I shall likewise endeavour to
shew hereafter, by the value of silver, by the richness or barrenness of the
mines which supply the market with that metal, or by the quantity of labour
which must be employed, and consequently of corn which must be consumed, in
order to bring any particular quantity of silver from the mine to the market.
But the value of silver, though it sometimes varies greatly from century to
century, seldom varies much from year to year, but frequently continues the
same, or very nearly the same, for half a century or a century together. The
ordinary or average money price of corn, therefore, may, during so long a
period, continue the same, or very nearly the same, too, and along with it the
money price of labour, provided, at least, the society continues, in other
respects, in the same, or nearly in the same, condition. In the mean time, the
temporary and occasional price of corn may frequently be double one year of
what it had been the year before, or fluctuate, for example, from
five-and-twenty to fifty shillings the quarter. But when corn is at the latter
price, not only the nominal, but the real value of a corn rent, will be double
of what it is when at the former, or will command double the quantity either of
labour, or of the greater part of other commodities; the money price of labour,
and along with it that of most other things, continuing the same during all
these fluctuations.

Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the
only accurate, measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare
the values of different commodities, at all times, and at all places. We cannot
estimate, it is allowed, the real value of different commodities from century
to century by the quantities of silver which were given for them. We cannot
estimate it from year to year by the quantities of corn. By the quantities of
labour, we can, with the greatest accuracy, estimate it, both from century to
century, and from year to year. From century to century, corn is a better
measure than silver, because, from century to century, equal quantities of corn
will command the same quantity of labour more nearly than equal quantities of
silver. From year to year, on the contrary, silver is a better measure than
corn, because equal quantities of it will more nearly command the same quantity
of labour.

But though, in establishing perpetual rents, or even in letting very long
leases, it may be of use to distinguish between real and nominal price; it is
of none in buying and selling, the more common and ordinary transactions of
human life.

At the same time and place, the real and the nominal price of all commodities
are exactly in proportion to one another. The more or less money you get for
any commodity, in the London market, for example, the more or less labour it
will at that time and place enable you to purchase or command. At the same time
and place, therefore, money is the exact measure of the real exchangeable value
of all commodities. It is so, however, at the same time and place only.

Though at distant places there is no regular proportion between the real and
the money price of commodities, yet the merchant who carries goods from the one
to the other, has nothing to consider but the money price, or the difference
between the quantity of silver for which he buys them, and that for which he is
likely to sell them. Half an ounce of silver at Canton in China may command a
greater quantity both of labour and of the necessaries and conveniencies of
life, than an ounce at London. A commodity, therefore, which sells for half an
ounce of silver at Canton, may there be really dearer, of more real importance
to the man who possesses it there, than a commodity which sells for an ounce at
London is to the man who possesses it at London. If a London merchant, however,
can buy at Canton, for half an ounce of silver, a commodity which he can
afterwards sell at London for an ounce, he gains a hundred per cent. by the
bargain, just as much as if an ounce of silver was at London exactly of the
same value as at Canton. It is of no importance to him that half an ounce of
silver at Canton would have given him the command of more labour, and of a
greater quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than an ounce can
do at London. An ounce at London will always give him the command of double the
quantity of all these, which half an ounce could have done there, and this is
precisely what he wants.

As it is the nominal or money price of goods, therefore, which finally
determines the prudence or imprudence of all purchases and sales, and thereby
regulates almost the whole business of common life in which price is concerned,
we cannot wonder that it should have been so much more attended to than the
real price.

In such a work as this, however, it may sometimes be of use to compare the
different real values of a particular commodity at different times and places,
or the different degrees of power over the labour of other people which it may,
upon different occasions, have given to those who possessed it. We must in this
case compare, not so much the different quantities of silver for which it was
commonly sold, as the different quantities or labour which those different
quantities of silver could have purchased. But the current prices of labour, at
distant times and places, can scarce ever be known with any degree of
exactness. Those of corn, though they have in few places been regularly
recorded, are in general better known, and have been more frequently taken
notice of by historians and other writers. We must generally, therefore,
content ourselves with them, not as being always exactly in the same proportion
as the current prices of labour, but as being the nearest approximation which
can commonly be had to that proportion. I shall hereafter have occasion to make
several comparisons of this kind.

In the progress of industry, commercial nations have found it convenient to
coin several different metals into money; gold for larger payments, silver for
purchases of moderate value, and copper, or some other coarse metal, for those
of still smaller consideration, They have always, however, considered one of
those metals as more peculiarly the measure of value than any of the other two;
and this preference seems generally to have been given to the metal which they
happen first to make use of as the instrument of commerce. Having once begun to
use it as their standard, which they must have done when they had no other
money, they have generally continued to do so even when the necessity was not
the same.

The Romans are said to have had nothing but copper money till within five years
before the first Punic war (Pliny, lib. xxxiii. cap. 3), when they first began
to coin silver. Copper, therefore, appears to have continued always the measure
of value in that republic. At Rome all accounts appear to have been kept, and
the value of all estates to have been computed, either in asses or in
sestertii. The as was always the denomination of a copper coin. The word
sestertius signifies two asses and a half. Though the sestertius, therefore,
was originally a silver coin, its value was estimated in copper. At Rome, one
who owed a great deal of money was said to have a great deal of other
people’s copper.

The northern nations who established themselves upon the ruins of the Roman
empire, seem to have had silver money from the first beginning of their
settlements, and not to have known either gold or copper coins for several ages
thereafter. There were silver coins in England in the time of the Saxons; but
there was little gold coined till the time of Edward III nor any copper till
that of James I. of Great Britain. In England, therefore, and for the same
reason, I believe, in all other modern nations of Europe, all accounts are
kept, and the value of all goods and of all estates is generally computed, in
silver: and when we mean to express the amount of a person’s fortune, we
seldom mention the number of guineas, but the number of pounds sterling which
we suppose would be given for it.

Originally, in all countries, I believe, a legal tender of payment could be
made only in the coin of that metal which was peculiarly considered as the
standard or measure of value. In England, gold was not considered as a legal
tender for a long time after it was coined into money. The proportion between
the values of gold and silver money was not fixed by any public law or
proclamation, but was left to be settled by the market. If a debtor offered
payment in gold, the creditor might either reject such payment altogether, or
accept of it at such a valuation of the gold as he and his debtor could agree
upon. Copper is not at present a legal tender, except in the change of the
smaller silver coins.

In this state of things, the distinction between the metal which was the
standard, and that which was not the standard, was something more than a
nominal distinction.

In process of time, and as people became gradually more familiar with the use
of the different metals in coin, and consequently better acquainted with the
proportion between their respective values, it has, in most countries, I
believe, been found convenient to ascertain this proportion, and to declare by
a public law, that a guinea, for example, of such a weight and fineness, should
exchange for one-and-twenty shillings, or be a legal tender for a debt of that
amount. In this state of things, and during the continuance of any one
regulated proportion of this kind, the distinction between the metal, which is
the standard, and that which is not the standard, becomes little more than a
nominal distinction.

In consequence of any change, however, in this regulated proportion, this
distinction becomes, or at least seems to become, something more than nominal
again. If the regulated value of a guinea, for example, was either reduced to
twenty, or raised to two-and-twenty shillings, all accounts being kept, and
almost all obligations for debt being expressed, in silver money, the greater
part of payments could in either case be made with the same quantity of silver
money as before; but would require very different quantities of gold money; a
greater in the one case, and a smaller in the other. Silver would appear to be
more invariable in its value than gold. Silver would appear to measure the
value of gold, and gold would not appear to measure the value of silver. The
value of gold would seem to depend upon the quantity of silver which it would
exchange for, and the value of silver would not seem to depend upon the
quantity of gold which it would exchange for. This difference, however, would
be altogether owing to the custom of keeping accounts, and of expressing the
amount of all great and small sums rather in silver than in gold money. One of
Mr Drummond’s notes for five-and-twenty or fifty guineas would, after an
alteration of this kind, be still payable with five-and-twenty or fifty
guineas, in the same manner as before. It would, after such an alteration, be
payable with the same quantity of gold as before, but with very different
quantities of silver. In the payment of such a note, gold would appear to be
more invariable in its value than silver. Gold would appear to measure the
value of silver, and silver would not appear to measure the value of gold. If
the custom of keeping accounts, and of expressing promissory-notes and other
obligations for money, in this manner should ever become general, gold, and not
silver, would be considered as the metal which was peculiarly the standard or
measure of value.

In reality, during the continuance of any one regulated proportion between the
respective values of the different metals in coin, the value of the most
precious metal regulates the value of the whole coin. Twelve copper pence
contain half a pound avoirdupois of copper, of not the best quality, which,
before it is coined, is seldom worth seven-pence in silver. But as, by the
regulation, twelve such pence are ordered to exchange for a shilling, they are
in the market considered as worth a shilling, and a shilling can at any time be
had for them. Even before the late reformation of the gold coin of Great
Britain, the gold, that part of it at least which circulated in London and its
neighbourhood, was in general less degraded below its standard weight than the
greater part of the silver. One-and-twenty worn and defaced shillings, however,
were considered as equivalent to a guinea, which, perhaps, indeed, was worn and
defaced too, but seldom so much so. The late regulations have brought the gold
coin as near, perhaps, to its standard weight as it is possible to bring the
current coin of any nation; and the order to receive no gold at the public
offices but by weight, is likely to preserve it so, as long as that order is
enforced. The silver coin still continues in the same worn and degraded state
as before the reformation of the cold coin. In the market, however,
one-and-twenty shillings of this degraded silver coin are still considered as
worth a guinea of this excellent gold coin.

The reformation of the gold coin has evidently raised the value of the silver
coin which can be exchanged for it.

In the English mint, a pound weight of gold is coined into forty-four guineas
and a half, which at one-and-twenty shillings the guinea, is equal to forty-six
pounds fourteen shillings and sixpence. An ounce of such gold coin, therefore,
is worth £ 3:17:10½ in silver. In England, no duty or seignorage is paid upon
the coinage, and he who carries a pound weight or an ounce weight of standard
gold bullion to the mint, gets back a pound weight or an ounce weight of gold
in coin, without any deduction. Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence
halfpenny an ounce, therefore, is said to be the mint price of gold in England,
or the quantity of gold coin which the mint gives in return for standard gold
bullion.

Before the reformation of the gold coin, the price of standard gold bullion in
the market had, for many years, been upwards of £3:18s. sometimes £ 3:19s, and
very frequently £4 an ounce; that sum, it is probable, in the worn and degraded
gold coin, seldom containing more than an ounce of standard gold. Since the
reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard gold bullion seldom
exceeds £ 3:17:7 an ounce. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the market
price was always more or less above the mint price. Since that reformation, the
market price has been constantly below the mint price. But that market price is
the same whether it is paid in gold or in silver coin. The late reformation of
the gold coin, therefore, has raised not only the value of the gold coin, but
likewise that of the silver coin in proportion to gold bullion, and probably,
too, in proportion to all other commodities; though the price of the greater
part of other commodities being influenced by so many other causes, the rise in
the value of either gold or silver coin in proportion to them may not be so
distinct and sensible.

In the English mint, a pound weight of standard silver bullion is coined into
sixty-two shillings, containing, in the same manner, a pound weight of standard
silver. Five shillings and twopence an ounce, therefore, is said to be the mint
price of silver in England, or the quantity of silver coin which the mint gives
in return for standard silver bullion. Before the reformation of the gold coin,
the market price of standard silver bullion was, upon different occasions, five
shillings and fourpence, five shillings and fivepence, five shillings and
sixpence, five shillings and sevenpence, and very often five shillings and
eightpence an ounce. Five shillings and sevenpence, however, seems to have been
the most common price. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market price
of standard silver bullion has fallen occasionally to five shillings and
threepence, five shillings and fourpence, and five shillings and fivepence an
ounce, which last price it has scarce ever exceeded. Though the market price of
silver bullion has fallen considerably since the reformation of the gold coin,
it has not fallen so low as the mint price.

In the proportion between the different metals in the English coin, as copper
is rated very much above its real value, so silver is rated somewhat below it.
In the market of Europe, in the French coin and in the Dutch coin, an ounce of
fine gold exchanges for about fourteen ounces of fine silver. In the English
coin, it exchanges for about fifteen ounces, that is, for more silver than it
is worth, according to the common estimation of Europe. But as the price of
copper in bars is not, even in England, raised by the high price of copper in
English coin, so the price of silver in bullion is not sunk by the low rate of
silver in English coin. Silver in bullion still preserves its proper proportion
to gold, for the same reason that copper in bars preserves its proper
proportion to silver.

Upon the reformation of the silver coin, in the reign of William III., the
price of silver bullion still continued to be somewhat above the mint price. Mr
Locke imputed this high price to the permission of exporting silver bullion,
and to the prohibition of exporting silver coin. This permission of exporting,
he said, rendered the demand for silver bullion greater than the demand for
silver coin. But the number of people who want silver coin for the common uses
of buying and selling at home, is surely much greater than that of those who
want silver bullion either for the use of exportation or for any other use.
There subsists at present a like permission of exporting gold bullion, and a
like prohibition of exporting gold coin; and yet the price of gold bullion has
fallen below the mint price. But in the English coin, silver was then, in the
same manner as now, under-rated in proportion to gold; and the gold coin (which
at that time, too, was not supposed to require any reformation) regulated then,
as well as now, the real value of the whole coin. As the reformation of the
silver coin did not then reduce the price of silver bullion to the mint price,
it is not very probable that a like reformation will do so now.

Were the silver coin brought back as near to its standard weight as the gold, a
guinea, it is probable, would, according to the present proportion, exchange
for more silver in coin than it would purchase in bullion. The silver coin
containing its full standard weight, there would in this case, be a profit in
melting it down, in order, first to sell the bullion for gold coin, and
afterwards to exchange this gold coin for silver coin, to be melted down in the
same manner. Some alteration in the present proportion seems to be the only
method of preventing this inconveniency.

The inconveniency, perhaps, would be less, if silver was rated in the coin as
much above its proper proportion to gold as it is at present rated below it,
provided it was at the same time enacted, that silver should not be a legal
tender for more than the change of a guinea, in the same manner as copper is
not a legal tender for more than the change of a shilling. No creditor could,
in this case, be cheated in consequence of the high valuation of silver in
coin; as no creditor can at present be cheated in consequence of the high
valuation of copper. The bankers only would suffer by this regulation. When a
run comes upon them, they sometimes endeavour to gain time, by paying in
sixpences, and they would be precluded by this regulation from this
discreditable method of evading immediate payment. They would be obliged, in
consequence, to keep at all times in their coffers a greater quantity of cash
than at present; and though this might, no doubt, be a considerable
inconveniency to them, it would, at the same time, be a considerable security
to their creditors.

Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny (the mint price of
gold) certainly does not contain, even in our present excellent gold coin, more
than an ounce of standard gold, and it may be thought, therefore, should not
purchase more standard bullion. But gold in coin is more convenient than gold
in bullion; and though, in England, the coinage is free, yet the gold which is
carried in bullion to the mint, can seldom be returned in coin to the owner
till after a delay of several weeks. In the present hurry of the mint, it could
not be returned till after a delay of several months. This delay is equivalent
to a small duty, and renders gold in coin somewhat more valuable than an equal
quantity of gold in bullion. If, in the English coin, silver was rated
according to its proper proportion to gold, the price of silver bullion would
probably fall below the mint price, even without any reformation of the silver
coin; the value even of the present worn and defaced silver coin being
regulated by the value of the excellent gold coin for which it can be changed.

A small seignorage or duty upon the coinage of both gold and silver, would
probably increase still more the superiority of those metals in coin above an
equal quantity of either of them in bullion. The coinage would, in this case,
increase the value of the metal coined in proportion to the extent of this
small duty, for the same reason that the fashion increases the value of plate
in proportion to the price of that fashion. The superiority of coin above
bullion would prevent the melting down of the coin, and would discourage its
exportation. If, upon any public exigency, it should become necessary to export
the coin, the greater part of it would soon return again, of its own accord.
Abroad, it could sell only for its weight in bullion. At home, it would buy
more than that weight. There would be a profit, therefore, in bringing it home
again. In France, a seignorage of about eight per cent. is imposed upon the
coinage, and the French coin, when exported, is said to return home again, of
its own accord.

The occasional fluctuations in the market price of gold and silver bullion
arise from the same causes as the like fluctuations in that of all other
commodities. The frequent loss of those metals from various accidents by sea
and by land, the continual waste of them in gilding and plating, in lace and
embroidery, in the wear and tear of coin, and in that of plate, require, in all
countries which possess no mines of their own, a continual importation, in
order to repair this loss and this waste. The merchant importers, like all
other merchants, we may believe, endeavour, as well as they can, to suit their
occasional importations to what they judge is likely to be the immediate
demand. With all their attention, however, they sometimes overdo the business,
and sometimes underdo it. When they import more bullion than is wanted, rather
than incur the risk and trouble of exporting it again, they are sometimes
willing to sell a part of it for something less than the ordinary or average
price. When, on the other hand, they import less than is wanted, they get
something more than this price. But when, under all those occasional
fluctuations, the market price either of gold or silver bullion continues for
several years together steadily and constantly, either more or less above, or
more or less below the mint price, we may be assured that this steady and
constant, either superiority or inferiority of price, is the effect of
something in the state of the coin, which, at that time, renders a certain
quantity of coin either of more value or of less value than the precise
quantity of bullion which it ought to contain. The constancy and steadiness of
the effect supposes a proportionable constancy and steadiness in the cause.

The money of any particular country is, at any particular time and place, more
or less an accurate measure or value, according as the current coin is more or
less exactly agreeable to its standard, or contains more or less exactly the
precise quantity of pure gold or pure silver which it ought to contain. If in
England, for example, forty-four guineas and a half contained exactly a pound
weight of standard gold, or eleven ounces of fine gold, and one ounce of alloy,
the gold coin of England would be as accurate a measure of the actual value of
goods at any particular time and place as the nature of the thing would admit.
But if, by rubbing and wearing, forty-four guineas and a half generally contain
less than a pound weight of standard gold, the diminution, however, being
greater in some pieces than in others, the measure of value comes to be liable
to the same sort of uncertainty to which all other weights and measures are
commonly exposed. As it rarely happens that these are exactly agreeable to
their standard, the merchant adjusts the price of his goods as well as he can,
not to what those weights and measures ought to be, but to what, upon an
average, he finds, by experience, they actually are. In consequence of a like
disorder in the coin, the price of goods comes, in the same manner, to be
adjusted, not to the quantity of pure gold or silver which the coin ought to
contain, but to that which, upon an average, it is found, by experience, it
actually does contain.

By the money price of goods, it is to be observed, I understand always the
quantity of pure gold or silver for which they are sold, without any regard to
the denomination of the coin. Six shillings and eight pence, for example, in
the time of Edward I., I consider as the same money price with a pound sterling
in the present times, because it contained, as nearly as we can judge, the same
quantity of pure silver.

CHAPTER VI.
OF THE COMPONENT PART OF THE PRICE OF COMMODITIES.

In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of
stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of
labour necessary for acquiring different objects, seems to be the only
circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another. If
among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually costs twice the labour to
kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver should naturally
exchange for or be worth two deer. It is natural that what is usually the
produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth double of what is
usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s labour.

If the one species of labour should be more severe than the other, some
allowance will naturally be made for this superior hardship; and the produce of
one hour’s labour in the one way may frequently exchange for that of two
hour’s labour in the other.

Or if the one species of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity and
ingenuity, the esteem which men have for such talents, will naturally give a
value to their produce, superior to what would be due to the time employed
about it. Such talents can seldom be acquired but in consequence of long
application, and the superior value of their produce may frequently be no more
than a reasonable compensation for the time and labour which must be spent in
acquiring them. In the advanced state of society, allowances of this kind, for
superior hardship and superior skill, are commonly made in the wages of labour;
and something of the same kind must probably have taken place in its earliest
and rudest period.

In this state of things, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer;
and the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any
commodity, is the only circumstance which can regulate the quantity of labour
which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or exchange for.

As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of
them will naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they
will supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the
sale of their work, or by what their labour adds to the value of the materials.
In exchanging the complete manufacture either for money, for labour, or for
other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to pay the price of the
materials, and the wages of the workmen, something must be given for the
profits of the undertaker of the work, who hazards his stock in this adventure.
The value which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves itself in
this case into two parts, of which the one pays their wages, the other the
profits of their employer upon the whole stock of materials and wages which he
advanced. He could have no interest to employ them, unless he expected from the
sale of their work something more than what was sufficient to replace his stock
to him; and he could have no interest to employ a great stock rather than a
small one, unless his profits were to bear some proportion to the extent of his
stock.

The profits of stock, it may perhaps be thought, are only a different name for
the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection and
direction. They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite
different principles, and bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or
the ingenuity of this supposed labour of inspection and direction. They are
regulated altogether by the value of the stock employed, and are greater or
smaller in proportion to the extent of this stock. Let us suppose, for example,
that in some particular place, where the common annual profits of manufacturing
stock are ten per cent. there are two different manufactures, in each of which
twenty workmen are employed, at the rate of fifteen pounds a year each, or at
the expense of three hundred a-year in each manufactory. Let us suppose, too,
that the coarse materials annually wrought up in the one cost only seven
hundred pounds, while the finer materials in the other cost seven thousand. The
capital annually employed in the one will, in this case, amount only to one
thousand pounds; whereas that employed in the other will amount to seven
thousand three hundred pounds. At the rate of ten per cent. therefore, the
undertaker of the one will expect a yearly profit of about one hundred pounds
only; while that of the other will expect about seven hundred and thirty
pounds. But though their profits are so very different, their labour of
inspection and direction may be either altogether or very nearly the same. In
many great works, almost the whole labour of this kind is committed to some
principal clerk. His wages properly express the value of this labour of
inspection and direction. Though in settling them some regard is had commonly,
not only to his labour and skill, but to the trust which is reposed in him, yet
they never bear any regular proportion to the capital of which he oversees the
management; and the owner of this capital, though he is thus discharged of
almost all labour, still expects that his profit should bear a regular
proportion to his capital. In the price of commodities, therefore, the profits
of stock constitute a component part altogether different from the wages of
labour, and regulated by quite different principles.

In this state of things, the whole produce of labour does not always belong to
the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the stock which
employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring
or producing any commodity, the only circumstance which can regulate the
quantity which it ought commonly to purchase, command or exchange for. An
additional quantity, it is evident, must be due for the profits of the stock
which advanced the wages and furnished the materials of that labour.

As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the
landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand
a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the
field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common,
cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to
have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to
gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour
either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing,
the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land, and in the price of
the greater part of commodities, makes a third component part.

The real value of all the different component parts of price, it must be
observed, is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of them,
purchase or command. Labour measures the value, not only of that part of price
which resolves itself into labour, but of that which resolves itself into rent,
and of that which resolves itself into profit.

In every society, the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into
some one or other, or all of those three parts; and in every improved society,
all the three enter, more or less, as component parts, into the price of the
far greater part of commodities.

In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord,
another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle
employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer. These
three parts seem either immediately or ultimately to make up the whole price of
corn. A fourth part, it may perhaps be thought is necessary for replacing the
stock of the farmer, or for compensating the wear and tear of his labouring
cattle, and other instruments of husbandry. But it must be considered, that the
price of any instrument of husbandry, such as a labouring horse, is itself made
up of the same time parts; the rent of the land upon which he is reared, the
labour of tending and rearing him, and the profits of the farmer, who advances
both the rent of this land, and the wages of this labour. Though the price of
the corn, therefore, may pay the price as well as the maintenance of the horse,
the whole price still resolves itself, either immediately or ultimately, into
the same three parts of rent, labour, and profit.

In the price of flour or meal, we must add to the price of the corn, the
profits of the miller, and the wages of his servants; in the price of bread,
the profits of the baker, and the wages of his servants; and in the price of
both, the labour of transporting the corn from the house of the farmer to that
of the miller, and from that of the miller to that of the baker, together with
the profits of those who advance the wages of that labour.

The price of flax resolves itself into the same three parts as that of corn. In
the price of linen we must add to this price the wages of the flax-dresser, of
the spinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, etc. together with the profits of
their respective employers.

As any particular commodity comes to be more manufactured, that part of the
price which resolves itself into wages and profit, comes to be greater in
proportion to that which resolves itself into rent. In the progress of the
manufacture, not only the number of profits increase, but every subsequent
profit is greater than the foregoing; because the capital from which it is
derived must always be greater. The capital which employs the weavers, for
example, must be greater than that which employs the spinners; because it not
only replaces that capital with its profits, but pays, besides, the wages of
the weavers: and the profits must always bear some proportion to the capital.

In the most improved societies, however, there are always a few commodities of
which the price resolves itself into two parts only: the wages of labour, and
the profits of stock; and a still smaller number, in which it consists
altogether in the wages of labour. In the price of sea-fish, for example, one
part pays the labour of the fisherman, and the other the profits of the capital
employed in the fishery. Rent very seldom makes any part of it, though it does
sometimes, as I shall shew hereafter. It is otherwise, at least through the
greater part of Europe, in river fisheries. A salmon fishery pays a rent; and
rent, though it cannot well be called the rent of land, makes a part of the
price of a salmon, as well as wares and profit. In some parts of Scotland, a
few poor people make a trade of gathering, along the sea-shore, those little
variegated stones commonly known by the name of Scotch pebbles. The price which
is paid to them by the stone-cutter, is altogether the wages of their labour;
neither rent nor profit makes an part of it.

But the whole price of any commodity must still finally resolve itself into
some one or other or all of those three parts; as whatever part of it remains
after paying the rent of the land, and the price of the whole labour employed
in raising, manufacturing, and bringing it to market, must necessarily be
profit to somebody.

As the price or exchangeable value of every particular commodity, taken
separately, resolves itself into some one or other, or all of those three
parts; so that of all the commodities which compose the whole annual produce of
the labour of every country, taken complexly, must resolve itself into the same
three parts, and be parcelled out among different inhabitants of the country,
either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock, or the rent of
their land. The whole of what is annually either collected or produced by the
labour of every society, or, what comes to the same thing, the whole price of
it, is in this manner originally distributed among some of its different
members. Wages, profit, and rent, are the three original sources of all
revenue, as well as of all exchangeable value. All other revenue is ultimately
derived from some one or other of these.

Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his own, must draw it either
from his labour, from his stock, or from his land. The revenue derived from
labour is called wages; that derived from stock, by the person who manages or
employs it, is called profit; that derived from it by the person who does not
employ it himself, but lends it to another, is called the interest or the use
of money. It is the compensation which the borrower pays to the lender, for the
profit which he has an opportunity of making by the use of the money. Part of
that profit naturally belongs to the borrower, who runs the risk and takes the
trouble of employing it, and part to the lender, who affords him the
opportunity of making this profit. The interest of money is always a derivative
revenue, which, if it is not paid from the profit which is made by the use of
the money, must be paid from some other source of revenue, unless perhaps the
borrower is a spendthrift, who contracts a second debt in order to pay the
interest of the first. The revenue which proceeds altogether from land, is
called rent, and belongs to the landlord. The revenue of the farmer is derived
partly from his labour, and partly from his stock. To him, land is only the
instrument which enables him to earn the wages of this labour, and to make the
profits of this stock. All taxes, and all the revenue which is founded upon
them, all salaries, pensions, and annuities of every kind, are ultimately
derived from some one or other of those three original sources of revenue, and
are paid either immediately or mediately from the wages of labour, the profits
of stock, or the rent of land.

When those three different sorts of revenue belong to different persons, they
are readily distinguished; but when they belong to the same, they are sometimes
confounded with one another, at least in common language.

A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expense of
cultivation, should gain both the rent of the landlord and the profit of the
farmer. He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus
confounds rent with profit, at least in common language. The greater part of
our North American and West Indian planters are in this situation. They farm,
the greater part of them, their own estates: and accordingly we seldom hear of
the rent of a plantation, but frequently of its profit.

Common farmers seldom employ any overseer to direct the general operations of
the farm. They generally, too, work a good deal with their own hands, as
ploughmen, harrowers, etc. What remains of the crop, after paying the rent,
therefore, should not only replace to them their stock employed in cultivation,
together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the wages which are due to
them, both as labourers and overseers. Whatever remains, however, after paying
the rent and keeping up the stock, is called profit. But wages evidently make a
part of it. The farmer, by saving these wages, must necessarily gain them.
Wages, therefore, are in this case confounded with profit.

An independent manufacturer, who has stock enough both to purchase materials,
and to maintain himself till he can carry his work to market, should gain both
the wages of a journeyman who works under a master, and the profit which that
master makes by the sale of that journeyman’s work. His whole gains,
however, are commonly called profit, and wages are, in this case, too,
confounded with profit.

A gardener who cultivates his own garden with his own hands, unites in his own
person the three different characters, of landlord, farmer, and labourer. His
produce, therefore, should pay him the rent of the first, the profit of the
second, and the wages of the third. The whole, however, is commonly considered
as the earnings of his labour. Both rent and profit are, in this case,
confounded with wages.

As in a civilized country there are but few commodities of which the
exchangeable value arises from labour only, rent and profit contributing
largely to that of the far greater part of them, so the annual produce of its
labour will always be sufficient to purchase or command a much greater quantity
of labour than what was employed in raising, preparing, and bringing that
produce to market. If the society were annually to employ all the labour which
it can annually purchase, as the quantity of labour would increase greatly
every year, so the produce of every succeeding year would be of vastly greater
value than that of the foregoing. But there is no country in which the whole
annual produce is employed in maintaining the industrious. The idle everywhere
consume a great part of it; and, according to the different proportions in
which it is annually divided between those two different orders of people, its
ordinary or average value must either annually increase or diminish, or
continue the same from one year to another.

CHAPTER VII.
OF THE NATURAL AND MARKET PRICE OF COMMODITIES.

There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate, both of
wages and profit, in every different employment of labour and stock. This rate
is naturally regulated, as I shall shew hereafter, partly by the general
circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their advancing,
stationary, or declining condition, and partly by the particular nature of each
employment.

There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate
of rent, which is regulated, too, as I shall shew hereafter, partly by the
general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is
situated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land.

These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages,
profit and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail.

When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is
sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the
profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market,
according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be
called its natural price.

The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it
really costs the person who brings it to market; for though, in common
language, what is called the prime cost of any commodity does not comprehend
the profit of the person who is to sell it again, yet, if he sells it at a
price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his
neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the trade; since, by employing his
stock in some other way, he might have made that profit. His profit, besides,
is his revenue, the proper fund of his subsistence. As, while he is preparing
and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his workmen their wages, or
their subsistence; so he advances to himself, in the same manner, his own
subsistence, which is generally suitable to the profit which he may reasonably
expect from the sale of his goods. Unless they yield him this profit,
therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be said to have
really cost him.

Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit, is not always the
lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at
which he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where there
is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleases.

The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold, is called its market
price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its natural
price.

The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion
between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of
those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole
value of the rent, labour, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it
thither. Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand
the effectual demand; since it maybe sufficient to effectuate the bringing of
the commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor
man may be said, in some sense, to have a demand for a coach and six; he might
like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity
can never be brought to market in order to satisfy it.

When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of
the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole value of the
rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither,
cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it
altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A competition will
immediately begin among them, and the market price will rise more or less above
the natural price, according as either the greatness of the deficiency, or the
wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or less the
eagerness of the competition. Among competitors of equal wealth and luxury, the
same deficiency will generally occasion a more or less eager competition,
according as the acquisition of the commodity happens to be of more or less
importance to them. Hence the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life
during the blockade of a town, or in a famine.

When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot be
all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages,
and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be
sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give
for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market price will sink more or
less below the natural price, according as the greatness of the excess
increases more or less the competition of the sellers, or according as it
happens to be more or less important to them to get immediately rid of the
commodity. The same excess in the importation of perishable, will occasion a
much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in the
importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.

When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual
demand, and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or
as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. The whole
quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and can not be disposed
of for more. The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to
accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept of less.

The quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally suits itself to the
effectual demand. It is the interest of all those who employ their land,
labour, or stock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity never
should exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interest of all other people
that it never should fall short of that demand.

If at any time it exceeds the effectual demand, some of the component parts of
its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of
the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their land;
and if it is wages or profit, the interest of the labourers in the one case,
and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw a part of
their labour or stock, from this employment. The quantity brought to market
will soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the
different parts of its price will rise to their natural rate, and the whole
price to its natural price.

If, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market should at any time fall
short of the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must
rise above their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of all other
landlords will naturally prompt them to prepare more land for the raising of
this commodity; if it is wages or profit, the interest of all other labourers
and dealers will soon prompt them to employ more labour and stock in preparing
and bringing it to market. The quantity brought thither will soon be sufficient
to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will soon
sink to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.

The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the
prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them
down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder
them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are
constantly tending towards it.

The whole quantity of industry annually employed in order to bring any
commodity to market, naturally suits itself in this manner to the effectual
demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precise quantity thither
which may be sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, that demand.

But, in some employments, the same quantity of industry will, in different
years, produce very different quantities of commodities; while, in others, it
will produce always the same, or very nearly the same. The same number of
labourers in husbandry will, in different years, produce very different
quantities of corn, wine, oil, hops, etc. But the same number of spinners or
weavers will every year produce the same, or very nearly the same, quantity of
linen and woollen cloth. It is only the average produce of the one species of
industry which can be suited, in any respect, to the effectual demand; and as
its actual produce is frequently much greater, and frequently much less, than
its average produce, the quantity of the commodities brought to market will
sometimes exceed a good deal, and sometimes fall short a good deal, of the
effectual demand. Even though that demand, therefore, should continue always
the same, their market price will be liable to great fluctuations, will
sometimes fall a good deal below, and sometimes rise a good deal above, their
natural price. In the other species of industry, the produce of equal
quantities of labour being always the same, or very nearly the same, it can be
more exactly suited to the effectual demand. While that demand continues the
same, therefore, the market price of the commodities is likely to do so too,
and to be either altogether, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with
the natural price. That the price of linen and woollen cloth is liable neither
to such frequent, nor to such great variations, as the price of corn, every
man’s experience will inform him. The price of the one species of
commodities varies only with the variations in the demand; that of the other
varies not only with the variations in the demand, but with the much greater,
and more frequent, variations in the quantity of what is brought to market, in
order to supply that demand.

The occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of any commodity
fall chiefly upon those parts of its price which resolve themselves into wages
and profit. That part which resolves itself into rent is less affected by them.
A rent certain in money is not in the least affected by them, either in its
rate or in its value. A rent which consists either in a certain proportion, or
in a certain quantity, of the rude produce, is no doubt affected in its yearly
value by all the occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of
that rude produce; but it is seldom affected by them in its yearly rate. In
settling the terms of the lease, the landlord and farmer endeavour, according
to their best judgment, to adjust that rate, not to the temporary and
occasional, but to the average and ordinary price of the produce.

Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate, either of wages or of
profit, according as the market happens to be either overstocked or
understocked with commodities or with labour, with work done, or with work to
be done. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth (with which the
market is almost always understocked upon such occasions), and augments the
profits of the merchants who possess any considerable quantity of it. It has no
effect upon the wages of the weavers. The market is understocked with
commodities, not with labour, with work done, not with work to be done. It
raises the wages of journeymen tailors. The market is here understocked with
labour. There is an effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done,
than can be had. It sinks the price of coloured silks and cloths, and thereby
reduces the profits of the merchants who have any considerable quantity of them
upon hand. It sinks, too, the wages of the workmen employed in preparing such
commodities, for which all demand is stopped for six months, perhaps for a
twelvemonth. The market is here overstocked both with commodities and with
labour.

But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this manner
continually gravitating, if one may say so, towards the natural price; yet
sometimes particular accidents, sometimes natural causes, and sometimes
particular regulations of policy, may, in many commodities, keep up the market
price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural price.

When, by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some
particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price, those
who employ their stocks in supplying that market, are generally careful to
conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt
so many new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way, that, the effectual
demand being fully supplied, the market price would soon be reduced to the
natural price, and, perhaps, for some time even below it. If the market is at a
great distance from the residence of those who supply it, they may sometimes be
able to keep the secret for several years together, and may so long enjoy their
extraordinary profits without any new rivals. Secrets of this kind, however, it
must be acknowledged, can seldom be long kept; and the extraordinary profit can
last very little longer than they are kept.

Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than secrets in trade.
A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour with materials
which cost only half the price of those commonly made use of, may, with good
management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long as he lives, and even
leave it as a legacy to his posterity. His extraordinary gains arise from the
high price which is paid for his private labour. They properly consist in the
high wages of that labour. But as they are repeated upon every part of his
stock, and as their whole amount bears, upon that account, a regular proportion
to it, they are commonly considered as extraordinary profits of stock.

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of particular
accidents, of which, however, the operation may sometimes last for many years
together.

Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that
all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not be
sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to
market, therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to give more
than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them,
together with the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock which were
employed in preparing and bringing them to market, according to their natural
rates. Such commodities may continue for whole centuries together to be sold at
this high price; and that part of it which resolves itself into the rent of
land, is in this case the part which is generally paid above its natural rate.
The rent of the land which affords such singular and esteemed productions, like
the rent of some vineyards in France of a peculiarly happy soil and situation,
bears no regular proportion to the rent of other equally fertile and equally
well cultivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of the labour, and the
profits of the stock employed in bringing such commodities to market, on the
contrary, are seldom out of their natural proportion to those of the other
employments of labour and stock in their neighbourhood.

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural
causes, which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully supplied,
and which may continue, therefore, to operate for ever.

A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company, has the
same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping
the market constantly understocked by never fully supplying the effectual
demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their
natural rate.

The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The
natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest
which can be taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable
time together. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed
out of the buyers, or which it is supposed they will consent to give; the other
is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same
time continue their business.

The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and all
those laws which restrain in particular employments, the competition to a
smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency,
though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may
frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of employments, keep up the
market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain
both the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them
somewhat above their natural rate.

Such enhancements of the market price may last as long as the regulations of
policy which give occasion to them.

The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue long
above, can seldom continue long below, its natural price. Whatever part of it
was paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected would
immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw either so much land
or so much labour, or so much stock, from being employed about it, that the
quantity brought to market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the
effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would soon rise to the natural
price; this at least would be the case where there was perfect liberty.

The same statutes of apprenticeship and other corporation laws, indeed, which,
when a manufacture is in prosperity, enable the workman to raise his wages a
good deal above their natural rate, sometimes oblige him, when it decays, to
let them down a good deal below it. As in the one case they exclude many people
from his employment, so in the other they exclude him from many employments.
The effect of such regulations, however, is not near so durable in sinking the
workman’s wages below, as in raising them above their natural rate. Their
operation in the one way may endure for many centuries, but in the other it can
last no longer than the lives of some of the workmen who were bred to the
business in the time of its prosperity. When they are gone, the number of those
who are afterwards educated to the trade will naturally suit itself to the
effectual demand. The policy must be as violent as that of Indostan or ancient
Egypt (where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the
occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege
if he changed it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for
several generations together, sink either the wages of labour or the profits of
stock below their natural rate.

This is all that I think necessary to be observed at present concerning the
deviations, whether occasional or permanent, of the market price of commodities
from the natural price.

The natural price itself varies with the natural rate of each of its component
parts, of wages, profit, and rent; and in every society this rate varies
according to their circumstances, according to their riches or poverty, their
advancing, stationary, or declining condition. I shall, in the four following
chapters, endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, the causes of
those different variations.

First, I shall endeavour to explain what are the circumstances which naturally
determine the rate of wages, and in what manner those circumstances are
affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing, stationary, or declining
state of the society.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew what are the circumstances which naturally
determine the rate of profit; and in what manner, too, those circumstances are
affected by the like variations in the state of the society.

Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different
employments of labour and stock; yet a certain proportion seems commonly to
take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different employments of
labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different employments of stock.
This proportion, it will appear hereafter, depends partly upon the nature of
the different employments, and partly upon the different laws and policy of the
society in which they are carried on. But though in many respects dependent
upon the laws and policy, this proportion seems to be little affected by the
riches or poverty of that society, by its advancing, stationary, or declining
condition, but to remain the same, or very nearly the same, in all those
different states. I shall, in the third place, endeavour to explain all the
different circumstances which regulate this proportion.

In the fourth and last place, I shall endeavour to shew what are the
circumstances which regulate the rent of land, and which either raise or lower
the real price of all the different substances which it produces.

CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE WAGES OF LABOUR.

The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompence or wages of labour. In
that original state of things which precedes both the appropriation of land and
the accumulation of stock, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer.
He has neither landlord nor master to share with him.

Had this state continued, the wages of labour would have augmented with all
those improvements in its productive powers, to which the division of labour
gives occasion. All things would gradually have become cheaper. They would have
been produced by a smaller quantity of labour; and as the commodities produced
by equal quantities of labour would naturally in this state of things be
exchanged for one another, they would have been purchased likewise with the
produce of a smaller quantity.

But though all things would have become cheaper in reality, in appearance many
things might have become dearer, than before, or have been exchanged for a
greater quantity of other goods. Let us suppose, for example, that in the
greater part of employments the productive powers of labour had been improved
to tenfold, or that a day’s labour could produce ten times the quantity
of work which it had done originally; but that in a particular employment they
had been improved only to double, or that a day’s labour could produce
only twice the quantity of work which it had done before. In exchanging the
produce of a day’s labour in the greater part of employments for that of
a day’s labour in this particular one, ten times the original quantity of
work in them would purchase only twice the original quantity in it. Any
particular quantity in it, therefore, a pound weight, for example, would appear
to be five times dearer than before. In reality, however, it would be twice as
cheap. Though it required five times the quantity of other goods to purchase
it, it would require only half the quantity of labour either to purchase or to
produce it. The acquisition, therefore, would be twice as easy as before.

But this original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole
produce of his own labour, could not last beyond the first introduction of the
appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. It was at an end,
therefore, long before the most considerable improvements were made in the
productive powers of labour; and it would be to no purpose to trace further
what might have been its effects upon the recompence or wages of labour.

As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share of
almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise or collect from it.
His rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which is
employed upon land.

It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal to
maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally
advanced to him from the stock of a master, the farmer who employs him, and who
would have no interest to employ him, unless he was to share in the produce of
his labour, or unless his stock was to be replaced to him with a profit. This
profit makes a second deduction from the produce of the labour which is
employed upon land.

The produce of almost all other labour is liable to the like deduction of
profit. In all arts and manufactures, the greater part of the workmen stand in
need of a master, to advance them the materials of their work, and their wages
and maintenance, till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their
labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is
bestowed; and in this share consists his profit.

It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single independent workman has stock
sufficient both to purchase the materials of his work, and to maintain himself
till it be completed. He is both master and workman, and enjoys the whole
produce of his own labour, or the whole value which it adds to the materials
upon which it is bestowed. It includes what are usually two distinct revenues,
belonging to two distinct persons, the profits of stock, and the wages of
labour.

Such cases, however, are not very frequent; and in every part of Europe twenty
workmen serve under a master for one that is independent, and the wages of
labour are everywhere understood to be, what they usually are, when the
labourer is one person, and the owner of the stock which employs him another.

What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the contract
usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the
same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little, as
possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in
order to lower, the wages of labour.

It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon
all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other
into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can
combine much more easily: and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does
not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We
have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work, but
many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes, the masters can hold
out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant,
though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two
upon the stocks, which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not
subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year, without
employment. In the long run, the workman may be as necessary to his master as
his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though
frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that
masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters
are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform,
combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To
violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of
reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear
of this combination, because it is the usual, and, one may say, the natural
state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into
particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These
are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy till the moment of
execution; and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do without resistance,
though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such
combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive
combination of the workmen, who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this
kind, combine, of their own accord, to raise the price of their labour. Their
usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the
great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their
combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In
order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the
loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They
are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who
must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with
their demands. The masters, upon these occasions, are just as clamorous upon
the other side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil
magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted
with so much severity against the combination of servants, labourers, and
journeymen. The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the
violence of those tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition
of the civil magistrate, partly from the superior steadiness of the masters,
partly from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under of
submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing but
the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders.

But though, in disputes with their workmen, masters must generally have the
advantage, there is, however, a certain rate, below which it seems impossible
to reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of the lowest
species of labour.

A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be sufficient
to maintain him. They must even upon most occasions be somewhat more, otherwise
it would be impossible for him to bring up a family, and the race of such
workmen could not last beyond the first generation. Mr Cantillon seems, upon
this account, to suppose that the lowest species of common labourers must
everywhere earn at least double their own maintenance, in order that, one with
another, they may be enabled to bring up two children; the labour of the wife,
on account of her necessary attendance on the children, being supposed no more
than sufficient to provide for herself: But one half the children born, it is
computed, die before the age of manhood. The poorest labourers, therefore,
according to this account, must, one with another, attempt to rear at least
four children, in order that two may have an equal chance of living to that
age. But the necessary maintenance of four children, it is supposed, may be
nearly equal to that of one man. The labour of an able-bodied slave, the same
author adds, is computed to be worth double his maintenance; and that of the
meanest labourer, he thinks, cannot be worth less than that of an able-bodied
slave. Thus far at least seems certain, that, in order to bring up a family,
the labour of the husband and wife together must, even in the lowest species of
common labour, be able to earn something more than what is precisely necessary
for their own maintenance; but in what proportion, whether in that
above-mentioned, or many other, I shall not take upon me to determine.

There are certain circumstances, however, which sometimes give the labourers an
advantage, and enable them to raise their wages considerably above this rate,
evidently the lowest which is consistent with common humanity.

When in any country the demand for those who live by wages, labourers,
journeymen, servants of every kind, is continually increasing; when every year
furnishes employment for a greater number than had been employed the year
before, the workmen have no occasion to combine in order to raise their wages.
The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid against
one another in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break through the
natural combination of masters not to raise wages. The demand for those who
live by wages, it is evident, cannot increase but in proportion to the increase
of the funds which are destined to the payment of wages. These funds are of two
kinds, first, the revenue which is over and above what is necessary for the
maintenance; and, secondly, the stock which is over and above what is necessary
for the employment of their masters.

When the landlord, annuitant, or monied man, has a greater revenue than what he
judges sufficient to maintain his own family, he employs either the whole or a
part of the surplus in maintaining one or more menial servants. Increase this
surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of those servants.

When an independent workman, such as a weaver or shoemaker, has got more stock
than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own work, and to
maintain himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally employs one or more
journeymen with the surplus, in order to make a profit by their work. Increase
this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of his journeymen.

The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, necessarily increases with
the increase of the revenue and stock of every country, and cannot possibly
increase without it. The increase of revenue and stock is the increase of
national wealth. The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, naturally
increases with the increase of national wealth, and cannot possibly increase
without it.

It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase,
which occasions a rise in the wages of labour. It is not, accordingly, in the
richest countries, but in the most thriving, or in those which are growing rich
the fastest, that the wages of labour are highest. England is certainly, in the
present times, a much richer country than any part of North America. The wages
of labour, however, are much higher in North America than in any part of
England. In the province of New York, common labourers earned in 1773, before
the commencement of the late disturbances, three shillings and sixpence
currency, equal to two shillings sterling, a-day; ship-carpenters, ten
shillings and sixpence currency, with a pint of rum, worth sixpence sterling,
equal in all to six shillings and sixpence sterling; house-carpenters and
bricklayers, eight shillings currency, equal to four shillings and sixpence
sterling; journeymen tailors, five shillings currency, equal to about two
shillings and tenpence sterling. These prices are all above the London price;
and wages are said to be as high in the other colonies as in New York. The
price of provisions is everywhere in North America much lower than in England.
A dearth has never been known there. In the worst seasons they have always had
a sufficiency for themselves, though less for exportation. If the money price
of labour, therefore, be higher than it is anywhere in the mother-country, its
real price, the real command of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which
it conveys to the labourer, must be higher in a still greater proportion.

But though North America is not yet so rich as England, it is much more
thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquisition
of riches. The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the
increase of the number of its inhabitants. In Great Britain, and most other
European countries, they are not supposed to double in less than five hundred
years. In the British colonies in North America, it has been found that they
double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. Nor in the present times is this
increase principally owing to the continual importation of new inhabitants, but
to the great multiplication of the species. Those who live to old age, it is
said, frequently see there from fifty to a hundred, and sometimes many more,
descendants from their own body. Labour is there so well rewarded, that a
numerous family of children, instead of being a burden, is a source of opulence
and prosperity to the parents. The labour of each child, before it can leave
their house, is computed to be worth a hundred pounds clear gain to them. A
young widow with four or five young children, who, among the middling or
inferior ranks of people in Europe, would have so little chance for a second
husband, is there frequently courted as a sort of fortune. The value of
children is the greatest of all encouragements to marriage. We cannot,
therefore, wonder that the people in North America should generally marry very
young. Notwithstanding the great increase occasioned by such early marriages,
there is a continual complaint of the scarcity of hands in North America. The
demand for labourers, the funds destined for maintaining them increase, it
seems, still faster than they can find labourers to employ.

Though the wealth of a country should be very great, yet if it has been long
stationary, we must not expect to find the wages of labour very high in it. The
funds destined for the payment of wages, the revenue and stock of its
inhabitants, may be of the greatest extent; but if they have continued for
several centuries of the same, or very nearly of the same extent, the number of
labourers employed every year could easily supply, and even more than supply,
the number wanted the following year. There could seldom be any scarcity of
hands, nor could the masters be obliged to bid against one another in order to
get them. The hands, on the contrary, would, in this case, naturally multiply
beyond their employment. There would be a constant scarcity of employment, and
the labourers would be obliged to bid against one another in order to get it.
If in such a country the wages of labour had ever been more than sufficient to
maintain the labourer, and to enable him to bring up a family, the competition
of the labourers and the interest of the masters would soon reduce them to the
lowest rate which is consistent with common humanity. China has been long one
of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most
industrious, and most populous, countries in the world. It seems, however, to
have been long stationary. Marco Polo, who visited it more than five hundred
years ago, describes its cultivation, industry, and populousness, almost in the
same terms in which they are described by travellers in the present times. It
had, perhaps, even long before his time, acquired that full complement of
riches which the nature of its laws and institutions permits it to acquire. The
accounts of all travellers, inconsistent in many other respects, agree in the
low wages of labour, and in the difficulty which a labourer finds in bringing
up a family in China. If by digging the ground a whole day he can get what will
purchase a small quantity of rice in the evening, he is contented. The
condition of artificers is, if possible, still worse. Instead of waiting
indolently in their work-houses for the calls of their customers, as in Europe,
they are continually running about the streets with the tools of their
respective trades, offering their services, and, as it were, begging
employment. The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses
that of the most beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighbourhood of Canton,
many hundred, it is commonly said, many thousand families have no habitation on
the land, but live constantly in little fishing-boats upon the rivers and
canals. The subsistence which they find there is so scanty, that they are eager
to fish up the nastiest garbage thrown overboard from any European ship. Any
carrion, the carcase of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and
stinking, is as welcome to them as the most wholesome food to the people of
other countries. Marriage is encouraged in China, not by the profitableness of
children, but by the liberty of destroying them. In all great towns, several
are every night exposed in the street, or drowned like puppies in the water.
The performance of this horrid office is even said to be the avowed business by
which some people earn their subsistence.

China, however, though it may, perhaps, stand still, does not seem to go
backwards. Its towns are nowhere deserted by their inhabitants. The lands which
had once been cultivated, are nowhere neglected. The same, or very nearly the
same, annual labour, must, therefore, continue to be performed, and the funds
destined for maintaining it must not, consequently, be sensibly diminished. The
lowest class of labourers, therefore, notwithstanding their scanty subsistence,
must some way or another make shift to continue their race so far as to keep up
their usual numbers.

But it would be otherwise in a country where the funds destined for the
maintenance of labour were sensibly decaying. Every year the demand for
servants and labourers would, in all the different classes of employments, be
less than it had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the superior
classes, not being able to find employment in their own business, would be glad
to seek it in the lowest. The lowest class being not only overstocked with its
own workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other classes, the
competition for employment would be so great in it, as to reduce the wages of
labour to the most miserable and scanty subsistence of the labourer. Many would
not be able to find employment even upon these hard terms, but would either
starve, or be driven to seek a subsistence, either by begging, or by the
perpetration perhaps, of the greatest enormities. Want, famine, and mortality,
would immediately prevail in that class, and from thence extend themselves to
all the superior classes, till the number of inhabitants in the country was
reduced to what could easily be maintained by the revenue and stock which
remained in it, and which had escaped either the tyranny or calamity which had
destroyed the rest. This, perhaps, is nearly the present state of Bengal, and
of some other of the English settlements in the East Indies. In a fertile
country, which had before been much depopulated, where subsistence,
consequently, should not be very difficult, and where, notwithstanding, three
or four hundred thousand people die of hunger in one year, we may be assured
that the funds destined for the maintenance of the labouring poor are fast
decaying. The difference between the genius of the British constitution, which
protects and governs North America, and that of the mercantile company which
oppresses and domineers in the East Indies, cannot, perhaps, be better
illustrated than by the different state of those countries.

The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the necessary effect, so it
is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty maintenance of
the labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are
at a stand, and their starving condition, that they are going fast backwards.

In Great Britain, the wages of labour seem, in the present times, to be
evidently more than what is precisely necessary to enable the labourer to bring
up a family. In order to satisfy ourselves upon this point, it will not be
necessary to enter into any tedious or doubtful calculation of what may be the
lowest sum upon which it is possible to do this. There are many plain symptoms,
that the wages of labour are nowhere in this country regulated by this lowest
rate, which is consistent with common humanity.

First, in almost every part of Great Britain there is a distinction, even in
the lowest species of labour, between summer and winter wages. Summer wages are
always highest. But, on account of the extraordinary expense of fuel, the
maintenance of a family is most expensive in winter. Wages, therefore, being
highest when this expense is lowest, it seems evident that they are not
regulated by what is necessary for this expense, but by the quantity and
supposed value of the work. A labourer, it may be said, indeed, ought to save
part of his summer wages, in order to defray his winter expense; and that,
through the whole year, they do not exceed what is necessary to maintain his
family through the whole year. A slave, however, or one absolutely dependent on
us for immediate subsistence, would not be treated in this manner. His daily
subsistence would be proportioned to his daily necessities.

Secondly, the wages of labour do not, in Great Britain, fluctuate with the
price of provisions. These vary everywhere from year to year, frequently from
month to month. But in many places, the money price of labour remains uniformly
the same, sometimes for half a century together. If, in these places,
therefore, the labouring poor can maintain their families in dear years, they
must be at their ease in times of moderate plenty, and in affluence in those of
extraordinary cheapness. The high price of provisions during these ten years
past, has not, in many parts of the kingdom, been accompanied with any sensible
rise in the money price of labour. It has, indeed, in some; owing, probably,
more to the increase of the demand for labour, than to that of the price of
provisions.

Thirdly, as the price of provisions varies more from year to year than the
wages of labour, so, on the other hand, the wages of labour vary more from
place to place than the price of provisions. The prices of bread and
butchers’ meat are generally the same, or very nearly the same, through
the greater part of the united kingdom. These, and most other things which are
sold by retail, the way in which the labouring poor buy all things, are
generally fully as cheap, or cheaper, in great towns than in the remoter parts
of the country, for reasons which I shall have occasion to explain hereafter.
But the wages of labour in a great town and its neighbourhood are frequently a
fourth or a fifth part, twenty or five-and—twenty per cent. higher than
at a few miles distance. Eighteen pence a day may be reckoned the common price
of labour in London and its neighbourhood. At a few miles distance, it falls to
fourteen and fifteen pence. Tenpence may be reckoned its price in Edinburgh and
its neighbourhood. At a few miles distance, it falls to eightpence, the usual
price of common labour through the greater part of the low country of Scotland,
where it varies a good deal less than in England. Such a difference of prices,
which, it seems, is not always sufficient to transport a man from one parish to
another, would necessarily occasion so great a transportation of the most bulky
commodities, not only from one parish to another, but from one end of the
kingdom, almost from one end of the world to the other, as would soon reduce
them more nearly to a level. After all that has been said of the levity and
inconstancy of human nature, it appears evidently from experience, that man is,
of all sorts of luggage, the most difficult to be transported. If the labouring
poor, therefore, can maintain their families in those parts of the kingdom
where the price of labour is lowest, they must be in affluence where it is
highest.

Fourthly, the variations in the price of labour not only do not correspond,
either in place or time, with those in the price of provisions, but they are
frequently quite opposite.

Grain, the food of the common people, is dearer in Scotland than in England,
whence Scotland receives almost every year very large supplies. But English
corn must be sold dearer in Scotland, the country to which it is brought, than
in England, the country from which it comes; and in proportion to its quality
it cannot be sold dearer in Scotland than the Scotch corn that comes to the
same market in competition with it. The quality of grain depends chiefly upon
the quantity of flour or meal which it yields at the mill; and, in this
respect, English grain is so much superior to the Scotch, that though often
dearer in appearance, or in proportion to the measure of its bulk, it is
generally cheaper in reality, or in proportion to its quality, or even to the
measure of its weight. The price of labour, on the contrary, is dearer in
England than in Scotland. If the labouring poor, therefore, can maintain their
families in the one part of the united kingdom, they must be in affluence in
the other. Oatmeal, indeed, supplies the common people in Scotland with the
greatest and the best part of their food, which is, in general, much inferior
to that of their neighbours of the same rank in England. This difference,
however, in the mode of their subsistence, is not the cause, but the effect, of
the difference in their wages; though, by a strange misapprehension, I have
frequently heard it represented as the cause. It is not because one man keeps a
coach, while his neighbour walks a-foot, that the one is rich, and the other
poor; but because the one is rich, he keeps a coach, and because the other is
poor, he walks a-foot.

During the course of the last century, taking one year with another, grain was
dearer in both parts of the united kingdom than during that of the present.
This is a matter of fact which cannot now admit of any reasonable doubt; and
the proof of it is, if possible, still more decisive with regard to Scotland
than with regard to England. It is in Scotland supported by the evidence of the
public fiars, annual valuations made upon oath, according to the actual state
of the markets, of all the different sorts of grain in every different county
of Scotland. If such direct proof could require any collateral evidence to
confirm it, I would observe, that this has likewise been the case in France,
and probably in most other parts of Europe. With regard to France, there is the
clearest proof. But though it is certain, that in both parts of the united
kingdom grain was somewhat dearer in the last century than in the present, it
is equally certain that labour was much cheaper. If the labouring poor,
therefore, could bring up their families then, they must be much more at their
ease now. In the last century, the most usual day-wages of common labour
through the greater part of Scotland were sixpence in summer, and fivepence in
winter. Three shillings a-week, the same price, very nearly still continues to
be paid in some parts of the Highlands and Western islands. Through the greater
part of the Low country, the most usual wages of common labour are now eight
pence a-day; tenpence, sometimes a shilling, about Edinburgh, in the counties
which border upon England, probably on account of that neighbourhood, and in a
few other places where there has lately been a considerable rise in the demand
for labour, about Glasgow, Carron, Ayrshire, etc. In England, the improvements
of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, began much earlier than in
Scotland. The demand for labour, and consequently its price, must necessarily
have increased with those improvements. In the last century, accordingly, as
well as in the present, the wages of labour were higher in England than in
Scotland. They have risen, too, considerably since that time, though, on
account of the greater variety of wages paid there in different places, it is
more difficult to ascertain how much. In 1614, the pay of a foot soldier was
the same as in the present times, eightpence a-day. When it was first
established, it would naturally be regulated by the usual wages of common
labourers, the rank of people from which foot soldiers are commonly drawn.
Lord-chief-justice Hales, who wrote in the time of Charles II. computes the
necessary expense of a labourer’s family, consisting of six persons, the
father and mother, two children able to do something, and two not able, at ten
shillings a-week, or twenty-six pounds a-year. If they cannot earn this by
their labour, they must make it up, he supposes, either by begging or stealing.
He appears to have enquired very carefully into this subject {See his scheme
for the maintenance of the poor, in Burn’s History of the Poor Laws.}. In
1688, Mr Gregory King, whose skill in political arithmetic is so much extolled
by Dr Davenant, computed the ordinary income of labourers and out-servants to
be fifteen pounds a-year to a family, which he supposed to consist, one with
another, of three and a half persons. His calculation, therefore, though
different in appearance, corresponds very nearly at bottom with that of Judge
Hales. Both suppose the weekly expense of such families to be about
twenty-pence a-head. Both the pecuniary income and expense of such families
have increased considerably since that time through the greater part of the
kingdom, in some places more, and in some less, though perhaps scarce anywhere
so much as some exaggerated accounts of the present wages of labour have lately
represented them to the public. The price of labour, it must be observed,
cannot be ascertained very accurately anywhere, different prices being often
paid at the same place and for the same sort of labour, not only according to
the different abilities of the workman, but according to the easiness or
hardness of the masters. Where wages are not regulated by law, all that we can
pretend to determine is, what are the most usual; and experience seems to shew
that law can never regulate them properly, though it has often pretended to do
so.

The real recompence of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries and
conveniencies of life which it can procure to the labourer, has, during the
course of the present century, increased perhaps in a still greater proportion
than its money price. Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but many
other things, from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and wholesome
variety of food, have become a great deal cheaper. Potatoes, for example, do
not at present, through the greater part of the kingdom, cost half the price
which they used to do thirty or forty years ago. The same thing may be said of
turnips, carrots, cabbages; things which were formerly never raised but by the
spade, but which are now commonly raised by the plough. All sort of garden
stuff, too, has become cheaper. The greater part of the apples, and even of the
onions, consumed in Great Britain, were, in the last century, imported from
Flanders. The great improvements in the coarser manufactories of both linen and
woollen cloth furnish the labourers with cheaper and better clothing; and those
in the manufactories of the coarser metals, with cheaper and better instruments
of trade, as well as with many agreeable and convenient pieces of household
furniture. Soap, salt, candles, leather, and fermented liquors, have, indeed,
become a good deal dearer, chiefly from the taxes which have been laid upon
them. The quantity of these, however, which the labouring poor are under any
necessity of consuming, is so very small, that the increase in their price does
not compensate the diminution in that of so many other things. The common
complaint, that luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people,
and that the labouring poor will not now be contented with the same food,
clothing, and lodging, which satisfied them in former times, may convince us
that it is not the money price of labour only, but its real recompence, which
has augmented.

Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be
regarded as an advantage, or as an inconveniency, to the society? The answer
seems at first abundantly plain. Servants, labourers, and workmen of different
kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what
improves the circumstances of the greater part, can never be regarded as any
inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of
which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but
equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the
people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be
themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged.

Poverty, though it no doubt discourages, does not always prevent, marriage. It
seems even to be favourable to generation. A half-starved Highland woman
frequently bears more than twenty children, while a pampered fine lady is often
incapable of bearing any, and is generally exhausted by two or three.
Barrenness, so frequent among women of fashion, is very rare among those of
inferior station. Luxury, in the fair sex, while it inflames, perhaps, the
passion for enjoyment, seems always to weaken, and frequently to destroy
altogether, the powers of generation.

But poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is extremely
unfavourable to the rearing of children. The tender plant is produced; but in
so cold a soil, and so severe a climate, soon withers and dies. It is not
uncommon, I have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland, for a
mother who has born twenty children not to have two alive. Several officers of
great experience have assured me, that, so far from recruiting their regiment,
they have never been able to supply it with drums and fifes, from all the
soldiers’ children that were born in it. A greater number of fine
children, however, is seldom seen anywhere than about a barrack of soldiers.
Very few of them, it seems, arrive at the age of thirteen or fourteen. In some
places, one half the children die before they are four years of age, in many
places before they are seven, and in almost all places before they are nine or
ten. This great mortality, however will everywhere be found chiefly among the
children of the common people, who cannot afford to tend them with the same
care as those of better station. Though their marriages are generally more
fruitful than those of people of fashion, a smaller proportion of their
children arrive at maturity. In foundling hospitals, and among the children
brought up by parish charities, the mortality is still greater than among those
of the common people.

Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of
their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it. But in civilized
society, it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of
subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the human species;
and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part of the
children which their fruitful marriages produce.

The liberal reward of labour, by enabling them to provide better for their
children, and consequently to bring up a greater number, naturally tends to
widen and extend those limits. It deserves to be remarked, too, that it
necessarily does this as nearly as possible in the proportion which the demand
for labour requires. If this demand is continually increasing, the reward of
labour must necessarily encourage in such a manner the marriage and
multiplication of labourers, as may enable them to supply that continually
increasing demand by a continually increasing population. If the reward should
at any time be less than what was requisite for this purpose, the deficiency of
hands would soon raise it; and if it should at any time be more, their
excessive multiplication would soon lower it to this necessary rate. The market
would be so much understocked with labour in the one case, and so much
overstocked in the other, as would soon force back its price to that proper
rate which the circumstances of the society required. It is in this manner that
the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates
the production of men, quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops it
when it advances too fast. It is this demand which regulates and determines the
state of propagation in all the different countries of the world; in North
America, in Europe, and in China; which renders it rapidly progressive in the
first, slow and gradual in the second, and altogether stationary in the last.

The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his
master; but that of a free servant is at his own expense. The wear and tear of
the latter, however, is, in reality, as much at the expense of his master as
that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen and servants of every kind
must be such as may enable them, one with another to continue the race of
journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or
stationary demand of the society, may happen to require. But though the wear
and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it
generally costs him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for
replacing or repairing, if I may say so, the wear and tear of the slave, is
commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined for
performing the same office with regard to the freeman is managed by the freeman
himself. The disorders which generally prevail in the economy of the rich,
naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former; the strict
frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor as naturally establish
themselves in that of the latter. Under such different management, the same
purpose must require very different degrees of expense to execute it. It
appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe,
that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by
slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New-York, and Philadelphia, where
the wages of common labour are so very high.

The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the effect of increasing
wealth, so it is the cause of increasing population. To complain of it, is to
lament over the necessary cause and effect of the greatest public prosperity.

It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive state, while
the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has
acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring
poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the most
comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining
state. The progressive state is, in reality, the cheerful and the hearty state
to all the different orders of the society; the stationary is dull; the
declining melancholy.

The liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the propagation, so it increases
the industry of the common people. The wages of labour are the encouragement of
industry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the
encouragement it receives. A plentiful subsistence increases the bodily
strength of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition,
and of ending his days, perhaps, in ease and plenty, animates him to exert that
strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find
the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are low; in
England, for example, than in Scotland; in the neighbourhood of great towns,
than in remote country places. Some workmen, indeed, when they can earn in four
days what will maintain them through the week, will be idle the other three.
This, however, is by no means the case with the greater part. Workmen, on the
contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork
themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years. A
carpenter in London, and in some other places, is not supposed to last in his
utmost vigour above eight years. Something of the same kind happens in many
other trades, in which the workmen are paid by the piece; as they generally are
in manufactures, and even in country labour, wherever wages are higher than
ordinary. Almost every class of artificers is subject to some peculiar
infirmity occasioned by excessive application to their peculiar species of
work. Ramuzzini, an eminent Italian physician, has written a particular book
concerning such diseases. We do not reckon our soldiers the most industrious
set of people among us; yet when soldiers have been employed in some particular
sorts of work, and liberally paid by the piece, their officers have frequently
been obliged to stipulate with the undertaker, that they should not be allowed
to earn above a certain sum every day, according to the rate at which they were
paid. Till this stipulation was made, mutual emulation, and the desire of
greater gain, frequently prompted them to overwork themselves, and to hurt
their health by excessive labour. Excessive application, during four days of
the week, is frequently the real cause of the idleness of the other three, so
much and so loudly complained of. Great labour, either of mind or body,
continued for several days together is, in most men, naturally followed by a
great desire of relaxation, which, if not restrained by force, or by some
strong necessity, is almost irresistible. It is the call of nature, which
requires to be relieved by some indulgence, sometimes of ease only, but
sometimes too of dissipation and diversion. If it is not complied with, the
consequences are often dangerous and sometimes fatal, and such as almost
always, sooner or later, bring on the peculiar infirmity of the trade. If
masters would always listen to the dictates of reason and humanity, they have
frequently occasion rather to moderate, than to animate the application of many
of their workmen. It will be found, I believe, in every sort of trade, that the
man who works so moderately, as to be able to work constantly, not only
preserves his health the longest, but, in the course of the year, executes the
greatest quantity of work.

In cheap years it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in dear
times more industrious than ordinary. A plentiful subsistence, therefore, it
has been concluded, relaxes, and a scanty one quickens their industry. That a
little more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen idle, cannot be well
doubted; but that it should have this effect upon the greater part, or that men
in general should work better when they are ill fed, than when they are well
fed, when they are disheartened than when they are in good spirits, when they
are frequently sick than when they are generally in good health, seems not very
probable. Years of dearth, it is to be observed, are generally among the common
people years of sickness and mortality, which cannot fail to diminish the
produce of their industry.

In years of plenty, servants frequently leave their masters, and trust their
subsistence to what they can make by their own industry. But the same cheapness
of provisions, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of
servants, encourages masters, farmers especially, to employ a greater number.
Farmers, upon such occasions, expect more profit from their corn by maintaining
a few more labouring servants, than by selling it at a low price in the market.
The demand for servants increases, while the number of those who offer to
supply that demand diminishes. The price of labour, therefore, frequently rises
in cheap years.

In years of scarcity, the difficulty and uncertainty of subsistence make all
such people eager to return to service. But the high price of provisions, by
diminishing the funds destined for the maintenance of servants, disposes
masters rather to diminish than to increase the number of those they have. In
dear years, too, poor independent workmen frequently consume the little stock
with which they had used to supply themselves with the materials of their work,
and are obliged to become journeymen for subsistence. More people want
employment than easily get it; many are willing to take it upon lower terms
than ordinary; and the wages of both servants and journeymen frequently sink in
dear years.

Masters of all sorts, therefore, frequently make better bargains with their
servants in dear than in cheap years, and find them more humble and dependent
in the former than in the latter. They naturally, therefore, commend the former
as more favourable to industry. Landlords and farmers, besides, two of the
largest classes of masters, have another reason for being pleased with dear
years. The rents of the one, and the profits of the other, depend very much
upon the price of provisions. Nothing can be more absurd, however, than to
imagine that men in general should work less when they work for themselves,
than when they work for other people. A poor independent workman will generally
be more industrious than even a journeyman who works by the piece. The one
enjoys the whole produce of his own industry, the other shares it with his
master. The one, in his separate independent state, is less liable to the
temptations of bad company, which, in large manufactories, so frequently ruin
the morals of the other. The superiority of the independent workman over those
servants who are hired by the month or by the year, and whose wages and
maintenance are the same, whether they do much or do little, is likely to be
still greater. Cheap years tend to increase the proportion of independent
workmen to journeymen and servants of all kinds, and dear years to diminish it.

A French author of great knowledge and ingenuity, Mr Messance, receiver of the
tallies in the election of St Etienne, endeavours to shew that the poor do more
work in cheap than in dear years, by comparing the quantity and value of the
goods made upon those different occasions in three different manufactures; one
of coarse woollens, carried on at Elbeuf; one of linen, and another of silk,
both which extend through the whole generality of Rouen. It appears from his
account, which is copied from the registers of the public offices, that the
quantity and value of the goods made in all those three manufactories has
generally been greater in cheap than in dear years, and that it has always been
greatest in the cheapest, and least in the dearest years. All the three seem to
be stationary manufactures, or which, though their produce may vary somewhat
from year to year, are, upon the whole, neither going backwards nor forwards.

The manufacture of linen in Scotland, and that of coarse woollens in the West
Riding of Yorkshire, are growing manufactures, of which the produce is
generally, though with some variations, increasing both in quantity and value.
Upon examining, however, the accounts which have been published of their annual
produce, I have not been able to observe that its variations have had any
sensible connection with the dearness or cheapness of the seasons. In 1740, a
year of great scarcity, both manufactures, indeed, appear to have declined very
considerably. But in 1756, another year of great scarcity, the Scotch
manufactures made more than ordinary advances. The Yorkshire manufacture,
indeed, declined, and its produce did not rise to what it had been in 1755,
till 1766, after the repeal of the American stamp act. In that and the
following year, it greatly exceeded what it had ever been before, and it has
continued to advance ever since.

The produce of all great manufactures for distant sale must necessarily depend,
not so much upon the dearness or cheapness of the seasons in the countries
where they are carried on, as upon the circumstances which affect the demand in
the countries where they are consumed; upon peace or war, upon the prosperity
or declension of other rival manufactures and upon the good or bad humour of
their principal customers. A great part of the extraordinary work, besides,
which is probably done in cheap years, never enters the public registers of
manufactures. The men-servants, who leave their masters, become independent
labourers. The women return to their parents, and commonly spin, in order to
make clothes for themselves and their families. Even the independent workmen do
not always, work for public sale, but are employed by some of their neighbours
in manufactures for family use. The produce of their labour, therefore,
frequently makes no figure in those public registers, of which the records are
sometimes published with so much parade, and from which our merchants and
manufacturers would often vainly pretend to announce the prosperity or
declension of the greatest empires.

Though the variations in the price of labour not only do not always correspond
with those in the price of provisions, but are frequently quite opposite, we
must not, upon this account, imagine that the price of provisions has no
influence upon that of labour. The money price of labour is necessarily
regulated by two circumstances; the demand for labour, and the price of the
necessaries and conveniencies of life. The demand for labour, according as it
happens to be increasing, stationary, or declining, or to require an
increasing, stationary, or declining population, determines the quantities of
the necessaries and conveniencies of life which must be given to the labourer;
and the money price of labour is determined by what is requisite for purchasing
this quantity. Though the money price of labour, therefore, is sometimes high
where the price of provisions is low, it would be still higher, the demand
continuing the same, if the price of provisions was high.

It is because the demand for labour increases in years of sudden and
extraordinary plenty, and diminishes in those of sudden and extraordinary
scarcity, that the money price of labour sometimes rises in the one, and sinks
in the other.

In a year of sudden and extraordinary plenty, there are funds in the hands of
many of the employers of industry, sufficient to maintain and employ a greater
number of industrious people than had been employed the year before; and this
extraordinary number cannot always be had. Those masters, therefore, who want
more workmen, bid against one another, in order to get them, which sometimes
raises both the real and the money price of their labour.

The contrary of this happens in a year of sudden and extraordinary scarcity.
The funds destined for employing industry are less than they had been the year
before. A considerable number of people are thrown out of employment, who bid
one against another, in order to get it, which sometimes lowers both the real
and the money price of labour. In 1740, a year of extraordinary scarcity, many
people were willing to work for bare subsistence. In the succeeding years of
plenty, it was more difficult to get labourers and servants. The scarcity of a
dear year, by diminishing the demand for labour, tends to lower its price, as
the high price of provisions tends to raise it. The plenty of a cheap year, on
the contrary, by increasing the demand, tends to raise the price of labour, as
the cheapness of provisions tends to lower it. In the ordinary variations of
the prices of provisions, those two opposite causes seem to counterbalance one
another, which is probably, in part, the reason why the wages of labour are
everywhere so much more steady and permanent than the price of provisions.

The increase in the wages of labour necessarily increases the price of many
commodities, by increasing that part of it which resolves itself into wages,
and so far tends to diminish their consumption, both at home and abroad. The
same cause, however, which raises the wages of labour, the increase of stock,
tends to increase its productive powers, and to make a smaller quantity of
labour produce a greater quantity of work. The owner of the stock which employs
a great number of labourers necessarily endeavours, for his own advantage, to
make such a proper division and distribution of employment, that they may be
enabled to produce the greatest quantity of work possible. For the same reason,
he endeavours to supply them with the best machinery which either he or they
can think of. What takes place among the labourers in a particular workhouse,
takes place, for the same reason, among those of a great society. The greater
their number, the more they naturally divide themselves into different classes
and subdivisions of employments. More heads are occupied in inventing the most
proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore, more
likely to be invented. There are many commodities, therefore, which, in
consequence of these improvements, come to be produced by so much less labour
than before, that the increase of its price is more than compensated by the
diminution of its quantity.

CHAPTER IX.
OF THE PROFITS OF STOCK.

The rise and fall in the profits of stock depend upon the same causes with the
rise and fall in the wages of labour, the increasing or declining state of the
wealth of the society; but those causes affect the one and the other very
differently.

The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. When the
stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade, their mutual
competition naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there is a like
increase of stock in all the different trades carried on in the same society,
the same competition must produce the same effect in them all.

It is not easy, it has already been observed, to ascertain what are the average
wages of labour, even in a particular place, and at a particular time. We can,
even in this case, seldom determine more than what are the most usual wages.
But even this can seldom be done with regard to the profits of stock. Profit is
so very fluctuating, that the person who carries on a particular trade, cannot
always tell you himself what is the average of his annual profit. It is
affected, not only by every variation of price in the commodities which he
deals in, but by the good or bad fortune both of his rivals and of his
customers, and by a thousand other accidents, to which goods, when carried
either by sea or by land, or even when stored in a warehouse, are liable. It
varies, therefore, not only from year to year, but from day to day, and almost
from hour to hour. To ascertain what is the average profit of all the different
trades carried on in a great kingdom, must be much more difficult; and to judge
of what it may have been formerly, or in remote periods of time, with any
degree of precision, must be altogether impossible.

But though it may be impossible to determine, with any degree of precision,
what are or were the average profits of stock, either in the present or in
ancient times, some notion may be formed of them from the interest of money. It
may be laid down as a maxim, that wherever a great deal can be made by the use
of money, a great deal will commonly be given for the use of it; and that,
wherever little can be made by it, less will commonly he given for it.
Accordingly, therefore, as the usual market rate of interest varies in any
country, we may be assured that the ordinary profits of stock must vary with
it, must sink as it sinks, and rise as it rises. The progress of interest,
therefore, may lead us to form some notion of the progress of profit.

By the 37th of Henry VIII. all interest above ten per cent. was declared
unlawful. More, it seems, had sometimes been taken before that. In the reign of
Edward VI. religious zeal prohibited all interest. This prohibition, however,
like all others of the same kind, is said to have produced no effect, and
probably rather increased than diminished the evil of usury. The statute of
Henry VIII. was revived by the 13th of Elizabeth, cap. 8. and ten per cent.
continued to be the legal rate of interest till the 21st of James I. when it
was restricted to eight per cent. It was reduced to six per cent. soon after
the Restoration, and by the 12th of Queen Anne, to five per cent. All these
different statutory regulations seem to have been made with great propriety.
They seem to have followed, and not to have gone before, the market rate of
interest, or the rate at which people of good credit usually borrowed. Since
the time of Queen Anne, five per cent. seems to have been rather above than
below the market rate. Before the late war, the government borrowed at three
per cent.; and people of good credit in the capital, and in many other parts of
the kingdom, at three and a-half, four, and four and a-half per cent.

Since the time of Henry VIII. the wealth and revenue of the country have been
continually advancing, and in the course of their progress, their pace seems
rather to have been gradually accelerated than retarded. They seem not only to
have been going on, but to have been going on faster and faster. The wages of
labour have been continually increasing during the same period, and, in the
greater part of the different branches of trade and manufactures, the profits
of stock have been diminishing.

It generally requires a greater stock to carry on any sort of trade in a great
town than in a country village. The great stocks employed in every branch of
trade, and the number of rich competitors, generally reduce the rate of profit
in the former below what it is in the latter. But the wages of labour are
generally higher in a great town than in a country village. In a thriving town,
the people who have great stocks to employ, frequently cannot get the number of
workmen they want, and therefore bid against one another, in order to get as
many as they can, which raises the wages of labour, and lowers the profits of
stock. In the remote parts of the country, there is frequently not stock
sufficient to employ all the people, who therefore bid against one another, in
order to get employment, which lowers the wages of labour, and raises the
profits of stock.

In Scotland, though the legal rate of interest is the same as in England, the
market rate is rather higher. People of the best credit there seldom borrow
under five per cent. Even private bankers in Edinburgh give four per cent. upon
their promissory-notes, of which payment, either in whole or in part may be
demanded at pleasure. Private bankers in London give no interest for the money
which is deposited with them. There are few trades which cannot be carried on
with a smaller stock in Scotland than in England. The common rate of profit,
therefore, must be somewhat greater. The wages of labour, it has already been
observed, are lower in Scotland than in England. The country, too, is not only
much poorer, but the steps by which it advances to a better condition, for it
is evidently advancing, seem to be much slower and more tardy. The legal rate
of interest in France has not during the course of the present century, been
always regulated by the market rate {See Denisart, Article Taux des Interests,
tom. iii, p.13}. In 1720, interest was reduced from the twentieth to the
fiftieth penny, or from five to two per cent. In 1724, it was raised to the
thirtieth penny, or to three and a third per cent. In 1725, it was again raised
to the twentieth penny, or to five per cent. In 1766, during the administration
of Mr Laverdy, it was reduced to the twenty-fifth penny, or to four per cent.
The Abbé Terray raised it afterwards to the old rate of five per cent. The
supposed purpose of many of those violent reductions of interest was to prepare
the way for reducing that of the public debts; a purpose which has sometimes
been executed. France is, perhaps, in the present times, not so rich a country
as England; and though the legal rate of interest has in France frequently been
lower than in England, the market rate has generally been higher; for there, as
in other countries, they have several very safe and easy methods of evading the
law. The profits of trade, I have been assured by British merchants who had
traded in both countries, are higher in France than in England; and it is no
doubt upon this account, that many British subjects chuse rather to employ
their capitals in a country where trade is in disgrace, than in one where it is
highly respected. The wages of labour are lower in France than in England. When
you go from Scotland to England, the difference which you may remark between
the dress and countenance of the common people in the one country and in the
other, sufficiently indicates the difference in their condition. The contrast
is still greater when you return from France. France, though no doubt a richer
country than Scotland, seems not to be going forward so fast. It is a common
and even a popular opinion in the country, that it is going backwards; an
opinion which I apprehend, is ill-founded, even with regard to France, but
which nobody can possibly entertain with regard to Scotland, who sees the
country now, and who saw it twenty or thirty years ago.

The province of Holland, on the other hand, in proportion to the extent of its
territory and the number of its people, is a richer country than England. The
government there borrow at two per cent. and private people of good credit at
three. The wages of labour are said to be higher in Holland than in England,
and the Dutch, it is well known, trade upon lower profits than any people in
Europe. The trade of Holland, it has been pretended by some people, is
decaying, and it may perhaps be true that some particular branches of it are
so; but these symptoms seem to indicate sufficiently that there is no general
decay. When profit diminishes, merchants are very apt to complain that trade
decays, though the diminution of profit is the natural effect of its
prosperity, or of a greater stock being employed in it than before. During the
late war, the Dutch gained the whole carrying trade of France, of which they
still retain a very large share. The great property which they possess both in
French and English funds, about forty millions, it is said in the latter (in
which, I suspect, however, there is a considerable exaggeration ), the great
sums which they lend to private people, in countries where the rate of interest
is higher than in their own, are circumstances which no doubt demonstrate the
redundancy of their stock, or that it has increased beyond what they can employ
with tolerable profit in the proper business of their own country; but they do
not demonstrate that that business has decreased. As the capital of a private
man, though acquired by a particular trade, may increase beyond what he can
employ in it, and yet that trade continue to increase too, so may likewise the
capital of a great nation.

In our North American and West Indian colonies, not only the wages of labour,
but the interest of money, and consequently the profits of stock, are higher
than in England. In the different colonies, both the legal and the market rate
of interest run from six to eight percent. High wages of labour and high
profits of stock, however, are things, perhaps, which scarce ever go together,
except in the peculiar circumstances of new colonies. A new colony must always,
for some time, be more understocked in proportion to the extent of its
territory, and more underpeopled in proportion to the extent of its stock, than
the greater part of other countries. They have more land than they have stock
to cultivate. What they have, therefore, is applied to the cultivation only of
what is most fertile and most favourably situated, the land near the sea-shore,
and along the banks of navigable rivers. Such land, too, is frequently
purchased at a price below the value even of its natural produce. Stock
employed in the purchase and improvement of such lands, must yield a very large
profit, and, consequently, afford to pay a very large interest. Its rapid
accumulation in so profitable an employment enables the planter to increase the
number of his hands faster than he can find them in a new settlement. Those
whom he can find, therefore, are very liberally rewarded. As the colony
increases, the profits of stock gradually diminish. When the most fertile and
best situated lands have been all occupied, less profit can be made by the
cultivation of what is inferior both in soil and situation, and less interest
can be afforded for the stock which is so employed. In the greater part of our
colonies, accordingly, both the legal and the market rate of interest have been
considerably reduced during the course of the present century. As riches,
improvement, and population, have increased, interest has declined. The wages
of labour do not sink with the profits of stock. The demand for labour
increases with the increase of stock, whatever be its profits; and after these
are diminished, stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase much
faster than before. It is with industrious nations, who are advancing in the
acquisition of riches, as with industrious individuals. A great stock, though
with small profits, generally increases faster than a small stock with great
profits. Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it
is often easy to get more. The great difficulty is to get that little. The
connection between the increase of stock and that of industry, or of the demand
for useful labour, has partly been explained already, but will be explained
more fully hereafter, in treating of the accumulation of stock.

The acquisition of new territory, or of new branches of trade, may sometimes
raise the profits of stock, and with them the interest of money, even in a
country which is fast advancing in the acquisition of riches. The stock of the
country, not being sufficient for the whole accession of business which such
acquisitions present to the different people among whom it is divided, is
applied to those particular branches only which afford the greatest profit.
Part of what had before been employed in other trades, is necessarily withdrawn
from them, and turned into some of the new and more profitable ones. In all
those old trades, therefore, the competition comes to be less than before. The
market comes to be less fully supplied with many different sorts of goods.
Their price necessarily rises more or less, and yields a greater profit to
those who deal in them, who can, therefore, afford to borrow at a higher
interest. For some time after the conclusion of the late war, not only private
people of the best credit, but some of the greatest companies in London,
commonly borrowed at five per cent. who, before that, had not been used to pay
more than four, and four and a half per cent. The great accession both of
territory and trade by our acquisitions in North America and the West Indies,
will sufficiently account for this, without supposing any diminution in the
capital stock of the society. So great an accession of new business to be
carried on by the old stock, must necessarily have diminished the quantity
employed in a great number of particular branches, in which the competition
being less, the profits must have been greater. I shall hereafter have occasion
to mention the reasons which dispose me to believe that the capital stock of
Great Britain was not diminished, even by the enormous expense of the late war.

The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds destined
for the maintenance of industry, however, as it lowers the wages of labour, so
it raises the profits of stock, and consequently the interest of money. By the
wages of labour being lowered, the owners of what stock remains in the society
can bring their goods at less expense to market than before; and less stock
being employed in supplying the market than before, they can sell them dearer.
Their goods cost them less, and they get more for them. Their profits,
therefore, being augmented at both ends, can well afford a large interest. The
great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired in Bengal and the other
British settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy us, that as the wages of
labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined
countries. The interest of money is proportionably so. In Bengal, money is
frequently lent to the farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent. and the
succeeding crop is mortgaged for the payment. As the profits which can afford
such an interest must eat up almost the whole rent of the landlord, so such
enormous usury must in its turn eat up the greater part of those profits.
Before the fall of the Roman republic, a usury of the same kind seems to have
been common in the provinces, under the ruinous administration of their
proconsuls. The virtuous Brutus lent money in Cyprus at eight-and-forty per
cent. as we learn from the letters of Cicero.

In a country which had acquired that full complement of riches which the nature
of its soil and climate, and its situation with respect to other countries,
allowed it to acquire, which could, therefore, advance no further, and which
was not going backwards, both the wages of labour and the profits of stock
would probably be very low. In a country fully peopled in proportion to what
either its territory could maintain, or its stock employ, the competition for
employment would necessarily be so great as to reduce the wages of labour to
what was barely sufficient to keep up the number of labourers, and the country
being already fully peopled, that number could never be augmented. In a country
fully stocked in proportion to all the business it had to transact, as great a
quantity of stock would be employed in every particular branch as the nature
and extent of the trade would admit. The competition, therefore, would
everywhere be as great, and, consequently, the ordinary profit as low as
possible.

But, perhaps, no country has ever yet arrived at this degree of opulence. China
seems to have been long stationary, and had, probably, long ago acquired that
full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and
institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws
and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and situation, might admit
of. A country which neglects or despises foreign commerce, and which admits the
vessel of foreign nations into one or two of its ports only, cannot transact
the same quantity of business which it might do with different laws and
institutions. In a country, too, where, though the rich, or the owners of large
capitals, enjoy a good deal of security, the poor, or the owners of small
capitals, enjoy scarce any, but are liable, under the pretence of justice, to
be pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarins, the quantity
of stock employed in all the different branches of business transacted within
it, can never be equal to what the nature and extent of that business might
admit. In every different branch, the oppression of the poor must establish the
monopoly of the rich, who, by engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be
able to make very large profits. Twelve per cent. accordingly, is said to be
the common interest of money in China, and the ordinary profits of stock must
be sufficient to afford this large interest.

A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of interest considerably above
what the condition of the country, as to wealth or poverty, would require. When
the law does not enforce the performance of contracts, it puts all borrowers
nearly upon the same footing with bankrupts, or people of doubtful credit, in
better regulated countries. The uncertainty of recovering his money makes the
lender exact the same usurious interest which is usually required from
bankrupts. Among the barbarous nations who overran the western provinces of the
Roman empire, the performance of contracts was left for many ages to the faith
of the contracting parties. The courts of justice of their kings seldom
intermeddled in it. The high rate of interest which took place in those ancient
times, may, perhaps, be partly accounted for from this cause.

When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not prevent it. Many people
must borrow, and nobody will lend without such a consideration for the use of
their money as is suitable, not only to what can be made by the use of it, but
to the difficulty and danger of evading the law. The high rate of interest
among all Mahometan nations is accounted for by M. Montesquieu, not from their
poverty, but partly from this, and partly from the difficulty of recovering the
money.

The lowest ordinary rate of profit must always be something more than what is
sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which every employment of
stock is exposed. It is this surplus only which is neat or clear profit. What
is called gross profit, comprehends frequently not only this surplus, but what
is retained for compensating such extraordinary losses. The interest which the
borrower can afford to pay is in proportion to the clear profit only. The
lowest ordinary rate of interest must, in the same manner, be something more
than sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which lending, even with
tolerable prudence, is exposed. Were it not, mere charity or friendship could
be the only motives for lending.

In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches, where, in every
particular branch of business, there was the greatest quantity of stock that
could be employed in it, as the ordinary rate of clear profit would be very
small, so the usual market rate of interest which could be afforded out of it
would be so low as to render it impossible for any but the very wealthiest
people to live upon the interest of their money. All people of small or
middling fortunes would be obliged to superintend themselves the employment of
their own stocks. It would be necessary that almost every man should be a man
of business, or engage in some sort of trade. The province of Holland seems to
be approaching near to this state. It is there unfashionable not to be a man of
business. Necessity makes it usual for almost every man to be so, and custom
everywhere regulates fashion. As it is ridiculous not to dress, so is it, in
some measure, not to be employed like other people. As a man of a civil
profession seems awkward in a camp or a garrison, and is even in some danger of
being despised there, so does an idle man among men of business.

The highest ordinary rate of profit may be such as, in the price of the greater
part of commodities, eats up the whole of what should go to the rent of the
land, and leaves only what is sufficient to pay the labour of preparing and
bringing them to market, according to the lowest rate at which labour can
anywhere be paid, the bare subsistence of the labourer. The workman must always
have been fed in some way or other while he was about the work, but the
landlord may not always have been paid. The profits of the trade which the
servants of the East India Company carry on in Bengal may not, perhaps, be very
far from this rate.

The proportion which the usual market rate of interest ought to bear to the
ordinary rate of clear profit, necessarily varies as profit rises or falls.
Double interest is in Great Britain reckoned what the merchants call a good,
moderate, reasonable profit; terms which, I apprehend, mean no more than a
common and usual profit. In a country where the ordinary rate of clear profit
is eight or ten per cent. it may be reasonable that one half of it should go to
interest, wherever business is carried on with borrowed money. The stock is at
the risk of the borrower, who, as it were, insures it to the lender; and four
or five per cent. may, in the greater part of trades, be both a sufficient
profit upon the risk of this insurance, and a sufficient recompence for the
trouble of employing the stock. But the proportion between interest and clear
profit might not be the same in countries where the ordinary rate of profit was
either a good deal lower, or a good deal higher. If it were a good deal lower,
one half of it, perhaps, could not be afforded for interest; and more might be
afforded if it were a good deal higher.

In countries which are fast advancing to riches, the low rate of profit may, in
the price of many commodities, compensate the high wages of labour, and enable
those countries to sell as cheap as their less thriving neighbours, among whom
the wages of labour may be lower.

In reality, high profits tend much more to raise the price of work than high
wages. If, in the linen manufacture, for example, the wages of the different
working people, the flax-dressers, the spinners, the weavers, etc. should all
of them be advanced twopence a-day, it would be necessary to heighten the price
of a piece of linen only by a number of twopences equal to the number of people
that had been employed about it, multiplied by the number of days during which
they had been so employed. That part of the price of the commodity which
resolved itself into the wages, would, through all the different stages of the
manufacture, rise only in arithmetical proportion to this rise of wages. But if
the profits of all the different employers of those working people should be
raised five per cent. that part of the price of the commodity which resolved
itself into profit would, through all the different stages of the manufacture,
rise in geometrical proportion to this rise of profit. The employer of the flax
dressers would, in selling his flax, require an additional five per cent. upon
the whole value of the materials and wages which he advanced to his workmen.
The employer of the spinners would require an additional five per cent. both
upon the advanced price of the flax, and upon the wages of the spinners. And
the employer of the weavers would require alike five per cent. both upon the
advanced price of the linen-yarn, and upon the wages of the weavers. In raising
the price of commodities, the rise of wages operates in the same manner as
simple interest does in the accumulation of debt. The rise of profit operates
like compound interest. Our merchants and master manufacturers complain much of
the bad effects of high wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the
sale of their goods, both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the
bad effects of high profits; they are silent with regard to the pernicious
effects of their own gains; they complain only of those of other people.

CHAPTER X.
OF WAGES AND PROFIT IN THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF LABOUR AND STOCK.

The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of
labour and stock, must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal,
or continually tending to equality. If, in the same neighbourhood, there was
any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so
many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in
the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other
employments. This, at least, would be the case in a society where things were
left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where
every man was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper,
and to change it as often as he thought proper. Every man’s interest
would prompt him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous
employment.

Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are everywhere in Europe extremely
different, according to the different employments of labour and stock. But this
difference arises, partly from certain circumstances in the employments
themselves, which, either really, or at least in the imagination of men, make
up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in
others, and partly from the policy of Europe, which nowhere leaves things at
perfect liberty.

The particular consideration of those circumstances, and of that policy, will
divide this Chapter into two parts.

PART I. Inequalities arising from the nature of the employments
themselves.

The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been
able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and
counterbalance a great one in others. First, the agreeableness or
disagreeableness of the employments themselves; secondly, the easiness and
cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning them; thirdly, the
constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or great
trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and, fifthly, the
probability or improbability of success in them.

First, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or
dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness, of the employment. Thus in
most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor earns less than a
journeyman weaver. His work is much easier. A journeyman weaver earns less than
a journeyman smith. His work is not always easier, but it is much cleanlier. A
journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns so much in twelve
hours, as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight. His work is not
quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in day-light, and above
ground. Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions.
In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally
under-recompensed, as I shall endeavour to shew by and by. Disgrace has the
contrary effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but
it is in most places more profitable than the greater part of common trades.
The most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in
proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade
whatever.

Hunting and fishing, the most important employments of mankind in the rude
state of society, become, in its advanced state, their most agreeable
amusements, and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed from
necessity. In the advanced state of society, therefore, they are all very poor
people who follow as a trade, what other people pursue as a pastime. Fishermen
have been so since the time of Theocritus. {See Idyllium xxi.}. A poacher is
everywhere a very poor man in Great Britain. In countries where the rigour of
the law suffers no poachers, the licensed hunter is not in a much better
condition. The natural taste for those employments makes more people follow
them, than can live comfortably by them; and the produce of their labour, in
proportion to its quantity, comes always too cheap to market, to afford any
thing but the most scanty subsistence to the labourers.

Disagreeableness and disgrace affect the profits of stock in the same manner as
the wages of labour. The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never master of his
own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercises
neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable business. But there is scarce
any common trade in which a small stock yields so great a profit.

Secondly, the wages of labour vary with the easiness and cheapness, or the
difficulty and expense, of learning the business.

When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed
by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid
out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at the expense
of much labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary
dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. The
work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual
wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education,
with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do
this too in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration
of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the
machine.

The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common labour,
is founded upon this principle.

The policy of Europe considers the labour of all mechanics, artificers, and
manufacturers, as skilled labour; and that of all country labourers as common
labour. It seems to suppose that of the former to be of a more nice and
delicate nature than that of the latter. It is so perhaps in some cases; but in
the greater part it is quite otherwise, as I shall endeavour to shew by and by.
The laws and customs of Europe, therefore, in order to qualify any person for
exercising the one species of labour, impose the necessity of an
apprenticeship, though with different degrees of rigour in different places.
They leave the other free and open to every body. During the continuance of the
apprenticeship, the whole labour of the apprentice belongs to his master. In
the meantime he must, in many cases, be maintained by his parents or relations,
and, in almost all cases, must be clothed by them. Some money, too, is commonly
given to the master for teaching him his trade. They who cannot give money,
give time, or become bound for more than the usual number of years; a
consideration which, though it is not always advantageous to the master, on
account of the usual idleness of apprentices, is always disadvantageous to the
apprentice. In country labour, on the contrary, the labourer, while he is
employed about the easier, learns the more difficult parts of his business, and
his own labour maintains him through all the different stages of his
employment. It is reasonable, therefore, that in Europe the wages of mechanics,
artificers, and manufacturers, should be somewhat higher than those of common
labourers. They are so accordingly, and their superior gains make them, in most
places, be considered as a superior rank of people. This superiority, however,
is generally very small: the daily or weekly earnings of journeymen in the more
common sorts of manufactures, such as those of plain linen and woollen cloth,
computed at an average, are, in most places, very little more than the
day-wages of common labourers. Their employment, indeed, is more steady and
uniform, and the superiority of their earnings, taking the whole year together,
may be somewhat greater. It seems evidently, however, to be no greater than
what is sufficient to compensate the superior expense of their education.
Education in the ingenious arts, and in the liberal professions, is still more
tedious and expensive. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of painters and
sculptors, of lawyers and physicians, ought to be much more liberal; and it is
so accordingly.

The profits of stock seem to be very little affected by the easiness or
difficulty of learning the trade in which it is employed. All the different
ways in which stock is commonly employed in great towns seem, in reality, to be
almost equally easy and equally difficult to learn. One branch, either of
foreign or domestic trade, cannot well be a much more intricate business than
another.

Thirdly, the wages of labour in different occupations vary with the constancy
or inconstancy of employment.

Employment is much more constant in some trades than in others. In the greater
part of manufactures, a journeyman maybe pretty sure of employment almost every
day in the year that he is able to work. A mason or bricklayer, on the
contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul weather, and his
employment at all other times depends upon the occasional calls of his
customers. He is liable, in consequence, to be frequently without any. What he
earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is
idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments
which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion. Where
the computed earnings of the greater part of manufacturers, accordingly, are
nearly upon a level with the day-wages of common labourers, those of masons and
bricklayers are generally from one-half more to double those wages. Where
common labourers earn four or five shillings a-week, masons and bricklayers
frequently earn seven and eight; where the former earn six, the latter often
earn nine and ten; and where the former earn nine and ten, as in London, the
latter commonly earn fifteen and eighteen. No species of skilled labour,
however, seems more easy to learn than that of masons and bricklayers. Chairmen
in London, during the summer season, are said sometimes to be employed as
bricklayers. The high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the
recompence of their skill, as the compensation for the inconstancy of their
employment.

A house-carpenter seems to exercise rather a nicer and a more ingenious trade
than a mason. In most places, however, for it is not universally so, his
day-wages are somewhat lower. His employment, though it depends much, does not
depend so entirely upon the occasional calls of his customers; and it is not
liable to be interrupted by the weather.

When the trades which generally afford constant employment, happen in a
particular place not to do so, the wages of the workmen always rise a good deal
above their ordinary proportion to those of common labour. In London, almost
all journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and dismissed by their
masters from day to day, and from week to week, in the same manner as
day-labourers in other places. The lowest order of artificers, journeymen
tailors, accordingly, earn their half-a-crown a-day, though eighteen pence may
be reckoned the wages of common labour. In small towns and country villages,
the wages of journeymen tailors frequently scarce equal those of common labour;
but in London they are often many weeks without employment, particularly during
the summer.

When the inconstancy of employment is combined with the hardship,
disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the wages of
the most common labour above those of the most skilful artificers. A collier
working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about double,
and, in many parts of Scotland, about three times, the wages of common labour.
His high wages arise altogether from the hardship, disagreeableness, and
dirtiness of his work. His employment may, upon most occasions, be as constant
as he pleases. The coal-heavers in London exercise a trade which, in hardship,
dirtiness, and disagreeableness, almost equals that of colliers; and, from the
unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals of coal-ships, the employment of the
greater part of them is necessarily very inconstant. If colliers, therefore,
commonly earn double and triple the wages of common labour, it ought not to
seem unreasonable that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four and five times
those wages. In the inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was
found that, at the rate at which they were then paid, they could earn from six
to ten shillings a-day. Six shillings are about four times the wages of common
labour in London; and, in every particular trade, the lowest common earnings
may always be considered as those of the far greater number. How extravagant
soever those earnings may appear, if they were more than sufficient to
compensate all the disagreeable circumstances of the business, there would soon
be so great a number of competitors, as, in a trade which has no exclusive
privilege, would quickly reduce them to a lower rate.

The constancy or inconstancy of employment cannot affect the ordinary profits
of stock in any particular trade. Whether the stock is or is not constantly
employed, depends, not upon the trade, but the trader.

Fourthly, the wages of labour vary according to the small or great trust which
must be reposed in the workmen.

The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are everywhere superior to those of many
other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity, on account of
the precious materials with which they are entrusted. We trust our health to
the physician, our fortune, and sometimes our life and reputation, to the
lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a
very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give
them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires. The long
time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when
combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of
their labour.

When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there is no trust; and the
credit which he may get from other people, depends, not upon the nature of the
trade, but upon their opinion of his fortune, probity and prudence. The
different rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches of trade,
cannot arise from the different degrees of trust reposed in the traders.

Fifthly, the wages of labour in different employments vary according to the
probability or improbability of success in them.

The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified for the
employments to which he is educated, is very different in different
occupations. In the greatest part of mechanic trades success is almost certain;
but very uncertain in the liberal professions. Put your son apprentice to a
shoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a pair of shoes; but
send him to study the law, it as at least twenty to one if he ever makes such
proficiency as will enable him to live by the business. In a perfectly fair
lottery, those who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost by those who
draw the blanks. In a profession, where twenty fail for one that succeeds, that
one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty.
The counsellor at law, who, perhaps, at near forty years of age, begins to make
something by his profession, ought to receive the retribution, not only of his
own so tedious and expensive education, but of that of more than twenty others,
who are never likely to make any thing by it. How extravagant soever the fees
of counsellors at law may sometimes appear, their real retribution is never
equal to this. Compute, in any particular place, what is likely to be annually
gained, and what is likely to be annually spent, by all the different workmen
in any common trade, such as that of shoemakers or weavers, and you will find
that the former sum will generally exceed the latter. But make the same
computation with regard to all the counsellors and students of law, in all the
different Inns of Court, and you will find that their annual gains bear but a
very small proportion to their annual expense, even though you rate the former
as high, and the latter as low, as can well be done. The lottery of the law,
therefore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery; and that as well as
many other liberal and honourable professions, is, in point of pecuniary gain,
evidently under-recompensed.

Those professions keep their level, however, with other occupations; and,
notwithstanding these discouragements, all the most generous and liberal
spirits are eager to crowd into them. Two different causes contribute to
recommend them. First, the desire of the reputation which attends upon superior
excellence in any of them; and, secondly, the natural confidence which every
man has, more or less, not only in his own abilities, but in his own good
fortune.

To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most
decisive mark of what is called genius, or superior talents. The public
admiration which attends upon such distinguished abilities makes always a part
of their reward; a greater or smaller, in proportion as it is higher or lower
in degree. It makes a considerable part of that reward in the profession of
physic; a still greater, perhaps, in that of law; in poetry and philosophy it
makes almost the whole.

There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents, of which the possession
commands a certain sort of admiration, but of which the exercise, for the sake
of gain, is considered, whether from reason or prejudice, as a sort of public
prostitution. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of those who exercise them
in this manner, must be sufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour, and
expense of acquiring the talents, but for the discredit which attends the
employment of them as the means of subsistence. The exorbitant rewards of
players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc. are founded upon those two
principles; the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the discredit of
employing them in this manner. It seems absurd at first sight, that we should
despise their persons, and yet reward their talents with the most profuse
liberality. While we do the one, however, we must of necessity do the other,
Should the public opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to such
occupations, their pecuniary recompence would quickly diminish. More people
would apply to them, and the competition would quickly reduce the price of
their labour. Such talents, though far from being common, are by no means so
rare as imagined. Many people possess them in great perfection, who disdain to
make this use of them; and many more are capable of acquiring them, if any
thing could be made honourably by them.

The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own
abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all
ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune has been less taken
notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal. There is no man
living, who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share of it.
The chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued, and the chance of
loss is by most men under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable
health and spirits, valued more than it is worth.

That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, we may learn from the
universal success of lotteries. The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see,
a perfectly fair lottery, or one in which the whole gain compensated the whole
loss; because the undertaker could make nothing by it. In the state lotteries,
the tickets are really not worth the price which is paid by the original
subscribers, and yet commonly sell in the market for twenty, thirty, and
sometimes forty per cent. advance. The vain hopes of gaining some of the great
prizes is the sole cause of this demand. The soberest people scarce look upon
it as a folly to pay a small sum for the chance of gaining ten or twenty
thousand pounds, though they know that even that small sum is perhaps twenty or
thirty per cent. more than the chance is worth. In a lottery in which no prize
exceeded twenty pounds, though in other respects it approached much nearer to a
perfectly fair one than the common state lotteries, there would not be the same
demand for tickets. In order to have a better chance for some of the great
prizes, some people purchase several tickets; and others, small shares in a
still greater number. There is not, however, a more certain proposition in
mathematics, than that the more tickets you adventure upon, the more likely you
are to be a loser. Adventure upon all the tickets in the lottery, and you lose
for certain; and the greater the number of your tickets, the nearer you
approach to this certainty.

That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, and scarce ever valued more
than it is worth, we may learn from the very moderate profit of insurers. In
order to make insurance, either from fire or sea-risk, a trade at all, the
common premium must be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to pay the
expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been drawn
from an equal capital employed in any common trade. The person who pays no more
than this, evidently pays no more than the real value of the risk, or the
lowest price at which he can reasonably expect to insure it. But though many
people have made a little money by insurance, very few have made a great
fortune; and, from this consideration alone, it seems evident enough that the
ordinary balance of profit and loss is not more advantageous in this than in
other common trades, by which so many people make fortunes. Moderate, however,
as the premium of insurance commonly is, many people despise the risk too much
to care to pay it. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houses in
twenty, or rather, perhaps, ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from
fire. Sea-risk is more alarming to the greater part of people; and the
proportion of ships insured to those not insured is much greater. Many sail,
however, at all seasons, and even in time of war, without any insurance. This
may sometimes, perhaps, be done without any imprudence. When a great company,
or even a great merchant, has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they may, as it
were, insure one another. The premium saved up on them all may more than
compensate such losses as they are likely to meet with in the common course of
chances. The neglect of insurance upon shipping, however, in the same manner as
upon houses, is, in most cases, the effect of no such nice calculation, but of
mere thoughtless rashness, and presumptuous contempt of the risk.

The contempt of risk, and the presumptuous hope of success, are in no period of
life more active than at the age at which young people choose their
professions. How little the fear of misfortune is then capable of balancing the
hope of good luck, appears still more evidently in the readiness of the common
people to enlist as soldiers, or to go to sea, than in the eagerness of those
of better fashion to enter into what are called the liberal professions.

What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. Without regarding the danger,
however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new
war; and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to
themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour
and distinction which never occur. These romantic hopes make the whole price of
their blood. Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and, in actual
service, their fatigues are much greater.

The lottery of the sea is not altogether so disadvantageous as that of the
army. The son of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to sea
with his father’s consent; but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always
without it. Other people see some chance of his making something by the one
trade; nobody but himself sees any of his making any thing by the other. The
great admiral is less the object of public admiration than the great general;
and the highest success in the sea service promises a less brilliant fortune
and reputation than equal success in the land. The same difference runs through
all the inferior degrees of preferment in both. By the rules of precedency, a
captain in the navy ranks with a colonel in the army; but he does not rank with
him in the common estimation. As the great prizes in the lottery are less, the
smaller ones must be more numerous. Common sailors, therefore, more frequently
get some fortune and preferment than common soldiers; and the hope of those
prizes is what principally recommends the trade. Though their skill and
dexterity are much superior to that of almost any artificers; and though their
whole life is one continual scene of hardship and danger; yet for all this
dexterity and skill, for all those hardships and dangers, while they remain in
the condition of common sailors, they receive scarce any other recompence but
the pleasure of exercising the one and of surmounting the other. Their wages
are not greater than those of common labourers at the port which regulates the
rate of seamen’s wages. As they are continually going from port to port,
the monthly pay of those who sail from all the different ports of Great
Britain, is more nearly upon a level than that of any other workmen in those
different places; and the rate of the port to and from which the greatest
number sail, that is, the port of London, regulates that of all the rest. At
London, the wages of the greater part of the different classes of workmen are
about double those of the same classes at Edinburgh. But the sailors who sail
from the port of London, seldom earn above three or four shillings a month more
than those who sail from the port of Leith, and the difference is frequently
not so great. In time of peace, and in the merchant-service, the London price
is from a guinea to about seven-and-twenty shillings the calendar month. A
common labourer in London, at the rate of nine or ten shillings a week, may
earn in the calendar month from forty to five-and-forty shillings. The sailor,
indeed, over and above his pay, is supplied with provisions. Their value,
however, may not perhaps always exceed the difference between his pay and that
of the common labourer; and though it sometimes should, the excess will not be
clear gain to the sailor, because he cannot share it with his wife and family,
whom he must maintain out of his wages at home.

The dangers and hair-breadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of
disheartening young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A
tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to send her
son to school at a sea-port town, lest the sight of the ships, and the
conversation and adventures of the sailors, should entice him to go to sea. The
distant prospect of hazards, from which we can hope to extricate ourselves by
courage and address, is not disagreeable to us, and does not raise the wages of
labour in any employment. It is otherwise with those in which courage and
address can be of no avail. In trades which are known to be very unwholesome,
the wages of labour are always remarkably high. Unwholesomeness is a species of
disagreeableness, and its effects upon the wages of labour are to be ranked
under that general head.

In all the different employments of stock, the ordinary rate of profit varies
more or less with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns. These are, in
general, less uncertain in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in some
branches of foreign trade than in others; in the trade to North America, for
example, than in that to Jamaica. The ordinary rate of profit always rises more
or less with the risk. It does not, however, seem to rise in proportion to it,
or so as to compensate it completely. Bankruptcies are most frequent in the
most hazardous trades. The most hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler,
though, when the adventure succeeds, it is likewise the most profitable, is the
infallible road to bankruptcy. The presumptuous hope of success seems to act
here as upon all other occasions, and to entice so many adventurers into those
hazardous trades, that their competition reduces the profit below what is
sufficient to compensate the risk. To compensate it completely, the common
returns ought, over and above the ordinary profits of stock, not only to make
up for all occasional losses, but to afford a surplus profit to the
adventurers, of the same nature with the profit of insurers. But if the common
returns were sufficient for all this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent
in these than in other trades.

Of the five circumstances, therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two only
affect the profits of stock; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the
business, and the risk or security with which it is attended. In point of
agreeableness or disagreeableness, there is little or no difference in the far
greater part of the different employments of stock, but a great deal in those
of labour; and the ordinary profit of stock, though it rises with the risk,
does not always seem to rise in proportion to it. It should follow from all
this, that, in the same society or neighbourhood, the average and ordinary
rates of profit in the different employments of stock should be more nearly
upon a level than the pecuniary wages of the different sorts of labour.

They are so accordingly. The difference between the earnings of a common
labourer and those of a well employed lawyer or physician, is evidently much
greater than that between the ordinary profits in any two different branches of
trade. The apparent difference, besides, in the profits of different trades, is
generally a deception arising from our not always distinguishing what ought to
be considered as wages, from what ought to be considered as profit.

Apothecaries’ profit is become a bye-word, denoting something uncommonly
extravagant. This great apparent profit, however, is frequently no more than
the reasonable wages of labour. The skill of an apothecary is a much nicer and
more delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever; and the trust which
is reposed in him is of much greater importance. He is the physician of the
poor in all cases, and of the rich when the distress or danger is not very
great. His reward, therefore, ought to be suitable to his skill and his trust;
and it arises generally from the price at which he sells his drugs. But the
whole drugs which the best employed apothecary in a large market-town, will
sell in a year, may not perhaps cost him above thirty or forty pounds. Though
he should sell them, therefore, for three or four hundred, or at a thousand per
cent. profit, this may frequently be no more than the reasonable wages of his
labour, charged, in the only way in which he can charge them, upon the price of
his drugs. The greater part of the apparent profit is real wages disguised in
the garb of profit.

In a small sea-port town, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent.
upon a stock of a single hundred pounds, while a considerable wholesale
merchant in the same place will scarce make eight or ten per cent. upon a stock
of ten thousand. The trade of the grocer may be necessary for the conveniency
of the inhabitants, and the narrowness of the market may not admit the
employment of a larger capital in the business. The man, however, must not only
live by his trade, but live by it suitably to the qualifications which it
requires. Besides possessing a little capital, he must be able to read, write,
and account and must be a tolerable judge, too, of perhaps fifty or sixty
different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the markets where they
are to be had cheapest. He must have all the knowledge, in short, that is
necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him from becoming but the
want of a sufficient capital. Thirty or forty pounds a year cannot be
considered as too great a recompence for the labour of a person so
accomplished. Deduct this from the seemingly great profits of his capital, and
little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits of stock. The
greater part of the apparent profit is, in this case too, real wages.

The difference between the apparent profit of the retail and that of the
wholesale trade, is much less in the capital than in small towns and country
villages. Where ten thousand pounds can be employed in the grocery trade, the
wages of the grocer’s labour must be a very trifling addition to the real
profits of so great a stock. The apparent profits of the wealthy retailer,
therefore, are there more nearly upon a level with those of the wholesale
merchant. It is upon this account that goods sold by retail are generally as
cheap, and frequently much cheaper, in the capital than in small towns and
country villages. Grocery goods, for example, are generally much cheaper; bread
and butchers’ meat frequently as cheap. It costs no more to bring grocery
goods to the great town than to the country village; but it costs a great deal
more to bring corn and cattle, as the greater part of them must be brought from
a much greater distance. The prime cost of grocery goods, therefore, being the
same in both places, they are cheapest where the least profit is charged upon
them. The prime cost of bread and butchers’ meat is greater in the great
town than in the country village; and though the profit is less, therefore they
are not always cheaper there, but often equally cheap. In such articles as
bread and butchers’ meat, the same cause which diminishes apparent
profit, increases prime cost. The extent of the market, by giving employment to
greater stocks, diminishes apparent profit; but by requiring supplies from a
greater distance, it increases prime cost. This diminution of the one and
increase of the other, seem, in most cases, nearly to counterbalance one
another; which is probably the reason that, though the prices of corn and
cattle are commonly very different in different parts of the kingdom, those of
bread and butchers’ meat are generally very nearly the same through the
greater part of it.

Though the profits of stock, both in the wholesale and retail trade, are
generally less in the capital than in small towns and country villages, yet
great fortunes are frequently acquired from small beginnings in the former, and
scarce ever in the latter. In small towns and country villages, on account of
the narrowness of the market, trade cannot always be extended as stock extends.
In such places, therefore, though the rate of a particular person’s
profits may be very high, the sum or amount of them can never be very great,
nor consequently that of his annual accumulation. In great towns, on the
contrary, trade can be extended as stock increases, and the credit of a frugal
and thriving man increases much faster than his stock. His trade is extended in
proportion to the amount of both; and the sum or amount of his profits is in
proportion to the extent of his trade, and his annual accumulation in
proportion to the amount of his profits. It seldom happens, however, that great
fortunes are made, even in great towns, by any one regular, established, and
well-known branch of business, but in consequence of a long life of industry,
frugality, and attention. Sudden fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such
places, by what is called the trade of speculation. The speculative merchant
exercises no one regular, established, or well-known branch of business. He is
a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the next, and a sugar, tobacco,
or tea merchant the year after. He enters into every trade, when he foresees
that it is likely to be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it when he
foresees that its profits are likely to return to the level of other trades.
His profits and losses, therefore, can bear no regular proportion to those of
any one established and well-known branch of business. A bold adventurer may
sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by two or three successful
speculations, but is just as likely to lose one by two or three unsuccessful
ones. This trade can be carried on nowhere but in great towns. It is only in
places of the most extensive commerce and correspondence that the intelligence
requisite for it can be had.

The five circumstances above mentioned, though they occasion considerable
inequalities in the wages of labour and profits of stock, occasion none in the
whole of the advantages and disadvantages, real or imaginary, of the different
employments of either. The nature of those circumstances is such, that they
make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in
others.

In order, however, that this equality may take place in the whole of their
advantages or disadvantages, three things are requisite, even where there is
the most perfect freedom. First the employments must be well known and long
established in the neighbourhood; secondly, they must be in their ordinary, or
what may be called their natural state; and, thirdly, they must be the sole or
principal employments of those who occupy them.

First, this equality can take place only in those employments which are well
known, and have been long established in the neighbourhood.

Where all other circumstances are equal, wages are generally higher in new than
in old trades. When a projector attempts to establish a new manufacture, he
must at first entice his workmen from other employments, by higher wages than
they can either earn in their own trades, or than the nature of his work would
otherwise require; and a considerable time must pass away before he can venture
to reduce them to the common level. Manufactures for which the demand arises
altogether from fashion and fancy, are continually changing, and seldom last
long enough to be considered as old established manufactures. Those, on the
contrary, for which the demand arises chiefly from use or necessity, are less
liable to change, and the same form or fabric may continue in demand for whole
centuries together. The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be higher in
manufactures of the former, than in those of the latter kind. Birmingham deals
chiefly in manufactures of the former kind; Sheffield in those of the latter;
and the wages of labour in those two different places are said to be suitable
to this difference in the nature of their manufactures.

The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new branch of commerce, or of
any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation from which the
projector promises himself extraordinary profits. These profits sometimes are
very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they are quite otherwise;
but, in general, they bear no regular proportion to those of other old trades
in the neighbourhood. If the project succeeds, they are commonly at first very
high. When the trade or practice becomes thoroughly established and well known,
the competition reduces them to the level of other trades.

Secondly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in the ordinary,
or what may be called the natural state of those employments.

The demand for almost every different species of labour is sometimes greater,
and sometimes less than usual. In the one case, the advantages of the
employment rise above, in the other they fall below the common level. The
demand for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvest than during the
greater part of the year; and wages rise with the demand. In time of war, when
forty or fifty thousand sailors are forced from the merchant service into that
of the king, the demand for sailors to merchant ships necessarily rises with
their scarcity; and their wages, upon such occasions, commonly rise from a
guinea and seven-and-twenty shillings to forty shillings and three pounds
a-month. In a decaying manufacture, on the contrary, many workmen, rather than
quit their own trade, are contented with smaller wages than would otherwise be
suitable to the nature of their employment.

The profits of stock vary with the price of the commodities in which it is
employed. As the price of any commodity rises above the ordinary or average
rate, the profits of at least some part of the stock that is employed in
bringing it to market, rise above their proper level, and as it falls they sink
below it. All commodities are more or less liable to variations of price, but
some are much more so than others. In all commodities which are produced by
human industry, the quantity of industry annually employed is necessarily
regulated by the annual demand, in such a manner that the average annual
produce may, as nearly as possible, be equal to the average annual consumption.
In some employments, it has already been observed, the same quantity of
industry will always produce the same, or very nearly the same quantity of
commodities. In the linen or woollen manufactures, for example, the same number
of hands will annually work up very nearly the same quantity of linen and
woollen cloth. The variations in the market price of such commodities,
therefore, can arise only from some accidental variation in the demand. A
public mourning raises the price of black cloth. But as the demand for most
sorts of plain linen and woollen cloth is pretty uniform, so is likewise the
price. But there are other employments in which the same quantity of industry
will not always produce the same quantity of commodities. The same quantity of
industry, for example, will, in different years, produce very different
quantities of corn, wine, hops, sugar tobacco, etc. The price of such
commodities, therefore, varies not only with the variations of demand, but with
the much greater and more frequent variations of quantity, and is consequently
extremely fluctuating; but the profit of some of the dealers must necessarily
fluctuate with the price of the commodities. The operations of the speculative
merchant are principally employed about such commodities. He endeavours to buy
them up when he foresees that their price is likely to rise, and to sell them
when it is likely to fall.

Thirdly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in such as are
the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.

When a person derives his subsistence from one employment, which does not
occupy the greater part of his time, in the intervals of his leisure he is
often willing to work at another for less wages than would otherwise suit the
nature of the employment.

There still subsists, in many parts of Scotland, a set of people called cottars
or cottagers, though they were more frequent some years ago than they are now.
They are a sort of out-servants of the landlords and farmers. The usual reward
which they receive from their master is a house, a small garden for pot-herbs,
as much grass as will feed a cow, and, perhaps, an acre or two of bad arable
land. When their master has occasion for their labour, he gives them, besides,
two pecks of oatmeal a-week, worth about sixteen pence sterling. During a great
part of the year, he has little or no occasion for their labour, and the
cultivation of their own little possession is not sufficient to occupy the time
which is left at their own disposal. When such occupiers were more numerous
than they are at present, they are said to have been willing to give their
spare time for a very small recompence to any body, and to have wrought for
less wages than other labourers. In ancient times, they seem to have been
common all over Europe. In countries ill cultivated, and worse inhabited, the
greater part of landlords and farmers could not otherwise provide themselves
with the extraordinary number of hands which country labour requires at certain
seasons. The daily or weekly recompence which such labourers occasionally
received from their masters, was evidently not the whole price of their labour.
Their small tenement made a considerable part of it. This daily or weekly
recompence, however, seems to have been considered as the whole of it, by many
writers who have collected the prices of labour and provisions in ancient
times, and who have taken pleasure in representing both as wonderfully low.

The produce of such labour comes frequently cheaper to market than would
otherwise be suitable to its nature. Stockings, in many parts of Scotland, are
knit much cheaper than they can anywhere be wrought upon the loom. They are the
work of servants and labourers who derive the principal part of their
subsistence from some other employment. More than a thousand pair of Shetland
stockings are annually imported into Leith, of which the price is from
fivepence to seven-pence a pair. At Lerwick, the small capital of the Shetland
islands, tenpence a-day, I have been assured, is a common price of common
labour. In the same islands, they knit worsted stockings to the value of a
guinea a pair and upwards.

The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly in the same way as
the knitting of stockings, by servants, who are chiefly hired for other
purposes. They earn but a very scanty subsistence, who endeavour to get their
livelihood by either of those trades. In most parts of Scotland, she is a good
spinner who can earn twentypence a-week.

In opulent countries, the market is generally so extensive, that any one trade
is sufficient to employ the whole labour and stock of those who occupy it.
Instances of people living by one employment, and, at the same time, deriving
some little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor countries. The
following instance, however, of something of the same kind, is to be found in
the capital of a very rich one. There is no city in Europe, I believe, in which
house-rent is dearer than in London, and yet I know no capital in which a
furnished apartment can be hired so cheap. Lodging is not only much cheaper in
London than in Paris; it is much cheaper than in Edinburgh, of the same degree
of goodness; and, what may seem extraordinary, the dearness of house-rent is
the cause of the cheapness of lodging. The dearness of house-rent in London
arises, not only from those causes which render it dear in all great capitals,
the dearness of labour, the dearness of all the materials of building, which
must generally be brought from a great distance, and, above all, the dearness
of ground-rent, every landlord acting the part of a monopolist, and frequently
exacting a higher rent for a single acre of bad land in a town, than can be had
for a hundred of the best in the country; but it arises in part from the
peculiar manners and customs of the people, which oblige every master of a
family to hire a whole house from top to bottom. A dwelling-house in England
means every thing that is contained under the same roof. In France, Scotland,
and many other parts of Europe, it frequently means no more than a single
storey. A tradesman in London is obliged to hire a whole house in that part of
the town where his customers live. His shop is upon the ground floor, and he
and his family sleep in the garret; and he endeavours to pay a part of his
house-rent by letting the two middle storeys to lodgers. He expects to maintain
his family by his trade, and not by his lodgers. Whereas at Paris and
Edinburgh, people who let lodgings have commonly no other means of subsistence;
and the price of the lodging must pay, not only the rent of the house, but the
whole expense of the family.

PART II.—Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe.

Such are the inequalities in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of
the different employments of labour and stock, which the defect of any of the
three requisites above mentioned must occasion, even where there is the most
perfect liberty. But the policy of Europe, by not leaving things at perfect
liberty, occasions other inequalities of much greater importance.

It does this chiefly in the three following ways. First, by restraining the
competition in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be
disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it in others beyond what
it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of
labour and stock, both from employment to employment, and from place to place.

First, The policy of Europe occasions a very important inequality in the whole
of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and
stock, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number
than might otherwise be disposed to enter into them.

The exclusive privileges of corporations are the principal means it makes use
of for this purpose.

The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade necessarily restrains the
competition, in the town where it is established, to those who are free of the
trade. To have served an apprenticeship in the town, under a master properly
qualified, is commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining this freedom. The
bye-laws of the corporation regulate sometimes the number of apprentices which
any master is allowed to have, and almost always the number of years which each
apprentice is obliged to serve. The intention of both regulations is to
restrain the competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise be
disposed to enter into the trade. The limitation of the number of apprentices
restrains it directly. A long term of apprenticeship restrains it more
indirectly, but as effectually, by increasing the expense of education.

In Sheffield, no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time, by
a bye-law of the corporation. In Norfolk and Norwich, no master weaver can have
more than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a-month to the
king. No master hatter can have more than two apprentices anywhere in England,
or in the English plantations, under pain of forfeiting; five pounds a-month,
half to the king, and half to him who shall sue in any court of record. Both
these regulations, though they have been confirmed by a public law of the
kingdom, are evidently dictated by the same corporation-spirit which enacted
the bye-law of Sheffield. The silk-weavers in London had scarce been
incorporated a year, when they enacted a bye-law, restraining any master from
having more than two apprentices at a time. It required a particular act of
parliament to rescind this bye-law.

Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the usual term
established for the duration of apprenticeships in the greater part of
incorporated trades. All such incorporations were anciently called
universities, which, indeed, is the proper Latin name for any incorporation
whatever. The university of smiths, the university of tailors, etc. are
expressions which we commonly meet with in the old charters of ancient towns.
When those particular incorporations, which are now peculiarly called
universities, were first established, the term of years which it was necessary
to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of arts, appears evidently to
have been copied from the term of apprenticeship in common trades, of which the
incorporations were much more ancient. As to have wrought seven years under a
master properly qualified, was necessary, in order to entitle any person to
become a master, and to have himself apprentices in a common trade; so to have
studied seven years under a master properly qualified, was necessary to entitle
him to become a master, teacher, or doctor (words anciently synonymous), in the
liberal arts, and to have scholars or apprentices (words likewise originally
synonymous) to study under him.

By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticeship, it was
enacted, that no person should, for the future, exercise any trade, craft, or
mystery, at that time exercised in England, unless he had previously served to
it an apprenticeship of seven years at least; and what before had been the
bye-law of many particular corporations, became in England the general and
public law of all trades carried on in market towns. For though the words of
the statute are very general, and seem plainly to include the whole kingdom, by
interpretation its operation has been limited to market towns; it having been
held that, in country villages, a person may exercise several different trades,
though he has not served a seven years apprenticeship to each, they being
necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the number of people
frequently not being sufficient to supply each with a particular set of hands.
By a strict interpretation of the words, too, the operation of this statute has
been limited to those trades which were established in England before the 5th
of Elizabeth, and has never been extended to such as have been introduced since
that time. This limitation has given occasion to several distinctions, which,
considered as rules of police, appear as foolish as can well be imagined. It
has been adjudged, for example, that a coach-maker can neither himself make nor
employ journeymen to make his coach-wheels, but must buy them of a master
wheel-wright; this latter trade having been exercised in England before the 5th
of Elizabeth. But a wheel-wright, though he has never served an apprenticeship
to a coachmaker, may either himself make or employ journeymen to make coaches;
the trade of a coachmaker not being within the statute, because not exercised
in England at the time when it was made. The manufactures of Manchester,
Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, are many of them, upon this account, not within
the statute, not having been exercised in England before the 5th of Elizabeth.

In France, the duration of apprenticeships is different in different towns and
in different trades. In Paris, five years is the term required in a great
number; but, before any person can be qualified to exercise the trade as a
master, he must, in many of them, serve five years more as a journeyman. During
this latter term, he is called the companion of his master, and the term itself
is called his companionship.

In Scotland, there is no general law which regulates universally the duration
of apprenticeships. The term is different in different corporations. Where it
is long, a part of it may generally be redeemed by paying a small fine. In most
towns, too, a very small fine is sufficient to purchase the freedom of any
corporation. The weavers of linen and hempen cloth, the principal manufactures
of the country, as well as all other artificers subservient to them,
wheel-makers, reel-makers, etc. may exercise their trades in any town-corporate
without paying any fine. In all towns-corporate, all persons are free to sell
butchers’ meat upon any lawful day of the week. Three years is, in
Scotland, a common term of apprenticeship, even in some very nice trades; and,
in general, I know of no country in Europe, in which corporation laws are so
little oppressive.

The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The
patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to
hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks
proper, without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most
sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty, both of
the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders
the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from
employing whom they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed,
may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers, whose interest it so
much concerns. The affected anxiety of the lawgiver, lest they should employ an
improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive.

The institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient
workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to public sale. When this is done,
it is generally the effect of fraud, and not of inability; and the longest
apprenticeship can give no security against fraud. Quite different regulations
are necessary to prevent this abuse. The sterling mark upon plate, and the
stamps upon linen and woollen cloth, give the purchaser much greater security
than any statute of apprenticeship. He generally looks at these, but never
thinks it worth while to enquire whether the workman had served a seven years
apprenticeship.

The institution of long apprenticeships has no tendency to form young people to
industry. A journeyman who works by the piece is likely to be industrious,
because he derives a benefit from every exertion of his industry. An apprentice
is likely to be idle, and almost always is so, because he has no immediate
interest to be otherwise. In the inferior employments, the sweets of labour
consist altogether in the recompence of labour. They who are soonest in a
condition to enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest to conceive a relish
for it, and to acquire the early habit of industry. A young man naturally
conceives an aversion to labour, when for a long time he receives no benefit
from it. The boys who are put out apprentices from public charities are
generally bound for more than the usual number of years, and they generally
turn out very idle and worthless.

Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the ancients. The reciprocal duties
of master and apprentice make a considerable article in every modern code. The
Roman law is perfectly silent with regard to them. I know no Greek or Latin
word (I might venture, I believe, to assert that there is none) which expresses
the idea we now annex to the word apprentice, a servant bound to work at a
particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term of years, upon
condition that the master shall teach him that trade.

Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary. The arts, which are much
superior to common trades, such as those of making clocks and watches, contain
no such mystery as to require a long course of instruction. The first invention
of such beautiful machines, indeed, and even that of some of the instruments
employed in making them, must no doubt have been the work of deep thought and
long time, and may justly be considered as among the happiest efforts of human
ingenuity. But when both have been fairly invented, and are well understood, to
explain to any young man, in the completest manner, how to apply the
instruments, and how to construct the machines, cannot well require more than
the lessons of a few weeks; perhaps those of a few days might be sufficient. In
the common mechanic trades, those of a few days might certainly be sufficient.
The dexterity of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired
without much practice and experience. But a young man would practice with much
more diligence and attention, if from the beginning he wrought as a journeyman,
being paid in proportion to the little work which he could execute, and paying
in his turn for the materials which he might sometimes spoil through
awkwardness and inexperience. His education would generally in this way be more
effectual, and always less tedious and expensive. The master, indeed, would be
a loser. He would lose all the wages of the apprentice, which he now saves, for
seven years together. In the end, perhaps, the apprentice himself would be a
loser. In a trade so easily learnt he would have more competitors, and his
wages, when he came to be a complete workman, would be much less than at
present. The same increase of competition would reduce the profits of the
masters, as well as the wages of workmen. The trades, the crafts, the
mysteries, would all be losers. But the public would be a gainer, the work of
all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market.

It is to prevent this reduction of price, and consequently of wages and profit,
by restraining that free competition which would most certainly occasion it,
that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws have been
established. In order to erect a corporation, no other authority in ancient
times was requisite, in many parts of Europe, but that of the town-corporate in
which it was established. In England, indeed, a charter from the king was
likewise necessary. But this prerogative of the crown seems to have been
reserved rather for extorting money from the subject, than for the defence of
the common liberty against such oppressive monopolies. Upon paying a fine to
the king, the charter seems generally to have been readily granted; and when
any particular class of artificers or traders thought proper to act as a
corporation, without a charter, such adulterine guilds, as they were called,
were not always disfranchised upon that account, but obliged to fine annually
to the king, for permission to exercise their usurped privileges {See Madox
Firma Burgi p. 26 etc.}. The immediate inspection of all corporations, and of
the bye-laws which they might think proper to enact for their own government,
belonged to the town-corporate in which they were established; and whatever
discipline was exercised over them, proceeded commonly, not from the king, but
from that greater incorporation of which those subordinate ones were only parts
or members.

The government of towns-corporate was altogether in the hands of traders and
artificers, and it was the manifest interest of every particular class of them,
to prevent the market from being overstocked, as they commonly express it, with
their own particular species of industry; which is in reality to keep it always
understocked. Each class was eager to establish regulations proper for this
purpose, and, provided it was allowed to do so, was willing to consent that
every other class should do the same. In consequence of such regulations,
indeed, each class was obliged to buy the goods they had occasion for from
every other within the town, somewhat dearer than they otherwise might have
done. But, in recompence, they were enabled to sell their own just as much
dearer; so that, so far it was as broad as long, as they say; and in the
dealings of the different classes within the town with one another, none of
them were losers by these regulations. But in their dealings with the country
they were all great gainers; and in these latter dealings consist the whole
trade which supports and enriches every town.

Every town draws its whole subsistence, and all the materials of its industry,
from the: country. It pays for these chiefly in two ways. First, by sending
back to the country a part of those materials wrought up and manufactured; in
which case, their price is augmented by the wages of the workmen, and the
profits of their masters or immediate employers; secondly, by sending to it a
part both of the rude and manufactured produce, either of other countries, or
of distant parts of the same country, imported into the town; in which case,
too, the original price of those goods is augmented by the wages of the
carriers or sailors, and by the profits of the merchants who employ them. In
what is gained upon the first of those branches of commerce, consists the
advantage which the town makes by its manufactures; in what is gained upon the
second, the advantage of its inland and foreign trade. The wages of the
workmen, and the profits of their different employers, make up the whole of
what is gained upon both. Whatever regulations, therefore, tend to increase
those wages and profits beyond what they otherwise: would be, tend to enable
the town to purchase, with a smaller quantity of its labour, the produce of a
greater quantity of the labour of the country. They give the traders and
artificers in the town an advantage over the landlords, farmers, and labourers,
in the country, and break down that natural equality which would otherwise take
place in the commerce which is carried on between them. The whole annual
produce of the labour of the society is annually divided between those two
different sets of people. By means of those regulations, a greater share of it
is given to the inhabitants of the town than would otherwise fall to them, and
a less to those of the country.

The price which the town really pays for the provisions and materials annually
imported into it, is the quantity of manufactures and other goods annually
exported from it. The dearer the latter are sold, the cheaper the former are
bought. The industry of the town becomes more, and that of the country less
advantageous.

That the industry which is carried on in towns is, everywhere in Europe, more
advantageous than that which is carried on in the country, without entering
into any very nice computations, we may satisfy ourselves by one very simple
and obvious observation. In every country of Europe, we find at least a hundred
people who have acquired great fortunes, from small beginnings, by trade and
manufactures, the industry which properly belongs to towns, for one who has
done so by that which properly belongs to the country, the raising of rude
produce by the improvement and cultivation of land. Industry, therefore, must
be better rewarded, the wages of labour and the profits of stock must evidently
be greater, in the one situation than in the other. But stock and labour
naturally seek the most advantageous employment. They naturally, therefore,
resort as much as they can to the town, and desert the country.

The inhabitants of a town being collected into one place, can easily combine
together. The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have, accordingly,
in some place or other, been incorporated; and even where they have never been
incorporated, yet the corporation-spirit, the jealousy of strangers, the
aversion to take apprentices, or to communicate the secret of their trade,
generally prevail in them, and often teach them, by voluntary associations and
agreements, to prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit by
bye-laws. The trades which employ but a small number of hands, run most easily
into such combinations. Half-a-dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are necessary to
keep a thousand spinners and weavers at work. By combining not to take
apprentices, they can not only engross the employment, but reduce the whole
manufacture into a sort of slavery to themselves, and raise the price of their
labour much above what is due to the nature of their work.

The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places, cannot easily
combine together. They have not only never been incorporated, but the
incorporation spirit never has prevailed among them. No apprenticeship has ever
been thought necessary to qualify for husbandry, the great trade of the
country. After what are called the fine arts, and the liberal professions,
however, there is perhaps no trade which requires so great a variety of
knowledge and experience. The innumerable volumes which have been written upon
it in all languages, may satisfy us, that among the wisest and most learned
nations, it has never been regarded as a matter very easily understood. And
from all those volumes we shall in vain attempt to collect that knowledge of
its various and complicated operations which is commonly possessed even by the
common farmer; how contemptuously soever the very contemptible authors of some
of them may sometimes affect to speak of him. There is scarce any common
mechanic trade, on the contrary, of which all the operations may not be as
completely and distinctly explained in a pamphlet of a very few pages, as it is
possible for words illustrated by figures to explain them. In the history of
the arts, now publishing by the French Academy of Sciences, several of them are
actually explained in this manner. The direction of operations, besides, which
must be varied with every change of the weather, as well as with many other
accidents, requires much more judgment and discretion, than that of those which
are always the same, or very nearly the same.

Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of the operations of
husbandry, but many inferior branches of country labour require much more skill
and experience than the greater part of mechanic trades. The man who works upon
brass and iron, works with instruments, and upon materials of which the temper
is always the same, or very nearly the same. But the man who ploughs the ground
with a team of horses or oxen, works with instruments of which the health,
strength, and temper, are very different upon different occasions. The
condition of the materials which he works upon, too, is as variable as that of
the instruments which he works with, and both require to be managed with much
judgment and discretion. The common ploughman, though generally regarded as the
pattern of stupidity and ignorance, is seldom defective in this judgment and
discretion. He is less accustomed, indeed, to social intercourse, than the
mechanic who lives in a town. His voice and language are more uncouth, and more
difficult to be understood by those who are not used to them. His
understanding, however, being accustomed to consider a greater variety of
objects, is generally much superior to that of the other, whose whole
attention, from morning till night, is commonly occupied in performing one or
two very simple operations. How much the lower ranks of people in the country
are really superior to those of the town, is well known to every man whom
either business or curiosity has led to converse much with both. In China and
Indostan, accordingly, both the rank and the wages of country labourers are
said to be superior to those of the greater part of artificers and
manufacturers. They would probably be so everywhere, if corporation laws and
the corporation spirit did not prevent it.

The superiority which the industry of the towns has everywhere in Europe over
that of the country, is not altogether owing to corporations and corporation
laws. It is supported by many other regulations. The high duties upon foreign
manufactures, and upon all goods imported by alien merchants, all tend to the
same purpose. Corporation laws enable the inhabitants of towns to raise their
prices, without fearing to be undersold by the free competition of their own
countrymen. Those other regulations secure them equally against that of
foreigners. The enhancement of price occasioned by both is everywhere finally
paid by the landlords, farmers, and labourers, of the country, who have seldom
opposed the establishment of such monopolies. They have commonly neither
inclination nor fitness to enter into combinations; and the clamour and
sophistry of merchants and manufacturers easily persuade them, that the private
interest of a part, and of a subordinate part, of the society, is the general
interest of the whole.

In Great Britain, the superiority of the industry of the towns over that of the
country seems to have been greater formerly than in the present times. The
wages of country labour approach nearer to those of manufacturing labour, and
the profits of stock employed in agriculture to those of trading and
manufacturing stock, than they are said to have done in the last century, or in
the beginning of the present. This change may be regarded as the necessary,
though very late consequence of the extraordinary encouragement given to the
industry of the towns. The stocks accumulated in them come in time to be so
great, that it can no longer be employed with the ancient profit in that
species of industry which is peculiar to them. That industry has its limits
like every other; and the increase of stock, by increasing the competition,
necessarily reduces the profit. The lowering of profit in the town forces out
stock to the country, where, by creating a new demand for country labour, it
necessarily raises its wages. It then spreads itself, if I my say so, over the
face of the land, and, by being employed in agriculture, is in part restored to
the country, at the expense of which, in a great measure, it had originally
been accumulated in the town. That everywhere in Europe the greatest
improvements of the country have been owing to such over flowings of the stock
originally accumulated in the towns, I shall endeavour to shew hereafter, and
at the same time to demonstrate, that though some countries have, by this
course, attained to a considerable degree of opulence, it is in itself
necessarily slow, uncertain, liable to be disturbed and interrupted by
innumerable accidents, and, in every respect, contrary to the order of nature
and of reason. The interests, prejudices, laws, and customs, which have given
occasion to it, I shall endeavour to explain as fully and distinctly as I can
in the third and fourth books of this Inquiry.

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in
some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible, indeed, to prevent such
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent
with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same
trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate
such assemblies, much less to render them necessary.

A regulation which obliges all those of the same trade in a particular town to
enter their names and places of abode in a public register, facilitates such
assemblies. It connects individuals who might never otherwise be known to one
another, and gives every man of the trade a direction where to find every other
man of it.

A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves, in order
to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them
a common interest to manage, renders such assemblies necessary.

An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but makes the act of the
majority binding upon the whole. In a free trade, an effectual combination
cannot be established but by the unanimous consent of every single trader, and
it cannot last longer than every single trader continues of the same mind. The
majority of a corporation can enact a bye-law, with proper penalties, which
will limit the competition more effectually and more durably than any voluntary
combination whatever.

The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of the
trade, is without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which is
exercised over a workman, is not that of his corporation, but that of his
customers. It is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds
and corrects his negligence. An exclusive corporation necessarily weakens the
force of this discipline. A particular set of workmen must then be employed,
let them behave well or ill. It is upon this account that, in many large
incorporated towns, no tolerable workmen are to be found, even in some of the
most necessary trades. If you would have your work tolerably executed, it must
be done in the suburbs, where the workmen, having no exclusive privilege, have
nothing but their character to depend upon, and you must then smuggle it into
the town as well as you can.

It is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by restraining the competition
in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to
enter into them, occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock.

Secondly, the policy of Europe, by increasing the competition in some
employments beyond what it naturally would be, occasions another inequality, of
an opposite kind, in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments of labour and stock.

It has been considered as of so much importance that a proper number of young
people should be educated for certain professions, that sometimes the public,
and sometimes the piety of private founders, have established many pensions,
scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc. for this purpose, which draw many
more people into those trades than could otherwise pretend to follow them. In
all Christian countries, I believe, the education of the greater part of
churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are educated altogether
at their own expense. The long, tedious, and expensive education, therefore, of
those who are, will not always procure them a suitable reward, the church being
crowded with people, who, in order to get employment, are willing to accept of
a much smaller recompence than what such an education would otherwise have
entitled them to; and in this manner the competition of the poor takes away the
reward of the rich. It would be indecent, no doubt, to compare either a curate
or a chaplain with a journeyman in any common trade. The pay of a curate or
chaplain, however, may very properly be considered as of the same nature with
the wages of a journeyman. They are all three paid for their work according to
the contract which they may happen to make with their respective superiors.
Till after the middle of the fourteenth century, five merks, containing about
as much silver as ten pounds of our present money, was in England the usual pay
of a curate or a stipendiary parish priest, as we find it regulated by the
decrees of several different national councils. At the same period, fourpence
a-day, containing the same quantity of silver as a shilling of our present
money, was declared to be the pay of a master mason; and threepence a-day,
equal to ninepence of our present money, that of a journeyman mason. {See the
Statute of Labourers, 25, Ed. III.} The wages of both these labourers,
therefore, supposing them to have been constantly employed, were much superior
to those of the curate. The wages of the master mason, supposing him to have
been without employment one-third of the year, would have fully equalled them.
By the 12th of Queen Anne, c. 12. it is declared, “That whereas, for want
of sufficient maintenance and encouragement to curates, the cures have, in
several places, been meanly supplied, the bishop is, therefore, empowered to
appoint, by writing under his hand and seal, a sufficient certain stipend or
allowance, not exceeding fifty, and not less than twenty pounds a-year”.
Forty pounds a-year is reckoned at present very good pay for a curate; and,
notwithstanding this act of parliament, there are many curacies under twenty
pounds a-year. There are journeymen shoemakers in London who earn forty pounds
a-year, and there is scarce an industrious workman of any kind in that
metropolis who does not earn more than twenty. This last sum, indeed, does not
exceed what is frequently earned by common labourers in many country parishes.
Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has always
been rather to lower them than to raise them. But the law has, upon many
occasions, attempted to raise the wages of curates, and, for the dignity of the
church, to oblige the rectors of parishes to give them more than the wretched
maintenance which they themselves might be willing to accept of. And, in both
cases, the law seems to have been equally ineffectual, and has never either
been able to raise the wages of curates, or to sink those of labourers to the
degree that was intended; because it has never been able to hinder either the
one from being willing to accept of less than the legal allowance, on account
of the indigence of their situation and the multitude of their competitors, or
the other from receiving more, on account of the contrary competition of those
who expected to derive either profit or pleasure from employing them.

The great benefices and other ecclesiastical dignities support the honour of
the church, notwithstanding the mean circumstances of some of its inferior
members. The respect paid to the profession, too, makes some compensation even
to them for the meanness of their pecuniary recompence. In England, and in all
Roman catholic countries, the lottery of the church is in reality much more
advantageous than is necessary. The example of the churches of Scotland, of
Geneva, and of several other protestant churches, may satisfy us, that in so
creditable a profession, in which education is so easily procured, the hopes of
much more moderate benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent,
and respectable men into holy orders.

In professions in which there are no benefices, such as law and physic, if an
equal proportion of people were educated at the public expense, the competition
would soon be so great as to sink very much their pecuniary reward. It might
then not be worth any man’s while to educate his son to either of those
professions at his own expense. They would be entirely abandoned to such as had
been educated by those public charities, whose numbers and necessities would
oblige them in general to content themselves with a very miserable recompence,
to the entire degradation of the now respectable professions of law and physic.

That unprosperous race of men, commonly called men of letters, are pretty much
in the situation which lawyers and physicians probably would be in, upon the
foregoing supposition. In every part of Europe, the greater part of them have
been educated for the church, but have been hindered by different reasons from
entering into holy orders. They have generally, therefore, been educated at the
public expense; and their numbers are everywhere so great, as commonly to
reduce the price of their labour to a very paltry recompence.

Before the invention of the art of printing, the only employment by which a man
of letters could make any thing by his talents, was that of a public or private
teacher, or by communicating to other people the curious and useful knowledge
which he had acquired himself; and this is still surely a more honourable, a
more useful, and, in general, even a more profitable employment than that other
of writing for a bookseller, to which the art of printing has given occasion.
The time and study, the genius, knowledge, and application requisite to qualify
an eminent teacher of the sciences, are at least equal to what is necessary for
the greatest practitioners in law and physic. But the usual reward of the
eminent teacher bears no proportion to that of the lawyer or physician, because
the trade of the one is crowded with indigent people, who have been brought up
to it at the public expense; whereas those of the other two are encumbered with
very few who have not been educated at their own. The usual recompence,
however, of public and private teachers, small as it may appear, would
undoubtedly be less than it is, if the competition of those yet more indigent
men of letters, who write for bread, was not taken out of the market. Before
the invention of the art of printing, a scholar and a beggar seem to have been
terms very nearly synonymous. The different governors of the universities,
before that time, appear to have often granted licences to their scholars to
beg.

In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been established for
the education of indigent people to the learned professions, the rewards of
eminent teachers appear to have been much more considerable. Isocrates, in what
is called his discourse against the sophists, reproaches the teachers of his
own times with inconsistency. “They make the most magnificent promises to
their scholars,” says he, “and undertake to teach them to be wise,
to be happy, and to be just; and, in return for so important a service, they
stipulate the paltry reward of four or five minae.” “They who teach
wisdom,” continues he, “ought certainly to be wise themselves; but
if any man were to sell such a bargain for such a price, he would be convicted
of the most evident folly.” He certainly does not mean here to exaggerate
the reward, and we may be assured that it was not less than he represents it.
Four minae were equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and eightpence; five
minae to sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence. Something not less
than the largest of those two sums, therefore, must at that time have been
usually paid to the most eminent teachers at Athens. Isocrates himself demanded
ten minae, or £ 33:6:8 from each scholar. When he taught at Athens, he is said
to have had a hundred scholars. I understand this to be the number whom he
taught at one time, or who attended what we would call one course of lectures;
a number which will not appear extraordinary from so great a city to so famous
a teacher, who taught, too, what was at that time the most fashionable of all
sciences, rhetoric. He must have made, therefore, by each course of lectures, a
thousand minae, or £ 3335:6:8. A thousand minae, accordingly, is said by
Plutarch, in another place, to have been his didactron, or usual price of
teaching. Many other eminent teachers in those times appear to have acquired
great fortunes. Georgias made a present to the temple of Delphi of his own
statue in solid gold. We must not, I presume, suppose that it was as large as
the life. His way of living, as well as that of Hippias and Protagoras, two
other eminent teachers of those times, is represented by Plato as splendid,
even to ostentation. Plato himself is said to have lived with a good deal of
magnificence. Aristotle, after having been tutor to Alexander, and most
munificently rewarded, as it is universally agreed, both by him and his father,
Philip, thought it worth while, notwithstanding, to return to Athens, in order
to resume the teaching of his school. Teachers of the sciences were probably in
those times less common than they came to be in an age or two afterwards, when
the competition had probably somewhat reduced both the price of their labour
and the admiration for their persons. The most eminent of them, however, appear
always to have enjoyed a degree of consideration much superior to any of the
like profession in the present times. The Athenians sent Carneades the
academic, and Diogenes the stoic, upon a solemn embassy to Rome; and though
their city had then declined from its former grandeur, it was still an
independent and considerable republic.

Carneades, too, was a Babylonian by birth; and as there never was a people more
jealous of admitting foreigners to public offices than the Athenians, their
consideration for him must have been very great.

This inequality is, upon the whole, perhaps rather advantageous than hurtful to
the public. It may somewhat degrade the profession of a public teacher; but the
cheapness of literary education is surely an advantage which greatly
overbalances this trifling inconveniency. The public, too, might derive still
greater benefit from it, if the constitution of those schools and colleges, in
which education is carried on, was more reasonable than it is at present
through the greater part of Europe.

Thirdly, the policy of Europe, by obstructing the free circulation of labour
and stock, both from employment to employment, and from place to place,
occasions, in some cases, a very inconvenient inequality in the whole of the
advantages and disadvantages of their different employments.

The statute of apprenticeship obstructs the free circulation of labour from one
employment to another, even in the same place. The exclusive privileges of
corporations obstruct it from one place to another, even in the same
employment.

It frequently happens, that while high wages are given to the workmen in one
manufacture, those in another are obliged to content themselves with bare
subsistence. The one is in an advancing state, and has therefore a continual
demand for new hands; the other is in a declining state, and the superabundance
of hands is continually increasing. Those two manufactures may sometimes be in
the same town, and sometimes in the same neighbourhood, without being able to
lend the least assistance to one another. The statute of apprenticeship may
oppose it in the one case, and both that and an exclusive corporation in the
other. In many different manufactures, however, the operations are so much
alike, that the workmen could easily change trades with one another, if those
absurd laws did not hinder them. The arts of weaving plain linen and plain
silk, for example, are almost entirely the same. That of weaving plain woollen
is somewhat different; but the difference is so insignificant, that either a
linen or a silk weaver might become a tolerable workman in a very few days. If
any of those three capital manufactures, therefore, were decaying, the workmen
might find a resource in one of the other two which was in a more prosperous
condition; and their wages would neither rise too high in the thriving, nor
sink too low in the decaying manufacture. The linen manufacture, indeed, is in
England, by a particular statute, open to every body; but as it is not much
cultivated through the greater part of the country, it can afford no general
resource to the work men of other decaying manufactures, who, wherever the
statute of apprenticeship takes place, have no other choice, but either to come
upon the parish, or to work as common labourers; for which, by their habits,
they are much worse qualified than for any sort of manufacture that bears any
resemblance to their own. They generally, therefore, chuse to come upon the
parish.

Whatever obstructs the free circulation of labour from one employment to
another, obstructs that of stock likewise; the quantity of stock which can be
employed in any branch of business depending very much upon that of the labour
which can be employed in it. Corporation laws, however, give less obstruction
to the free circulation of stock from one place to another, than to that of
labour. It is everywhere much easier for a wealthy merchant to obtain the
privilege of trading in a town-corporate, than for a poor artificer to obtain
that of working in it.

The obstruction which corporation laws give to the free circulation of labour
is common, I believe, to every part of Europe. That which is given to it by the
poor laws is, so far as I know, peculiar to England. It consists in the
difficulty which a poor man finds in obtaining a settlement, or even in being
allowed to exercise his industry in any parish but that to which he belongs. It
is the labour of artificers and manufacturers only of which the free
circulation is obstructed by corporation laws. The difficulty of obtaining
settlements obstructs even that of common labour. It may be worth while to give
some account of the rise, progress, and present state of this disorder, the
greatest, perhaps, of any in the police of England.

When, by the destruction of monasteries, the poor had been deprived of the
charity of those religious houses, after some other ineffectual attempts for
their relief, it was enacted, by the 43d of Elizabeth, c. 2. that every parish
should be bound to provide for its own poor, and that overseers of the poor
should be annually appointed, who, with the church-wardens, should raise, by a
parish rate, competent sums for this purpose.

By this statute, the necessity of providing for their own poor was
indispensably imposed upon every parish. Who were to be considered as the poor
of each parish became, therefore, a question of some importance. This question,
after some variation, was at last determined by the 13th and 14th of Charles
II. when it was enacted, that forty days undisturbed residence should gain any
person a settlement in any parish; but that within that time it should be
lawful for two justices of the peace, upon complaint made by the church-wardens
or overseers of the poor, to remove any new inhabitant to the parish where he
was last legally settled; unless he either rented a tenement of ten pounds
a-year, or could give such security for the discharge of the parish where he
was then living, as those justices should judge sufficient.

Some frauds, it is said, were committed in consequence of this statute; parish
officers sometimes bribing their own poor to go clandestinely to another
parish, and, by keeping themselves concealed for forty days, to gain a
settlement there, to the discharge of that to which they properly belonged. It
was enacted, therefore, by the 1st of James II. that the forty days undisturbed
residence of any person necessary to gain a settlement, should be accounted
only from the time of his delivering notice, in writing, of the place of his
abode and the number of his family, to one of the church-wardens or overseers
of the parish where he came to dwell.

But parish officers, it seems, were not always more honest with regard to their
own than they had been with regard to other parishes, and sometimes connived at
such intrusions, receiving the notice, and taking no proper steps in
consequence of it. As every person in a parish, therefore, was supposed to have
an interest to prevent as much as possible their being burdened by such
intruders, it was further enacted by the 3rd of William III. that the forty
days residence should be accounted only from the publication of such notice in
writing on Sunday in the church, immediately after divine service.

“After all,” says Doctor Burn, “this kind of settlement, by
continuing forty days after publication of notice in writing, is very seldom
obtained; and the design of the acts is not so much for gaining of settlements,
as for the avoiding of them by persons coming into a parish clandestinely, for
the giving of notice is only putting a force upon the parish to remove. But if
a person’s situation is such, that it is doubtful whether he is actually
removable or not, he shall, by giving of notice, compel the parish either to
allow him a settlement uncontested, by suffering him to continue forty days, or
by removing him to try the right.”

This statute, therefore, rendered it almost impracticable for a poor man to
gain a new settlement in the old way, by forty days inhabitancy. But that it
might not appear to preclude altogether the common people of one parish from
ever establishing themselves with security in another, it appointed four other
ways by which a settlement might be gained without any notice delivered or
published. The first was, by being taxed to parish rates and paying them; the
second, by being elected into an annual parish office, and serving in it a
year; the third, by serving an apprenticeship in the parish; the fourth, by
being hired into service there for a year, and continuing in the same service
during the whole of it. Nobody can gain a settlement by either of the two first
ways, but by the public deed of the whole parish, who are too well aware of the
consequences to adopt any new-comer, who has nothing but his labour to support
him, either by taxing him to parish rates, or by electing him into a parish
office.

No married man can well gain any settlement in either of the two last ways. An
apprentice is scarce ever married; and it is expressly enacted, that no married
servant shall gain any settlement by being hired for a year. The principal
effect of introducing settlement by service, has been to put out in a great
measure the old fashion of hiring for a year; which before had been so
customary in England, that even at this day, if no particular term is agreed
upon, the law intends that every servant is hired for a year. But masters are
not always willing to give their servants a settlement by hiring them in this
manner; and servants are not always willing to be so hired, because, as every
last settlement discharges all the foregoing, they might thereby lose their
original settlement in the places of their nativity, the habitation of their
parents and relations.

No independent workman, it is evident, whether labourer or artificer, is likely
to gain any new settlement, either by apprenticeship or by service. When such a
person, therefore, carried his industry to a new parish, he was liable to be
removed, how healthy and industrious soever, at the caprice of any churchwarden
or overseer, unless he either rented a tenement of ten pounds a-year, a thing
impossible for one who has nothing but his labour to live by, or could give
such security for the discharge of the parish as two justices of the peace
should judge sufficient.

What security they shall require, indeed, is left altogether to their
discretion; but they cannot well require less than thirty pounds, it having
been enacted, that the purchase even of a freehold estate of less than thirty
pounds value, shall not gain any person a settlement, as not being sufficient
for the discharge of the parish. But this is a security which scarce any man
who lives by labour can give; and much greater security is frequently demanded.

In order to restore, in some measure, that free circulation of labour which
those different statutes had almost entirely taken away, the invention of
certificates was fallen upon. By the 8th and 9th of William III. it was enacted
that if any person should bring a certificate from the parish where he was last
legally settled, subscribed by the church-wardens and overseers of the poor,
and allowed by two justices of the peace, that every other parish should be
obliged to receive him; that he should not be removable merely upon account of
his being likely to become chargeable, but only upon his becoming actually
chargeable; and that then the parish which granted the certificate should be
obliged to pay the expense both of his maintenance and of his removal. And in
order to give the most perfect security to the parish where such certificated
man should come to reside, it was further enacted by the same statute, that he
should gain no settlement there by any means whatever, except either by renting
a tenement of ten pounds a-year, or by serving upon his own account in an
annual parish office for one whole year; and consequently neither by notice nor
by service, nor by apprenticeship, nor by paying parish rates. By the 12th of
Queen Anne, too, stat. 1, c.18, it was further enacted, that neither the
servants nor apprentices of such certificated man should gain any settlement in
the parish where he resided under such certificate.

How far this invention has restored that free circulation of labour, which the
preceding statutes had almost entirely taken away, we may learn from the
following very judicious observation of Doctor Burn. “It is
obvious,” says he, “that there are divers good reasons for
requiring certificates with persons coming to settle in any place; namely, that
persons residing under them can gain no settlement, neither by apprenticeship,
nor by service, nor by giving notice, nor by paying parish rates; that they can
settle neither apprentices nor servants; that if they become chargeable, it is
certainly known whither to remove them, and the parish shall be paid for the
removal, and for their maintenance in the mean time; and that, if they fall
sick, and cannot be removed, the parish which gave the certificate must
maintain them; none of all which can be without a certificate. Which reasons
will hold proportionably for parishes not granting certificates in ordinary
cases; for it is far more than an equal chance, but that they will have the
certificated persons again, and in a worse condition.” The moral of this
observation seems to be, that certificates ought always to be required by the
parish where any poor man comes to reside, and that they ought very seldom to
be granted by that which he purposes to leave. “There is somewhat of
hardship in this matter of certificates,” says the same very intelligent
author, in his History of the Poor Laws, “by putting it in the power of a
parish officer to imprison a man as it were for life, however inconvenient it
may be for him to continue at that place where he has had the misfortune to
acquire what is called a settlement, or whatever advantage he may propose
himself by living elsewhere.”

Though a certificate carries along with it no testimonial of good behaviour,
and certifies nothing but that the person belongs to the parish to which he
really does belong, it is altogether discretionary in the parish officers
either to grant or to refuse it. A mandamus was once moved for, says Doctor
Burn, to compel the church-wardens and overseers to sign a certificate; but the
Court of King’s Bench rejected the motion as a very strange attempt.

The very unequal price of labour which we frequently find in England, in places
at no great distance from one another, is probably owing to the obstruction
which the law of settlements gives to a poor man who would carry his industry
from one parish to another without a certificate. A single man, indeed who is
healthy and industrious, may sometimes reside by sufferance without one; but a
man with a wife and family who should attempt to do so, would, in most
parishes, be sure of being removed; and, if the single man should afterwards
marry, he would generally be removed likewise. The scarcity of hands in one
parish, therefore, cannot always be relieved by their superabundance in
another, as it is constantly in Scotland, and I believe, in all other countries
where there is no difficulty of settlement. In such countries, though wages may
sometimes rise a little in the neighbourhood of a great town, or wherever else
there is an extraordinary demand for labour, and sink gradually as the distance
from such places increases, till they fall back to the common rate of the
country; yet we never meet with those sudden and unaccountable differences in
the wages of neighbouring places which we sometimes find in England, where it
is often more difficult for a poor man to pass the artificial boundary of a
parish, than an arm of the sea, or a ridge of high mountains, natural
boundaries which sometimes separate very distinctly different rates of wages in
other countries.

To remove a man who has committed no misdemeanour, from the parish where he
chooses to reside, is an evident violation of natural liberty and justice. The
common people of England, however, so jealous of their liberty, but like the
common people of most other countries, never rightly understanding wherein it
consists, have now, for more than a century together, suffered themselves to be
exposed to this oppression without a remedy. Though men of reflection, too,
have sometimes complained of the law of settlements as a public grievance; yet
it has never been the object of any general popular clamour, such as that
against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as
was not likely to occasion any general oppression. There is scarce a poor man
in England, of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who has not, in some
part of his life, felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law
of settlements.

I shall conclude this long chapter with observing, that though anciently it was
usual to rate wages, first by general laws extending over the whole kingdom,
and afterwards by particular orders of the justices of peace in every
particular county, both these practices have now gone entirely into disuse.
“By the experience of above four hundred years,” says Doctor Burn,
“it seems time to lay aside all endeavours to bring under strict
regulations, what in its own nature seems incapable of minute limitation; for
if all persons in the same kind of work were to receive equal wages, there
would be no emulation, and no room left for industry or ingenuity.”

Particular acts of parliament, however, still attempt sometimes to regulate
wages in particular trades, and in particular places. Thus the 8th of George
III. prohibits, under heavy penalties, all master tailors in London, and five
miles round it, from giving, and their workmen from accepting, more than two
shillings and sevenpence halfpenny a-day, except in the case of a general
mourning. Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between
masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the
regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and
equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters. Thus
the law which obliges the masters in several different trades to pay their
workmen in money, and not in goods, is quite just and equitable. It imposes no
real hardship upon the masters. It only obliges them to pay that value in
money, which they pretended to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods.
This law is in favour of the workmen; but the 8th of George III. is in favour
of the masters. When masters combine together, in order to reduce the wages of
their workmen, they commonly enter into a private bond or agreement, not to
give more than a certain wage, under a certain penalty. Were the workmen to
enter into a contrary combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain
wage, under a certain penalty, the law would punish them very severely; and, if
it dealt impartially, it would treat the masters in the same manner. But the
8th of George III. enforces by law that very regulation which masters sometimes
attempt to establish by such combinations. The complaint of the workmen, that
it puts the ablest and most industrious upon the same footing with an ordinary
workman, seems perfectly well founded.

In ancient times, too, it was usual to attempt to regulate the profits of
merchants and other dealers, by regulating the price of provisions and ether
goods. The assize of bread is, so far as I know, the only remnant of this
ancient usage. Where there is an exclusive corporation, it may, perhaps, be
proper to regulate the price of the first necessary of life; but, where there
is none, the competition will regulate it much better than any assize. The
method of fixing the assize of bread, established by the 31st of George II.
could not be put in practice in Scotland, on account of a defect in the law,
its execution depending upon the office of clerk of the market, which does not
exist there. This defect was not remedied till the third of George III. The
want of an assize occasioned no sensible inconveniency; and the establishment
of one in the few places where it has yet taken place has produced no sensible
advantage. In the greater part of the towns in Scotland, however, there is an
incorporation of bakers, who claim exclusive privileges, though they are not
very strictly guarded. The proportion between the different rates, both of
wages and profit, in the different employments of labour and stock, seems not
to be much affected, as has already been observed, by the riches or poverty,
the advancing, stationary, or declining state of the society. Such revolutions
in the public welfare, though they affect the general rates both of wages and
profit, must, in the end, affect them equally in all different employments. The
proportion between them, therefore, must remain the same, and cannot well be
altered, at least for any considerable time, by any such revolutions.

CHAPTER XI.
OF THE RENT OF LAND.

Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the
highest which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the
land. In adjusting the terms of the lease, the landlord endeavours to leave him
no greater share of the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stock
from which he furnishes the seed, pays the labour, and purchases and maintains
the cattle and other instruments of husbandry, together with the ordinary
profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. This is evidently the smallest
share with which the tenant can content himself, without being a loser, and the
landlord seldom means to leave him any more. Whatever part of the produce, or,
what is the same thing, whatever part of its price, is over and above this
share, he naturally endeavours to reserve to himself as the rent of his land,
which is evidently the highest the tenant can afford to pay in the actual
circumstances of the land. Sometimes, indeed, the liberality, more frequently
the ignorance, of the landlord, makes him accept of somewhat less than this
portion; and sometimes, too, though more rarely, the ignorance of the tenant
makes him undertake to pay somewhat more, or to content himself with somewhat
less, than the ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. This
portion, however, may still be considered as the natural rent of land, or the
rent at which it is naturally meant that land should, for the most part, be
let.

The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reasonable
profit or interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement.
This, no doubt, may be partly the case upon some occasions; for it can scarce
ever be more than partly the case. The landlord demands a rent even for
unimproved land, and the supposed interest or profit upon the expense of
improvement is generally an addition to this original rent. Those improvements,
besides, are not always made by the stock of the landlord, but sometimes by
that of the tenant. When the lease comes to be renewed, however, the landlord
commonly demands the same augmentation of rent as if they had been all made by
his own.

He sometimes demands rent for what is altogether incapable of human
improvements. Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an
alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soap, and for several other purposes.
It grows in several parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such
rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every day covered
with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human
industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp shore of
this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn-fields.

The sea in the neighbourhood of the islands of Shetland is more than commonly
abundant in fish, which makes a great part of the subsistence of their
inhabitants. But, in order to profit by the produce of the water, they must
have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in
proportion, not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he can
make both by the land and the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and one of
the very few instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that
commodity, is to be found in that country.

The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the
land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the
landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can
afford to take, but to what the farmer can afford to give.

Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to market, of
which the ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock which must be
employed in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary profits. If the
ordinary price is more than this, the surplus part of it will naturally go to
the rent of the land. If it is not more, though the commodity may be brought to
market, it can afford no rent to the landlord. Whether the price is, or is not
more, depends upon the demand.

There are some parts of the produce of land, for which the demand must always
be such as to afford a greater price than what is sufficient to bring them to
market; and there are others for which it either may or may not be such as to
afford this greater price. The former must always afford a rent to the
landlord. The latter sometimes may and sometimes may not, according to
different circumstances.

Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the price
of commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and
profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of
it. It is because high or low wages and profit must be paid, in order to bring
a particular commodity to market, that its price is high or low. But it is
because its price is high or low, a great deal more, or very little more, or no
more, than what is sufficient to pay those wages and profit, that it affords a
high rent, or a low rent, or no rent at all.

The particular consideration, first, of those parts of the produce of land
which always afford some rent; secondly, of those which sometimes may and
sometimes may not afford rent; and, thirdly, of the variations which, in the
different periods of improvement, naturally take place in the relative value of
those two different sorts of rude produce, when compared both with one another
and with manufactured commodities, will divide this chapter into three parts.

PART I.—Of the Produce of Land which always affords Rent.

As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the means
of their subsistence, food is always more or less in demand. It can always
purchase or command a greater or smaller quantity of labour, and somebody can
always be found who is willing to do something in order to obtain it. The
quantity of labour, indeed, which it can purchase, is not always equal to what
it could maintain, if managed in the most economical manner, on account of the
high wages which are sometimes given to labour; but it can always purchase such
a quantity of labour as it can maintain, according to the rate at which that
sort of labour is commonly maintained in the neighbourhood.

But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quantity of food than
what is sufficient to maintain all the labour necessary for bringing it to
market, in the most liberal way in which that labour is ever maintained. The
surplus, too, is always more than sufficient to replace the stock which
employed that labour, together with its profits. Something, therefore, always
remains for a rent to the landlord.

The most desert moors in Norway and Scotland produce some sort of pasture for
cattle, of which the milk and the increase are always more than sufficient, not
only to maintain all the labour necessary for tending them, and to pay the
ordinary profit to the farmer or the owner of the herd or flock, but to afford
some small rent to the landlord. The rent increases in proportion to the
goodness of the pasture. The same extent of ground not only maintains a greater
number of cattle, but as they are brought within a smaller compass, less labour
becomes requisite to tend them, and to collect their produce. The landlord
gains both ways; by the increase of the produce, and by the diminution of the
labour which must be maintained out of it.

The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce,
but with its situation, whatever be its fertility. Land in the neighbourhood of
a town gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a distant part of the
country. Though it may cost no more labour to cultivate the one than the other,
it must always cost more to bring the produce of the distant land to market. A
greater quantity of labour, therefore, must be maintained out of it; and the
surplus, from which are drawn both the profit of the farmer and the rent of the
landlord, must be diminished. But in remote parts of the country, the rate of
profit, as has already been shewn, is generally higher than in the
neighbourhood of a large town. A smaller proportion of this diminished surplus,
therefore, must belong to the landlord.

Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of
carriage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with
those in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest
of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must
always be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advantageous to
the town by breaking down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood.
They are advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce
some rival commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its
produce. Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which can
never be universally established, but in consequence of that free and universal
competition which forces every body to have recourse to it for the sake of self
defence. It is not more than fifty years ago, that some of the counties in the
neighbourhood of London petitioned the parliament against the extension of the
turnpike roads into the remoter counties. Those remoter counties, they
pretended, from the cheapness of labour, would be able to sell their grass and
corn cheaper in the London market than themselves, and would thereby reduce
their rents, and ruin their cultivation. Their rents, however, have risen, and
their cultivation has been improved since that time.

A corn field of moderate fertility produces a much greater quantity of food for
man, than the best pasture of equal extent. Though its cultivation requires
much more labour, yet the surplus which remains after replacing the seed and
maintaining all that labour, is likewise much greater. If a pound of
butcher’s meat, therefore, was never supposed to be worth more than a
pound of bread, this greater surplus would everywhere be of greater value and
constitute a greater fund, both for the profit of the farmer and the rent of
the landlord. It seems to have done so universally in the rude beginnings of
agriculture.

But the relative values of those two different species of food, bread and
butcher’s meat, are very different in the different periods of
agriculture. In its rude beginnings, the unimproved wilds, which then occupy
the far greater part of the country, are all abandoned to cattle. There is more
butcher’s meat than bread; and bread, therefore, is the food for which
there is the greatest competition, and which consequently brings the greatest
price. At Buenos Ayres, we are told by Ulloa, four reals, one-and-twenty pence
halfpenny sterling, was, forty or fifty years ago, the ordinary price of an ox,
chosen from a herd of two or three hundred. He says nothing of the price of
bread, probably because he found nothing remarkable about it. An ox there, he
says, costs little more than the labour of catching him. But corn can nowhere
be raised without a great deal of labour; and in a country which lies upon the
river Plate, at that time the direct road from Europe to the silver mines of
Potosi, the money-price of labour could be very cheap. It is otherwise when
cultivation is extended over the greater part of the country. There is then
more bread than butcher’s meat. The competition changes its direction,
and the price of butcher’s meat becomes greater than the price of bread.

By the extension, besides, of cultivation, the unimproved wilds become
insufficient to supply the demand for butcher’s meat. A great part of the
cultivated lands must be employed in rearing and fattening cattle; of which the
price, therefore, must be sufficient to pay, not only the labour necessary for
tending them, but the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the farmer,
could have drawn from such land employed in tillage. The cattle bred upon the
most uncultivated moors, when brought to the same market, are, in proportion to
their weight or goodness, sold at the same price as those which are reared upon
the most improved land. The proprietors of those moors profit by it, and raise
the rent of their land in proportion to the price of their cattle. It is not
more than a century ago, that in many parts of the Highlands of Scotland,
butcher’s meat was as cheap or cheaper than even bread made of oatmeal.
The Union opened the market of England to the Highland cattle. Their ordinary
price, at present, is about three times greater than at the beginning of the
century, and the rents of many Highland estates have been tripled and
quadrupled in the same time. In almost every part of Great Britain, a pound of
the best butcher’s meat is, in the present times, generally worth more
than two pounds of the best white bread; and in plentiful years it is sometimes
worth three or four pounds.

It is thus that, in the progress of improvement, the rent and profit of
unimproved pasture come to be regulated in some measure by the rent and profit
of what is improved, and these again by the rent and profit of corn. Corn is an
annual crop; butcher’s meat, a crop which requires four or five years to
grow. As an acre of land, therefore, will produce a much smaller quantity of
the one species of food than of the other, the inferiority of the quantity must
be compensated by the superiority of the price. If it was more than
compensated, more corn-land would be turned into pasture; and if it was not
compensated, part of what was in pasture would be brought back into corn.

This equality, however, between the rent and profit of grass and those of corn;
of the land of which the immediate produce is food for cattle, and of that of
which the immediate produce is food for men, must be understood to take place
only through the greater part of the improved lands of a great country. In some
particular local situations it is quite otherwise, and the rent and profit of
grass are much superior to what can be made by corn.

Thus, in the neighbourhood of a great town, the demand for milk, and for forage
to horses, frequently contribute, together with the high price of
butcher’s meat, to raise the value of grass above what may be called its
natural proportion to that of corn. This local advantage, it is evident, cannot
be communicated to the lands at a distance.

Particular circumstances have sometimes rendered some countries so populous,
that the whole territory, like the lands in the neighbourhood of a great town,
has not been sufficient to produce both the grass and the corn necessary for
the subsistence of their inhabitants. Their lands, therefore, have been
principally employed in the production of grass, the more bulky commodity, and
which cannot be so easily brought from a great distance; and corn, the food of
the great body of the people, has been chiefly imported from foreign countries.
Holland is at present in this situation; and a considerable part of ancient
Italy seems to have been so during the prosperity of the Romans. To feed well,
old Cato said, as we are told by Cicero, was the first and most profitable
thing in the management of a private estate; to feed tolerably well, the
second; and to feed ill, the third. To plough, he ranked only in the fourth
place of profit and advantage. Tillage, indeed, in that part of ancient Italy
which lay in the neighbour hood of Rome, must have been very much discouraged
by the distributions of corn which were frequently made to the people, either
gratuitously, or at a very low price. This corn was brought from the conquered
provinces, of which several, instead of taxes, were obliged to furnish a tenth
part of their produce at a stated price, about sixpence a-peck, to the
republic. The low price at which this corn was distributed to the people, must
necessarily have sunk the price of what could be brought to the Roman market
from Latium, or the ancient territory of Rome, and must have discouraged its
cultivation in that country.

In an open country, too, of which the principal produce is corn, a
well-inclosed piece of grass will frequently rent higher than any corn field in
its neighbourhood. It is convenient for the maintenance of the cattle employed
in the cultivation of the corn; and its high rent is, in this case, not so
properly paid from the value of its own produce, as from that of the corn lands
which are cultivated by means of it. It is likely to fall, if ever the
neighbouring lands are completely inclosed. The present high rent of inclosed
land in Scotland seems owing to the scarcity of inclosure, and will probably
last no longer than that scarcity. The advantage of inclosure is greater for
pasture than for corn. It saves the labour of guarding the cattle, which feed
better, too, when they are not liable to be disturbed by their keeper or his
dog.

But where there is no local advantage of this kind, the rent and profit of
corn, or whatever else is the common vegetable food of the people, must
naturally regulate upon the land which is fit for producing it, the rent and
profit of pasture.

The use of the artificial grasses, of turnips, carrots, cabbages, and the other
expedients which have been fallen upon to make an equal quantity of land feed a
greater number of cattle than when in natural grass, should somewhat reduce, it
might be expected, the superiority which, in an improved country, the price of
butcher’s meat naturally has over that of bread. It seems accordingly to
have done so; and there is some reason for believing that, at least in the
London market, the price of butcher’s meat, in proportion to the price of
bread, is a good deal lower in the present times than it was in the beginning
of the last century.

In the Appendix to the life of Prince Henry, Doctor Birch has given us an
account of the prices of butcher’s meat as commonly paid by that prince.
It is there said, that the four quarters of an ox, weighing six hundred pounds,
usually cost him nine pounds ten shillings, or thereabouts; that is thirty-one
shillings and eight-pence per hundred pounds weight. Prince Henry died on the
6th of November 1612, in the nineteenth year of his age.

In March 1764, there was a parliamentary inquiry into the causes of the high
price of provisions at that time. It was then, among other proof to the same
purpose, given in evidence by a Virginia merchant, that in March 1763, he had
victualled his ships for twentyfour or twenty-five shillings the hundred weight
of beef, which he considered as the ordinary price; whereas, in that dear year,
he had paid twenty-seven shillings for the same weight and sort. This high
price in 1764 is, however, four shillings and eight-pence cheaper than the
ordinary price paid by Prince Henry; and it is the best beef only, it must be
observed, which is fit to be salted for those distant voyages.

The price paid by Prince Henry amounts to 3d. 4/5ths per pound weight of the
whole carcase, coarse and choice pieces taken together; and at that rate the
choice pieces could not have been sold by retail for less than 4½d. or 5d. the
pound.

In the parliamentary inquiry in 1764, the witnesses stated the price of the
choice pieces of the best beef to be to the consumer 4d. and 4½d. the pound;
and the coarse pieces in general to be from seven farthings to 2½d. and 2¾d.;
and this, they said, was in general one halfpenny dearer than the same sort of
pieces had usually been sold in the month of March. But even this high price is
still a good deal cheaper than what we can well suppose the ordinary retail
price to have been in the time of Prince Henry.

During the first twelve years of the last century, the average price of the
best wheat at the Windsor market was £ 1:18:3½d. the quarter of nine Winchester
bushels.

But in the twelve years preceding 1764 including that year, the average price
of the same measure of the best wheat at the same market was £ 2:1:9½d.

In the first twelve years of the last century, therefore, wheat appears to have
been a good deal cheaper, and butcher’s meat a good deal dearer, than in
the twelve years preceding 1764, including that year.

In all great countries, the greater part of the cultivated lands are employed
in producing either food for men or food for cattle. The rent and profit of
these regulate the rent and profit of all other cultivated land. If any
particular produce afforded less, the land would soon be turned into corn or
pasture; and if any afforded more, some part of the lands in corn or pasture
would soon be turned to that produce.

Those productions, indeed, which require either a greater original expense of
improvement, or a greater annual expense of cultivation in order to fit the
land for them, appear commonly to afford, the one a greater rent, the other a
greater profit, than corn or pasture. This superiority, however, will seldom be
found to amount to more than a reasonable interest or compensation for this
superior expense.

In a hop garden, a fruit garden, a kitchen garden, both the rent of the
landlord, and the profit of the farmer, are generally greater than in acorn or
grass field. But to bring the ground into this condition requires more expense.
Hence a greater rent becomes due to the landlord. It requires, too, a more
attentive and skilful management. Hence a greater profit becomes due to the
farmer. The crop, too, at least in the hop and fruit garden, is more
precarious. Its price, therefore, besides compensating all occasional losses,
must afford something like the profit of insurance. The circumstances of
gardeners, generally mean, and always moderate, may satisfy us that their great
ingenuity is not commonly over-recompensed. Their delightful art is practised
by so many rich people for amusement, that little advantage is to be made by
those who practise it for profit; because the persons who should naturally be
their best customers, supply themselves with all their most precious
productions.

The advantage which the landlord derives from such improvements, seems at no
time to have been greater than what was sufficient to compensate the original
expense of making them. In the ancient husbandry, after the vineyard, a
well-watered kitchen garden seems to have been the part of the farm which was
supposed to yield the most valuable produce. But Democritus, who wrote upon
husbandry about two thousand years ago, and who was regarded by the ancients as
one of the fathers of the art, thought they did not act wisely who inclosed a
kitchen garden. The profit, he said, would not compensate the expense of a
stone-wall: and bricks (he meant, I suppose, bricks baked in the sun) mouldered
with the rain and the winter-storm, and required continual repairs. Columella,
who reports this judgment of Democritus, does not controvert it, but proposes a
very frugal method of inclosing with a hedge of brambles and briars, which he
says he had found by experience to be both a lasting and an impenetrable fence;
but which, it seems, was not commonly known in the time of Democritus.
Palladius adopts the opinion of Columella, which had before been recommended by
Varro. In the judgment of those ancient improvers, the produce of a kitchen
garden had, it seems, been little more than sufficient to pay the extraordinary
culture and the expense of watering; for in countries so near the sun, it was
thought proper, in those times as in the present, to have the command of a
stream of water, which could be conducted to every bed in the garden. Through
the greater part of Europe, a kitchen garden is not at present supposed to
deserve a better inclosure than that recommended by Columella. In Great
Britain, and some other northern countries, the finer fruits cannot be brought
to perfection but by the assistance of a wall. Their price, therefore, in such
countries, must be sufficient to pay the expense of building and maintaining
what they cannot be had without. The fruit-wall frequently surrounds the
kitchen garden, which thus enjoys the benefit of an inclosure which its own
produce could seldom pay for.

That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was the
most valuable part of the farm, seems to have been an undoubted maxim in the
ancient agriculture, as it is in the modern, through all the wine countries.
But whether it was advantageous to plant a new vineyard, was a matter of
dispute among the ancient Italian husbandmen, as we learn from Columella. He
decides, like a true lover of all curious cultivation, in favour of the
vineyard; and endeavours to shew, by a comparison of the profit and expense,
that it was a most advantageous improvement. Such comparisons, however, between
the profit and expense of new projects are commonly very fallacious; and in
nothing more so than in agriculture. Had the gain actually made by such
plantations been commonly as great as he imagined it might have been, there
could have been no dispute about it. The same point is frequently at this day a
matter of controversy in the wine countries. Their writers on agriculture,
indeed, the lovers and promoters of high cultivation, seem generally disposed
to decide with Columella in favour of the vineyard. In France, the anxiety of
the proprietors of the old vineyards to prevent the planting of any new ones,
seems to favour their opinion, and to indicate a consciousness in those who
must have the experience, that this species of cultivation is at present in
that country more profitable than any other. It seems, at the same time,
however, to indicate another opinion, that this superior profit can last no
longer than the laws which at present restrain the free cultivation of the
vine. In 1731, they obtained an order of council, prohibiting both the planting
of new vineyards, and the renewal of these old ones, of which the cultivation
had been interrupted for two years, without a particular permission from the
king, to be granted only in consequence of an information from the intendant of
the province, certifying that he had examined the land, and that it was
incapable of any other culture. The pretence of this order was the scarcity of
corn and pasture, and the superabundance of wine. But had this superabundance
been real, it would, without any order of council, have effectually prevented
the plantation of new vineyards, by reducing the profits of this species of
cultivation below their natural proportion to those of corn and pasture. With
regard to the supposed scarcity of corn occasioned by the multiplication of
vineyards, corn is nowhere in France more carefully cultivated than in the wine
provinces, where the land is fit for producing it: as in Burgundy, Guienne, and
the Upper Languedoc. The numerous hands employed in the one species of
cultivation necessarily encourage the other, by affording a ready market for
its produce. To diminish the number of those who are capable of paying it, is
surely a most unpromising expedient for encouraging the cultivation of corn. It
is like the policy which would promote agriculture, by discouraging
manufactures.

The rent and profit of those productions, therefore, which require either a
greater original expense of improvement in order to fit the land for them, or a
greater annual expense of cultivation, though often much superior to those of
corn and pasture, yet when they do no more than compensate such extraordinary
expense, are in reality regulated by the rent and profit of those common crops.

It sometimes happens, indeed, that the quantity of land which can be fitted for
some particular produce, is too small to supply the effectual demand. The whole
produce can be disposed of to those who are willing to give somewhat more than
what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages, and profit, necessary for
raising and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, or
according to the rates at which they are paid in the greater part of other
cultivated land. The surplus part of the price which remains after defraying
the whole expense of improvement and cultivation, may commonly, in this case,
and in this case only, bear no regular proportion to the like surplus in corn
or pasture, but may exceed it in almost any degree; and the greater part of
this excess naturally goes to the rent of the landlord.

The usual and natural proportion, for example, between the rent and profit of
wine, and those of corn and pasture, must be understood to take place only with
regard to those vineyards which produce nothing but good common wine, such as
can be raised almost anywhere, upon any light, gravelly, or sandy soil, and
which has nothing to recommend it but its strength and wholesomeness. It is
with such vineyards only, that the common land of the country can be brought
into competition; for with those of a peculiar quality it is evident that it
cannot.

The vine is more affected by the difference of soils than any other fruit-tree.
From some it derives a flavour which no culture or management can equal, it is
supposed, upon any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is sometimes
peculiar to the produce of a few vineyards; sometimes it extends through the
greater part of a small district, and sometimes through a considerable part of
a large province. The whole quantity of such wines that is brought to market
falls short of the effectual demand, or the demand of those who would be
willing to pay the whole rent, profit, and wages, necessary for preparing and
bringing them thither, according to the ordinary rate, or according to the rate
at which they are paid in common vineyards. The whole quantity, therefore, can
be disposed of to those who are willing to pay more, which necessarily raises
their price above that of common wine. The difference is greater or less,
according as the fashionableness and scarcity of the wine render the
competition of the buyers more or less eager. Whatever it be, the greater part
of it goes to the rent of the landlord. For though such vineyards are in
general more carefully cultivated than most others, the high price of the wine
seems to be, not so much the effect, as the cause of this careful cultivation.
In so valuable a produce, the loss occasioned by negligence is so great, as to
force even the most careless to attention. A small part of this high price,
therefore, is sufficient to pay the wages of the extraordinary labour bestowed
upon their cultivation, and the profits of the extraordinary stock which puts
that labour into motion.

The sugar colonies possessed by the European nations in the West Indies may be
compared to those precious vineyards. Their whole produce falls short of the
effectual demand of Europe, and can be disposed of to those who are willing to
give more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, profit, and wages,
necessary for preparing and bringing it to market, according to the rate at
which they are commonly paid by any other produce. In Cochin China, the finest
white sugar generally sells for three piastres the quintal, about thirteen
shillings and sixpence of our money, as we are told by Mr Poivre {Voyages
d’un Philosophe.}, a very careful observer of the agriculture of that
country. What is there called the quintal, weighs from a hundred and fifty to
two hundred Paris pounds, or a hundred and seventy-five Paris pounds at a
medium, which reduces the price of the hundred weight English to about eight
shillings sterling; not a fourth part of what is commonly paid for the brown or
muscovada sugars imported from our colonies, and not a sixth part of what is
paid for the finest white sugar. The greater part of the cultivated lands in
Cochin China are employed in producing corn and rice, the food of the great
body of the people. The respective prices of corn, rice, and sugar, are there
probably in the natural proportion, or in that which naturally takes place in
the different crops of the greater part of cultivated land, and which
recompenses the landlord and farmer, as nearly as can be computed, according to
what is usually the original expense of improvement, and the annual expense of
cultivation. But in our sugar colonies, the price of sugar bears no such
proportion to that of the produce of a rice or corn field either in Europe or
America. It is commonly said that a sugar planter expects that the rum and the
molasses should defray the whole expense of his cultivation, and that his sugar
should be all clear profit. If this be true, for I pretend not to affirm it, it
is as if a corn farmer expected to defray the expense of his cultivation with
the chaff and the straw, and that the grain should be all clear profit. We see
frequently societies of merchants in London, and other trading towns, purchase
waste lands in our sugar colonies, which they expect to improve and cultivate
with profit, by means of factors and agents, notwithstanding the great distance
and the uncertain returns, from the defective administration of justice in
those countries. Nobody will attempt to improve and cultivate in the same
manner the most fertile lands of Scotland, Ireland, or the corn provinces of
North America, though, from the more exact administration of justice in these
countries, more regular returns might be expected.

In Virginia and Maryland, the cultivation of tobacco is preferred, as most
profitable, to that of corn. Tobacco might be cultivated with advantage through
the greater part of Europe; but, in almost every part of Europe, it has become
a principal subject of taxation; and to collect a tax from every different farm
in the country where this plant might happen to be cultivated, would be more
difficult, it has been supposed, than to levy one upon its importation at the
custom-house. The cultivation of tobacco has, upon this account, been most
absurdly prohibited through the greater part of Europe, which necessarily gives
a sort of monopoly to the countries where it is allowed; and as Virginia and
Maryland produce the greatest quantity of it, they share largely, though with
some competitors, in the advantage of this monopoly. The cultivation of
tobacco, however, seems not to be so advantageous as that of sugar. I have
never even heard of any tobacco plantation that was improved and cultivated by
the capital of merchants who resided in Great Britain; and our tobacco colonies
send us home no such wealthy planters as we see frequently arrive from our
sugar islands. Though, from the preference given in those colonies to the
cultivation of tobacco above that of corn, it would appear that the effectual
demand of Europe for tobacco is not completely supplied, it probably is more
nearly so than that for sugar; and though the present price of tobacco is
probably more than sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages, and profit,
necessary for preparing and bringing it to market, according to the rate at
which they are commonly paid in corn land, it must not be so much more as the
present price of sugar. Our tobacco planters, accordingly, have shewn the same
fear of the superabundance of tobacco, which the proprietors of the old
vineyards in France have of the superabundance of wine. By act of assembly,
they have restrained its cultivation to six thousand plants, supposed to yield
a thousand weight of tobacco, for every negro between sixteen and sixty years
of age. Such a negro, over and above this quantity of tobacco, can manage, they
reckon, four acres of Indian corn. To prevent the market from being
overstocked, too, they have sometimes, in plentiful years, we are told by Dr
Douglas {Douglas’s Summary, vol. ii. p. 379, 373.} (I suspect he has been
ill informed), burnt a certain quantity of tobacco for every negro, in the same
manner as the Dutch are said to do of spices. If such violent methods are
necessary to keep up the present price of tobacco, the superior advantage of
its culture over that of corn, if it still has any, will not probably be of
long continuance.

It is in this manner that the rent of the cultivated land, of which the produce
is human food, regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land.
No particular produce can long afford less, because the land would immediately
be turned to another use; and if any particular produce commonly affords more,
it is because the quantity of land which can be fitted for it is too small to
supply the effectual demand.

In Europe, corn is the principal produce of land, which serves immediately for
human food. Except in particular situations, therefore, the rent of corn land
regulates in Europe that of all other cultivated land. Britain need envy
neither the vineyards of France, nor the olive plantations of Italy. Except in
particular situations, the value of these is regulated by that of corn, in
which the fertility of Britain is not much inferior to that of either of those
two countries.

If, in any country, the common and favourite vegetable food of the people
should be drawn from a plant of which the most common land, with the same, or
nearly the same culture, produced a much greater quantity than the most fertile
does of corn; the rent of the landlord, or the surplus quantity of food which
would remain to him, after paying the labour, and replacing the stock of the
farmer, together with its ordinary profits, would necessarily be much greater.
Whatever was the rate at which labour was commonly maintained in that country,
this greater surplus could always maintain a greater quantity of it, and,
consequently, enable the landlord to purchase or command a greater quantity of
it. The real value of his rent, his real power and authority, his command of
the necessaries and conveniencies of life with which the labour of other people
could supply him, would necessarily be much greater.

A rice field produces a much greater quantity of food than the most fertile
corn field. Two crops in the year, from thirty to sixty bushels each, are said
to be the ordinary produce of an acre. Though its cultivation, therefore,
requires more labour, a much greater surplus remains after maintaining all that
labour. In those rice countries, therefore, where rice is the common and
favourite vegetable food of the people, and where the cultivators are chiefly
maintained with it, a greater share of this greater surplus should belong to
the landlord than in corn countries. In Carolina, where the planters, as in
other British colonies, are generally both farmers and landlords, and where
rent, consequently, is confounded with profit, the cultivation of rice is found
to be more profitable than that of corn, though their fields produce only one
crop in the year, and though, from the prevalence of the customs of Europe,
rice is not there the common and favourite vegetable food of the people.

A good rice field is a bog at all seasons, and at one season a bog covered with
water. It is unfit either for corn, or pasture, or vineyard, or, indeed, for
any other vegetable produce that is very useful to men; and the lands which are
fit for those purposes are not fit for rice. Even in the rice countries,
therefore, the rent of rice lands cannot regulate the rent of the other
cultivated land which can never be turned to that produce.

The food produced by a field of potatoes is not inferior in quantity to that
produced by a field of rice, and much superior to what is produced by a field
of wheat. Twelve thousand weight of potatoes from an acre of land is not a
greater produce than two thousand weight of wheat. The food or solid
nourishment, indeed, which can be drawn from each of those two plants, is not
altogether in proportion to their weight, on account of the watery nature of
potatoes. Allowing, however, half the weight of this root to go to water, a
very large allowance, such an acre of potatoes will still produce six thousand
weight of solid nourishment, three times the quantity produced by the acre of
wheat. An acre of potatoes is cultivated with less expense than an acre of
wheat; the fallow, which generally precedes the sowing of wheat, more than
compensating the hoeing and other extraordinary culture which is always given
to potatoes. Should this root ever become in any part of Europe, like rice in
some rice countries, the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, so
as to occupy the same proportion of the lands in tillage, which wheat and other
sorts of grain for human food do at present, the same quantity of cultivated
land would maintain a much greater number of people; and the labourers being
generally fed with potatoes, a greater surplus would remain after replacing all
the stock, and maintaining all the labour employed in cultivation. A greater
share of this surplus, too, would belong to the landlord. Population would
increase, and rents would rise much beyond what they are at present.

The land which is fit for potatoes, is fit for almost every other useful
vegetable. If they occupied the same proportion of cultivated land which corn
does at present, they would regulate, in the same manner, the rent of the
greater part of other cultivated land.

In some parts of Lancashire, it is pretended, I have been told, that bread of
oatmeal is a heartier food for labouring people than wheaten bread, and I have
frequently heard the same doctrine held in Scotland. I am, however, somewhat
doubtful of the truth of it. The common people in Scotland, who are fed with
oatmeal, are in general neither so strong nor so handsome as the same rank of
people in England, who are fed with wheaten bread. They neither work so well,
nor look so well; and as there is not the same difference between the people of
fashion in the two countries, experience would seem to shew, that the food of
the common people in Scotland is not so suitable to the human constitution as
that of their neighbours of the same rank in England. But it seems to be
otherwise with potatoes. The chairmen, porters, and coal-heavers in London, and
those unfortunate women who live by prostitution, the strongest men and the
most beautiful women perhaps in the British dominions, are said to be, the
greater part of them, from the lowest rank of people in Ireland, who are
generally fed with this root. No food can afford a more decisive proof of its
nourishing quality, or of its being peculiarly suitable to the health of the
human constitution.

It is difficult to preserve potatoes through the year, and impossible to store
them like corn, for two or three years together. The fear of not being able to
sell them before they rot, discourages their cultivation, and is, perhaps, the
chief obstacle to their ever becoming in any great country, like bread, the
principal vegetable food of all the different ranks of the people.

PART II.—Of the Produce of Land, which sometimes does, and sometimes
does not, afford Rent.

Human food seems to be the only produce of land, which always and necessarily
affords some rent to the landlord. Other sorts of produce sometimes may, and
sometimes may not, according to different circumstances.

After food, clothing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind.

Land, in its original rude state, can afford the materials of clothing and
lodging to a much greater number of people than it can feed. In its improved
state, it can sometimes feed a greater number of people than it can supply with
those materials; at least in the way in which they require them, and are
willing to pay for them. In the one state, therefore, there is always a
superabundance of these materials, which are frequently, upon that account, of
little or no value. In the other, there is often a scarcity, which necessarily
augments their value. In the one state, a great part of them is thrown away as
useless and the price of what is used is considered as equal only to the labour
and expense of fitting it for use, and can, therefore, afford no rent to the
landlord. In the other, they are all made use of, and there is frequently a
demand for more than can be had. Somebody is always willing to give more for
every part of them, than what is sufficient to pay the expense of bringing them
to market. Their price, therefore, can always afford some rent to the landlord.

The skins of the larger animals were the original materials of clothing. Among
nations of hunters and shepherds, therefore, whose food consists chiefly in the
flesh of those animals, everyman, by providing himself with food, provides
himself with the materials of more clothing than he can wear. If there was no
foreign commerce, the greater part of them would be thrown away as things of no
value. This was probably the case among the hunting nations of North America,
before their country was discovered by the Europeans, with whom they now
exchange their surplus peltry, for blankets, fire-arms, and brandy, which gives
it some value. In the present commercial state of the known world, the most
barbarous nations, I believe, among whom land property is established, have
some foreign commerce of this kind, and find among their wealthier neighbours
such a demand for all the materials of clothing, which their land produces, and
which can neither be wrought up nor consumed at home, as raises their price
above what it costs to send them to those wealthier neighbours. It affords,
therefore, some rent to the landlord. When the greater part of the Highland
cattle were consumed on their own hills, the exportation of their hides made
the most considerable article of the commerce of that country, and what they
were exchanged for afforded some addition to the rent of the Highland estates.
The wool of England, which in old times, could neither be consumed nor wrought
up at home, found a market in the then wealthier and more industrious country
of Flanders, and its price afforded something to the rent of the land which
produced it. In countries not better cultivated than England was then, or than
the Highlands of Scotland are now, and which had no foreign commerce, the
materials of clothing would evidently be so superabundant, that a great part of
them would be thrown away as useless, and no part could afford any rent to the
landlord.

The materials of lodging cannot always be transported to so great a distance as
those of clothing, and do not so readily become an object of foreign commerce.
When they are superabundant in the country which produces them, it frequently
happens, even in the present commercial state of the world, that they are of no
value to the landlord. A good stone quarry in the neighbourhood of London would
afford a considerable rent. In many parts of Scotland and Wales it affords
none. Barren timber for building is of great value in a populous and
well-cultivated country, and the land which produces it affords a considerable
rent. But in many parts of North America, the landlord would be much obliged to
any body who would carry away the greater part of his large trees. In some
parts of the Highlands of Scotland, the bark is the only part of the wood
which, for want of roads and water-carriage, can be sent to market; the timber
is left to rot upon the ground. When the materials of lodging are so
superabundant, the part made use of is worth only the labour and expense of
fitting it for that use. It affords no rent to the landlord, who generally
grants the use of it to whoever takes the trouble of asking it. The demand of
wealthier nations, however, sometimes enables him to get a rent for it. The
paving of the streets of London has enabled the owners of some barren rocks on
the coast of Scotland to draw a rent from what never afforded any before. The
woods of Norway, and of the coasts of the Baltic, find a market in many parts
of Great Britain, which they could not find at home, and thereby afford some
rent to their proprietors.

Countries are populous, not in proportion to the number of people whom their
produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can
feed. When food is provided, it is easy to find the necessary clothing and
lodging. But though these are at hand, it may often be difficult to find food.
In some parts of the British dominions, what is called a house may be built by
one day’s labour of one man. The simplest species of clothing, the skins
of animals, require somewhat more labour to dress and prepare them for use.
They do not, however, require a great deal. Among savage or barbarous nations,
a hundredth, or little more than a hundredth part of the labour of the whole
year, will be sufficient to provide them with such clothing and lodging as
satisfy the greater part of the people. All the other ninety-nine parts are
frequently no more than enough to provide them with food.

But when, by the improvement and cultivation of land, the labour of one family
can provide food for two, the labour of half the society becomes sufficient to
provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore, or at least the greater
part of them, can be employed in providing other things, or in satisfying the
other wants and fancies of mankind. Clothing and lodging, household furniture,
and what is called equipage, are the principal objects of the greater part of
those wants and fancies. The rich man consumes no more food than his poor
neighbour. In quality it may be very different, and to select and prepare it
may require more labour and art; but in quantity it is very nearly the same.
But compare the spacious palace and great wardrobe of the one, with the hovel
and the few rags of the other, and you will be sensible that the difference
between their clothing, lodging, and household furniture, is almost as great in
quantity as it is in quality. The desire of food is limited in every man by the
narrow capacity of the human stomach; but the desire of the conveniencies and
ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems to have
no limit or certain boundary. Those, therefore, who have the command of more
food than they themselves can consume, are always willing to exchange the
surplus, or, what is the same thing, the price of it, for gratifications of
this other kind. What is over and above satisfying the limited desire, is given
for the amusement of those desires which cannot be satisfied, but seem to be
altogether endless. The poor, in order to obtain food, exert themselves to
gratify those fancies of the rich; and to obtain it more certainly, they vie
with one another in the cheapness and perfection of their work. The number of
workmen increases with the increasing quantity of food, or with the growing
improvement and cultivation of the lands; and as the nature of their business
admits of the utmost subdivisions of labour, the quantity of materials which
they can work up, increases in a much greater proportion than their numbers.
Hence arises a demand for every sort of material which human invention can
employ, either usefully or ornamentally, in building, dress, equipage, or
household furniture; for the fossils and minerals contained in the bowels of
the earth, the precious metals, and the precious stones.

Food is, in this manner, not only the original source of rent, but every other
part of the produce of land which afterwards affords rent, derives that part of
its value from the improvement of the powers of labour in producing food, by
means of the improvement and cultivation of land.

Those other parts of the produce of land, however, which afterwards afford
rent, do not afford it always. Even in improved and cultivated countries, the
demand for them is not always such as to afford a greater price than what is
sufficient to pay the labour, and replace, together with its ordinary profits,
the stock which must be employed in bringing them to market. Whether it is or
is not such, depends upon different circumstances.

Whether a coal mine, for example, can afford any rent, depends partly upon its
fertility, and partly upon its situation.

A mine of any kind may be said to be either fertile or barren, according as the
quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain quantity of
labour, is greater or less than what can be brought by an equal quantity from
the greater part of other mines of the same kind.

Some coal mines, advantageously situated, cannot be wrought on account of their
barrenness. The produce does not pay the expense. They can afford neither
profit nor rent.

There are some, of which the produce is barely sufficient to pay the labour,
and replace, together with its ordinary profits, the stock employed in working
them. They afford some profit to the undertaker of the work, but no rent to the
landlord. They can be wrought advantageously by nobody but the landlord, who,
being himself the undertaker of the work, gets the ordinary profit of the
capital which he employs in it. Many coal mines in Scotland are wrought in this
manner, and can be wrought in no other. The landlord will allow nobody else to
work them without paying some rent, and nobody can afford to pay any.

Other coal mines in the same country, sufficiently fertile, cannot be wrought
on account of their situation. A quantity of mineral, sufficient to defray the
expense of working, could be brought from the mine by the ordinary, or even
less than the ordinary quantity of labour: but in an inland country, thinly
inhabited, and without either good roads or water-carriage, this quantity could
not be sold.

Coals are a less agreeable fuel than wood: they are said too to be less
wholesome. The expense of coals, therefore, at the place where they are
consumed, must generally be somewhat less than that of wood.

The price of wood, again, varies with the state of agriculture, nearly in the
same manner, and exactly for the same reason, as the price of cattle. In its
rude beginnings, the greater part of every country is covered with wood, which
is then a mere incumbrance, of no value to the landlord, who would gladly give
it to any body for the cutting. As agriculture advances, the woods are partly
cleared by the progress of tillage, and partly go to decay in consequence of
the increased number of cattle. These, though they do not increase in the same
proportion as corn, which is altogether the acquisition of human industry, yet
multiply under the care and protection of men, who store up in the season of
plenty what may maintain them in that of scarcity; who, through the whole year,
furnish them with a greater quantity of food than uncultivated nature provides
for them; and who, by destroying and extirpating their enemies, secure them in
the free enjoyment of all that she provides. Numerous herds of cattle, when
allowed to wander through the woods, though they do not destroy the old trees,
hinder any young ones from coming up; so that, in the course of a century or
two, the whole forest goes to ruin. The scarcity of wood then raises its price.
It affords a good rent; and the landlord sometimes finds that he can scarce
employ his best lands more advantageously than in growing barren timber, of
which the greatness of the profit often compensates the lateness of the
returns. This seems, in the present times, to be nearly the state of things in
several parts of Great Britain, where the profit of planting is found to be
equal to that of either corn or pasture. The advantage which the landlord
derives from planting can nowhere exceed, at least for any considerable time,
the rent which these could afford him; and in an inland country, which is
highly cultivated, it will frequently not fall much short of this rent. Upon
the sea-coast of a well-improved country, indeed, if coals can conveniently be
had for fuel, it may sometimes be cheaper to bring barren timber for building
from less cultivated foreign countries than to raise it at home. In the new
town of Edinburgh, built within these few years, there is not, perhaps, a
single stick of Scotch timber.

Whatever may be the price of wood, if that of coals is such that the expense of
a coal fire is nearly equal to that of a wood one we may be assured, that at
that place, and in these circumstances, the price of coals is as high as it can
be. It seems to be so in some of the inland parts of England, particularly in
Oxfordshire, where it is usual, even in the fires of the common people, to mix
coals and wood together, and where the difference in the expense of those two
sorts of fuel cannot, therefore, be very great. Coals, in the coal countries,
are everywhere much below this highest price. If they were not, they could not
bear the expense of a distant carriage, either by land or by water. A small
quantity only could be sold; and the coal masters and the coal proprietors find
it more for their interest to sell a great quantity at a price somewhat above
the lowest, than a small quantity at the highest. The most fertile coal mine,
too, regulates the price of coals at all the other mines in its neighbourhood.
Both the proprietor and the undertaker of the work find, the one that he can
get a greater rent, the other that he can get a greater profit, by somewhat
underselling all their neighbours. Their neighbours are soon obliged to sell at
the same price, though they cannot so well afford it, and though it always
diminishes, and sometimes takes away altogether, both their rent and their
profit. Some works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent, and can
be wrought only by the proprietor.

The lowest price at which coals can be sold for any considerable time, is, like
that of all other commodities, the price which is barely sufficient to replace,
together with its ordinary profits, the stock which must be employed in
bringing them to market. At a coal mine for which the landlord can get no rent,
but, which he must either work himself or let it alone altogether, the price of
coals must generally be nearly about this price.

Rent, even where coals afford one, has generally a smaller share in their price
than in that of most other parts of the rude produce of land. The rent of an
estate above ground, commonly amounts to what is supposed to be a third of the
gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent of the
occasional variations in the crop. In coal mines, a fifth of the gross produce
is a very great rent, a tenth the common rent; and it is seldom a rent certain,
but depends upon the occasional variations in the produce. These are so great,
that in a country where thirty years purchase is considered as a moderate price
for the property of a landed estate, ten years purchase is regarded as a good
price for that of a coal mine.

The value of a coal mine to the proprietor, frequently depends as much upon its
situation as upon its fertility. That of a metallic mine depends more upon its
fertility, and less upon its situation. The coarse, and still more the precious
metals, when separated from the ore, are so valuable, that they can generally
bear the expense of a very long land, and of the most distant sea carriage.
Their market is not confined to the countries in the neighbourhood of the mine,
but extends to the whole world. The copper of Japan makes an article of
commerce in Europe; the iron of Spain in that of Chili and Peru. The silver of
Peru finds its way, not only to Europe, but from Europe to China.

The price of coals in Westmoreland or Shropshire can have little effect on
their price at Newcastle; and their price in the Lionnois can have none at all.
The productions of such distant coal mines can never be brought into
competition with one another. But the productions of the most distant metallic
mines frequently may, and in fact commonly are.

The price, therefore, of the coarse, and still more that of the precious
metals, at the most fertile mines in the world, must necessarily more or less
affect their price at every other in it. The price of copper in Japan must have
some influence upon its price at the copper mines in Europe. The price of
silver in Peru, or the quantity either of labour or of other goods which it
will purchase there, must have some influence on its price, not only at the
silver mines of Europe, but at those of China. After the discovery of the mines
of Peru, the silver mines of Europe were, the greater part of them, abandoned.
The value of silver was so much reduced, that their produce could no longer pay
the expense of working them, or replace, with a profit, the food, clothes,
lodging, and other necessaries which were consumed in that operation. This was
the case, too, with the mines of Cuba and St. Domingo, and even with the
ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of those of Potosi. The price of
every metal, at every mine, therefore, being regulated in some measure by its
price at the most fertile mine in the world that is actually wrought, it can,
at the greater part of mines, do very little more than pay the expense of
working, and can seldom afford a very high rent to the landlord. Rent
accordingly, seems at the greater part of mines to have but a small share in
the price of the coarse, and a still smaller in that of the precious metals.
Labour and profit make up the greater part of both.

A sixth part of the gross produce may be reckoned the average rent of the tin
mines of Cornwall, the most fertile that are known in the world, as we are told
by the Rev. Mr. Borlace, vice-warden of the stannaries. Some, he says, afford
more, and some do not afford so much. A sixth part of the gross produce is the
rent, too, of several very fertile lead mines in Scotland.

In the silver mines of Peru, we are told by Frezier and Ulloa, the proprietor
frequently exacts no other acknowledgment from the undertaker of the mine, but
that he will grind the ore at his mill, paying him the ordinary multure or
price of grinding. Till 1736, indeed, the tax of the king of Spain amounted to
one fifth of the standard silver, which till then might be considered as the
real rent of the greater part of the silver mines of Peru, the richest which
have been known in the world. If there had been no tax, this fifth would
naturally have belonged to the landlord, and many mines might have been wrought
which could not then be wrought, because they could not afford this tax. The
tax of the duke of Cornwall upon tin is supposed to amount to more than five
per cent. or one twentieth part of the value; and whatever may be his
proportion, it would naturally, too, belong to the proprietor of the mine, if
tin was duty free. But if you add one twentieth to one sixth, you will find
that the whole average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, was to the whole
average rent of the silver mines of Peru, as thirteen to twelve. But the silver
mines of Peru are not now able to pay even this low rent; and the tax upon
silver was, in 1736, reduced from one fifth to one tenth. Even this tax upon
silver, too, gives more temptation to smuggling than the tax of one twentieth
upon tin; and smuggling must be much easier in the precious than in the bulky
commodity. The tax of the king of Spain, accordingly, is said to be very ill
paid, and that of the duke of Cornwall very well. Rent, therefore, it is
probable, makes a greater part of the price of tin at the most fertile tin
mines than it does of silver at the most fertile silver mines in the world.
After replacing the stock employed in working those different mines, together
with its ordinary profits, the residue which remains to the proprietor is
greater, it seems, in the coarse, than in the precious metal.

Neither are the profits of the undertakers of silver mines commonly very great
in Peru. The same most respectable and well-informed authors acquaint us, that
when any person undertakes to work a new mine in Peru, he is universally looked
upon as a man destined to bankruptcy and ruin, and is upon that account shunned
and avoided by every body. Mining, it seems, is considered there in the same
light as here, as a lottery, in which the prizes do not compensate the blanks,
though the greatness of some tempts many adventurers to throw away their
fortunes in such unprosperous projects.

As the sovereign, however, derives a considerable part of his revenue from the
produce of silver mines, the law in Peru gives every possible encouragement to
the discovery and working of new ones. Whoever discovers a new mine, is
entitled to measure off two hundred and forty-six feet in length, according to
what he supposes to be the direction of the vein, and half as much in breadth.
He becomes proprietor of this portion of the mine, and can work it without
paving any acknowledgment to the landlord. The interest of the duke of Cornwall
has given occasion to a regulation nearly of the same kind in that ancient
dutchy. In waste and uninclosed lands, any person who discovers a tin mine may
mark out its limits to a certain extent, which is called bounding a mine. The
bounder becomes the real proprietor of the mine, and may either work it
himself, or give it in lease to another, without the consent of the owner of
the land, to whom, however, a very small acknowledgment must be paid upon
working it. In both regulations, the sacred rights of private property are
sacrificed to the supposed interests of public revenue.

The same encouragement is given in Peru to the discovery and working of new
gold mines; and in gold the king’s tax amounts only to a twentieth part
of the standard rental. It was once a fifth, and afterwards a tenth, as in
silver; but it was found that the work could not bear even the lowest of these
two taxes. If it is rare, however, say the same authors, Frezier and Ulloa, to
find a person who has made his fortune by a silver, it is still much rarer to
find one who has done so by a gold mine. This twentieth part seems to be the
whole rent which is paid by the greater part of the gold mines of Chili and
Peru. Gold, too, is much more liable to be smuggled than even silver; not only
on account of the superior value of the metal in proportion to its bulk, but on
account of the peculiar way in which nature produces it. Silver is very seldom
found virgin, but, like most other metals, is generally mineralized with some
other body, from which it is impossible to separate it in such quantities as
will pay for the expense, but by a very laborious and tedious operation, which
cannot well be carried on but in work-houses erected for the purpose, and,
therefore, exposed to the inspection of the king’s officers. Gold, on the
contrary, is almost always found virgin. It is sometimes found in pieces of
some bulk; and, even when mixed, in small and almost insensible particles, with
sand, earth, and other extraneous bodies, it can be separated from them by a
very short and simple operation, which can be carried on in any private house
by any body who is possessed of a small quantity of mercury. If the
king’s tax, therefore, is but ill paid upon silver, it is likely to be
much worse paid upon gold; and rent must make a much smaller part of the price
of gold than that of silver.

The lowest price at which the precious metals can be sold, or the smallest
quantity of other goods for which they can be exchanged, during any
considerable time, is regulated by the same principles which fix the lowest
ordinary price of all other goods. The stock which must commonly be employed,
the food, clothes, and lodging, which must commonly be consumed in bringing
them from the mine to the market, determine it. It must at least be sufficient
to replace that stock, with the ordinary profits.

Their highest price, however, seems not to be necessarily determined by any
thing but the actual scarcity or plenty of these metals themselves. It is not
determined by that of any other commodity, in the same manner as the price of
coals is by that of wood, beyond which no scarcity can ever raise it. Increase
the scarcity of gold to a certain degree, and the smallest bit of it may become
more precious than a diamond, and exchange for a greater quantity of other
goods.

The demand for those metals arises partly from their utility, and partly from
their beauty. If you except iron, they are more useful than, perhaps, any other
metal. As they are less liable to rust and impurity, they can more easily be
kept clean; and the utensils, either of the table or the kitchen, are often,
upon that account, more agreeable when made of them. A silver boiler is more
cleanly than a lead, copper, or tin one; and the same quality would render a
gold boiler still better than a silver one. Their principal merit, however,
arises from their beauty, which renders them peculiarly fit for the ornaments
of dress and furniture. No paint or dye can give so splendid a colour as
gilding. The merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their scarcity. With
the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the
parade of riches; which, in their eye, is never so complete as when they appear
to possess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but
themselves. In their eyes, the merit of an object, which is in any degree
either useful or beautiful, is greatly enhanced by its scarcity, or by the
great labour which it requires to collect any considerable quantity of it; a
labour which nobody can afford to pay but themselves. Such objects they are
willing to purchase at a higher price than things much more beautiful and
useful, but more common. These qualities of utility, beauty, and scarcity, are
the original foundation of the high price of those metals, or of the great
quantity of other goods for which they can everywhere be exchanged. This value
was antecedent to, and independent of their being employed as coin, and was the
quality which fitted them for that employment. That employment, however, by
occasioning a new demand, and by diminishing the quantity which could be
employed in any other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep up or
increase their value.

The demand for the precious stones arises altogether from their beauty. They
are of no use but as ornaments; and the merit of their beauty is greatly
enhanced by their scarcity, or by the difficulty and expense of getting them
from the mine. Wages and profit accordingly make up, upon most occasions,
almost the whole of the high price. Rent comes in but for a very small share,
frequently for no share; and the most fertile mines only afford any
considerable rent. When Tavernier, a jeweller, visited the diamond mines of
Golconda and Visiapour, he was informed that the sovereign of the country, for
whose benefit they were wrought, had ordered all of them to be shut up except
those which yielded the largest and finest stones. The other, it seems, were to
the proprietor not worth the working.

As the prices, both of the precious metals and of the precious stones, is
regulated all over the world by their price at the most fertile mine in it, the
rent which a mine of either can afford to its proprietor is in proportion, not
to its absolute, but to what may be called its relative fertility, or to its
superiority over other mines of the same kind. If new mines were discovered, as
much superior to those of Potosi, as they were superior to those of Europe, the
value of silver might be so much degraded as to render even the mines of Potosi
not worth the working. Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, the
most fertile mines in Europe may have afforded as great a rent to their
proprietors as the richest mines in Peru do at present. Though the quantity of
silver was much less, it might have exchanged for an equal quantity of other
goods, and the proprietor’s share might have enabled him to purchase or
command an equal quantity either of labour or of commodities.

The value, both of the produce and of the rent, the real revenue which they
afforded, both to the public and to the proprietor, might have been the same.

The most abundant mines, either of the precious metals, or of the precious
stones, could add little to the wealth of the world. A produce, of which the
value is principally derived from its scarcity, is necessarily degraded by its
abundance. A service of plate, and the other frivolous ornaments of dress and
furniture, could be purchased for a smaller quantity of commodities; and in
this would consist the sole advantage which the world could derive from that
abundance.

It is otherwise in estates above ground. The value, both of their produce and
of their rent, is in proportion to their absolute, and not to their relative
fertility. The land which produces a certain quantity of food, clothes, and
lodging, can always feed, clothe, and lodge, a certain number of people; and
whatever may be the proportion of the landlord, it will always give him a
proportionable command of the labour of those people, and of the commodities
with which that labour can supply him. The value of the most barren land is not
diminished by the neighbourhood of the most fertile. On the contrary, it is
generally increased by it. The great number of people maintained by the fertile
lands afford a market to many parts of the produce of the barren, which they
could never have found among those whom their own produce could maintain.

Whatever increases the fertility of land in producing food, increases not only
the value of the lands upon which the improvement is bestowed, but contributes
likewise to increase that of many other lands, by creating a new demand for
their produce. That abundance of food, of which, in consequence of the
improvement of land, many people have the disposal beyond what they themselves
can consume, is the great cause of the demand, both for the precious metals and
the precious stones, as well as for every other conveniency and ornament of
dress, lodging, household furniture, and equipage. Food not only constitutes
the principal part of the riches of the world, but it is the abundance of food
which gives the principal part of their value to many other sorts of riches.
The poor inhabitants of Cuba and St. Domingo, when they were first discovered
by the Spaniards, used to wear little bits of gold as ornaments in their hair
and other parts of their dress. They seemed to value them as we would do any
little pebbles of somewhat more than ordinary beauty, and to consider them as
just worth the picking up, but not worth the refusing to any body who asked
them, They gave them to their new guests at the first request, without seeming
to think that they had made them any very valuable present. They were
astonished to observe the rage of the Spaniards to obtain them; and had no
notion that there could anywhere be a country in which many people had the
disposal of so great a superfluity of food; so scanty always among themselves,
that, for a very small quantity of those glittering baubles, they would
willingly give as much as might maintain a whole family for many years. Could
they have been made to understand this, the passion of the Spaniards would not
have surprised them.

PART III.—Of the variations in the Proportion between the respective
Values of that sort of Produce which always affords Rent, and of that which
sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent.

The increasing abundance of food, in consequence of the increasing improvement
and cultivation, must necessarily increase the demand for every part of the
produce of land which is not food, and which can be applied either to use or to
ornament. In the whole progress of improvement, it might, therefore, be
expected there should be only one variation in the comparative values of those
two different sorts of produce. The value of that sort which sometimes does,
and sometimes does not afford rent, should constantly rise in proportion to
that which always affords some rent. As art and industry advance, the materials
of clothing and lodging, the useful fossils and materials of the earth, the
precious metals and the precious stones, should gradually come to be more and
more in demand, should gradually exchange for a greater and a greater quantity
of food; or, in other words, should gradually become dearer and dearer. This,
accordingly, has been the case with most of these things upon most occasions,
and would have been the case with all of them upon all occasions, if particular
accidents had not, upon some occasions, increased the supply of some of them in
a still greater proportion than the demand.

The value of a free-stone quarry, for example, will necessarily increase with
the increasing improvement and population of the country round about it,
especially if it should be the only one in the neighbourhood. But the value of
a silver mine, even though there should not be another within a thousand miles
of it, will not necessarily increase with the improvement of the country in
which it is situated. The market for the produce of a free-stone quarry can
seldom extend more than a few miles round about it, and the demand must
generally be in proportion to the improvement and population of that small
district; but the market for the produce of a silver mine may extend over the
whole known world. Unless the world in general, therefore, be advancing in
improvement and population, the demand for silver might not be at all increased
by the improvement even of a large country in the neighbourhood of the mine.
Even though the world in general were improving, yet if, in the course of its
improvements, new mines should be discovered, much more fertile than any which
had been known before, though the demand for silver would necessarily increase,
yet the supply might increase in so much a greater proportion, that the real
price of that metal might gradually fall; that is, any given quantity, a pound
weight of it, for example, might gradually purchase or command a smaller and a
smaller quantity of labour, or exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of
corn, the principal part of the subsistence of the labourer.

The great market for silver is the commercial and civilized part of the world.

If, by the general progress of improvement, the demand of this market should
increase, while, at the same time, the supply did not increase in the same
proportion, the value of silver would gradually rise in proportion to that of
corn. Any given quantity of silver would exchange for a greater and a greater
quantity of corn; or, in other words, the average money price of corn would
gradually become cheaper and cheaper.

If, on the contrary, the supply, by some accident, should increase, for many
years together, in a greater proportion than the demand, that metal would
gradually become cheaper and cheaper; or, in other words, the average money
price of corn would, in spite of all improvements, gradually become dearer and
dearer.

But if, on the other hand, the supply of that metal should increase nearly in
the same proportion as the demand, it would continue to purchase or exchange
for nearly the same quantity of corn; and the average money price of corn
would, in spite of all improvements. continue very nearly the same.

These three seem to exhaust all the possible combinations of events which can
happen in the progress of improvement; and during the course of the four
centuries preceding the present, if we may judge by what has happened both in
France and Great Britain, each of those three different combinations seems to
have taken place in the European market, and nearly in the same order, too, in
which I have here set them down.

Digression concerning the Variations in the value of Silver during the
Course of the Four last Centuries.

First Period.—In 1350, and for some time before, the average price of the
quarter of wheat in England seems not to have been estimated lower than four
ounces of silver, Tower weight, equal to about twenty shillings of our present
money. From this price it seems to have fallen gradually to two ounces of
silver, equal to about ten shillings of our present money, the price at which
we find it estimated in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and at which it
seems to have continued to be estimated till about 1570.

In 1350, being the 25th of Edward III. was enacted what is called the Statute
of Labourers. In the preamble, it complains much of the insolence of servants,
who endeavoured to raise their wages upon their masters. It therefore ordains,
that all servants and labourers should, for the future, be contented with the
same wages and liveries (liveries in those times signified not only clothes,
but provisions) which they had been accustomed to receive in the 20th year of
the king, and the four preceding years; that, upon this account, their
livery-wheat should nowhere be estimated higher than tenpence a-bushel, and
that it should always be in the option of the master to deliver them either the
wheat or the money. Tenpence: a-bushel, therefore, had, in the 25th of Edward
III. been reckoned a very moderate price of wheat, since it required a
particular statute to oblige servants to accept of it in exchange for their
usual livery of provisions; and it had been reckoned a reasonable price ten
years before that, or in the 16th year of the king, the term to which the
statute refers. But in the 16th year of Edward III. tenpence contained about
half an ounce of silver, Tower weight, and was nearly equal to half-a-crown of
our present money. Four ounces of silver, Tower weight, therefore, equal to six
shillings and eightpence of the money of those times, and to near twenty
shillings of that of the present, must have been reckoned a moderate price for
the quarter of eight bushels.

This statute is surely a better evidence of what was reckoned, in those times,
a moderate price of grain, than the prices of some particular years, which have
generally been recorded by historians and other writers, on account of their
extraordinary dearness or cheapness, and from which, therefore, it is difficult
to form any judgment concerning what may have been the ordinary price. There
are, besides, other reasons for believing that, in the beginning of the
fourteenth century, and for some time before, the common price of wheat was not
less than four ounces of silver the quarter, and that of other grain in
proportion.

In 1309, Ralph de Born, prior of St Augustine’s, Canterbury, gave a feast
upon his installation-day, of which William Thorn has preserved, not only the
bill of fare, but the prices of many particulars. In that feast were consumed,
1st, fifty-three quarters of wheat, which cost nineteen pounds, or seven
shillings, and twopence a-quarter, equal to about one-and-twenty shillings and
sixpence of our present money; 2dly, fifty-eight quarters of malt, which cost
seventeen pounds ten shillings, or six shillings a-quarter, equal to about
eighteen shillings of our present money; 3dly, twenty quarters of oats, which
cost four pounds, or four shillings a-quarter, equal to about twelve shillings
of our present money. The prices of malt and oats seem here to be higher than
their ordinary proportion to the price of wheat.

These prices are not recorded, on account of their extraordinary dearness or
cheapness, but are mentioned accidentally, as the prices actually paid for
large quantities of grain consumed at a feast, which was famous for its
magnificence.

In 1262, being the 51st of Henry III. was revived an ancient statute, called
the assize of bread and ale, which, the king says in the preamble, had been
made in the times of his progenitors, some time kings of England. It is
probably, therefore, as old at least as the time of his grandfather, Henry II.
and may have been as old as the Conquest. It regulates the price of bread
according as the prices of wheat may happen to be, from one shilling to twenty
shillings the quarter of the money of those times. But statutes of this kind
are generally presumed to provide with equal care for all deviations from the
middle price, for those below it, as well as for those above it. Ten shillings,
therefore, containing six ounces of silver, Tower weight, and equal to about
thirty shillings of our present money, must, upon this supposition, have been
reckoned the middle price of the quarter of wheat when this statute was first
enacted, and must have continued to be so in the 51st of Henry III. We cannot,
therefore, be very wrong in supposing that the middle price was not less than
one-third of the highest price at which this statute regulates the price of
bread, or than six shillings and eightpence of the money of those times,
containing four ounces of silver, Tower weight.

From these different facts, therefore, we seem to have some reason to conclude
that, about the middle of the fourteenth century, and for a considerable time
before, the average or ordinary price of the quarter of wheat was not supposed
to be less than four ounces of silver, Tower weight.

From about the middle of the fourteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth
century, what was reckoned the reasonable and moderate, that is, the ordinary
or average price of wheat, seems to have sunk gradually to about one half of
this price; so as at last to have fallen to about two ounces of silver, Tower
weight, equal to about ten shillings of our present money. It continued to be
estimated at this price till about 1570.

In the household book of Henry, the fifth earl of Northumberland, drawn up in
1512 there are two different estimations of wheat. In one of them it is
computed at six shilling and eightpence the quarter, in the other at five
shillings and eightpence only. In 1512, six shillings and eightpence contained
only two ounces of silver, Tower weight, and were equal to about ten shillings
of our present money.

From the 25th of Edward III. to the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, during
the space of more than two hundred years, six shillings and eightpence, it
appears from several different statutes, had continued to be considered as what
is called the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price
of wheat. The quantity of silver, however, contained in that nominal sum was,
during the course of this period, continually diminishing in consequence of
some alterations which were made in the coin. But the increase of the value of
silver had, it seems, so far compensated the diminution of the quantity of it
contained in the same nominal sum, that the legislature did not think it worth
while to attend to this circumstance.

Thus, in 1436, it was enacted, that wheat might be exported without a licence
when the price was so low as six shillings and eightpence: and in 1463, it was
enacted, that no wheat should be imported if the price was not above six
shillings and eightpence the quarter: The legislature had imagined, that when
the price was so low, there could be no inconveniency in exportation, but that
when it rose higher, it became prudent to allow of importation. Six shillings
and eightpence, therefore, containing about the same quantity of silver as
thirteen shillings and fourpence of our present money (one-third part less than
the same nominal sum contained in the time of Edward III), had, in those times,
been considered as what is called the moderate and reasonable price of wheat.

In 1554, by the 1st and 2nd of Philip and Mary, and in 1558, by the 1st of
Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was in the same manner prohibited, whenever
the price of the quarter should exceed six shillings and eightpence, which did
not then contain two penny worth more silver than the same nominal sum does at
present. But it had soon been found, that to restrain the exportation of wheat
till the price was so very low, was, in reality, to prohibit it altogether. In
1562, therefore, by the 5th of Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was allowed
from certain ports, whenever the price of the quarter should not exceed ten
shillings, containing nearly the same quantity of silver as the like nominal
sum does at present. This price had at this time, therefore, been considered as
what is called the moderate and reasonable price of wheat. It agrees nearly
with the estimation of the Northumberland book in 1512.

That in France the average price of grain was, in the same manner, much lower
in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century, than in the
two centuries preceding, has been observed both by Mr Dupré de St Maur, and by
the elegant author of the Essay on the Policy of Grain. Its price, during the
same period, had probably sunk in the same manner through the greater part of
Europe.

This rise in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, may either
have been owing altogether to the increase of the demand for that metal, in
consequence of increasing improvement and cultivation, the supply, in the mean
time, continuing the same as before; or, the demand continuing the same as
before, it may have been owing altogether to the gradual diminution of the
supply: the greater part of the mines which were then known in the world being
much exhausted, and, consequently, the expense of working them much increased;
or it may have been owing partly to the one, and partly to the other of those
two circumstances. In the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth
centuries, the greater part of Europe was approaching towards a more settled
form of government than it had enjoyed for several ages before. The increase of
security would naturally increase industry and improvement; and the demand for
the precious metals, as well as for every other luxury and ornament, would
naturally increase with the increase of riches. A greater annual produce would
require a greater quantity of coin to circulate it; and a greater number of
rich people would require a greater quantity of plate and other ornaments of
silver. It is natural to suppose, too, that the greater part of the mines which
then supplied the European market with silver might be a good deal exhausted,
and have become more expensive in the working. They had been wrought, many of
them, from the time of the Romans.

It has been the opinion, however, of the greater part of those who have written
upon the prices of commodities in ancient times, that, from the Conquest,
perhaps from the invasion of Julius Caesar, till the discovery of the mines of
America, the value of silver was continually diminishing. This opinion they
seem to have been led into, partly by the observations which they had occasion
to make upon the prices both of corn and of some other parts of the rude
produce of land, and partly by the popular notion, that as the quantity of
silver naturally increases in every country with the increase of wealth, so its
value diminishes as it quantity increases.

In their observations upon the prices of corn, three different circumstances
seem frequently to have misled them.

First, in ancient times, almost all rents were paid in kind; in a certain
quantity of corn, cattle, poultry, etc. It sometimes happened, however, that
the landlord would stipulate, that he should be at liberty to demand of the
tenant, either the annual payment in kind or a certain sum of money instead of
it. The price at which the payment in kind was in this manner exchanged for a
certain sum of money, is in Scotland called the conversion price. As the option
is always in the landlord to take either the substance or the price, it is
necessary, for the safety of the tenant, that the conversion price should
rather be below than above the average market price. In many places,
accordingly, it is not much above one half of this price. Through the greater
part of Scotland this custom still continues with regard to poultry, and in
some places with regard to cattle. It might probably have continued to take
place, too, with regard to corn, had not the institution of the public fiars
put an end to it. These are annual valuations, according to the judgment of an
assize, of the average price of all the different sorts of grain, and of all
the different qualities of each, according to the actual market price in every
different county. This institution rendered it sufficiently safe for the
tenant, and much more convenient for the landlord, to convert, as they call it,
the corn rent, rather at what should happen to be the price of the fiars of
each year, than at any certain fixed price. But the writers who have collected
the prices of corn in ancient times seem frequently to have mistaken what is
called in Scotland the conversion price for the actual market price. Fleetwood
acknowledges, upon one occasion, that he had made this mistake. As he wrote his
book, however, for a particular purpose, he does not think proper to make this
acknowledgment till after transcribing this conversion price fifteen times. The
price is eight shillings the quarter of wheat. This sum in 1423, the year at
which he begins with it, contained the same quantity of silver as sixteen
shillings of our present money. But in 1562, the year at which he ends with it,
it contained no more than the same nominal sum does at present.

Secondly, they have been misled by the slovenly manner in which some ancient
statutes of assize had been sometimes transcribed by lazy copiers, and
sometimes, perhaps, actually composed by the legislature.

The ancient statutes of assize seem to have begun always with determining what
ought to be the price of bread and ale when the price of wheat and barley were
at the lowest; and to have proceeded gradually to determine what it ought to
be, according as the prices of those two sorts of grain should gradually rise
above this lowest price. But the transcribers of those statutes seem frequently
to have thought it sufficient to copy the regulation as far as the three or
four first and lowest prices; saving in this manner their own labour, and
judging, I suppose, that this was enough to show what proportion ought to be
observed in all higher prices.

Thus, in the assize of bread and ale, of the 51st of Henry III. the price of
bread was regulated according to the different prices of wheat, from one
shilling to twenty shillings the quarter of the money of those times. But in
the manuscripts from which all the different editions of the statutes,
preceding that of Mr Ruffhead, were printed, the copiers had never transcribed
this regulation beyond the price of twelve shillings. Several writers,
therefore, being misled by this faulty transcription, very naturally conclude
that the middle price, or six shillings the quarter, equal to about eighteen
shillings of our present money, was the ordinary or average price of wheat at
that time.

In the statute of Tumbrel and Pillory, enacted nearly about the same time, the
price of ale is regulated according to every sixpence rise in the price of
barley, from two shillings, to four shillings the quarter. That four shillings,
however, was not considered as the highest price to which barley might
frequently rise in those times, and that these prices were only given as an
example of the proportion which ought to be observed in all other prices,
whether higher or lower, we may infer from the last words of the statute:
“Et sic deinceps crescetur vel diminuetur per sex denarios.” The
expression is very slovenly, but the meaning is plain enough, “that the
price of ale is in this manner to be increased or diminished according to every
sixpence rise or fall in the price of barley.” In the composition of this
statute, the legislature itself seems to have been as negligent as the copiers
were in the transcription of the other.

In an ancient manuscript of the Regiam Majestatem, an old Scotch law book,
there is a statute of assize, in which the price of bread is regulated
according to all the different prices of wheat, from tenpence to three
shillings the Scotch boll, equal to about half an English quarter. Three
shillings Scotch, at the time when this assize is supposed to have been
enacted, were equal to about nine shillings sterling of our present money. Mr
Ruddiman seems {See his Preface to Anderson’s Diplomata Scotiae.} to
conclude from this, that three shillings was the highest price to which wheat
ever rose in those times, and that tenpence, a shilling, or at most two
shillings, were the ordinary prices. Upon consulting the manuscript, however,
it appears evidently, that all these prices are only set down as examples of
the proportion which ought to be observed between the respective prices of
wheat and bread. The last words of the statute are “reliqua judicabis
secundum praescripta, habendo respectum ad pretium
bladi.”—“You shall judge of the remaining cases, according to
what is above written, having respect to the price of corn.”

Thirdly, they seem to have been misled too, by the very low price at which
wheat was sometimes sold in very ancient times; and to have imagined, that as
its lowest price was then much lower than in later times its ordinary price
must likewise have been much lower. They might have found, however, that in
those ancient times its highest price was fully as much above, as its lowest
price was below any thing that had ever been known in later times. Thus, in
1270, Fleetwood gives us two prices of the quarter of wheat. The one is four
pounds sixteen shillings of the money of those times, equal to fourteen pounds
eight shillings of that of the present; the other is six pounds eight
shillings, equal to nineteen pounds four shillings of our present money. No
price can be found in the end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth
century, which approaches to the extravagance of these. The price of corn,
though at all times liable to variation varies most in those turbulent and
disorderly societies, in which the interruption of all commerce and
communication hinders the plenty of one part of the country from relieving the
scarcity of another. In the disorderly state of England under the Plantagenets,
who governed it from about the middle of the twelfth till towards the end of
the fifteenth century, one district might be in plenty, while another, at no
great distance, by having its crop destroyed, either by some accident of the
seasons, or by the incursion of some neighbouring baron, might be suffering all
the horrors of a famine; and yet if the lands of some hostile lord were
interposed between them, the one might not be able to give the least assistance
to the other. Under the vigorous administration of the Tudors, who governed
England during the latter part of the fifteenth, and through the whole of the
sixteenth century, no baron was powerful enough to dare to disturb the public
security.

The reader will find at the end of this chapter all the prices of wheat which
have been collected by Fleetwood, from 1202 to 1597, both inclusive, reduced to
the money of the present times, and digested, according to the order of time,
into seven divisions of twelve years each. At the end of each division, too, he
will find the average price of the twelve years of which it consists. In that
long period of time, Fleetwood has been able to collect the prices of no more
than eighty years; so that four years are wanting to make out the last twelve
years. I have added, therefore, from the accounts of Eton college, the prices
of 1598, 1599, 1600, and 1601. It is the only addition which I have made. The
reader will see, that from the beginning of the thirteenth till after the
middle of the sixteenth century, the average price of each twelve years grows
gradually lower and lower; and that towards the end of the sixteenth century it
begins to rise again. The prices, indeed, which Fleetwood has been able to
collect, seem to have been those chiefly which were remarkable for
extraordinary dearness or cheapness; and I do not pretend that any very certain
conclusion can be drawn from them. So far, however, as they prove any thing at
all, they confirm the account which I have been endeavouring to give. Fleetwood
himself, however, seems, with most other writers, to have believed, that,
during all this period, the value of silver, in consequence of its increasing
abundance, was continually diminishing. The prices of corn, which he himself
has collected, certainly do not agree with this opinion. They agree perfectly
with that of Mr Dupré de St Maur, and with that which I have been endeavouring
to explain. Bishop Fleetwood and Mr Dupré de St Maur are the two authors who
seem to have collected, with the greatest diligence and fidelity, the prices of
things in ancient times. It is somewhat curious that, though their opinions are
so very different, their facts, so far as they relate to the price of corn at
least, should coincide so very exactly.

It is not, however, so much from the low price of corn, as from that of some
other parts of the rude produce of land, that the most judicious writers have
inferred the great value of silver in those very ancient times. Corn, it has
been said, being a sort of manufacture, was, in those rude ages, much dearer in
proportion than the greater part of other commodities; it is meant, I suppose,
than the greater part of unmanufactured commodities, such as cattle, poultry,
game of all kinds, etc. That in those times of poverty and barbarism these were
proportionably much cheaper than corn, is undoubtedly true. But this cheapness
was not the effect of the high value of silver, but of the low value of those
commodities. It was not because silver would in such times purchase or
represent a greater quantity of labour, but because such commodities would
purchase or represent a much smaller quantity than in times of more opulence
and improvement. Silver must certainly be cheaper in Spanish America than in
Europe; in the country where it is produced, than in the country to which it is
brought, at the expense of a long carriage both by land and by sea, of a
freight, and an insurance. One-and-twenty pence halfpenny sterling, however, we
are told by Ulloa, was, not many years ago, at Buenos Ayres, the price of an ox
chosen from a herd of three or four hundred. Sixteen shillings sterling, we are
told by Mr Byron, was the price of a good horse in the capital of Chili. In a
country naturally fertile, but of which the far greater part is altogether
uncultivated, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, etc. as they can be acquired
with a very small quantity of labour, so they will purchase or command but a
very small quantity. The low money price for which they may be sold, is no
proof that the real value of silver is there very high, but that the real value
of those commodities is very low.

Labour, it must always be remembered, and not any particular commodity, or set
of commodities, is the real measure of the value both of silver and of all
other commodities.

But in countries almost waste, or but thinly inhabited, cattle, poultry, game
of all kinds, etc. as they are the spontaneous productions of Nature, so she
frequently produces them in much greater quantities than the consumption of the
inhabitants requires. In such a state of things, the supply commonly exceeds
the demand. In different states of society, in different states of improvement,
therefore, such commodities will represent, or be equivalent, to very different
quantities of labour.

In every state of society, in every stage of improvement, corn is the
production of human industry. But the average produce of every sort of industry
is always suited, more or less exactly, to the average consumption; the average
supply to the average demand. In every different stage of improvement, besides,
the raising of equal quantities of corn in the same soil and climate, will, at
an average, require nearly equal quantities of labour; or, what comes to the
same thing, the price of nearly equal quantities; the continual increase of the
productive powers of labour, in an improved state of cultivation, being more or
less counterbalanced by the continual increasing price of cattle, the principal
instruments of agriculture. Upon all these accounts, therefore, we may rest
assured, that equal quantities of corn will, in every state of society, in
every stage of improvement, more nearly represent, or be equivalent to, equal
quantities of labour, than equal quantities of any other part of the rude
produce of land. Corn, accordingly, it has already been observed, is, in all
the different stages of wealth and improvement, a more accurate measure of
value than any other commodity or set of commodities. In all those different
stages, therefore, we can judge better of the real value of silver, by
comparing it with corn, than by comparing it with any other commodity or set of
commodities.

Corn, besides, or whatever else is the common and favourite vegetable food of
the people, constitutes, in every civilized country, the principal part of the
subsistence of the labourer. In consequence of the extension of agriculture,
the land of every country produces a much greater quantity of vegetable than of
animal food, and the labourer everywhere lives chiefly upon the wholesome food
that is cheapest and most abundant. Butcher’s meat, except in the most
thriving countries, or where labour is most highly rewarded, makes but an
insignificant part of his subsistence; poultry makes a still smaller part of
it, and game no part of it. In France, and even in Scotland, where labour is
somewhat better rewarded than in France, the labouring poor seldom eat
butcher’s meat, except upon holidays, and other extraordinary occasions.
The money price of labour, therefore, depends much more upon the average money
price of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than upon that of
butcher’s meat, or of any other part of the rude produce of land. The
real value of gold and silver, therefore, the real quantity of labour which
they can purchase or command, depends much more upon the quantity of corn which
they can purchase or command, than upon that of butcher’s meat, or any
other part of the rude produce of land.

Such slight observations, however, upon the prices either of corn or of other
commodities, would not probably have misled so many intelligent authors, had
they not been influenced at the same time by the popular notion, that as the
quantity of silver naturally increases in every country with the increase of
wealth, so its value diminishes as its quantity increases. This notion,
however, seems to be altogether groundless.

The quantity of the precious metals may increase in any country from two
different causes; either, first, from the increased abundance of the mines
which supply it; or, secondly, from the increased wealth of the people, from
the increased produce of their annual labour. The first of these causes is no
doubt necessarily connected with the diminution of the value of the precious
metals; but the second is not.

When more abundant mines are discovered, a greater quantity of the precious
metals is brought to market; and the quantity of the necessaries and
conveniencies of life for which they must be exchanged being the same as
before, equal quantities of the metals must be exchanged for smaller quantities
of commodities. So far, therefore, as the increase of the quantity of the
precious metals in any country arises from the increased abundance of the
mines, it is necessarily connected with some diminution of their value.

When, on the contrary, the wealth of any country increases, when the annual
produce of its labour becomes gradually greater and greater, a greater quantity
of coin becomes necessary in order to circulate a greater quantity of
commodities: and the people, as they can afford it, as they have more
commodities to give for it, will naturally purchase a greater and a greater
quantity of plate. The quantity of their coin will increase from necessity; the
quantity of their plate from vanity and ostentation, or from the same reason
that the quantity of fine statues, pictures, and of every other luxury and
curiosity, is likely to increase among them. But as statuaries and painters are
not likely to be worse rewarded in times of wealth and prosperity, than in
times of poverty and depression, so gold and silver are not likely to be worse
paid for.

The price of gold and silver, when the accidental discovery of more abundant
mines does not keep it down, as it naturally rises with the wealth of every
country, so, whatever be the state of the mines, it is at all times naturally
higher in a rich than in a poor country. Gold and silver, like all other
commodities, naturally seek the market where the best price is given for them,
and the best price is commonly given for every thing in the country which can
best afford it. Labour, it must be remembered, is the ultimate price which is
paid for every thing; and in countries where labour is equally well rewarded,
the money price of labour will be in proportion to that of the subsistence of
the labourer. But gold and silver will naturally exchange for a greater
quantity of subsistence in a rich than in a poor country; in a country which
abounds with subsistence, than in one which is but indifferently supplied with
it. If the two countries are at a great distance, the difference may be very
great; because, though the metals naturally fly from the worse to the better
market, yet it may be difficult to transport them in such quantities as to
bring their price nearly to a level in both. If the countries are near, the
difference will be smaller, and may sometimes be scarce perceptible; because in
this case the transportation will be easy. China is a much richer country than
any part of Europe, and the difference between the price of subsistence in
China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much cheaper than wheat is
any where in Europe. England is a much richer country than Scotland, but the
difference between the money price of corn in those two countries is much
smaller, and is but just perceptible. In proportion to the quantity or measure,
Scotch corn generally appears to be a good deal cheaper than English; but, in
proportion to its quality, it is certainly somewhat dearer. Scotland receives
almost every year very large supplies from England, and every commodity must
commonly be somewhat dearer in the country to which it is brought than in that
from which it comes. English corn, therefore, must be dearer in Scotland than
in England; and yet in proportion to its quality, or to the quantity and
goodness of the flour or meal which can be made from it, it cannot commonly be
sold higher there than the Scotch corn which comes to market in competition
with it.

The difference between the money price of labour in China and in Europe, is
still greater than that between the money price of subsistence; because the
real recompence of labour is higher in Europe than in China, the greater part
of Europe being in an improving state, while China seems to be standing still.
The money price of labour is lower in Scotland than in England, because the
real recompence of labour is much lower: Scotland, though advancing to greater
wealth, advances much more slowly than England. The frequency of emigration
from Scotland, and the rarity of it from England, sufficiently prove that the
demand for labour is very different in the two countries. The proportion
between the real recompence of labour in different countries, it must be
remembered, is naturally regulated, not by their actual wealth or poverty, but
by their advancing, stationary, or declining condition.

Gold and silver, as they are naturally of the greatest value among the richest,
so they are naturally of the least value among the poorest nations. Among
savages, the poorest of all nations, they are scarce of any value.

In great towns, corn is always dearer than in remote parts of the country.
This, however, is the effect, not of the real cheapness of silver, but of the
real dearness of corn. It does not cost less labour to bring silver to the
great town than to the remote parts of the country; but it costs a great deal
more to bring corn.

In some very rich and commercial countries, such as Holland and the territory
of Genoa, corn is dear for the same reason that it is dear in great towns. They
do not produce enough to maintain their inhabitants. They are rich in the
industry and skill of their artificers and manufacturers, in every sort of
machinery which can facilitate and abridge labour; in shipping, and in all the
other instruments and means of carriage and commerce: but they are poor in
corn, which, as it must be brought to them from distant countries, must, by an
addition to its price, pay for the carriage from those countries. It does not
cost less labour to bring silver to Amsterdam than to Dantzic; but it costs a
great deal more to bring corn. The real cost of silver must be nearly the same
in both places; but that of corn must be very different. Diminish the real
opulence either of Holland or of the territory of Genoa, while the number of
their inhabitants remains the same; diminish their power of supplying
themselves from distant countries; and the price of corn, instead of sinking
with that diminution in the quantity of their silver, which must necessarily
accompany this declension, either as its cause or as its effect, will rise to
the price of a famine. When we are in want of necessaries, we must part with
all superfluities, of which the value, as it rises in times of opulence and
prosperity, so it sinks in times of poverty and distress. It is otherwise with
necessaries. Their real price, the quantity of labour which they can purchase
or command, rises in times of poverty and distress, and sinks in times of
opulence and prosperity, which are always times of great abundance; for they
could not otherwise be times of opulence and prosperity. Corn is a necessary,
silver is only a superfluity.

Whatever, therefore, may have been the increase in the quantity of the precious
metals, which, during the period between the middle of the fourteenth and that
of the sixteenth century, arose from the increase of wealth and improvement, it
could have no tendency to diminish their value, either in Great Britain, or in
my other part of Europe. If those who have collected the prices of things in
ancient times, therefore, had, during this period, no reason to infer the
diminution of the value of silver from any observations which they had made
upon the prices either of corn, or of other commodities, they had still less
reason to infer it from any supposed increase of wealth and improvement.

Second Period.—But how various soever may have been the opinions of the
learned concerning the progress of the value of silver during the first period,
they are unanimous concerning it during the second.

From about 1570 to about 1640, during a period of about seventy years, the
variation in the proportion between the value of silver and that of corn held a
quite opposite course. Silver sunk in its real value, or would exchange for a
smaller quantity of labour than before; and corn rose in its nominal price,
and, instead of being commonly sold for about two ounces of silver the quarter,
or about ten shillings of our present money, came to be sold for six and eight
ounces of silver the quarter, or about thirty and forty shillings of our
present money.

The discovery of the abundant mines of America seems to have been the sole
cause of this diminution in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn.
It is accounted for, accordingly, in the same manner by every body; and there
never has been any dispute, either about the fact, or about the cause of it.
The greater part of Europe was, during this period, advancing in industry and
improvement, and the demand for silver must consequently have been increasing;
but the increase of the supply had, it seems, so far exceeded that of the
demand, that the value of that metal sunk considerably. The discovery of the
mines of America, it is to be observed, does not seem to have had any very
sensible effect upon the prices of things in England till after 1570; though
even the mines of Potosi had been discovered more than twenty years before.

From 1595 to 1620, both inclusive, the average price of the quarter of nine
bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the accounts of
Eton college, to have been £ 2:1:6 9/13. From which sum, neglecting the
fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 7 1/3d., the price of the quarter of
eight bushels comes out to have been £ 1:16:10 2/3. And from this sum,
neglecting likewise the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 1 1/9d., for
the difference between the price of the best wheat and that of the middle
wheat, the price of the middle wheat comes out to have been about £ 1:12:8 8/9,
or about six ounces and one-third of an ounce of silver.

From 1621 to 1636, both inclusive, the average price of the same measure of the
best wheat, at the same market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been £
2:10s.; from which, making the like deductions as in the foregoing case, the
average price of the quarter of eight bushels of middle wheat comes out to have
been £ 1:19:6, or about seven ounces and two-thirds of an ounce of silver.

Third Period.—Between 1630 and 1640, or about 1636, the effect of the
discovery of the mines of America, in reducing the value of silver, appears to
have been completed, and the value of that metal seems never to have sunk lower
in proportion to that of corn than it was about that time. It seems to have
risen somewhat in the course of the present century, and it had probably begun
to do so, even some time before the end of the last.

From 1637 to 1700, both inclusive, being the sixty-four last years of the last
century the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at
Windsor market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been £ 2:11:0 1/3,
which is only 1s. 0 1/3d. dearer than it had been during the sixteen years
before. But, in the course of these sixty-four years, there happened two
events, which must have produced a much greater scarcity of corn than what the
course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned, and which, therefore,
without supposing any further reduction in the value of silver, will much more
than account for this very small enhancement of price.

The first of these events was the civil war, which, by discouraging tillage and
interrupting commerce, must have raised the price of corn much above what the
course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned. It must have had this
effect, more or less, at all the different markets in the kingdom, but
particularly at those in the neighbourhood of London, which require to be
supplied from the greatest distance. In 1648, accordingly, the price of the
best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been £
4:5s., and, in 1649, to have been £ 4, the quarter of nine bushels. The excess
of those two years above £ 2:10s. (the average price of the sixteen years
preceding 1637) is £ 3:5s., which, divided among the sixty four last years of
the last century, will alone very nearly account for that small enhancement of
price which seems to have taken place in them. These, however, though the
highest, are by no means the only high prices which seem to have been
occasioned by the civil wars.

The second event was the bounty upon the exportation of corn, granted in 1688.
The bounty, it has been thought by many people, by encouraging tillage, may, in
a long course of years, have occasioned a greater abundance, and, consequently,
a greater cheapness of corn in the home market, than what would otherwise have
taken place there. How far the bounty could produce this effect at any time I
shall examine hereafter: I shall only observe at present, that between 1688 and
1700, it had not time to produce any such effect. During this short period, its
only effect must have been, by encouraging the exportation of the surplus
produce of every year, and thereby hindering the abundance of one year from
compensating the scarcity of another, to raise the price in the home market.
The scarcity which prevailed in England, from 1693 to 1699, both inclusive,
though no doubt principally owing to the badness of the seasons, and,
therefore, extending through a considerable part of Europe, must have been
somewhat enhanced by the bounty. In 1699, accordingly, the further exportation
of corn was prohibited for nine months.

There was a third event which occurred in the course of the same period, and
which, though it could not occasion any scarcity of corn, nor, perhaps, any
augmentation in the real quantity of silver which was usually paid for it, must
necessarily have occasioned some augmentation in the nominal sum. This event
was the great debasement of the silver coin, by clipping and wearing. This evil
had begun in the reign of Charles II. and had gone on continually increasing
till 1695; at which time, as we may learn from Mr Lowndes, the current silver
coin was, at an average, near five-and-twenty per cent. below its standard
value. But the nominal sum which constitutes the market price of every
commodity is necessarily regulated, not so much by the quantity of silver,
which, according to the standard, ought to be contained in it, as by that
which, it is found by experience, actually is contained in it. This nominal
sum, therefore, is necessarily higher when the coin is much debased by clipping
and wearing, than when near to its standard value.

In the course of the present century, the silver coin has not at any time been
more below its standard weight than it is at present. But though very much
defaced, its value has been kept up by that of the gold coin, for which it is
exchanged. For though, before the late recoinage, the gold coin was a good deal
defaced too, it was less so than the silver. In 1695, on the contrary, the
value of the silver coin was not kept up by the gold coin; a guinea then
commonly exchanging for thirty shillings of the worn and clipt silver. Before
the late recoinage of the gold, the price of silver bullion was seldom higher
than five shillings and sevenpence an ounce, which is but fivepence above the
mint price. But in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was six shillings
and fivepence an ounce, {Lowndes’s Essay on the Silver Coin, 68.} which
is fifteen pence above the mint price. Even before the late recoinage of the
gold, therefore, the coin, gold and silver together, when compared with silver
bullion, was not supposed to be more than eight per cent. below its standard
value, In 1695, on the contrary, it had been supposed to be near
five-and-twenty per cent. below that value. But in the beginning of the present
century, that is, immediately after the great recoinage in King William’s
time, the greater part of the current silver coin must have been still nearer
to its standard weight than it is at present. In the course of the present
century, too, there has been no great public calamity, such as a civil war,
which could either discourage tillage, or interrupt the interior commerce of
the country. And though the bounty which has taken place through the greater
part of this century, must always raise the price of corn somewhat higher than
it otherwise would be in the actual state of tillage; yet, as in the course of
this century, the bounty has had full time to produce all the good effects
commonly imputed to it to encourage tillage, and thereby to increase the
quantity of corn in the home market, it may, upon the principles of a system
which I shall explain and examine hereafter, be supposed to have done something
to lower the price of that commodity the one way, as well as to raise it the
other. It is by many people supposed to have done more. In the sixty-four years
of the present century, accordingly, the average price of the quarter of nine
bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, by the accounts of Eton
college, to have been £ 2:0:6 10/32, which is about ten shillings and sixpence,
or more than five-and-twenty percent. cheaper than it had been during the
sixty-four last years of the last century; and about nine shillings and
sixpence cheaper than it had been during the sixteen years preceding 1636, when
the discovery of the abundant mines of America may be supposed to have produced
its full effect; and about one shilling cheaper than it had been in the
twenty-six years preceding 1620, before that discovery can well be supposed to
have produced its full effect. According to this account, the average price of
middle wheat, during these sixty-four first years of the present century, comes
out to have been about thirty-two shillings the quarter of eight bushels.

The value of silver, therefore, seems to have risen somewhat in proportion to
that of corn during the course of the present century, and it had probably
begun to do so even some time before the end of the last.

In 1687, the price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor
market, was £ 1:5:2, the lowest price at which it had ever been from 1595.

In 1688, Mr Gregory King, a man famous for his knowledge in matters of this
kind, estimated the average price of wheat, in years of moderate plenty, to be
to the grower 3s. 6d. the bushel, or eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter.
The grower’s price I understand to be the same with what is sometimes
called the contract price, or the price at which a farmer contracts for a
certain number of years to deliver a certain quantity of corn to a dealer. As a
contract of this kind saves the farmer the expense and trouble of marketing,
the contract price is generally lower than what is supposed to be the average
market price. Mr King had judged eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter to be
at that time the ordinary contract price in years of moderate plenty. Before
the scarcity occasioned by the late extraordinary course of bad seasons, it
was, I have been assured, the ordinary contract price in all common years.

In 1688 was granted the parliamentary bounty upon the exportation of corn. The
country gentlemen, who then composed a still greater proportion of the
legislature than they do at present, had felt that the money price of corn was
falling. The bounty was an expedient to raise it artificially to the high price
at which it had frequently been sold in the times of Charles I. and II. It was
to take place, therefore, till wheat was so high as fortyeight shillings the
quarter; that is, twenty shillings, or 5-7ths dearer than Mr King had, in that
very year, estimated the grower’s price to be in times of moderate
plenty. If his calculations deserve any part of the reputation which they have
obtained very universally, eight-and-forty shillings the quarter was a price
which, without some such expedient as the bounty, could not at that time be
expected, except in years of extraordinary scarcity. But the government of King
William was not then fully settled. It was in no condition to refuse anything
to the country gentlemen, from whom it was, at that very time, soliciting the
first establishment of the annual land-tax.

The value of silver, therefore, in proportion to that of corn, had probably
risen somewhat before the end of the last century; and it seems to have
continued to do so during the course of the greater part of the present, though
the necessary operation of the bounty must have hindered that rise from being
so sensible as it otherwise would have been in the actual state of tillage.

In plentiful years, the bounty, by occasioning an extraordinary exportation,
necessarily raises the price of corn above what it otherwise would be in those
years. To encourage tillage, by keeping up the price of corn, even in the most
plentiful years, was the avowed end of the institution.

In years of great scarcity, indeed, the bounty has generally been suspended. It
must, however, have had some effect upon the prices of many of those years. By
the extraordinary exportation which it occasions in years of plenty, it must
frequently hinder the plenty of one year from compensating the scarcity of
another.

Both in years of plenty and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty raises
the price of corn above what it naturally would be in the actual state of
tillage. If during the sixty-four first years of the present century,
therefore, the average price has been lower than during the sixty-four last
years of the last century, it must, in the same state of tillage, have been
much more so, had it not been for this operation of the bounty.

But, without the bounty, it may be said the state of tillage would not have
been the same. What may have been the effects of this institution upon the
agriculture of the country, I shall endeavour to explain hereafter, when I come
to treat particularly of bounties. I shall only observe at present, that this
rise in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, has not been
peculiar to England. It has been observed to have taken place in France during
the same period, and nearly in the same proportion, too, by three very
faithful, diligent, and laborious collectors of the prices of corn, Mr Dupré de
St Maur, Mr Messance, and the author of the Essay on the Police of Grain. But
in France, till 1764, the exportation of grain was by law prohibited; and it is
somewhat difficult to suppose, that nearly the same diminution of price which
took place in one country, notwithstanding this prohibition, should, in
another, be owing to the extraordinary encouragement given to exportation.

It would be more proper, perhaps, to consider this variation in the average
money price of corn as the effect rather of some gradual rise in the real value
of silver in the European market, than of any fall in the real average value of
corn. Corn, it has already been observed, is, at distant periods of time, a
more accurate measure of value than either silver or, perhaps, any other
commodity. When, after the discovery of the abundant mines of America, corn
rose to three and four times its former money price, this change was
universally ascribed, not to any rise in the real value of corn, but to a fall
in the real value of silver. If, during the sixty-four first years of the
present century, therefore, the average money price of corn has fallen somewhat
below what it had been during the greater part of the last century, we should,
in the same manner, impute this change, not to any fall in the real value of
corn, but to some rise in the real value of silver in the European market.

The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years past, indeed, has
occasioned a suspicion that the real value of silver still continues to fall in
the European market. This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to have
been the effect of the extraordinary unfavourableness of the seasons, and
ought, therefore, to be regarded, not as a permanent, but as a transitory and
occasional event. The seasons, for these ten or twelve years past, have been
unfavourable through the greater part of Europe; and the disorders of Poland
have very much increased the scarcity in all those countries, which, in dear
years, used to be supplied from that market. So long a course of bad seasons,
though not a very common event, is by no means a singular one; and whoever has
inquired much into the history of the prices of corn in former times, will be
at no loss to recollect several other examples of the same kind. Ten years of
extraordinary scarcity, besides, are not more wonderful than ten years of
extraordinary plenty. The low price of corn, from 1741 to 1750, both inclusive,
may very well be set in opposition to its high price during these last eight or
ten years. From 1741 to 1750, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels
of the best wheat, at Windsor market, it appears from the accounts of Eton
college, was only £ 1:13:9 4/5, which is nearly 6s.3d. below the average price
of the sixty-four first years of the present century. The average price of the
quarter of eight bushels of middle wheat comes out, according to this account,
to have been, during these ten years, only £ 1:6:8.

Between 1741 and 1750, however, the bounty must have hindered the price of corn
from falling so low in the home market as it naturally would have done. During
these ten years, the quantity of all sorts of grain exported, it appears from
the custom-house books, amounted to no less than 8,029,156 quarters, one
bushel. The bounty paid for this amounted to £ 1,514,962:17:4 1/2. In 1749,
accordingly, Mr Pelham, at that time prime minister, observed to the house of
commons, that, for the three years preceding, a very extraordinary sum had been
paid as bounty for the exportation of corn. He had good reason to make this
observation, and in the following year he might have had still better. In that
single year, the bounty paid amounted to no less than £ 324,176:10:6. {See
Tracts on the Corn Trade, Tract 3,} It is unnecessary to observe how much this
forced exportation must have raised the price of corn above what it otherwise
would have been in the home market.

At the end of the accounts annexed to this chapter the reader will find the
particular account of those ten years separated from the rest. He will find
there, too, the particular account of the preceding ten years, of which the
average is likewise below, though not so much below, the general average of the
sixty-four first years of the century. The year 1740, however, was a year of
extraordinary scarcity. These twenty years preceding 1750 may very well be set
in opposition to the twenty preceding 1770. As the former were a good deal
below the general average of the century, notwithstanding the intervention of
one or two dear years; so the latter have been a good deal above it,
notwithstanding the intervention of one or two cheap ones, of 1759, for
example. If the former have not been as much below the general average as the
latter have been above it, we ought probably to impute it to the bounty. The
change has evidently been too sudden to be ascribed to any change in the value
of silver, which is always slow and gradual. The suddenness of the effect can
be accounted for only by a cause which can operate suddenly, the accidental
variations of the seasons.

The money price of labour in Great Britain has, indeed, risen during the course
of the present century. This, however, seems to be the effect, not so much of
any diminution in the value of silver in the European market, as of an increase
in the demand for labour in Great Britain, arising from the great, and almost
universal prosperity of the country. In France, a country not altogether so
prosperous, the money price of labour has, since the middle of the last
century, been observed to sink gradually with the average money price of corn.
Both in the last century and in the present, the day wages of common labour are
there said to have been pretty uniformly about the twentieth part of the
average price of the septier of wheat; a measure which contains a little more
than four Winchester bushels. In Great Britain, the real recompence of labour,
it has already been shewn, the real quantities of the necessaries and
conveniencies of life which are given to the labourer, has increased
considerably during the course of the present century. The rise in its money
price seems to have been the effect, not of any diminution of the value of
silver in the general market of Europe, but of a rise in the real price of
labour, in the particular market of Great Britain, owing to the peculiarly
happy circumstances of the country.

For some time after the first discovery of America, silver would continue to
sell at its former, or not much below its former price. The profits of mining
would for some time be very great, and much above their natural rate. Those who
imported that metal into Europe, however, would soon find that the whole annual
importation could not be disposed of at this high price. Silver would gradually
exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of goods. Its price would sink
gradually lower and lower, till it fell to its natural price; or to what was
just sufficient to pay, according to their natural rates, the wages of the
labour, the profits of the stock, and the rent of the land, which must be paid
in order to bring it from the mine to the market. In the greater part of the
silver mines of Peru, the tax of the king of Spain, amounting to a tenth of the
gross produce, eats up, it has already been observed, the whole rent of the
land. This tax was originally a half; it soon afterwards fell to a third, then
to a fifth, and at last to a tenth, at which late it still continues. In the
greater part of the silver mines of Peru, this, it seems, is all that remains,
after replacing the stock of the undertaker of the work, together with its
ordinary profits; and it seems to be universally acknowledged that these
profits, which were once very high, are now as low as they can well be,
consistently with carrying on the works.

The tax of the king of Spain was reduced to a fifth of the registered silver in
1504 {Solorzano, vol, ii.}, one-and-forty years before 1545, the date of the
discovery of the mines of Potosi. In the course of ninety years, or before
1636, these mines, the most fertile in all America, had time sufficient to
produce their full effect, or to reduce the value of silver in the European
market as low as it could well fall, while it continued to pay this tax to the
king of Spain. Ninety years is time sufficient to reduce any commodity, of
which there is no monopoly, to its natural price, or to the lowest price at
which, while it pays a particular tax, it can continue to be sold for any
considerable time together.

The price of silver in the European market might, perhaps, have fallen still
lower, and it might have become necessary either to reduce the tax upon it, not
only to one-tenth, as in 1736, but to one twentieth, in the same manner as that
upon gold, or to give up working the greater part of the American mines which
are now wrought. The gradual increase of the demand for silver, or the gradual
enlargement of the market for the produce of the silver mines of America, is
probably the cause which has prevented this from happening, and which has not
only kept up the value of silver in the European market, but has perhaps even
raised it somewhat higher than it was about the middle of the last century.

Since the first discovery of America, the market for the produce of its silver
mines has been growing gradually more and more extensive.

First, the market of Europe has become gradually more and more extensive. Since
the discovery of America, the greater part of Europe has been much improved.
England, Holland, France, and Germany; even Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, have
all advanced considerably, both in agriculture and in manufactures. Italy seems
not to have gone backwards. The fall of Italy preceded the conquest of Peru.
Since that time it seems rather to have recovered a little. Spain and Portugal,
indeed, are supposed to have gone backwards. Portugal, however, is but a very
small part of Europe, and the declension of Spain is not, perhaps, so great as
is commonly imagined. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, Spain was a
very poor country, even in comparison with France, which has been so much
improved since that time. It was the well known remark of the emperor Charles
V. who had travelled so frequently through both countries, that every thing
abounded in France, but that every thing was wanting in Spain. The increasing
produce of the agriculture and manufactures of Europe must necessarily have
required a gradual increase in the quantity of silver coin to circulate it; and
the increasing number of wealthy individuals must have required the like
increase in the quantity of their plate and other ornaments of silver.

Secondly, America is itself a new market, for the produce of its own silver
mines; and as its advances in agriculture, industry, and population, are much
more rapid than those of the most thriving countries in Europe, its demand must
increase much more rapidly. The English colonies are altogether a new market,
which, partly for coin, and partly for plate, requires a continual augmenting
supply of silver through a great continent where there never was any demand
before. The greater part, too, of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, are
altogether new markets. New Granada, the Yucatan, Paraguay, and the Brazils,
were, before discovered by the Europeans, inhabited by savage nations, who had
neither arts nor agriculture. A considerable degree of both has now been
introduced into all of them. Even Mexico and Peru, though they cannot be
considered as altogether new markets, are certainly much more extensive ones
than they ever were before. After all the wonderful tales which have been
published concerning the splendid state of those countries in ancient times,
whoever reads, with any degree of sober judgment, the history of their first
discovery and conquest, will evidently discern that, in arts, agriculture, and
commerce, their inhabitants were much more ignorant than the Tartars of the
Ukraine are at present. Even the Peruvians, the more civilized nation of the
two, though they made use of gold and silver as ornaments, had no coined money
of any kind. Their whole commerce was carried on by barter, and there was
accordingly scarce any division of labour among them. Those who cultivated the
ground, were obliged to build their own houses, to make their own household
furniture, their own clothes, shoes, and instruments of agriculture. The few
artificers among them are said to have been all maintained by the sovereign,
the nobles, and the priests, and were probably their servants or slaves. All
the ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never furnished one single manufacture
to Europe. The Spanish armies, though they scarce ever exceeded five hundred
men, and frequently did not amount to half that number, found almost everywhere
great difficulty in procuring subsistence. The famines which they are said to
have occasioned almost wherever they went, in countries, too, which at the same
time are represented as very populous and well cultivated, sufficiently
demonstrate that the story of this populousness and high cultivation is in a
great measure fabulous. The Spanish colonies are under a government in many
respects less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that
of the English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all those much
more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy climate,
the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common to all new
colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage, as to compensate many defects in
civil government. Frezier, who visited Peru in 1713, represents Lima as
containing between twenty-five and twenty-eight thousand inhabitants. Ulloa,
who resided in the same country between 1740 and 1746, represents it as
containing more than fifty thousand. The difference in their accounts of the
populousness of several other principal towns of Chili and Peru is nearly the
same; and as there seems to be no reason to doubt of the good information of
either, it marks an increase which is scarce inferior to that of the English
colonies. America, therefore, is a new market for the produce of its own silver
mines, of which the demand must increase much more rapidly than that of the
most thriving country in Europe.

Thirdly, the East Indies is another market for the produce of the silver mines
of America, and a market which, from the time of the first discovery of those
mines, has been continually taking off a greater and a greater quantity of
silver. Since that time, the direct trade between America and the East Indies,
which is carried on by means of the Acapulco ships, has been continually
augmenting, and the indirect intercourse by the way of Europe has been
augmenting in a still greater proportion. During the sixteenth century, the
Portuguese were the only European nation who carried on any regular trade to
the East Indies. In the last years of that century, the Dutch began to encroach
upon this monopoly, and in a few years expelled them from their principal
settlements in India. During the greater part of the last century, those two
nations divided the most considerable part of the East India trade between
them; the trade of the Dutch continually augmenting in a still greater
proportion than that of the Portuguese declined. The English and French carried
on some trade with India in the last century, but it has been greatly augmented
in the course of the present. The East India trade of the Swedes and Danes
began in the course of the present century. Even the Muscovites now trade
regularly with China, by a sort of caravans which go over land through Siberia
and Tartary to Pekin. The East India trade of all these nations, if we except
that of the French, which the last war had well nigh annihilated, has been
almost continually augmenting. The increasing consumptions of East India goods
in Europe is, it seems, so great, as to afford a gradual increase of employment
to them all. Tea, for example, was a drug very little used in Europe, before
the middle of the last century. At present, the value of the tea annually
imported by the English East India company, for the use of their own
countrymen, amounts to more than a million and a half a year; and even this is
not enough; a great deal more being constantly smuggled into the country from
the ports of Holland, from Gottenburgh in Sweden, and from the coast of France,
too, as long as the French East India company was in prosperity. The
consumption of the porcelain of China, of the spiceries of the Moluccas, of the
piece goods of Bengal, and of innumerable other articles, has increased very
nearly in a like proportion. The tonnage, accordingly, of all the European
shipping employed in the East India trade, at any one time during the last
century, was not, perhaps, much greater than that of the English East India
company before the late reduction of their shipping.

But in the East Indies, particularly in China and Indostan, the value of the
precious metals, when the Europeans first began to trade to those countries,
was much higher than in Europe; and it still continues to be so. In rice
countries, which generally yield two, sometimes three crops in the year, each
of them more plentiful than any common crop of corn, the abundance of food must
be much greater than in any corn country of equal extent. Such countries are
accordingly much more populous. In them, too, the rich, having a greater
superabundance of food to dispose of beyond what they themselves can consume,
have the means of purchasing a much greater quantity of the labour of other
people. The retinue of a grandee in China or Indostan accordingly is, by all
accounts, much more numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in
Europe. The same superabundance of food, of which they have the disposal,
enables them to give a greater quantity of it for all those singular and rare
productions which nature furnishes but in very small quantities; such as the
precious metals and the precious stones, the great objects of the competition
of the rich. Though the mines, therefore, which supplied the Indian market, had
been as abundant as those which supplied the European, such commodities would
naturally exchange for a greater quantity of food in India than in Europe. But
the mines which supplied the Indian market with the precious metals seem to
have been a good deal less abundant, and those which supplied it with the
precious stones a good deal more so, than the mines which supplied the
European. The precious metals, therefore, would naturally exchange in India for
a somewhat greater quantity of the precious stones, and for a much greater
quantity of food than in Europe. The money price of diamonds, the greatest of
all superfluities, would be somewhat lower, and that of food, the first of all
necessaries, a great deal lower in the one country than in the other. But the
real price of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries of life which is
given to the labourer, it has already been observed, is lower both in China and
Indostan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the greater part
of Europe. The wages of the labourer will there purchase a smaller quantity of
food: and as the money price of food is much lower in India than in Europe, the
money price of labour is there lower upon a double account; upon account both
of the small quantity of food which it will purchase, and of the low price of
that food. But in countries of equal art and industry, the money price of the
greater part of manufactures will be in proportion to the money price of
labour; and in manufacturing art and industry, China and Indostan, though
inferior, seem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe. The money price
of the greater part of manufactures, therefore, will naturally be much lower in
those great empires than it is anywhere in Europe. Through the greater part of
Europe, too, the expense of land-carriage increases very much both the real and
nominal price of most manufactures. It costs more labour, and therefore more
money, to bring first the materials, and afterwards the complete manufacture to
market. In China and Indostan, the extent and variety of inland navigations
save the greater part of this labour, and consequently of this money, and
thereby reduce still lower both the real and the nominal price of the greater
part of their manufactures. Upon all these accounts, the precious metals are a
commodity which it always has been, and still continues to be, extremely
advantageous to carry from Europe to India. There is scarce any commodity which
brings a better price there; or which, in proportion to the quantity of labour
and commodities which it costs in Europe, will purchase or command a greater
quantity of labour and commodities in India. It is more advantageous, too, to
carry silver thither than gold; because in China, and the greater part of the
other markets of India, the proportion between fine silver and fine gold is but
as ten, or at most as twelve to one; whereas in Europe it is as fourteen or
fifteen to one. In China, and the greater part of the other markets of India,
ten, or at most twelve ounces of silver, will purchase an ounce of gold; in
Europe, it requires from fourteen to fifteen ounces. In the cargoes, therefore,
of the greater part of European ships which sail to India, silver has generally
been one of the most valuable articles. It is the most valuable article in the
Acapulco ships which sail to Manilla. The silver of the new continent seems, in
this manner, to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce
between the two extremities of the old one is carried on; and it is by means of
it, in a great measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected
with one another.

In order to supply so very widely extended a market, the quantity of silver
annually brought from the mines must not only be sufficient to support that
continued increase, both of coin and of plate, which is required in all
thriving countries; but to repair that continual waste and consumption of
silver which takes place in all countries where that metal is used.

The continual consumption of the precious metals in coin by wearing, and in
plate both by wearing and cleaning, is very sensible; and in commodities of
which the use is so very widely extended, would alone require a very great
annual supply. The consumption of those metals in some particular manufactures,
though it may not perhaps be greater upon the whole than this gradual
consumption, is, however, much more sensible, as it is much more rapid. In the
manufactures of Birmingham alone, the quantity of gold and silver annually
employed in gilding and plating, and thereby disqualified from ever afterwards
appearing in the shape of those metals, is said to amount to more than fifty
thousand pounds sterling. We may from thence form some notion how great must be
the annual consumption in all the different parts of the world, either in
manufactures of the same kind with those of Birmingham, or in laces,
embroideries, gold and silver stuffs, the gilding of books, furniture, etc. A
considerable quantity, too, must be annually lost in transporting those metals
from one place to another both by sea and by land. In the greater part of the
governments of Asia, besides, the almost universal custom of concealing
treasures in the bowels of the earth, of which the knowledge frequently dies
with the person who makes the concealment, must occasion the loss of a still
greater quantity.

The quantity of gold and silver imported at both Cadiz and Lisbon (including
not only what comes under register, but what may be supposed to be smuggled)
amounts, according to the best accounts, to about six millions sterling a-year.

According to Mr Meggens {Postscript to the Universal Merchant p. 15 and 16.
This postscript was not printed till 1756, three years after the publication of
the book, which has never had a second edition. The postscript is, therefore,
to be found in few copies; it corrects several errors in the book.}, the annual
importation of the precious metals into Spain, at an average of six years, viz.
from 1748 to 1753, both inclusive, and into Portugal, at an average of seven
years, viz. from 1747 to 1753, both inclusive, amounted in silver to 1,101,107
pounds weight, and in gold to 49,940 pounds weight. The silver, at sixty two
shillings the pound troy, amounts to £ 3,413,431:10s. sterling. The gold, at
forty-four guineas and a half the pound troy, amounts to £ 2,333,446:14s.
sterling. Both together amount to £ 5,746,878:4s. sterling. The account of what
was imported under register, he assures us, is exact. He gives us the detail of
the particular places from which the gold and silver were brought, and of the
particular quantity of each metal, which, according to the register, each of
them afforded. He makes an allowance, too, for the quantity of each metal
which, he supposes, may have been smuggled. The great experience of this
judicious merchant renders his opinion of considerable weight.

According to the eloquent, and sometimes well-informed, author of the
Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment of the Europeans in
the two Indies, the annual importation of registered gold and silver into
Spain, at an average of eleven years, viz. from 1754 to 1764, both inclusive,
amounted to 13,984,185 3/5 piastres of ten reals. On account of what may have
been smuggled, however, the whole annual importation, he supposes, may have
amounted to seventeen millions of piastres, which, at 4s. 6d. the piastre, is
equal to £ 3,825,000 sterling. He gives the detail, too, of the particular
places from which the gold and silver were brought, and of the particular
quantities of each metal, which according to the register, each of them
afforded. He informs us, too, that if we were to judge of the quantity of gold
annually imported from the Brazils to Lisbon, by the amount of the tax paid to
the king of Portugal, which it seems, is one-fifth of the standard metal, we
might value it at eighteen millions of cruzadoes, or forty-five millions of
French livres, equal to about twenty millions sterling. On account of what may
have been smuggled, however, we may safely, he says, add to this sum an eighth
more, or £ 250,000 sterling, so that the whole will amount to £ 2,250,000
sterling. According to this account, therefore, the whole annual importation of
the precious metals into both Spain and Portugal, mounts to about £ 6,075,000
sterling.

Several other very well authenticated, though manuscript accounts, I have been
assured, agree in making this whole annual importation amount, at an average,
to about six millions sterling; sometimes a little more, sometimes a little
less.

The annual importation of the precious metals into Cadiz and Lisbon, indeed, is
not equal to the whole annual produce of the mines of America. Some part is
sent annually by the Acapulco ships to Manilla; some part is employed in a
contraband trade, which the Spanish colonies carry on with those of other
European nations; and some part, no doubt, remains in the country. The mines of
America, besides, are by no means the only gold and silver mines in the world.
They, are, however, by far the most abundant. The produce of all the other
mines which are known is insignificant, it is acknowledged, in comparison with
theirs; and the far greater part of their produce, it is likewise acknowledged,
is annually imported into Cadiz and Lisbon. But the consumption of Birmingham
alone, at the rate of fifty thousand pounds a-year, is equal to the
hundred-and-twentieth part of this annual importation, at the rate of six
millions a-year. The whole annual consumption of gold and silver, therefore, in
all the different countries of the world where those metals are used, may,
perhaps, be nearly equal to the whole annual produce. The remainder may be no
more than sufficient to supply the increasing demand of all thriving countries.
It may even have fallen so far short of this demand, as somewhat to raise the
price of those metals in the European market.

The quantity of brass and iron annually brought from the mine to the market, is
out of all proportion greater than that of gold and silver. We do not, however,
upon this account, imagine that those coarse metals are likely to multiply
beyond the demand, or to become gradually cheaper and cheaper. Why should we
imagine that the precious metals are likely to do so? The coarse metals,
indeed, though harder, are put to much harder uses, and, as they are of less
value, less care is employed in their preservation. The precious metals,
however, are not necessarily immortal any more than they, but are liable, too,
to be lost, wasted, and consumed, in a great variety of ways.

The price of all metals, though liable to slow and gradual variations, varies
less from year to year than that of almost any other part of the rude produce
of land: and the price of the precious metals is even less liable to sudden
variations than that of the coarse ones. The durableness of metals is the
foundation of this extraordinary steadiness of price. The corn which was
brought to market last year will be all, or almost all, consumed, long before
the end of this year. But some part of the iron which was brought from the mine
two or three hundred years ago, may be still in use, and, perhaps, some part of
the gold which was brought from it two or three thousand years ago. The
different masses of corn, which, in different years, must supply the
consumption of the world, will always be nearly in proportion to the respective
produce of those different years. But the proportion between the different
masses of iron which may be in use in two different years, will be very little
affected by any accidental difference in the produce of the iron mines of those
two years; and the proportion between the masses of gold will be still less
affected by any such difference in the produce of the gold mines. Though the
produce of the greater part of metallic mines, therefore, varies, perhaps,
still more from year to year than that of the greater part of corn fields,
those variations have not the same effect upon the price of the one species of
commodities as upon that of the other.

Variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of Gold and
Silver.

Before the discovery of the mines of America, the value of fine gold to fine
silver was regulated in the different mines of Europe, between the proportions
of one to ten and one to twelve; that is, an ounce of fine gold was supposed to
be worth from ten to twelve ounces of fine silver. About the middle of the last
century, it came to be regulated, between the proportions of one to fourteen
and one to fifteen; that is, an ounce of fine gold came to be supposed worth
between fourteen and fifteen ounces of fine silver. Gold rose in its nominal
value, or in the quantity of silver which was given for it. Both metals sunk in
their real value, or in the quantity of labour which they could purchase; but
silver sunk more than gold. Though both the gold and silver mines of America
exceeded in fertility all those which had ever been known before, the fertility
of the silver mines had, it seems, been proportionally still greater than that
of the gold ones.

The great quantities of silver carried annually from Europe to India, have, in
some of the English settlements, gradually reduced the value of that metal in
proportion to gold. In the mint of Calcutta, an ounce of fine gold is supposed
to be worth fifteen ounces of fine silver, in the same manner as in Europe. It
is in the mint, perhaps, rated too high for the value which it bears in the
market of Bengal. In China, the proportion of gold to silver still continues as
one to ten, or one to twelve. In Japan, it is said to be as one to eight.

The proportion between the quantities of gold and silver annually imported into
Europe, according to Mr Meggens’ account, is as one to twenty-two nearly;
that is, for one ounce of gold there are imported a little more than twenty-two
ounces of silver. The great quantity of silver sent annually to the East Indies
reduces, he supposes, the quantities of those metals which remain in Europe to
the proportion of one to fourteen or fifteen, the proportion of their values.
The proportion between their values, he seems to think, must necessarily be the
same as that between their quantities, and would therefore be as one to
twenty-two, were it not for this greater exportation of silver.

But the ordinary proportion between the respective values of two commodities is
not necessarily the same as that between the quantities of them which are
commonly in the market. The price of an ox, reckoned at ten guineas, is about
three score times the price of a lamb, reckoned at 3s. 6d. It would be absurd,
however, to infer from thence, that there are commonly in the market three
score lambs for one ox; and it would be just as absurd to infer, because an
ounce of gold will commonly purchase from fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver,
that there are commonly in the market only fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver
for one ounce of gold.

The quantity of silver commonly in the market, it is probable, is much greater
in proportion to that of gold, than the value of a certain quantity of gold is
to that of an equal quantity of silver. The whole quantity of a cheap commodity
brought to market is commonly not only greater, but of greater value, than the
whole quantity of a dear one. The whole quantity of bread annually brought to
market, is not only greater, but of greater value, than the whole quantity of
butcher’s meat; the whole quantity of butcher’s meat, than the
whole quantity of poultry; and the whole quantity of poultry, than the whole
quantity of wild fowl. There are so many more purchasers for the cheap than for
the dear commodity, that, not only a greater quantity of it, but a greater
value can commonly be disposed of. The whole quantity, therefore, of the cheap
commodity, must commonly be greater in proportion to the whole quantity of the
dear one, than the value of a certain quantity of the dear one, is to the value
of an equal quantity of the cheap one. When we compare the precious metals with
one another, silver is a cheap, and gold a dear commodity. We ought naturally
to expect, therefore, that there should always be in the market, not only a
greater quantity, but a greater value of silver than of gold. Let any man, who
has a little of both, compare his own silver with his gold plate, and he will
probably find, that not only the quantity, but the value of the former, greatly
exceeds that of the latter. Many people, besides, have a good deal of silver
who have no gold plate, which, even with those who have it, is generally
confined to watch-cases, snuff-boxes, and such like trinkets, of which the
whole amount is seldom of great value. In the British coin, indeed, the value
of the gold preponderates greatly, but it is not so in that of all countries.
In the coin of some countries, the value of the two metals is nearly equal. In
the Scotch coin, before the union with England, the gold preponderated very
little, though it did somewhat {See Ruddiman’s Preface to
Anderson’s Diplomata, etc. Scotiae.}, as it appears by the accounts of
the mint. In the coin of many countries the silver preponderates. In France,
the largest sums are commonly paid in that metal, and it is there difficult to
get more gold than what is necessary to carry about in your pocket. The
superior value, however, of the silver plate above that of the gold, which
takes place in all countries, will much more than compensate the preponderancy
of the gold coin above the silver, which takes place only in some countries.

Though, in one sense of the word, silver always has been, and probably always
will be, much cheaper than gold; yet, in another sense, gold may perhaps, in
the present state of the Spanish market, be said to be somewhat cheaper than
silver. A commodity may be said to be dear or cheap not only according to the
absolute greatness or smallness of its usual price, but according as that price
is more or less above the lowest for which it is possible to bring it to market
for any considerable time together. This lowest price is that which barely
replaces, with a moderate profit, the stock which must be employed in bringing
the commodity thither. It is the price which affords nothing to the landlord,
of which rent makes not any component part, but which resolves itself
altogether into wages and profit. But, in the present state of the Spanish
market, gold is certainly somewhat nearer to this lowest price than silver. The
tax of the king of Spain upon gold is only one-twentieth part of the standard
metal, or five per cent.; whereas his tax upon silver amounts to one-tenth part
of it, or to ten per cent. In these taxes, too, it has already been observed,
consists the whole rent of the greater part of the gold and silver mines of
Spanish America; and that upon gold is still worse paid than that upon silver.
The profits of the undertakers of gold mines, too, as they more rarely make a
fortune, must, in general, be still more moderate than those of the undertakers
of silver mines. The price of Spanish gold, therefore, as it affords both less
rent and less profit, must, in the Spanish market, be somewhat nearer to the
lowest price for which it is possible to bring it thither, than the price of
Spanish silver. When all expenses are computed, the whole quantity of the one
metal, it would seem, cannot, in the Spanish market, be disposed of so
advantageously as the whole quantity of the other. The tax, indeed, of the king
of Portugal upon the gold of the Brazils, is the same with the ancient tax of
the king of Spain upon the silver of Mexico and Peru; or one-fifth part of the
standard metal. It may therefore be uncertain, whether, to the general market
of Europe, the whole mass of American gold comes at a price nearer to the
lowest for which it is possible to bring it thither, than the whole mass of
American silver.

The price of diamonds and other precious stones may, perhaps, be still nearer
to the lowest price at which it is possible to bring them to market, than even
the price of gold.

Though it is not very probable that any part of a tax, which is not only
imposed upon one of the most proper subjects of taxation, a mere luxury and
superfluity, but which affords so very important a revenue as the tax upon
silver, will ever be given up as long as it is possible to pay it; yet the same
impossibility of paying it, which, in 1736. made it necessary to reduce it from
one-fifth to one-tenth, may in time make it necessary to reduce it still
further; in the same manner as it made it necessary to reduce the tax upon gold
to one-twentieth. That the silver mines of Spanish America, like all other
mines, become gradually more expensive in the working, on account of the
greater depths at which it is necessary to carry on the works, and of the
greater expense of drawing out the water, and of supplying them with fresh air
at those depths, is acknowledged by everybody who has inquired into the state
of those mines.

These causes, which are equivalent to a growing scarcity of silver (for a
commodity may be said to grow scarcer when it becomes more difficult and
expensive to collect a certain quantity of it), must, in time, produce one or
other of the three following events: The increase of the expense must either,
first, be compensated altogether by a proportionable increase in the price of
the metal; or, secondly, it must be compensated altogether by a proportionable
diminution of the tax upon silver; or, thirdly, it must be compensated partly
by the one and partly by the other of those two expedients. This third event is
very possible. As gold rose in its price in proportion to silver,
notwithstanding a great diminution of the tax upon gold, so silver might rise
in its price in proportion to labour and commodities, notwithstanding an equal
diminution of the tax upon silver.

Such successive reductions of the tax, however, though they may not prevent
altogether, must certainly retard, more or less, the rise of the value of
silver in the European market. In consequence of such reductions, many mines
may be wrought which could not be wrought before, because they could not afford
to pay the old tax; and the quantity of silver annually brought to market, must
always be somewhat greater, and, therefore, the value of any given quantity
somewhat less, than it otherwise would have been. In consequence of the
reduction in 1736, the value of silver in the European market, though it may
not at this day be lower than before that reduction, is, probably, at least ten
per cent. lower than it would have been, had the court of Spain continued to
exact the old tax. That, notwithstanding this reduction, the value of silver
has, during the course of the present century, begun to rise somewhat in the
European market, the facts and arguments which have been alleged above, dispose
me to believe, or more properly to suspect and conjecture; for the best opinion
which I can form upon this subject, scarce, perhaps, deserves the name of
belief. The rise, indeed, supposing there has been any, has hitherto been so
very small, that after all that has been said, it may, perhaps, appear to many
people uncertain, not only whether this event has actually taken place, but
whether the contrary may not have taken place, or whether the value of silver
may not still continue to fall in the European market.

It must be observed, however, that whatever may be the supposed annual
importation of gold and silver, there must be a certain period at which the
annual consumption of those metals will be equal to that annual importation.
Their consumption must increase as their mass increases, or rather in a much
greater proportion. As their mass increases, their value diminishes. They are
more used, and less cared for, and their consumption consequently increases in
a greater proportion than their mass. After a certain period, therefore, the
annual consumption of those metals must, in this manner, become equal to their
annual importation, provided that importation is not continually increasing;
which, in the present times, is not supposed to be the case.

If, when the annual consumption has become equal to the annual importation, the
annual importation should gradually diminish, the annual consumption may, for
some time, exceed the annual importation. The mass of those metals may
gradually and insensibly diminish, and their value gradually and insensibly
rise, till the annual importation becoming again stationary, the annual
consumption will gradually and insensibly accommodate itself to what that
annual importation can maintain.

Grounds of the suspicion that the Value of Silver still continues to
decrease.

The increase of the wealth of Europe, and the popular notion, that as the
quantity of the precious metals naturally increases with the increase of
wealth, so their value diminishes as their quantity increases, may, perhaps,
dispose many people to believe that their value still continues to fall in the
European market; and the still gradually increasing price of many parts of the
rude produce of land may confirm them still farther in this opinion.

That that increase in the quantity of the precious metals, which arises in any
country from the increase of wealth, has no tendency to diminish their value, I
have endeavoured to shew already. Gold and silver naturally resort to a rich
country, for the same reason that all sorts of luxuries and curiosities resort
to it; not because they are cheaper there than in poorer countries, but because
they are dearer, or because a better price is given for them. It is the
superiority of price which attracts them; and as soon as that superiority
ceases, they necessarily cease to go thither.

If you except corn, and such other vegetables as are raised altogether by human
industry, that all other sorts of rude produce, cattle, poultry, game of all
kinds, the useful fossils and minerals of the earth, etc. naturally grow
dearer, as the society advances in wealth and improvement, I have endeavoured
to shew already. Though such commodities, therefore, come to exchange for a
greater quantity of silver than before, it will not from thence follow that
silver has become really cheaper, or will purchase less labour than before; but
that such commodities have become really dearer, or will purchase more labour
than before. It is not their nominal price only, but their real price, which
rises in the progress of improvement. The rise of their nominal price is the
effect, not of any degradation of the value of silver, but of the rise in their
real price.

Different Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon three different sorts
of rude Produce.

These different sorts of rude produce may be divided into three classes. The
first comprehends those which it is scarce in the power of human industry to
multiply at all. The second, those which it can multiply in proportion to the
demand. The third, those in which the efficacy of industry is either limited or
uncertain. In the progress of wealth and improvement, the real price of the
first may rise to any degree of extravagance, and seems not to be limited by
any certain boundary. That of the second, though it may rise greatly, has,
however, a certain boundary, beyond which it cannot well pass for any
considerable time together. That of the third, though its natural tendency is
to rise in the progress of improvement, yet in the same degree of improvement
it may sometimes happen even to fall, sometimes to continue the same, and
sometimes to rise more or less, according as different accidents render the
efforts of human industry, in multiplying this sort of rude produce, more or
less successful.

First Sort.—The first sort of rude produce, of which the price rises in
the progress of improvement, is that which it is scarce in the power of human
industry to multiply at all. It consists in those things which nature produces
only in certain quantities, and which being of a very perishable nature, it is
impossible to accumulate together the produce of many different seasons. Such
are the greater part of rare and singular birds and fishes, many different
sorts of game, almost all wild-fowl, all birds of passage in particular, as
well as many other things. When wealth, and the luxury which accompanies it,
increase, the demand for these is likely to increase with them, and no effort
of human industry may be able to increase the supply much beyond what it was
before this increase of the demand. The quantity of such commodities,
therefore, remaining the same, or nearly the same, while the competition to
purchase them is continually increasing, their price may rise to any degree of
extravagance, and seems not to be limited by any certain boundary. If woodcocks
should become so fashionable as to sell for twenty guineas a-piece, no effort
of human industry could increase the number of those brought to market, much
beyond what it is at present. The high price paid by the Romans, in the time of
their greatest grandeur, for rare birds and fishes, may in this manner easily
be accounted for. These prices were not the effects of the low value of silver
in those times, but of the high value of such rarities and curiosities as human
industry could not multiply at pleasure. The real value of silver was higher at
Rome, for sometime before, and after the fall of the republic, than it is
through the greater part of Europe at present. Three sestertii equal to about
sixpence sterling, was the price which the republic paid for the modius or peck
of the tithe wheat of Sicily. This price, however, was probably below the
average market price, the obligation to deliver their wheat at this rate being
considered as a tax upon the Sicilian farmers. When the Romans, therefore, had
occasion to order more corn than the tithe of wheat amounted to, they were
bound by capitulation to pay for the surplus at the rate of four sestertii, or
eightpence sterling the peck; and this had probably been reckoned the moderate
and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average contract price of those times;
it is equal to about one-and-twenty shillings the quarter. Eight-and-twenty
shillings the quarter was, before the late years of scarcity, the ordinary
contract price of English wheat, which in quality is inferior to the Sicilian,
and generally sells for a lower price in the European market. The value of
silver, therefore, in those ancient times, must have been to its value in the
present, as three to four inversely; that is, three ounces of silver would then
have purchased the same quantity of labour and commodities which four ounces
will do at present. When we read in Pliny, therefore, that Seius {Lib. X, c.
29.} bought a white nightingale, as a present for the empress Agrippina, at the
price of six thousand sestertii, equal to about fifty pounds of our present
money; and that Asinius Celer {Lib. IX, c. 17.} purchased a surmullet at the
price of eight thousand sestertii, equal to about sixty-six pounds thirteen
shillings and fourpence of our present money; the extravagance of those prices,
how much soever it may surprise us, is apt, notwithstanding, to appear to us
about one third less than it really was. Their real price, the quantity of
labour and subsistence which was given away for them, was about one-third more
than their nominal price is apt to express to us in the present times. Seius
gave for the nightingale the command of a quantity of labour and subsistence,
equal to what £ 66:13: 4d. would purchase in the present times; and Asinius
Celer gave for a surmullet the command of a quantity equal to what £ 88:17: 9d.
would purchase. What occasioned the extravagance of those high prices was, not
so much the abundance of silver, as the abundance of labour and subsistence, of
which those Romans had the disposal, beyond what was necessary for their own
use. The quantity of silver, of which they had the disposal, was a good deal
less than what the command of the same quantity of labour and subsistence would
have procured to them in the present times.

Second sort.—The second sort of rude produce, of which the price rises in
the progress of improvement, is that which human industry can multiply in
proportion to the demand. It consists in those useful plants and animals,
which, in uncultivated countries, nature produces with such profuse abundance,
that they are of little or no value, and which, as cultivation advances, are
therefore forced to give place to some more profitable produce. During a long
period in the progress of improvement, the quantity of these is continually
diminishing, while, at the same time, the demand for them is continually
increasing. Their real value, therefore, the real quantity of labour which they
will purchase or command, gradually rises, till at last it gets so high as to
render them as profitable a produce as any thing else which human industry can
raise upon the most fertile and best cultivated land. When it has got so high,
it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land and more industry would soon be
employed to increase their quantity.

When the price of cattle, for example, rises so high, that it is as profitable
to cultivate land in order to raise food for them as in order to raise food for
man, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more corn land would soon be turned
into pasture. The extension of tillage, by diminishing the quantity of wild
pasture, diminishes the quantity of butcher’s meat, which the country
naturally produces without labour or cultivation; and, by increasing the number
of those who have either corn, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of
corn, to give in exchange for it, increases the demand. The price of
butcher’s meat, therefore, and, consequently, of cattle, must gradually
rise, till it gets so high, that it becomes as profitable to employ the most
fertile and best cultivated lands in raising food for them as in raising corn.
But it must always be late in the progress of improvement before tillage can be
so far extended as to raise the price of cattle to this height; and, till it
has got to this height, if the country is advancing at all, their price must be
continually rising. There are, perhaps, some parts of Europe in which the price
of cattle has not yet got to this height. It had not got to this height in any
part of Scotland before the Union. Had the Scotch cattle been always confined
to the market of Scotland, in a country in which the quantity of land, which
can be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, is so great in
proportion to what can be applied to other purposes, it is scarce possible,
perhaps, that their price could ever have risen so high as to render it
profitable to cultivate land for the sake of feeding them. In England, the
price of cattle, it has already been observed, seems, in the neighbourhood of
London, to have got to this height about the beginning of the last century; but
it was much later, probably, before it got through the greater part of the
remoter counties, in some of which, perhaps, it may scarce yet have got to it.
Of all the different substances, however, which compose this second sort of
rude produce, cattle is, perhaps, that of which the price, in the progress of
improvement, rises first to this height.

Till the price of cattle, indeed, has got to this height, it seems scarce
possible that the greater part, even of those lands which are capable of the
highest cultivation, can be completely cultivated. In all farms too distant
from any town to carry manure from it, that is, in the far greater part of
those of every extensive country, the quantity of well cultivated land must be
in proportion to the quantity of manure which the farm itself produces; and
this, again, must be in proportion to the stock of cattle which are maintained
upon it. The land is manured, either by pasturing the cattle upon it, or by
feeding them in the stable, and from thence carrying out their dung to it. But
unless the price of the cattle be sufficient to pay both the rent and profit of
cultivated land, the farmer cannot afford to pasture them upon it; and he can
still less afford to feed them in the stable. It is with the produce of
improved and cultivated land only that cattle can be fed in the stable;
because, to collect the scanty and scattered produce of waste and unimproved
lands, would require too much labour, and be too expensive. If the price of the
cattle, therefore, is not sufficient to pay for the produce of improved and
cultivated land, when they are allowed to pasture it, that price will be still
less sufficient to pay for that produce, when it must be collected with a good
deal of additional labour, and brought into the stable to them. In these
circumstances, therefore, no more cattle can with profit be fed in the stable
than what are necessary for tillage. But these can never afford manure enough
for keeping constantly in good condition all the lands which they are capable
of cultivating. What they afford, being insufficient for the whole farm, will
naturally be reserved for the lands to which it can be most advantageously or
conveniently applied; the most fertile, or those, perhaps, in the neighbourhood
of the farm-yard. These, therefore, will be kept constantly in good condition,
and fit for tillage. The rest will, the greater part of them, be allowed to lie
waste, producing scarce any thing but some miserable pasture, just sufficient
to keep alive a few straggling, half-starved cattle; the farm, though much
overstocked in proportion to what would be necessary for its complete
cultivation, being very frequently overstocked in proportion to its actual
produce. A portion of this waste land, however, after having been pastured in
this wretched manner for six or seven years together, may be ploughed up, when
it will yield, perhaps, a poor crop or two of bad oats, or of some other coarse
grain; and then, being entirely exhausted, it must be rested and pastured again
as before, and another portion ploughed up, to be in the same manner exhausted
and rested again in its turn. Such, accordingly, was the general system of
management all over the low country of Scotland before the Union. The lands
which were kept constantly well manured and in good condition seldom exceeded a
third or fourth part of the whole farm, and sometimes did not amount to a fifth
or a sixth part of it. The rest were never manured, but a certain portion of
them was in its turn, notwithstanding, regularly cultivated and exhausted.
Under this system of management, it is evident, even that part of the lands of
Scotland which is capable of good cultivation, could produce but little in
comparison of what it may be capable of producing. But how disadvantageous
soever this system may appear, yet, before the Union, the low price of cattle
seems to have rendered it almost unavoidable. If, notwithstanding a great rise
in the price, it still continues to prevail through a considerable part of the
country, it is owing in many places, no doubt, to ignorance and attachment to
old customs, but, in most places, to the unavoidable obstructions which the
natural course of things opposes to the immediate or speedy establishment of a
better system: first, to the poverty of the tenants, to their not having yet
had time to acquire a stock of cattle sufficient to cultivate their lands more
completely, the same rise of price, which would render it advantageous for them
to maintain a greater stock, rendering it more difficult for them to acquire
it; and, secondly, to their not having yet had time to put their lands in
condition to maintain this greater stock properly, supposing they were capable
of acquiring it. The increase of stock and the improvement of land are two
events which must go hand in hand, and of which the one can nowhere much outrun
the other. Without some increase of stock, there can be scarce any improvement
of land, but there can be no considerable increase of stock, but in consequence
of a considerable improvement of land; because otherwise the land could not
maintain it. These natural obstructions to the establishment of a better
system, cannot be removed but by a long course of frugality and industry; and
half a century or a century more, perhaps, must pass away before the old
system, which is wearing out gradually, can be completely abolished through all
the different parts of the country. Of all the commercial advantages, however,
which Scotland has derived from the Union with England, this rise in the price
of cattle is, perhaps, the greatest. It has not only raised the value of all
highland estates, but it has, perhaps, been the principal cause of the
improvement of the low country.

In all new colonies, the great quantity of waste land, which can for many years
be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, soon renders them
extremely abundant; and in every thing great cheapness is the necessary
consequence of great abundance. Though all the cattle of the European colonies
in America were originally carried from Europe, they soon multiplied so much
there, and became of so little value, that even horses were allowed to run wild
in the woods, without any owner thinking it worth while to claim them. It must
be a long time after the first establishment of such colonies, before it can
become profitable to feed cattle upon the produce of cultivated land. The same
causes, therefore, the want of manure, and the disproportion between the stock
employed in cultivation and the land which it is destined to cultivate, are
likely to introduce there a system of husbandry, not unlike that which still
continues to take place in so many parts of Scotland. Mr Kalm, the Swedish
traveller, when he gives an account of the husbandry of some of the English
colonies in North America, as he found it in 1749, observes, accordingly, that
he can with difficulty discover there the character of the English nation, so
well skilled in all the different branches of agriculture. They make scarce any
manure for their corn fields, he says; but when one piece of ground has been
exhausted by continual cropping, they clear and cultivate another piece of
fresh land; and when that is exhausted, proceed to a third. Their cattle are
allowed to wander through the woods and other uncultivated grounds, where they
are half-starved; having long ago extirpated almost all the annual grasses, by
cropping them too early in the spring, before they had time to form their
flowers, or to shed their seeds. {Kalm’s Travels, vol 1, pp. 343, 344.}
The annual grasses were, it seems, the best natural grasses in that part of
North America; and when the Europeans first settled there, they used to grow
very thick, and to rise three or four feet high. A piece of ground which, when
he wrote, could not maintain one cow, would in former times, he was assured,
have maintained four, each of which would have given four times the quantity of
milk which that one was capable of giving. The poorness of the pasture had, in
his opinion, occasioned the degradation of their cattle, which degenerated
sensibly from one generation to another. They were probably not unlike that
stunted breed which was common all over Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and
which is now so much mended through the greater part of the low country, not so
much by a change of the breed, though that expedient has been employed in some
places, as by a more plentiful method of feeding them.

Though it is late, therefore, in the progress of improvement, before cattle can
bring such a price as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the sake of
feeding them; yet of all the different parts which compose this second sort of
rude produce, they are perhaps the first which bring this price; because, till
they bring it, it seems impossible that improvement can be brought near even to
that degree of perfection to which it has arrived in many parts of Europe.

As cattle are among the first, so perhaps venison is among the last parts of
this sort of rude produce which bring this price. The price of venison in Great
Britain, how extravagant soever it may appear, is not near sufficient to
compensate the expense of a deer park, as is well known to all those who have
had any experience in the feeding of deer. If it was otherwise, the feeding of
deer would soon become an article of common farming, in the same manner as the
feeding of those small birds, called turdi, was among the ancient Romans. Varro
and Columella assure us, that it was a most profitable article. The fattening
of ortolans, birds of passage which arrive lean in the country, is said to be
so in some parts of France. If venison continues in fashion, and the wealth and
luxury of Great Britain increase as they have done for some time past, its
price may very probably rise still higher than it is at present.

Between that period in the progress of improvement, which brings to its height
the price of so necessary an article as cattle, and that which brings to it the
price of such a superfluity as venison, there is a very long interval, in the
course of which many other sorts of rude produce gradually arrive at their
highest price, some sooner and some later, according to different
circumstances.

Thus, in every farm, the offals of the barn and stable will maintain a certain
number of poultry. These, as they are fed with what would otherwise be lost,
are a mere save-all; and as they cost the farmer scarce any thing, so he can
afford to sell them for very little. Almost all that he gets is pure gain, and
their price can scarce be so low as to discourage him from feeding this number.
But in countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the
poultry, which are thus raised without expense, are often fully sufficient to
supply the whole demand. In this state of things, therefore, they are often as
cheap as butcher’s meat, or any other sort of animal food. But the whole
quantity of poultry which the farm in this manner produces without expense,
must always be much smaller than the whole quantity of butcher’s meat
which is reared upon it; and in times of wealth and luxury, what is rare, with
only nearly equal merit, is always preferred to what is common. As wealth and
luxury increase, therefore, in consequence of improvement and cultivation, the
price of poultry gradually rises above that of butcher’s meat, till at
last it gets so high, that it becomes profitable to cultivate land for the sake
of feeding them. When it has got to this height, it cannot well go higher. If
it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. In several provinces of
France, the feeding of poultry is considered as a very important article in
rural economy, and sufficiently profitable to encourage the farmer to raise a
considerable quantity of Indian corn and buckwheat for this purpose. A middling
farmer will there sometimes have four hundred fowls in his yard. The feeding of
poultry seems scarce yet to be generally considered as a matter of so much
importance in England. They are certainly, however, dearer in England than in
France, as England receives considerable supplies from France. In the progress
of improvements, the period at which every particular sort of animal food is
dearest, must naturally be that which immediately precedes the general practice
of cultivating land for the sake of raising it. For some time before this
practice becomes general, the scarcity must necessarily raise the price. After
it has become general, new methods of feeding are commonly fallen upon, which
enable the farmer to raise upon the same quantity of ground a much greater
quantity of that particular sort of animal food. The plenty not only obliges
him to sell cheaper, but, in consequence of these improvements, he can afford
to sell cheaper; for if he could not afford it, the plenty would not be of long
continuance. It has been probably in this manner that the introduction of
clover, turnips, carrots, cabbages, etc. has contributed to sink the common
price of butcher’s meat in the London market, somewhat below what it was
about the beginning of the last century.

The hog, that finds his food among ordure, and greedily devours many things
rejected by every other useful animal, is, like poultry, originally kept as a
save-all. As long as the number of such animals, which can thus be reared at
little or no expense, is fully sufficient to supply the demand, this sort of
butcher’s meat comes to market at a much lower price than any other. But
when the demand rises beyond what this quantity can supply, when it becomes
necessary to raise food on purpose for feeding and fattening hogs, in the same
manner as for feeding and fattening other cattle, the price necessarily rises,
and becomes proportionably either higher or lower than that of other
butcher’s meat, according as the nature of the country, and the state of
its agriculture, happen to render the feeding of hogs more or less expensive
than that of other cattle. In France, according to Mr Buffon, the price of pork
is nearly equal to that of beef. In most parts of Great Britain it is at
present somewhat higher.

The great rise in the price both of hogs and poultry, has, in Great Britain,
been frequently imputed to the diminution of the number of cottagers and other
small occupiers of land; an event which has in every part of Europe been the
immediate forerunner of improvement and better cultivation, but which at the
same time may have contributed to raise the price of those articles, both
somewhat sooner and somewhat faster than it would otherwise have risen. As the
poorest family can often maintain a cat or a dog without any expense, so the
poorest occupiers of land can commonly maintain a few poultry, or a sow and a
few pigs, at very little. The little offals of their own table, their whey,
skimmed milk, and butter milk, supply those animals with a part of their food,
and they find the rest in the neighbouring fields, without doing any sensible
damage to any body. By diminishing the number of those small occupiers,
therefore, the quantity of this sort of provisions, which is thus produced at
little or no expense, must certainly have been a good deal diminished, and
their price must consequently have been raised both sooner and faster than it
would otherwise have risen. Sooner or later, however, in the progress of
improvement, it must at any rate have risen to the utmost height to which it is
capable of rising; or to the price which pays the labour and expense of
cultivating the land which furnishes them with food, as well as these are paid
upon the greater part of other cultivated land.

The business of the dairy, like the feeding of hogs and poultry, is originally
carried on as a save-all. The cattle necessarily kept upon the farm produce
more milk than either the rearing of their own young, or the consumption of the
farmer’s family requires; and they produce most at one particular season.
But of all the productions of land, milk is perhaps the most perishable. In the
warm season, when it is most abundant, it will scarce keep four-and-twenty
hours. The farmer, by making it into fresh butter, stores a small part of it
for a week; by making it into salt butter, for a year; and by making it into
cheese, he stores a much greater part of it for several years. Part of all
these is reserved for the use of his own family; the rest goes to market, in
order to find the best price which is to be had, and which can scarce be so low
is to discourage him from sending thither whatever is over and above the use of
his own family. If it is very low indeed, he will be likely to manage his dairy
in a very slovenly and dirty manner, and will scarce, perhaps, think it worth
while to have a particular room or building on purpose for it, but will suffer
the business to be carried on amidst the smoke, filth, and nastiness of his own
kitchen, as was the case of almost all the farmers’ dairies in Scotland
thirty or forty years ago, and as is the case of many of them still. The same
causes which gradually raise the price of butcher’s meat, the increase of
the demand, and, in consequence of the improvement of the country, the
diminution of the quantity which can be fed at little or no expense, raise, in
the same manner, that of the produce of the dairy, of which the price naturally
connects with that of butcher’s meat, or with the expense of feeding
cattle. The increase of price pays for more labour, care, and cleanliness. The
dairy becomes more worthy of the farmer’s attention, and the quality of
its produce gradually improves. The price at last gets so high, that it becomes
worth while to employ some of the most fertile and best cultivated lands in
feeding cattle merely for the purpose of the dairy; and when it has got to this
height, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to
this purpose. It seems to have got to this height through the greater part of
England, where much good land is commonly employed in this manner. If you
except the neighbourhood of a few considerable towns, it seems not yet to have
got to this height anywhere in Scotland, where common farmers seldom employ
much good land in raising food for cattle, merely for the purpose of the dairy.
The price of the produce, though it has risen very considerably within these
few years, is probably still too low to admit of it. The inferiority of the
quality, indeed, compared with that of the produce of English dairies, is fully
equal to that of the price. But this inferiority of quality is, perhaps, rather
the effect of this lowness of price, than the cause of it. Though the quality
was much better, the greater part of what is brought to market could not, I
apprehend, in the present circumstances of the country, be disposed of at a
much better price; and the present price, it is probable, would not pay the
expense of the land and labour necessary for producing a much better quality.
Through the greater part of England, notwithstanding the superiority of price,
the dairy is not reckoned a more profitable employment of land than the raising
of corn, or the fattening of cattle, the two great objects of agriculture.
Through the greater part of Scotland, therefore, it cannot yet be even so
profitable.

The lands of no country, it is evident, can ever be completely cultivated and
improved, till once the price of every produce, which human industry is obliged
to raise upon them, has got so high as to pay for the expense of complete
improvement and cultivation. In order to do this, the price of each particular
produce must be sufficient, first, to pay the rent of good corn land, as it is
that which regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land;
and, secondly, to pay the labour and expense of the farmer, as well as they are
commonly paid upon good corn land; or, in other words, to replace with the
ordinary profits the stock which he employs about it. This rise in the price of
each particular produce; must evidently be previous to the improvement and
cultivation of the land which is destined for raising it. Gain is the end of
all improvement; and nothing could deserve that name, of which loss was to be
the necessary consequence. But loss must be the necessary consequence of
improving land for the sake of a produce of which the price could never bring
back the expense. If the complete improvement and cultivation of the country
be, as it most certainly is, the greatest of all public advantages, this rise
in the price of all those different sorts of rude produce, instead of being
considered as a public calamity, ought to be regarded as the necessary
forerunner and attendant of the greatest of all public advantages.

This rise, too, in the nominal or money price of all those different sorts of
rude produce, has been the effect, not of any degradation in the value of
silver, but of a rise in their real price. They have become worth, not only a
greater quantity of silver, but a greater quantity of labour and subsistence
than before. As it costs a greater quantity of labour and subsistence to bring
them to market, so, when they are brought thither they represent, or are
equivalent to a greater quantity.

Third Sort.—The third and last sort of rude produce, of which the price
naturally rises in the progress of improvement, is that in which the efficacy
of human industry, in augmenting the quantity, is either limited or uncertain.
Though the real price of this sort of rude produce, therefore, naturally tends
to rise in the progress of improvement, yet, according as different accidents
happen to render the efforts of human industry more or less successful in
augmenting the quantity, it may happen sometimes even to fall, sometimes to
continue the same, in very different periods of improvement, and sometimes to
rise more or less in the same period.

There are some sorts of rude produce which nature has rendered a kind of
appendages to other sorts; so that the quantity of the one which any country
can afford, is necessarily limited by that of the other. The quantity of wool
or of raw hides, for example, which any country can afford, is necessarily
limited by the number of great and small cattle that are kept in it. The state
of its improvement, and the nature of its agriculture, again necessarily
determine this number.

The same causes which, in the progress of improvement, gradually raise the
price of butcher’s meat, should have the same effect, it may be thought,
upon the prices of wool and raw hides, and raise them, too, nearly in the same
proportion. It probably would be so, if, in the rude beginnings of improvement,
the market for the latter commodities was confined within as narrow bounds as
that for the former. But the extent of their respective markets is commonly
extremely different.

The market for butcher’s meat is almost everywhere confined to the
country which produces it. Ireland, and some part of British America, indeed,
carry on a considerable trade in salt provisions; but they are, I believe, the
only countries in the commercial world which do so, or which export to other
countries any considerable part of their butcher’s meat.

The market for wool and raw hides, on the contrary, is, in the rude beginnings
of improvement, very seldom confined to the country which produces them. They
can easily be transported to distant countries; wool without any preparation,
and raw hides with very little; and as they are the materials of many
manufactures, the industry of other countries may occasion a demand for them,
though that of the country which produces them might not occasion any.

In countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the price of
the wool and the hide bears always a much greater proportion to that of the
whole beast, than in countries where, improvement and population being further
advanced, there is more demand for butcher’s meat. Mr Hume observes, that
in the Saxon times, the fleece was estimated at two-fifths of the value of the
whole sheep and that this was much above the proportion of its present
estimation. In some provinces of Spain, I have been assured, the sheep is
frequently killed merely for the sake of the fleece and the tallow. The carcase
is often left to rot upon the ground, or to be devoured by beasts and birds of
prey. If this sometimes happens even in Spain, it happens almost constantly in
Chili, at Buenos Ayres, and in many other parts of Spanish America, where the
horned cattle are almost constantly killed merely for the sake of the hide and
the tallow. This, too, used to happen almost constantly in Hispaniola, while it
was infested by the buccaneers, and before the settlement, improvement, and
populousness of the French plantations ( which now extend round the coast of
almost the whole western half of the island) had given some value to the cattle
of the Spaniards, who still continue to possess, not only the eastern part of
the coast, but the whole inland mountainous part of the country.

Though, in the progress of improvement and population, the price of the whole
beast necessarily rises, yet the price of the carcase is likely to be much more
affected by this rise than that of the wool and the hide. The market for the
carcase being in the rude state of society confined always to the country which
produces it, must necessarily be extended in proportion to the improvement and
population of that country. But the market for the wool and the hides, even of
a barbarous country, often extending to the whole commercial world, it can very
seldom be enlarged in the same proportion. The state of the whole commercial
world can seldom be much affected by the improvement of any particular country;
and the market for such commodities may remain the same, or very nearly the
same, after such improvements, as before. It should, however, in the natural
course of things, rather, upon the whole, be somewhat extended in consequence
of them. If the manufactures, especially, of which those commodities are the
materials, should ever come to flourish in the country, the market, though it
might not be much enlarged, would at least be brought much nearer to the place
of growth than before; and the price of those materials might at least be
increased by what had usually been the expense of transporting them to distant
countries. Though it might not rise, therefore, in the same proportion as that
of butcher’s meat, it ought naturally to rise somewhat, and it ought
certainly not to fall.

In England, however, notwithstanding the flourishing state of its woollen
manufacture, the price of English wool has fallen very considerably since the
time of Edward III. There are many authentic records which demonstrate that,
during the reign of that prince (towards the middle of the fourteenth century,
or about 1339), what was reckoned the moderate and reasonable price of the tod,
or twenty-eight pounds of English wool, was not less than ten shillings of the
money of those times {See Smith’s Memoirs of Wool, vol. i c. 5, 6, 7.
also vol. ii.}, containing, at the rate of twenty-pence the ounce, six ounces
of silver, Tower weight, equal to about thirty shillings of our present money.
In the present times, one-and-twenty shillings the tod may be reckoned a good
price for very good English wool. The money price of wool, therefore, in the
time of Edward III. was to its money price in the present times as ten to
seven. The superiority of its real price was still greater. At the rate of six
shillings and eightpence the quarter, ten shillings was in those ancient times
the price of twelve bushels of wheat. At the rate of twenty-eight shillings the
quarter, one-and-twenty shillings is in the present times the price of six
bushels only. The proportion between the real price of ancient and modern
times, therefore, is as twelve to six, or as two to one. In those ancient
times, a tod of wool would have purchased twice the quantity of subsistence
which it will purchase at present, and consequently twice the quantity of
labour, if the real recompence of labour had been the same in both periods.

This degradation, both in the real and nominal value of wool, could never have
happened in consequence of the natural course of things. It has accordingly
been the effect of violence and artifice. First, of the absolute prohibition of
exporting wool from England: secondly, of the permission of importing it from
Spain, duty free: thirdly, of the prohibition of exporting it from Ireland to
another country but England. In consequence of these regulations, the market
for English wool, instead of being somewhat extended, in consequence of the
improvement of England, has been confined to the home market, where the wool of
several other countries is allowed to come into competition with it, and where
that of Ireland is forced into competition with it. As the woollen
manufactures, too, of Ireland, are fully as much discouraged as is consistent
with justice and fair dealing, the Irish can work up but a smaller part of
their own wool at home, and are therefore obliged to send a greater proportion
of it to Great Britain, the only market they are allowed.

I have not been able to find any such authentic records concerning the price of
raw hides in ancient times. Wool was commonly paid as a subsidy to the king,
and its valuation in that subsidy ascertains, at least in some degree, what was
its ordinary price. But this seems not to have been the case with raw hides.
Fleetwood, however, from an account in 1425, between the prior of Burcester
Oxford and one of his canons, gives us their price, at least as it was stated
upon that particular occasion, viz. five ox hides at twelve shillings; five cow
hides at seven shillings and threepence; thirtysix sheep skins of two years old
at nine shillings; sixteen calf skins at two shillings. In 1425, twelve
shillings contained about the same quantity of silver as four-and-twenty
shillings of our present money. An ox hide, therefore, was in this account
valued at the same quantity of silver as 4s. 4/5ths of our present money. Its
nominal price was a good deal lower than at present. But at the rate of six
shillings and eightpence the quarter, twelve shillings would in those times
have purchased fourteen bushels and four-fifths of a bushel of wheat, which, at
three and sixpence the bushel, would in the present times cost 51s. 4d. An ox
hide, therefore, would in those times have purchased as much corn as ten
shillings and threepence would purchase at present. Its real value was equal to
ten shillings and threepence of our present money. In those ancient times, when
the cattle were half starved during the greater part of the winter, we cannot
suppose that they were of a very large size. An ox hide which weighs four stone
of sixteen pounds of avoirdupois, is not in the present times reckoned a bad
one; and in those ancient times would probably have been reckoned a very good
one. But at half-a-crown the stone, which at this moment (February 1773) I
understand to be the common price, such a hide would at present cost only ten
shillings. Through its nominal price, therefore, is higher in the present than
it was in those ancient times, its real price, the real quantity of subsistence
which it will purchase or command, is rather somewhat lower. The price of cow
hides, as stated in the above account, is nearly in the common proportion to
that of ox hides. That of sheep skins is a good deal above it. They had
probably been sold with the wool. That of calves skins, on the contrary, is
greatly below it. In countries where the price of cattle is very low, the
calves, which are not intended to be reared in order to keep up the stock, are
generally killed very young, as was the case in Scotland twenty or thirty years
ago. It saves the milk, which their price would not pay for. Their skins,
therefore, are commonly good for little.

The price of raw hides is a good deal lower at present than it was a few years
ago; owing probably to the taking off the duty upon seal skins, and to the
allowing, for a limited time, the importation of raw hides from Ireland, and
from the plantations, duty free, which was done in 1769. Take the whole of the
present century at an average, their real price has probably been somewhat
higher than it was in those ancient times. The nature of the commodity renders
it not quite so proper for being transported to distant markets as wool. It
suffers more by keeping. A salted hide is reckoned inferior to a fresh one, and
sells for a lower price. This circumstance must necessarily have some tendency
to sink the price of raw hides produced in a country which does not manufacture
them, but is obliged to export them, and comparatively to raise that of those
produced in a country which does manufacture them. It must have some tendency
to sink their price in a barbarous, and to raise it in an improved and
manufacturing country. It must have had some tendency, therefore, to sink it in
ancient, and to raise it in modern times. Our tanners, besides, have not been
quite so successful as our clothiers, in convincing the wisdom of the nation,
that the safety of the commonwealth depends upon the prosperity of their
particular manufacture. They have accordingly been much less favoured. The
exportation of raw hides has, indeed, been prohibited, and declared a nuisance;
but their importation from foreign countries has been subjected to a duty; and
though this duty has been taken off from those of Ireland and the plantations
(for the limited time of five years only), yet Ireland has not been confined to
the market of Great Britain for the sale of its surplus hides, or of those
which are not manufactured at home. The hides of common cattle have, but within
these few years, been put among the enumerated commodities which the
plantations can send nowhere but to the mother country; neither has the
commerce of Ireland been in this case oppressed hitherto, in order to support
the manufactures of Great Britain.

Whatever regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw hides,
below what it naturally would be, must, in an improved and cultivated country,
have some tendency to raise the price of butcher’s meat. The price both
of the great and small cattle, which are fed on improved and cultivated land,
must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the
farmer, has reason to expect from improved and cultivated land. If it is not,
they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part of this price, therefore, is
not paid by the wool and the hide, must be paid by the carcase. The less there
is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the other. In what manner this
price is to be divided upon the different parts of the beast, is indifferent to
the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid to them. In an improved and
cultivated country, therefore, their interest as landlords and farmers cannot
be much affected by such regulations, though their interest as consumers may,
by the rise in the price of provisions. It would be quite otherwise, however,
in an unimproved and uncultivated country, where the greater part of the lands
could be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, and where the
wool and the hide made the principal part of the value of those cattle. Their
interest as landlords and farmers would in this case be very deeply affected by
such regulations, and their interest as consumers very little. The fall in the
price of the wool and the hide would not in this case raise the price of the
carcase; because the greater part of the lands of the country being applicable
to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, the same number would still
continue to be fed. The same quantity of butcher’s meat would still come
to market. The demand for it would be no greater than before. Its price,
therefore, would be the same as before. The whole price of cattle would fall,
and along with it both the rent and the profit of all those lands of which
cattle was the principal produce, that is, of the greater part of the lands of
the country. The perpetual prohibition of the exportation of wool, which is
commonly, but very falsely, ascribed to Edward III., would, in the then
circumstances of the country, have been the most destructive regulation which
could well have been thought of. It would not only have reduced the actual
value of the greater part of the lands in the kingdom, but by reducing the
price of the most important species of small cattle, it would have retarded
very much its subsequent improvement.

The wool of Scotland fell very considerably in its price in consequence of the
union with England, by which it was excluded from the great market of Europe,
and confined to the narrow one of Great Britain. The value of the greater part
of the lands in the southern counties of Scotland, which are chiefly a sheep
country, would have been very deeply affected by this event, had not the rise
in the price of butcher’s meat fully compensated the fall in the price of
wool.

As the efficacy of human industry, in increasing the quantity either of wool or
of raw hides, is limited, so far as it depends upon the produce of the country
where it is exerted; so it is uncertain so far as it depends upon the produce
of other countries. It so far depends not so much upon the quantity which they
produce, as upon that which they do not manufacture; and upon the restraints
which they may or may not think proper to impose upon the exportation of this
sort of rude produce. These circumstances, as they are altogether independent
of domestic industry, so they necessarily render the efficacy of its efforts
more or less uncertain. In multiplying this sort of rude produce, therefore,
the efficacy of human industry is not only limited, but uncertain.

In multiplying another very important sort of rude produce, the quantity of
fish that is brought to market, it is likewise both limited and uncertain. It
is limited by the local situation of the country, by the proximity or distance
of its different provinces from the sea, by the number of its lakes and rivers,
and by what may be called the fertility or barrenness of those seas, lakes, and
rivers, as to this sort of rude produce. As population increases, as the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country grows greater and greater, there
come to be more buyers of fish; and those buyers, too, have a greater quantity
and variety of other goods, or, what is the same thing, the price of a greater
quantity and variety of other goods, to buy with. But it will generally be
impossible to supply the great and extended market, without employing a
quantity of labour greater than in proportion to what had been requisite for
supplying the narrow and confined one. A market which, from requiring only one
thousand, comes to require annually ten thousand ton of fish, can seldom be
supplied, without employing more than ten times the quantity of labour which
had before been sufficient to supply it. The fish must generally be sought for
at a greater distance, larger vessels must be employed, and more expensive
machinery of every kind made use of. The real price of this commodity,
therefore, naturally rises in the progress of improvement. It has accordingly
done so, I believe, more or less in every country.

Though the success of a particular day’s fishing may be a very uncertain
matter, yet the local situation of the country being supposed, the general
efficacy of industry in bringing a certain quantity of fish to market, taking
the course of a year, or of several years together, it may, perhaps, be thought
is certain enough; and it, no doubt, is so. As it depends more, however, upon
the local situation of the country, than upon the state of its wealth and
industry; as upon this account it may in different countries be the same in
very different periods of improvement, and very different in the same period;
its connection with the state of improvement is uncertain; and it is of this
sort of uncertainty that I am here speaking.

In increasing the quantity of the different minerals and metals which are drawn
from the bowels of the earth, that of the more precious ones particularly, the
efficacy of human industry seems not to be limited, but to be altogether
uncertain.

The quantity of the precious metals which is to be found in any country, is not
limited by any thing in its local situation, such as the fertility or
barrenness of its own mines. Those metals frequently abound in countries which
possess no mines. Their quantity, in every particular country, seems to depend
upon two different circumstances; first, upon its power of purchasing, upon the
state of its industry, upon the annual produce of its land and labour, in
consequence of which it can afford to employ a greater or a smaller quantity of
labour and subsistence, in bringing or purchasing such superfluities as gold
and silver, either from its own mines, or from those of other countries; and,
secondly, upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which may happen at any
particular time to supply the commercial world with those metals. The quantity
of those metals in the countries most remote from the mines, must be more or
less affected by this fertility or barrenness, on account of the easy and cheap
transportation of those metals, of their small bulk and great value. Their
quantity in China and Indostan must have been more or less affected by the
abundance of the mines of America.

So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the former of
those two circumstances (the power of purchasing), their real price, like that
of all other luxuries and superfluities, is likely to rise with the wealth and
improvement of the country, and to fall with its poverty and depression.
Countries which have a great quantity of labour and subsistence to spare, can
afford to purchase any particular quantity of those metals at the expense of a
greater quantity of labour and subsistence, than countries which have less to
spare.

So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the latter of
those two circumstances (the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen
to supply the commercial world), their real price, the real quantity of labour
and subsistence which they will purchase or exchange for, will, no doubt, sink
more or less in proportion to the fertility, and rise in proportion to the
barrenness of those mines.

The fertility or barrenness of the mines, however, which may happen at any
particular time to supply the commercial world, is a circumstance which, it is
evident, may have no sort of connection with the state of industry in a
particular country. It seems even to have no very necessary connection with
that of the world in general. As arts and commerce, indeed, gradually spread
themselves over a greater and a greater part of the earth, the search for new
mines, being extended over a wider surface, may have somewhat a better chance
for being successful than when confined within narrower bounds. The discovery
of new mines, however, as the old ones come to be gradually exhausted, is a
matter of the greatest uncertainty, and such as no human skill or industry can
insure. All indications, it is acknowledged, are doubtful; and the actual
discovery and successful working of a new mine can alone ascertain the reality
of its value, or even of its existence. In this search there seem to be no
certain limits, either to the possible success, or to the possible
disappointment of human industry. In the course of a century or two, it is
possible that new mines may be discovered, more fertile than any that have ever
yet been known; and it is just equally possible, that the most fertile mine
then known may be more barren than any that was wrought before the discovery of
the mines of America. Whether the one or the other of those two events may
happen to take place, is of very little importance to the real wealth and
prosperity of the world, to the real value of the annual produce of the land
and labour of mankind. Its nominal value, the quantity of gold and silver by
which this annual produce could be expressed or represented, would, no doubt,
be very different; but its real value, the real quantity of labour which it
could purchase or command, would be precisely the same. A shilling might, in
the one case, represent no more labour than a penny does at present; and a
penny, in the other, might represent as much as a shilling does now. But in the
one case, he who had a shilling in his pocket would be no richer than he who
has a penny at present; and in the other, he who had a penny would be just as
rich as he who has a shilling now. The cheapness and abundance of gold and
silver plate would be the sole advantage which the world could derive from the
one event; and the dearness and scarcity of those trifling superfluities, the
only inconveniency it could suffer from the other.

Conclusion of the Digression concerning the Variations in the Value of
Silver.

The greater part of the writers who have collected the money price of things in
ancient times, seem to have considered the low money price of corn, and of
goods in general, or, in other words, the high value of gold and silver, as a
proof, not only of the scarcity of those metals, but of the poverty and
barbarism of the country at the time when it took place. This notion is
connected with the system of political economy, which represents national
wealth as consisting in the abundance and national poverty in the scarcity, of
gold and silver; a system which I shall endeavour to explain and examine at
great length in the fourth book of this Inquiry. I shall only observe at
present, that the high value of the precious metals can be no proof of the
poverty or barbarism of any particular country at the time when it took place.
It is a proof only of the barrenness of the mines which happened at that time
to supply the commercial world. A poor country, as it cannot afford to buy
more, so it can as little afford to pay dearer for gold and silver than a rich
one; and the value of those metals, therefore, is not likely to be higher in
the former than in the latter. In China, a country much richer than any part of
Europe, the value of the precious metals is much higher than in any part of
Europe. As the wealth of Europe, indeed, has increased greatly since the
discovery of the mines of America, so the value of gold and silver has
gradually diminished. This diminution of their value, however, has not been
owing to the increase of the real wealth of Europe, of the annual produce of
its land and labour, but to the accidental discovery of more abundant mines
than any that were known before. The increase of the quantity of gold and
silver in Europe, and the increase of its manufactures and agriculture, are two
events which, though they have happened nearly about the same time, yet have
arisen from very different causes, and have scarce any natural connection with
one another. The one has arisen from a mere accident, in which neither prudence
nor policy either had or could have any share; the other, from the fall of the
feudal system, and from the establishment of a government which afforded to
industry the only encouragement which it requires, some tolerable security that
it shall enjoy the fruits of its own labour. Poland, where the feudal system
still continues to take place, is at this day as beggarly a country as it was
before the discovery of America. The money price of corn, however, has risen;
the real value of the precious metals has fallen in Poland, in the same manner
as in other parts of Europe. Their quantity, therefore, must have increased
there as in other places, and nearly in the same proportion to the annual
produce of its land and labour. This increase of the quantity of those metals,
however, has not, it seems, increased that annual produce, has neither improved
the manufactures and agriculture of the country, nor mended the circumstances
of its inhabitants. Spain and Portugal, the countries which possess the mines,
are, after Poland, perhaps the two most beggarly countries in Europe. The value
of the precious metals, however, must be lower in Spain and Portugal than in
any other part of Europe, as they come from those countries to all other parts
of Europe, loaded, not only with a freight and an insurance, but with the
expense of smuggling, their exportation being either prohibited or subjected to
a duty. In proportion to the annual produce of the land and labour, therefore,
their quantity must be greater in those countries than in any other part of
Europe; those countries, however, are poorer than the greater part of Europe.
Though the feudal system has been abolished in Spain and Portugal, it has not
been succeeded by a much better.

As the low value of gold and silver, therefore, is no proof of the wealth and
flourishing state of the country where it takes place; so neither is their high
value, or the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in
particular, any proof of its poverty and barbarism.

But though the low money price, either of goods in general, or of corn in
particular, be no proof of the poverty or barbarism of the times, the low money
price of some particular sorts of goods, such as cattle, poultry, game of all
kinds, etc. in proportion to that of corn, is a most decisive one. It clearly
demonstrates, first, their great abundance in proportion to that of corn, and,
consequently, the great extent of the land which they occupied in proportion to
what was occupied by corn; and, secondly, the low value of this land in
proportion to that of corn land, and, consequently, the uncultivated and
unimproved state of the far greater part of the lands of the country. It
clearly demonstrates, that the stock and population of the country did not bear
the same proportion to the extent of its territory, which they commonly do in
civilized countries; and that society was at that time, and in that country,
but in its infancy. From the high or low money price, either of goods in
general, or of corn in particular, we can infer only, that the mines, which at
that time happened to supply the commercial world with gold and silver, were
fertile or barren, not that the country was rich or poor. But from the high or
low money price of some sorts of goods in proportion to that of others, we can
infer, with a degree of probability that approaches almost to certainty, that
it was rich or poor, that the greater part of its lands were improved or
unimproved, and that it was either in a more or less barbarous state, or in a
more or less civilized one.

Any rise in the money price of goods which proceeded altogether from the
degradation of the value of silver, would affect all sorts of goods equally,
and raise their price universally, a third, or a fourth, or a fifth part
higher, according as silver happened to lose a third, or a fourth, or a fifth
part of its former value. But the rise in the price of provisions, which has
been the subject of so much reasoning and conversation, does not affect all
sorts of provisions equally. Taking the course of the present century at an
average, the price of corn, it is acknowledged, even by those who account for
this rise by the degradation of the value of silver, has risen much less than
that of some other sorts of provisions. The rise in the price of those other
sorts of provisions, therefore, cannot be owing altogether to the degradation
of the value of silver. Some other causes must be taken into the account; and
those which have been above assigned, will, perhaps, without having recourse to
the supposed degradation of the value of silver, sufficiently explain this rise
in those particular sorts of provisions, of which the price has actually risen
in proportion to that of corn.

As to the price of corn itself, it has, during the sixty-four first years of
the present century, and before the late extraordinary course of bad seasons,
been somewhat lower than it was during the sixty-four last years of the
preceding century. This fact is attested, not only by the accounts of Windsor
market, but by the public fiars of all the different counties of Scotland, and
by the accounts of several different markets in France, which have been
collected with great diligence and fidelity by Mr Messance, and by Mr Dupré de
St Maur. The evidence is more complete than could well have been expected in a
matter which is naturally so very difficult to be ascertained.

As to the high price of corn during these last ten or twelve years, it can be
sufficiently accounted for from the badness of the seasons, without supposing
any degradation in the value of silver.

The opinion, therefore, that silver is continually sinking in its value, seems
not to be founded upon any good observations, either upon the prices of corn,
or upon those of other provisions.

The same quantity of silver, it may perhaps be said, will, in the present
times, even according to the account which has been here given, purchase a much
smaller quantity of several sorts of provisions than it would have done during
some part of the last century; and to ascertain whether this change be owing to
a rise in the value of those goods, or to a fall in the value of silver, is
only to establish a vain and useless distinction, which can be of no sort of
service to the man who has only a certain quantity of silver to go to market
with, or a certain fixed revenue in money. I certainly do not pretend that the
knowledge of this distinction will enable him to buy cheaper. It may not,
however, upon that account be altogether useless.

It may be of some use to the public, by affording an easy proof of the
prosperous condition of the country. If the rise in the price of some sorts of
provisions be owing altogether to a fall in the value of silver, it is owing to
a circumstance, from which nothing can be inferred but the fertility of the
American mines. The real wealth of the country, the annual produce of its land
and labour, may, notwithstanding this circumstance, be either gradually
declining, as in Portugal and Poland; or gradually advancing, as in most other
parts of Europe. But if this rise in the price of some sorts of provisions be
owing to a rise in the real value of the land which produces them, to its
increased fertility, or, in consequence of more extended improvement and good
cultivation, to its having been rendered fit for producing corn; it is owing to
a circumstance which indicates, in the clearest manner, the prosperous and
advancing state of the country. The land constitutes by far the greatest, the
most important, and the most durable part of the wealth of every extensive
country. It may surely be of some use, or, at least, it may give some
satisfaction to the public, to have so decisive a proof of the increasing value
of by far the greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of its
wealth.

It may, too, be of some use to the public, in regulating the pecuniary reward
of some of its inferior servants. If this rise in the price of some sorts of
provisions be owing to a fall in the value of silver, their pecuniary reward,
provided it was not too large before, ought certainly to be augmented in
proportion to the extent of this fall. If it is not augmented, their real
recompence will evidently be so much diminished. But if this rise of price is
owing to the increased value, in consequence of the improved fertility of the
land which produces such provisions, it becomes a much nicer matter to judge,
either in what proportion any pecuniary reward ought to be augmented, or
whether it ought to be augmented at all. The extension of improvement and
cultivation, as it necessarily raises more or less, in proportion to the price
of corn, that of every sort of animal food, so it as necessarily lowers that
of, I believe, every sort of vegetable food. It raises the price of animal
food; because a great part of the land which produces it, being rendered fit
for producing corn, must afford to the landlord and farmer the rent and profit
of corn land. It lowers the price of vegetable food; because, by increasing the
fertility of the land, it increases its abundance. The improvements of
agriculture, too, introduce many sorts of vegetable food, which requiring less
land, and not more labour than corn, come much cheaper to market. Such are
potatoes and maize, or what is called Indian corn, the two most important
improvements which the agriculture of Europe, perhaps, which Europe itself, has
received from the great extension of its commerce and navigation. Many sorts of
vegetable food, besides, which in the rude state of agriculture are confined to
the kitchen-garden, and raised only by the spade, come, in its improved state,
to be introduced into common fields, and to be raised by the plough; such as
turnips, carrots, cabbages, etc. If, in the progress of improvement, therefore,
the real price of one species of food necessarily rises, that of another as
necessarily falls; and it becomes a matter of more nicety to judge how far the
rise in the one may be compensated by the fall in the other. When the real
price of butcher’s meat has once got to its height (which, with regard to
every sort, except perhaps that of hogs flesh, it seems to have done through a
great part of England more than a century ago), any rise which can afterwards
happen in that of any other sort of animal food, cannot much affect the
circumstances of the inferior ranks of people. The circumstances of the poor,
through a great part of England, cannot surely be so much distressed by any
rise in the price of poultry, fish, wild-fowl, or venison, as they must be
relieved by the fall in that of potatoes.

In the present season of scarcity, the high price of corn no doubt distresses
the poor. But in times of moderate plenty, when corn is at its ordinary or
average price, the natural rise in the price of any other sort of rude produce
cannot much affect them. They suffer more, perhaps, by the artificial rise
which has been occasioned by taxes in the price of some manufactured
commodities, as of salt, soap, leather, candles, malt, beer, ale, etc.

Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the real Price of
Manufactures.

It is the natural effect of improvement, however, to diminish gradually the
real price of almost all manufactures. That of the manufacturing workmanship
diminishes, perhaps, in all of them without exception. In consequence of better
machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a more proper division and distribution
of work, all of which are the natural effects of improvement, a much smaller
quantity of labour becomes requisite for executing any particular piece of
work; and though, in consequence of the flourishing circumstances of the
society, the real price of labour should rise very considerably, yet the great
diminution of the quantity will generally much more than compensate the
greatest rise which can happen in the price.

There are, indeed, a few manufactures, in which the necessary rise in the real
price of the rude materials will more than compensate all the advantages which
improvement can introduce into the execution of the work. In carpenters’
and joiners’ work, and in the coarser sort of cabinet work, the necessary
rise in the real price of barren timber, in consequence of the improvement of
land, will more than compensate all the advantages which can be derived from
the best machinery, the greatest dexterity, and the most proper division and
distribution of work.

But in all cases in which the real price of the rude material either does not
rise at all, or does not rise very much, that of the manufactured commodity
sinks very considerably.

This diminution of price has, in the course of the present and preceding
century, been most remarkable in those manufactures of which the materials are
the coarser metals. A better movement of a watch, than about the middle of the
last century could have been bought for twenty pounds, may now perhaps be had
for twenty shillings. In the work of cutlers and locksmiths, in all the toys
which are made of the coarser metals, and in all those goods which are commonly
known by the name of Birmingham and Sheffield ware, there has been, during the
same period, a very great reduction of price, though not altogether so great as
in watch-work. It has, however, been sufficient to astonish the workmen of
every other part of Europe, who in many cases acknowledge that they can produce
no work of equal goodness for double or even for triple the price. There are
perhaps no manufactures, in which the division of labour can be carried
further, or in which the machinery employed admits of a greater variety of
improvements, than those of which the materials are the coarser metals.

In the clothing manufacture there has, during the same period, been no such
sensible reduction of price. The price of superfine cloth, I have been assured,
on the contrary, has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty years, risen
somewhat in proportion to its quality, owing, it was said, to a considerable
rise in the price of the material, which consists altogether of Spanish wool.
That of the Yorkshire cloth, which is made altogether of English wool, is said,
indeed, during the course of the present century, to have fallen a good deal in
proportion to its quality. Quality, however, is so very disputable a matter,
that I look upon all information of this kind as somewhat uncertain. In the
clothing manufacture, the division of labour is nearly the same now as it was a
century ago, and the machinery employed is not very different. There may,
however, have been some small improvements in both, which may have occasioned
some reduction of price.

But the reduction will appear much more sensible and undeniable, if we compare
the price of this manufacture in the present times with what it was in a much
remoter period, towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the labour was
probably much less subdivided, and the machinery employed much more imperfect,
than it is at present.

In 1487, being the 4th of Henry VII., it was enacted, that “whosoever
shall sell by retail a broad yard of the finest scarlet grained, or of other
grained cloth of the finest making, above sixteen shillings, shall forfeit
forty shillings for every yard so sold.” Sixteen shillings, therefore,
containing about the same quantity of silver as four-and-twenty shillings of
our present money, was, at that time, reckoned not an unreasonable price for a
yard of the finest cloth; and as this is a sumptuary law, such cloth, it is
probable, had usually been sold somewhat dearer. A guinea may be reckoned the
highest price in the present times. Even though the quality of the cloths,
therefore, should be supposed equal, and that of the present times is most
probably much superior, yet, even upon this supposition, the money price of the
finest cloth appears to have been considerably reduced since the end of the
fifteenth century. But its real price has been much more reduced. Six shillings
and eightpence was then, and long afterwards, reckoned the average price of a
quarter of wheat. Sixteen shillings, therefore, was the price of two quarters
and more than three bushels of wheat. Valuing a quarter of wheat in the present
times at eight-and-twenty shillings, the real price of a yard of fine cloth
must, in those times, have been equal to at least three pounds six shillings
and sixpence of our present money. The man who bought it must have parted with
the command of a quantity of labour and subsistence equal to what that sum
would purchase in the present times.

The reduction in the real price of the coarse manufacture, though considerable,
has not been so great as in that of the fine.

In 1463, being the 3rd of Edward IV. it was enacted, that “no servant in
husbandry nor common labourer, nor servant to any artificer inhabiting out of a
city or burgh, shall use or wear in their clothing any cloth above two
shillings the broad yard.” In the 3rd of Edward IV., two shillings
contained very nearly the same quantity of silver as four of our present money.
But the Yorkshire cloth which is now sold at four shillings the yard, is
probably much superior to any that was then made for the wearing of the very
poorest order of common servants. Even the money price of their clothing,
therefore, may, in proportion to the quality, be somewhat cheaper in the
present than it was in those ancient times. The real price is certainly a good
deal cheaper. Tenpence was then reckoned what is called the moderate and
reasonable price of a bushel of wheat. Two shillings, therefore, was the price
of two bushels and near two pecks of wheat, which in the present times, at
three shillings and sixpence the bushel, would be worth eight shillings and
ninepence. For a yard of this cloth the poor servant must have parted with the
power of purchasing a quantity of subsistence equal to what eight shillings and
ninepence would purchase in the present times. This is a sumptuary law, too,
restraining the luxury and extravagance of the poor. Their clothing, therefore,
had commonly been much more expensive.

The same order of people are, by the same law, prohibited from wearing hose, of
which the price should exceed fourteen-pence the pair, equal to about
eight-and-twenty pence of our present money. But fourteen-pence was in those
times the price of a bushel and near two pecks of wheat; which in the present
times, at three and sixpence the bushel, would cost five shillings and
threepence. We should in the present times consider this as a very high price
for a pair of stockings to a servant of the poorest and lowest order. He must
however, in those times, have paid what was really equivalent to this price for
them.

In the time of Edward IV. the art of knitting stockings was probably not known
in any part of Europe. Their hose were made of common cloth, which may have
been one of the causes of their dearness. The first person that wore stockings
in England is said to have been Queen Elizabeth. She received them as a present
from the Spanish ambassador.

Both in the coarse and in the fine woollen manufacture, the machinery employed
was much more imperfect in those ancient, than it is in the present times. It
has since received three very capital improvements, besides, probably, many
smaller ones, of which it may be difficult to ascertain either the number or
the importance. The three capital improvements are, first, the exchange of the
rock and spindle for the spinning-wheel, which, with the same quantity of
labour, will perform more than double the quantity of work. Secondly, the use
of several very ingenious machines, which facilitate and abridge, in a still
greater proportion, the winding of the worsted and woollen yarn, or the proper
arrangement of the warp and woof before they are put into the loom; an
operation which, previous to the invention of those machines, must have been
extremely tedious and troublesome. Thirdly, the employment of the fulling-mill
for thickening the cloth, instead of treading it in water. Neither wind nor
water mills of any kind were known in England so early as the beginning of the
sixteenth century, nor, so far as I know, in any other part of Europe north of
the Alps. They had been introduced into Italy some time before.

The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure, explain
to us why the real price both of the coarse and of the fine manufacture was so
much higher in those ancient than it is in the present times. It cost a greater
quantity of labour to bring the goods to market. When they were brought
thither, therefore, they must have purchased, or exchanged for the price of, a
greater quantity.

The coarse manufacture probably was, in those ancient times, carried on in
England in the same manner as it always has been in countries where arts and
manufactures are in their infancy. It was probably a household manufacture, in
which every different part of the work was occasionally performed by all the
different members of almost every private family, but so as to be their work
only when they had nothing else to do, and not to be the principal business
from which any of them derived the greater part of their subsistence. The work
which is performed in this manner, it has already been observed, comes always
much cheaper to market than that which is the principal or sole fund of the
workman’s subsistence. The fine manufacture, on the other hand, was not,
in those times, carried on in England, but in the rich and commercial country
of Flanders; and it was probably conducted then, in the same manner as now, by
people who derived the whole, or the principal part of their subsistence from
it. It was, besides, a foreign manufacture, and must have paid some duty, the
ancient custom of tonnage and poundage at least, to the king. This duty,
indeed, would not probably be very great. It was not then the policy of Europe
to restrain, by high duties, the importation of foreign manufactures, but
rather to encourage it, in order that merchants might be enabled to supply, at
as easy a rate as possible, the great men with the conveniencies and luxuries
which they wanted, and which the industry of their own country could not afford
them.

The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure explain
to us why, in those ancient times, the real price of the coarse manufacture
was, in proportion to that of the fine, so much lower than in the present
times.

Conclusion of the Chapter.

I shall conclude this very long chapter with observing, that every improvement
in the circumstances of the society tends, either directly or indirectly, to
raise the real rent of land to increase the real wealth of the landlord, his
power of purchasing the labour, or the produce of the labour of other people.

The extension of improvement and cultivation tends to raise it directly. The
landlord’s share of the produce necessarily increases with the increase
of the produce.

That rise in the real price of those parts of the rude produce of land, which
is first the effect of the extended improvement and cultivation, and afterwards
the cause of their being still further extended, the rise in the price of
cattle, for example, tends, too, to raise the rent of land directly, and in a
still greater proportion. The real value of the landlord’s share, his
real command of the labour of other people, not only rises with the real value
of the produce, but the proportion of his share to the whole produce rises with
it.

That produce, after the rise in its real price, requires no more labour to
collect it than before. A smaller proportion of it will, therefore, be
sufficient to replace, with the ordinary profit, the stock which employs that
labour. A greater proportion of it must consequently belong to the landlord.

All those improvements in the productive powers of labour, which tend directly
to reduce the rent price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raise the real
rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is
over and above his own consumption, or, what comes to the same thing, the price
of that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces the real price
of the latter, raises that of the former. An equal quantity of the former
becomes thereby equivalent to a greater quantity of the latter; and the
landlord is enabled to purchase a greater quantity of the conveniencies,
ornaments, or luxuries which he has occasion for.

Every increase in the real wealth of the society, every increase in the
quantity of useful labour employed within it, tends indirectly to raise the
real rent of land. A certain proportion of this labour naturally goes to the
land. A greater number of men and cattle are employed in its cultivation, the
produce increases with the increase of the stock which is thus employed in
raising it, and the rent increases with the produce.

The contrary circumstances, the neglect of cultivation and improvement, the
fall in the real price of any part of the rude produce of land, the rise in the
real price of manufactures from the decay of manufacturing art and industry,
the declension of the real wealth of the society, all tend, on the other hand,
to lower the real rent of land, to reduce the real wealth of the landlord, to
diminish his power of purchasing either the labour, or the produce of the
labour, of other people.

The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, or, what
comes to the same thing, the whole price of that annual produce, naturally
divides itself, it has already been observed, into three parts; the rent of
land, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and constitutes a revenue
to three different orders of people; to those who live by rent, to those who
live by wages, and to those who live by profit. These are the three great,
original, and constituent, orders of every civilized society, from whose
revenue that of every other order is ultimately derived.

The interest of the first of those three great orders, it appears from what has
been just now said, is strictly and inseparably connected with the general
interest of the society. Whatever either promotes or obstructs the one,
necessarily promotes or obstructs the other. When the public deliberates
concerning any regulation of commerce or police, the proprietors of land never
can mislead it, with a view to promote the interest of their own particular
order; at least, if they have any tolerable knowledge of that interest. They
are, indeed, too often defective in this tolerable knowledge. They are the only
one of the three orders whose revenue costs them neither labour nor care, but
comes to them, as it were, of its own accord, and independent of any plan or
project of their own. That indolence which is the natural effect of the ease
and security of their situation, renders them too often, not only ignorant, but
incapable of that application of mind, which is necessary in order to foresee
and understand the consequence of any public regulation.

The interest of the second order, that of those who live by wages, is as
strictly connected with the interest of the society as that of the first. The
wages of the labourer, it has already been shewn, are never so high as when the
demand for labour is continually rising, or when the quantity employed is every
year increasing considerably. When this real wealth of the society becomes
stationary, his wages are soon reduced to what is barely enough to enable him
to bring up a family, or to continue the race of labourers. When the society
declines, they fall even below this. The order of proprietors may perhaps gain
more by the prosperity of the society than that of labourers; but there is no
order that suffers so cruelly from its decline. But though the interest of the
labourer is strictly connected with that of the society, he is incapable either
of comprehending that interest, or of understanding its connexion with his own.
His condition leaves him no time to receive the necessary information, and his
education and habits are commonly such as to render him unfit to judge, even
though he was fully informed. In the public deliberations, therefore, his voice
is little heard, and less regarded; except upon particular occasions, when his
clamour is animated, set on, and supported by his employers, not for his, but
their own particular purposes.

His employers constitute the third order, that of those who live by profit. It
is the stock that is employed for the sake of profit, which puts into motion
the greater part of the useful labour of every society. The plans and projects
of the employers of stock regulate and direct all the most important operation
of labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and projects. But
the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity, and
fall with the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low
in rich, and high in poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries
which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order, therefore,
has not the same connexion with the general interest of the society, as that of
the other two. Merchants and master manufacturers are, in this order, the two
classes of people who commonly employ the largest capitals, and who by their
wealth draw to themselves the greatest share of the public consideration. As
during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have
frequently more acuteness of understanding than the greater part of country
gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about the
interest of their own particular branch of business. than about that of the
society, their judgment, even when given with the greatest candour (which it
has not been upon every occasion), is much more to be depended upon with regard
to the former of those two objects, than with regard to the latter. Their
superiority over the country gentleman is, not so much in their knowledge of
the public interest, as in their having a better knowledge of their own
interest than he has of his. It is by this superior knowledge of their own
interest that they have frequently imposed upon his generosity, and persuaded
him to give up both his own interest and that of the public, from a very simple
but honest conviction, that their interest, and not his, was the interest of
the public. The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of
trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even
opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market, and to narrow the
competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may
frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the
competition must always be against it, and can only serve to enable the
dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy,
for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens.
The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this
order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to
be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with
the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an
order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public,
who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and
who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.

# PRICES OF WHEAT

Year Prices/Quarter Average of different Average prices of
in each year prices in one year each year in money
of 1776

£ s d £ s d £ s d
1202 0 12 0 1 16 0
1205 0 12 0
0 13 4 0 13 5 2 0 3
0 15 0
1223 0 12 0 1 16 0
1237 0 3 4 0 10 0
1243 0 2 0 0 6 0
1244 0 2 0 0 6 0
1246 0 16 0 2 8 0
1247 0 13 5 2 0 0
1257 1 4 0 3 12 0
1258 1 0 0
0 15 0 0 17 0 2 11 0
0 16 0
1270 4 16 0
6 8 0 5 12 0 16 16 0
1286 0 2 8
0 16 0 0 9 4 1 8 0
Total 35 9 3
Average 2 19 1¼

1287 0 3 4 0 10 0
1288 0 0 8
0 1 0
0 1 4
0 1 6
0 1 8 0 3 0¼ 0 9 1¾
0 2 0
0 3 4
0 9 4
1289 0 12 0
0 6 0
0 2 0 0 10 1½ 1 10 4½
0 10 8
1 0 0
1290 0 16 0 2 8 0
1294 0 16 0 2 8 0
1302 0 4 0 0 12 0
1309 0 7 2 1 1 6
1315 1 0 0 3 0 0
1316 1 0 0
1 10 0 1 10 6 4 11 6
1 12 0
2 0 0
1317 2 4 0
0 14 0
2 13 0 1 19 6 5 18 6
4 0 0
0 6 8
1336 0 2 0 0 6 0
1338 0 3 4 0 10 0
Total 23 4 11¼
Average 1 18 8

1339 0 9 0 1 7 0
1349 0 2 0 0 5 2
1359 1 6 8 3 2 2
1361 0 2 0 0 4 8
1363 0 15 0 1 15 0
1369 1 0 0
1 4 0 1 2 0 2 9 4
1379 0 4 0 0 9 4
1387 0 2 0 0 4 8
1390 0 13 4
0 14 0 0 14 5 1 13 7
0 16 0
1401 0 16 0 1 17 6
1407 0 4 4¾
0 3 4 0 3 10 0 8 10
1416 0 16 0 1 12 0
Total 15 9 4
Average 1 5 9½

1423 0 8 0 0
1425 0 4 0 0
1434 1 6 8 4
1435 0 5 4 8
1439 1 0 0
1 6 8 1 3 4 2 6 8
1440 1 4 0 2 8 0
1444 0 4 4 0 4 2 0 4 8
0 4 0
1445 0 4 6 0 9 0
1447 0 8 0 0 16 0
1448 0 6 8 0 13 4
1449 0 5 0 0 10 0
1451 0 8 0 0 16 0
Total 12 15 4
Average 1 1 3¹/³

1453 0 5 4 0 10 8
1455 0 1 2 0 2 4
1457 0 7 8 1 15 4
1459 0 5 0 0 10 0
1460 0 8 0 0 16 0
1463 0 2 0 0 1 10 0 3 8
0 1 8
1464 0 6 8 0 10 0
1486 1 4 0 1 17 0
1491 0 14 8 1 2 0
1494 0 4 0 0 6 0
1495 0 3 4 0 5 0
1497 1 0 0 1 11 0
Total 8 9 0
Average 0 14 1

1499 0 4 0 0 6 0
1504 0 5 8 0 8 6
1521 1 0 0 1 10 0
1551 0 8 0 0 8 0
1553 0 8 0 0 8 0
1554 0 8 0 0 8 0
1555 0 8 0 0 8 0
1556 0 8 0 0 8 0
1557 0 8 0
0 4 0 0 17 8½ 0 17 8½
0 5 0
2 13 4
1558 0 8 0 0 8 0
1559 0 8 0 0 8 0
1560 0 8 0 0 8 0
Total 6 0 2½
Average 0 10 0½

1561 0 8 0 0 8 0
1562 0 8 0 0 8 0
1574 2 16 0
1 4 0 2 0 0 2 0 0
1587 3 4 0 3 4 0
1594 2 16 0 2 16 0
1595 2 13 0 2 13 0
1596 4 0 0 4 0 0
1597 5 4 0
4 0 0 4 12 0 4 12 0
1598 2 16 8 2 16 8
1599 1 19 2 1 19 8
1600 1 17 8 1 17 8
1601 1 14 10 1 14 10
Total 28 9 4
Average 2 7 5½

PRICES OF THE QUARTER OF NINE BUSHELS OF THE BEST OR HIGHEST PRICED WHEAT AT
WINDSOR MARKET, ON LADY DAY AND MICHAELMAS, FROM 1595 TO 1764 BOTH INCLUSIVE;
THE PRICE OF EACH YEAR BEING THE MEDIUM BETWEEN THE HIGHEST PRICES OF THESE TWO
MARKET DAYS.

£ s d
1595 2 0 0
1596 2 8 0
1597 3 9 6
1598 2 16 8
1599 1 19 2
1600 1 17 8
1601 1 14 10
1602 1 9 4
1603 1 15 4
1604 1 10 8
1605 1 15 10
1606 1 13 0
1607 1 16 8
1608 2 16 8
1609 2 10 0
1610 1 15 10
1611 1 18 8
1612 2 2 4
1613 2 8 8
1614 2 1 8½
1615 1 18 8
1616 2 0 4
1617 2 8 8
1618 2 6 8
1619 1 15 4
1620 1 10 4
26)54 0 6½
Average 2 1 6¾

1621 1 10 4
1622 2 18 8
1623 2 12 0
1624 2 8 0
1625 2 12 0
1626 2 9 4
1627 1 16 0
1628 1 8 0
1629 2 2 0
1630 2 15 8
1631 3 8 0
1632 2 13 4
1633 2 18 0
1634 2 16 0
1635 2 16 0
1636 2 16 8
16)40 0 0
Average 2 10 0

1637 2 13 0
1638 2 17 4
1639 2 4 10
1640 2 4 8
1641 2 8 0
1646 2 8 0
1647 3 13 0
1648 4 5 0
1649 4 0 0
1650 3 16 8
1651 3 13 4
1652 2 9 6
1653 1 15 6
1654 1 6 0
1655 1 13 4
1656 2 3 0
1657 2 6 8
1658 3 5 0
1659 3 6 0
1660 2 16 6
1661 3 10 0
1662 3 14 0
1663 2 17 0
1664 2 0 6
1665 2 9 4
1666 1 16 0
1667 1 16 0
1668 2 0 0
1669 2 4 4
1670 2 1 8
1671 2 2 0
1672 2 1 0
1673 2 6 8
1674 3 8 8
1675 3 4 8
1676 1 18 0
1677 2 2 0
1678 2 19 0
1679 3 0 0
1680 2 5 0
1681 2 6 8
1682 2 4 0
1683 2 0 0
1684 2 4 0
1685 2 6 8
1686 1 14 0
1687 1 5 2
1688 2 6 0
1689 1 10 0
1690 1 14 8
1691 1 14 0
1692 2 6 8
1693 3 7 8
1694 3 4 0
1695 2 13 0
1696 3 11 0
1697 3 0 0
1698 3 8 4
1699 3 4 0
1700 2 0 0
60) 153 1 8
Average 2 11 0¹/³

1701 1 17 8
1702 1 9 6
1703 1 16 0
1704 2 6 6
1705 1 10 0
1706 1 6 0
1707 1 8 6
1708 2 1 6
1709 3 18 6
1710 3 18 0
1711 2 14 0
1712 2 6 4
1713 2 11 0
1714 2 10 4
1715 2 3 0
1716 2 8 0
1717 2 5 8
1718 1 18 10
1719 1 15 0
1720 1 17 0
1721 1 17 6
1722 1 16 0
1723 1 14 8
1724 1 17 0
1725 2 8 6
1726 2 6 0
1727 2 2 0
1728 2 14 6
1729 2 6 10
1730 1 16 6
1731 1 12 10 1 12 10
1732 1 6 8 1 6 8
1733 1 8 4 1 8 4
1734 1 18 10 1 18 10
1735 2 3 0 2 3 0
1736 2 0 4 2 0 4
1737 1 18 0 1 18 0
1738 1 15 6 1 15 6
1739 1 18 6 1 18 6
1740 2 10 8 2 10 8
10) 18 12 8
1 17 3½

1741 2 6 8 2 6 8
1742 1 14 0 1 14 0
1743 1 4 10 1 4 10
1744 1 4 10 1 4 10
1745 1 7 6 1 7 6
1746 1 19 0 1 19 0
1747 1 14 10 1 14 10
1748 1 17 0 1 17 0
1749 1 17 0 1 17 0
1750 1 12 6 1 12 6
10) 16 18 2
1 13 9¾

1751 1 18 6
1752 2 1 10
1753 2 4 8
1754 1 13 8
1755 1 14 10
1756 2 5 3
1757 3 0 0
1758 2 10 0
1759 1 19 10
1760 1 16 6
1761 1 10 3
1762 1 19 0
1763 2 0 9
1764 2 6 9
64) 129 13 6
Average 2 0 6¾

BOOK II.
OF THE NATURE, ACCUMULATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK.

INTRODUCTION.

In that rude state of society, in which there is no division of labour, in
which exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides every thing
for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated, or
stored up before-hand, in order to carry on the business of the society. Every
man endeavours to supply, by his own industry, his own occasional wants, as
they occur. When he is hungry, he goes to the forest to hunt; when his coat is
worn out, he clothes himself with the skin of the first large animal he kills:
and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs it, as well as he can, with
the trees and the turf that are nearest it.

But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the
produce of a man’s own labour can supply but a very small part of his
occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce of
other men’s labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the
same thing, with the price of the produce, of his own. But this purchase cannot
be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only been
completed, but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, therefore, must be
stored up somewhere, sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the
materials and tools of his work, till such time at least as both these events
can be brought about. A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his peculiar
business, unless there is before-hand stored up somewhere, either in his own
possession, or in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to maintain
him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, till he has
not only completed, but sold his web. This accumulation must evidently be
previous to his applying his industry for so long a time to such a peculiar
business.

As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the
division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion
only as stock is previously more and more accumulated. The quantity of
materials which the same number of people can work up, increases in a great
proportion as labour comes to be more and more subdivided; and as the
operations of each workman are gradually reduced to a greater degree of
simplicity, a variety of new machines come to be invented for facilitating and
abridging those operations. As the division of labour advances, therefore, in
order to give constant employment to an equal number of workmen, an equal stock
of provisions, and a greater stock of materials and tools than what would have
been necessary in a ruder state of things, must be accumulated before-hand. But
the number of workmen in every branch of business generally increases with the
division of labour in that branch; or rather it is the increase of their number
which enables them to class and subdivide themselves in this manner.

As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this great
improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation naturally
leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in maintaining
labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to produce as great
a quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore, both to make among
his workmen the most proper distribution of employment, and to furnish them
with the best machines which he can either invent or afford to purchase. His
abilities, in both these respects, are generally in proportion to the extent of
his stock, or to the number of people whom it can employ. The quantity of
industry, therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase of
the stock which employs it, but, in consequence of that increase, the same
quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work.

Such are in general the effects of the increase of stock upon industry and its
productive powers.

In the following book, I have endeavoured to explain the nature of stock, the
effects of its accumulation into capital of different kinds, and the effects of
the different employments of those capitals. This book is divided into five
chapters. In the first chapter, I have endeavoured to shew what are the
different parts or branches into which the stock, either of an individual, or
of a great society, naturally divides itself. In the second, I have endeavoured
to explain the nature and operation of money, considered as a particular branch
of the general stock of the society. The stock which is accumulated into a
capital, may either be employed by the person to whom it belongs, or it may be
lent to some other person. In the third and fourth chapters, I have endeavoured
to examine the manner in which it operates in both these situations. The fifth
and last chapter treats of the different effects which the different
employments of capital immediately produce upon the quantity, both of national
industry, and of the annual produce of land and labour.

CHAPTER I.
OF THE DIVISION OF STOCK.

When the stock which a man possesses is no more than sufficient to maintain him
for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving any revenue from
it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can, and endeavours, by his labour, to
acquire something which may supply its place before it be consumed altogether.
His revenue is, in this case, derived from his labour only. This is the state
of the greater part of the labouring poor in all countries.

But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or years, he
naturally endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of it, reserving
only so much for his immediate consumption as may maintain him till this
revenue begins to come in. His whole stock, therefore, is distinguished into
two parts. That part which he expects is to afford him this revenue is called
his capital. The other is that which supplies his immediate consumption, and
which consists either, first, in that portion of his whole stock which was
originally reserved for this purpose; or, secondly, in his revenue, from
whatever source derived, as it gradually comes in; or, thirdly, in such things
as had been purchased by either of these in former years, and which are not yet
entirely consumed, such as a stock of clothes, household furniture, and the
like. In one or other, or all of these three articles, consists the stock which
men commonly reserve for their own immediate consumption.

There are two different ways in which a capital may be employed so as to yield
a revenue or profit to its employer.

First, it may be employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and
selling them again with a profit. The capital employed in this manner yields no
revenue or profit to its employer, while it either remains in his possession,
or continues in the same shape. The goods of the merchant yield him no revenue
or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields him as little till
it is again exchanged for goods. His capital is continually going from him in
one shape, and returning to him in another; and it is only by means of such
circulation, or successive changes, that it can yield him any profit. Such
capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating capitals.

Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, in the purchase of
useful machines and instruments of trade, or in such like things as yield a
revenue or profit without changing masters, or circulating any further. Such
capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals.

Different occupations require very different proportions between the fixed and
circulating capitals employed in them.

The capital of a merchant, for example, is altogether a circulating capital. He
has occasion for no machines or instruments of trade, unless his shop or
warehouse be considered as such.

Some part of the capital of every master artificer or manufacturer must be
fixed in the instruments of his trade. This part, however, is very small in
some, and very great in others, A master tailor requires no other instruments
of trade but a parcel of needles. Those of the master shoemaker are a little,
though but a very little, more expensive. Those of the weaver rise a good deal
above those of the shoemaker. The far greater part of the capital of all such
master artificers, however, is circulated either in the wages of their workmen,
or in the price of their materials, and repaid, with a profit, by the price of
the work.

In other works a much greater fixed capital is required. In a great iron-work,
for example, the furnace for melting the ore, the forge, the slit-mill, are
instruments of trade which cannot be erected without a very great expense. In
coal works, and mines of every kind, the machinery necessary, both for drawing
out the water, and for other purposes, is frequently still more expensive.

That part of the capital of the farmer which is employed in the instruments of
agriculture is a fixed, that which is employed in the wages and maintenance of
his labouring servants is a circulating capital. He makes a profit of the one
by keeping it in his own possession, and of the other by parting with it. The
price or value of his labouring cattle is a fixed capital, in the same manner
as that of the instruments of husbandry; their maintenance is a circulating
capital, in the same manner as that of the labouring servants. The farmer makes
his profit by keeping the labouring cattle, and by parting with their
maintenance. Both the price and the maintenance of the cattle which are bought
in and fattened, not for labour, but for sale, are a circulating capital. The
farmer makes his profit by parting with them. A flock of sheep or a herd of
cattle, that, in a breeding country, is brought in neither for labour nor for
sale, but in order to make a profit by their wool, by their milk, and by their
increase, is a fixed capital. The profit is made by keeping them. Their
maintenance is a circulating capital. The profit is made by parting with it;
and it comes back with both its own profit and the profit upon the whole price
of the cattle, in the price of the wool, the milk, and the increase. The whole
value of the seed, too, is properly a fixed capital. Though it goes backwards
and forwards between the ground and the granary, it never changes masters, and
therefore does not properly circulate. The farmer makes his profit, not by its
sale, but by its increase.

The general stock of any country or society is the same with that of all its
inhabitants or members; and, therefore, naturally divides itself into the same
three portions, each of which has a distinct function or office.

The first is that portion which is reserved for immediate consumption, and of
which the characteristic is, that it affords no revenue or profit. It consists
in the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, etc. which have been
purchased by their proper consumers, but which are not yet entirely consumed.
The whole stock of mere dwelling-houses, too, subsisting at any one time in the
country, make a part of this first portion. The stock that is laid out in a
house, if it is to be the dwelling-house of the proprietor, ceases from that
moment to serve in the function of a capital, or to afford any revenue to its
owner. A dwelling-house, as such, contributes nothing to the revenue of its
inhabitant; and though it is, no doubt, extremely useful to him, it is as his
clothes and household furniture are useful to him, which, however, make a part
of his expense, and not of his revenue. If it is to be let to a tenant for
rent, as the house itself can produce nothing, the tenant must always pay the
rent out of some other revenue, which he derives, either from labour, or stock,
or land. Though a house, therefore, may yield a revenue to its proprietor, and
thereby serve in the function of a capital to him, it cannot yield any to the
public, nor serve in the function of a capital to it, and the revenue of the
whole body of the people can never be in the smallest degree increased by it.
Clothes and household furniture, in the same manner, sometimes yield a revenue,
and thereby serve in the function of a capital to particular persons. In
countries where masquerades are common, it is a trade to let out masquerade
dresses for a night. Upholsterers frequently let furniture by the month or by
the year. Undertakers let the furniture of funerals by the day and by the week.
Many people let furnished houses, and get a rent, not only for the use of the
house, but for that of the furniture. The revenue, however, which is derived
from such things, must always be ultimately drawn from some other source of
revenue. Of all parts of the stock, either of an individual or of a society,
reserved for immediate consumption, what is laid out in houses is most slowly
consumed. A stock of clothes may last several years; a stock of furniture half
a century or a century; but a stock of houses, well built and properly taken
care of, may last many centuries. Though the period of their total consumption,
however, is more distant, they are still as really a stock reserved for
immediate consumption as either clothes or household furniture.

The second of the three portions into which the general stock of the society
divides itself, is the fixed capital; of which the characteristic is, that it
affords a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters. It
consists chiefly of the four following articles.

First, of all useful machines and instruments of trade, which facilitate and
abridge labour.

Secondly, of all those profitable buildings which are the means of procuring a
revenue, not only to the proprietor who lets them for a rent, but to the person
who possesses them, and pays that rent for them; such as shops, warehouses,
work-houses, farm-houses, with all their necessary buildings, stables,
granaries, etc. These are very different from mere dwelling-houses. They are a
sort of instruments of trade, and may be considered in the same light.

Thirdly, of the improvements of land, of what has been profitably laid out in
clearing, draining, inclosing, manuring, and reducing it into the condition
most proper for tillage and culture. An improved farm may very justly be
regarded in the same light as those useful machines which facilitate and
abridge labour, and by means of which an equal circulating capital can afford a
much greater revenue to its employer. An improved farm is equally advantageous
and more durable than any of those machines, frequently requiring no other
repairs than the most profitable application of the farmer’s capital
employed in cultivating it.

Fourthly, of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants and
members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of
the acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a
real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person.
Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of
the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be
considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which
facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense,
repays that expense with a profit.

The third and last of the three portions into which the general stock of the
society naturally divides itself, is the circulating capital, of which the
characteristic is, that it affords a revenue only by circulating or changing
masters. It is composed likewise of four parts.

First, of the money, by means of which all the other three are circulated and
distributed to their proper consumers.

Secondly, of the stock of provisions which are in the possession of the
butcher, the grazier, the farmer, the corn-merchant, the brewer, etc. and from
the sale of which they expect to derive a profit.

Thirdly, of the materials, whether altogether rude, or more or less
manufactured, of clothes, furniture, and building which are not yet made up
into any of those three shapes, but which remain in the hands of the growers,
the manufacturers, the mercers, and drapers, the timber-merchants, the
carpenters and joiners, the brick-makers, etc.

Fourthly, and lastly, of the work which is made up and completed, but which is
still in the hands of the merchant and manufacturer, and not yet disposed of or
distributed to the proper consumers; such as the finished work which we
frequently find ready made in the shops of the smith, the cabinet-maker, the
goldsmith, the jeweller, the china-merchant, etc. The circulating capital
consists, in this manner, of the provisions, materials, and finished work of
all kinds that are in the hands of their respective dealers, and of the money
that is necessary for circulating and distributing them to those who are
finally to use or to consume them.

Of these four parts, three—provisions, materials, and finished work, are
either annually or in a longer or shorter period, regularly withdrawn from it,
and placed either in the fixed capital, or in the stock reserved for immediate
consumption.

Every fixed capital is both originally derived from, and requires to be
continually supported by, a circulating capital. All useful machines and
instruments of trade are originally derived from a circulating capital, which
furnishes the materials of which they are made, and the maintenance of the
workmen who make them. They require, too, a capital of the same kind to keep
them in constant repair.

No fixed capital can yield any revenue but by means of a circulating capital.
The most useful machines and instruments of trade will produce nothing, without
the circulating capital, which affords the materials they are employed upon,
and the maintenance of the workmen who employ them. Land, however improved,
will yield no revenue without a circulating capital, which maintains the
labourers who cultivate and collect its produce.

To maintain and augment the stock which may be reserved for immediate
consumption, is the sole end and purpose both of the fixed and circulating
capitals. It is this stock which feeds, clothes, and lodges the people. Their
riches or poverty depend upon the abundant or sparing supplies which those two
capitals can afford to the stock reserved for immediate consumption.

So great a part of the circulating capital being continually withdrawn from it,
in order to be placed in the other two branches of the general stock of the
society, it must in its turn require continual supplies without which it would
soon cease to exist. These supplies are principally drawn from three sources;
the produce of land, of mines, and of fisheries. These afford continual
supplies of provisions and materials, of which part is afterwards wrought up
into finished work and by which are replaced the provisions, materials, and
finished work, continually withdrawn from the circulating capital. From mines,
too, is drawn what is necessary for maintaining and augmenting that part of it
which consists in money. For though, in the ordinary course of business, this
part is not, like the other three, necessarily withdrawn from it, in order to
be placed in the other two branches of the general stock of the society, it
must, however, like all other things, be wasted and worn out at last, and
sometimes, too, be either lost or sent abroad, and must, therefore, require
continual, though no doubt much smaller supplies.

Land, mines, and fisheries, require all both a fixed and circulating capital
to cultivate them; and their produce replaces, with a profit not only those
capitals, but all the others in the society. Thus the farmer annually replaces
to the manufacturer the provisions which he had consumed, and the materials
which he had wrought up the year before; and the manufacturer replaces to the
farmer the finished work which he had wasted and worn out in the same time.
This is the real exchange that is annually made between those two orders of
people, though it seldom happens that the rude produce of the one, and the
manufactured produce of the other, are directly bartered for one another;
because it seldom happens that the farmer sells his corn and his cattle, his
flax and his wool, to the very same person of whom he chuses to purchase the
clothes, furniture, and instruments of trade, which he wants. He sells,
therefore, his rude produce for money, with which he can purchase, wherever it
is to be had, the manufactured produce he has occasion for. Land even replaces,
in part at least, the capitals with which fisheries and mines are cultivated.
It is the produce of land which draws the fish from the waters; and it is the
produce of the surface of the earth which extracts the minerals from its
bowels.

The produce of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural fertility is
equal, is in proportion to the extent and proper application of the capitals
employed about them. When the capitals are equal, and equally well applied, it
is in proportion to their natural fertility.

In all countries where there is a tolerable security, every man of common
understanding will endeavour to employ whatever stock he can command, in
procuring either present enjoyment or future profit. If it is employed in
procuring present enjoyment, it is a stock reserved for immediate consumption.
If it is employed in procuring future profit, it must procure this profit
either by staying with him, or by going from him. In the one case it is a
fixed, in the other it is a circulating capital. A man must be perfectly crazy,
who, where there is a tolerable security, does not employ all the stock which
he commands, whether it be his own, or borrowed of other people, in some one or
other of those three ways.

In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the
violence of their superiors, they frequently bury or conceal a great part of
their stock, in order to have it always at hand to carry with them to some
place of safety, in case of their being threatened with any of those disasters
to which they consider themselves at all times exposed. This is said to be a
common practice in Turkey, in Indostan, and, I believe, in most other
governments of Asia. It seems to have been a common practice among our
ancestors during the violence of the feudal government. Treasure-trove was, in
those times, considered as no contemptible part of the revenue of the greatest
sovereigns in Europe. It consisted in such treasure as was found concealed in
the earth, and to which no particular person could prove any right. This was
regarded, in those times, as so important an object, that it was always
considered as belonging to the sovereign, and neither to the finder nor to the
proprietor of the land, unless the right to it had been conveyed to the latter
by an express clause in his charter. It was put upon the same footing with gold
and silver mines, which, without a special clause in the charter, were never
supposed to be comprehended in the general grant of the lands, though mines of
lead, copper, tin, and coal were, as things of smaller consequence.

CHAPTER II.
OF MONEY, CONSIDERED AS A PARTICULAR BRANCH OF THE GENERAL STOCK OF THE
SOCIETY, OR OF THE EXPENSE OF MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL CAPITAL.

It has been shown in the First Book, that the price of the greater part of
commodities resolves itself into three parts, of which one pays the wages of
the labour, another the profits of the stock, and a third the rent of the land
which had been employed in producing and bringing them to market: that there
are, indeed, some commodities of which the price is made up of two of those
parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and a very few in
which it consists altogether in one, the wages of labour; but that the price of
every commodity necessarily resolves itself into some one or other, or all, of
those three parts; every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to wages,
being necessarily profit to some body.

Since this is the case, it has been observed, with regard to every particular
commodity, taken separately, it must be so with regard to all the commodities
which compose the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country,
taken complexly. The whole price or exchangeable value of that annual produce
must resolve itself into the same three parts, and be parcelled out among the
different inhabitants of the country, either as the wages of their labour, the
profits of their stock, or the rent of their land.

But though the whole value of the annual produce of the land and labour of
every country, is thus divided among, and constitutes a revenue to, its
different inhabitants; yet, as in the rent of a private estate, we distinguish
between the gross rent and the neat rent, so may we likewise in the revenue of
all the inhabitants of a great country.

The gross rent of a private estate comprehends whatever is paid by the farmer;
the neat rent, what remains free to the landlord, after deducting the expense
of management, of repairs, and all other necessary charges; or what, without
hurting his estate, he can afford to place in his stock reserved for immediate
consumption, or to spend upon his table, equipage, the ornaments of his house
and furniture, his private enjoyments and amusements. His real wealth is in
proportion, not to his gross, but to his neat rent.

The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends the
whole annual produce of their land and labour; the neat revenue, what remains
free to them, after deducting the expense of maintaining first, their fixed,
and, secondly, their circulating capital, or what, without encroaching upon
their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate
consumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements.
Their real wealth, too, is in proportion, not to their gross, but to their neat
revenue.

The whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital must evidently be excluded
from the neat revenue of the society. Neither the materials necessary for
supporting their useful machines and instruments of trade, their profitable
buildings, etc. nor the produce of the labour necessary for fashioning those
materials into the proper form, can ever make any part of it. The price of that
labour may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen so employed may place the
whole value of their wages in their stock reserved for immediate consumption.
But in other sorts of labour, both the price and the produce go to this stock;
the price to that of the workmen, the produce to that of other people, whose
subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements, are augmented by the labour of
those workmen.

The intention of the fixed capital is to increase the productive powers of
labour, or to enable the same number of labourers to perform a much greater
quantity of work. In a farm where all the necessary buildings, fences, drains,
communications, etc. are in the most perfect good order, the same number of
labourers and labouring cattle will raise a much greater produce, than in one
of equal extent and equally good ground, but not furnished with equal
conveniencies. In manufactures, the same number of hands, assisted with the
best machinery, will work up a much greater quantity of goods than with more
imperfect instruments of trade. The expense which is properly laid out upon a
fixed capital of any kind, is always repaid with great profit, and increases
the annual produce by a much greater value than that of the support which such
improvements require. This support, however, still requires a certain portion
of that produce. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain
number of workmen, both of which might have been immediately employed to
augment the food, clothing, and lodging, the subsistence and conveniencies of
the society, are thus diverted to another employment, highly advantageous
indeed, but still different from this one. It is upon this account that all
such improvements in mechanics, as enable the same number of workmen to perform
an equal quantity of work with cheaper and simpler machinery than had been
usual before, are always regarded as advantageous to every society. A certain
quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of workmen, which had
before been employed in supporting a more complex and expensive machinery, can
afterwards be applied to augment the quantity of work which that or any other
machinery is useful only for performing. The undertaker of some great
manufactory, who employs a thousand a-year in the maintenance of his machinery,
if he can reduce this expense to five hundred, will naturally employ the other
five hundred in purchasing an additional quantity of materials, to be wrought
up by an additional number of workmen. The quantity of that work, therefore,
which his machinery was useful only for performing, will naturally be
augmented, and with it all the advantage and conveniency which the society can
derive from that work.

The expense of maintaining the fixed capital in a great country, may very
properly be compared to that of repairs in a private estate. The expense of
repairs may frequently be necessary for supporting the produce of the estate,
and consequently both the gross and the neat rent of the landlord. When by a
more proper direction, however, it can be diminished without occasioning any
diminution of produce, the gross rent remains at least the same as before, and
the neat rent is necessarily augmented.

But though the whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital is thus
necessarily excluded from the neat revenue of the society, it is not the same
case with that of maintaining the circulating capital. Of the four parts of
which this latter capital is composed, money, provisions, materials, and
finished work, the three last, it has already been observed, are regularly
withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital of the society, or in
their stock reserved for immediate consumption. Whatever portion of those
consumable goods is not employed in maintaining the former, goes all to the
latter, and makes a part of the neat revenue of the society. The maintenance of
those three parts of the circulating capital, therefore, withdraws no portion
of the annual produce from the neat revenue of the society, besides what is
necessary for maintaining the fixed capital.

The circulating capital of a society is in this respect different from that of
an individual. That of an individual is totally excluded from making any part
of his neat revenue, which must consist altogether in his profits. But though
the circulating capital of every individual makes a part of that of the society
to which he belongs, it is not upon that account totally excluded from making a
part likewise of their neat revenue. Though the whole goods in a
merchant’s shop must by no means be placed in his own stock reserved for
immediate consumption, they may in that of other people, who, from a revenue
derived from other funds, may regularly replace their value to him, together
with its profits, without occasioning any diminution either of his capital or
of theirs.

Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capital of a society, of
which the maintenance can occasion any diminution in their neat revenue.

The fixed capital, and that part of the circulating capital which consists in
money, so far as they affect the revenue of the society, bear a very great
resemblance to one another.

First, as those machines and instruments of trade, etc. require a certain
expense, first to erect them, and afterwards to support them, both which
expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are deductions from the neat
revenue of the society; so the stock of money which circulates in any country
must require a certain expense, first to collect it, and afterwards to support
it; both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are, in the same
manner, deductions from the neat revenue of the society. A certain quantity of
very valuable materials, gold and silver, and of very curious labour, instead
of augmenting the stock reserved for immediate consumption, the subsistence,
conveniencies, and amusements of individuals, is employed in supporting that
great but expensive instrument of commerce, by means of which every individual
in the society has his subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements, regularly
distributed to him in their proper proportions.

Secondly, as the machines and instruments of trade, etc. which compose the
fixed capital either of an individual or of a society, make no part either of
the gross or of the neat revenue of either; so money, by means of which the
whole revenue of the society is regularly distributed among all its different
members, makes itself no part of that revenue. The great wheel of circulation
is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by means of it. The
revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods, and not in the wheel
which circulates them. In computing either the gross or the neat revenue of any
society, we must always, from the whole annual circulation of money and goods,
deduct the whole value of the money, of which not a single farthing can ever
make any part of either.

It is the ambiguity of language only which can make this proposition appear
either doubtful or paradoxical. When properly explained and understood, it is
almost self-evident.

When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes mean nothing but the
metal pieces of which it is composed, and sometimes we include in our meaning
some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for it, or to
the power of purchasing which the possession of it conveys. Thus, when we say
that the circulating money of England has been computed at eighteen millions,
we mean only to express the amount of the metal pieces, which some writers have
computed, or rather have supposed, to circulate in that country. But when we
say that a man is worth fifty or a hundred pounds a-year, we mean commonly to
express, not only the amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to
him, but the value of the goods which he can annually purchase or consume; we
mean commonly to ascertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the
quantity and quality of the necessaries and conveniencies of life in which he
can with propriety indulge himself.

When, by any particular sum of money, we mean not only to express the amount of
the metal pieces of which it is composed, but to include in its signification
some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for them, the
wealth or revenue which it in this case denotes, is equal only to one of the
two values which are thus intimated somewhat ambiguously by the same word, and
to the latter more properly than to the former, to the money’s worth more
properly than to the money.

Thus, if a guinea be the weekly pension of a particular person, he can in the
course of the week purchase with it a certain quantity of subsistence,
conveniencies, and amusements. In proportion as this quantity is great or
small, so are his real riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is
certainly not equal both to the guinea and to what can be purchased with it,
but only to one or other of those two equal values, and to the latter more
properly than to the former, to the guinea’s worth rather than to the
guinea.

If the pension of such a person was paid to him, not in gold, but in a weekly
bill for a guinea, his revenue surely would not so properly consist in the
piece of paper, as in what he could get for it. A guinea may be considered as a
bill for a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniencies upon all the
tradesmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the person to whom it is paid,
does not so properly consist in the piece of gold, as in what he can get for
it, or in what he can exchange it for. If it could be exchanged for nothing, it
would, like a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than the most useless
piece of paper.

Though the weekly or yearly revenue of all the different inhabitants of any
country, in the same manner, may be, and in reality frequently is, paid to them
in money, their real riches, however, the real weekly or yearly revenue of all
of them taken together, must always be great or small, in proportion to the
quantity of consumable goods which they can all of them purchase with this
money. The whole revenue of all of them taken together is evidently not equal
to both the money and the consumable goods, but only to one or other of those
two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former.

Though we frequently, therefore, express a person’s revenue by the metal
pieces which are annually paid to him, it is because the amount of those pieces
regulates the extent of his power of purchasing, or the value of the goods
which he can annually afford to consume. We still consider his revenue as
consisting in this power of purchasing or consuming, and not in the pieces
which convey it.

But if this is sufficiently evident, even with regard to an individual, it is
still more so with regard to a society. The amount of the metal pieces which
are annually paid to an individual, is often precisely equal to his revenue,
and is upon that account the shortest and best expression of its value. But the
amount of the metal pieces which circulate in a society, can never be equal to
the revenue of all its members. As the same guinea which pays the weekly
pension of one man to-day, may pay that of another to-morrow, and that of a
third the day thereafter, the amount of the metal pieces which annually
circulate in any country, must always be of much less value than the whole
money pensions annually paid with them. But the power of purchasing, or the
goods which can successively be bought with the whole of those money pensions,
as they are successively paid, must always be precisely of the same value with
those pensions; as must likewise be the revenue of the different persons to
whom they are paid. That revenue, therefore, cannot consist in those metal
pieces, of which the amount is so much inferior to its value, but in the power
of purchasing, in the goods which can successively be bought with them as they
circulate from hand to hand.

Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of
commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part, and a
very valuable part, of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society
to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in
the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man the revenue
which properly belongs to him, they make themselves no part of that revenue.

Thirdly, and lastly, the machines and instruments of trade, etc. which compose
the fixed capital, bear this further resemblance to that part of the
circulating capital which consists in money; that as every saving in the
expense of erecting and supporting those machines, which does not diminish the
introductive powers of labour, is an improvement of the neat revenue of the
society; so every saving in the expense of collecting and supporting that part
of the circulating capital which consists in money is an improvement of exactly
the same kind.

It is sufficiently obvious, and it has partly, too, been explained already, in
what manner every saving in the expense of supporting the fixed capital is an
improvement of the neat revenue of the society. The whole capital of the
undertaker of every work is necessarily divided between his fixed and his
circulating capital. While his whole capital remains the same, the smaller the
one part, the greater must necessarily be the other. It is the circulating
capital which furnishes the materials and wages of labour, and puts industry
into motion. Every saving, therefore, in the expense of maintaining the fixed
capital, which does not diminish the productive powers of labour, must increase
the fund which puts industry into motion, and consequently the annual produce
of land and labour, the real revenue of every society.

The substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver money, replaces a very
expensive instrument of commerce with one much less costly, and sometimes
equally convenient. Circulation comes to be carried on by a new wheel, which it
costs less both to erect and to maintain than the old one. But in what manner
this operation is performed, and in what manner it tends to increase either the
gross or the neat revenue of the society, is not altogether so obvious, and may
therefore require some further explication.

There are several different sorts of paper money; but the circulating notes of
banks and bankers are the species which is best known, and which seems best
adapted for this purpose.

When the people of any particular country have such confidence in the fortune,
probity and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that he is always
ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes as are likely to be at
any time presented to him, those notes come to have the same currency as gold
and silver money, from the confidence that such money can at any time be had
for them.

A particular banker lends among his customers his own promissory notes, to the
extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred thousand pounds. As those notes serve
all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same interest as if he had
lent them so much money. This interest is the source of his gain. Though some
of those notes are continually coming back upon him for payment, part of them
continue to circulate for months and years together. Though he has generally in
circulation, therefore, notes to the extent of a hundred thousand pounds,
twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver may, frequently, be a sufficient
provision for answering occasional demands. By this operation, therefore,
twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform all the functions which a
hundred thousand could otherwise have performed. The same exchanges may be
made, the same quantity of consumable goods may be circulated and distributed
to their proper consumers, by means of his promissory notes, to the value of a
hundred thousand pounds, as by an equal value of gold and silver money. Eighty
thousand pounds of gold and silver, therefore, can in this manner be spared
from the circulation of the country; and if different operations of the same
kind should, at the same time, be carried on by many different banks and
bankers, the whole circulation may thus be conducted with a fifth part only of
the gold and silver which would otherwise have been requisite.

Let us suppose, for example, that the whole circulating money of some
particular country amounted, at a particular time, to one million sterling,
that sum being then sufficient for circulating the whole annual produce of
their land and labour; let us suppose, too, that some time thereafter,
different banks and bankers issued promissory notes payable to the bearer, to
the extent of one million, reserving in their different coffers two hundred
thousand pounds for answering occasional demands; there would remain,
therefore, in circulation, eight hundred thousand pounds in gold and silver,
and a million of bank notes, or eighteen hundred thousand pounds of paper and
money together. But the annual produce of the land and labour of the country
had before required only one million to circulate and distribute it to its
proper consumers, and that annual produce cannot be immediately augmented by
those operations of banking. One million, therefore, will be sufficient to
circulate it after them. The goods to be bought and sold being precisely the
same as before, the same quantity of money will be sufficient for buying and
selling them. The channel of circulation, if I may be allowed such an
expression, will remain precisely the same as before. One million we have
supposed sufficient to fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is poured into
it beyond this sum, cannot run into it, but must overflow. One million eight
hundred thousand pounds are poured into it. Eight hundred thousand pounds,
therefore, must overflow, that sum being over and above what can be employed in
the circulation of the country. But though this sum cannot be employed at home,
it is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle. It will, therefore, be sent
abroad, in order to seek that profitable employment which it cannot find at
home. But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a distance from the banks
which issue it, and from the country in which payment of it can be exacted by
law, it will not be received in common payments. Gold and silver, therefore, to
the amount of eight hundred thousand pounds, will be sent abroad, and the
channel of home circulation will remain filled with a million of paper instead
of a million of those metals which filled it before.

But though so great a quantity of gold and silver is thus sent abroad, we must
not imagine that it is sent abroad for nothing, or that its proprietors make a
present of it to foreign nations. They will exchange it for foreign goods of
some kind or another, in order to supply the consumption either of some other
foreign country, or of their own.

If they employ it in purchasing goods in one foreign country, in order to
supply the consumption of another, or in what is called the carrying trade,
whatever profit they make will be in addition to the neat revenue of their own
country. It is like a new fund, created for carrying on a new trade; domestic
business being now transacted by paper, and the gold and silver being converted
into a fund for this new trade.

If they employ it in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, they may
either, first, purchase such goods as are likely to be consumed by idle people,
who produce nothing, such as foreign wines, foreign silks, etc.; or, secondly,
they may purchase an additional stock of materials, tools, and provisions, in
order to maintain and employ an additional number of industrious people, who
reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption.

So far as it is employed in the first way, it promotes prodigality, increases
expense and consumption, without increasing production, or establishing any
permanent fund for supporting that expense, and is in every respect hurtful to
the society.

So far as it is employed in the second way, it promotes industry; and though it
increases the consumption of the society, it provides a permanent fund for
supporting that consumption; the people who consume reproducing, with a profit,
the whole value of their annual consumption. The gross revenue of the society,
the annual produce of their land and labour, is increased by the whole value
which the labour of those workmen adds to the materials upon which they are
employed, and their neat revenue by what remains of this value, after deducting
what is necessary for supporting the tools and instruments of their trade.

That the greater part of the gold and silver which being forced abroad by those
operations of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign goods for home
consumption, is, and must be, employed in purchasing those of this second kind,
seems not only probable, but almost unavoidable. Though some particular men may
sometimes increase their expense very considerably, though their revenue does
not increase at all, we maybe assured that no class or order of men ever does
so; because, though the principles of common prudence do not always govern the
conduct of every individual, they always influence that of the majority of
every class or order. But the revenue of idle people, considered as a class or
order, cannot, in the smallest degree, be increased by those operations of
banking. Their expense in general, therefore, cannot be much increased by them,
though that of a few individuals among them may, and in reality sometimes is.
The demand of idle people, therefore, for foreign goods, being the same, or
very nearly the same as before, a very small part of the money which, being
forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign
goods for home consumption, is likely to be employed in purchasing those for
their use. The greater part of it will naturally be destined for the employment
of industry, and not for the maintenance of idleness.

When we compute the quantity of industry which the circulating capital of any
society can employ, we must always have regard to those parts of it only which
consist in provisions, materials, and finished work; the other, which consists
in money, and which serves only to circulate those three, must always be
deducted. In order to put industry into motion, three things are requisite;
materials to work upon, tools to work with, and the wages or recompence for the
sake of which the work is done. Money is neither a material to work upon, nor a
tool to work with; and though the wages of the workman are commonly paid to him
in money, his real revenue, like that of all other men, consists, not in the
money, but in the money’s worth; not in the metal pieces, but in what can
be got for them.

The quantity of industry which any capital can employ, must evidently be equal
to the number of workmen whom it can supply with materials, tools, and a
maintenance suitable to the nature of the work. Money may be requisite for
purchasing the materials and tools of the work, as well as the maintenance of
the workmen; but the quantity of industry which the whole capital can employ,
is certainly not equal both to the money which purchases, and to the materials,
tools, and maintenance, which are purchased with it, but only to one or other
of those two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former.

When paper is substituted in the room of gold and silver money, the quantity of
the materials, tools, and maintenance, which the whole circulating capital can
supply, may be increased by the whole value of gold and silver which used to be
employed in purchasing them. The whole value of the great wheel of circulation
and distribution is added to the goods which are circulated and distributed by
means of it. The operation, in some measure, resembles that of the undertaker
of some great work, who, in consequence of some improvement in mechanics, takes
down his old machinery, and adds the difference between its price and that of
the new to his circulating capital, to the fund from which he furnishes
materials and wages to his workmen.

What is the proportion which the circulating money of any country bears to the
whole value of the annual produce circulated by means of it, it is perhaps
impossible to determine. It has been computed by different authors at a fifth,
at a tenth, at a twentieth, and at a thirtieth, part of that value. But how
small soever the proportion which the circulating money may bear to the whole
value of the annual produce, as but a part, and frequently but a small part, of
that produce, is ever destined for the maintenance of industry, it must always
bear a very considerable proportion to that part. When, therefore, by the
substitution of paper, the gold and silver necessary for circulation is reduced
to, perhaps, a fifth part of the former quantity, if the value of only the
greater part of the other four-fifths be added to the funds which are destined
for the maintenance of industry, it must make a very considerable addition to
the quantity of that industry, and, consequently, to the value of the annual
produce of land and labour.

An operation of this kind has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty years,
been performed in Scotland, by the erection of new banking companies in almost
every considerable town, and even in some country villages. The effects of it
have been precisely those above described. The business of the country is
almost entirely carried on by means of the paper of those different banking
companies, with which purchases and payments of all kinds are commonly made.
Silver very seldom appears, except in the change of a twenty shilling bank
note, and gold still seldomer. But though the conduct of all those different
companies has not been unexceptionable, and has accordingly required an act of
parliament to regulate it, the country, notwithstanding, has evidently derived
great benefit from their trade. I have heard it asserted, that the trade of the
city of Glasgow doubled in about fifteen years after the first erection of the
banks there; and that the trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled since the
first erection of the two public banks at Edinburgh; of which the one, called
the Bank of Scotland, was established by act of parliament in 1695, and the
other, called the Royal Bank, by royal charter in 1727. Whether the trade,
either of Scotland in general, or of the city of Glasgow in particular, has
really increased in so great a proportion, during so short a period, I do not
pretend to know. If either of them has increased in this proportion, it seems
to be an effect too great to be accounted for by the sole operation of this
cause. That the trade and industry of Scotland, however, have increased very
considerably during this period, and that the banks have contributed a good
deal to this increase, cannot be doubted.

The value of the silver money which circulated in Scotland before the Union in
1707, and which, immediately after it, was brought into the Bank of Scotland,
in order to be recoined, amounted to £411,117: 10: 9 sterling. No account has
been got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient accounts of the mint
of Scotland, that the value of the gold annually coined somewhat exceeded that
of the silver. There were a good many people, too, upon this occasion, who,
from a diffidence of repayment, did not bring their silver into the Bank of
Scotland; and there was, besides, some English coin, which was not called in.
The whole value of the gold and silver, therefore, which circulated in Scotland
before the Union, cannot be estimated at less than a million sterling. It seems
to have constituted almost the whole circulation of that country; for though
the circulation of the Bank of Scotland, which had then no rival, was
considerable, it seems to have made but a very small part of the whole. In the
present times, the whole circulation of Scotland cannot be estimated at less
than two millions, of which that part which consists in gold and silver, most
probably, does not amount to half a million. But though the circulating gold
and silver of Scotland have suffered so great a diminution during this period,
its real riches and prosperity do not appear to have suffered any. Its
agriculture, manufactures, and trade, on the contrary, the annual produce of
its land and labour, have evidently been augmented.

It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing money
upon them before they are due, that the greater part of banks and bankers issue
their promissory notes. They deduct always, upon whatever sum they advance, the
legal interest till the bill shall become due. The payment of the bill, when it
becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what had been advanced, together
with a clear profit of the interest. The banker, who advances to the merchant
whose bill he discounts, not gold and silver, but his own promissory notes, has
the advantage of being able to discount to a greater amount by the whole value
of his promissory notes, which he finds, by experience, are commonly in
circulation. He is thereby enabled to make his clear gain of interest on so
much a larger sum.

The commerce of Scotland, which at present is not very great, was still more
inconsiderable when the two first banking companies were established; and those
companies would have had but little trade, had they confined their business to
the discounting of bills of exchange. They invented, therefore, another method
of issuing their promissory notes; by granting what they call cash accounts,
that is, by giving credit, to the extent of a certain sum (two or three
thousand pounds for example), to any individual who could procure two persons
of undoubted credit and good landed estate to become surety for him, that
whatever money should be advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit
had been given, should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest.
Credits of this kind are, I believe, commonly granted by banks and bankers in
all different parts of the world. But the easy terms upon which the Scotch
banking companies accept of repayment are, so far as I know, peculiar to them,
and have perhaps been the principal cause, both of the great trade of those
companies, and of the benefit which the country has received from it.

Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of those companies, and borrows a
thousand pounds upon it, for example, may repay this sum piece-meal, by twenty
and thirty pounds at a time, the company discounting a proportionable part of
the interest of the great sum, from the day on which each of those small sums
is paid in, till the whole be in this manner repaid. All merchants, therefore,
and almost all men of business, find it convenient to keep such cash accounts
with them, and are thereby interested to promote the trade of those companies,
by readily receiving their notes in all payments, and by encouraging all those
with whom they have any influence to do the same. The banks, when their
customers apply to them for money, generally advance it to them in their own
promissory notes. These the merchants pay away to the manufacturers for goods,
the manufacturers to the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to
their landlords for rent; the landlords repay them to the merchants for the
conveniencies and luxuries with which they supply them, and the merchants again
return them to the banks, in order to balance their cash accounts, or to
replace what they may have borrowed of them; and thus almost the whole money
business of the country is transacted by means of them. Hence the great trade
of those companies.

By means of those cash accounts, every merchant can, without imprudence, carry
on a greater trade than he otherwise could do. If there are two merchants, one
in London and the other in Edinburgh, who employ equal stocks in the same
branch of trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, without imprudence, carry on a
greater trade, and give employment to a greater number of people, than the
London merchant. The London merchant must always keep by him a considerable sum
of money, either in his own coffers, or in those of his banker, who gives him
no interest for it, in order to answer the demands continually coming upon him
for payment of the goods which he purchases upon credit. Let the ordinary
amount of this sum be supposed five hundred pounds; the value of the goods in
his warehouse must always be less, by five hundred pounds, than it would have
been, had he not been obliged to keep such a sum unemployed. Let us suppose
that he generally disposes of his whole stock upon hand, or of goods to the
value of his whole stock upon hand, once in the year. By being obliged to keep
so great a sum unemployed, he must sell in a year five hundred pounds worth
less goods than he might otherwise have done. His annual profits must be less
by all that he could have made by the sale of five hundred pounds worth more
goods; and the number of people employed in preparing his goods for the market
must be less by all those that five hundred pounds more stock could have
employed. The merchant in Edinburgh, on the other hand, keeps no money
unemployed for answering such occasional demands. When they actually come upon
him, he satisfies them from his cash account with the bank, and gradually
replaces the sum borrowed with the money or paper which comes in from the
occasional sales of his goods. With the same stock, therefore, he can, without
imprudence, have at all times in his warehouse a larger quantity of goods than
the London merchant; and can thereby both make a greater profit himself, and
give constant employment to a greater number of industrious people who prepare
those goods for the market. Hence the great benefit which the country has
derived from this trade.

The facility of discounting bills of exchange, it may be thought, indeed, gives
the English merchants a conveniency equivalent to the cash accounts of the
Scotch merchants. But the Scotch merchants, it must be remembered, can discount
their bills of exchange as easily as the English merchants; and have, besides,
the additional conveniency of their cash accounts.

The whole paper money of every kind which can easily circulate in any country,
never can exceed the value of the gold and silver, of which it supplies the
place, or which (the commerce being supposed the same) would circulate there,
if there was no paper money. If twenty shilling notes, for example, are the
lowest paper money current in Scotland, the whole of that currency which can
easily circulate there, cannot exceed the sum of gold and silver which would be
necessary for transacting the annual exchanges of twenty shillings value and
upwards usually transacted within that country. Should the circulating paper at
any time exceed that sum, as the excess could neither be sent abroad nor be
employed in the circulation of the country, it must immediately return upon the
banks, to be exchanged for gold and silver. Many people would immediately
perceive that they had more of this paper than was necessary for transacting
their business at home; and as they could not send it abroad, they would
immediately demand payment for it from the banks. When this superfluous paper
was converted into gold and silver, they could easily find a use for it, by
sending it abroad; but they could find none while it remained in the shape of
paper. There would immediately, therefore, be a run upon the banks to the whole
extent of this superfluous paper, and if they showed any difficulty or
backwardness in payment, to a much greater extent; the alarm which this would
occasion necessarily increasing the run.

Over and above the expenses which are common to every branch of trade, such as
the expense of house-rent, the wages of servants, clerks, accountants, etc. the
expenses peculiar to a bank consist chiefly in two articles: first, in the
expense of keeping at all times in its coffers, for answering the occasional
demands of the holders of its notes, a large sum of money, of which it loses
the interest; and, secondly, in the expense of replenishing those coffers as
fast as they are emptied by answering such occasional demands.

A banking company which issues more paper than can be employed in the
circulation of the country, and of which the excess is continually returning
upon them for payment, ought to increase the quantity of gold and silver which
they keep at all times in their coffers, not only in proportion to this
excessive increase of their circulation, but in a much greater proportion;
their notes returning upon them much faster than in proportion to the excess of
their quantity. Such a company, therefore, ought to increase the first article
of their expense, not only in proportion to this forced increase of their
business, but in a much greater proportion.

The coffers of such a company, too, though they ought to be filled much fuller,
yet must empty themselves much faster than if their business was confined
within more reasonable bounds, and must require not only a more violent, but a
more constant and uninterrupted exertion of expense, in order to replenish
them, The coin, too, which is thus continually drawn in such large quantities
from their coffers, cannot be employed in the circulation of the country. It
comes in place of a paper which is over and above what can be employed in that
circulation, and is, therefore, over and above what can be employed in it too.
But as that coin will not be allowed to lie idle, it must, in one shape or
another, be sent abroad, in order to find that profitable employment which it
cannot find at home; and this continual exportation of gold and silver, by
enhancing the difficulty, must necessarily enhance still farther the expense of
the bank, in finding new gold and silver in order to replenish those coffers,
which empty themselves so very rapidly. Such a company, therefore, must in
proportion to this forced increase of their business, increase the second
article of their expense still more than the first.

Let us suppose that all the paper of a particular bank, which the circulation
of the country can easily absorb and employ, amounts exactly to forty thousand
pounds, and that, for answering occasional demands, this bank is obliged to
keep at all times in its coffers ten thousand pounds in gold and silver. Should
this bank attempt to circulate forty-four thousand pounds, the four thousand
pounds which are over and above what the circulation can easily absorb and
employ, will return upon it almost as fast as they are issued. For answering
occasional demands, therefore, this bank ought to keep at all times in its
coffers, not eleven thousand pounds only, but fourteen thousand pounds. It will
thus gain nothing by the interest of the four thousand pounds excessive
circulation; and it will lose the whole expense of continually collecting four
thousand pounds in gold and silver, which will be continually going out of its
coffers as fast as they are brought into them.

Had every particular banking company always understood and attended to its own
particular interest, the circulation never could have been overstocked with
paper money. But every particular banking company has not always understood or
attended to its own particular interest, and the circulation has frequently
been overstocked with paper money.

By issuing too great a quantity of paper, of which the excess was continually
returning, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, the Bank of England
was for many years together obliged to coin gold to the extent of between eight
hundred thousand pounds and a million a-year; or, at an average, about eight
hundred and fifty thousand pounds. For this great coinage, the bank
(in consequence of the worn and degraded state into which the gold coin had
fallen a few years ago) was frequently obliged to purchase gold bullion at the
high price of four pounds an ounce, which it soon after issued in coin at
£3:17:10 1/2 an ounce, losing in this manner between two and a half and three
per cent. upon the coinage of so very large a sum. Though the bank, therefore,
paid no seignorage, though the government was properly at the expense of this
coinage, this liberality of government did not prevent altogether the expense
of the bank.

The Scotch banks, in consequence of an excess of the same kind, were all
obliged to employ constantly agents at London to collect money for them, at an
expense which was seldom below one and a half or two per cent. This money was
sent down by the waggon, and insured by the carriers at an additional expense
of three quarters per cent. or fifteen shillings on the hundred pounds. Those
agents were not always able to replenish the coffers of their employers so fast
as they were emptied. In this case, the resource of the banks was, to draw upon
their correspondents in London bills of exchange, to the extent of the sum
which they wanted. When those correspondents afterwards drew upon them for the
payment of this sum, together with the interest and commission, some of those
banks, from the distress into which their excessive circulation had thrown
them, had sometimes no other means of satisfying this draught, but by drawing a
second set of bills, either upon the same, or upon some other correspondents in
London; and the same sum, or rather bills for the same sum, would in this
manner make sometimes more than two or three journeys; the debtor bank paying
always the interest and commission upon the whole accumulated sum. Even those
Scotch banks which never distinguished themselves by their extreme imprudence,
were sometimes obliged to employ this ruinous resource.

The gold coin which was paid out, either by the Bank of England or by the
Scotch banks, in exchange for that part of their paper which was over and above
what could be employed in the circulation of the country, being likewise over
and above what could be employed in that circulation, was sometimes sent abroad
in the shape of coin, sometimes melted down and sent abroad in the shape of
bullion, and sometimes melted down and sold to the Bank of England at the high
price of four pounds an ounce. It was the newest, the heaviest, and the best
pieces only, which were carefully picked out of the whole coin, and either sent
abroad or melted down. At home, and while they remained in the shape of coin,
those heavy pieces were of no more value than the light; but they were of more
value abroad, or when melted down into bullion at home. The Bank of England,
notwithstanding their great annual coinage, found, to their astonishment, that
there was every year the same scarcity of coin as there had been the year
before; and that, notwithstanding the great quantity of good and new coin which
was every year issued from the bank, the state of the coin, instead of growing
better and better, became every year worse and worse. Every year they found
themselves under the necessity of coining nearly the same quantity of gold as
they had coined the year before; and from the continual rise in the price of
gold bullion, in consequence of the continual wearing and clipping of the coin,
the expense of this great annual coinage became, every year, greater and
greater. The Bank of England, it is to be observed, by supplying its own
coffers with coin, is indirectly obliged to supply the whole kingdom, into
which coin is continually flowing from those coffers in a great variety of
ways. Whatever coin, therefore, was wanted to support this excessive
circulation both of Scotch and English paper money, whatever vacuities this
excessive circulation occasioned in the necessary coin of the kingdom, the Bank
of England was obliged to supply them. The Scotch banks, no doubt, paid all of
them very dearly for their own imprudence and inattention: but the Bank of
England paid very dearly, not only for its own imprudence, but for the much
greater imprudence of almost all the Scotch banks.

The over-trading of some bold projectors in both parts of the united kingdom,
was the original cause of this excessive circulation of paper money.

What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker of any kind,
is not either the whole capital with which he trades, or even any considerable
part of that capital; but that part of it only which he would otherwise be
obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money, for answering occasional
demands. If the paper money which the bank advances never exceeds this value,
it can never exceed the value of the gold and silver which would necessarily
circulate in the country if there was no paper money; it can never exceed the
quantity which the circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ.

When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange, drawn by a real
creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as soon as it becomes due, is really
paid by that debtor; it only advances to him a part of the value which he would
otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money, for
answering occasional demands. The payment of the bill, when it becomes due,
replaces to the bank the value of what it had advanced, together with the
interest. The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are confined to such
customers, resemble a water-pond, from which, though a stream is continually
running out, yet another is continually running in, fully equal to that which
runs out; so that, without any further care or attention, the pond keeps always
equally, or very near equally full. Little or no expense can ever be necessary
for replenishing the coffers of such a bank.

A merchant, without over-trading, may frequently have occasion for a sum of
ready money, even when he has no bills to discount. When a bank, besides
discounting his bills, advances him likewise, upon such occasions, such sums
upon his cash account, and accepts of a piece-meal repayment, as the money
comes in from the occasional sale of his goods, upon the easy terms of the
banking companies of Scotland; it dispenses him entirely from the necessity of
keeping any part of his stock by him unemployed and in ready money for
answering occasional demands. When such demands actually come upon him, he can
answer them sufficiently from his cash account. The bank, however, in dealing
with such customers, ought to observe with great attention, whether, in the
course of some short period (of four, five, six, or eight months, for example),
the sum of the repayments which it commonly receives from them, is, or is not,
fully equal to that of the advances which it commonly makes to them. If, within
the course of such short periods, the sum of the repayments from certain
customers is, upon most occasions, fully equal to that of the advances, it may
safely continue to deal with such customers. Though the stream which is in this
case continually running out from its coffers may be very large, that which is
continually running into them must be at least equally large, so that, without
any further care or attention, those coffers are likely to be always equally or
very near equally full, and scarce ever to require any extraordinary expense to
replenish them. If, on the contrary, the sum of the repayments from certain
other customers, falls commonly very much short of the advances which it makes
to them, it cannot with any safety continue to deal with such customers, at
least if they continue to deal with it in this manner. The stream which is in
this case continually running out from its coffers, is necessarily much larger
than that which is continually running in; so that, unless they are replenished
by some great and continual effort of expense, those coffers must soon be
exhausted altogether.

The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for a long time very
careful to require frequent and regular repayments from all their customers,
and did not care to deal with any person, whatever might be his fortune or
credit, who did not make, what they called, frequent and regular operations
with them. By this attention, besides saving almost entirely the extraordinary
expense of replenishing their coffers, they gained two other very considerable
advantages.

First, by this attention they were enabled to make some tolerable judgment
concerning the thriving or declining circumstances of their debtors, without
being obliged to look out for any other evidence besides what their own books
afforded them; men being, for the most part, either regular or irregular in
their repayments, according as their circumstances are either thriving or
declining. A private man who lends out his money to perhaps half a dozen or a
dozen of debtors, may, either by himself or his agents, observe and inquire
both constantly and carefully into the conduct and situation of each of them.
But a banking company, which lends money to perhaps five hundred different
people, and of which the attention is continually occupied by objects of a very
different kind, can have no regular information concerning the conduct and
circumstances of the greater part of its debtors, beyond what its own books
afford it. In requiring frequent and regular repayments from all their
customers, the banking companies of Scotland had probably this advantage in
view.

Secondly, by this attention they secured themselves from the possibility of
issuing more paper money than what the circulation of the country could easily
absorb and employ. When they observed, that within moderate periods of time,
the repayments of a particular customer were, upon most occasions, fully equal
to the advances which they had made to him, they might be assured that the
paper money which they had advanced to him had not, at any time, exceeded the
quantity of gold and silver which he would otherwise have been obliged to keep
by him for answering occasional demands; and that, consequently, the paper
money, which they had circulated by his means, had not at any time exceeded the
quantity of gold and silver which would have circulated in the country, had
there been no paper money. The frequency, regularity, and amount of his
repayments, would sufficiently demonstrate that the amount of their advances
had at no time exceeded that part of his capital which he would otherwise have
been obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering
occasional demands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his capital
in constant employment. It is this part of his capital only which, within
moderate periods of time, is continually returning to every dealer in the shape
of money, whether paper or coin, and continually going from him in the same
shape. If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded this part of his
capital, the ordinary amount of his repayments could not, within moderate
periods of time, have equalled the ordinary amount of its advances. The stream
which, by means of his dealings, was continually running into the coffers of
the bank, could not have been equal to the stream which, by means of the same
dealings was continually running out. The advances of the bank paper, by
exceeding the quantity of gold and silver which, had there been no such
advances, he would have been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional
demands, might soon come to exceed the whole quantity of gold and silver which
( the commerce being supposed the same ) would have circulated in the country,
had there been no paper money; and, consequently, to exceed the quantity which
the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ; and the excess
of this paper money would immediately have returned upon the bank, in order to
be exchanged for gold and silver. This second advantage, though equally real,
was not, perhaps, so well understood by all the different banking companies in
Scotland as the first.

When, partly by the conveniency of discounting bills, and partly by that of
cash accounts, the creditable traders of any country can be dispensed from the
necessity of keeping any part of their stock by them unemployed, and in ready
money, for answering occasional demands, they can reasonably expect no farther
assistance from hanks and bankers, who, when they have gone thus far, cannot,
consistently with their own interest and safety, go farther. A bank cannot,
consistently with its own interest, advance to a trader the whole, or even the
greater part of the circulating capital with which he trades; because, though
that capital is continually returning to him in the shape of money, and going
from him in the same shape, yet the whole of the returns is too distant from
the whole of the outgoings, and the sum of his repayments could not equal the
sum of his advances within such moderate periods of time as suit the
conveniency of a bank. Still less could a bank afford to advance him any
considerable part of his fixed capital; of the capital which the undertaker of
an iron forge, for example, employs in erecting his forge and smelting-houses,
his work-houses, and warehouses, the dwelling-houses of his workmen, etc.; of
the capital which the undertaker of a mine employs in sinking his shafts, in
erecting engines for drawing out the water, in making roads and waggon-ways,
etc.; of the capital which the person who undertakes to improve land employs in
clearing, draining, inclosing, manuring, and ploughing waste and uncultivated
fields; in building farmhouses, with all their necessary appendages of stables,
granaries, etc. The returns of the fixed capital are, in almost all cases, much
slower than those of the circulating capital: and such expenses, even when laid
out with the greatest prudence and judgment, very seldom return to the
undertaker till after a period of many years, a period by far too distant to
suit the conveniency of a bank. Traders and other undertakers may, no doubt
with great propriety, carry on a very considerable part of their projects with
borrowed money. In justice to their creditors, however, their own capital ought
in this case to be sufficient to insure, if I may say so, the capital of those
creditors; or to render it extremely improbable that those creditors should
incur any loss, even though the success of the project should fall very much
short of the expectation of the projectors. Even with this precaution, too, the
money which is borrowed, and which it is meant should not be repaid till after
a period of several years, ought not to be borrowed of a bank, but ought to be
borrowed upon bond or mortgage, of such private people as propose to live upon
the interest of their money, without taking the trouble themselves to employ
the capital, and who are, upon that account, willing to lend that capital to
such people of good credit as are likely to keep it for several years. A bank,
indeed, which lends its money without the expense of stamped paper, or of
attorneys’ fees for drawing bonds and mortgages, and which accepts of
repayment upon the easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland, would, no
doubt, be a very convenient creditor to such traders and undertakers. But such
traders and undertakers would surely be most inconvenient debtors to such a
bank.

It is now more than five and twenty years since the paper money issued by the
different banking companies of Scotland was fully equal, or rather was somewhat
more than fully equal, to what the circulation of the country could easily
absorb and employ. Those companies, therefore, had so long ago given all the
assistance to the traders and other undertakers of Scotland which it is
possible for banks and bankers, consistently with their own interest, to give.
They had even done somewhat more. They had over-traded a little, and had
brought upon themselves that loss, or at least that diminution of profit,
which, in this particular business, never fails to attend the smallest degree
of over-trading. Those traders and other undertakers, having got so much
assistance from banks and bankers, wished to get still more. The banks, they
seem to have thought, could extend their credits to whatever sum might be
wanted, without incurring any other expense besides that of a few reams of
paper. They complained of the contracted views and dastardly spirit of the
directors of those banks, which did not, they said, extend their credits in
proportion to the extension of the trade of the country; meaning, no doubt, by
the extension of that trade, the extension of their own projects beyond what
they could carry on either with their own capital, or with what they had credit
to borrow of private people in the usual way of bond or mortgage. The banks,
they seem to have thought, were in honour bound to supply the deficiency, and
to provide them with all the capital which they wanted to trade with. The
banks, however, were of a different opinion; and upon their refusing to extend
their credits, some of those traders had recourse to an expedient which, for a
time, served their purpose, though at a much greater expense, yet as
effectually as the utmost extension of bank credits could have done. This
expedient was no other than the well known shift of drawing and redrawing; the
shift to which unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse, when they are upon
the brink of bankruptcy. The practice of raising money in this manner had been
long known in England; and, during the course of the late war, when the high
profits of trade afforded a great temptation to over-trading, is said to have
been carried on to a very great extent. From England it was brought into
Scotland, where, in proportion to the very limited commerce, and to the very
moderate capital of the country, it was soon carried on to a much greater
extent than it ever had been in England.

The practice of drawing and redrawing is so well known to all men of business,
that it may, perhaps, be thought unnecessary to give any account of it. But as
this book may come into the hands of many people who are not men of business,
and as the effects of this practice upon the banking trade are not, perhaps,
generally understood, even by men of business themselves, I shall endeavour to
explain it as distinctly as I can.

The customs of merchants, which were established when the barbarous laws of
Europe did not enforce the performance of their contracts, and which, during
the course of the two last centuries, have been adopted into the laws of all
European nations, have given such extraordinary privileges to bills of
exchange, that money is more readily advanced upon them than upon any other
species of obligation; especially when they are made payable within so short a
period as two or three months after their date. If, when the bill becomes due,
the acceptor does not pay it as soon as it is presented, he becomes from that
moment a bankrupt. The bill is protested, and returns upon the drawer, who, if
he does not immediately pay it, becomes likewise a bankrupt. If, before it came
to the person who presents it to the acceptor for payment, it had passed
through the hands of several other persons, who had successively advanced to
one another the contents of it, either in money or goods, and who, to express
that each of them had in his turn received those contents, had all of them in
their order indorsed, that is, written their names upon the back of the bill;
each indorser becomes in his turn liable to the owner of the bill for those
contents, and, if he fails to pay, he becomes too, from that moment, a
bankrupt. Though the drawer, acceptor, and indorsers of the bill, should all of
them be persons of doubtful credit; yet, still the shortness of the date gives
some security to the owner of the bill. Though all of them may be very likely
to become bankrupts, it is a chance if they all become so in so short a time.
The house is crazy, says a weary traveller to himself, and will not stand very
long; but it is a chance if it falls to-night, and I will venture, therefore,
to sleep in it to-night.

The trader A in Edinburgh, we shall suppose, draws a bill upon B in London,
payable two months after date. In reality B in London owes nothing to A in
Edinburgh; but he agrees to accept of A’s bill, upon condition, that
before the term of payment he shall redraw upon A in Edinburgh for the same
sum, together with the interest and a commission, another bill, payable
likewise two months after date. B accordingly, before the expiration of the
first two months, redraws this bill upon A in Edinburgh; who, again before the
expiration of the second two months, draws a second bill upon B in London,
payable likewise two months after date; and before the expiration of the third
two months, B in London redraws upon A in Edinburgh another bill payable also
two months after date. This practice has sometimes gone on, not only for
several months, but for several years together, the bill always returning upon
A in Edinburgh with the accumulated interest and commission of all the former
bills. The interest was five per cent. in the year, and the commission was
never less than one half per cent. on each draught. This commission being
repeated more than six times in the year, whatever money A might raise by this
expedient might necessarily have cost him something more than eight per cent.
in the year and sometimes a great deal more, when either the price of the
commission happened to rise, or when he was obliged to pay compound interest
upon the interest and commission of former bills. This practice was called
raising money by circulation.

In a country where the ordinary profits of stock, in the greater part of
mercantile projects, are supposed to run between six and ten per cent. it must
have been a very fortunate speculation, of which the returns could not only
repay the enormous expense at which the money was thus borrowed for carrying it
on, but afford, besides, a good surplus profit to the projector. Many vast and
extensive projects, however, were undertaken, and for several years carried on,
without any other fund to support them besides what was raised at this enormous
expense. The projectors, no doubt, had in their golden dreams the most distinct
vision of this great profit. Upon their awakening, however, either at the end
of their projects, or when they were no longer able to carry them on, they very
seldom, I believe, had the good fortune to find it.

{The method described in the text was by no means either the most common or the
most expensive one in which those adventurers sometimes raised money by
circulation. It frequently happened, that A in Edinburgh would enable B in
London to pay the first bill of exchange, by drawing, a few days before it
became due, a second bill at three months date upon the same B in London. This
bill, being payable to his own order, A sold in Edinburgh at par; and with its
contents purchased bills upon London, payable at sight to the order of B, to
whom he sent them by the post. Towards the end of the late war, the exchange
between Edinburgh and London was frequently three per cent. against Edinburgh,
and those bills at sight must frequently have cost A that premium. This
transaction, therefore, being repeated at least four times in the year, and
being loaded with a commission of at least one half per cent. upon each
repetition, must at that period have cost A, at least, fourteen per cent. in
the year. At other times A would enable to discharge the first bill of
exchange, by drawing, a few days before it became due, a second bill at two
months date, not upon B, but upon some third person, C, for example, in London.
This other bill was made payable to the order of B, who, upon its being
accepted by C, discounted it with some banker in London; and A enabled C to
discharge it, by drawing, a few day’s before it became due, a third bill
likewise at two months date, sometimes upon his first correspondent B, and
sometimes upon some fourth or fifth person, D or E, for example. This third
bill was made payable to the order of C, who, as soon as it was accepted,
discounted it in the same manner with some banker in London. Such operations
being repeated at least six times in the year, and being loaded with a
commission of at least one half per cent. upon each repetition, together with
the legal interest of five per cent. this method of raising money, in the same
manner as that described in the text, must have cost A something more than
eight per cent. By saving, however, the exchange between Edinburgh and London,
it was less expensive than that mentioned in the foregoing part of this note;
but then it required an established credit with more houses than one in London,
an advantage which many of these adventurers could not always find it easy to
procure.}

The bills which A in Edinburgh drew upon B in London, he regularly discounted
two months before they were due, with some bank or banker in Edinburgh; and the
bills which B in London redrew upon A in Edinburgh, he as regularly discounted,
either with the Bank of England, or with some other banker in London. Whatever
was advanced upon such circulating bills was in Edinburgh advanced in the paper
of the Scotch banks; and in London, when they were discounted at the Bank of
England in the paper of that bank. Though the bills upon which this paper had
been advanced were all of them repaid in their turn as soon as they became due,
yet the value which had been really advanced upon the first bill was never
really returned to the banks which advanced it; because, before each bill
became due, another bill was always drawn to somewhat a greater amount than the
bill which was soon to be paid: and the discounting of this other bill was
essentially necessary towards the payment of that which was soon to be due.
This payment, therefore, was altogether fictitious. The stream which, by means
of those circulating bills of exchange, had once been made to run out from the
coffers of the banks, was never replaced by any stream which really ran into
them.

The paper which was issued upon those circulating bills of exchange amounted,
upon many occasions, to the whole fund destined for carrying on some vast and
extensive project of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures; and not merely to
that part of it which, had there been no paper money, the projector would have
been obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering
occasional demands. The greater part of this paper was, consequently, over and
above the value of the gold and silver which would have circulated in the
country, had there been no paper money. It was over and above, therefore, what
the circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ, and upon that
account, immediately returned upon the banks, in order to be exchanged for gold
and silver, which they were to find as they could. It was a capital which those
projectors had very artfully contrived to draw from those banks, not only
without their knowledge or deliberate consent, but for some time, perhaps,
without their having the most distant suspicion that they had really advanced
it.

When two people, who are continually drawing and redrawing upon one another,
discount their bills always with the same banker, he must immediately discover
what they are about, and see clearly that they are trading, not with any
capital of their own, but with the capital which he advances to them. But this
discovery is not altogether so easy when they discount their bills sometimes
with one banker, and sometimes with another, and when the two same persons do
not constantly draw and redraw upon one another, but occasionally run the round
of a great circle of projectors, who find it for their interest to assist one
another in this method of raising money and to render it, upon that account, as
difficult as possible to distinguish between a real and a fictitious bill of
exchange, between a bill drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a
bill for which there was properly no real creditor but the bank which
discounted it, nor any real debtor but the projector who made use of the money.
When a banker had even made this discovery, he might sometimes make it too
late, and might find that he had already discounted the bills of those
projectors to so great an extent, that, by refusing to discount any more, he
would necessarily make them all bankrupts; and thus by ruining them, might
perhaps ruin himself. For his own interest and safety, therefore, he might find
it necessary, in this very perilous situation, to go on for some time,
endeavouring, however, to withdraw gradually, and, upon that account, making
every day greater and greater difficulties about discounting, in order to force
these projectors by degrees to have recourse, either to other bankers, or to
other methods of raising money: so as that he himself might, as soon as
possible, get out of the circle. The difficulties, accordingly, which the Bank
of England, which the principal bankers in London, and which even the more
prudent Scotch banks began, after a certain time, and when all of them had
already gone too far, to make about discounting, not only alarmed, but enraged,
in the highest degree, those projectors. Their own distress, of which this
prudent and necessary reserve of the banks was, no doubt, the immediate
occasion, they called the distress of the country; and this distress of the
country, they said, was altogether owing to the ignorance, pusillanimity, and
bad conduct of the banks, which did not give a sufficiently liberal aid to the
spirited undertakings of those who exerted themselves in order to beautify,
improve, and enrich the country. It was the duty of the banks, they seemed to
think, to lend for as long a time, and to as great an extent, as they might
wish to borrow. The banks, however, by refusing in this manner to give more
credit to those to whom they had already given a great deal too much, took the
only method by which it was now possible to save either their own credit, or
the public credit of the country.

In the midst of this clamour and distress, a new bank was established in
Scotland, for the express purpose of relieving the distress of the country. The
design was generous; but the execution was imprudent, and the nature and causes
of the distress which it meant to relieve, were not, perhaps, well understood.
This bank was more liberal than any other had ever been, both in granting
cash-accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange. With regard to the latter,
it seems to have made scarce any distinction between real and circulating
bills, but to have discounted all equally. It was the avowed principle of this
bank to advance upon any reasonable security, the whole capital which was to be
employed in those improvements of which the returns are the most slow and
distant, such as the improvements of land. To promote such improvements was
even said to be the chief of the public-spirited purposes for which it was
instituted. By its liberality in granting cash-accounts, and in discounting
bills of exchange, it, no doubt, issued great quantities of its bank notes. But
those bank notes being, the greater part of them, over and above what the
circulation of the country could easily absorb and employ, returned upon it, in
order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they were issued. Its
coffers were never well filled. The capital which had been subscribed to this
bank, at two different subscriptions, amounted to one hundred and sixty
thousand pounds, of which eighty per cent. only was paid up. This sum ought to
have been paid in at several different instalments. A great part of the
proprietors, when they paid in their first instalment, opened a cash-account
with the bank; and the directors, thinking themselves obliged to treat their
own proprietors with the same liberality with which they treated all other men,
allowed many of them to borrow upon this cash-account what they paid in upon
all their subsequent instalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one
coffer what had the moment before been taken out of another. But had the
coffers of this bank been filled ever so well, its excessive circulation must
have emptied them faster than they could have been replenished by any other
expedient but the ruinous one of drawing upon London; and when the bill became
due, paying it, together with interest and commission, by another draught upon
the same place. Its coffers having been filled so very ill, it is said to have
been driven to this resource within a very few months after it began to do
business. The estates of the proprietors of this bank were worth several
millions, and, by their subscription to the original bond or contract of the
bank, were really pledged for answering all its engagements. By means of the
great credit which so great a pledge necessarily gave it, it was,
notwithstanding its too liberal conduct, enabled to carry on business for more
than two years. When it was obliged to stop, it had in the circulation about
two hundred thousand pounds in bank notes. In order to support the circulation
of those notes, which were continually returning upon it as fast as they were
issued, it had been constantly in the practice of drawing bills of exchange
upon London, of which the number and value were continually increasing, and,
when it stopt, amounted to upwards of six hundred thousand pounds. This bank,
therefore, had, in little more than the course of two years, advanced to
different people upwards of eight hundred thousand pounds at five per cent.
Upon the two hundred thousand pounds which it circulated in bank notes, this
five per cent. might perhaps be considered as a clear gain, without any other
deduction besides the expense of management. But upon upwards of six hundred
thousand pounds, for which it was continually drawing bills of exchange upon
London, it was paying, in the way of interest and commission, upwards of eight
per cent. and was consequently losing more than three per cent. upon more than
three fourths of all its dealings.

The operations of this bank seem to have produced effects quite opposite to
those which were intended by the particular persons who planned and directed
it. They seem to have intended to support the spirited undertakings, for as
such they considered them, which were at that time carrying on in different
parts of the country; and, at the same time, by drawing the whole banking
business to themselves, to supplant all the other Scotch banks, particularly
those established at Edinburgh, whose backwardness in discounting bills of
exchange had given some offence. This bank, no doubt, gave some temporary
relief to those projectors, and enabled them to carry on their projects for
about two years longer than they could otherwise have done. But it thereby only
enabled them to get so much deeper into debt; so that, when ruin came, it fell
so much the heavier both upon them and upon their creditors. The operations of
this bank, therefore, instead of relieving, in reality aggravated in the
long-run the distress which those projectors had brought both upon themselves
and upon their country. It would have been much better for themselves, their
creditors, and their country, had the greater part of them been obliged to stop
two years sooner than they actually did. The temporary relief, however, which
this bank afforded to those projectors, proved a real and permanent relief to
the other Scotch banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, which
those other banks had become so backward in discounting, had recourse to this
new bank, where they were received with open arms. Those other banks,
therefore, were enabled to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which
they could not otherwise have disengaged themselves without incurring a
considerable loss, and perhaps, too, even some degree of discredit.

In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increased the real
distress of the country, which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved,
from a very great distress, those rivals whom it meant to supplant.

At the first setting out of this bank, it was the opinion of some people, that
how fast soever its coffers might be emptied, it might easily replenish them,
by raising money upon the securities of those to whom it had advanced its
paper. Experience, I believe, soon convinced them that this method of raising
money was by much too slow to answer their purpose; and that coffers which
originally were so ill filled, and which emptied themselves so very fast, could
be replenished by no other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing bills upon
London, and when they became due, paying them by other draughts on the same
place, with accumulated interest and commission. But though they had been able
by this method to raise money as fast as they wanted it, yet, instead of making
a profit, they must have suffered a loss of every such operation; so that in
the long-run they must have ruined themselves as a mercantile company, though
perhaps not so soon as by the more expensive practice of drawing and redrawing.
They could still have made nothing by the interest of the paper, which, being
over and above what the circulation of the country could absorb and employ,
returned upon them in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as
they issued it; and for the payment of which they were themselves continually
obliged to borrow money. On the contrary, the whole expense of this borrowing,
of employing agents to look out for people who had money to lend, of
negotiating with those people, and of drawing the proper bond or assignment,
must have fallen upon them, and have been so much clear loss upon the balance
of their accounts. The project of replenishing their coffers in this manner may
be compared to that of a man who had a water-pond from which a stream was
continually running out, and into which no stream was continually running, but
who proposed to keep it always equally full, by employing a number of people to
go continually with buckets to a well at some miles distance, in order to bring
water to replenish it.

But though this operation had proved not only practicable, but profitable to
the bank, as a mercantile company; yet the country could have derived no
benefit front it, but, on the contrary, must have suffered a very considerable
loss by it. This operation could not augment, in the smallest degree, the
quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this bank into a sort
of general loan office for the whole country. Those who wanted to borrow must
have applied to this bank, instead of applying to the private persons who had
lent it their money. But a bank which lends money, perhaps to five hundred
different people, the greater part of whom its directors can know very little
about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice of its debtors than a
private person who lends out his money among a few people whom he knows, and in
whose sober and frugal conduct he thinks he has good reason to confide. The
debtors of such a bank as that whose conduct I have been giving some account of
were likely, the greater part of them, to be chimerical projectors, the drawers
and redrawers of circulating bills of exchange, who would employ the money in
extravagant undertakings, which, with all the assistance that could be given
them, they would probably never be able to complete, and which, if they should
be completed, would never repay the expense which they had really cost, would
never afford a fund capable of maintaining a quantity of labour equal to that
which had been employed about them. The sober and frugal debtors of private
persons, on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the money borrowed in
sober undertakings which were proportioned to their capitals, and which, though
they might have less of the grand and the marvellous, would have more of the
solid and the profitable; which would repay with a large profit whatever had
been laid out upon them, and which would thus afford a fund capable of
maintaining a much greater quantity of labour than that which had been employed
about them. The success of this operation, therefore, without increasing in the
smallest degree the capital of the country, would only have transferred a great
part of it from prudent and profitable to imprudent and unprofitable
undertakings.

That the industry of Scotland languished for want of money to employ it, was
the opinion of the famous Mr Law. By establishing a bank of a particular kind,
which he seems to have imagined might issue paper to the amount of the whole
value of all the lands in the country, he proposed to remedy this want of
money. The parliament of Scotland, when he first proposed his project, did not
think proper to adopt it. It was afterwards adopted, with some variations, by
the Duke of Orleans, at that time regent of France. The idea of the possibility
of multiplying paper money to almost any extent was the real foundation of what
is called the Mississippi scheme, the most extravagant project, both of banking
and stock-jobbing, that perhaps the world ever saw. The different operations of
this scheme are explained so fully, so clearly, and with so much order and
distinctness, by Mr Du Verney, in his Examination of the Political Reflections
upon commerce and finances of Mr Du Tot, that I shall not give any account of
them. The principles upon which it was founded are explained by Mr Law himself,
in a discourse concerning money and trade, which he published in Scotland when
he first proposed his project. The splendid but visionary ideas which are set
forth in that and some other works upon the same principles, still continue to
make an impression upon many people, and have, perhaps, in part, contributed to
that excess of banking, which has of late been complained of, both in Scotland
and in other places.

The Bank of England is the greatest bank of circulation in Europe. It was
incorporated, in pursuance of an act of parliament, by a charter under the
great seal, dated the 27th of July 1694. It at that time advanced to government
the sum of £1,200,000 for an annuity of £100,000, or for £ 96,000 a-year,
interest at the rate of eight per cent. and £4,000 year for the expense of
management. The credit of the new government, established by the Revolution, we
may believe, must have been very low, when it was obliged to borrow at so high
an interest.

In 1697, the bank was allowed to enlarge its capital stock, by an ingraftment
of £1,001,171:10s. Its whole capital stock, therefore, amounted at this time to
£2,201,171: 10s. This ingraftment is said to have been for the support of
public credit. In 1696, tallies had been at forty, and fifty, and sixty, per
cent. discount, and bank notes at twenty per cent. {James Postlethwaite’s
History of the Public Revenue, p.301.} During the great re-coinage of the
silver, which was going on at this time, the bank had thought proper to
discontinue the payment of its notes, which necessarily occasioned their
discredit.

In pursuance of the 7th Anne, c. 7, the bank advanced and paid into the
exchequer the sum of £400,000; making in all the sum of £1,600,000, which it
had advanced upon its original annuity of £96,000 interest, and £4,000 for
expense of management. In 1708, therefore, the credit of government was as good
as that of private persons, since it could borrow at six per cent. interest,
the common legal and market rate of those times. In pursuance of the same act,
the bank cancelled exchequer bills to the amount of £ 1,775,027: 17s: 10½d. at
six per cent. interest, and was at the same time allowed to take in
subscriptions for doubling its capital. In 1703, therefore, the capital of the
bank amounted to £4,402,343; and it had advanced to government the sum of
£3,375,027:17:10½d.

By a call of fifteen per cent. in 1709, there was paid in, and made stock, £
656,204:1:9d.; and by another of ten per cent. in 1710, £501,448:12:11d. In
consequence of those two calls, therefore, the bank capital amounted to £
5,559,995:14:8d.

In pursuance of the 3rd George I. c.8, the bank delivered up two millions of
exchequer Bills to be cancelled. It had at this time, therefore, advanced to
government £5,375,027:17 10d. In pursuance of the 8th George I. c.21, the bank
purchased of the South-sea company, stock to the amount of £4,000,000: and in
1722, in consequence of the subscriptions which it had taken in for enabling it
to make this purchase, its capital stock was increased by £ 3,400,000. At this
time, therefore, the bank had advanced to the public £ 9,375,027 17s. 10½d.;
and its capital stock amounted only to £ 8,959,995:14:8d. It was upon this
occasion that the sum which the bank had advanced to the public, and for which
it received interest, began first to exceed its capital stock, or the sum for
which it paid a dividend to the proprietors of bank stock; or, in other words,
that the bank began to have an undivided capital, over and above its divided
one. It has continued to have an undivided capital of the same kind ever since.
In 1746, the bank had, upon different occasions, advanced to the public
£11,686,800, and its divided capital had been raised by different calls and
subscriptions to £ 10,780,000. The state of those two sums has continued to be
the same ever since. In pursuance of the 4th of George III. c.25, the bank
agreed to pay to government for the renewal of its charter £110,000, without
interest or re-payment. This sum, therefore did not increase either of those
two other sums.

The dividend of the bank has varied according to the variations in the rate of
the interest which it has, at different times, received for the money it had
advanced to the public, as well as according to other circumstances. This rate
of interest has gradually been reduced from eight to three per cent. For some
years past, the bank dividend has been at five and a half per cent.

The stability of the bank of England is equal to that of the British
government. All that it has advanced to the public must be lost before its
creditors can sustain any loss. No other banking company in England can be
established by act of parliament, or can consist of more than six members. It
acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of state. It receives
and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the creditors of
the public; it circulates exchequer bills; and it advances to government the
annual amount of the land and malt taxes, which are frequently not paid up till
some years thereafter. In these different operations, its duty to the public
may sometimes have obliged it, without any fault of its directors, to overstock
the circulation with paper money. It likewise discounts merchants’ bills,
and has, upon several different occasions, supported the credit of the
principal houses, not only of England, but of Hamburgh and Holland. Upon one
occasion, in 1763, it is said to have advanced for this purpose, in one week,
about £1,600,000, a great part of it in bullion. I do not, however, pretend to
warrant either the greatness of the sum, or the shortness of the time. Upon
other occasions, this great company has been reduced to the necessity of paying
in sixpences.

It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater
part of that capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the
most judicious operations of banking can increase the industry of the country.
That part of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep by him unemployed
and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, is so much dead stock,
which, so long as it remains in this situation, produces nothing, either to him
or to his country. The judicious operations of banking enable him to convert
this dead stock into active and productive stock; into materials to work upon;
into tools to work with; and into provisions and subsistence to work for; into
stock which produces something both to himself and to his country. The gold and
silver money which circulates in any country, and by means of which, the
produce of its land and labour is annually circulated and distributed to the
proper consumers, is, in the same manner as the ready money of the dealer, all
dead stock. It is a very valuable part of the capital of the country, which
produces nothing to the country. The judicious operations of banking, by
substituting paper in the room of a great part of this gold and silver, enable
the country to convert a great part of this dead stock into active and
productive stock; into stock which produces something to the country. The gold
and silver money which circulates in any country may very properly be compared
to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass
and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either. The
judicious operations of banking, by providing, if I may be allowed so violent a
metaphor, a sort of waggon-way through the air, enable the country to convert,
as it were, a great part of its highways into good pastures, and corn fields,
and thereby to increase, very considerably, the annual produce of its land and
labour. The commerce and industry of the country, however, it must be
acknowledged, though they may be somewhat augmented, cannot be altogether so
secure, when they are thus, as it were, suspended upon the Daedalian wings of
paper money, as when they travel about upon the solid ground of gold and
silver. Over and above the accidents to which they are exposed from the
unskilfulness of the conductors of this paper money, they are liable to several
others, from which no prudence or skill of those conductors can guard them.

An unsuccessful war, for example, in which the enemy got possession of the
capital, and consequently of that treasure which supported the credit of the
paper money, would occasion a much greater confusion in a country where the
whole circulation was carried on by paper, than in one where the greater part
of it was carried on by gold and silver. The usual instrument of commerce
having lost its value, no exchanges could be made but either by barter or upon
credit. All taxes having been usually paid in paper money, the prince would not
have wherewithal either to pay his troops, or to furnish his magazines; and the
state of the country would be much more irretrievable than if the greater part
of its circulation had consisted in gold and silver. A prince, anxious to
maintain his dominions at all times in the state in which he can most easily
defend them, ought upon this account to guard not only against that excessive
multiplication of paper money which ruins the very banks which issue it, but
even against that multiplication of it which enables them to fill the greater
part of the circulation of the country with it.

The circulation of every country may be considered as divided into two
different branches; the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the
circulation between the dealers and the consumers. Though the same pieces of
money, whether paper or metal, may be employed sometimes in the one circulation
and sometimes in the other; yet as both are constantly going on at the same
time, each requires a certain stock of money, of one kind or another, to carry
it on. The value of the goods circulated between the different dealers never
can exceed the value of those circulated between the dealers and the consumers;
whatever is bought by the dealers being ultimately destined to be sold to the
consumers. The circulation between the dealers, as it is carried on by
wholesale, requires generally a pretty large sum for every particular
transaction. That between the dealers and the consumers, on the contrary, as it
is generally carried on by retail, frequently requires but very small ones, a
shilling, or even a halfpenny, being often sufficient. But small sums circulate
much faster than large ones. A shilling changes masters more frequently than a
guinea, and a halfpenny more frequently than a shilling. Though the annual
purchases of all the consumers, therefore, are at least equal in value to those
of all the dealers, they can generally be transacted with a much smaller
quantity of money; the same pieces, by a more rapid circulation, serving as the
instrument of many more purchases of the one kind than of the other.

Paper money may be so regulated as either to confine itself very much to the
circulation between the different dealers, or to extend itself likewise to a
great part of that between the dealers and the consumers. Where no bank notes
are circulated under £10 value, as in London, paper money confines itself very
much to the circulation between the dealers. When a ten pound bank note comes
into the hands of a consumer, he is generally obliged to change it at the first
shop where he has occasion to purchase five shillings worth of goods; so that
it often returns into the hands of a dealer before the consumer has spent the
fortieth part of the money. Where bank notes are issued for so small sums as
20s. as in Scotland, paper money extends itself to a considerable part of the
circulation between dealers and consumers. Before the Act of parliament which
put a stop to the circulation of ten and five shilling notes, it filled a still
greater part of that circulation. In the currencies of North America, paper was
commonly issued for so small a sum as a shilling, and filled almost the whole
of that circulation. In some paper currencies of Yorkshire, it was issued even
for so small a sum as a sixpence.

Where the issuing of bank notes for such very small sums is allowed, and
commonly practised, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged to become
bankers. A person whose promissory note for £5, or even for 20s. would be
rejected by every body, will get it to be received without scruple when it is
issued for so small a sum as a sixpence. But the frequent bankruptcies to which
such beggarly bankers must be liable, may occasion a very considerable
inconveniency, and sometimes even a very great calamity, to many poor people
who had received their notes in payment.

It were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were issued in any part of the
kingdom for a smaller sum than £5. Paper money would then, probably, confine
itself, in every part of the kingdom, to the circulation between the different
dealers, as much as it does at present in London, where no bank notes are
issued under £10 value; £5 being, in most part of the kingdom, a sum which,
though it will purchase, perhaps, little more than half the quantity of goods,
is as much considered, and is as seldom spent all at once, as £10 are amidst
the profuse expense of London.

Where paper money, it is to be observed, is pretty much confined to the
circulation between dealers and dealers, as at London, there is always plenty
of gold and silver. Where it extends itself to a considerable part of the
circulation between dealers and consumers, as in Scotland, and still more in
North America, it banishes gold and silver almost entirely from the country;
almost all the ordinary transactions of its interior commerce being thus
carried on by paper. The suppression of ten and five shilling bank notes,
somewhat relieved the scarcity of gold and silver in Scotland; and the
suppression of twenty shilling notes will probably relieve it still more. Those
metals are said to have become more abundant in America, since the suppression
of some of their paper currencies. They are said, likewise, to have been more
abundant before the institution of those currencies.

Though paper money should be pretty much confined to the circulation between
dealers and dealers, yet banks and bankers might still be able to give nearly
the same assistance to the industry and commerce of the country, as they had
done when paper money filled almost the whole circulation. The ready money
which a dealer is obliged to keep by him, for answering occasional demands, is
destined altogether for the circulation between himself and other dealers of
whom he buys goods. He has no occasion to keep any by him for the circulation
between himself and the consumers, who are his customers, and who bring ready
money to him, instead of taking any from him. Though no paper money, therefore,
was allowed to be issued, but for such sums as would confine it pretty much to
the circulation between dealers and dealers; yet partly by discounting real
bills of exchange, and partly by lending upon cash-accounts, banks and bankers
might still be able to relieve the greater part of those dealers from the
necessity of keeping any considerable part of their stock by them unemployed,
and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. They might still be able
to give the utmost assistance which banks and bankers can with propriety give
to traders of every kind.

To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in payment the
promissory notes of a banker for any sum, whether great or small, when they
themselves are willing to receive them; or, to restrain a banker from issuing
such notes, when all his neighbours are willing to accept of them, is a
manifest violation of that natural liberty, which it is the proper business of
law not to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be
considered as in some respect a violation of natural liberty. But those
exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the
security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of
all governments; of the most free, as well as or the most despotical. The
obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of
fire, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the
regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed.

A paper money, consisting in bank notes, issued by people of undoubted credit,
payable upon demand, without any condition, and, in fact, always readily paid
as soon as presented, is, in every respect, equal in value to gold and silver
money, since gold and silver money can at anytime be had for it. Whatever is
either bought or sold for such paper, must necessarily be bought or sold as
cheap as it could have been for gold and silver.

The increase of paper money, it has been said, by augmenting the quantity, and
consequently diminishing the value, of the whole currency, necessarily augments
the money price of commodities. But as the quantity of gold and silver, which
is taken from the currency, is always equal to the quantity of paper which is
added to it, paper money does not necessarily increase the quantity of the
whole currency. From the beginning of the last century to the present time,
provisions never were cheaper in Scotland than in 1759, though, from the
circulation of ten and five shilling bank notes, there was then more paper
money in the country than at present. The proportion between the price of
provisions in Scotland and that in England is the same now as before the great
multiplication of banking companies in Scotland. Corn is, upon most occasions,
fully as cheap in England as in France, though there is a great deal of paper
money in England, and scarce any in France. In 1751 and 1752, when Mr Hume
published his Political Discourses, and soon after the great multiplication of
paper money in Scotland, there was a very sensible rise in the price of
provisions, owing, probably, to the badness of the seasons, and not to the
multiplication of paper money.

It would be otherwise, indeed, with a paper money, consisting in promissory
notes, of which the immediate payment depended, in any respect, either upon the
good will of those who issued them, or upon a condition which the holder of the
notes might not always have it in his power to fulfil, or of which the payment
was not exigible till after a certain number of years, and which, in the mean
time, bore no interest. Such a paper money would, no doubt, fall more or less
below the value of gold and silver, according as the difficulty or uncertainty
of obtaining immediate payment was supposed to be greater or less, or according
to the greater or less distance of time at which payment was exigible.

Some years ago the different banking companies of Scotland were in the practice
of inserting into their bank notes, what they called an optional clause; by
which they promised payment to the bearer, either as soon as the note should be
presented, or, in the option of the directors, six months after such
presentment, together with the legal interest for the said six months. The
directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of this optional
clause, and sometimes threatened those who demanded gold and silver in exchange
for a considerable number of their notes, that they would take advantage of it,
unless such demanders would content themselves with a part of what they
demanded. The promissory notes of those banking companies constituted, at that
time, the far greater part of the currency of Scotland, which this uncertainty
of payment necessarily degraded below value of gold and silver money. During
the continuance of this abuse (which prevailed chiefly in 1762, 1763, and
1764), while the exchange between London and Carlisle was at par, that between
London and Dumfries would sometimes be four per cent. against Dumfries, though
this town is not thirty miles distant from Carlisle. But at Carlisle, bills
were paid in gold and silver; whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch bank
notes; and the uncertainty of getting these bank notes exchanged for gold and
silver coin, had thus degraded them four per cent. below the value of that
coin. The same act of parliament which suppressed ten and five shilling bank
notes, suppressed likewise this optional clause, and thereby restored the
exchange between England and Scotland to its natural rate, or to what the
course of trade and remittances might happen to make it.

In the paper currencies of Yorkshire, the payment of so small a sum as 6d.
sometimes depended upon the condition, that the holder of the note should bring
the change of a guinea to the person who issued it; a condition which the
holders of such notes might frequently find it very difficult to fulfil, and
which must have degraded this currency below the value of gold and silver
money. An act of parliament, accordingly, declared all such clauses unlawful,
and suppressed, in the same manner as in Scotland, all promissory notes,
payable to the bearer, under 20s. value.

The paper currencies of North America consisted, not in bank notes payable to
the bearer on demand, but in a government paper, of which the payment was not
exigible till several years after it was issued; and though the colony
governments paid no interest to the holders of this paper, they declared it to
be, and in fact rendered it, a legal tender of payment for the full value for
which it was issued. But allowing the colony security to be perfectly good,
£100, payable fifteen years hence, for example, in a country where interest is
at six per cent., is worth little more than £40 ready money. To oblige a
creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full payment for a debt of £100,
actually paid down in ready money, was an act of such violent injustice, as has
scarce, perhaps, been attempted by the government of any other country which
pretended to be free. It bears the evident marks of having originally been,
what the honest and downright Doctor Douglas assures us it was, a scheme of
fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors. The government of Pennsylvania,
indeed, pretended, upon their first emission of paper money, in 1722, to render
their paper of equal value with gold and silver, by enacting penalties against
all those who made any difference in the price of their goods when they sold
them for a colony paper, and when they sold them for gold and silver, a
regulation equally tyrannical, but much less, effectual, than that which it was
meant to support. A positive law may render a shilling a legal tender for a
guinea, because it may direct the courts of justice to discharge the debtor who
has made that tender; but no positive law can oblige a person who sells goods,
and who is at liberty to sell or not to sell as he pleases, to accept of a
shilling as equivalent to a guinea in the price of them. Notwithstanding any
regulation of this kind, it appeared, by the course of exchange with Great
Britain, that £100 sterling was occasionally considered as equivalent, in some
of the colonies, to £130, and in others to so great a sum as £1100 currency;
this difference in the value arising from the difference in the quantity of
paper emitted in the different colonies, and in the distance and probability of
the term of its final discharge and redemption.

No law, therefore, could be more equitable than the act of parliament, so
unjustly complained of in the colonies, which declared, that no paper currency
to be emitted there in time coming, should be a legal tender of payment.

Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of paper money than any
other of our colonies. Its paper currency, accordingly, is said never to have
sunk below the value of the gold and silver which was current in the colony
before the first emission of its paper money. Before that emission, the colony
had raised the denomination of its coin, and had, by act of assembly, ordered
5s. sterling to pass in the colonies for 6s:3d., and afterwards for 6s:8d. A
pound, colony currency, therefore, even when that currency was gold and silver,
was more than thirty per cent. below the value of £1 sterling; and when that
currency was turned into paper, it was seldom much more than thirty per cent.
below that value. The pretence for raising the denomination of the coin was to
prevent the exportation of gold and silver, by making equal quantities of those
metals pass for greater sums in the colony than they did in the mother country.
It was found, however, that the price of all goods from the mother country rose
exactly in proportion as they raised the denomination of their coin, so that
their gold and silver were exported as fast as ever.

The paper of each colony being received in the payment of the provincial taxes,
for the full value for which it had been issued, it necessarily derived from
this use some additional value, over and above what it would have had, from the
real or supposed distance of the term of its final discharge and redemption.
This additional value was greater or less, according as the quantity of paper
issued was more or less above what could be employed in the payment of the
taxes of the particular colony which issued it. It was in all the colonies very
much above what could be employed in this manner.

A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be
paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to
this paper money, even though the term of its final discharge and redemption
should depend altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank which issued
this paper was careful to keep the quantity of it always somewhat below what
could easily be employed in this manner, the demand for it might be such as to
make it even bear a premium, or sell for somewhat more in the market than the
quantity of gold or silver currency for which it was issued. Some people
account in this manner for what is called the agio of the bank of Amsterdam, or
for the superiority of bank money over current money, though this bank money,
as they pretend, cannot be taken out of the bank at the will of the owner. The
greater part of foreign bills of exchange must be paid in bank money, that is,
by a transfer in the books of the bank; and the directors of the bank, they
allege, are careful to keep the whole quantity of bank money always below what
this use occasions a demand for. It is upon this account, they say, the bank
money sells for a premium, or bears an agio of four or five per cent. above the
same nominal sum of the gold and silver currency of the country. This account
of the bank of Amsterdam, however, it will appear hereafter, is in a great
measure chimerical.

A paper currency which falls below the value of gold and silver coin, does not
thereby sink the value of those metals, or occasion equal quantities of them to
exchange for a smaller quantity of goods of any other kind. The proportion
between the value of gold and silver and that of goods of any other kind,
depends in all cases, not upon the nature and quantity of any particular paper
money, which may be current in any particular country, but upon the richness or
poverty of the mines, which happen at any particular time to supply the great
market of the commercial world with those metals. It depends upon the
proportion between the quantity of labour which is necessary in order to bring
a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, and that which is necessary in
order to bring thither a certain quantity of any other sort of goods.

If bankers are restrained from issuing any circulating bank notes, or notes
payable to the bearer, for less than a certain sum; and if they are subjected
to the obligation of an immediate and unconditional payment of such bank notes
as soon as presented, their trade may, with safety to the public, be rendered
in all other respects perfectly free. The late multiplication of banking
companies in both parts of the united kingdom, an event by which many people
have been much alarmed, instead of diminishing, increases the security of the
public. It obliges all of them to be more circumspect in their conduct, and, by
not extending their currency beyond its due proportion to their cash, to guard
themselves against those malicious runs, which the rivalship of so many
competitors is always ready to bring upon them. It restrains the circulation of
each particular company within a narrower circle, and reduces their circulating
notes to a smaller number. By dividing the whole circulation into a greater
number of parts, the failure of any one company, an accident which, in the
course of things, must sometimes happen, becomes of less consequence to the
public. This free competition, too, obliges all bankers to be more liberal in
their dealings with their customers, lest their rivals should carry them away.
In general, if any branch of trade, or any division of labour, be advantageous
to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will always be
the more so.

CHAPTER III.
OF THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL, OR OF PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR.

There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which
it is bestowed; there is another which has no such effect. The former as it
produces a value, may be called productive, the latter, unproductive labour.
{Some French authors of great learning and ingenuity have used those words in a
different sense. In the last chapter of the fourth book, I shall endeavour to
shew that their sense is an improper one.} Thus the labour of a manufacturer
adds generally to the value of the materials which he works upon, that of his
own maintenance, and of his master’s profit. The labour of a menial
servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing. Though the manufacturer
has his wages advanced to him by his master, he in reality costs him no
expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, together with a
profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed.
But the maintenance of a menial servant never is restored. A man grows rich by
employing a multitude of manufacturers; he grows poor by maintaining a
multitude or menial servants. The labour of the latter, however, has its value,
and deserves its reward as well as that of the former. But the labour of the
manufacturer fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible
commodity, which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is,
as it were, a certain quantity of labour stocked and stored up, to be employed,
if necessary, upon some other occasion. That subject, or, what is the same
thing, the price of that subject, can afterwards, if necessary, put into motion
a quantity of labour equal to that which had originally produced it. The labour
of the menial servant, on the contrary, does not fix or realize itself in any
particular subject or vendible commodity. His services generally perish in the
very instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace of value behind
them, for which an equal quantity of service could afterwards be procured.

The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is, like that
of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or realize
itself in any permanent subject, or vendible commodity, which endures after
that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of labour could afterwards
be procured. The sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice
and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive
labourers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of
the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how
honourable, how useful, or how necessary soever, produces nothing for which an
equal quantity of service can afterwards be procured. The protection, security,
and defence, of the commonwealth, the effect of their labour this year, will
not purchase its protection, security, and defence, for the year to come. In
the same class must be ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and
some of the most frivolous professions; churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of
letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers,
opera-dancers, etc. The labour of the meanest of these has a certain value,
regulated by the very same principles which regulate that of every other sort
of labour; and that of the noblest and most useful, produces nothing which
could afterwards purchase or procure an equal quantity of labour. Like the
declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the
musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its
production.

Both productive and unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour at all,
are all equally maintained by the annual produce of the land and labour of the
country. This produce, how great soever, can never be infinite, but must have
certain limits. According, therefore, as a smaller or greater proportion of it
is in any one year employed in maintaining unproductive hands, the more in the
one case, and the less in the other, will remain for the productive, and the
next year’s produce will be greater or smaller accordingly; the whole
annual produce, if we except the spontaneous productions of the earth, being
the effect of productive labour.

Though the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country is no
doubt ultimately destined for supplying the consumption of its inhabitants, and
for procuring a revenue to them; yet when it first comes either from the
ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, it naturally divides
itself into two parts. One of them, and frequently the largest, is, in the
first place, destined for replacing a capital, or for renewing the provisions,
materials, and finished work, which had been withdrawn from a capital; the
other for constituting a revenue either to the owner of this capital, as the
profit of his stock, or to some other person, as the rent of his land. Thus, of
the produce of land, one part replaces the capital of the farmer; the other
pays his profit and the rent of the landlord; and thus constitutes a revenue
both to the owner of this capital, as the profits of his stock, and to some
other person as the rent of his land. Of the produce of a great manufactory, in
the same manner, one part, and that always the largest, replaces the capital of
the undertaker of the work; the other pays his profit, and thus constitutes a
revenue to the owner of this capital.

That part of the annual produce of the land and labour of any country which
replaces a capital, never is immediately employed to maintain any but
productive hands. It pays the wages of productive labour only. That which is
immediately destined for constituting a revenue, either as profit or as rent,
may maintain indifferently either productive or unproductive hands.

Whatever part of his stock a man employs as a capital, he always expects it to
be replaced to him with a profit. He employs it, therefore, in maintaining
productive hands only; and after having served in the function of a capital to
him, it constitutes a revenue to them. Whenever he employs any part of it in
maintaining unproductive hands of any kind, that part is from that moment
withdrawn from his capital, and placed in his stock reserved for immediate
consumption.

Unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour at all, are all maintained
by revenue; either, first, by that part of the annual produce which is
originally destined for constituting a revenue to some particular persons,
either as the rent of land, or as the profits of stock; or, secondly, by that
part which, though originally destined for replacing a capital, and for
maintaining productive labourers only, yet when it comes into their hands,
whatever part of it is over and above their necessary subsistence, may be
employed in maintaining indifferently either productive or unproductive hands.
Thus, not only the great landlord or the rich merchant, but even the common
workman, if his wages are considerable, may maintain a menial servant; or he
may sometimes go to a play or a puppet-show, and so contribute his share
towards maintaining one set of unproductive labourers; or he may pay some
taxes, and thus help to maintain another set, more honourable and useful,
indeed, but equally unproductive. No part of the annual produce, however, which
had been originally destined to replace a capital, is ever directed towards
maintaining unproductive hands, till after it has put into motion its full
complement of productive labour, or all that it could put into motion in the
way in which it was employed. The workman must have earned his wages by work
done, before he can employ any part of them in this manner. That part, too, is
generally but a small one. It is his spare revenue only, of which productive
labourers have seldom a great deal. They generally have some, however; and in
the payment of taxes, the greatness of their number may compensate, in some
measure, the smallness of their contribution. The rent of land and the profits
of stock are everywhere, therefore, the principal sources from which
unproductive hands derive their subsistence. These are the two sorts of revenue
of which the owners have generally most to spare. They might both maintain
indifferently, either productive or unproductive hands. They seem, however, to
have some predilection for the latter. The expense of a great lord feeds
generally more idle than industrious people. The rich merchant, though with his
capital he maintains industrious people only, yet by his expense, that is, by
the employment of his revenue, he feeds commonly the very same sort as the
great lord.

The proportion, therefore, between the productive and unproductive hands,
depends very much in every country upon the proportion between that part of the
annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or from the
hands of the productive labourers, is destined for replacing a capital, and
that which is destined for constituting a revenue, either as rent or as profit.
This proportion is very different in rich from what it is in poor countries.

Thus, at present, in the opulent countries of Europe, a very large, frequently
the largest, portion of the produce of the land, is destined for replacing the
capital of the rich and independent farmer; the other for paying his profits,
and the rent of the landlord. But anciently, during the prevalency of the
feudal government, a very small portion of the produce was sufficient to
replace the capital employed in cultivation. It consisted commonly in a few
wretched cattle, maintained altogether by the spontaneous produce of
uncultivated land, and which might, therefore, be considered as a part of that
spontaneous produce. It generally, too, belonged to the landlord, and was by
him advanced to the occupiers of the land. All the rest of the produce properly
belonged to him too, either as rent for his land, or as profit upon this paltry
capital. The occupiers of land were generally bond-men, whose persons and
effects were equally his property. Those who were not bond-men were tenants at
will; and though the rent which they paid was often nominally little more than
a quit-rent, it really amounted to the whole produce of the land. Their lord
could at all times command their labour in peace and their service in war.
Though they lived at a distance from his house, they were equally dependent
upon him as his retainers who lived in it. But the whole produce of the land
undoubtedly belongs to him, who can dispose of the labour and service of all
those whom it maintains. In the present state of Europe, the share of the
landlord seldom exceeds a third, sometimes not a fourth part of the whole
produce of the land. The rent of land, however, in all the improved parts of
the country, has been tripled and quadrupled since those ancient times; and
this third or fourth part of the annual produce is, it seems, three or four
times greater than the whole had been before. In the progress of improvement,
rent, though it increases in proportion to the extent, diminishes in proportion
to the produce of the land.

In the opulent countries of Europe, great capitals are at present employed in
trade and manufactures. In the ancient state, the little trade that was
stirring, and the few homely and coarse manufactures that were carried on,
required but very small capitals. These, however, must have yielded very large
profits. The rate of interest was nowhere less than ten per cent. and their
profits must have been sufficient to afford this great interest. At present,
the rate of interest, in the improved parts of Europe, is nowhere higher than
six per cent.; and in some of the most improved, it is so low as four, three,
and two per cent. Though that part of the revenue of the inhabitants which is
derived from the profits of stock, is always much greater in rich than in poor
countries, it is because the stock is much greater; in proportion to the stock,
the profits are generally much less.

That part of the annual produce, therefore, which, as soon as it comes either
from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined for
replacing a capital, is not only much greater in rich than in poor countries,
but bears a much greater proportion to that which is immediately destined for
constituting a revenue either as rent or as profit. The funds destined for the
maintenance of productive labour are not only much greater in the former than
in the latter, but bear a much greater proportion to those which, though they
may be employed to maintain either productive or unproductive hands, have
generally a predilection for the latter.

The proportion between those different funds necessarily determines in every
country the general character of the inhabitants as to industry or idleness. We
are more industrious than our forefathers, because, in the present times, the
funds destined for the maintenance of industry are much greater in proportion
to those which are likely to be employed in the maintenance of idleness, than
they were two or three centuries ago. Our ancestors were idle for want of a
sufficient encouragement to industry. It is better, says the proverb, to play
for nothing, than to work for nothing. In mercantile and manufacturing towns,
where the inferior ranks of people are chiefly maintained by the employment of
capital, they are in general industrious, sober, and thriving; as in many
English, and in most Dutch towns. In those towns which are principally
supported by the constant or occasional residence of a court, and in which the
inferior ranks of people are chiefly maintained by the spending of revenue,
they are in general idle, dissolute, and poor; as at Rome, Versailles,
Compeigne, and Fontainbleau. If you except Rouen and Bourdeaux, there is little
trade or industry in any of the parliament towns of France; and the inferior
ranks of people, being chiefly maintained by the expense of the members of the
courts of justice, and of those who come to plead before them, are in general
idle and poor. The great trade of Rouen and Bourdeaux seems to be altogether
the effect of their situation. Rouen is necessarily the entrepot of almost all
the goods which are brought either from foreign countries, or from the maritime
provinces of France, for the consumption of the great city of Paris. Bourdeaux
is, in the same manner, the entrepot of the wines which grow upon the banks of
the Garronne, and of the rivers which run into it, one of the richest wine
countries in the world, and which seems to produce the wine fittest for
exportation, or best suited to the taste of foreign nations. Such advantageous
situations necessarily attract a great capital by the great employment which
they afford it; and the employment of this capital is the cause of the industry
of those two cities. In the other parliament towns of France, very little more
capital seems to be employed than what is necessary for supplying their own
consumption; that is, little more than the smallest capital which can be
employed in them. The same thing may be said of Paris, Madrid, and Vienna. Of
those three cities, Paris is by far the most industrious, but Paris itself is
the principal market of all the manufactures established at Paris, and its own
consumption is the principal object of all the trade which it carries on.
London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen, are, perhaps, the only three cities in Europe,
which are both the constant residence of a court, and can at the same time be
considered as trading cities, or as cities which trade not only for their own
consumption, but for that of other cities and countries. The situation of all
the three is extremely advantageous, and naturally fits them to be the
entrepots of a great part of the goods destined for the consumption of distant
places. In a city where a great revenue is spent, to employ with advantage a
capital for any other purpose than for supplying the consumption of that city,
is probably more difficult than in one in which the inferior ranks of people
have no other maintenance but what they derive from the employment of such a
capital. The idleness of the greater part of the people who are maintained by
the expense of revenue, corrupts, it is probable, the industry of those who
ought to be maintained by the employment of capital, and renders it less
advantageous to employ a capital there than in other places. There was little
trade or industry in Edinburgh before the Union. When the Scotch parliament was
no longer to be assembled in it, when it ceased to be the necessary residence
of the principal nobility and gentry of Scotland, it became a city of some
trade and industry. It still continues, however, to be the residence of the
principal courts of justice in Scotland, of the boards of customs and excise,
etc. A considerable revenue, therefore, still continues to be spent in it. In
trade and industry, it is much inferior to Glasgow, of which the inhabitants
are chiefly maintained by the employment of capital. The inhabitants of a large
village, it has sometimes been observed, after having made considerable
progress in manufactures, have become idle and poor, in consequence of a great
lord’s having taken up his residence in their neighbourhood.

The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems everywhere to
regulate the proportion between industry and idleness Wherever capital
predominates, industry prevails; wherever revenue, idleness. Every increase or
diminution of capital, therefore, naturally tends to increase or diminish the
real quantity of industry, the number of productive hands, and consequently the
exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country,
the real wealth and revenue of all its inhabitants.

Capitals are increased by parsimony, and diminished by prodigality and
misconduct.

Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and either
employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive hands, or
enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an interest, that
is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can be
increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual gains, so
the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals
who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.

Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital.
Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony accumulates; but
whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the
capital would never be the greater.

Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of
productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands whose labour adds
to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends, therefore, to
increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of
the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which
gives an additional value to the annual produce.

What is annually saved, is as regularly consumed as what is annually spent, and
nearly in the same time too: but it is consumed by a different set of people.
That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is, in most
cases, consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave nothing behind
them in return for their consumption. That portion which he annually saves, as,
for the sake of the profit, it is immediately employed as a capital, is
consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too, but by a
different set of people: by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers, who
reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption. His revenue,
we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole, the food,
clothing, and lodging, which the whole could have purchased, would have been
distributed among the former set of people. By saving a part of it, as that
part is, for the sake of the profit, immediately employed as a capital, either
by himself or by some other person, the food, clothing, and lodging, which may
be purchased with it, are necessarily reserved for the latter. The consumption
is the same, but the consumers are different.

By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to an
additional number of productive hands, for that of the ensuing year, but like
the founder of a public work-house he establishes, as it were, a perpetual fund
for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The perpetual
allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always guarded by any
positive law, by any trust-right or deed of mortmain. It is always guarded,
however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every
individual to whom any share of it shall ever belong. No part of it can ever
afterwards be employed to maintain any but productive hands, without an evident
loss to the person who thus perverts it from its proper destination.

The prodigal perverts it in this manner: By not confining his expense within
his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts the revenues
of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the wages of idleness
with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers had, as it were,
consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing the funds destined
for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as
it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the
subject upon which it is bestowed, and, consequently, the value of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and
revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some were not compensated by
the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle
with the bread of the industrious, would tend not only to beggar himself, but
to impoverish his country.

Though the expense of the prodigal should be altogether in home made, and no
part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive funds of the
society would still be the same. Every year there would still be a certain
quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained productive,
employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year, therefore, there would
still be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the value of the
annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

This expense, it may be said, indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not
occasioning any exportation of gold and silver, the same quantity of money
would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and clothing
which were thus consumed by unproductive, had been distributed among productive
hands, they would have reproduced, together with a profit, the full value of
their consumption. The same quantity of money would, in this case, equally have
remained in the country, and there would, besides, have been a reproduction of
an equal value of consumable goods. There would have been two values instead of
one.

The same quantity of money, besides, can not long remain in any country in
which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money is to
circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and finished
work, are bought and sold, and distributed to their proper consumers. The
quantity of money, therefore, which can be annually employed in any country,
must be determined by the value of the consumable goods annually circulated
within it. These must consist, either in the immediate produce of the land and
labour of the country itself, or in something which had been purchased with
some part of that produce. Their value, therefore, must diminish as the value
of that produce diminishes, and along with it the quantity of money which can
be employed in circulating them. But the money which, by this annual diminution
of produce, is annually thrown out of domestic circulation, will not be allowed
to lie idle. The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it should be
employed; but having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws and
prohibitions, be sent abroad, and employed in purchasing consumable goods,
which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will, in this manner,
continue for some time to add something to the annual consumption of the
country beyond the value of its own annual produce. What in the days of its
prosperity had been saved from that annual produce, and employed in purchasing
gold and silver, will contribute, for some little time, to support its
consumption in adversity. The exportation of gold and silver is, in this case,
not the cause, but the effect of its declension, and may even, for some little
time, alleviate the misery of that declension.

The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally
increase as the value of the annual produce increases. The value of the
consumable goods annually circulated within the society being greater, will
require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the increased
produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to
be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver necessary for circulating
the rest. The increase of those metals will, in this case, be the effect, not
the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased everywhere
in the same manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the revenue and
maintenance, of all those whose labour or stock is employed in bringing them
from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in Peru as well as in
England. The country which has this price to pay, will never belong without the
quantity of those metals which it has occasion for; and no country will ever
long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for.

Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a country to
consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land and labour,
as plain reason seems to dictate, or in the quantity of the precious metals
which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose; in either view of the
matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a
public benefactor.

The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodigality. Every
injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries, trade,
or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds destined for
the maintenance of productive labour. In every such project, though the capital
is consumed by productive hands only, yet as, by the injudicious manner in
which they are employed, they do not reproduce the full value of their
consumption, there must always be some diminution in what would otherwise have
been the productive funds of the society.

It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can be
much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals; the
profusion or imprudence of some being always more than compensated by the
frugality and good conduct of others.

With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expense is the passion
for present enjoyment; which, though sometimes violent and very difficult to be
restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional. But the principle
which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our condition; a desire
which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb,
and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which
separates those two moments, there is scarce, perhaps, a single instance, in
which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation, as
to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any kind. An
augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose
and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most vulgar and the
most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting their fortune, is to save
and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually,
or upon some extraordinary occasion. Though the principle of expense,
therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some occasions, and in some men upon
almost all occasions; yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole course
of their life at an average, the principle of frugality seems not only to
predominate, but to predominate very greatly.

With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful undertakings is
everywhere much greater than that of injudicious and unsuccessful ones. After
all our complaints of the frequency of bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall
into this misfortune, make but a very small part of the whole number engaged in
trade, and all other sorts of business; not much more, perhaps, than one in a
thousand. Bankruptcy is, perhaps, the greatest and most humiliating calamity
which can befal an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are
sufficiently careful to avoid it. Some, indeed, do not avoid it; as some do not
avoid the gallows.

Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by
public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole public
revenue is, in most countries, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Such
are the people who compose a numerous and splendid court, a great
ecclesiastical establishment, great fleets and armies, who in time of peace
produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can compensate the
expense of maintaining them, even while the war lasts. Such people, as they
themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other
men’s labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an unnecessary number, they
may in a particular year consume so great a share of this produce, as not to
leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive labourers, who should
reproduce it next year. The next year’s produce, therefore, will be less
than that of the foregoing; and if the same disorder should continue, that of
the third year will be still less than that of the second. Those unproductive
hands who should be maintained by a part only of the spare revenue of the
people, may consume so great a share of their whole revenue, and thereby oblige
so great a number to encroach upon their capitals, upon the funds destined for
the maintenance of productive labour, that all the frugality and good conduct
of individuals may not be able to compensate the waste and degradation of
produce occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment.

This frugality and good conduct, however, is, upon most occasions, it appears
from experience, sufficient to compensate, not only the private prodigality and
misconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of government. The
uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his
condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private
opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the
natural progress of things towards improvement, in spite both of the
extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration. Like
the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour
to the constitution, in spite not only of the disease, but of the absurd
prescriptions of the doctor.

The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased in its
value by no other means, but by increasing either the number of its productive
labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who had before been
employed. The number of its productive labourers, it is evident, can never be
much increased, but in consequence of an increase of capital, or of the funds
destined for maintaining them. The productive powers of the same number of
labourers cannot be increased, but in consequence either of some addition and
improvement to those machines and instruments which facilitate and abridge
labour, or of more proper division and distribution of employment. In either
case, an additional capital is almost always required. It is by means of an
additional capital only, that the undertaker of any work can either provide his
workmen with better machinery, or make a more proper distribution of employment
among them. When the work to be done consists of a number of parts, to keep
every man constantly employed in one way, requires a much greater capital than
where every man is occasionally employed in every different part of the work.
When we compare, therefore, the state of a nation at two different periods, and
find that the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the
latter than at the former, that its lands are better cultivated, its
manufactures more numerous and more flourishing, and its trade more extensive;
we may be assured that its capital must have increased during the interval
between those two periods, and that more must have been added to it by the good
conduct of some, than had been taken from it either by the private misconduct
of others, or by the public extravagance of government. But we shall find this
to have been the case of almost all nations, in all tolerably quiet and
peaceable times, even of those who have not enjoyed the most prudent and
parsimonious governments. To form a right judgment of it, indeed, we must
compare the state of the country at periods somewhat distant from one another.
The progress is frequently so gradual, that, at near periods, the improvement
is not only not sensible, but, from the declension either of certain branches
of industry, or of certain districts of the country, things which sometimes
happen, though the country in general is in great prosperity, there frequently
arises a suspicion, that the riches and industry of the whole are decaying.

The annual produce of the land and labour of England, for example, is certainly
much greater than it was a little more than a century ago, at the restoration
of Charles II. Though at present few people, I believe, doubt of this, yet
during this period five years have seldom passed away, in which some book or
pamphlet has not been published, written, too, with such abilities as to gain
some authority with the public, and pretending to demonstrate that the wealth
of the nation was fast declining; that the country was depopulated, agriculture
neglected, manufactures decaying, and trade undone. Nor have these publications
been all party pamphlets, the wretched offspring of falsehood and venality.
Many of them have been written by very candid and very intelligent people, who
wrote nothing but what they believed, and for no other reason but because they
believed it.

The annual produce of the land and labour of England, again, was certainly much
greater at the Restoration than we can suppose it to have been about a hundred
years before, at the accession of Elizabeth. At this period, too, we have all
reason to believe, the country was much more advanced in improvement, than it
had been about a century before, towards the close of the dissensions between
the houses of York and Lancaster. Even then it was, probably, in a better
condition than it had been at the Norman conquest: and at the Norman conquest,
than during the confusion of the Saxon heptarchy. Even at this early period, it
was certainly a more improved country than at the invasion of Julius Caesar,
when its inhabitants were nearly in the same state with the savages in North
America.

In each of those periods, however, there was not only much private and public
profusion, many expensive and unnecessary wars, great perversion of the annual
produce from maintaining productive to maintain unproductive hands; but
sometimes, in the confusion of civil discord, such absolute waste and
destruction of stock, as might be supposed, not only to retard, as it certainly
did, the natural accumulation of riches, but to have left the country, at the
end of the period, poorer than at the beginning. Thus, in the happiest and most
fortunate period of them all, that which has passed since the Restoration, how
many disorders and misfortunes have occurred, which, could they have been
foreseen, not only the impoverishment, but the total ruin of the country would
have been expected from them? The fire and the plague of London, the two Dutch
wars, the disorders of the revolution, the war in Ireland, the four expensive
French wars of 1688, 1701, 1742, and 1756, together with the two rebellions of
1715 and 1745. In the course of the four French wars, the nation has contracted
more than £145,000,000 of debt, over and above all the other extraordinary
annual expense which they occasioned; so that the whole cannot be computed at
less than £200,000,000. So great a share of the annual produce of the land and
labour of the country, has, since the Revolution, been employed upon different
occasions, in maintaining an extraordinary number of unproductive hands. But
had not those wars given this particular direction to so large a capital, the
greater part of it would naturally have been employed in maintaining productive
hands, whose labour would have replaced, with a profit, the whole value of
their consumption. The value of the annual produce of the land and labour of
the country would have been considerably increased by it every year, and every
years increase would have augmented still more that of the following year. More
houses would have been built, more lands would have been improved, and those
which had been improved before would have been better cultivated; more
manufactures would have been established, and those which had been established
before would have been more extended; and to what height the real wealth and
revenue of the country might by this time have been raised, it is not perhaps
very easy even to imagine.

But though the profusion of government must undoubtedly have retarded the
natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement, it has not been
able to stop it. The annual produce of its land and labour is undoubtedly much
greater at present than it was either at the Restoration or at the Revolution.
The capital, therefore, annually employed in cultivating this land, and in
maintaining this labour, must likewise be much greater. In the midst of all the
exactions of government, this capital has been silently and gradually
accumulated by the private frugality and good conduct of individuals, by their
universal, continual, and uninterrupted effort to better their own condition.
It is this effort, protected by law, and allowed by liberty to exert itself in
the manner that is most advantageous, which has maintained the progress of
England towards opulence and improvement in almost all former times, and which,
it is to be hoped, will do so in all future times. England, however, as it has
never been blessed with a very parsimonious government, so parsimony has at no
time been the characteristic virtue of its inhabitants. It is the highest
impertinence and presumption, therefore, in kings and ministers to pretend to
watch over the economy of private people, and to restrain their expense, either
by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries. They
are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts in
the society. Let them look well after their own expense, and they may safely
trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not ruin the
state, that of the subject never will.

As frugality increases, and prodigality diminishes, the public capital, so the
conduct of those whose expense just equals their revenue, without either
accumulating or encroaching, neither increases nor diminishes it. Some modes of
expense, however, seem to contribute more to the growth of public opulence than
others.

The revenue of an individual may be spent, either in things which are consumed
immediately, and in which one day’s expense can neither alleviate nor
support that of another; or it may be spent in things mere durable, which can
therefore be accumulated, and in which every day’s expense may, as he
chooses, either alleviate, or support and heighten, the effect of that of the
following day. A man of fortune, for example, may either spend his revenue in a
profuse and sumptuous table, and in maintaining a great number of menial
servants, and a multitude of dogs and horses; or, contenting himself with a
frugal table, and few attendants, he may lay out the greater part of it in
adorning his house or his country villa, in useful or ornamental buildings, in
useful or ornamental furniture, in collecting books, statues, pictures; or in
things more frivolous, jewels, baubles, ingenious trinkets of different kinds;
or, what is most trifling of all, in amassing a great wardrobe of fine clothes,
like the favourite and minister of a great prince who died a few years ago.
Were two men of equal fortune to spend their revenue, the one chiefly in the
one way, the other in the other, the magnificence of the person whose expense
had been chiefly in durable commodities, would be continually increasing, every
day’s expense contributing something to support and heighten the effect
of that of the following day; that of the other, on the contrary, would be no
greater at the end of the period than at the beginning. The former too would,
at the end of the period, be the richer man of the two. He would have a stock
of goods of some kind or other, which, though it might not be worth all that it
cost, would always be worth something. No trace or vestige of the expense of
the latter would remain, and the effects of ten or twenty years’
profusion would be as completely annihilated as if they had never existed.

As the one mode of expense is more favourable than the other to the opulence of
an individual, so is it likewise to that of a nation. The houses, the
furniture, the clothing of the rich, in a little time, become useful to the
inferior and middling ranks of people. They are able to purchase them when
their superiors grow weary of them; and the general accommodation of the whole
people is thus gradually improved, when this mode of expense becomes universal
among men of fortune. In countries which have long been rich, you will
frequently find the inferior ranks of people in possession both of houses and
furniture perfectly good and entire, but of which neither the one could have
been built, nor the other have been made for their use. What was formerly a
seat of the family of Seymour, is now an inn upon the Bath road. The
marriage-bed of James I. of Great Britain, which his queen brought with her
from Denmark, as a present fit for a sovereign to make to a sovereign, was, a
few years ago, the ornament of an alehouse at Dunfermline. In some ancient
cities, which either have been long stationary, or have gone somewhat to decay,
you will sometimes scarce find a single house which could have been built for
its present inhabitants. If you go into those houses, too, you will frequently
find many excellent, though antiquated pieces of furniture, which are still
very fit for use, and which could as little have been made for them. Noble
palaces, magnificent villas, great collections of books, statues, pictures, and
other curiosities, are frequently both an ornament and an honour, not only to
the neighbourhood, but to the whole country to which they belong. Versailles is
an ornament and an honour to France, Stowe and Wilton to England. Italy still
continues to command some sort of veneration, by the number of monuments of
this kind which it possesses, though the wealth which produced them has
decayed, and though the genius which planned them seems to be extinguished,
perhaps from not having the same employment.

The expense, too, which is laid out in durable commodities, is favourable not
only to accumulation, but to frugality. If a person should at any time exceed
in it, he can easily reform without exposing himself to the censure of the
public. To reduce very much the number of his servants, to reform his table
from great profusion to great frugality, to lay down his equipage after he has
once set it up, are changes which cannot escape the observation of his
neighbours, and which are supposed to imply some acknowledgment of preceding
bad conduct. Few, therefore, of those who have once been so unfortunate as to
launch out too far into this sort of expense, have afterwards the courage to
reform, till ruin and bankruptcy oblige them. But if a person has, at any time,
been at too great an expense in building, in furniture, in books, or pictures,
no imprudence can be inferred from his changing his conduct. These are things
in which further expense is frequently rendered unnecessary by former expense;
and when a person stops short, he appears to do so, not because he has exceeded
his fortune, but because he has satisfied his fancy.

The expense, besides, that is laid out in durable commodities, gives
maintenance, commonly, to a greater number of people than that which is
employed in the most profuse hospitality. Of two or three hundred weight of
provisions, which may sometimes be served up at a great festival, one half,
perhaps, is thrown to the dunghill, and there is always a great deal wasted and
abused. But if the expense of this entertainment had been employed in setting
to work masons, carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, etc. a quantity of
provisions of equal value would have been distributed among a still greater
number of people, who would have bought them in pennyworths and pound weights,
and not have lost or thrown away a single ounce of them. In the one way,
besides, this expense maintains productive, in the other unproductive hands. In
the one way, therefore, it increases, in the other it does not increase the
exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

I would not, however, by all this, be understood to mean, that the one species
of expense always betokens a more liberal or generous spirit than the other.
When a man of fortune spends his revenue chiefly in hospitality, he shares the
greater part of it with his friends and companions; but when he employs it in
purchasing such durable commodities, he often spends the whole upon his own
person, and gives nothing to any body without an equivalent. The latter species
of expense, therefore, especially when directed towards frivolous objects, the
little ornaments of dress and furniture, jewels, trinkets, gew-gaws, frequently
indicates, not only a trifling, but a base and selfish disposition. All that I
mean is, that the one sort of expense, as it always occasions some accumulation
of valuable commodities, as it is more favourable to private frugality, and,
consequently, to the increase of the public capital, and as it maintains
productive rather than unproductive hands, conduces more than the other to the
growth of public opulence.

CHAPTER IV.
OF STOCK LENT AT INTEREST.

The stock which is lent at interest is always considered as a capital by the
lender. He expects that in due time it is to be restored to him, and that, in
the mean time, the borrower is to pay him a certain annual rent for the use of
it. The borrower may use it either as a capital, or as a stock reserved for
immediate consumption. If he uses it as a capital, he employs it in the
maintenance of productive labourers, who reproduce the value, with a profit. He
can, in this case, both restore the capital, and pay the interest, without
alienating or encroaching upon any other source of revenue. If he uses it as a
stock reserved for immediate consumption, he acts the part of a prodigal, and
dissipates, in the maintenance of the idle, what was destined for the support
of the industrious. He can, in this case, neither restore the capital nor pay
the interest, without either alienating or encroaching upon some other source
of revenue, such as the property or the rent of land.

The stock which is lent at interest is, no doubt, occasionally employed in both
these ways, but in the former much more frequently than in the latter. The man
who borrows in order to spend will soon be ruined, and he who lends to him will
generally have occasion to repent of his folly. To borrow or to lend for such a
purpose, therefore, is, in all cases, where gross usury is out of the question,
contrary to the interest of both parties; and though it no doubt happens
sometimes, that people do both the one and the other, yet, from the regard that
all men have for their own interest, we may be assured, that it cannot happen
so very frequently as we are sometimes apt to imagine. Ask any rich man of
common prudence, to which of the two sorts of people he has lent the greater
part of his stock, to those who he thinks will employ it profitably, or to
those who will spend it idly, and he will laugh at you for proposing the
question. Even among borrowers, therefore, not the people in the world most
famous for frugality, the number of the frugal and industrious surpasses
considerably that of the prodigal and idle.

The only people to whom stock is commonly lent, without their being expected to
make any very profitable use of it, are country gentlemen, who borrow upon
mortgage. Even they scarce ever borrow merely to spend. What they borrow, one
may say, is commonly spent before they borrow it. They have generally consumed
so great a quantity of goods, advanced to them upon credit by shop-keepers and
tradesmen, that they find it necessary to borrow at interest, in order to pay
the debt. The capital borrowed replaces the capitals of those shop-keepers and
tradesmen which the country gentlemen could not have replaced from the rents of
their estates. It is not properly borrowed in order to be spent, but in order
to replace a capital which had been spent before.

Almost all loans at interest are made in money, either of paper, or of gold and
silver; but what the borrower really wants, and what the lender readily
supplies him with, is not the money, but the money’s worth, or the goods
which it can purchase. If he wants it as a stock for immediate consumption, it
is those goods only which he can place in that stock. If he wants it as a
capital for employing industry, it is from those goods only that the
industrious can be furnished with the tools, materials, and maintenance
necessary for carrying on their work. By means of the loan, the lender, as it
were, assigns to the borrower his right to a certain portion of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country, to be employed as the borrower
pleases.

The quantity of stock, therefore, or, as it is commonly expressed, of money,
which can be lent at interest in any country, is not regulated by the value of
the money, whether paper or coin, which serves as the instrument of the
different loans made in that country, but by the value of that part of the
annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or from the
hands of the productive labourers, is destined, not only for replacing a
capital, but such a capital as the owner does not care to be at the trouble of
employing himself. As such capitals are commonly lent out and paid back in
money, they constitute what is called the monied interest. It is distinct, not
only from the landed, but from the trading and manufacturing interests, as in
these last the owners themselves employ their own capitals. Even in the monied
interest, however, the money is, as it were, but the deed of assignment, which
conveys from one hand to another those capitals which the owners do not care to
employ themselves. Those capitals may be greater, in almost any proportion,
than the amount of the money which serves as the instrument of their
conveyance; the same pieces of money successively serving for many different
loans, as well as for many different purchases. A, for example, lends to W
£1000, with which W immediately purchases of B £1000 worth of goods. B having
no occasion for the money himself, lends the identical pieces to X, with which
X immediately purchases of C another £1000 worth of goods. C, in the same
manner, and for the same reason, lends them to Y, who again purchases goods
with them of D. In this manner, the same pieces, either of coin or of paper,
may, in the course of a few days, serve as the Instrument of three different
loans, and of three different purchases, each of which is, in value, equal to
the whole amount of those pieces. What the three monied men, A, B, and C,
assigned to the three borrowers, W, X, and Y, is the power of making those
purchases. In this power consist both the value and the use of the loans. The
stock lent by the three monied men is equal to the value of the goods which can
be purchased with it, and is three times greater than that of the money with
which the purchases are made. Those loans, however, may be all perfectly well
secured, the goods purchased by the different debtors being so employed as, in
due time, to bring back, with a profit, an equal value either of coin or of
paper. And as the same pieces of money can thus serve as the instrument of
different loans to three, or, for the same reason, to thirty times their value,
so they may likewise successively serve as the instrument of repayment.

A capital lent at interest may, in this manner, be considered as an assignment,
from the lender to the borrower, of a certain considerable portion of the
annual produce, upon condition that the burrower in return shall, during the
continuance of the loan, annually assign to the lender a small portion, called
the interest; and, at the end of it, a portion equally considerable with that
which had originally been assigned to him, called the repayment. Though money,
either coin or paper, serves generally as the deed of assignment, both to the
smaller and to the more considerable portion, it is itself altogether different
from what is assigned by it.

In proportion as that share of the annual produce which, as soon as it comes
either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is
destined for replacing a capital, increases in any country, what is called the
monied interest naturally increases with it. The increase of those particular
capitals from which the owners wish to derive a revenue, without being at the
trouble of employing them themselves, naturally accompanies the general
increase of capitals; or, in other words, as stock increases, the quantity of
stock to be lent at interest grows gradually greater and greater.

As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the interest, or the
price which must be paid for the use of that stock, necessarily diminishes, not
only from those general causes which make the market price of things commonly
diminish as their quantity increases, but from other causes which are peculiar
to this particular case. As capitals increase in any country, the profits which
can be made by employing them necessarily diminish. It becomes gradually more
and more difficult to find within the country a profitable method of employing
any new capital. There arises, in consequence, a competition between different
capitals, the owner of one endeavouring to get possession of that employment
which is occupied by another; but, upon most occasions, he can hope to justle
that other out of this employment by no other means but by dealing upon more
reasonable terms. He must not only sell what he deals in somewhat cheaper, but,
in order to get it to sell, he must sometimes, too, buy it dearer. The demand
for productive labour, by the increase of the funds which are destined for
maintaining it, grows every day greater and greater. Labourers easily find
employment; but the owners of capitals find it difficult to get labourers to
employ. Their competition raises the wages of labour, and sinks the profits of
stock. But when the profits which can be made by the use of a capital are in
this manner diminished, as it were, at both ends, the price which can be paid
for the use of it, that is, the rate of interest, must necessarily be
diminished with them.

Mr Locke, Mr Lawe, and Mr Montesquieu, as well as many other writers, seem to
have imagined that the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, in
consequence of the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, was the real cause of
the lowering of the rate of interest through the greater part of Europe. Those
metals, they say, having become of less value themselves, the use of any
particular portion of them necessarily became of less value too, and,
consequently, the price which could be paid for it. This notion, which at first
sight seems so plausible, has been so fully exposed by Mr Hume, that it is,
perhaps, unnecessary to say any thing more about it. The following very short
and plain argument, however, may serve to explain more distinctly the fallacy
which seems to have misled those gentlemen.

Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, ten per cent. seems to have
been the common rate of interest through the greater part of Europe. It has
since that time, in different countries, sunk to six, five, four, and three per
cent. Let us suppose, that in every particular country the value of silver has
sunk precisely in the same proportion as the rate of interest; and that in
those countries, for example, where interest has been reduced from ten to five
per cent. the same quantity of silver can now purchase just half the quantity
of goods which it could have purchased before. This supposition will not, I
believe, be found anywhere agreeable to the truth; but it is the most
favourable to the opinion which we are going to examine; and, even upon this
supposition, it is utterly impossible that the lowering of the value of silver
could have the smallest tendency to lower the rate of interest. If £100 are in
those countries now of no more value than £50 were then, £10 must now be of no
more value than £5 were then. Whatever were the causes which lowered the value
of the capital, the same must necessarily have lowered that of the interest,
and exactly in the same proportion. The proportion between the value of the
capital and that of the interest must have remained the same, though the rate
had never been altered. By altering the rate, on the contrary, the proportion
between those two values is necessarily altered. If £100 now are worth no more
than £50 were then, £5 now can be worth no more than £2:10s. were then. By
reducing the rate of interest, therefore, from ten to five per cent. we give
for the use of a capital, which is supposed to be equal to one half of its
former value, an interest which is equal to one fourth only of the value of the
former interest.

An increase in the quantity of silver, while that of the commodities circulated
by means of it remained the same, could have no other effect than to diminish
the value of that metal. The nominal value of all sorts of goods would be
greater, but their real value would be precisely the same as before. They would
be exchanged for a greater number of pieces of silver; but the quantity of
labour which they could command, the number of people whom they could maintain
and employ, would be precisely the same. The capital of the country would be
the same, though a greater number of pieces might be requisite for conveying
any equal portion of it from one hand to another. The deeds of assignment, like
the conveyances of a verbose attorney, would be more cumbersome; but the thing
assigned would be precisely the same as before, and could produce only the same
effects. The funds for maintaining productive labour being the same, the demand
for it would be the same. Its price or wages, therefore, though nominally
greater, would really be the same. They would be paid in a greater number of
pieces of silver, but they would purchase only the same quantity of goods. The
profits of stock would be the same, both nominally and really. The wages of
labour are commonly computed by the quantity of silver which is paid to the
labourer. When that is increased, therefore, his wages appear to be increased,
though they may sometimes be no greater than before. But the profits of stock
are not computed by the number of pieces of silver with which they are paid,
but by the proportion which those pieces bear to the whole capital employed.
Thus, in a particular country, 5s. a-week are said to be the common wages of
labour, and ten per cent. the common profits of stock; but the whole capital of
the country being the same as before, the competition between the different
capitals of individuals into which it was divided would likewise be the same.
They would all trade with the same advantages and disadvantages. The common
proportion between capital and profit, therefore, would be the same, and
consequently the common interest of money; what can commonly be given for the
use of money being necessarily regulated by what can commonly be made by the
use of it.

Any increase in the quantity of commodities annually circulated within the
country, while that of the money which circulated them remained the same,
would, on the contrary, produce many other important effects, besides that of
raising the value of the money. The capital of the country, though it might
nominally be the same, would really be augmented. It might continue to be
expressed by the same quantity of money, but it would command a greater
quantity of labour. The quantity of productive labour which it could maintain
and employ would be increased, and consequently the demand for that labour. Its
wages would naturally rise with the demand, and yet might appear to sink. They
might be paid with a smaller quantity of money, but that smaller quantity might
purchase a greater quantity of goods than a greater had done before. The
profits of stock would be diminished, both really and in appearance. The whole
capital of the country being augmented, the competition between the different
capitals of which it was composed would naturally be augmented along with it.
The owners of those particular capitals would be obliged to content themselves
with a smaller proportion of the produce of that labour which their respective
capitals employed. The interest of money, keeping pace always with the profits
of stock, might, in this manner, be greatly diminished, though the value of
money, or the quantity of goods which any particular sum could purchase, was
greatly augmented.

In some countries the interest of money has been prohibited by law. But as
something can everywhere be made by the use of money, something ought
everywhere to be paid for the use of it. This regulation, instead of
preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury. The
debtor being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for the
risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use, he is
obliged, if one may say so, to insure his creditor from the penalties of usury.

In countries where interest is permitted, the law in order to prevent the
extortion of usury, generally fixes the highest rate which can be taken without
incurring a penalty. This rate ought always to be somewhat above the lowest
market price, or the price which is commonly paid for the use of money by those
who can give the most undoubted security. If this legal rate should be fixed
below the lowest market rate, the effects of this fixation must be nearly the
same as those of a total prohibition of interest. The creditor will not lend
his money for less than the use of it is worth, and the debtor must pay him for
the risk which he runs by accepting the full value of that use. If it is fixed
precisely at the lowest market price, it ruins, with honest people who respect
the laws of their country, the credit of all those who cannot give the very
best security, and obliges them to have recourse to exorbitant usurers. In a
country such as Great Britain, where money is lent to government at three per
cent. and to private people, upon good security, at four and four and a-half,
the present legal rate, five per cent. is perhaps as proper as any.

The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be somewhat above,
ought not to be much above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of
interest in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight or ten per
cent. the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to
prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high
interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part
of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the
competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out
of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use
of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it.
Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is fixed but a very little
above the lowest market rate, sober people are universally preferred, as
borrowers, to prodigals and projectors. The person who lends money gets nearly
as much interest from the former as he dares to take from the latter, and his
money is much safer in the hands of the one set of people than in those of the
other. A great part of the capital of the country is thus thrown into the hands
in which it is most likely to be employed with advantage.

No law can reduce the common rate of interest below the lowest ordinary market
rate at the time when that law is made. Notwithstanding the edict of 1766, by
which the French king attempted to reduce the rate of interest from five to
four per cent. money continued to be lent in France at five per cent. the law
being evaded in several different ways.

The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends everywhere
upon the ordinary market rate of interest. The person who has a capital from
which he wishes to derive a revenue, without taking the trouble to employ it
himself, deliberates whether he should buy land with it, or lend it out at
interest. The superior security of land, together with some other advantages
which almost everywhere attend upon this species of property, will generally
dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from land, than what he
might have by lending out his money at interest. These advantages are
sufficient to compensate a certain difference of revenue; but they will
compensate a certain difference only; and if the rent of land should fall short
of the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody would buy land, which
would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if the advantages should
much more than compensate the difference, everybody would buy land, which again
would soon raise its ordinary price. When interest was at ten per cent. land
was commonly sold for ten or twelve years purchase. As interest sunk to six,
five, and four per cent. the price of land rose to twenty, five-and-twenty, and
thirty years purchase. The market rate of interest is higher in France than in
England, and the common price of land is lower. In England it commonly sells at
thirty, in France at twenty years purchase.

CHAPTER V.
OF THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF CAPITALS.

Though all capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour only,
yet the quantity of that labour which equal capitals are capable of putting
into motion, varies extremely according to the diversity of their employment;
as does likewise the value which that employment adds to the annual produce of
the land and labour of the country.

A capital may be employed in four different ways; either, first, in procuring
the rude produce annually required for the use and consumption of the society;
or, secondly, in manufacturing and preparing that rude produce for immediate
use and consumption; or, thirdly in transporting either the rude or
manufactured produce from the places where they abound to those where they are
wanted; or, lastly, in dividing particular portions of either into such small
parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who want them. In the first way
are employed the capitals of all those who undertake improvement or cultivation
of lands, mines, or fisheries; in the second, those of all master
manufacturers; in the third, those of all wholesale merchants; and in the
fourth, those of all retailers. It is difficult to conceive that a capital
should be employed in any way which may not be classed under some one or other
of those four.

Each of those four methods of employing a capital is essentially necessary,
either to the existence or extension of the other three, or to the general
conveniency of the society.

Unless a capital was employed in furnishing rude produce to a certain degree of
abundance, neither manufactures nor trade of any kind could exist.

Unless a capital was employed in manufacturing that part of the rude produce
which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for use and
consumption, it either would never be produced, because there could be no
demand for it; or if it was produced spontaneously, it would be of no value in
exchange, and could add nothing to the wealth of the society.

Unless a capital was employed in transporting either the rude or manufactured
produce from the places where it abounds to those where it is wanted, no more
of either could be produced than was necessary for the consumption of the
neighbourhood. The capital of the merchant exchanges the surplus produce of one
place for that of another, and thus encourages the industry, and increases the
enjoyments of both.

Unless a capital was employed in breaking and dividing certain portions either
of the rude or manufactured produce into such small parcels as suit the
occasional demands of those who want them, every man would be obliged to
purchase a greater quantity of the goods he wanted than his immediate occasions
required. If there was no such trade as a butcher, for example, every man would
be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole sheep at a time. This would
generally be inconvenient to the rich, and much more so to the poor. If a poor
workman was obliged to purchase a month’s or six months’ provisions
at a time, a great part of the stock which he employs as a capital in the
instruments of his trade, or in the furniture of his shop, and which yields him
a revenue, he would be forced to place in that part of his stock which is
reserved for immediate consumption, and which yields him no revenue. Nothing
can be more convenient for such a person than to be able to purchase his
subsistence from day to day, or even from hour to hour, as he wants it. He is
thereby enabled to employ almost his whole stock as a capital. He is thus
enabled to furnish work to a greater value; and the profit which he makes by it
in this way much more than compensates the additional price which the profit of
the retailer imposes upon the goods. The prejudices of some political writers
against shopkeepers and tradesmen are altogether without foundation. So far is
it from being necessary either to tax them, or to restrict their numbers, that
they can never be multiplied so as to hurt the public, though they may so as to
hurt one another. The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be sold
in a particular town, is limited by the demand of that town and its
neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the grocery
trade, cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If this
capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will tend
to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one only; and
if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just so much the
greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise the
price, just so much the less. Their competition might, perhaps, ruin some of
themselves; but to take care of this, is the business of the parties concerned,
and it may safely be trusted to their discretion. It can never hurt either the
consumer or the producer; on the contrary, it must tend to make the retailers
both sell cheaper and buy dearer, than if the whole trade was monopolised by
one or two persons. Some of them, perhaps, may sometimes decoy a weak customer
to buy what he has no occasion for. This evil, however, is of too little
importance to deserve the public attention, nor would it necessarily be
prevented by restricting their numbers. It is not the multitude of alehouses,
to give the must suspicious example, that occasions a general disposition to
drunkenness among the common people; but that disposition, arising from other
causes, necessarily gives employment to a multitude of alehouses.

The persons whose capitals are employed in any of those four ways, are
themselves productive labourers. Their labour, when properly directed, fixes
and realizes itself in the subject or vendible commodity upon which it is
bestowed, and generally adds to its price the value at least of their own
maintenance and consumption. The profits of the farmer, of the manufacturer, of
the merchant, and retailer, are all drawn from the price of the goods which the
two first produce, and the two last buy and sell. Equal capitals, however,
employed in each of those four different ways, will immediately put into motion
very different quantities of productive labour; and augment, too, in very
different proportions, the value of the annual produce of the land and labour
of the society to which they belong.

The capital of the retailer replaces, together with its profits, that of the
merchant of whom he purchases goods, and thereby enables him to continue his
business. The retailer himself is the only productive labourer whom it
immediately employs. In his profit consists the whole value which its
employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society.

The capital of the wholesale merchant replaces, together with their profits,
the capitals of the farmers and manufacturers of whom he purchases the rude and
manufactured produce which he deals in, and thereby enables them to continue
their respective trades. It is by this service chiefly that he contributes
indirectly to support the productive labour of the society, and to increase the
value of its annual produce. His capital employs, too, the sailors and carriers
who transport his goods from one place to another; and it augments the price of
those goods by the value, not only of his profits, but of their wages. This is
all the productive labour which it immediately puts into motion, and all the
value which it immediately adds to the annual produce. Its operation in both
these respects is a good deal superior to that of the capital of the retailer.

Part of the capital of the master manufacturer is employed as a fixed capital
in the instruments of his trade, and replaces, together with its profits, that
of some other artificer of whom he purchases them. Part of his circulating
capital is employed in purchasing materials, and replaces, with their profits,
the capitals of the farmers and miners of whom he purchases them. But a great
part of it is always, either annually, or in a much shorter period, distributed
among the different workmen whom he employs. It augments the value of those
materials by their wages, and by their masters’ profits upon the whole
stock of wages, materials, and instruments of trade employed in the business.
It puts immediately into motion, therefore, a much greater quantity of
productive labour, and adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the
land and labour of the society, than an equal capital in the hands of any
wholesale merchant.

No equal capital puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than
that of the farmer. Not only his labouring servants, but his labouring cattle,
are productive labourers. In agriculture, too, Nature labours along with man;
and though her labour costs no expense, its produce has its value, as well as
that of the most expensive workmen. The most important operations of
agriculture seem intended, not so much to increase, though they do that too, as
to direct the fertility of Nature towards the production of the plants most
profitable to man. A field overgrown with briars and brambles, may frequently
produce as great a quantity of vegetables as the best cultivated vineyard or
corn field. Planting and tillage frequently regulate more than they animate the
active fertility of Nature; and after all their labour, a great part of the
work always remains to be done by her. The labourers and labouring cattle,
therefore, employed in agriculture, not only occasion, like the workmen in
manufactures, the reproduction of a value equal to their own consumption, or to
the capital which employs them, together with its owner’s profits, but of
a much greater value. Over and above the capital of the farmer, and all its
profits, they regularly occasion the reproduction of the rent of the landlord.
This rent may be considered as the produce of those powers of Nature, the use
of which the landlord lends to the farmer. It is greater or smaller, according
to the supposed extent of those powers, or, in other words, according to the
supposed natural or improved fertility of the land. It is the work of Nature
which remains, after deducting or compensating every thing which can be
regarded as the work of man. It is seldom less than a fourth, and frequently
more than a third, of the whole produce. No equal quantity of productive labour
employed in manufactures, can ever occasion so great reproduction. In them
Nature does nothing; man does all; and the reproduction must always be in
proportion to the strength of the agents that occasion it. The capital employed
in agriculture, therefore, not only puts into motion a greater quantity of
productive labour than any equal capital employed in manufactures; but in
proportion, too, to the quantity of productive labour which it employs, it adds
a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in
which a capital can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to society.

The capitals employed in the agriculture and in the retail trade of any
society, must always reside within that society. Their employment is confined
almost to a precise spot, to the farm, and to the shop of the retailer. They
must generally, too, though there are some exceptions to this, belong to
resident members of the society.

The capital of a wholesale merchant, on the contrary, seems to have no fixed or
necessary residence anywhere, but may wander about from place to place,
according as it can either buy cheap or sell dear.

The capital of the manufacturer must, no doubt, reside where the manufacture is
carried on; but where this shall be, is not always necessarily determined. It
may frequently be at a great distance, both from the place where the materials
grow, and from that where the complete manufacture is consumed. Lyons is very
distant, both from the places which afford the materials of its manufactures,
and from those which consume them. The people of fashion in Sicily are clothed
in silks made in other countries, from the materials which their own produces.
Part of the wool of Spain is manufactured in Great Britain, and some part of
that cloth is afterwards sent back to Spain.

Whether the merchant whose capital exports the surplus produce of any society,
be a native or a foreigner, is of very little importance. If he is a foreigner,
the number of their productive labourers is necessarily less than if he had
been a native, by one man only; and the value of their annual produce, by the
profits of that one man. The sailors or carriers whom he employs, may still
belong indifferently either to his country, or to their country, or to some
third country, in the same manner as if he had been a native. The capital of a
foreigner gives a value to their surplus produce equally with that of a native,
by exchanging it for something for which there is a demand at home. It as
effectually replaces the capital of the person who produces that surplus, and
as effectually enables him to continue his business, the service by which the
capital of a wholesale merchant chiefly contributes to support the productive
labour, and to augment the value of the annual produce of the society to which
he belongs.

It is of more consequence that the capital of the manufacturer should reside
within the country. It necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity of
productive labour, and adds a greater value to the annual produce of the land
and labour of the society. It may, however, be very useful to the country,
though it should not reside within it. The capitals of the British
manufacturers who work up the flax and hemp annually imported from the coasts
of the Baltic, are surely very useful to the countries which produce them.
Those materials are a part of the surplus produce of those countries, which,
unless it was annually exchanged for something which is in demand there, would
be of no value, and would soon cease to be produced. The merchants who export
it, replace the capitals of the people who produce it, and thereby encourage
them to continue the production; and the British manufacturers replace the
capitals of those merchants.

A particular country, in the same manner as a particular person, may frequently
not have capital sufficient both to improve and cultivate all its lands, to
manufacture and prepare their whole rude produce for immediate use and
consumption, and to transport the surplus part either of the rude or
manufactured produce to those distant markets, where it can be exchanged for
something for which there is a demand at home. The inhabitants of many
different parts of Great Britain have not capital sufficient to improve and
cultivate all their lands. The wool of the southern counties of Scotland is, a
great part of it, after a long land carriage through very bad roads,
manufactured in Yorkshire, for want of a capital to manufacture it at home.
There are many little manufacturing towns in Great Britain, of which the
inhabitants have not capital sufficient to transport the produce of their own
industry to those distant markets where there is demand and consumption for it.
If there are any merchants among them, they are, properly, only the agents of
wealthier merchants who reside in some of the great commercial cities.

When the capital of any country is not sufficient for all those three purposes,
in proportion as a greater share of it is employed in agriculture, the greater
will be the quantity of productive labour which it puts into motion within the
country; as will likewise be the value which its employment adds to the annual
produce of the land and labour of the society. After agriculture, the capital
employed in manufactures puts into motion the greatest quantity of productive
labour, and adds the greatest value to the annual produce. That which is
employed in the trade of exportation has the least effect of any of the three.

The country, indeed, which has not capital sufficient for all those three
purposes, has not arrived at that degree of opulence for which it seems
naturally destined. To attempt, however, prematurely, and with an insufficient
capital, to do all the three, is certainly not the shortest way for a society,
no more than it would be for an individual, to acquire a sufficient one. The
capital of all the individuals of a nation has its limits, in the same manner
as that of a single individual, and is capable of executing only certain
purposes. The capital of all the individuals of a nation is increased in the
same manner as that of a single individual, by their continually accumulating
and adding to it whatever they save out of their revenue. It is likely to
increase the fastest, therefore, when it is employed in the way that affords
the greatest revenue to all the inhabitants or the country, as they will thus
be enabled to make the greatest savings. But the revenue of all the inhabitants
of the country is necessarily in proportion to the value of the annual produce
of their land and labour.

It has been the principal cause of the rapid progress of our American colonies
towards wealth and greatness, that almost their whole capitals have hitherto
been employed in agriculture. They have no manufactures, those household and
coarser manufactures excepted, which necessarily accompany the progress of
agriculture, and which are the work of the women and children in every private
family. The greater part, both of the exportation and coasting trade of
America, is carried on by the capitals of merchants who reside in Great
Britain. Even the stores and warehouses from which goods are retailed in some
provinces, particularly in Virginia and Maryland, belong many of them to
merchants who reside in the mother country, and afford one of the few instances
of the retail trade of a society being carried on by the capitals of those who
are not resident members of it. Were the Americans, either by combination, or
by any other sort of violence, to stop the importation of European
manufactures, and, by thus giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as
could manufacture the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital
into this employment, they would retard, instead of accelerating, the further
increase in the value of their annual produce, and would obstruct, instead of
promoting, the progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness.
This would be still more the case, were they to attempt, in the same manner, to
monopolize to themselves their whole exportation trade.

The course of human prosperity, indeed, seems scarce ever to have been of so
long continuance as to enable any great country to acquire capital sufficient
for all those three purposes; unless, perhaps, we give credit to the wonderful
accounts of the wealth and cultivation of China, of those of ancient Egypt, and
of the ancient state of Indostan. Even those three countries, the wealthiest,
according to all accounts, that ever were in the world, are chiefly renowned
for their superiority in agriculture and manufactures. They do not appear to
have been eminent for foreign trade. The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious
antipathy to the sea; a superstition nearly of the same kind prevails among the
Indians; and the Chinese have never excelled in foreign commerce. The greater
part of the surplus produce of all those three countries seems to have been
always exported by foreigners, who gave in exchange for it something else, for
which they found a demand there, frequently gold and silver.

It is thus that the same capital will in any country put into motion a greater
or smaller quantity of productive labour, and add a greater or smaller value to
the annual produce of its land and labour, according to the different
proportions in which it is employed in agriculture, manufactures, and wholesale
trade. The difference, too, is very great, according to the different sorts of
wholesale trade in which any part of it is employed.

All wholesale trade, all buying in order to sell again by wholesale, maybe
reduced to three different sorts: the home trade, the foreign trade of
consumption, and the carrying trade. The home trade is employed in purchasing
in one part of the same country, and selling in another, the produce of the
industry of that country. It comprehends both the inland and the coasting
trade. The foreign trade of consumption is employed in purchasing foreign goods
for home consumption. The carrying trade is employed in transacting the
commerce of foreign countries, or in carrying the surplus produce of one to
another.

The capital which is employed in purchasing in one part of the country, in
order to sell in another, the produce of the industry of that country,
generally replaces, by every such operation, two distinct capitals, that had
both been employed in the agriculture or manufactures of that country, and
thereby enables them to continue that employment. When it sends out from the
residence of the merchant a certain value of commodities, it generally brings
back in return at least an equal value of other commodities. When both are the
produce of domestic industry, it necessarily replaces, by every such operation,
two distinct capitals, which had both been employed in supporting productive
labour, and thereby enables them to continue that support. The capital which
sends Scotch manufactures to London, and brings back English corn and
manufactures to Edinburgh, necessarily replaces, by every such operation, two
British capitals, which had both been employed in the agriculture or
manufactures of Great Britain.

The capital employed in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, when
this purchase is made with the produce of domestic industry, replaces, too, by
every such operation, two distinct capitals; but one of them only is employed
in supporting domestic industry. The capital which sends British goods to
Portugal, and brings back Portuguese goods to Great Britain, replaces, by every
such operation, only one British capital. The other is a Portuguese one. Though
the returns, therefore, of the foreign trade of consumption, should be as quick
as those of the home trade, the capital employed in it will give but one half
of the encouragement to the industry or productive labour of the country.

But the returns of the foreign trade of consumption are very seldom so quick as
those of the home trade. The returns of the home trade generally come in before
the end of the year, and sometimes three or four times in the year. The returns
of the foreign trade of consumption seldom come in before the end of the year,
and sometimes not till after two or three years. A capital, therefore, employed
in the home trade, will sometimes make twelve operations, or be sent out and
returned twelve times, before a capital employed in the foreign trade of
consumption has made one. If the capitals are equal, therefore, the one will
give four-and-twenty times more encouragement and support to the industry of
the country than the other.

The foreign goods for home consumption may sometimes be purchased, not with the
produce of domestic industry but with some other foreign goods. These last,
however, must have been purchased, either immediately with the produce of
domestic industry, or with something else that had been purchased with it; for,
the case of war and conquest excepted, foreign goods can never be acquired, but
in exchange for something that had been produced at home, either immediately,
or after two or more different exchanges. The effects, therefore, of a capital
employed in such a round-about foreign trade of consumption, are, in every
respect, the same as those of one employed in the most direct trade of the same
kind, except that the final returns are likely to be still more distant, as
they must depend upon the returns of two or three distinct foreign trades. If
the hemp and flax of Riga are purchased with the tobacco of Virginia, which had
been purchased with British manufactures, the merchant must wait for the
returns of two distinct foreign trades, before he can employ the same capital
in repurchasing a like quantity of British manufactures. If the tobacco of
Virginia had been purchased, not with British manufactures, but with the sugar
and rum of Jamaica, which had been purchased with those manufactures, he must
wait for the returns of three. If those two or three distinct foreign trades
should happen to be carried on by two or three distinct merchants, of whom the
second buys the goods imported by the first, and the third buys those imported
by the second, in order to export them again, each merchant, indeed, will, in
this case, receive the returns of his own capital more quickly; but the final
returns of the whole capital employed in the trade will be just as slow as
ever. Whether the whole capital employed in such a round about trade belong to
one merchant or to three, can make no difference with regard to the country,
though it may with regard to the particular merchants. Three times a greater
capital must in both cases be employed, in order to exchange a certain value of
British manufactures for a certain quantity of flax and hemp, than would have
been necessary, had the manufactures and the flax and hemp been directly
exchanged for one another. The whole capital employed, therefore, in such a
round-about foreign trade of consumption, will generally give less
encouragement and support to the productive labour of the country, than an
equal capital employed in a more direct trade of the same kind.

Whatever be the foreign commodity with which the foreign goods for home
consumption are purchased, it can occasion no essential difference, either in
the nature of the trade, or in the encouragement and support which it can give
to the productive labour of the country from which it is carried on. If they
are purchased with the gold of Brazil, for example, or with the silver of Peru,
this gold and silver, like the tobacco of Virginia, must have been purchased
with something that either was the produce of the industry of the country, or
that had been purchased with something else that was so. So far, therefore, as
the productive labour of the country is concerned, the foreign trade of
consumption, which is carried on by means of gold and silver, has all the
advantages and all the inconveniencies of any other equally round-about foreign
trade of consumption; and will replace, just as fast, or just as slow, the
capital which is immediately employed in supporting that productive labour. It
seems even to have one advantage over any other equally round-about foreign
trade. The transportation of those metals from one place to another, on account
of their small bulk and great value, is less expensive than that of almost any
other foreign goods of equal value. Their freight is much less, and their
insurance not greater; and no goods, besides, are less liable to suffer by the
carriage. An equal quantity of foreign goods, therefore, may frequently be
purchased with a smaller quantity of the produce of domestic industry, by the
intervention of gold and silver, than by that of any other foreign goods. The
demand of the country may frequently, in this manner, be supplied more
completely, and at a smaller expense, than in any other. Whether, by the
continual exportation of those metals, a trade of this kind is likely to
impoverish the country from which it is carried on in any other way, I shall
have occasion to examine at great length hereafter.

That part of the capital of any country which is employed in the carrying
trade, is altogether withdrawn from supporting the productive labour of that
particular country, to support that of some foreign countries. Though it may
replace, by every operation, two distinct capitals, yet neither of them belongs
to that particular country. The capital of the Dutch merchant, which carries
the corn of Poland to Portugal, and brings back the fruits and wines of
Portugal to Poland, replaces by every such operation two capitals, neither of
which had been employed in supporting the productive labour of Holland; but one
of them in supporting that of Poland, and the other that of Portugal. The
profits only return regularly to Holland, and constitute the whole addition
which this trade necessarily makes to the annual produce of the land and labour
of that country. When, indeed, the carrying trade of any particular country is
carried on with the ships and sailors of that country, that part of the capital
employed in it which pays the freight is distributed among, and puts into
motion, a certain number of productive labourers of that country. Almost all
nations that have had any considerable share of the carrying trade have, in
fact, carried it on in this manner. The trade itself has probably derived its
name from it, the people of such countries being the carriers to other
countries. It does not, however, seem essential to the nature of the trade that
it should be so. A Dutch merchant may, for example, employ his capital in
transacting the commerce of Poland and Portugal, by carrying part of the
surplus produce of the one to the other, not in Dutch, but in British bottoms.
It maybe presumed, that he actually does so upon some particular occasions. It
is upon this account, however, that the carrying trade has been supposed
peculiarly advantageous to such a country as Great Britain, of which the
defence and security depend upon the number of its sailors and shipping. But
the same capital may employ as many sailors and shipping, either in the foreign
trade of consumption, or even in the home trade, when carried on by coasting
vessels, as it could in the carrying trade. The number of sailors and shipping
which any particular capital can employ, does not depend upon the nature of the
trade, but partly upon the bulk of the goods, in proportion to their value, and
partly upon the distance of the ports between which they are to be carried;
chiefly upon the former of those two circumstances. The coal trade from
Newcastle to London, for example, employs more shipping than all the carrying
trade of England, though the ports are at no great distance. To force,
therefore, by extraordinary encouragements, a larger share of the capital of
any country into the carrying trade, than what would naturally go to it, will
not always necessarily increase the shipping of that country.

The capital, therefore, employed in the home trade of any country, will
generally give encouragement and support to a greater quantity of productive
labour in that country, and increase the value of its annual produce, more than
an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption; and the capital
employed in this latter trade has, in both these respects, a still greater
advantage over an equal capital employed in the carrying trade. The riches, and
so far as power depends upon riches, the power of every country must always be
in proportion to the value of its annual produce, the fund from which all taxes
must ultimately be paid. But the great object of the political economy of every
country, is to increase the riches and power of that country. It ought,
therefore, to give no preference nor superior encouragement to the foreign
trade of consumption above the home trade, nor to the carrying trade above
either of the other two. It ought neither to force nor to allure into either of
those two channels a greater share of the capital of the country, than what
would naturally flow into them of its own accord.

Each of those different branches of trade, however, is not only advantageous,
but necessary and unavoidable, when the course of things, without any
constraint or violence, naturally introduces it.

When the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the demand
of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and exchanged for
something for which there is a demand at home. Without such exportation, a part
of the productive labour of the country must cease, and the value of its annual
produce diminish. The land and labour of Great Britain produce generally more
corn, woollens, and hardware, than the demand of the home market requires. The
surplus part of them, therefore, must be sent abroad, and exchanged for
something for which there is a demand at home. It is only by means of such
exportation, that this surplus can acquire a value sufficient to compensate the
labour and expense of producing it. The neighbourhood of the sea-coast, and the
banks of all navigable rivers, are advantageous situations for industry, only
because they facilitate the exportation and exchange of such surplus produce
for something else which is more in demand there.

When the foreign goods which are thus purchased with the surplus produce of
domestic industry exceed the demand of the home market, the surplus part of
them must be sent abroad again, and exchanged for something more in demand at
home. About 96,000 hogsheads of tobacco are annually purchased in Virginia and
Maryland with a part of the surplus produce of British industry. But the demand
of Great Britain does not require, perhaps, more than 14,000. If the remaining
82,000, therefore, could not be sent abroad, and exchanged for something more
in demand at home, the importation of them must cease immediately, and with it
the productive labour of all those inhabitants of Great Britain who are at
present employed in preparing the goods with which these 82,000 hogsheads are
annually purchased. Those goods, which are part of the produce of the land and
labour of Great Britain, having no market at home, and being deprived of that
which they had abroad, must cease to be produced. The most round-about foreign
trade of consumption, therefore, may, upon some occasions, be as necessary for
supporting the productive labour of the country, and the value of its annual
produce, as the most direct.

When the capital stock of any country is increased to such a degree that it
cannot be all employed in supplying the consumption, and supporting the
productive labour of that particular country, the surplus part of it naturally
disgorges itself into the carrying trade, and is employed in performing the
same offices to other countries. The carrying trade is the natural effect and
symptom of great national wealth; but it does not seem to be the natural cause
of it. Those statesmen who have been disposed to favour it with particular
encouragement, seem to have mistaken the effect and symptom for the cause.
Holland, in proportion to the extent of the land and the number of its
inhabitants, by far the richest country in Europe, has accordingly the greatest
share of the carrying trade of Europe. England, perhaps the second richest
country of Europe, is likewise supposed to have a considerable share in it;
though what commonly passes for the carrying trade of England will frequently,
perhaps, be found to be no more than a round-about foreign trade of
consumption. Such are, in a great measure, the trades which carry the goods of
the East and West Indies and of America to the different European markets.
Those goods are generally purchased, either immediately with the produce of
British industry, or with something else which had been purchased with that
produce, and the final returns of those trades are generally used or consumed
in Great Britain. The trade which is carried on in British bottoms between the
different ports of the Mediterranean, and some trade of the same kind carried
on by British merchants between the different ports of India, make, perhaps,
the principal branches of what is properly the carrying trade of Great Britain.

The extent of the home trade, and of the capital which can be employed in it,
is necessarily limited by the value of the surplus produce of all those distant
places within the country which have occasion to exchange their respective
productions with one another; that of the foreign trade of consumption, by the
value of the surplus produce of the whole country, and of what can be purchased
with it; that of the carrying trade, by the value of the surplus produce of all
the different countries in the world. Its possible extent, therefore, is in a
manner infinite in comparison of that of the other two, and is capable of
absorbing the greatest capitals.

The consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which determines
the owner of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in manufactures,
or in some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade. The different
quantities of productive labour which it may put into motion, and the different
values which it may add to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
society, according as it is employed in one or other of those different ways,
never enter into his thoughts. In countries, therefore, where agriculture is
the most profitable of all employments, and farming and improving the most
direct roads to a splendid fortune, the capitals of individuals will naturally
be employed in the manner most advantageous to the whole society. The profits
of agriculture, however, seem to have no superiority over those of other
employments in any part of Europe. Projectors, indeed, in every corner of it,
have, within these few years, amused the public with most magnificent accounts
of the profits to be made by the cultivation and improvement of land. Without
entering into any particular discussion of their calculations, a very simple
observation may satisfy us that the result of them must be false. We see, every
day, the most splendid fortunes, that have been acquired in the course of a
single life, by trade and manufactures, frequently from a very small capital,
sometimes from no capital. A single instance of such a fortune, acquired by
agriculture in the same time, and from such a capital, has not, perhaps,
occurred in Europe, during the course of the present century. In all the great
countries of Europe, however, much good land still remains uncultivated; and
the greater part of what is cultivated, is far from being improved to the
degree of which it is capable. Agriculture, therefore, is almost everywhere
capable of absorbing a much greater capital than has ever yet been employed in
it. What circumstances in the policy of Europe have given the trades which are
carried on in towns so great an advantage over that which is carried on in the
country, that private persons frequently find it more for their advantage to
employ their capitals in the most distant carrying trades of Asia and America
than in the improvement and cultivation of the most fertile fields in their own
neighbourhood, I shall endeavour to explain at full length in the two following
books.

BOOK III.
OF THE DIFFERENT PROGRESS OF OPULENCE IN DIFFERENT NATIONS

CHAPTER I.
OF THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE.

The great commerce of every civilized society is that carried on between the
inhabitants of the town and those of the country. It consists in the exchange
of rude for manufactured produce, either immediately, or by the intervention of
money, or of some sort of paper which represents money. The country supplies
the town with the means of subsistence and the materials of manufacture. The
town repays this supply, by sending back a part of the manufactured produce to
the inhabitants of the country. The town, in which there neither is nor can be
any reproduction of substances, may very properly be said to gain its whole
wealth and subsistence from the country. We must not, however, upon this
account, imagine that the gain of the town is the loss of the country. The
gains of both are mutual and reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this,
as in all other cases, advantageous to all the different persons employed in
the various occupations into which it is subdivided. The inhabitants of the
country purchase of the town a greater quantity of manufactured goods with the
produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour, than they must have
employed had they attempted to prepare them themselves. The town affords a
market for the surplus produce of the country, or what is over and above the
maintenance of the cultivators; and it is there that the inhabitants of the
country exchange it for something else which is in demand among them. The
greater the number and revenue of the inhabitants of the town, the more
extensive is the market which it affords to those of the country; and the more
extensive that market, it is always the more advantageous to a great number.
The corn which grows within a mile of the town, sells there for the same price
with that which comes from twenty miles distance. But the price of the latter
must, generally, not only pay the expense of raising it and bringing it to
market, but afford, too, the ordinary profits of agriculture to the farmer. The
proprietors and cultivators of the country, therefore, which lies in the
neighbourhood of the town, over and above the ordinary profits of agriculture,
gain, in the price of what they sell, the whole value of the carriage of the
like produce that is brought from more distant parts; and they save, besides,
the whole value of this carriage in the price of what they buy. Compare the
cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any considerable town, with
that of those which lie at some distance from it, and you will easily satisfy
yourself how much the country is benefited by the commerce of the town. Among
all the absurd speculations that have been propagated concerning the balance of
trade, it has never been pretended that either the country loses by its
commerce with the town, or the town by that with the country which maintains
it.

As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and luxury, so
the industry which procures the former, must necessarily be prior to that which
ministers to the latter. The cultivation and improvement of the country,
therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to the
increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency and luxury.
It is the surplus produce of the country only, or what is over and above the
maintenance of the cultivators, that constitutes the subsistence of the town,
which can therefore increase only with the increase of the surplus produce. The
town, indeed, may not always derive its whole subsistence from the country in
its neighbourhood, or even from the territory to which it belongs, but from
very distant countries; and this, though it forms no exception from the general
rule, has occasioned considerable variations in the progress of opulence in
different ages and nations.

That order of things which necessity imposes, in general, though not in every
particular country, is in every particular country promoted by the natural
inclinations of man. If human institutions had never thwarted those natural
inclinations, the towns could nowhere have increased beyond what the
improvement and cultivation of the territory in which they were situated could
support; till such time, at least, as the whole of that territory was
completely cultivated and improved. Upon equal, or nearly equal profits, most
men will choose to employ their capitals, rather in the improvement and
cultivation of land, than either in manufactures or in foreign trade. The man
who employs his capital in land, has it more under his view and command; and
his fortune is much less liable to accidents than that of the trader, who is
obliged frequently to commit it, not only to the winds and the waves, but to
the more uncertain elements of human folly and injustice, by giving great
credits, in distant countries, to men with whose character and situation he can
seldom be thoroughly acquainted. The capital of the landlord, on the contrary,
which is fixed in the improvement of his land, seems to be as well secured as
the nature of human affairs can admit of. The beauty of the country, besides,
the pleasure of a country life, the tranquillity of mind which it promises,
and, wherever the injustice of human laws does not disturb it, the independency
which it really affords, have charms that, more or less, attract everybody; and
as to cultivate the ground was the original destination of man, so, in every
stage of his existence, he seems to retain a predilection for this primitive
employment.

Without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation of land
cannot be carried on, but with great inconveniency and continual interruption.
Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights and ploughwrights, masons and bricklayers,
tanners, shoemakers, and tailors, are people whose service the farmer has
frequent occasion for. Such artificers, too, stand occasionally in need of the
assistance of one another; and as their residence is not, like that of the
farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise spot, they naturally settle in the
neighbourhood of one another, and thus form a small town or village. The
butcher, the brewer, and the baker, soon join them, together with many other
artificers and retailers, necessary or useful for supplying their occasional
wants, and who contribute still further to augment the town. The inhabitants of
the town, and those of the country, are mutually the servants of one another.
The town is a continual fair or market, to which the inhabitants of the country
resort, in order to exchange their rude for manufactured produce. It is this
commerce which supplies the inhabitants of the town, both with the materials of
their work, and the means of their subsistence. The quantity of the finished
work which they sell to the inhabitants of the country, necessarily regulates
the quantity of the materials and provisions which they buy. Neither their
employment nor subsistence, therefore, can augment, but in proportion to the
augmentation of the demand from the country for finished work; and this demand
can augment only in proportion to the extension of improvement and cultivation.
Had human institutions, therefore, never disturbed the natural course of
things, the progressive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every
political society, be consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and
cultivation of the territory of country.

In our North American colonies, where uncultivated land is still to be had upon
easy terms, no manufactures for distant sale have ever yet been established in
any of their towns. When an artificer has acquired a little more stock than is
necessary for carrying on his own business in supplying the neighbouring
country, he does not, in North America, attempt to establish with it a
manufacture for more distant sale, but employs it in the purchase and
improvement of uncultivated land. From artificer he becomes planter; and
neither the large wages nor the easy subsistence which that country affords to
artificers, can bribe him rather to work for other people than for himself. He
feels that an artificer is the servant of his customers, from whom he derives
his subsistence; but that a planter who cultivates his own land, and derives
his necessary subsistence from the labour of his own family, is really a
master, and independent of all the world.

In countries, on the contrary, where there is either no uncultivated land, or
none that can be had upon easy terms, every artificer who has acquired more
stock than he can employ in the occasional jobs of the neighbourhood,
endeavours to prepare work for more distant sale. The smith erects some sort of
iron, the weaver some sort of linen or woollen manufactory. Those different
manufactures come, in process of time, to be gradually subdivided, and thereby
improved and refined in a great variety of ways, which may easily be conceived,
and which it is therefore unnecessary to explain any farther.

In seeking for employment to a capital, manufactures are, upon equal or nearly
equal profits, naturally preferred to foreign commerce, for the same reason
that agriculture is naturally preferred to manufactures. As the capital of the
landlord or farmer is more secure than that of the manufacturer, so the capital
of the manufacturer, being at all times more within his view and command, is
more secure than that of the foreign merchant. In every period, indeed, of
every society, the surplus part both of the rude and manufactured produce, or
that for which there is no demand at home, must be sent abroad, in order to be
exchanged for something for which there is some demand at home. But whether the
capital which carries this surplus produce abroad be a foreign or a domestic
one, is of very little importance. If the society has not acquired sufficient
capital, both to cultivate all its lands, and to manufacture in the completest
manner the whole of its rude produce, there is even a considerable advantage
that the rude produce should be exported by a foreign capital, in order that
the whole stock of the society may be employed in more useful purposes. The
wealth of ancient Egypt, that of China and Indostan, sufficiently demonstrate
that a nation may attain a very high degree of opulence, though the greater
part of its exportation trade be carried on by foreigners. The progress of our
North American and West Indian colonies, would have been much less rapid, had
no capital but what belonged to themselves been employed in exporting their
surplus produce.

According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of the
capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards
to manufactures, and, last of all, to foreign commerce. This order of things is
so very natural, that in every society that had any territory, it has always, I
believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands must have been
cultivated before any considerable towns could be established, and some sort of
coarse industry of the manufacturing kind must have been carried on in those
towns, before they could well think of employing themselves in foreign
commerce.

But though this natural order of things must have taken place in some degree in
every such society, it has, in all the modern states of Europe, been in many
respects entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their cities has
introduced all their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for distant sale;
and manufactures and foreign commerce together have given birth to the
principal improvements of agriculture. The manners and customs which the nature
of their original government introduced, and which remained after that
government was greatly altered, necessarily forced them into this unnatural and
retrograde order.

CHAPTER II.
OF THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ANCIENT STATE OF EUROPE, AFTER THE
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

When the German and Scythian nations overran the western provinces of the Roman
empire, the confusions which followed so great a revolution lasted for several
centuries. The rapine and violence which the barbarians exercised against the
ancient inhabitants, interrupted the commerce between the towns and the
country. The towns were deserted, and the country was left uncultivated; and
the western provinces of Europe, which had enjoyed a considerable degree of
opulence under the Roman empire, sunk into the lowest state of poverty and
barbarism. During the continuance of those confusions, the chiefs and principal
leaders of those nations acquired, or usurped to themselves, the greater part
of the lands of those countries. A great part of them was uncultivated; but no
part of them, whether cultivated or uncultivated, was left without a
proprietor. All of them were engrossed, and the greater part by a few great
proprietors.

This original engrossing of uncultivated lands, though a great, might have been
but a transitory evil. They might soon have been divided again, and broke into
small parcels, either by succession or by alienation. The law of primogeniture
hindered them from being divided by succession; the introduction of entails
prevented their being broke into small parcels by alienation.

When land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and
enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among all the
children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be
supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession,
accordingly, took place among the Romans who made no more distinction between
elder and younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of lands, than
we do in the distribution of moveables. But when land was considered as the
means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought
better that it should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times,
every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects.
He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace and their
leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against
his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed
estate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who
dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to
expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of
its neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not
immediately indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed
estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of
monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and
consequently the security of the monarchy, may not be weakened by division, it
must descend entire to one of the children. To which of them so important a
preference shall be given, must be determined by some general rule, founded not
upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and
evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among the children of the
same family there can be no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that
of age. The male sex is universally preferred to the female; and when all other
things are equal, the elder everywhere takes place of the younger. Hence the
origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal succession.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave
occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more. In
the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of land is as
perfectly secure in his possession as the proprietor of 100,000. The right of
primogeniture, however, still continues to be respected; and as of all
institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of family distinctions, it
is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing
can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right
which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.

Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They were
introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of
primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original
estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either by gift, or device,
or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its
successive owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their
substitutions, nor fidei commisses, bear any resemblance to entails, though
some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern institution in the
language and garb of those ancient ones.

When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not be
unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some monarchies,
they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being endangered by
the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the present state of Europe,
when small as well as great estates derive their security from the laws of
their country, nothing can be more completely absurd. They are founded upon the
most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive
generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it
possesses; but that the property of the present generation should be restrained
and regulated according to the fancy of those who died, perhaps five hundred
years ago. Entails, however, are still respected, through the greater part of
Europe; In those countries, particularly, in which noble birth is a necessary
qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails
are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility
to the great offices and honours of their country; and that order having
usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow-citizens, lest their
poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should
have another. The common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities,
and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European
monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland, more
than one fifth, perhaps more than one third part of the whole lands in the
country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail.

Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed by
particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as
much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a great
proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth to
those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently employed in
defending his own territories, or in extending his jurisdiction and authority
over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to the cultivation
and improvement of land. When the establishment of law and order afforded him
this leisure, he often wanted the inclination, and almost always the requisite
abilities. If the expense of his house and person either equalled or exceeded
his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no stock to employ in this
manner. If he was an economist, he generally found it more profitable to employ
his annual savings in new purchases than in the improvement of his old estate.
To improve land with profit, like all other commercial projects, requires an
exact attention to small savings and small gains, of which a man born to a
great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very seldom capable. The
situation of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to ornament,
which pleases his fancy, than to profit, for which he has so little occasion.
The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, of his house and household
furniture, are objects which, from his infancy, he has been accustomed to have
some anxiety about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, follows
him when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embellishes, perhaps,
four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the
expense which the land is worth after all his improvements; and finds, that if
he was to improve his whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste
for any other, he would be a bankrupt before he had finished the tenth part of
it. There still remain, in both parts of the united kingdom, some great estates
which have continued, without interruption, in the hands of the same family
since the times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of those
estates with the possessions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood,
and you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable such
extensive property is to improvement.

If little improvement was to be expected from such great proprietors, still
less was to be hoped for from those who occupied the land under them. In the
ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will. They
were all, or almost all, slaves, but their slavery was of a milder kind than
that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our West Indian
colonies. They were supposed to belong more directly to the land than to their
master. They could, therefore, be sold with it, but not separately. They could
marry, provided it was with the consent of their master; and he could not
afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the man and wife to different
persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable to some penalty,
though generally but to a small one. They were not, however, capable of
acquiring property. Whatever they acquired was acquired to their master, and he
could take it from them at pleasure. Whatever cultivation and improvement could
be carried on by means of such slaves, was properly carried on by their master.
It was at his expense. The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry,
were all his. It was for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but
their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore,
that in this case occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own
bondmen. This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary,
Bohemia, Moravia, and other parts of Germany. It is only in the western and
south-western provinces of Europe that it has gradually been abolished
altogether.

But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great proprietors,
they are least of all to be expected when they employ slaves for their workmen.
The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work
done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end
the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no property can have no other
interest but to eat as much and to labour as little as possible. Whatever work
he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be
squeezed out of him by violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In
ancient Italy, how much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable
it became to the master, when it fell under the management of slaves, is
remarked both by Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle, it had not been
much better in ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal republic described in the
laws of Plato, to maintain 5000 idle men (the number of warriors supposed
necessary for its defence), together with their women and servants, would
require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the
plains of Babylon.

The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so much
as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law
allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will
generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of
sugar and tobacco can afford the expense of slave cultivation. The raising of
corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of which
the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done by
freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, to set at liberty
all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be very great.
Had they made any considerable part of their property, such a resolution could
never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies., on the contrary, the whole
work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great part of it.
The profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West Indian colonies, are
generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either
in Europe or America; and the profits of a tobacco plantation, though inferior
to those of sugar, are superior to those of corn, as has already been observed.
Both can afford the expense of slave cultivation but sugar can afford it still
better than tobacco. The number of negroes, accordingly, is much greater, in
proportion to that of whites, in our sugar than in our tobacco colonies.

To the slave cultivators of ancient times gradually succeeded a species of
farmers, known at present in France by the name of metayers. They are called in
Latin Coloni Partiarii. They have been so long in disuse in England, that at
present I know no English name for them. The proprietor furnished them with the
seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry, the whole stock, in short,
necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce was divided equally between the
proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside what was judged necessary for
keeping up the stock, which was restored to the proprietor, when the farmer
either quitted or was turned out of the farm.

Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expense of the
proprietors, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one very
essential difference between them. Such tenants, being freemen, are capable of
acquiring property; and having a certain proportion of the produce of the land,
they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as
possible, in order that their own proportion may be so. A slave, on the
contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease,
by making the land produce as little as possible over and above that
maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this advantage,
and partly upon account of the encroachments which the sovereigns, always
jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make upon
their authority, and which seem, at least, to have been such as rendered this
species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that tenure in villanage
gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and manner,
however, in which so important a revolution was brought about, is one of the
most obscure points in modern history. The church of Rome claims great merit in
it; and it is certain, that so early as the twelfth century, Alexander III.
published a bull for the general emancipation of slaves. It seems, however, to
have been rather a pious exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was
required from the faithful. Slavery continued to take place almost universally
for several centuries afterwards, till it was gradually abolished by the joint
operation of the two interests above mentioned; that of the proprietor on the
one hand, and that of the sovereign on the other. A villain, enfranchised, and
at the same time allowed to continue in possession of the land, having no stock
of his own, could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to
him, and must therefore have been what the French call a metayer.

It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of
cultivators, to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any part of
the little stock which they might save from their own share of the produce;
because the landlord, who laid out nothing, was to get one half of whatever it
produced. The tithe, which is but a tenth of the produce, is found to be a very
great hindrance to improvement. A tax, therefore, which amounted to one half,
must have been an effectual bar to it. It might be the interest of a metayer to
make the land produce as much as could be brought out of it by means of the
stock furnished by the proprietor; but it could never be his interest to mix
any part of his own with it. In France, where five parts out of six of the
whole kingdom are said to be still occupied by this species of cultivators, the
proprietors complain, that their metayers take every opportunity of employing
their master’s cattle rather in carriage than in cultivation; because, in
the one case, they get the whole profits to themselves, in the other they share
them with their landlord. This species of tenants still subsists in some parts
of Scotland. They are called steel-bow tenants. Those ancient English tenants,
who are said by Chief-Baron Gilbert and Dr Blackstone to have been rather
bailiffs of the landlord than farmers, properly so called, were probably of the
same kind.

To this species of tenantry succeeded, though by very slow degrees, farmers,
properly so called, who cultivated the land with their own stock, paying a rent
certain to the landlord. When such farmers have a lease for a term of years,
they may sometimes find it for their interest to lay out part of their capital
in the further improvement of the farm; because they may sometimes expect to
recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration of the lease. The
possession, even of such farmers, however, was long extremely precarious, and
still is so in many parts of Europe. They could, before the expiration of their
term, be legally ousted of their leases by a new purchaser; in England, even,
by the fictitious action of a common recovery. If they were turned out
illegally by the violence of their master, the action by which they obtained
redress was extremely imperfect. It did not always reinstate them in the
possession of the land, but gave them damages, which never amounted to a real
loss. Even in England, the country, perhaps of Europe, where the yeomanry has
always been most respected, it was not till about the 14th of Henry VII. that
the action of ejectment was invented, by which the tenant recovers, not damages
only, but possession, and in which his claim is not necessarily concluded by
the uncertain decision of a single assize. This action has been found so
effectual a remedy, that, in the modern practice, when the landlord has
occasion to sue for the possession of the land, he seldom makes use of the
actions which properly belong to him as a landlord, the writ of right or the
writ of entry, but sues in the name of his tenant, by the writ of ejectment. In
England, therefore the security of the tenant is equal to that of the
proprietor. In England, besides, a lease for life of forty shillings a-year
value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee to a vote for a member of
parliament; and as a great part of the yeomanry have freeholds of this kind,
the whole order becomes respectable to their landlords, on account of the
political consideration which this gives them. There is, I believe, nowhere in
Europe, except in England, any instance of the tenant building upon the land of
which he had no lease, and trusting that the honour of his landlord would take
no advantage of so important an improvement. Those laws and customs, so
favourable to the yeomanry, have perhaps contributed more to the present
grandeur of England, than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken
together.

The law which secures the longest leases against successors of every kind, is,
so far as I know, peculiar to Great Britain. It was introduced into Scotland so
early as 1449, by a law of James II. Its beneficial influence, however, has
been much obstructed by entails; the heirs of entail being generally restrained
from letting leases for any long term of years, frequently for more than one
year. A late act of parliament has, in this respect, somewhat slackened their
fetters, though they are still by much too strait. In Scotland, besides, as no
leasehold gives a vote for a member of parliament, the yeomanry are upon this
account less respectable to their landlords than in England.

In other parts of Europe, after it was found convenient to secure tenants both
against heirs and purchasers, the term of their security was still limited to a
very short period; in France, for example, to nine years from the commencement
of the lease. It has in that country, indeed, been lately extended to
twentyseven, a period still too short to encourage the tenant to make the most
important improvements. The proprietors of land were anciently the legislators
of every part of Europe. The laws relating to land, therefore, were all
calculated for what they supposed the interest of the proprietor. It was for
his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted by any of his
predecessors should hinder him from enjoying, during a long term of years, the
full value of his land. Avarice and injustice are always short-sighted, and
they did not foresee how much this regulation must obstruct improvement, and
thereby hurt, in the long-run, the real interest of the landlord.

The farmers, too, besides paying the rent, were anciently, it was supposed,
bound to perform a great number of services to the landlord, which were seldom
either specified in the lease, or regulated by any precise rule, but by the use
and wont of the manor or barony. These services, therefore, being almost
entirely arbitrary, subjected the tenant to many vexations. In Scotland the
abolition of all services not precisely stipulated in the lease, has, in the
course of a few years, very much altered for the better the condition of the
yeomanry of that country.

The public services to which the yeomanry were bound, were not less arbitrary
than the private ones. To make and maintain the high roads, a servitude which
still subsists, I believe, everywhere, though with different degrees of
oppression in different countries, was not the only one. When the king’s
troops, when his household, or his officers of any kind, passed through any
part of the country, the yeomanry were bound to provide them with horses,
carriages, and provisions, at a price regulated by the purveyor. Great Britain
is, I believe, the only monarchy in Europe where the oppression of purveyance
has been entirely abolished. It still subsists in France and Germany.

The public taxes, to which they were subject, were as irregular and oppressive
as the services. The ancient lords, though extremely unwilling to grant,
themselves, any pecuniary aid to their sovereign, easily allowed him to
tallage, as they called it, their tenants, and had not knowledge enough to
foresee how much this must, in the end, affect their own revenue. The taille,
as it still subsists in France may serve as an example of those ancient
tallages. It is a tax upon the supposed profits of the farmer, which they
estimate by the stock that he has upon the farm. It is his interest, therefore,
to appear to have as little as possible, and consequently to employ as little
as possible in its cultivation, and none in its improvement. Should any stock
happen to accumulate in the hands of a French farmer, the taille is almost
equal to a prohibition of its ever being employed upon the land. This tax,
besides, is supposed to dishonour whoever is subject to it, and to degrade him
below, not only the rank of a gentleman, but that of a burgher; and whoever
rents the lands of another becomes subject to it. No gentleman, nor even any
burgher, who has stock, will submit to this degradation. This tax, therefore,
not only hinders the stock which accumulates upon the land from being employed
in its improvement, but drives away all other stock from it. The ancient tenths
and fifteenths, so usual in England in former times, seem, so far as they
affected the land, to have been taxes of the same nature with the taille.

Under all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected from the
occupiers of land. That order of people, with all the liberty and security
which law can give, must always improve under great disadvantage. The farmer,
compared with the proprietor, is as a merchant who trades with burrowed money,
compared with one who trades with his own. The stock of both may improve; but
that of the one, with only equal good conduct, must always improve more slowly
than that of the other, on account of the large share of the profits which is
consumed by the interest of the loan. The lands cultivated by the farmer must,
in the same manner, with only equal good conduct, be improved more slowly than
those cultivated by the proprietor, on account of the large share of the
produce which is consumed in the rent, and which, had the farmer been
proprietor, he might have employed in the further improvement of the land. The
station of a farmer, besides, is, from the nature of things, inferior to that
of a proprietor. Through the greater part of Europe, the yeomanry are regarded
as an inferior rank of people, even to the better sort of tradesmen and
mechanics, and in all parts of Europe to the great merchants and master
manufacturers. It can seldom happen, therefore, that a man of any considerable
stock should quit the superior, in order to place himself in an inferior
station. Even in the present state of Europe, therefore, little stock is likely
to go from any other profession to the improvement of land in the way of
farming. More does, perhaps, in Great Britain than in any other country, though
even there the great stocks which are in some places employed in farming, have
generally been acquired by fanning, the trade, perhaps, in which, of all
others, stock is commonly acquired most slowly. After small proprietors,
however, rich and great farmers are in every country the principal improvers.
There are more such, perhaps, in England than in any other European monarchy.
In the republican governments of Holland, and of Berne in Switzerland, the
farmers are said to be not inferior to those of England.

The ancient policy of Europe was, over and above all this, unfavourable to the
improvement and cultivation of land, whether carried on by the proprietor or by
the farmer; first, by the general prohibition of the exportation of corn,
without a special licence, which seems to have been a very universal
regulation; and, secondly, by the restraints which were laid upon the inland
commerce, not only of corn, but of almost every other part of the produce of
the farm, by the absurd laws against engrossers, regraters, and forestallers,
and by the privileges of fairs and markets. It has already been observed in
what manner the prohibition of the exportation of corn, together with some
encouragement given to the importation of foreign corn, obstructed the
cultivation of ancient Italy, naturally the most fertile country in Europe, and
at that time the seat of the greatest empire in the world. To what degree such
restraints upon the inland commerce of this commodity, joined to the general
prohibition of exportation, must have discouraged the cultivation of countries
less fertile, and less favourably circumstanced, it is not, perhaps, very easy
to imagine.

CHAPTER III.
OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF CITIES AND TOWNS, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE.

The inhabitants of cities and towns were, after the fall of the Roman empire,
not more favoured than those of the country. They consisted, indeed, of a very
different order of people from the first inhabitants of the ancient republics
of Greece and Italy. These last were composed chiefly of the proprietors of
lands, among whom the public territory was originally divided, and who found it
convenient to build their houses in the neighbourhood of one another, and to
surround them with a wall, for the sake of common defence. After the fall of
the Roman empire, on the contrary, the proprietors of land seem generally to
have lived in fortified castles on their own estates, and in the midst of their
own tenants and dependants. The towns were chiefly inhabited by tradesmen and
mechanics, who seem, in those days, to have been of servile, or very nearly of
servile condition. The privileges which we find granted by ancient charters to
the inhabitants of some of the principal towns in Europe, sufficiently show
what they were before those grants. The people to whom it is granted as a
privilege, that they might give away their own daughters in marriage without
the consent of their lord, that upon their death their own children, and not
their lord, should succeed to their goods, and that they might dispose of their
own effects by will, must, before those grants, have been either altogether, or
very nearly, in the same state of villanage with the occupiers of land in the
country.

They seem, indeed, to have been a very poor, mean set of people, who seemed to
travel about with their goods from place to place, and from fair to fair, like
the hawkers and pedlars of the present times. In all the different countries of
Europe then, in the same manner as in several of the Tartar governments of Asia
at present, taxes used to be levied upon the persons and goods of travellers,
when they passed through certain manors, when they went over certain bridges,
when they carried about their goods from place to place in a fair, when they
erected in it a booth or stall to sell them in. These different taxes were
known in England by the names of passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage.
Sometimes the king, sometimes a great lord, who had, it seems, upon some
occasions, authority to do this, would grant to particular traders, to such
particularly as lived in their own demesnes, a general exemption from such
taxes. Such traders, though in other respects of servile, or very nearly of
servile condition, were upon this account called free traders. They, in return,
usually paid to their protector a sort of annual poll-tax. In those days
protection was seldom granted without a valuable consideration, and this tax
might perhaps be considered as compensation for what their patrons might lose
by their exemption from other taxes. At first, both those poll-taxes and those
exemptions seem to have been altogether personal, and to have affected only
particular individuals, during either their lives, or the pleasure of their
protectors. In the very imperfect accounts which have been published from
Doomsday-book, of several of the towns of England, mention is frequently made,
sometimes of the tax which particular burghers paid, each of them, either to
the king, or to some other great lord, for this sort of protection, and
sometimes of the general amount only of all those taxes. {see Brady’s
Historical Treatise of Cities and Boroughs, p. 3. etc.}

But how servile soever may have been originally the condition of the
inhabitants of the towns, it appears evidently, that they arrived at liberty
and independency much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country. That
part of the king’s revenue which arose from such poll-taxes in any
particular town, used commonly to be let in farm, during a term of years, for a
rent certain, sometimes to the sheriff of the county, and sometimes to other
persons. The burghers themselves frequently got credit enough to be admitted to
farm the revenues of this sort which arose out of their own town, they becoming
jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent. {See Madox, Firma Burgi,
p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10, sect. v, p. 223, first
edition.} To let a farm in this manner, was quite agreeable to the usual
economy of, I believe, the sovereigns of all the different countries of Europe,
who used frequently to let whole manors to all the tenants of those manors,
they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent; but in
return being allowed to collect it in their own way, and to pay it into the
king’s exchequer by the hands of their own bailiff, and being thus
altogether freed from the insolence of the king’s officers; a
circumstance in those days regarded as of the greatest importance.

At first, the farm of the town was probably let to the burghers, in the same
manner as it had been to other farmers, for a term of years only. In process of
time, however, it seems to have become the general practice to grant it to them
in fee, that is for ever, reserving a rent certain, never afterwards to be
augmented. The payment having thus become perpetual, the exemptions, in return,
for which it was made, naturally became perpetual too. Those exemptions,
therefore, ceased to be personal, and could not afterwards be considered as
belonging to individuals, as individuals, but as burghers of a particular
burgh, which, upon this account, was called a free burgh, for the same reason
that they had been called free burghers or free traders.

Along with this grant, the important privileges, above mentioned, that they
might give away their own daughters in marriage, that their children should
succeed to them, and that they might dispose of their own effects by will, were
generally bestowed upon the burghers of the town to whom it was given. Whether
such privileges had before been usually granted, along with the freedom of
trade, to particular burghers, as individuals, I know not. I reckon it not
improbable that they were, though I cannot produce any direct evidence of it.
But however this may have been, the principal attributes of villanage and
slavery being thus taken away from them, they now at least became really free,
in our present sense of the word freedom.

Nor was this all. They were generally at the same time erected into a
commonalty or corporation, with the privilege of having magistrates and a
town-council of their own, of making bye-laws for their own government, of
building walls for their own defence, and of reducing all their inhabitants
under a sort of military discipline, by obliging them to watch and ward; that
is, as anciently understood, to guard and defend those walls against all
attacks and surprises, by night as well as by day. In England they were
generally exempted from suit to the hundred and county courts: and all such
pleas as should arise among them, the pleas of the crown excepted, were left to
the decision of their own magistrates. In other countries, much greater and
more extensive jurisdictions were frequently granted to them. {See Madox, Firma
Burgi. See also Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under Frederick II. and his
Successors of the House of Suabia.}

It might, probably, be necessary to grant to such towns as were admitted to
farm their own revenues, some sort of compulsive jurisdiction to oblige their
own citizens to make payment. In those disorderly times, it might have been
extremely inconvenient to have left them to seek this sort of justice from any
other tribunal. But it must seem extraordinary, that the sovereigns of all the
different countries of Europe should have exchanged in this manner for a rent
certain, never more to be augmented, that branch of their revenue, which was,
perhaps, of all others, the most likely to be improved by the natural course of
things, without either expense or attention of their own; and that they should,
besides, have in this manner voluntarily erected a sort of independent
republics in the heart of their own dominions.

In order to understand this, it must be remembered, that, in those days, the
sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect, through the
whole extent of his dominions, the weaker part of his subjects from the
oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and who
were not strong enough to defend themselves, were obliged either to have
recourse to the protection of some great lord, and in order to obtain it, to
become either his slaves or vassals; or to enter into a league of mutual
defence for the common protection of one another. The inhabitants of cities and
burghs, considered as single individuals, had no power to defend themselves;
but by entering into a league of mutual defence with their neighbours, they
were capable of making no contemptible resistance. The lords despised the
burghers, whom they considered not only as a different order, but as a parcel
of emancipated slaves, almost of a different species from themselves. The
wealth of the burghers never failed to provoke their envy and indignation, and
they plundered them upon every occasion without mercy or remorse. The burghers
naturally hated and feared the lords. The king hated and feared them too; but
though, perhaps, he might despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the
burghers. Mutual interest, therefore, disposed them to support the king, and
the king to support them against the lords. They were the enemies of his
enemies, and it was his interest to render them as secure and independent of
those enemies as he could. By granting them magistrates of their own, the
privilege of making bye-laws for their own government, that of building walls
for their own defence, and that of reducing all their inhabitants under a sort
of military discipline, he gave them all the means of security and independency
of the barons which it was in his power to bestow. Without the establishment of
some regular government of this kind, without some authority to compel their
inhabitants to act according to some certain plan or system, no voluntary
league of mutual defence could either have afforded them any permanent
security, or have enabled them to give the king any considerable support. By
granting them the farm of their own town in fee, he took away from those whom
he wished to have for his friends, and, if one may say so, for his allies, all
ground of jealousy and suspicion, that he was ever afterwards to oppress them,
either by raising the farm-rent of their town, or by granting it to some other
farmer.

The princes who lived upon the worst terms with their barons, seem accordingly
to have been the most liberal in grants of this kind to their burghs. King John
of England, for example, appears to have been a most munificent benefactor to
his towns. {See Madox.} Philip I. of France lost all authority over his barons.
Towards the end of his reign, his son Lewis, known afterwards by the name of
Lewis the Fat, consulted, according to Father Daniel, with the bishops of the
royal demesnes, concerning the most proper means of restraining the violence of
the great lords. Their advice consisted of two different proposals. One was to
erect a new order of jurisdiction, by establishing magistrates and a
town-council in every considerable town of his demesnes. The other was to form
a new militia, by making the inhabitants of those towns, under the command of
their own magistrates, march out upon proper occasions to the assistance of the
king. It is from this period, according to the French antiquarians, that we are
to date the institution of the magistrates and councils of cities in France. It
was during the unprosperous reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia, that
the greater part of the free towns of Germany received the first grants of
their privileges, and that the famous Hanseatic league first became formidable.
{See Pfeffel.}

The militia of the cities seems, in those times, not to have been inferior to
that of the country; and as they could be more readily assembled upon any
sudden occasion, they frequently had the advantage in their disputes with the
neighbouring lords. In countries such as Italy or Switzerland, in which, on
account either of their distance from the principal seat of government, of the
natural strength of the country itself, or of some other reason, the sovereign
came to lose the whole of his authority; the cities generally became
independent republics, and conquered all the nobility in their neighbourhood;
obliging them to pull down their castles in the country, and to live, like
other peaceable inhabitants, in the city. This is the short history of the
republic of Berne, as well as of several other cities in Switzerland. If you
except Venice, for of that city the history is somewhat different, it is the
history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which so great a number
arose and perished between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the
sixteenth century.

In countries such as France and England, where the authority of the sovereign,
though frequently very low, never was destroyed altogether, the cities had no
opportunity of becoming entirely independent. They became, however, so
considerable, that the sovereign could impose no tax upon them, besides the
stated farm-rent of the town, without their own consent. They were, therefore,
called upon to send deputies to the general assembly of the states of the
kingdom, where they might join with the clergy and the barons in granting, upon
urgent occasions, some extraordinary aid to the king. Being generally, too,
more favourable to his power, their deputies seem sometimes to have been
employed by him as a counterbalance in those assemblies to the authority of the
great lords. Hence the origin of the representation of burghs in the
states-general of all great monarchies in Europe.

Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of
individuals, were in this manner established in cities, at a time when the
occupiers of land in the country, were exposed to every sort of violence. But
men in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their necessary
subsistence; because, to acquire more, might only tempt the injustice of their
oppressors. On the contrary, when they are secure of enjoying the fruits of
their industry, they naturally exert it to better their condition, and to
acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniencies and elegancies of life.
That industry, therefore, which aims at something more than necessary
subsistence, was established in cities long before it was commonly practised by
the occupiers of land in the country. If, in the hands of a poor cultivator,
oppressed with the servitude of villanage, some little stock should accumulate,
he would naturally conceal it with great care from his master, to whom it would
otherwise have belonged, and take the first opportunity of running away to a
town. The law was at that time so indulgent to the inhabitants of towns, and so
desirous of diminishing the authority of the lords over those of the country,
that if he could conceal himself there from the pursuit of his lord for a year,
he was free for ever. Whatever stock, therefore, accumulated in the hands of
the industrious part of the inhabitants of the country, naturally took refuge
in cities, as the only sanctuaries in which it could be secure to the person
that acquired it.

The inhabitants of a city, it is true, must always ultimately derive their
subsistence, and the whole materials and means of their industry, from the
country. But those of a city, situated near either the sea-coast or the banks
of a navigable river, are not necessarily confined to derive them from the
country in their neighbourhood. They have a much wider range, and may draw them
from the most remote corners of the world, either in exchange for the
manufactured produce of their own industry, or by performing the office of
carriers between distant countries, and exchanging the produce of one for that
of another. A city might, in this manner, grow up to great wealth and
splendour, while not only the country in its neighbourhood, but all those to
which it traded, were in poverty and wretchedness. Each of those countries,
perhaps, taken singly, could afford it but a small part, either of its
subsistence or of its employment; but all of them taken together, could afford
it both a great subsistence and a great employment. There were, however, within
the narrow circle of the commerce of those times, some countries that were
opulent and industrious. Such was the Greek empire as long as it subsisted, and
that of the Saracens during the reigns of the Abassides. Such, too, was Egypt
till it was conquered by the Turks, some part of the coast of Barbary, and all
those provinces of Spain which were under the government of the Moors.

The cities of Italy seem to have been the first in Europe which were raised by
commerce to any considerable degree of opulence. Italy lay in the centre of
what was at that time the improved and civilized part of the world. The
crusades, too, though, by the great waste of stock and destruction of
inhabitants which they occasioned, they must necessarily have retarded the
progress of the greater part of Europe, were extremely favourable to that of
some Italian cities. The great armies which marched from all parts to the
conquest of the Holy Land, gave extraordinary encouragement to the shipping of
Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, sometimes in transporting them thither, and always in
supplying them with provisions. They were the commissaries, if one may say so,
of those armies; and the most destructive frenzy that ever befel the European
nations, was a source of opulence to those republics.

The inhabitants of trading cities, by importing the improved manufactures and
expensive luxuries of richer countries, afforded some food to the vanity of the
great proprietors, who eagerly purchased them with great quantities of the rude
produce of their own lands. The commerce of a great part of Europe in those
times, accordingly, consisted chiefly in the exchange of their own rude, for
the manufactured produce of more civilized nations. Thus the wool of England
used to be exchanged for the wines of France, and the fine cloths of Flanders,
in the same manner as the corn in Poland is at this day, exchanged for the
wines and brandies of France, and for the silks and velvets of France and
Italy.

A taste for the finer and more improved manufactures was, in this manner,
introduced by foreign commerce into countries where no such works were carried
on. But when this taste became so general as to occasion a considerable demand,
the merchants, in order to save the expense of carriage, naturally endeavoured
to establish some manufactures of the same kind in their own country. Hence the
origin of the first manufactures for distant sale, that seem to have been
established in the western provinces of Europe, after the fall of the Roman
empire.

No large country, it must be observed, ever did or could subsist without some
sort of manufactures being carried on in it; and when it is said of any such
country that it has no manufactures, it must always be understood of the finer
and more improved, or of such as are fit for distant sale. In every large
country both the clothing and household furniture or the far greater part of
the people, are the produce of their own industry. This is even more
universally the case in those poor countries which are commonly said to have no
manufactures, than in those rich ones that are said to abound in them. In the
latter you will generally find, both in the clothes and household furniture of
the lowest rank of people, a much greater proportion of foreign productions
than in the former.

Those manufactures which are fit for distant sale, seem to have been introduced
into different countries in two different ways.

Sometimes they have been introduced in the manner above mentioned, by the
violent operation, if one may say so, of the stocks of particular merchants and
undertakers, who established them in imitation of some foreign manufactures of
the same kind. Such manufactures, therefore, are the offspring of foreign
commerce; and such seem to have been the ancient manufactures of silks,
velvets, and brocades, which flourished in Lucca during the thirteenth century.
They were banished from thence by the tyranny of one of Machiavel’s
heroes, Castruccio Castracani. In 1310, nine hundred families were driven out
of Lucca, of whom thirty-one retired to Venice, and offered to introduce there
the silk manufacture. {See Sandi Istoria civile de Vinezia, part 2 vol. i, page
247 and 256.} Their offer was accepted, many privileges were conferred upon
them, and they began the manufacture with three hundred workmen. Such, too,
seem to have been the manufactures of fine cloths that anciently flourished in
Flanders, and which were introduced into England in the beginning of the reign
of Elizabeth, and such are the present silk manufactures of Lyons and
Spitalfields. Manufactures introduced in this manner are generally employed
upon foreign materials, being imitations of foreign manufactures. When the
Venetian manufacture was first established, the materials were all brought from
Sicily and the Levant. The more ancient manufacture of Lucca was likewise
carried on with foreign materials. The cultivation of mulberry trees, and the
breeding of silk-worms, seem not to have been common in the northern parts of
Italy before the sixteenth century. Those arts were not introduced into France
till the reign of Charles IX. The manufactures of Flanders were carried on
chiefly with Spanish and English wool. Spanish wool was the material, not of
the first woollen manufacture of England, but of the first that was fit for
distant sale. More than one half the materials of the Lyons manufacture is at
this day foreign silk; when it was first established, the whole, or very nearly
the whole, was so. No part of the materials of the Spitalfields manufacture is
ever likely to be the produce of England. The seat of such manufactures, as
they are generally introduced by the scheme and project of a few individuals,
is sometimes established in a maritime city, and sometimes in an inland town,
according as their interest, judgment, or caprice, happen to determine.

At other times, manufactures for distant sale grow up naturally, and as it were
of their own accord, by the gradual refinement of those household and coarser
manufactures which must at all times be carried on even in the poorest and
rudest countries. Such manufactures are generally employed upon the materials
which the country produces, and they seem frequently to have been first refined
and improved in such inland countries as were not, indeed, at a very great, but
at a considerable distance from the sea-coast, and sometimes even from all
water carriage. An inland country, naturally fertile and easily cultivated,
produces a great surplus of provisions beyond what is necessary for maintaining
the cultivators; and on account of the expense of land carriage, and
inconveniency of river navigation, it may frequently be difficult to send this
surplus abroad. Abundance, therefore, renders provisions cheap, and encourages
a great number of workmen to settle in the neighbourhood, who find that their
industry can there procure them more of the necessaries and conveniencies of
life than in other places. They work up the materials of manufacture which the
land produces, and exchange their finished work, or, what is the same thing,
the price of it, for more materials and provisions. They give a new value to
the surplus part of the rude produce, by saving the expense of carrying it to
the water-side, or to some distant market; and they furnish the cultivators
with something in exchange for it that is either useful or agreeable to them,
upon easier terms than they could have obtained it before. The cultivators get
a better price for their surplus produce, and can purchase cheaper other
conveniencies which they have occasion for. They are thus both encouraged and
enabled to increase this surplus produce by a further improvement and better
cultivation of the land; and as the fertility of the land had given birth to
the manufacture, so the progress of the manufacture re-acts upon the land, and
increases still further its fertility. The manufacturers first supply the
neighbourhood, and afterwards, as their work improves and refines, more distant
markets. For though neither the rude produce, nor even the coarse manufacture,
could, without the greatest difficulty, support the expense of a considerable
land-carriage, the refined and improved manufacture easily may. In a small bulk
it frequently contains the price of a great quantity of rude produce. A piece
of fine cloth, for example which weighs only eighty pounds, contains in it the
price, not only of eighty pounds weight of wool, but sometimes of several
thousand weight of corn, the maintenance of the different working people, and
of their immediate employers. The corn which could with difficulty have been
carried abroad in its own shape, is in this manner virtually exported in that
of the complete manufacture, and may easily be sent to the remotest corners of
the world. In this manner have grown up naturally, and, as it were, of their
own accord, the manufactures of Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, Birmingham, and
Wolverhampton. Such manufactures are the offspring of agriculture. In the
modern history of Europe, their extension and improvement have generally been
posterior to those which were the offspring of foreign commerce. England was
noted for the manufacture of fine cloths made of Spanish wool, more than a
century before any of those which now flourish in the places above mentioned
were fit for foreign sale. The extension and improvement of these last could
not take place but in consequence of the extension and improvement of
agriculture, the last and greatest effect of foreign commerce, and of the
manufactures immediately introduced by it, and which I shall now proceed to
explain.

CHAPTER IV.
HOW THE COMMERCE OF TOWNS CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY.

The increase and riches of commercial and manufacturing towns contributed to
the improvement and cultivation of the countries to which they belonged, in
three different ways.

First, by affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the
country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further improvement.
This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which they were
situated, but extended more or less to all those with which they had any
dealings. To all of them they afforded a market for some part either of their
rude or manufactured produce, and, consequently, gave some encouragement to the
industry and improvement of all. Their own country, however, on account of its
neighbourhood, necessarily derived the greatest benefit from this market. Its
rude produce being charged with less carriage, the traders could pay the
growers a better price for it, and yet afford it as cheap to the consumers as
that of more distant countries.

Secondly, the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently
employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part
would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming
country gentlemen, and, when they do, they are generally the best of all
improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable
projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly
in expense. The one often sees his money go from him, and return to him again
with a profit; the other, when once he parts with it, very seldom expects to
see any more of it. Those different habits naturally affect their temper and
disposition in every sort of business. The merchant is commonly a bold, a
country gentleman a timid undertaker. The one is not afraid to lay out at once
a large capital upon the improvement of his land, when he has a probable
prospect of raising the value of it in proportion to the expense; the other, if
he has any capital, which is not always the case, seldom ventures to employ it
in this manner. If he improves at all, it is commonly not with a capital, but
with what he can save out or his annual revenue. Whoever has had the fortune to
live in a mercantile town, situated in an unimproved country, must have
frequently observed how much more spirited the operations of merchants were in
this way, than those of mere country gentlemen. The habits, besides, of order,
economy, and attention, to which mercantile business naturally forms a
merchant, render him much fitter to execute, with profit and success, any
project of improvement.

Thirdly, and lastly, commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and
good government, and with them the liberty and security of individuals, among
the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual
state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their
superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most
important of all their effects. Mr Hume is the only writer who, so far as I
know, has hitherto taken notice of it.

In a country which has neither foreign commerce nor any of the finer
manufactures, a great proprietor, having nothing for which he can exchange the
greater part of the produce of his lands which is over and above the
maintenance of the cultivators, consumes the whole in rustic hospitality at
home. If this surplus produce is sufficient to maintain a hundred or a thousand
men, he can make use of it in no other way than by maintaining a hundred or a
thousand men. He is at all times, therefore, surrounded with a multitude of
retainers and dependants, who, having no equivalent to give in return for their
maintenance, but being fed entirely by his bounty, must obey him, for the same
reason that soldiers must obey the prince who pays them. Before the extension
of commerce and manufactures in Europe, the hospitality of the rich and the
great, from the sovereign down to the smallest baron, exceeded every thing
which, in the present times, we can easily form a notion of Westminster-hall
was the dining-room of William Rufus, and might frequently, perhaps, not be too
large for his company. It was reckoned a piece of magnificence in Thomas
Becket, that he strewed the floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in the
season, in order that the knights and squires, who could not get seats, might
not spoil their fine clothes when they sat down on the floor to eat their
dinner. The great Earl of Warwick is said to have entertained every day, at his
different manors, 30,000 people; and though the number here may have been
exaggerated, it must, however, have been very great to admit of such
exaggeration. A hospitality nearly of the same kind was exercised not many
years ago in many different parts of the Highlands of Scotland. It seems to be
common in all nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known. I
have seen, says Doctor Pocock, an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town
where he had come to sell his cattle, and invite all passengers, even common
beggars, to sit down with him and partake of his banquet.

The occupiers of land were in every respect as dependent upon the great
proprietor as his retainers. Even such of them as were not in a state of
villanage, were tenants at will, who paid a rent in no respect equivalent to
the subsistence which the land afforded them. A crown, half a crown, a sheep, a
lamb, was some years ago, in the Highlands of Scotland, a common rent for lands
which maintained a family. In some places it is so at this day; nor will money
at present purchase a greater quantity of commodities there than in other
places. In a country where the surplus produce of a large estate must be
consumed upon the estate itself, it will frequently be more convenient for the
proprietor, that part of it be consumed at a distance from his own house,
provided they who consume it are as dependent upon him as either his retainers
or his menial servants. He is thereby saved from the embarrassment of either
too large a company, or too large a family. A tenant at will, who possesses
land sufficient to maintain his family for little more than a quit-rent, is as
dependent upon the proprietor as any servant or retainer whatever, and must
obey him with as little reserve. Such a proprietor, as he feeds his servants
and retainers at his own house, so he feeds his tenants at their houses. The
subsistence of both is derived from his bounty, and its continuance depends
upon his good pleasure.

Upon the authority which the great proprietors necessarily had, in such a state
of things, over their tenants and retainers, was founded the power of the
ancient barons. They necessarily became the judges in peace, and the leaders in
war, of all who dwelt upon their estates. They could maintain order, and
execute the law, within their respective demesnes, because each of them could
there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against the injustice of
anyone. No other person had sufficient authority to do this. The king, in
particular, had not. In those ancient times, he was little more than the
greatest proprietor in his dominions, to whom, for the sake of common defence
against their common enemies, the other great proprietors paid certain
respects. To have enforced payment of a small debt within the lands of a great
proprietor, where all the inhabitants were armed, and accustomed to stand by
one another, would have cost the king, had he attempted it by his own
authority, almost the same effort as to extinguish a civil war. He was,
therefore, obliged to abandon the administration of justice, through the
greater part of the country, to those who were capable of administering it;
and, for the same reason, to leave the command of the country militia to those
whom that militia would obey.

It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial jurisdictions took their
origin from the feudal law. Not only the highest jurisdictions, both civil and
criminal, but the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that of
making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights
possessed allodially by the great proprietors of land, several centuries before
even the name of the feudal law was known in Europe. The authority and
jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in England appear to have been as great before
the Conquest as that of any of the Norman lords after it. But the feudal law is
not supposed to have become the common law of England till after the Conquest.
That the most extensive authority and jurisdictions were possessed by the great
lords in France allodially, long before the feudal law was introduced into that
country, is a matter of fact that admits of no doubt. That authority, and those
jurisdictions, all necessarily flowed from the state of property and manners
just now described. Without remounting to the remote antiquities of either the
French or English monarchies, we may find, in much later times, many proofs
that such effects must always flow from such causes. It is not thirty years ago
since Mr Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman of Lochaber in Scotland, without any
legal warrant whatever, not being what was then called a lord of regality, nor
even a tenant in chief, but a vassal of the Duke of Argyll, and with out being
so much as a justice of peace, used, notwithstanding, to exercise the highest
criminal jurisdictions over his own people. He is said to have done so with
great equity, though without any of the formalities of justice; and it is not
improbable that the state of that part of the country at that time made it
necessary for him to assume this authority, in order to maintain the public
peace. That gentleman, whose rent never exceeded £500 a-year, carried, in 1745,
800 of his own people into the rebellion with him.

The introduction of the feudal law, so far from extending, may be regarded as
an attempt to moderate, the authority of the great allodial lords. It
established a regular subordination, accompanied with a long train of services
and duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor. During the minority
of the proprietor, the rent, together with the management of his lands, fell
into the hands of his immediate superior; and, consequently, those of all great
proprietors into the hands of the king, who was charged with the maintenance
and education of the pupil, and who, from his authority as guardian, was
supposed to have a right of disposing of him in marriage, provided it was in a
manner not unsuitable to his rank. But though this institution necessarily
tended to strengthen the authority of the king, and to weaken that of the great
proprietors, it could not do either sufficiently for establishing order and
good government among the inhabitants of the country; because it could not
alter sufficiently that state of property and manners from which the disorders
arose. The authority of government still continued to be, as before, too weak
in the head, and too strong in the inferior members; and the excessive strength
of the inferior members was the cause of the weakness of the head. After the
institution of feudal subordination, the king was as incapable of restraining
the violence of the great lords as before. They still continued to make war
according to their own discretion, almost continually upon one another, and
very frequently upon the king; and the open country still continued to be a
scene of violence, rapine, and disorder.

But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have effected,
the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and manufactures
gradually brought about. These gradually furnished the great proprietors with
something for which they could exchange the whole surplus produce of their
lands, and which they could consume themselves, without sharing it either with
tenants or retainers. All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems,
in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of
mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a method of consuming the whole
value of their rents themselves, they had no disposition to share them with any
other persons. For a pair of diamond buckles, perhaps, or for something as
frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or, what is the same
thing, the price of the maintenance of 1000 men for a year, and with it the
whole weight and authority which it could give them. The buckles, however, were
to be all their own, and no other human creature was to have any share of them;
whereas, in the more ancient method of expense, they must have shared with at
least 1000 people. With the judges that were to determine the preference, this
difference was perfectly decisive; and thus, for the gratification of the most
childish, the meanest, and the most sordid of all vanities they gradually
bartered their whole power and authority.

In a country where there is no foreign commerce, nor any of the finer
manufactures, a man of £10,000 a-year cannot well employ his revenue in any
other way than in maintaining, perhaps, 1000 families, who are all of them
necessarily at his command. In the present state of Europe, a man of £10,000
a-year can spend his whole revenue, and he generally does so, without directly
maintaining twenty people, or being able to command more than ten footmen, not
worth the commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he maintains as great, or even a
greater number of people, than he could have done by the ancient method of
expense. For though the quantity of precious productions for which he exchanges
his whole revenue be very small, the number of workmen employed in collecting
and preparing it must necessarily have been very great. Its great price
generally arises from the wages of their labour, and the profits of all their
immediate employers. By paying that price, he indirectly pays all those wages
and profits, and thus indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the
workmen and their employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very
small proportion to that of each; to a very few, perhaps, not a tenth, to many
not a hundredth, and to some not a thousandth, or even a ten thousandth part of
their whole annual maintenance. Though he contributes, therefore, to the
maintenance of them all, they are all more or less independent of him, because
generally they can all be maintained without him.

When the great proprietors of land spend their rents in maintaining their
tenants and retainers, each of them maintains entirely all his own tenants and
all his own retainers. But when they spend them in maintaining tradesmen and
artificers, they may, all of them taken together, perhaps maintain as great,
or, on account of the waste which attends rustic hospitality, a greater number
of people than before. Each of them, however, taken singly, contributes often
but a very small share to the maintenance of any individual of this greater
number. Each tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the
employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers.
Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not absolutely
dependent upon any one of them.

The personal expense of the great proprietors having in this manner gradually
increased, it was impossible that the number of their retainers should not as
gradually diminish, till they were at last dismissed altogether. The same cause
gradually led them to dismiss the unnecessary part of their tenants. Farms were
enlarged, and the occupiers of land, notwithstanding the complaints of
depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for cultivating it, according to
the imperfect state of cultivation and improvement in those times. By the
removal of the unnecessary mouths, and by exacting from the farmer the full
value of the farm, a greater surplus, or, what is the same thing, the price of
a greater surplus, was obtained for the proprietor, which the merchants and
manufacturers soon furnished him with a method of spending upon his own person,
in the same manner as he had done the rest. The cause continuing to operate, he
was desirous to raise his rents above what his lands, in the actual state of
their improvement, could afford. His tenants could agree to this upon one
condition only, that they should be secured in their possession for such a term
of years as might give them time to recover, with profit, whatever they should
lay out in the further improvement of the land. The expensive vanity of the
landlord made him willing to accept of this condition; and hence the origin of
long leases.

Even a tenant at will, who pays the full value of the land, is not altogether
dependent upon the landlord. The pecuniary advantages which they receive from
one another are mutual and equal, and such a tenant will expose neither his
life nor his fortune in the service of the proprietor. But if he has a lease
for a long term of years he is altogether independent; and his landlord must
not expect from him even the most trifling service, beyond what is either
expressly stipulated in the lease, or imposed upon him by the common and known
law of the country.

The tenants having in this manner become independent, and the retainers being
dismissed, the great proprietors were no longer capable of interrupting the
regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of the country. Having
sold their birth-right, not like Esau, for a mess of pottage in time of hunger
and necessity, but, in the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets and baubles,
fitter to be the playthings of children than the serious pursuits of men, they
became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or tradesmen in a city. A
regular government was established in the country as well as in the city,
nobody having sufficient power to disturb its operations in the one, any more
than in the other.

It does not, perhaps, relate to the present subject, but I cannot help
remarking it, that very old families, such as have possessed some considerable
estate from father to son for many successive generations, are very rare in
commercial countries. In countries which have little commerce, on the contrary,
such as Wales, or the Highlands of Scotland, they are very common. The Arabian
histories seem to be all full of genealogies; and there is a history written by
a Tartar Khan, which has been translated into several European languages, and
which contains scarce any thing else; a proof that ancient families are very
common among those nations. In countries where a rich man can spend his revenue
in no other way than by maintaining as many people as it can maintain, he is
apt to run out, and his benevolence, it seems, is seldom so violent as to
attempt to maintain more than he can afford. But where he can spend the
greatest revenue upon his own person, he frequently has no bounds to his
expense, because he frequently has no bounds to his vanity, or to his affection
for his own person. In commercial countries, therefore, riches, in spite of the
most violent regulations of law to prevent their dissipation, very seldom
remain long in the same family. Among simple nations, on the contrary, they
frequently do, without any regulations of law; for among nations of shepherds,
such as the Tartars and Arabs, the consumable nature of their property
necessarily renders all such regulations impossible.

A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness, was in this
manner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not the least
intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity was the sole
motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much less
ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit of
their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got.
Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution
which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually
bringing about.

It was thus, that, through the greater part of Europe, the commerce and
manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and
occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country.

This order, however, being contrary to the natural course of things, is
necessarily both slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of those
European countries of which the wealth depends very much upon their commerce
and manufactures, with the rapid advances of our North American colonies, of
which the wealth is founded altogether in agriculture. Through the greater part
of Europe, the number of inhabitants is not supposed to double in less than
five hundred years. In several of our North American colonies, it is found to
double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. In Europe, the law of primogeniture,
and perpetuities of different kinds, prevent the division of great estates, and
thereby hinder the multiplication of small proprietors. A small proprietor,
however, who knows every part of his little territory, views it with all the
affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and
who upon that account takes pleasure, not only in cultivating, but in adorning
it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent,
and the most successful. The same regulations, besides, keep so much land out
of the market, that there are always more capitals to buy than there is land to
sell, so that what is sold always sells at a monopoly price. The rent never
pays the interest of the purchase-money, and is, besides, burdened with repairs
and other occasional charges, to which the interest of money is not liable. To
purchase land, is, everywhere in Europe, a most unprofitable employment of a
small capital. For the sake of the superior security, indeed, a man of moderate
circumstances, when he retires from business, will sometimes choose to lay out
his little capital in land. A man of profession, too whose revenue is derived
from another source often loves to secure his savings in the same way. But a
young man, who, instead of applying to trade or to some profession, should
employ a capital of two or three thousand pounds in the purchase and
cultivation of a small piece of land, might indeed expect to live very happily
and very independently, but must bid adieu for ever to all hope of either great
fortune or great illustration, which, by a different employment of his stock,
he might have had the same chance of acquiring with other people. Such a
person, too, though he cannot aspire at being a proprietor, will often disdain
to be a farmer. The small quantity of land, therefore, which is brought to
market, and the high price of what is brought thither, prevents a great number
of capitals from being employed in its cultivation and improvement, which would
otherwise have taken that direction. In North America, on the contrary, fifty
or sixty pounds is often found a sufficient stock to begin a plantation with.
The purchase and improvement of uncultivated land is there the most profitable
employment of the smallest as well as of the greatest capitals, and the most
direct road to all the fortune and illustration which can be required in that
country. Such land, indeed, is in North America to be had almost for nothing,
or at a price much below the value of the natural produce; a thing impossible
in Europe, or indeed in any country where all lands have long been private
property. If landed estates, however, were divided equally among all the
children, upon the death of any proprietor who left a numerous family, the
estate would generally be sold. So much land would come to market, that it
could no longer sell at a monopoly price. The free rent of the land would go no
nearer to pay the interest of the purchase-money, and a small capital might be
employed in purchasing land as profitable as in any other way.

England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent
of the sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many
navigable rivers which run through it, and afford the conveniency of water
carriage to some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by
nature as any large country in Europe to be the seat of foreign commerce, of
manufactures for distant sale, and of all the improvements which these can
occasion. From the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, too, the English
legislature has been peculiarly attentive to the interest of commerce and
manufactures, and in reality there is no country in Europe, Holland itself not
excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this sort of
industry. Commerce and manufactures have accordingly been continually advancing
during all this period. The cultivation and improvement of the country has, no
doubt, been gradually advancing too; but it seems to have followed slowly, and
at a distance, the more rapid progress of commerce and manufactures. The
greater part of the country must probably have been cultivated before the reign
of Elizabeth; and a very great part of it still remains uncultivated, and the
cultivation of the far greater part much inferior to what it might be, The law
of England, however, favours agriculture, not only indirectly, by the
protection of commerce, but by several direct encouragements. Except in times
of scarcity, the exportation of corn is not only free, but encouraged by a
bounty. In times of moderate plenty, the importation of foreign corn is loaded
with duties that amount to a prohibition. The importation of live cattle,
except from Ireland, is prohibited at all times; and it is but of late that it
was permitted from thence. Those who cultivate the land, therefore, have a
monopoly against their countrymen for the two greatest and most important
articles of land produce, bread and butcher’s meat. These encouragements,
although at bottom, perhaps, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter, altogether
illusory, sufficiently demonstrate at least the good intention of the
legislature to favour agriculture. But what is of much more importance than all
of them, the yeomanry of England are rendered as secure, as independent, and as
respectable, as law can make them. No country, therefore, which the right of
primogeniture takes place, which pays tithes, and where perpetuities, though
contrary to the spirit of the law, are admitted in some cases, can give more
encouragement to agriculture than England. Such, however, notwithstanding, is
the state of its cultivation. What would it have been, had the law given no
direct encouragement to agriculture besides what arises indirectly from the
progress of commerce, and had left the yeomanry in the same condition as in
most other countries of Europe? It is now more than two hundred years since the
beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, a period as long as the course of human
prosperity usually endures.

France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign commerce, near a
century before England was distinguished as a commercial country. The marine of
France was considerable, according to the notions of the times, before the
expedition of Charles VIII. to Naples. The cultivation and improvement of
France, however, is, upon the whole, inferior to that of England. The law of
the country has never given the same direct encouragement to agriculture.

The foreign commerce of Spain and Portugal to the other parts of Europe, though
chiefly carried on in foreign ships, is very considerable. That to their
colonies is carried on in their own, and is much greater, on account of the
great riches and extent of those colonies. But it has never introduced any
considerable manufactures for distant sale into either of those countries, and
the greater part of both still remains uncultivated. The foreign commerce of
Portugal is of older standing than that of any great country in Europe, except
Italy.

Italy is the only great country of Europe which seems to have been cultivated
and improved in every part, by means of foreign commerce and manufactures for
distant sale. Before the invasion of Charles VIII., Italy, according to
Guicciardini, was cultivated not less in the most mountainous and barren parts
of the country, than in the plainest and most fertile. The advantageous
situation of the country, and the great number of independent states which at
that time subsisted in it, probably contributed not a little to this general
cultivation. It is not impossible, too, notwithstanding this general expression
of one of the most judicious and reserved of modern historians, that Italy was
not at that time better cultivated than England is at present.

The capital, however, that is acquired to any country by commerce and
manufactures, is always a very precarious and uncertain possession, till some
part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement of
its lands. A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the
citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him
from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make
him remove his capital, and, together with it, all the industry which it
supports, from one country to another. No part of it can be said to belong to
any particular country, till it has been spread, as it were, over the face of
that country, either in buildings, or in the lasting improvement of lands. No
vestige now remains of the great wealth said to have been possessed by the
greater part of the Hanse Towns, except in the obscure histories of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even uncertain where some of them
were situated, or to what towns in Europe the Latin names given to some of them
belong. But though the misfortunes of Italy, in the end of the fifteenth and
beginning of the sixteenth centuries, greatly diminished the commerce and
manufactures of the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, those countries still
continue to be among the most populous and best cultivated in Europe. The civil
wars of Flanders, and the Spanish government which succeeded them, chased away
the great commerce of Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. But Flanders still continues
to be one of the richest, best cultivated, and most populous provinces of
Europe. The ordinary revolutions of war and government easily dry up the
sources of that wealth which arises from commerce only. That which arises from
the more solid improvements of agriculture is much more durable, and cannot be
destroyed but by those more violent convulsions occasioned by the depredations
of hostile and barbarous nations continued for a century or two together; such
as those that happened for some time before and after the fall of the Roman
empire in the western provinces of Europe.

BOOK IV.
OF SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or
legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful
revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable them to
provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and, secondly, to supply
the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It
proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.

The different progress of opulence in different ages and nations, has given
occasion to two different systems of political economy, with regard to
enriching the people. The one may be called the system of commerce, the other
that of agriculture. I shall endeavour to explain both as fully and distinctly
as I can, and shall begin with the system of commerce. It is the modern system,
and is best understood in our own country and in our own times.

CHAPTER I.
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMERCIAL OR MERCANTILE SYSTEM.

That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which
naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument of
commerce, and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the
instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain whatever
else we have occasion for, than by means of any other commodity. The great
affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained, there is no
difficulty in making any subsequent purchase. In consequence of its being the
measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by the quantity of
money which they will exchange for. We say of a rich man, that he is worth a
great deal, and of a poor man, that he is worth very little money. A frugal
man, or a man eager to be rich, is said to love money; and a careless, a
generous, or a profuse man, is said to be indifferent about it. To grow rich is
to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are, in common language,
considered as in every respect synonymous.

A rich country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country
abounding in money; and to heap up gold and silver in any country is supposed
to be the readiest way to enrich it. For some time after the discovery of
America, the first inquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived upon any unknown
coast, used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be found in the
neighbourhood? By the information which they received, they judged whether it
was worth while to make a settlement there, or if the country was worth the
conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk sent ambassador from the king of France to
one of the sons of the famous Gengis Khan, says, that the Tartars used
frequently to ask him, if there was plenty of sheep and oxen in the kingdom of
France? Their inquiry had the same object with that of the Spaniards. They
wanted to know if the country was rich enough to be worth the conquering. Among
the Tartars, as among all other nations of shepherds, who are generally
ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the instruments of commerce and the
measures of value. Wealth, therefore, according to them, consisted in cattle,
as, according to the Spaniards, it consisted in gold and silver. Of the two,
the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the nearest to the truth.

Mr Locke remarks a distinction between money and other moveable goods. All
other moveable goods, he says, are of so consumable a nature, that the wealth
which consists in them cannot be much depended on; and a nation which abounds
in them one year may, without any exportation, but merely by their own waste
and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is
a steady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it
can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be wasted and
consumed. Gold and silver, therefore, are, according to him, the must solid and
substantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation; and to multiply those
metals ought, he thinks, upon that account, to be the great object of its
political economy.

Others admit, that if a nation could be separated from all the world, it would
be of no consequence how much or how little money circulated in it. The
consumable goods, which were circulated by means of this money, would only be
exchanged for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but the real wealth or
poverty of the country, they allow, would depend altogether upon the abundance
or scarcity of those consumable goods. But it is otherwise, they think, with
countries which have connections with foreign nations, and which are obliged to
carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries.
This, they say, cannot be done, but by sending abroad money to pay them with;
and a nation cannot send much money abroad, unless it has a good deal at home.
Every such nation, therefore, must endeavour, in time of peace, to accumulate
gold and silver, that when occasion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry
on foreign wars.

In consequence of those popular notions, all the different nations of Europe
have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating
gold and silver in their respective countries. Spain and Portugal, the
proprietors of the principal mines which supply Europe with those metals, have
either prohibited their exportation under the severest penalties, or subjected
it to a considerable duty. The like prohibition seems anciently to have made a
part of the policy of most other European nations. It is even to be found,
where we should least of all expect to find it, in some old Scotch acts of
Parliament, which forbid, under heavy penalties, the carrying gold or silver
forth of the kingdom. The like policy anciently took place both in France and
England.

When those countries became commercial, the merchants found this prohibition,
upon many occasions, extremely inconvenient. They could frequently buy more
advantageously with gold and silver, than with any other commodity, the foreign
goods which they wanted, either to import into their own, or to carry to some
other foreign country. They remonstrated, therefore, against this prohibition
as hurtful to trade.

They represented, first, that the exportation of gold and silver, in order to
purchase foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those metals in
the kingdom; that, on the contrary, it might frequently increase the quantity;
because, if the consumption of foreign goods was not thereby increased in the
country, those goods might be re-exported to foreign countries, and being there
sold for a large profit, might bring back much more treasure than was
originally sent out to purchase them. Mr Mun compares this operation of foreign
trade to the seed-time and harvest of agriculture. “If we only
behold,” says he, “the actions of the husbandman in the seed time,
when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we shall account him
rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we consider his labours in the
harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we shall find the worth and
plentiful increase of his actions.”

They represented, secondly, that this prohibition could not hinder the
exportation of gold and silver, which, on account of the smallness of their
bulk in proportion to their value, could easily be smuggled abroad. That this
exportation could only be prevented by a proper attention to what they called
the balance of trade. That when the country exported to a greater value than it
imported, a balance became due to it from foreign nations, which was
necessarily paid to it in gold and silver, and thereby increased the quantity
of those metals in the kingdom. But that when it imported to a greater value
than it exported, a contrary balance became due to foreign nations, which was
necessarily paid to them in the same manner, and thereby diminished that
quantity: that in this case, to prohibit the exportation of those metals, could
not prevent it, but only, by making it more dangerous, render it more
expensive: that the exchange was thereby turned more against the country which
owed the balance, than it otherwise might have been; the merchant who purchased
a bill upon the foreign country being obliged to pay the banker who sold it,
not only for the natural risk, trouble, and expense of sending the money
thither, but for the extraordinary risk arising from the prohibition; but that
the more the exchange was against any country, the more the balance of trade
became necessarily against it; the money of that country becoming necessarily
of so much less value, in comparison with that of the country to which the
balance was due. That if the exchange between England and Holland, for example,
was five per cent. against England, it would require 105 ounces of silver in
England to purchase a bill for 100 ounces of silver in Holland: that 105 ounces
of silver in England, therefore, would be worth only 100 ounces of silver in
Holland, and would purchase only a proportionable quantity of Dutch goods; but
that 100 ounces of silver in Holland, on the contrary, would be worth 105
ounces in England, and would purchase a proportionable quantity of English
goods; that the English goods which were sold to Holland would be sold so much
cheaper, and the Dutch goods which were sold to England so much dearer, by the
difference of the exchange: that the one would draw so much less Dutch money to
England, and the other so much more English money to Holland, as this
difference amounted to: and that the balance of trade, therefore, would
necessarily be so much more against England, and would require a greater
balance of gold and silver to be exported to Holland.

Those arguments were partly solid and partly sophistical. They were solid, so
far as they asserted that the exportation of gold and silver in trade might
frequently be advantageous to the country. They were solid, too, in asserting
that no prohibition could prevent their exportation, when private people found
any advantage in exporting them. But they were sophistical, in supposing, that
either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those metals required more the
attention of government, than to preserve or to augment the quantity of any
other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, without any such
attention, never fails to supply in the proper quantity. They were sophistical,
too, perhaps, in asserting that the high price of exchange necessarily
increased what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, or occasioned the
exportation of a greater quantity of gold and silver. That high price, indeed,
was extremely disadvantageous to the merchants who had any money to pay in
foreign countries. They paid so much dearer for the bills which their bankers
granted them upon those countries. But though the risk arising from the
prohibition might occasion some extraordinary expense to the bankers, it would
not necessarily carry any more money out of the country. This expense would
generally be all laid out in the country, in smuggling the money out of it, and
could seldom occasion the exportation of a single sixpence beyond the precise
sum drawn for. The high price of exchange, too, would naturally dispose the
merchants to endeavour to make their exports nearly balance their imports, in
order that they might have this high exchange to pay upon as small a sum as
possible. The high price of exchange, besides, must necessarily have operated
as a tax, in raising the price of foreign goods, and thereby diminishing their
consumption. It would tend, therefore, not to increase, but to diminish, what
they called the unfavourable balance of trade, and consequently the exportation
of gold and silver.

Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to whom they
were addressed. They were addressed by merchants to parliaments and to the
councils of princes, to nobles, and to country gentlemen; by those who were
supposed to understand trade, to those who were conscious to them selves that
they knew nothing about the matter. That foreign trade enriched the country,
experience demonstrated to the nobles and country gentlemen, as well as to the
merchants; but how, or in what manner, none of them well knew. The merchants
knew perfectly in what manner it enriched themselves, it was their business to
know it. But to know in what manner it enriched the country, was no part of
their business. The subject never came into their consideration, but when they
had occasion to apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to
foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the beneficial
effects of foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects were obstructed
by the laws as they then stood. To the judges who were to decide the business,
it appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter, when they were told that
foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question
hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise would do. Those arguments,
therefore, produced the wished-for effect. The prohibition of exporting gold
and silver was, in France and England, confined to the coin of those respective
countries. The exportation of foreign coin and of bullion was made free. In
Holland, and in some other places, this liberty was extended even to the coin
of the country. The attention of government was turned away from guarding
against the exportation of gold and silver, to watch over the balance of trade,
as the only cause which could occasion any augmentation or diminution of those
metals. From one fruitless care, it was turned away to another care much more
intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless. The title of
Mun’s book, England’s Treasure in Foreign Trade, became a
fundamental maxim in the political economy, not of England only, but of all
other commercial countries. The inland or home trade, the most important of
all, the trade in which an equal capital affords the greatest revenue, and
creates the greatest employment to the people of the country, was considered as
subsidiary only to foreign trade. It neither brought money into the country, it
was said, nor carried any out of it. The country, therefore, could never become
either richer or poorer by means of it, except so far as its prosperity or
decay might indirectly influence the state of foreign trade.

A country that has no mines of its own, must undoubtedly draw its gold and
silver from foreign countries, in the same manner as one that has no vineyards
of its own must draw its wines. It does not seem necessary, however, that the
attention of government should be more turned towards the one than towards the
other object. A country that has wherewithal to buy wine, will always get the
wine which it has occasion for; and a country that has wherewithal to buy gold
and silver, will never be in want of those metals. They are to be bought for a
certain price, like all other commodities; and as they are the price of all
other commodities, so all other commodities are the price of those metals. We
trust, with perfect security, that the freedom of trade, without any attention
of government, will always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for;
and we may trust, with equal security, that it will always supply us with all
the gold and silver which we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in
circulating our commodities or in other uses.

The quantity of every commodity which human industry can either purchase or
produce, naturally regulates itself in every country according to the effectual
demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing to pay the whole
rent, labour, and profits, which must be paid in order to prepare and bring it
to market. But no commodities regulate themselves more easily or more exactly,
according to this effectual demand, than gold and silver; because, on account
of the small bulk and great value of those metals, no commodities can be more
easily transported from one place to another; from the places where they are
cheap, to those where they are dear; from the places where they exceed, to
those where they fall short of this effectual demand. If there were in England,
for example, an effectual demand for an additional quantity of gold, a
packet-boat could bring from Lisbon, or from wherever else it was to be had,
fifty tons of gold, which could be coined into more than five millions of
guineas. But if there were an effectual demand for grain to the same value, to
import it would require, at five guineas a-ton, a million of tons of shipping,
or a thousand ships of a thousand tons each. The navy of England would not be
sufficient.

When the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds the
effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their exportation. All
the sanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to keep their gold and
silver at home. The continual importations from Peru and Brazil exceed the
effectual demand of those countries, and sink the price of those metals there
below that in the neighbouring countries. If, on the contrary, in any
particular country, their quantity fell short of the effectual demand, so as to
raise their price above that of the neighbouring countries, the government
would have no occasion to take any pains to import them. If it were even to
take pains to prevent their importation, it would not be able to effectuate it.
Those metals, when the Spartans had got wherewithal to purchase them, broke
through all the barriers which the laws of Lycurgus opposed to their entrance
into Lacedaemon. All the sanguinary laws of the customs are not able to prevent
the importation of the teas of the Dutch and Gottenburg East India companies;
because somewhat cheaper than those of the British company. A pound of tea,
however, is about a hundred times the bulk of one of the highest prices,
sixteen shillings, that is commonly paid for it in silver, and more than two
thousand times the bulk of the same price in gold, and, consequently, just so
many times more difficult to smuggle.

It is partly owing to the easy transportation of gold and silver, from the
places where they abound to those where they are wanted, that the price of
those metals does not fluctuate continually, like that of the greater part of
other commodities, which are hindered by their bulk from shifting their
situation, when the market happens to be either over or under-stocked with
them. The price of those metals, indeed, is not altogether exempted from
variation; but the changes to which it is liable are generally slow, gradual,
and uniform. In Europe, for example, it is supposed, without much foundation,
perhaps, that during the course of the present and preceding century, they have
been constantly, but gradually, sinking in their value, on account of the
continual importations from the Spanish West Indies. But to make any sudden
change in the price of gold and silver, so as to raise or lower at once,
sensibly and remarkably, the money price of all other commodities, requires
such a revolution in commerce as that occasioned by the discovery of America.

If, not withstanding all this, gold and silver should at any time fall short in
a country which has wherewithal to purchase them, there are more expedients for
supplying their place, than that of almost any other commodity. If the
materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop. If provisions are
wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted, barter will supply its
place, though with a good deal of inconveniency. Buying and selling upon
credit, and the different dealers compensating their credits with one another,
once a-month, or once a-year, will supply it with less inconveniency. A
well-regulated paper-money will supply it not only without any inconveniency,
but, in some cases, with some advantages. Upon every account, therefore, the
attention of government never was so unnecessarily employed, as when directed
to watch over the preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any
country.

No complaint, however, is more common than that of a scarcity of money. Money,
like wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither wherewithal to buy
it, nor credit to borrow it. Those who have either, will seldom be in want
either of the money, or of the wine which they have occasion for. This
complaint, however, of the scarcity of money, is not always confined to
improvident spendthrifts. It is sometimes general through a whole mercantile
town and the country in its neighbourhood. Over-trading is the common cause of
it. Sober men, whose projects have been disproportioned to their capitals, are
as likely to have neither wherewithal to buy money, nor credit to borrow it, as
prodigals, whose expense has been disproportioned to their revenue. Before
their projects can be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and their credit
with it. They run about everywhere to borrow money, and everybody tells them
that they have none to lend. Even such general complaints of the scarcity of
money do not always prove that the usual number of gold and silver pieces are
not circulating in the country, but that many people want those pieces who have
nothing to give for them. When the profits of trade happen to be greater than
ordinary over-trading becomes a general error, both among great and small
dealers. They do not always send more money abroad than usual, but they buy
upon credit, both at home and abroad, an unusual quantity of goods, which they
send to some distant market, in hopes that the returns will come in before the
demand for payment. The demand comes before the returns, and they have nothing
at hand with which they can either purchase money or give solid security for
borrowing. It is not any scarcity of gold and silver, but the difficulty which
such people find in borrowing, and which their creditor find in getting
payment, that occasions the general complaint of the scarcity of money.

It would be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove, that wealth does not
consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is
valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part of the
national capital; but it has already been shown that it generally makes but a
small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it.

It is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods, that
the merchant finds it generally more easy to buy goods with money, than to buy
money with goods; but because money is the known and established instrument of
commerce, for which every thing is readily given in exchange, but which is not
always with equal readiness to be got in exchange for every thing. The greater
part of goods, besides, are more perishable than money, and he may frequently
sustain a much greater loss by keeping them. When his goods are upon hand, too,
he is more liable to such demands for money as he may not be able to answer,
than when he has got their price in his coffers. Over and above all this, his
profit arises more directly from selling than from buying; and he is, upon all
these accounts, generally much more anxious to exchange his goods for money
than his money for goods. But though a particular merchant, with abundance of
goods in his warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to sell them
in time, a nation or country is not liable to the same accident, The whole
capital of a merchant frequently consists in perishable goods destined for
purchasing money. But it is but a very small part of the annual produce of the
land and labour of a country, which can ever be destined for purchasing gold
and silver from their neighbours. The far greater part is circulated and
consumed among themselves; and even of the surplus which is sent abroad, the
greater part is generally destined for the purchase of other foreign goods.
Though gold and silver, therefore, could not be had in exchange for the goods
destined to purchase them, the nation would not be ruined. It might, indeed,
suffer some loss and inconveniency, and be forced upon some of those expedients
which are necessary for supplying the place of money. The annual produce of its
land and labour, however, would be the same, or very nearly the same as usual;
because the same, or very nearly the same consumable capital would be employed
in maintaining it. And though goods do not always draw money so readily as
money draws goods, in the long-run they draw it more necessarily than even it
draws them. Goods can serve many other purposes besides purchasing money, but
money can serve no other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore,
necessarily runs after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily run after
money. The man who buys, does not always mean to sell again, but frequently to
use or to consume; whereas he who sells always means to buy again. The one may
frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done more than the
one half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men desire money, but
for the sake of what they can purchase with it.

Consumable commodities, it is said, are soon destroyed; whereas gold and silver
are of a more durable nature, and were it not for this continual exportation,
might be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the
real wealth of the country. Nothing, therefore, it is pretended, can be more
disadvantageous to any country, than the trade which consists in the exchange
of such lasting for such perishable commodities. We do not, however, reckon
that trade disadvantageous, which consists in the exchange of the hardware of
England for the wines of France, and yet hardware is a very durable commodity,
and were it not for this continual exportation, might too be accumulated for
ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the pots and pans of the
country. But it readily occurs, that the number of such utensils is in every
country necessarily limited by the use which there is for them; that it would
be absurd to have more pots and pans than were necessary for cooking the
victuals usually consumed there; and that, if the quantity of victuals were to
increase, the number of pots and pans would readily increase along with it; a
part of the increased quantity of victuals being employed in purchasing them,
or in maintaining an additional number of workmen whose business it was to make
them. It should as readily occur, that the quantity of gold and silver is, in
every country, limited by the use which there is for those metals; that their
use consists in circulating commodities, as coin, and in affording a species of
household furniture, as plate; that the quantity of coin in every country is
regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it;
increase that value, and immediately a part of it will be sent abroad to
purchase, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of coin requisite
for circulating them: that the quantity of plate is regulated by the number and
wealth of those private families who choose to indulge themselves in that sort
of magnificence; increase the number and wealth of such families, and a part of
this increased wealth will most probably be employed in purchasing, wherever it
is to be found, an additional quantity of plate; that to attempt to increase
the wealth of any country, either by introducing or by detaining in it an
unnecessary quantity of gold and silver, is as absurd as it would be to attempt
to increase the good cheer of private families, by obliging them to keep an
unnecessary number of kitchen utensils. As the expense of purchasing those
unnecessary utensils would diminish, instead of increasing, either the quantity
or goodness of the family provisions; so the expense of purchasing an
unnecessary quantity of gold and silver must, in every country, as necessarily
diminish the wealth which feeds, clothes, and lodges, which maintains and
employs the people. Gold and silver, whether in the shape of coin or of plate,
are utensils, it must be remembered, as much as the furniture of the kitchen.
Increase the use of them, increase the consumable commodities which are to be
circulated, managed, and prepared by means of them, and you will infallibly
increase the quantity; but if you attempt by extraordinary means to increase
the quantity, you will as infallibly diminish the use, and even the quantity
too, which in those metals can never be greater than what the use requires.
Were they ever to be accumulated beyond this quantity, their transportation is
so easy, and the loss which attends their lying idle and unemployed so great,
that no law could prevent their being immediately sent out of the country.

It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver, in order to enable a
country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant
countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with
consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic
industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, and labour, and
consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant
countries, can maintain foreign wars there.

A nation may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant country
three different ways; by sending abroad either, first, some part of its
accumulated gold and silver; or, secondly, some part of the annual produce of
its manufactures; or, last of all, some part of its annual rude produce.

The gold and silver which can properly be considered as accumulated, or stored
up in any country, may be distinguished into three parts; first, the
circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last of all,
the money which may have been collected by many years parsimony, and laid up in
the treasury of the prince.

It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of the
country; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy. The value of
goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain quantity of
money to circulate and distribute them to their proper consumers, and can give
employment to no more. The channel of circulation necessarily draws to itself a
sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits any more. Something, however, is
generally withdrawn from this channel in the case of foreign war. By the great
number of people who are maintained abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer
goods are circulated there, and less money becomes necessary to circulate them.
An extraordinary quantity of paper money of some sort or other, too, such as
exchequer notes, navy bills, and bank bills, in England, is generally issued
upon such occasions, and, by supplying the place of circulating gold and
silver, gives an opportunity of sending a greater quantity of it abroad. All
this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a foreign war,
of great expense, and several years duration.

The melting down of the plate of private families has, upon every occasion,
been found a still more insignificant one. The French, in the beginning of the
last war, did not derive so much advantage from this expedient as to compensate
the loss of the fashion.

The accumulated treasures of the prince have in former times afforded a much
greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you except the king
of Prussia, to accumulate treasure seems to be no part of the policy of
European princes.

The funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the most
expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little dependency
upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the plate of
private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last French war cost
Great Britain upwards of £90,000,000, including not only the £75,000,000 of new
debt that was contracted, but the additional 2s. in the pound land-tax, and
what was annually borrowed of the sinking fund. More than two-thirds of this
expense were laid out in distant countries; in Germany, Portugal, America, in
the ports of the Mediterranean, in the East and West Indies. The kings of
England had no accumulated treasure. We never heard of any extraordinary
quantity of plate being melted down. The circulating gold and silver of the
country had not been supposed to exceed £18,000,000. Since the late recoinage
of the gold, however, it is believed to have been a good deal under-rated. Let
us suppose, therefore, according to the most exaggerated computation which I
remember to have either seen or heard of, that, gold and silver together, it
amounted to £30,000,000. Had the war been carried on by means of our money, the
whole of it must, even according to this computation, have been sent out and
returned again, at least twice in a period of between six and seven years.
Should this be supposed, it would afford the most decisive argument, to
demonstrate how unnecessary it is for government to watch over the preservation
of money, since, upon this supposition, the whole money of the country must
have gone from it, and returned to it again, two different times in so short a
period, without any body’s knowing any thing of the matter. The channel
of circulation, however, never appeared more empty than usual during any part
of this period. Few people wanted money who had wherewithal to pay for it. The
profits of foreign trade, indeed, were greater than usual during the whole war,
but especially towards the end of it. This occasioned, what it always
occasions, a general over-trading in all the ports of Great Britain; and this
again occasioned the usual complaint of the scarcity of money, which always
follows over-trading. Many people wanted it, who had neither wherewithal to buy
it, nor credit to borrow it; and because the debtors found it difficult to
borrow, the creditors found it difficult to get payment. Gold and silver,
however, were generally to be had for their value, by those who had that value
to give for them.

The enormous expense of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly
defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of British
commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those who acted
under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some foreign
country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign correspondent, upon
whom he granted a bill, by sending abroad rather commodities than gold and
silver. If the commodities of Great Britain were not in demand in that country,
he would endeavour to send them to some other country in which he could
purchase a bill upon that country. The transportation of commodities, when
properly suited to the market, is always attended with a considerable profit;
whereas that of gold and silver is scarce ever attended with any. When those
metals are sent abroad in order to purchase foreign commodities, the
merchant’s profit arises, not from the purchase, but from the sale of the
returns. But when they are sent abroad merely to pay a debt, he gets no
returns, and consequently no profit. He naturally, therefore, exerts his
invention to find out a way of paying his foreign debts, rather by the
exportation of commodities, than by that of gold and silver. The great quantity
of British goods, exported during the course of the late war, without bringing
back any returns, is accordingly remarked by the author of the Present State of
the Nation.

Besides the three sorts of gold and silver above mentioned, there is in all
great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately imported and
exported, for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it circulates
among different commercial countries, in the same manner as the national coin
circulates in every country, may be considered as the money of the great
mercantile republic. The national coin receives its movement and direction from
the commodities circulated within the precincts of each particular country; the
money in the mercantile republic, from those circulated between different
countries. Both are employed in facilitating exchanges, the one between
different individuals of the same, the other between those of different
nations. Part of this money of the great mercantile republic may have been, and
probably was, employed in carrying on the late war. In time of a general war,
it is natural to suppose that a movement and direction should be impressed upon
it, different from what it usually follows in profound peace, that it should
circulate more about the seat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing
there, and in the neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the
different armies. But whatever part of this money of the mercantile republic
Great Britain may have annually employed in this manner, it must have been
annually purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else
that had been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities,
to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the ultimate
resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural, indeed, to
suppose, that so great an annual expense must have been defrayed from a great
annual produce. The expense of 1761, for example, amounted to more than
£19,000,000. No accumulation could have supported so great an annual profusion.
There is no annual produce, even of gold and silver, which could have supported
it. The whole gold and silver annually imported into both Spain and Portugal,
according to the best accounts, does not commonly much exceed £6,000,000
sterling, which, in some years, would scarce have paid four months expense of
the late war.

The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, in
order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some part
of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing them, seem
to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as contain a great value
in a small bulk, and can therefore be exported to a great distance at little
expense. A country whose industry produces a great annual surplus of such
manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign countries, may carry on for
many years a very expensive foreign war, without either exporting any
considerable quantity of gold and silver, or even having any such quantity to
export. A considerable part of the annual surplus of its manufactures must,
indeed, in this case, be exported without bringing back any returns to the
country, though it does to the merchant; the government purchasing of the
merchant his bills upon foreign countries, in order to purchase there the pay
and provisions of an army. Some part of this surplus, however, may still
continue to bring back a return. The manufacturers during; the war will have a
double demand upon them, and be called upon first to work up goods to be sent
abroad, for paying the bills drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and
provisions of the army: and, secondly, to work up such as are necessary for
purchasing the common returns that had usually been consumed in the country. In
the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of
manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may
decline on the return of peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their
country, and begin to decay upon the return of its prosperity. The different
state of many different branches of the British manufactures during the late
war, and for some time after the peace, may serve as an illustration of what
has been just now said.

No foreign war, of great expense or duration, could conveniently be carried on
by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense of sending such
a quantity of it into a foreign country as might purchase the pay and
provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries, too, produce much more
rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence of their own
inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it, therefore, would be to
send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It is otherwise
with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the people employed in
them is kept at home, and only the surplus part of their work is exported. Mr
Hume frequently takes notice of the inability of the ancient kings of England
to carry on, without interruption, any foreign war of long duration. The
English in those days had nothing wherewithal to purchase the pay and
provisions of their armies in foreign countries, but either the rude produce of
the soil, of which no considerable part could be spared from the home
consumption, or a few manufactures of the coarsest kind, of which, as well as
of the rude produce, the transportation was too expensive. This inability did
not arise from the want of money, but of the finer and more improved
manufactures. Buying and selling was transacted by means of money in England
then as well as now. The quantity of circulating money must have borne the same
proportion, to the number and value of purchases and sales usually transacted
at that time, which it does to those transacted at present; or, rather, it must
have borne a greater proportion, because there was then no paper, which now
occupies a great part of the employment of gold and silver. Among nations to
whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the sovereign, upon
extraordinary occasions, can seldom draw any considerable aid from his
subjects, for reasons which shall be explained hereafter. It is in such
countries, therefore, that he generally endeavours to accumulate a treasure, as
the only resource against such emergencies. Independent of this necessity, he
is, in such a situation, naturally disposed to the parsimony requisite for
accumulation. In that simple state, the expense even of a sovereign is not
directed by the vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court, but is
employed in bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty
and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always
does. Every Tartar chief, accordingly, has a treasure. The treasures of Mazepa,
chief of the Cossacks in the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles XII., are said
to have been very great. The French kings of the Merovingian race had all
treasures. When they divided their kingdom among their different children, they
divided their treasures too. The Saxon princes, and the first kings after the
Conquest, seem likewise to have accumulated treasures. The first exploit of
every new reign was commonly to seize the treasure of the preceding king, as
the most essential measure for securing the succession. The sovereigns of
improved and commercial countries are not under the same necessity of
accumulating treasures, because they can generally draw from their subjects
extraordinary aids upon extraordinary occasions. They are likewise less
disposed to do so. They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow the mode of the
times; and their expense comes to be regulated by the same extravagant vanity
which directs that of all the other great proprietors in their dominions. The
insignificant pageantry of their court becomes every day more brilliant; and
the expense of it not only prevents accumulation, but frequently encroaches
upon the funds destined for more necessary expenses. What Dercyllidas said of
the court of Persia, may be applied to that of several European princes, that
he saw there much splendour, but little strength, and many servants, but few
soldiers.

The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole
benefit, which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between whatever places
foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from
it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour
for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it
something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their
superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a part
of their wants and increase their enjoyments. By means of it, the narrowness of
the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch
of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening
a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may
exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive
power, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase
the real revenue and wealth of the society. These great and important services
foreign trade is continually occupied in performing to all the different
countries between which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from
it, though that in which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest,
as he is generally more employed in supplying the wants, and carrying out the
superfluities of his own, than of any other particular country. To import the
gold and silver which may be wanted into the countries which have no mines, is,
no doubt a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most
insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon
this account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.

It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of America
has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines, those metals have
become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for about a third part
of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it would have cost in the
fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of labour and commodities,
Europe can annually purchase about three times the quantity of plate which it
could have purchased at that time. But when a commodity comes to be sold for a
third part of what bad been its usual price, not only those who purchased it
before can purchase three times their former quantity, but it is brought down
to the level of a much greater number of purchasers, perhaps to more than ten,
perhaps to more than twenty times the former number. So that there may be in
Europe at present, not only more than three times, but more than twenty or
thirty times the quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its
present state of improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never
been made. So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though
surely a very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver renders those
metals rather less fit for the purposes of money than they were before. In
order to make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater
quantity of them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket, where a groat would
have done before. It is difficult to say which is most trifling, this
inconveniency, or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could
have made any very essential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of
America, however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and
inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to new
divisions of labour and improvements of art, which in the narrow circle of the
ancient commerce could never have taken place, for want of a market to take off
the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of labour were
improved, and its produce increased in all the different countries of Europe,
and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants. The
commodities of Europe were almost all new to America, and many of those of
America were new to Europe. A new set of exchanges, therefore, began to take
place, which had never been thought of before, and which should naturally have
proved as advantageous to the new, as it certainly did to the old continent.
The savage injustice of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have
been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate
countries.

The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, which
happened much about the same time, opened perhaps a still more extensive range
to foreign commerce, than even that of America, notwithstanding the greater
distance. There were but two nations in America, in any respect, superior to
the savages, and these were destroyed almost as soon as discovered. The rest
were mere savages. But the empires of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as
several others in the East Indies, without having richer mines of gold or
silver, were, in every other respect, much richer, better cultivated, and more
advanced in all arts and manufactures, than either Mexico or Peru, even though
we should credit, what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated accounts of
the Spanish writers concerning the ancient state of those empires. But rich and
civilized nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another,
than with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto derived much
less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies, than from that with
America. The Portuguese monopolised the East India trade to themselves for
about a century; and it was only indirectly, and through them, that the other
nations of Europe could either send out or receive any goods from that country.
When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last century, began to encroach upon
them, they vested their whole East India commerce in an exclusive company. The
English, French, Swedes, and Danes, have all followed their example; so that no
great nation of Europe has ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the
East Indies. No other reason need be assigned why it has never been so
advantageous as the trade to America, which, between almost every nation of
Europe and its own colonies, is free to all its subjects. The exclusive
privileges of those East India companies, their great riches, the great favour
and protection which these have procured them from their respective
governments, have excited much envy against them. This envy has frequently
represented their trade as altogether pernicious, on account of the great
quantities of silver which it every year exports from the countries from which
it is carried on. The parties concerned have replied, that their trade by this
continual exportation of silver, might indeed tend to impoverish Europe in
general, but not the particular country from which it was carried on; because,
by the exportation of a part of the returns to other European countries, it
annually brought home a much greater quantity of that metal than it carried
out. Both the objection and the reply are founded in the popular notion which I
have been just now examining. It is therefore unnecessary to say any thing
further about either. By the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies,
plate is probably somewhat dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been;
and coined silver probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and
commodities. The former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter a
very small advantage; both too insignificant to deserve any part of the public
attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the commodities
of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the gold and silver
which is purchased with those commodities, must necessarily tend to increase
the annual production of European commodities, and consequently the real wealth
and revenue of Europe. That it has hitherto increased them so little, is
probably owing to the restraints which it everywhere labours under.

I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine at
full length this popular notion, that wealth consists in money or in gold and
silver. Money, in common language, as I have already observed, frequently
signifies wealth; and this ambiguity of expression has rendered this popular
notion so familiar to us, that even they who are convinced of its absurdity,
are very apt to forget their own principles, and, in the course of their
reasonings, to take it for granted as a certain and undeniable truth. Some of
the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing, that the wealth
of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands,
houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of their
reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods, seem to slip out
of their memory; and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all
wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the
great object of national industry and commerce.

The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold
and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no
mines, only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it
imported; it necessarily became the great object of political economy to
diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home
consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce
of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country,
therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragement to exportation.

The restraints upon importation were of two kinds.

First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home
consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were
imported.

Secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds, from
those particular countries with which the balance of trade was supposed to be
disadvantageous.

Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and sometimes in
absolute prohibitions.

Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties,
sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign states, and
sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries.

Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When the home manufactures
were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a part of it was
frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when foreign goods liable to
a duty were imported, in order to be exported again, either the whole or a part
of this duty was sometimes given back upon such exportation.

Bounties were given for the encouragement, either of some beginning
manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as were supposed to
deserve particular favour.

By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were procured in
some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country, beyond what were
granted to those of other countries.

By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only particular
privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured for the goods and merchants
of the country which established them.

The two sorts of restraints upon importation above mentioned, together with
these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal means by
which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and
silver in any country, by turning the balance of trade in its favour. I shall
consider each of them in a particular chapter, and, without taking much farther
notice of their supposed tendency to bring money into the country, I shall
examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of them upon the
annual produce of its industry. According as they tend either to increase or
diminish the value of this annual produce, they must evidently tend either to
increase or diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country.

CHAPTER II.
OF RESTRAINTS UPON IMPORTATION FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OF SUCH GOODS AS CAN BE
PRODUCED AT HOME.

By restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute prohibitions, the
importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at home,
the monopoly of the home market is more or less secured to the domestic
industry employed in producing them. Thus the prohibition of importing either
live cattle or salt provisions from foreign countries, secures to the graziers
of Great Britain the monopoly of the home market for butcher’s meat. The
high duties upon the importation of corn, which, in times of moderate plenty,
amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to the growers of that
commodity. The prohibition of the importation of foreign woollen is equally
favourable to the woollen manufacturers. The silk manufacture, though
altogether employed upon foreign materials, has lately obtained the same
advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet obtained it, but is making great
strides towards it. Many other sorts of manufactures have, in the same manner
obtained in Great Britain, either altogether, or very nearly, a monopoly
against their countrymen. The variety of goods, of which the importation into
Great Britain is prohibited, either absolutely, or under certain circumstances,
greatly exceeds what can easily be suspected by those who are not well
acquainted with the laws of the customs.

That this monopoly of the home market frequently gives great encouragement to
that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns
towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the
society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it
tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the
most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident.

The general industry of the society can never exceed what the capital of the
society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in employment by
any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, so the
number of those that can be continually employed by all the members of a great
society must bear a certain proportion to the whole capital of the society, and
never can exceed that proportion. No regulation of commerce can increase the
quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It
can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise
have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is
likely to be more advantageous to the society, than that into which it would
have gone of its own accord.

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own
advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the
study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.

First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he
can, and consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic industry,
provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal
less than the ordinary profits of stock.

Thus, upon equal, or nearly equal profits, every wholesale merchant naturally
prefers the home trade to the foreign trade of consumption, and the foreign
trade of consumption to the carrying trade. In the home trade, his capital is
never so long out of his sight as it frequently is in the foreign trade of
consumption. He can know better the character and situation of the persons whom
he trusts; and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of
the country from which he must seek redress. In the carrying trade, the capital
of the merchant is, as it were, divided between two foreign countries, and no
part of it is ever necessarily brought home, or placed under his own immediate
view and command. The capital which an Amsterdam merchant employs in carrying
corn from Koningsberg to Lisbon, and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Koningsberg,
must generally be the one half of it at Koningsberg, and the other half at
Lisbon. No part of it need ever come to Amsterdam. The natural residence of
such a merchant should either be at Koningsberg or Lisbon; and it can only be
some very particular circumstances which can make him prefer the residence of
Amsterdam. The uneasiness, however, which he feels at being separated so far
from his capital, generally determines him to bring part both of the
Koningsberg goods which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the Lisbon
goods which he destines for that of Koningsberg, to Amsterdam; and though this
necessarily subjects him to a double charge of loading and unloading as well as
to the payment of some duties and customs, yet, for the sake of having some
part of his capital always under his own view and command, he willingly submits
to this extraordinary charge; and it is in this manner that every country which
has any considerable share of the carrying trade, becomes always the emporium,
or general market, for the goods of all the different countries whose trade it
carries on. The merchant, in order to save a second loading and unloading,
endeavours always to sell in the home market, as much of the goods of all those
different countries as he can; and thus, so far as he can, to convert his
carrying trade into a foreign trade of consumption. A merchant, in the same
manner, who is engaged in the foreign trade of consumption, when he collects
goods for foreign markets, will always be glad, upon equal or nearly equal
profits, to sell as great a part of them at home as he can. He saves himself
the risk and trouble of exportation, when, so far as he can, he thus converts
his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. Home is in this manner the
centre, if I may say so, round which the capitals of the inhabitants of every
country are continually circulating, and towards which they are always tending,
though, by particular causes, they may sometimes be driven off and repelled
from it towards more distant employments. But a capital employed in the home
trade, it has already been shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater
quantity of domestic industry, and gives revenue and employment to a greater
number of the inhabitants of the country, than an equal capital employed in the
foreign trade of consumption; and one employed in the foreign trade of
consumption has the same advantage over an equal capital employed in the
carrying trade. Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits, therefore, every
individual naturally inclines to employ his capital in the manner in which it
is likely to afford the greatest support to domestic industry, and to give
revenue and employment to the greatest number of people of his own country.

Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of domestic
industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry, that its produce
may be of the greatest possible value.

The produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon which
it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or small,
so will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the sake of
profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and he will
always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of
which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the
greatest quantity either of money or of other goods.

But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the
exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is
precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual,
therefore, endeavours as much as he can, both to employ his capital in the
support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce
maybe of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the
annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain; and he is
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society
that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public
good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very
few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.

What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of
which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it
is evident, can in his local situation judge much better than any statesman or
lawgiver can do for him. The statesman, who should attempt to direct private
people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load
himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could
safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate
whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who
had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.

To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic industry, in
any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people
in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must in almost all
cases be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestic
can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is
evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is the maxim
of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it
will cost him more to make than to buy. The tailor does not attempt to make his
own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to
make his own clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to make neither
the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find
it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they
have some advantage over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its
produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever
else they have occasion for.

What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in
that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of
the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some
advantage. The general industry of the country being always in proportion to
the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, no more than that
of the abovementioned artificers; but only left to find out the way in which it
can be employed with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to
the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed towards an object which it can
buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is certainly more
or less diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing commodities
evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce.
According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign
countries cheaper than it can be made at home; it could therefore have been
purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with
a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an
equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its
natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus turned away
from a more to a less advantageous employment; and the exchangeable value of
its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of
the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished by every such regulation.

By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may sometimes be
acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a certain time may
be made at home as cheap, or cheaper, than in the foreign country. But though
the industry of the society may be thus carried with advantage into a
particular channel sooner than it could have been otherwise, it will by no
means follow that the sum-total, either of its industry, or of its revenue, can
ever be augmented by any such regulation. The industry of the society can
augment only in proportion as its capital augments, and its capital can augment
only in proportion to what can be gradually saved out of its revenue. But the
immediate effect of every such regulation is to diminish its revenue; and what
diminishes its revenue is certainly not very likely to augment its capital
faster than it would have augmented of its own accord, had both capital and
industry been left to find out their natural employments.

Though, for want of such regulations, the society should never acquire the
proposed manufacture, it would not upon that account necessarily be the poorer
in anyone period of its duration. In every period of its duration its whole
capital and industry might still have been employed, though upon different
objects, in the manner that was most advantageous at the time. In every period
its revenue might have been the greatest which its capital could afford, and
both capital and revenue might have been augmented with the greatest possible
rapidity.

The natural advantages which one country has over another, in producing
particular commodities, are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all
the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, hot-beds,
and hot-walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very good wine,
too, can be made of them, at about thirty times the expense for which at least
equally good can be brought from foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable
law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, merely to encourage the
making of claret and Burgundy in Scotland? But if there would be a manifest
absurdity in turning towards any employment thirty times more of the capital
and industry of the country than would be necessary to purchase from foreign
countries an equal quantity of the commodities wanted, there must be an
absurdity, though not altogether so glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in
turning towards any such employment a thirtieth, or even a three hundredth part
more of either. Whether the advantages which one country has over another be
natural or acquired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one
country has those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more
advantageous for the latter rather to buy of the former than to make. It is an
acquired advantage only, which one artificer has over his neighbour, who
exercises another trade; and yet they both find it more advantageous to buy of
one another, than to make what does not belong to their particular trades.

Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage
from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the importation of
foreign cattle and of salt provisions, together with the high duties upon
foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, are
not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of Great Britain, as other
regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and manufacturers.
Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more easily transported
from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in the fetching and
carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is chiefly employed. In
manufactures, a very small advantage will enable foreigners to undersell our
own workmen, even in the home market. It will require a very great one to
enable them to do so in the rude produce of the soil. If the free importation
of foreign manufactures were permitted, several of the home manufactures would
probably suffer, and some of them perhaps go to ruin altogether, and a
considerable part of the stock and industry at present employed in them, would
be forced to find out some other employment. But the freest importation of the
rude produce of the soil could have no such effect upon the agriculture of the
country.

If the importation of foreign cattle, for example, were made ever so free, so
few could be imported, that the grazing trade of Great Britain could be little
affected by it. Live cattle are, perhaps, the only commodity of which the
transportation is more expensive by sea than by land. By land they carry
themselves to market. By sea, not only the cattle, but their food and their
water too, must be carried at no small expense and inconveniency. The short sea
between Ireland and Great Britain, indeed, renders the importation of Irish
cattle more easy. But though the free importation of them, which was lately
permitted only for a limited time, were rendered perpetual, it could have no
considerable effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain. Those
parts of Great Britain which border upon the Irish sea are all grazing
countries. Irish cattle could never be imported for their use, but must be
drove through those very extensive countries, at no small expense and
inconveniency, before they could arrive at their proper market. Fat cattle
could not be drove so far. Lean cattle, therefore, could only be imported; and
such importation could interfere not with the interest of the feeding or
fattening countries, to which, by reducing the price of lean cattle it would
rather be advantageous, but with that of the breeding countries only. The small
number of Irish cattle imported since their importation was permitted, together
with the good price at which lean cattle still continue to sell, seem to
demonstrate, that even the breeding countries of Great Britain are never likely
to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle. The common people
of Ireland, indeed, are said to have sometimes opposed with violence the
exportation of their cattle. But if the exporters had found any great advantage
in continuing the trade, they could easily, when the law was on their side,
have conquered this mobbish opposition.

Feeding and fattening countries, besides, must always be highly improved,
whereas breeding countries are generally uncultivated. The high price of lean
cattle, by augmenting the value of uncultivated land, is like a bounty against
improvement. To any country which was highly improved throughout, it would be
more advantageous to import its lean cattle than to breed them. The province of
Holland, accordingly, is said to follow this maxim at present. The mountains of
Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland, indeed, are countries not capable of much
improvement, and seem destined by nature to be the breeding countries of Great
Britain. The freest importation of foreign cattle could have no other effect
than to hinder those breeding countries from taking advantage of the increasing
population and improvement of the rest of the kingdom, from raising their price
to an exorbitant height, and from laying a real tax upon all the more improved
and cultivated parts of the country.

The freest importation of salt provisions, in the same manner, could have as
little effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain as that of
live cattle. Salt provisions are not only a very bulky commodity, but when
compared with fresh meat they are a commodity both of worse quality, and, as
they cost more labour and expense, of higher price. They could never,
therefore, come into competition with the fresh meat, though they might with
the salt provisions of the country. They might be used for victualling ships
for distant voyages, and such like uses, but could never make any considerable
part of the food of the people. The small quantity of salt provisions imported
from Ireland since their importation was rendered free, is an experimental
proof that our graziers have nothing to apprehend from it. It does not appear
that the price of butcher’s meat has ever been sensibly affected by it.

Even the free importation of foreign corn could very little affect the interest
of the farmers of Great Britain. Corn is a much more bulky commodity than
butcher’s meat. A pound of wheat at a penny is as dear as a pound of
butcher’s meat at fourpence. The small quantity of foreign corn imported
even in times of the greatest scarcity, may satisfy our farmers that they can
have nothing to fear from the freest importation. The average quantity
imported, one year with another, amounts only, according to the very well
informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, to 23,728 quarters of all
sorts of grain, and does not exceed the five hundredth and seventy-one part of
the annual consumption. But as the bounty upon corn occasions a greater
exportation in years of plenty, so it must, of consequence, occasion a greater
importation in years of scarcity, than in the actual state of tillage would
otherwise take place. By means of it, the plenty of one year does not
compensate the scarcity of another; and as the average quantity exported is
necessarily augmented by it, so must likewise, in the actual state of tillage,
the average quantity imported. If there were no bounty, as less corn would be
exported, so it is probable that, one year with another, less would be imported
than at present. The corn-merchants, the fetchers and carriers of corn between
Great Britain and foreign countries, would have much less employment, and might
suffer considerably; but the country gentlemen and farmers could suffer very
little. It is in the corn-merchants, accordingly, rather than the country
gentlemen and farmers, that I have observed the greatest anxiety for the
renewal and continuation of the bounty.

Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, the
least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a great
manufactory is sometimes alarmed if another work of the same kind is
established within twenty miles of him; the Dutch undertaker of the woollen
manufacture at Abbeville, stipulated that no work of the same kind should be
established within thirty leagues of that city. Farmers and country gentlemen,
on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote, than to obstruct,
the cultivation and improvement of their neighbours farms and estates. They
have no secrets, such as those of the greater part of manufacturers, but are
generally rather fond of communicating to their neighbours, and of extending as
far as possible any new practice which they may have found to be advantageous.
“Pius quaestus”, says old Cato, “stabilissimusque, minimeque
invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt, qui in eo studio occupati
sunt.” Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed in different parts of the
country, cannot so easily combine as merchants and manufacturers, who being
collected into towns, and accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which
prevails in them, naturally endeavour to obtain, against all their countrymen,
the same exclusive privilege which they generally possess against the
inhabitants of their respective towns. They accordingly seem to have been the
original inventors of those restraints upon the importation of foreign goods,
which secure to them the monopoly of the home market. It was probably in
imitation of them, and to put themselves upon a level with those who, they
found, were disposed to oppress them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of
Great Britain so far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station,
as to demand the exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen with corn
and butcher’s meat. They did not, perhaps, take time to consider how much
less their interest could be affected by the freedom of trade, than that of the
people whose example they followed.

To prohibit, by a perpetual law, the importation of foreign corn and cattle, is
in reality to enact, that the population and industry of the country shall, at
no time, exceed what the rude produce of its own soil can maintain.

There seem, however, to be two cases, in which it will generally be
advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic
industry.

The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the
defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very
much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation,
therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great
Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases, by
absolute prohibitions, and in others, by heavy burdens upon the shipping of
foreign countries. The following are the principal dispositions of this act.

First, All ships, of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the
mariners, are not British subjects, are prohibited, upon pain of forfeiting
ship and cargo, from trading to the British settlements and plantations, or
from being employed in the coasting trade of Great Britain.

Secondly, A great variety of the most bulky articles of importation can be
brought into Great Britain only, either in such ships as are above described,
or in ships of the country where those goods are produced, and of which the
owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners, are of that particular
country; and when imported even in ships of this latter kind, they are subject
to double aliens duty. If imported in ships of any other country, the penalty
is forfeiture of ship and goods. When this act was made, the Dutch were, what
they still are, the great carriers of Europe; and by this regulation they were
entirely excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, or from importing
to us the goods of any other European country.

Thirdly, A great variety of the most bulky articles of importation are
prohibited from being imported, even in British ships, from any country but
that in which they are produced, under pain of forfeiting ship and cargo. This
regulation, too, was probably intended against the Dutch. Holland was then, as
now, the great emporium for all European goods; and by this regulation, British
ships were hindered from loading in Holland the goods of any other European
country.

Fourthly, Salt fish of all kinds, whale fins, whalebone, oil, and blubber, not
caught by and cured on board British vessels, when imported into Great Britain,
are subject to double aliens duty. The Dutch, as they are still the principal,
were then the only fishers in Europe that attempted to supply foreign nations
with fish. By this regulation, a very heavy burden was laid upon their
supplying Great Britain.

When the act of navigation was made, though England and Holland were not
actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations.
It had begun during the government of the long parliament, which first framed
this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars, during that of the
Protector and of Charles II. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the
regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity. They
are as wise, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate
wisdom. National animosity, at that particular time, aimed at the very same
object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution
of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the
security of England.

The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth
of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation, in its
commercial relations to foreign nations, is, like that of a merchant with
regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap, and to sell
as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when, by the most
perfect freedom of trade, it encourages all nations to bring to it the goods
which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be most
likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest number
of buyers. The act of navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon foreign ships
that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the ancient aliens
duty, which used to be paid upon all goods, exported as well as imported, has,
by several subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater part of the
articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or high
duties, are hindered from coming to sell, they cannot always afford to come to
buy; because, coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight from their own
country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of sellers, therefore, we
necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely not only to buy
foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if there was a more
perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much more importance than
opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial
regulations of England.

The second case, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden
upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, is when some tax is
imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it seems
reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce of the
former. This would not give the monopoly of the borne market to domestic
industry, nor turn towards a particular employment a greater share of the stock
and labour of the country, than what would naturally go to it. It would only
hinder any part of what would naturally go to it from being turned away by the
tax into a less natural direction, and would leave the competition between
foreign and domestic industry, after the tax, as nearly as possible upon the
same footing as before it. In Great Britain, when any such tax is laid upon the
produce of domestic industry, it is usual, at the same time, in order to stop
the clamorous complaints of our merchants and manufacturers, that they will be
undersold at home, to lay a much heavier duty upon the importation of all
foreign goods of the same kind.

This second limitation of the freedom of trade, according to some people,
should, upon most occasions, be extended much farther than to the precise
foreign commodities which could come into competition with those which had been
taxed at home. When the necessaries of life have been taxed in any country, it
becomes proper, they pretend, to tax not only the like necessaries of life
imported from other countries, but all sorts of foreign goods which can come
into competition with any thing that is the produce of domestic industry.
Subsistence, they say, becomes necessarily dearer in consequence of such taxes;
and the price of labour must always rise with the price of the labourer’s
subsistence. Every commodity, therefore, which is the produce of domestic
industry, though not immediately taxed itself, becomes dearer in consequence of
such taxes, because the labour which produces it becomes so. Such taxes,
therefore, are really equivalent, they say, to a tax upon every particular
commodity produced at home. In order to put domestic upon the same footing with
foreign industry, therefore, it becomes necessary, they think, to lay some duty
upon every foreign commodity, equal to this enhancement of the price of the
home commodities with which it can come into competition.

Whether taxes upon the necessaries of life, such as those in Great Britain upon
soap, salt, leather, candles, etc. necessarily raise the price of labour, and
consequently that of all other commodities, I shall consider hereafter, when I
come to treat of taxes. Supposing, however, in the mean time, that they have
this effect, and they have it undoubtedly, this general enhancement of the
price of all commodities, in consequence of that labour, is a case which
differs in the two following respects from that of a particular commodity, of
which the price was enhanced by a particular tax immediately imposed upon it.

First, It might always be known with great exactness, how far the price of such
a commodity could be enhanced by such a tax; but how far the general
enhancement of the price of labour might affect that of every different
commodity about which labour was employed, could never be known with any
tolerable exactness. It would be impossible, therefore, to proportion, with any
tolerable exactness, the tax of every foreign, to the enhancement of the price
of every home commodity.

Secondly, Taxes upon the necessaries of life have nearly the same effect upon
the circumstances of the people as a poor soil and a bad climate. Provisions
are thereby rendered dearer, in the same manner as if it required extraordinary
labour and expense to raise them. As, in the natural scarcity arising from soil
and climate, it would be absurd to direct the people in what manner they ought
to employ their capitals and industry, so is it likewise in the artificial
scarcity arising from such taxes. To be left to accommodate, as well as they
could, their industry to their situation, and to find out those employments in
which, notwithstanding their unfavourable circumstances, they might have some
advantage either in the home or in the foreign market, is what, in both cases,
would evidently be most for their advantage. To lay a new-tax upon them,
because they are already overburdened with taxes, and because they already pay
too dear for the necessaries of life, to make them likewise pay too dear for
the greater part of other commodities, is certainly a most absurd way of making
amends.

Such taxes, when they have grown up to a certain height, are a curse equal to
the barrenness of the earth, and the inclemency of the heavens, and yet it is
in the richest and most industrious countries that they have been most
generally imposed. No other countries could support so great a disorder. As the
strongest bodies only can live and enjoy health under an unwholesome regimen,
so the nations only, that in every sort of industry have the greatest natural
and acquired advantages, can subsist and prosper under such taxes. Holland is
the country in Europe in which they abound most, and which, from peculiar
circumstances, continues to prosper, not by means of them, as has been most
absurdly supposed, but in spite of them.

As there are two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some
burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, so there are
two others in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, in the one,
how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods;
and, in the other, how far, or in what manner, it may be proper to restore that
free importation, after it has been for some time interrupted.

The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it is
proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods, is when some
foreign nation restrains, by high duties or prohibitions, the importation of
some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge, in this case, naturally
dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties and
prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into
ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner. The French
have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures, by restraining
the importation of such foreign goods as could come into competition with them.
In this consisted a great part of the policy of Mr Colbert, who,
notwithstanding his great abilities, seems in this case to have been imposed
upon by the sophistry of merchants and manufacturers, who are always demanding
a monopoly against their countrymen. It is at present the opinion of the most
intelligent men in France, that his operations of this kind have not been
beneficial to his country. That minister, by the tariff of 1667, imposed very
high duties upon a great number of foreign manufactures. Upon his refusing to
moderate them in favour of the Dutch, they, in 1671, prohibited the importation
of the wines, brandies, and manufactures of France. The war of 1672 seems to
have been in part occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of Nimeguen
put an end to it in 1678, by moderating some of those duties in favour of the
Dutch, who in consequence took off their prohibition. It was about the same
time that the French and English began mutually to oppress each other’s
industry, by the like duties and prohibitions, of which the French, however,
seem to have set the first example, The spirit of hostility which has subsisted
between the two nations ever since, has hitherto hindered them from being
moderated on either side. In 1697, the Ehglish prohibited the importation of
bone lace, the manufacture of Flanders. The government of that country, at that
time under the dominion of Spain, prohibited, in return, the importation of
English woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of importing bone lace into England
was taken oft; upon condition that the importation of English woollens into
Flanders should be put on the same footing as before.

There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a
probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or
prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will
generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying dearer
during a short time for some sorts of goods. To judge whether such retaliations
are likely to produce such an effect, does not, perhaps, belong so much to the
science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general
principles, which are always the same, as to the skill of that insidious and
crafty animal vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are
directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When there is no probability
that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the
injury done to certain classes of our people, to do another injury ourselves,
not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of them. When
our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of ours, we generally prohibit, not
only the same, for that alone would seldom affect them considerably, but some
other manufacture of theirs. This may, no doubt, give encouragement to some
particular class of workmen among ourselves, and, by excluding some of their
rivals, may enable them to raise their price in the home market. Those workmen
however, who suffered by our neighbours prohibition, will not be benefited by
ours. On the contrary, they, and almost all the other classes of our citizens,
will thereby be obliged to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such
law, therefore, imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of
that particular class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours
prohibitions, but of some other class.

The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far, or in
what manner, it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign goods,
after it has been for some time interrupted, is when particular manufactures,
by means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign goods which can come
into competition with them, have been so far extended as to employ a great
multitude of hands. Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade
should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and
circumspection. Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once,
cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home
market, as to deprive all at once many thousands of our people of their
ordinary employment and means of subsistence. The disorder which this would
occasion might no doubt be very considerable. It would in all probability,
however, be much less than is commonly imagined, for the two following reasons.

First, All those manufactures of which any part is commonly exported to other
European countries without a bounty, could be very little affected by the
freest importation of foreign goods. Such manufactures must be sold as cheap
abroad as any other foreign goods of the same quality and kind, and
consequently must be sold cheaper at home. They would still, therefore, keep
possession of the home market; and though a capricious man of fashion might
sometimes prefer foreign wares, merely because they were foreign, to cheaper
and better goods of the same kind that were made at home, this folly could,
from the nature of things, extend to so few, that it could make no sensible
impression upon the general employment of the people. But a great part of all
the different branches of our woollen manufacture, of our tanned leather, and
of our hardware, are annually exported to other European countries without any
bounty, and these are the manufactures which employ the greatest number of
hands. The silk, perhaps, is the manufacture which would suffer the most by
this freedom of trade, and after it the linen, though the latter much less than
the former.

Secondly, Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom
of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and common
method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would thereby be
deprived either of employment or subsistence. By the reduction of the army and
navy at the end of the late war, more than 100,000 soldiers and seamen, a
number equal to what is employed in the greatest manufactures, were all at once
thrown out of their ordinary employment: but though they no doubt suffered some
inconveniency, they were not thereby deprived of all employment and
subsistence. The greater part of the seamen, it is probable, gradually betook
themselves to the merchant service as they could find occasion, and in the mean
time both they and the soldiers were absorbed in the great mass of the people,
and employed in a great variety of occupations. Not only no great convulsion,
but no sensible disorder, arose from so great a change in the situation of more
than 100,000 men, all accustomed to the use of arms, and many of them to rapine
and plunder. The number of vagrants was scarce anywhere sensibly increased by
it; even the wages of labour were not reduced by it in any occupation, so far
as I have been able to learn, except in that of seamen in the merchant service.
But if we compare together the habits of a soldier and of any sort of
manufacturer, we shall find that those of the latter do not tend so much to
disqualify him from being employed in a new trade, as those of the former from
being employed in any. The manufacturer has always been accustomed to look for
his subsistence from his labour only; the soldier to expect it from his pay.
Application and industry have been familiar to the one; idleness and
dissipation to the other. But it is surely much easier to change the direction
of industry from one sort of labour to another, than to turn idleness and
dissipation to any. To the greater part of manufactures, besides, it has
already been observed, there are other collateral manufactures of so similar a
nature, that a workman can easily transfer his industry from one of them to
another. The greater part of such workmen, too, are occasionally employed in
country labour. The stock which employed them in a particular manufacture
before, will still remain in the country, to employ an equal number of people
in some other way. The capital of the country remaining the same, the demand
for labour will likewise be the same, or very nearly the same, though it may be
exerted in different places, and for different occupations. Soldiers and
seamen, indeed, when discharged from the king’s service, are at liberty
to exercise any trade within any town or place of Great Britain or Ireland. Let
the same natural liberty of exercising what species of industry they please, be
restored to all his Majesty’s subjects, in the same manner as to soldiers
and seamen; that is, break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and
repeal the statute of apprenticeship, both which are really encroachments upon
natural Liberty, and add to those the repeal of the law of settlements, so that
a poor workman, when thrown out of employment, either in one trade or in one
place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place, without the fear
either of a prosecution or of a removal; and neither the public nor the
individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some
particular classes of manufacturers, than from that of the soldiers. Our
manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot
have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be treated
with more delicacy.

To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored
in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should
ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but, what is
much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals,
irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the army to oppose, with the same
zeal and unanimity, any reduction in the number of forces, with which master
manufacturers set themselves against every law that is likely to increase the
number of their rivals in the home market; were the former to animate their
soldiers. In the same manner as the latter inflame their workmen, to attack
with violence and outrage the proposers of any such regulation; to attempt to
reduce the army would be as dangerous as it has now become to attempt to
diminish, in any respect, the monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained
against us. This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular
tribes of them, that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become
formidable to the government, and, upon many occasions, intimidate the
legislature. The member of parliament who supports every proposal for
strengthening this monopoly, is sure to acquire not only the reputation of
understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men
whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them,
on the contrary, and still more, if he has authority enough to be able to
thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor
the greatest public services, can protect him from the most infamous abuse and
detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from
the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.

The undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being suddenly
laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to abandon his
trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his capital which
had usually been employed in purchasing materials, and in paying his workmen,
might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another employment; but that part
of it which was fixed in workhouses, and in the instruments of trade, could
scarce be disposed of without considerable loss. The equitable regard,
therefore, to his interest, requires that changes of this kind should never be
introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after a very long warning. The
legislature, were it possible that its deliberations could be always directed,
not by the clamorous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view
of the general good, ought, upon this very account, perhaps, to be particularly
careful, neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend
further those which are already established. Every such regulation introduces
some degree of real disorder into the constitution of the state, which it will
be difficult afterwards to cure without occasioning another disorder.

How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign goods,
in order not to prevent their importation, but to raise a revenue for
government, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes
imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are evidently
as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of trade.

CHAPTER III.
OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST ALL
KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE
DISADVANTAGEOUS.

Part I—Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints, even upon the
Principles of the Commercial System.

To lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all
kinds, from those particular countries with which the balance of trade is
supposed to be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the commercial
system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver. Thus, in Great
Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home consumption, upon paying
certain duties; but French cambrics and lawns are prohibited to be imported,
except into the port of London, there to be warehoused for exportation. Higher
duties are imposed upon the wines of France than upon those of Portugal, or
indeed of any other country. By what is called the impost 1692, a duty of five
and-twenty per cent. of the rate or value, was laid upon all French goods;
while the goods of other nations were, the greater part of them, subjected to
much lighter duties, seldom exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt,
and vinegar of France, were indeed excepted; these commodities being subjected
to other heavy duties, either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the
same law. In 1696, a second duty of twenty-five per cent. the first not having
been thought a sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French goods,
except brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds upon the ton
of French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of French vinegar.
French goods have never been omitted in any of those general subsidies or
duties of five per cent. which have been imposed upon all, or the greater part,
of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one-third and
two-third subsidies as making a complete subsidy between them, there have been
five of these general subsidies; so that, before the commencement of the
present war, seventy-five per cent. may be considered as the lowest duty to
which the greater part of the goods of the growth, produce, or manufacture of
France, were liable. But upon the greater part of goods, those duties are
equivalent to a prohibition. The French, in their turn, have, I believe,
treated our goods and manufactures just as hardly; though I am not so well
acquainted with the particular hardships which they have imposed upon them.
Those mutual restraints have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the
two nations; and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British
goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles which
I have been examining, in the foregoing chapter, took their origin from private
interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going te examine in this,
from national prejudice and animosity. They are, accordingly, as might well be
expected, still more unreasonable. They are so, even upon the principles of the
commercial system.

First, Though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between France
and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by
no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to England, or that
the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be turned more against it.
If the wines of France are better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its
linens than those of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain
to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occasion for of
France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual
importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the
whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French
goods of the same quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries.
This would be the case, even upon the supposition that the whole French goods
imported were to be consumed in Great Britain.

But, Secondly, A great part of them might be re-exported to other countries,
where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return, equal in value,
perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods imported. What has
frequently been said of the East India trade, might possibly be true of the
French; that though the greater part of East India goods were bought with gold
and silver, the re-exportation of a part of them to other countries brought
back more gold and silver to that which carried on the trade, than the prime
cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch
trade at present, consists in the carriage of French goods to other European
countries. Some part even of the French wine drank in Great Britain, is
clandestinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free
trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon
paying only the same duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn
back upon exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found
so advantageous to Holland.

Thirdly, and lastly, There is no certain criterion by which we can determine on
which side what is called the balance between any two countries lies, or which
of them exports to the greatest value. National prejudice and animosity,
prompted always by the private interest of particular traders, are the
principles which generally direct our judgment upon all questions concerning
it. There are two criterions, however, which have frequently been appealed to
upon such occasions, the custom-house books and the course of exchange. The
custom-house books, I think, it is now generally acknowledged, are a very
uncertain criterion, on account of the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the
greater part of goods are rated in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps,
almost equally so.

When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at par, it
is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are compensated by
those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a premium is paid at
London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from
London to Paris are not compensated by those due from Paris to London, but that
a balance in money must be sent out from the latter place; for the risk,
trouble, and expense, of exporting which, the premium is both demanded and
given. But the ordinary state of debt and credit between those two cities must
necessarily be regulated, it is said, by the ordinary course of their dealings
with one another. When neither of them imports from from other to a greater
amount than it exports to that other, the debts and credits of each may
compensate one another. But when one of them imports from the other to a
greater value than it exports to that other, the former necessarily becomes
indebted to the latter in a greater sum than the latter becomes indebted to it:
the debts and credits of each do not compensate one another, and money must be
sent out from that place of which the debts overbalance the credits. The
ordinary course of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary
state of debt and credit between two places, must likewise be an indication of
the ordinary course of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate
that state.

But though the ordinary course of exchange shall be allowed to be a sufficient
indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places, it
would not from thence follow, that the balance of trade was in favour of that
place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in its favour. The
ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not always entirely
regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another, but is
often influenced by that of the dealings of either with many other places. If
it is usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay for the goods
which they buy of Hamburg, Dantzic, Riga, etc. by bills upon Holland, the
ordinary state of debt and credit between England and Holland will not be
regulated entirely by the ordinary course of the dealings of those two
countries with one another, but will be influenced by that of the dealings in
England with those other places. England may be obliged to send out every year
money to Holland, though its annual exports to that country may exceed very
much the annual value of its imports from thence, and though what is called the
balance of trade may be very much in favour of England.

In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been computed,
the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient indication that the
ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that country which seems to
have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary course of exchange in its
favour; or, in other words, the real exchange may be, and in fact often is, so
very different from the computed one, that, from the course of the latter, no
certain conclusion can, upon many occasions, be drawn concerning that of the
former.

When for a sum or money paid in England, containing, according to the standard
of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you receive a
bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing, according to the
standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of pure silver, exchange
is said to be at par between England and France. When you pay more, you are
supposed to give a premium, and exchange is said to be against England, and in
favour of France. When you pay less, you are supposed to get a premium, and
exchange is said to be against France, and in favour of England.

But, first, We cannot always judge of the value of the current money of
different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it is
more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that
standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with
that of any other country, is in proportion, not to the quantity of pure silver
which it ought to contain, but to that which it actually does contain. Before
the reformation of the silver coin in King William’s time, exchange
between England and Holland, computed in the usual manner, according to the
standard of their respective mints, was five-and twenty per cent. against
England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr
Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five-and-twenty per cent. below its
standard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have been
in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange was so much against
it; a smaller number or ounces of pure silver, actually paid in England, may
have purchased a bill for a greater number of ounces of pure silver to be paid
in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give, may in reality have got the
premium. The French coin was, before the late reformation of the English gold
coin, much less wore than the English, and was perhaps two or three per cent.
nearer its standard. If the computed exchange with France, therefore, was not
more than two or three per cent. against England, the real exchange might have
been in its favour. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has
been constantly in favour of England, and against France.

Secondly, In some countries the expense of coinage is defrayed by the
government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people, who carry their
bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue from the
coinage. In England it is defrayed by the government; and if you carry a pound
weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back sixty-two shillings,
containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France a duty of
eight per cent. is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays the expense
of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. In England, as the
coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much more valuable than
the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In France, the workmanship,
as you pay for it, adds to the value, in the same manner as to that of wrought
plate. A sum of French money, therefore, containing an equal weight of pure
silver, is more valuable than a sum of English money containing an equal weight
of pure silver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities, to
purchase it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were
equally near the standards of their respective mints, a sum of English money
could not well purchase a sum of French money containing an equal number of
ounces of pure silver, nor, consequently, a bill upon France for such a sum.
If, for such a bill, no more additional money was paid than what was sufficient
to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at
par between the two countries; their debts and credits might mutually
compensate one another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour
of France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of
England, while the computed was in favour of France.

Thirdly, and lastly, In some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, etc.
foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while in
others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, etc. they are paid in the
common currency of the country. What is called bank money, is always of more
value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A thousand guilders in the
bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value than a thousand guilders of
Amsterdam currency. The difference between them is called the agio of the bank,
which at Amsterdam is generally about five per cent. Supposing the current
money of the two countries equally near to the standard of their respective
mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this common currency, while the
other pays them in bank money, it is evident that the computed exchange may be
in favour of that which pays in bank money, though the real exchange should be
in favour of that which pays in current money; for the same reason that the
computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in better money, or in
money nearer to its own standard, though the real exchange should be in favour
of that which pays in worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation
of the gold coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice,
and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money.
It will by no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it.
Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London, even
with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in favour of London
with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except France, I believe with most
other parts of Europe that pay in common currency; and it is not improbable
that the real exchange was so too.

Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of
Amsterdam.

The currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally consists
almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be at any
time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the state, by
a reformation of its coin, can effectually re-establish its currency. But the
currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom consist
altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, of the
coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a
continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not
always be able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid in
this currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature so
uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a state, its
currency being in all foreign states necessarily valued even below what it is
worth.

In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous exchange
must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they began to
attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted that foreign bills of
exchange of a certain value should be paid, not in common currency, but by an
order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain bank, established upon
the credit, and under the protection of the state, this bank being always
obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly according to the standard of
the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Nuremberg, seem
to have been all originally established with this view, though some of them may
have afterwards been made subservient to other purposes. The money of such
banks, being better than the common currency of the country, necessarily bore
an agio, which was greater or smaller, according as the currency was supposed
to be more or less degraded below the standard of the state. The agio of the
bank of Hamburg, for example, which is said to be commonly about fourteen per
cent. is the supposed difference between the good standard money of the state,
and the clipt, worn, and diminished currency, poured into it from all the
neighbouring states.

Before 1609, the great quantity of clipt and worn foreign coin which the
extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of Europe, reduced the
value of its currency about nine per cent. below that of good money fresh from
the mint. Such money no sooner appeared, than it was melted down or carried
away, as it always is in such circumstances. The merchants, with plenty of
currency, could not always find a sufficient quantity of good money to pay
their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in spite of several
regulations which were made to prevent it, became in a great measure uncertain.

In order to remedy these inconveniencies, a bank was established in 1609, under
the guarantee of the city. This bank received both foreign coin, and the light
and worn coin of the country, at its real intrinsic value in the good standard
money of the country, deducting only so much as was necessary for defraying the
expense of coinage and the other necessary expense of management. For the value
which remained after this small deduction was made, it gave a credit in its
books. This credit was called bank money, which, as it represented money
exactly according to the standard of the mint, was always of the same real
value, and intrinsically worth more than current money. It was at the same time
enacted, that all bills drawn upon or negotiated at Amsterdam, of the value of
600 guilders and upwards, should be paid in bank money, which at once took away
all uncertainty in the value of those bills. Every merchant, in consequence of
this regulation, was obliged to keep an account with the bank, in order to pay
his foreign bills of exchange, which necessarily occasioned a certain demand
for bank money.

Bank money, over and above both its intrinsic superiority to currency, and the
additional value which this demand necessarily gives it, has likewise some
other advantages, It is secure from fire, robbery, and other accidents; the
city of Amsterdam is bound for it; it can be paid away by a simple transfer,
without the trouble of counting, or the risk of transporting it from one place
to another. In consequence of those different advantages, it seems from the
beginning to have borne an agio; and it is generally believed that all the
money originally deposited in the bank, was allowed to remain there, nobody
caring to demand payment of a debt which he could sell for a premium in the
market. By demanding payment of the bank, the owner of a bank credit would lose
this premium. As a shilling fresh from the mint will buy no more goods in the
market than one of our common worn shillings, so the good and true money which
might be brought from the coffers of the bank into those of a private person,
being mixed and confounded with the common currency of the country, would be of
no more value than that currency, from which it could no longer be readily
distinguished. While it remained in the coffers of the bank, its superiority
was known and ascertained. When it had come into those of a private person, its
superiority could not well be ascertained without more trouble than perhaps the
difference was worth. By being brought from the coffers of the bank, besides,
it lost all the other advantages of bank money; its security, its easy and safe
transferability, its use in paying foreign bills of exchange. Over and above
all this, it could not be brought from those coffers, as will appear by and by,
without previously paying for the keeping.

Those deposits of coin, or those deposits which the bank was bound to restore
in coin, constituted the original capital of the bank, or the whole value of
what was represented by what is called bank money. At present they are supposed
to constitute but a very small part of it. In order to facilitate the trade in
bullion, the bank has been for these many years in the practice of giving
credit in its books, upon deposits of gold and silver bullion. This credit is
generally about five per cent. below the mint price of such bullion. The bank
grants at the same time what is called a recipice or receipt, entitling the
person who makes the deposit, or the bearer, to take out the bullion again at
any time within six months, upon transferring to the bank a quantity of bank
money equal to that for which credit had been given in its books when the
deposit was made, and upon paying one-fourth per cent. for the keeping, if the
deposit was in silver; and one-half per cent. if it was in gold; but at the
same time declaring, that in default of such payment, and upon the expiration
of this term, the deposit should belong to the bank, at the price at which it
had been received, or for which credit had been given in the transfer books.
What is thus paid for the keeping of the deposit may be considered as a sort of
warehouse rent; and why this warehouse rent should be so much dearer for gold
than for silver, several different reasons have been assigned. The fineness of
gold, it has been said, is more difficult to be ascertained than that of
silver. Frauds are more easily practised, and occasion a greater loss in the
most precious metal. Silver, besides, being the standard metal, the state, it
has been said, wishes to encourage more the making of deposits of silver than
those of gold.

Deposits of bullion are most commonly made when the price is somewhat lower
than ordinary, and they are taken out again when it happens to rise. In Holland
the market price of bullion is generally above the mint price, for the same
reason that it was so in England before the late reformation of the gold coin.
The difference is said to be commonly from about six to sixteen stivers upon
the mark, or eight ounces of silver, of eleven parts of fine and one part
alloy. The bank price, or the credit which the bank gives for the deposits of
such silver (when made in foreign coin, of which the fineness is well known and
ascertained, such as Mexico dollars), is twenty-two guilders the mark: the mint
price is about twenty-three guilders, and the market price is from twenty-three
guilders six, to twenty-three guilders sixteen stivers, or from two to three
per cent. above the mint price.

The following are the prices at which the bank of Amsterdam at present
{September 1775} receives bullion and coin of different kinds:

SILVER
Mexico dollars …………….. 22 Guilders / mark
French crowns ……………… 22
English silver coin…………. 22
Mexico dollars, new coin…….. 21 10
Ducatoons………………….. 3 0
Rix-dollars………………… 2 8

Bar silver, containing 11-12ths fine silver, 21 Guilders / mark, and in this
proportion down to 1-4th fine, on which 5 guilders are given. Fine
bars,…………….. 28 Guilders / mark.

GOLD
Portugal coin…………….. 310 Guilders / mark
Guineas………………….. 310
Louis d’ors, new………….. 310
Ditto old………….. 300
New ducats……………….. 4 19 8 per ducat

Bar or ingot gold is received in proportion to its fineness, compared with the
above foreign gold coin. Upon fine bars the bank gives 340 per mark. In
general, however, something more is given upon coin of a known fineness, than
upon gold and silver bars, of which the fineness cannot be ascertained but by a
process of melting and assaying.

The proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market price of
gold bullion, are nearly the same. A person can generally sell his receipt for
the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market price. A
receipt for bullion is almost always worth something, and it very seldom
happens, therefore, that anybody suffers his receipts to expire, or allows his
bullion to fall to the bank at the price at which it had been received, either
by not taking it out before the end of the six months, or by neglecting to pay
one fourth or one half per cent. in order to obtain a new receipt for another
six months. This, however, though it happens seldom, is said to happen
sometimes, and more frequently with regard to gold than with regard to silver,
on account of the higher warehouse rent which is paid for the keeping of the
more precious metal.

The person who, by making a deposit of bullion, obtains both a bank credit and
a receipt, pays his bills of exchange as they become due, with his bank credit;
and either sells or keeps his receipt, according as he judges that the price of
bullion is likely to rise or to fall. The receipt and the bank credit seldom
keep long together, and there is no occasion that they should. The person who
has a receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds always plenty of bank
credits, or bank money, to buy at the ordinary price, and the person who has
bank money, and wants to take out bullion, finds receipts always in equal
abundance.

The owners of bank credits, and the holders of receipts, constitute two
different sorts of creditors against the bank. The holder of a receipt cannot
draw out the bullion for which it is granted, without re-assigning to the bank
a sum of bank money equal to the price at which the bullion had been received.
If he has no bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those who have it.
The owner of bank money cannot draw out bullion, without producing to the bank
receipts for the quantity which he wants. If he has none of his own, he must
buy them of those who have them. The holder of a receipt, when he purchases
bank money, purchases the power of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which
the mint price is five per cent. above the bank price. The agio of five per
cent. therefore, which he commonly pays for it, is paid, not for an imaginary,
but for a real value. The owner of bank money, when he purchases a receipt,
purchases the power of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the market
price is commonly from two to three per cent. above the mint price. The price
which he pays for it, therefore, is paid likewise for a real value. The price
of the receipt, and the price of the bank money, compound or make up between
them the full value or price of the bullion.

Upon deposits of the coin current in the country, the bank grant receipts
likewise, as well as bank credits; but those receipts are frequently of no
value and will bring no price in the market. Upon ducatoons, for example, which
in the currency pass for three guilders three stivers each, the bank gives a
credit of three guilders only, or five per cent. below their current value. It
grants a receipt likewise, entitling the bearer to take out the number of
ducatoons deposited at any time within six months, upon paying one fourth per
cent. for the keeping. This receipt will frequently bring no price in the
market. Three guilders, bank money, generally sell in the market for three
guilders three stivers, the full value of the ducatoons, if they were taken out
of the bank; and before they can be taken out, one-fourth per cent. must be
paid for the keeping, which would be mere loss to the holder of the receipt. If
the agio of the bank, however, should at any time fall to three per cent. such
receipts might bring some price in the market, and might sell for one and
three-fourths per cent. But the agio of the bank being now generally about five
per cent. such receipts are frequently allowed to expire, or, as they express
it, to fall to the bank. The receipts which are given for deposits of gold
ducats fall to it yet more frequently, because a higher warehouse rent, or one
half per cent. must be paid for the keeping of them, before they can be taken
out again. The five per cent. which the bank gains, when deposits either of
coin or bullion are allowed to fall to it, maybe considered as the warehouse
rent for the perpetual keeping of such deposits.

The sum of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, must be very
considerable. It must comprehend the whole original capital of the bank, which,
it is generally supposed, has been allowed to remain there from the time it was
first deposited, nobody caring either to renew his receipt, or to take out his
deposit, as, for the reasons already assigned, neither the one nor the other
could be done without loss. But whatever may be the amount of this sum, the
proportion which it bears to the whole mass of bank money is supposed to be
very small. The bank of Amsterdam has, for these many years past, been the
great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for which the receipts are very seldom
allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to the bank. The far greater
part of the bank money, or of the credits upon the books of the bank, is
supposed to have been created, for these many years past, by such deposits,
which the dealers in bullion are continually both making and withdrawing.

No demand can be made upon the bank, but by means of a recipice or receipt. The
smaller mass of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, is mixed and
confounded with the much greater mass for which they are still in force; so
that, though there may be a considerable sum of bank money, for which there are
no receipts, there is no specific sum or portion of it which may not at any
time be demanded by one. The bank cannot be debtor to two persons for the same
thing; and the owner of bank money who has no receipt, cannot demand payment of
the bank till he buys one. In ordinary and quiet times, he can find no
difficulty in getting one to buy at the market price, which generally
corresponds with the price at which he can sell the coin or bullion it entitles
him to take out of the bank.

It might be otherwise during a public calamity; an invasion, for example, such
as that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank money being then all eager to
draw it out of the bank, in order to have it in their own keeping, the demand
for receipts might raise their price to an exorbitant height. The holders of
them might form extravagant expectations, and, instead of two or three per
cent. demand half the bank money for which credit had been given upon the
deposits that the receipts had respectively been granted for. The enemy,
informed of the constitution of the bank, might even buy them up, in order to
prevent the carrying away of the treasure. In such emergencies, the bank, it is
supposed, would break through its ordinary rule of making payment only to the
holders of receipts. The holders of receipts, who had no bank money, must have
received within two or three per cent. of the value of the deposit for which
their respective receipts had been granted. The bank, therefore, it is said,
would in this case make no scruple of paying, either with money or bullion, the
full value of what the owners of bank money, who could get no receipts, were
credited for in its books; paying, at the same time, two or three per cent. to
such holders of receipts as had no bank money, that being the whole value
which, in this state of things, could justly be supposed due to them.

Even in ordinary and quiet times, it is the interest of the holders of receipts
to depress the agio, in order either to buy bank money (and consequently the
bullion which their receipts would then enable them to take out of the bank )
so much cheaper, or to sell their receipts to those who have bank money, and
who want to take out bullion, so much dearer; the price of a receipt being
generally equal to the difference between the market price of bank money and
that of the coin or bullion for which the receipt had been granted. It is the
interest of the owners of bank money, on the contrary, to raise the agio, in
order either to sell their bank money so much dearer, or to buy a receipt so
much cheaper. To prevent the stock-jobbing tricks which those opposite
interests might sometimes occasion, the bank has of late years come to the
resolution, to sell at all times bank money for currency at five per cent.
agio, and to buy it in again at four per cent. agio. In consequence of this
resolution, the agio can never either rise above five, or sink below four per
cent.; and the proportion between the market price of bank and that of current
money is kept at all times very near the proportion between their intrinsic
values. Before this resolution was taken, the market price of bank money used
sometimes to rise so high as nine per cent. agio, and sometimes to sink so low
as par, according as opposite interests happened to influence the market.

The bank of Amsterdam professes to lend out no part of what is deposited with
it, but for every guilder for which it gives credit in its books, to keep in
its repositories the value of a guilder either in money or bullion. That it
keeps in its repositories all the money or bullion for which there are receipts
in force for which it is at all times liable to be called upon, and which in
reality is continually going from it, and returning to it again, cannot well be
doubted. But whether it does so likewise with regard to that part of its
capital for which the receipts are long ago expired, for which, in ordinary and
quiet times, it cannot be called upon, and which, in reality, is very likely to
remain with it for ever, or as long as the states of the United Provinces
subsist, may perhaps appear more uncertain. At Amsterdam, however, no point of
faith is better established than that, for every guilder circulated as bank
money, there is a correspondent guilder in gold or silver to be found in the
treasures of the bank. The city is guarantee that it should be so. The bank is
under the direction of the four reigning burgomasters who are changed every
year. Each new set of burgomasters visits the treasure, compares it with the
books, receives it upon oath, and delivers it over, with the same awful
solemnity to the set which succeeds; and in that sober and religious country,
oaths are not yet disregarded. A rotation of this kind seems alone a sufficient
security against any practices which cannot be avowed. Amidst all the
revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in the government of Amsterdam,
the prevailing party has at no time accused their predecessors of infidelity in
the administration of the bank. No accusation could have affected more deeply
the reputation and fortune of the disgraced party; and if such an accusation
could have been supported, we may be assured that it would have been brought.
In 1672, when the French king was at Utrecht, the bank of Amsterdam paid so
readily, as left no doubt of the fidelity with which it had observed its
engagements. Some of the pieces which were then brought from its repositories,
appeared to have been scorched with the fire which happened in the town-house
soon after the bank was established. Those pieces, therefore, must have lain
there from that time.

What may be the amount of the treasure in the bank, is a question which has
long employed the speculations of the curious. Nothing but conjecture can be
offered concerning it. It is generally reckoned, that there are about 2000
people who keep accounts with the bank; and allowing them to have, one with
another, the value of £1500 sterling lying upon their respective accounts (a
very large allowance), the whole quantity of bank money, and consequently of
treasure in the bank, will amount to about £3,000,000 sterling, or, at eleven
guilders the pound sterling, 33,000,000 of guilders; a great sum, and
sufficient to carry on a very extensive circulation, but vastly below the
extravagant ideas which some people have formed of this treasure.

The city of Amsterdam derives a considerable revenue from the bank. Besides
what may be called the warehouse rent above mentioned, each person, upon first
opening an account with the bank, pays a fee of ten guilders; and for every new
account, three guilders three stivers; for every transfer, two stivers; and if
the transfer is for less than 300 guilders, six stivers, in order to discourage
the multiplicity of small transactions. The person who neglects to balance his
account twice in the year, forfeits twenty-five guilders. The person who orders
a transfer for more than is upon his account, is obliged to pay three per cent.
for the sum overdrawn, and his order is set aside into the bargain. The bank is
supposed, too, to make a considerable profit by the sale of the foreign coin or
bullion which sometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts, and which is
always kept till it can be sold with advantage. It makes a profit, likewise, by
selling bank money at five per cent. agio, and buying it in at four. These
different emoluments amount to a good deal more than what is necessary for
paying the salaries of officers, and defraying the expense of management. What
is paid for the keeping of bullion upon receipts, is alone supposed to amount
to a neat annual revenue of between 150,000 and 200,000 guilders. Public
utility, however, and not revenue, was the original object of this institution.
Its object was to relieve the merchants from the inconvenience of a
disadvantageous exchange. The revenue which has arisen from it was unforeseen,
and may be considered as accidental. But it is now time to return from this
long digression, into which I have been insensibly led, in endeavouring to
explain the reasons why the exchange between the countries which pay in what is
called bank money, and those which pay in common currency, should generally
appear to be in favour of the former, and against the latter. The former pay in
a species of money, of which the intrinsic value is always the same, and
exactly agreeable to the standard of their respective mints; the latter is a
species of money, of which the intrinsic value is continually varying, and is
almost always more or less below that standard.

PART II.—Of the Unreasonableness of those extraordinary Restraints,
upon other Principles.

In the foregoing part of this chapter, I have endeavoured to show, even upon
the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay
extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries
with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous.

Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of
trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the other
regulations of commerce, are founded. When two places trade with one another,
this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them either
loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them
loses, and the other gains, in proportion to its declension from the exact
equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade, which is forced by means of
bounties and monopolies, may be, and commonly is, disadvantageous to the
country in whose favour it is meant to be established, as I shall endeavour to
show hereafter. But that trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally
and regularly carried on between any two places, is always advantageous, though
not always equally so, to both.

By advantage or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of gold
and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the
land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of its
inhabitants.

If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist
altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most
occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very nearly
equally; each will, in this case, afford a market for a part of the surplus
produce of the other; each will replace a capital which had been employed in
raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus produce of the
other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and maintenance
to, a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the inhabitants of each,
therefore, will directly derive their revenue and maintenance from the other.
As the commodities exchanged, too, are supposed to be of equal value, so the
two capitals employed in the trade will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very
nearly equal; and both being employed in raising the native commodities of the
two countries, the revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford
to the inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue
and maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller, in
proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually amount to
£100,000, for example, or to £1,000,000, on each side, each of them will afford
an annual revenue, in the one case, of £100,000, and, in the other, of
£1,000,000, to the inhabitants of the other.

If their trade should be of such a nature, that one of them exported to the
other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other consisted
altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would still be supposed
even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They would, in this case
too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and the inhabitants of the
country which exported nothing but native commodities, would derive the
greatest revenue from the trade. If England, for example, should import from
France nothing but the native commodities of that country, and not having such
commodities of its own as were in demand there, should annually repay them by
sending thither a large quantity of foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose,
and East India goods; this trade, though it would give some revenue to the
inhabitants of both countries, would give more to those of France than to those
of England. The whole French capital annually employed in it would annually be
distributed among the people of France; but that part of the English capital
only, which was employed in producing the English commodities with which those
foreign goods were purchased, would be annually distributed among the people of
England. The greater part of it would replace the capitals which had been
employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and which had given revenue and
maintenance to the inhabitants of those distant countries. If the capitals were
equal, or nearly equal, therefore, this employment of the French capital would
augment much more the revenue of the people of France, than that of the English
capital would the revenue of the people of England. France would, in this case,
carry on a direct foreign trade of consumption with England; whereas England
would carry on a round-about trade of the same kind with France. The different
effects of a capital employed in the direct, and of one employed in the
round-about foreign trade of consumption, have already been fully explained.

There is not, probably, between any two countries, a trade which consists
altogether in the exchange, either of native commodities on both sides, or of
native commodities on one side, and of foreign goods on the other. Almost all
countries exchange with one another, partly native and partly foreign goods.
That country, however, in whose cargoes there is the greatest proportion of
native, and the least of foreign goods, will always be the principal gainer.

If it was not with tobacco and East India goods, but with gold and silver, that
England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the balance, in
this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being paid for with
commodities, but with gold and silver. The trade, however, would in this case,
as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries,
but more to those of France than to those of England. It would give some
revenue to those of England. The capital which had been employed in producing
the English goods that purchased this gold and silver, the capital which had
been distributed among, and given revenue to, certain inhabitants of England,
would thereby be replaced, and enabled to continue that employment. The whole
capital of England would no more be diminished by this exportation of gold and
silver, than by the exportation of an equal value of any other goods. On the
contrary, it would, in most cases, be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but
those for which the demand is supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and
of which the returns, consequently, it is expected, will be of more value at
home than the commodities exported. If the tobacco which in England is worth
only £100,000, when sent to France, will purchase wine which is in England
worth £110,000, the exchange will augment the capital of England by £10,000. If
£100,000 of English gold, in the same manner, purchase French wine, which in
England is worth £110,000, this exchange will equally augment the capital of
England by £10,000. As a merchant, who has £110,000 worth of wine in his
cellar, is a richer man than he who has only £100,000 worth of tobacco in his
warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man than he who has only £100,000 worth
of gold in his coffers. He can put into motion a greater quantity of industry,
and give revenue, maintenance, and employment, to a greater number of people,
than either of the other two. But the capital of the country is equal to the
capital of all its different inhabitants; and the quantity of industry which
can be annually maintained in it is equal to what all those different capitals
can maintain. Both the capital of the country, therefore, and the quantity of
industry which can be annually maintained in it, must generally be augmented by
this exchange. It would, indeed, be more advantageous for England that it could
purchase the wines of France with its own hardware and broad cloth, than with
either the tobacco of Virginia, or the gold and silver of Brazil and Peru. A
direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a
round-about one. But a round-about foreign trade of consumption, which is
carried on with gold and silver, does not seem to be less advantageous than any
other equally round-about one. Neither is a country which has no mines, more
likely to be exhausted of gold and silver by this annual exportation of those
metals, than one which does not grow tobacco by the like annual exportation of
that plant. As a country which has wherewithal to buy tobacco will never be
long in want of it, so neither will one be long in want of gold and silver
which has wherewithal to purchase those metals.

It is a losing trade, it is said, which a workman carries on with the alehouse;
and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry on with a wine
country, may be considered as a trade of the same nature. I answer, that the
trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing trade. In its own nature it
is just as advantageous as any other, though, perhaps, somewhat more liable to
be abused. The employment of a brewer, and even that of a retailer of fermented
liquors, are as necessary divisions of labour as any other. It will generally
be more advantageous for a workman to buy of the brewer the quantity he has
occasion for, than to brew it himself; and if he is a poor workman, it will
generally be more advantageous for him to buy it by little and little of the
retailer, than a large quantity of the brewer. He may no doubt buy too much of
either, as he may of any other dealers in his neighbourhood; of the butcher, if
he is a glutton; or of the draper, if he affects to be a beau among his
companions. It is advantageous to the great body of workmen, notwithstanding,
that all these trades should be free, though this freedom may be abused in all
of them, and is more likely to be so, perhaps, in some than in others. Though
individuals, besides, may sometimes ruin their fortunes by an excessive
consumption of fermented liquors, there seems to be no risk that a nation
should do so. Though in every country there are many people who spend upon such
liquors more than they can afford, there are always many more who spend less.
It deserves to be remarked, too, that if we consult experience, the cheapness
of wine seems to be a cause, not of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The
inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the soberest people of Europe;
witness the Spaniards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the southern
provinces of France. People are seldom guilty of excess in what is their daily
fare. Nobody affects the character of liberality and good fellowship, by being
profuse of a liquor which is as cheap as small beer. On the contrary, in the
countries which, either from excessive heat or cold, produce no grapes, and
where wine consequently is dear and a rarity, drunkenness is a common vice, as
among the northern nations, and all those who live between the tropics, the
negroes, for example on the coast of Guinea. When a French regiment comes from
some of the northern provinces of France, where wine is somewhat dear, to be
quartered in the southern, where it is very cheap, the soldiers, I have
frequently heard it observed, are at first debauched by the cheapness and
novelty of good wine; but after a few months residence, the greater part of
them become as sober as the rest of the inhabitants. Were the duties upon
foreign wines, and the excises upon malt, beer, and ale, to be taken away all
at once, it might, in the same manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty
general and temporary drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of
people, which would probably be soon followed by a permanent and almost
universal sobriety. At present, drunkenness is by no means the vice of people
of fashion, or of those who can easily afford the most expensive liquors. A
gentleman drunk with ale has scarce ever been seen among us. The restraints
upon the wine trade in Great Britain, besides, do not so much seem calculated
to hinder the people from going, if I may say so, to the alehouse, as from
going where they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine
trade of Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is said,
indeed, are better customers for our manufactures than the French, and should
therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their custom, it
is pretended we should give them ours. The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen
are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire; for
it is the most underling tradesmen only who make it a rule to employ chiefly
their own customers. A great trader purchases his goods always where they are
cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest of this kind.

By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest
consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look
with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it
trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought
naturally to be, among nations as among individuals, a bond of union and
friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The
capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and the
preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the
impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice
of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature
of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy: but the mean rapacity, the
monopolizing spirit, of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought
to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot, perhaps, be corrected, may very
easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of anybody but themselves.

That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and
propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted and they who first taught it, were
by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it always is,
and must be, the interest of the great body of the people, to buy whatever they
want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest, that
it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been
called in question, had not the interested sophistry of merchants and
manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in
this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the people. As it
is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the rest of the
inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves; so it is the interest of
the merchants and manufacturers of every country to secure to themselves the
monopoly of the home market. Hence, in Great Britain, and in most other
European countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost all goods imported by
alien merchants. Hence the high duties and prohibitions upon all those foreign
manufactures which can come into competition with our own. Hence, too, the
extraordinary restraints upon the importation of almost all sorts of goods from
those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be
disadvantageous; that is, from those against whom national animosity happens ta
be most violently inflamed.

The wealth of neighbouring nations, however, though dangerous in war and
politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility, it may
enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in a
state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to
a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate
produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with that produce. As
a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his
neighbourhood, than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation. A rich man, indeed,
who is himself a manufacturer, is a very dangerous neighbour to all those who
deal in the same way. All the rest of the neighbourhood, however, by far the
greatest number, profit by the good market which his expense affords them. They
even profit by his underselling the poorer workmen who deal in the same way
with him. The manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may no doubt
be very dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very competition,
however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who profit greatly,
besides, by the good market which the great expense of such a nation affords
them in every other way. Private people, who want to make a fortune, never
think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces of the country, but resort
either to the capital, or to some of the great commercial towns. They know,
that where little wealth circulates, there is little to be got; but that where
a great deal is in motion, some share of it may fall to them. The same maxim
which would in this manner direct the common sense of one, or ten, or twenty
individuals, should regulate the judgment of one, or ten, or twenty millions,
and should make a whole nation regard the riches of its neighbours, as a
probable cause and occasion for itself to acquire riches. A nation that would
enrich itself by foreign trade, is certainly most likely to do so, when its
neighbours are all rich, industrious and commercial nations. A great nation,
surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians, might, no
doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own
interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this
manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired their great
wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign commerce, and the
modern Chinese, it is known, hold it in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign
to afford it the decent protection of the laws. The modern maxims of foreign
commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, so far as they
are capable of producing their intended effect, tend to render that very
commerce insignificant and contemptible.

It is in consequence of these maxims, that the commerce between France and
England has, in both countries, been subjected to so many discouragements and
restraints. If those two countries, however, were to consider their real
interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national animosity, the
commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great Britain than that of any
other country, and, for the same reason, that of Great Britain to France.
France is the nearest neighbour to Great Britain. In the trade between the
southern coast of England and the northern and north-western coast of France,
the returns might be expected, in the same manner as in the inland trade, four,
five, or six times in the year. The capital, therefore, employed in this trade
could, in each of the two countries, keep in motion four, five, or six times
the quantity of industry, and afford employment and subsistence to four, five,
or six times the number of people, which all equal capital could do in the
greater part of the other branches of foreign trade. Between the parts of
France and Great Britain most remote from one another, the returns might be
expected, at least, once in the year; and even this trade would so far be at
least equally advantageous, as the greater part of the other branches of our
foreign European trade. It would be, at least, three times more advantageous
than the boasted trade with our North American colonies, in which the returns
were seldom made in less than three years, frequently not in less than four or
five years. France, besides, is supposed to contain 24,000,000 of inhabitants.
Our North American colonies were never supposed to contain more than 3,000,000;
and France is a much richer country than North America; though, on account of
the more unequal distribution of riches, there is much more poverty and beggary
in the one country than in the other. France, therefore, could afford a market
at least eight times more extensive, and, on account of the superior frequency
of the returns, four-and-twenty times more advantageous than that which our
North American colonies ever afforded. The trade of Great Britain would be just
as advantageous to France, and, in proportion to the wealth, population, and
proximity of the respective countries, would have the same superiority over
that which France carries on with her own colonies. Such is the very great
difference between that trade which the wisdom of both nations has thought
proper to discourage, and that which it has favoured the most.

But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and free
commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have occasioned the
principal obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours, they are necessarily
enemies, and the wealth and power of each becomes, upon that account, more
formidable to the other; and what would increase the advantage of national
friendship, serves only to inflame the violence of national animosity. They are
both rich and industrious nations; and the merchants and manufacturers of each
dread the competition of the skill and activity of those of the other.
Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both inflames, and is itself inflamed, by
the violence of national animosity, and the traders of both countries have
announced, with all the passionate confidence of interested falsehood, the
certain ruin of each, in consequence of that unfavourable balance of trade,
which, they pretend, would be the infallible effect of an unrestrained commerce
with the other.

There is no commercial country in Europe, of which the approaching ruin has not
frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this system, from all
unfavourably balance of trade. After all the anxiety, however, which they have
excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost all trading nations
to turn that balance in their own favour, and against their neighbours, it does
not appear that any one nation in Europe has been, in any respect, impoverished
by this cause. Every town and country, on the contrary, in proportion as they
have opened their ports to all nations, instead of being ruined by this free
trade, as the principles of the commercial system would lead us to expect, have
been enriched by it. Though there are in Europe indeed, a few towns which, in
same respects, deserve the name of free ports, there is no country which does
so. Holland, perhaps, approaches the nearest to this character of any, though
still very remote from it; and Holland, it is acknowledged, not only derives
its whole wealth, but a great part of its necessary subsistence, from foreign
trade.

There is another balance, indeed, which has already been explained, very
different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to be
either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or
decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and
consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has already
been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital of the
society must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The society in
this case lives within its revenue; and what is annually saved out of its
revenue, is naturally added to its capital, and employed so as to increase
still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of the annual
produce, on the contrary, fall short of the annual consumption, the capital of
the society must annually decay in proportion to this deficiency. The expense
of the society, in this case, exceeds its revenue, and necessarily encroaches
upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must necessarily decay, and, together
with it, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its industry.

This balance of produce and consumption is entirely different from what is
called the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no
foreign trade, but which was entirely separated from all the world. It may take
place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth, population, and
improvement, may be either gradually increasing or gradually decaying.

The balance of produce and consumption may be constantly in favour of a nation,
though what is called the balance of trade be generally against it. A nation
may import to a greater value than it exports for half a century, perhaps,
together; the gold and silver which comes into it during all this time, may be
all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin may gradually decay,
different sorts of paper money being substituted in its place, and even the
debts, too, which it contracts in the principal nations with whom it deals, may
be gradually increasing; and yet its real wealth, the exchangeable value of the
annual produce of its lands and labour, may, during the same period, have been
increasing in a much greater proportion. The state of our North American
colonies, and of the trade which they carried on with Great Britain, before the
commencement of the present disturbances, {This paragraph was written in the
year 1775.} may serve as a proof that this is by no means an impossible
supposition.

CHAPTER IV.
OF DRAWBACKS.

Merchants and manufacturers are not contented with the monopoly of the home
market, but desire likewise the most extensive foreign sale for their goods.
Their country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and therefore can seldom
procure them any monopoly there. They are generally obliged, therefore, to
content themselves with petitioning for certain encouragements to exportation.

Of these encouragements, what are called drawbacks seem to be the most
reasonable. To allow the merchant to draw back upon exportation, either the
whole, or a part of whatever excise or inland duty is imposed upon domestic
industry, can never occasion the exportation of a greater quantity of goods
than what would have been exported had no duty been imposed. Such
encouragements do not tend to turn towards any particular employment a greater
share of the capital of the country, than what would go to that employment of
its own accord, but only to hinder the duty from driving away any part of that
share to other employments. They tend not to overturn that balance which
naturally establishes itself among all the various employments of the society,
but to hinder it from being overturned by the duty. They tend not to destroy,
but to preserve, what it is in most cases advantageous to preserve, the natural
division and distribution of labour in the society.

The same thing may be said of the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign
goods imported, which, in Great Britain, generally amount to by much the
largest part of the duty upon importation. By the second of the rules, annexed
to the act of parliament, which imposed what is now called the old subsidy,
every merchant, whether English or alien. was allowed to draw back half that
duty upon exportation; the English merchant, provided the exportation took
place within twelve months; the alien, provided it took place within nine
months. Wines, currants, and wrought silks, were the only goods which did not
fall within this rule, having other and more advantageous allowances. The
duties imposed by this act of parliament were, at that time, the only duties
upon the importation of foreign goods. The term within which this, and all
other drawbacks could be claimed, was afterwards (by 7 Geo. I. chap. 21. sect.
10.) extended to three years.

The duties which have been imposed since the old subsidy, are, the greater part
of them, wholly drawn back upon exportation. This general rule, however, is
liable to a great number of exceptions; and the doctrine of drawbacks has
become a much less simple matter than it was at their first institution.

Upon the exportation of some foreign goods, of which it was expected that the
importation would greatly exceed what was necessary for the home consumption,
the whole duties are drawn back, without retaining even half the old subsidy.
Before the revolt of our North American colonies, we had the monopoly of the
tobacco of Maryland and Virginia. We imported about ninety-six thousand
hogsheads, and the home consumption was not supposed to exceed fourteen
thousand. To facilitate the great exportation which was necessary, in order to
rid us of the rest, the whole duties were drawn back, provided the exportation
took place within three years.

We still have, though not altogether, yet very nearly, the monopoly of the
sugars of our West Indian islands. If sugars are exported within a year,
therefore, all the duties upon importation are drawn back; and if exported
within three years, all the duties, except half the old subsidy, which still
continues to be retained upon the exportation of the greater part of goods.
Though the importation of sugar exceeds a good deal what is necessary for the
home consumption, the excess is inconsiderable, in comparison of what it used
to be in tobacco.

Some goods, the particular objects of the jealousy of our own manufacturers,
are prohibited to be imported for home consumption. They may, however, upon
paying certain duties, be imported and warehoused for exportation. But upon
such exportation no part of these duties is drawn back. Our manufacturers are
unwilling, it seems, that even this restricted importation should be
encouraged, and are afraid lest some part of these goods should be stolen out
of the warehouse, and thus come into competition with their own. It is under
these regulations only that we can import wrought silks, French cambrics and
lawns, calicoes, painted, printed, stained, or dyed, etc.

We are unwilling even to be the carriers of French goods, and choose rather to
forego a profit to ourselves than to suffer those whom we consider as our
enemies to make any profit by our means. Not only half the old subsidy, but the
second twenty-five per cent. is retained upon the exportation of all French
goods.

By the fourth of the rules annexed to the old subsidy, the drawback allowed
upon the exportation of all wines amounted to a great deal more than half the
duties which were at that time paid upon their importation; and it seems at
that time to have been the object of the legislature to give somewhat more than
ordinary encouragement to the carrying trade in wine. Several of the other
duties, too which were imposed either at the same time or subsequent to the old
subsidy, what is called the additional duty, the new subsidy, the one-third and
two-thirds subsidies, the impost 1692, the tonnage on wine, were allowed to be
wholly drawn back upon exportation. All those duties, however, except the
additional duty and impost 1692, being paid down in ready money upon
importation, the interest of so large a sum occasioned an expense, which made
it unreasonable to expect any profitable carrying trade in this article. Only a
part, therefore of the duty called the impost on wine, and no part of the
twenty-five pounds the ton upon French wines, or of the duties imposed in 1745,
in 1763, and in 1778, were allowed to be drawn back upon exportation. The two
imposts of five per cent. imposed in 1779 and 1781, upon all the former duties
of customs, being allowed to be wholly drawn back upon the exportation of all
other goods, were likewise allowed to be drawn back upon that of wine. The last
duty that has been particularly imposed upon wine, that of 1780, is allowed to
be wholly drawn back; an indulgence which, when so many heavy duties are
retained, most probably could never occasion the exportation of a single ton of
wine. These rules took place with regard to all places of lawful exportation,
except the British colonies in America.

The 15th Charles II, chap. 7, called an act for the encouragement of trade, had
given Great Britain the monopoly of supplying the colonies with all the
commodities of the growth or manufacture of Europe, and consequently with
wines. In a country of so extensive a coast as our North American and West
Indian colonies, where our authority was always so very slender, and where the
inhabitants were allowed to carry out in their own ships their non-enumerated
commodities, at first to all parts of Europe, and afterwards to all parts of
Europe south of Cape Finisterre, it is not very probable that this monopoly
could ever be much respected; and they probably at all times found means of
bringing back some cargo from the countries to which they were allowed to carry
out one. They seem, however, to have found some difficulty in importing
European wines from the places of their growth; and they could not well import
them from Great Britain, where they were loaded with many heavy duties, of
which a considerable part was not drawn back upon exportation. Madeira wine,
not being an European commodity, could be imported directly into America and
the West Indies, countries which, in all their non-enumerated commodities,
enjoyed a free trade to the island of Madeira. These circumstances had probably
introduced that general taste for Madeira wine, which our officers found
established in all our colonies at the commencement of the war which began in
1755, and which they brought back with them to the mother country, where that
wine had not been much in fashion before. Upon the conclusion of that war, in
1763 (by the 4th Geo. III, chap. 15, sect. 12), all the duties except £3, 10s.
were allowed to be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of all
wines, except French wines, to the commerce and consumption of which national
prejudice would allow no sort of encouragement. The period between the granting
of this indulgence and the revolt of our North American colonies, was probably
too short to admit of any considerable change in the customs of those
countries.

The same act which, in the drawbacks upon all wines, except French wines, thus
favoured the colonies so much more than other countries, in those upon the
greater part of other commodities, favoured them much less. Upon the
exportation of the greater part of commodities to other countries, half the old
subsidy was drawn back. But this law enacted, that no part of that duty should
be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of any commodities of the
growth or manufacture either of Europe or the East Indies, except wines, white
calicoes, and muslins.

Drawbacks were, perhaps, originally granted for the encouragement of the
carrying trade, which, as the freight of the ship is frequently paid by
foreigners in money, was supposed to be peculiarly fitted for bringing gold and
silver into the country. But though the carrying trade certainly deserves no
peculiar encouragement, though the motive of the institution was, perhaps,
abundantly foolish, the institution itself seems reasonable enough. Such
drawbacks cannot force into this trade a greater share of the capital of the
country than what would have gone to it of its own accord, had there been no
duties upon importation; they only prevent its being excluded altogether by
those duties. The carrying trade, though it deserves no preference, ought not
to be precluded, but to be left free, like all other trades. It is a necessary
resource to those capitals which cannot find employment, either in the
agriculture or in the manufactures of the country, either in its home trade, or
in its foreign trade of consumption.

The revenue of the customs, instead of suffering, profits from such drawbacks,
by that part of the duty which is retained. If the whole duties had been
retained, the foreign goods upon which they are paid could seldom have been
exported, nor consequently imported, for want of a market. The duties,
therefore, of which a part is retained, would never have been paid.

These reasons seem sufficiently to justify drawbacks, and would justify them,
though the whole duties, whether upon the produce of domestic industry or upon
foreign goods, were always drawn back upon exportation. The revenue of excise
would, in this case indeed, suffer a little, and that of the customs a good
deal more; but the natural balance of industry, the natural division and
distribution of labour, which is always more or less disturbed by such duties,
would be more nearly re-established by such a regulation.

These reasons, however, will justify drawbacks only upon exporting goods to
those countries which are altogether foreign and independent, not to those in
which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy a monopoly. A drawback, for
example, upon the exportation of European goods to our American colonies, will
not always occasion a greater exportation than what would have taken place
without it. By means of the monopoly which our merchants and manufacturers
enjoy there, the same quantity might frequently, perhaps, be sent thither,
though the whole duties were retained. The drawback, therefore, may frequently
be pure loss to the revenue of excise and customs, without altering the state
of the trade, or rendering it in any respect more extensive. How far such
drawbacks can be justified as a proper encouragement to the industry of our
colonies, or how far it is advantageous to the mother country that they should
be exempted from taxes which are paid by all the rest of their fellow-subjects,
will appear hereafter, when I come to treat of colonies.

Drawbacks, however, it must always be understood, are useful only in those
cases in which the goods, for the exportation of which they are given, are
really exported to some foreign country, and not clandestinely re-imported into
our own. That some drawbacks, particularly those upon tobacco, have frequently
been abused in this manner, and have given occasion to many frauds, equally
hurtful both to the revenue and to the fair trader, is well known.

CHAPTER V.
OF BOUNTIES.

Bounties upon exportation are, in Great Britain, frequently petitioned for, and
sometimes granted, to the produce of particular branches of domestic industry.
By means of them, our merchants and manufacturers, it is pretended, will be
enabled to sell their goods as cheap or cheaper than their rivals in the
foreign market. A greater quantity, it is said, will thus be exported, and the
balance of trade consequently turned more in favour of our own country. We
cannot give our workmen a monopoly in the foreign, as we have done in the home
market. We cannot force foreigners to buy their goods, as we have done our own
countrymen. The next best expedient, it has been thought, therefore, is to pay
them for buying. It is in this manner that the mercantile system proposes to
enrich the whole country, and to put money into all our pockets, by means of
the balance of trade.

Bounties, it is allowed, ought to be given to those branches of trade only
which cannot be carried on without them. But every branch of trade in which the
merchant can sell his goods for a price which replaces to him, with the
ordinary profits of stock, the whole capital employed in preparing and sending
them to market, can be carried on without a bounty. Every such branch is
evidently upon a level with all the other branches of trade which are carried
on without bounties, and cannot, therefore, require one more than they. Those
trades only require bounties, in which the merchant is obliged to sell his
goods for a price which does not replace to him his capital, together with the
ordinary profit, or in which he is obliged to sell them for less than it really
cost him to send them to market. The bounty is given in order to make up this
loss, and to encourage him to continue, or, perhaps, to begin a trade, of which
the expense is supposed to be greater than the returns, of which every
operation eats up a part of the capital employed in it, and which is of such a
nature, that if all other trades resembled it, there would soon be no capital
left in the country.

The trades, it is to be observed, which are carried on by means of bounties,
are the only ones which can be carried on between two nations for any
considerable time together, in such a manner as that one of them shall always
and regularly lose, or sell its goods for less than it really cost to send them
to market. But if the bounty did not repay to the merchant what he would
otherwise lose upon the price of his goods, his own interest would soon oblige
him to employ his stock in another way, or to find out a trade in which the
price of the goods would replace to him, with the ordinary profit, the capital
employed in sending them to market. The effect of bounties, like that of all
the other expedients of the mercantile system, can only be to force the trade
of a country into a channel much less advantageous than that in which it would
naturally run of its own accord.

The ingenious and well-informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade has
shown very clearly, that since the bounty upon the exportation of corn was
first established, the price of the corn exported, valued moderately enough,
has exceeded that of the corn imported, valued very high, by a much greater sum
than the amount of the whole bounties which have been paid during that period.
This, he imagines, upon the true principles of the mercantile system, is a
clear proof that this forced corn trade is beneficial to the nation, the value
of the exportation exceeding that of the importation by a much greater sum than
the whole extraordinary expense which the public has been at in order to get it
exported. He does not consider that this extraordinary expense, or the bounty,
is the smallest part of the expense which the exportation of corn really costs
the society. The capital which the farmer employed in raising it must likewise
be taken into the account. Unless the price of the corn, when sold in the
foreign markets, replaces not only the bounty, but this capital, together with
the ordinary profits of stock, the society is a loser by the difference, or the
national stock is so much diminished. But the very reason for which it has been
thought necessary to grant a bounty, is the supposed insufficiency of the price
to do this.

The average price of corn, it has been said, has fallen considerably since the
establishment of the bounty. That the average price of corn began to fall
somewhat towards the end of the last century, and has continued to do so during
the course of the sixty-four first years of the present, I have already
endeavoured to show. But this event, supposing it to be real, as I believe it
to be, must have happened in spite of the bounty, and cannot possibly have
happened in consequence of it. It has happened in France, as well as in
England, though in France there was not only no bounty, but, till 1764, the
exportation of corn was subjected to a general prohibition. This gradual fall
in the average price of grain, it is probable, therefore, is ultimately owing
neither to the one regulation nor to the other, but to that gradual and
insensible rise in the real value of silver, which, in the first book of this
discourse, I have endeavoured to show, has taken place in the general market of
Europe during the course of the present century. It seems to be altogether
impossible that the bounty could ever contribute to lower the price of grain.

In years of plenty, it has already been observed, the bounty, by occasioning an
extraordinary exportation, necessarily keeps up the price of corn in the home
market above what it would naturally fall to. To do so was the avowed purpose
of the institution. In years of scarcity, though the bounty is frequently
suspended, yet the great exportation which it occasions in years of plenty,
must frequently hinder, more or less, the plenty of one year from relieving the
scarcity of another. Both in years of plenty and in years of scarcity,
therefore, the bounty necessarily tends to raise the money price of corn
somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the home market.

That in the actual state of tillage the bounty must necessarily have this
tendency, will not, I apprehend, be disputed by any reasonable person. But it
has been thought by many people, that it tends to encourage tillage, and that
in two different ways; first, by opening a more extensive foreign market to the
corn of the farmer, it tends, they imagine, to increase the demand for, and
consequently the production of, that commodity; and, secondly by securing to
him a better price than he could otherwise expect in the actual state of
tillage, it tends, they suppose, to encourage tillage. This double
encouragement must they imagine, in a long period of years, occasion such an
increase in the production of corn, as may lower its price in the home market,
much more than the bounty can raise it in the actual state which tillage may,
at the end of that period, happen to be in.

I answer, that whatever extension of the foreign market can be occasioned by
the bounty must, in every particular year, be altogether at the expense of the
home market; as every bushel of corn, which is exported by means of the bounty,
and which would not have been exported without the bounty, would have remained
in the home market to increase the consumption, and to lower the price of that
commodity. The corn bounty, it is to be observed, as well as every other bounty
upon exportation, imposes two different taxes upon the people; first, the tax
which they are obliged to contribute, in order to pay the bounty; and,
secondly, the tax which arises from the advanced price of the commodity in the
home market, and which, as the whole body of the people are purchasers of corn,
must, in this particular commodity, be paid by the whole body of the people. In
this particular commodity, therefore, this second tax is by much the heaviest
of the two. Let us suppose that, taking one year with another, the bounty of
5s. upon the exportation of the quarter of wheat raises the price of that
commodity in the home market only 6d. the bushel, or 4s. the quarter higher
than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the crop. Even upon
this very moderate supposition, the great body of the people, over and above
contributing the tax which pays the bounty of 5s. upon every quarter of wheat
exported, must pay another of 4s. upon every quarter which they themselves
consume. But according to the very well informed author of the Tracts upon the
Corn Trade, the average proportion of the corn exported to that consumed at
home, is not more than that of one to thirty-one. For every 5s. therefore,
which they contribute to the payment of the first tax, they must contribute
£6:4s. to the payment of the second. So very heavy a tax upon the first
necessary of life-must either reduce the subsistence of the labouring poor, or
it must occasion some augmentation in their pecuniary wages, proportionable to
that in the pecuniary price of their subsistence. So far as it operates in the
one way, it must reduce the ability of the labouring poor to educate and bring
up their children, and must, so far, tend to restrain the population of the
country. So far as it operates in the other, it must reduce the ability of the
employers of the poor, to employ so great a number as they otherwise might do,
and must so far tend to restrain the industry of the country. The extraordinary
exportation of corn, therefore occasioned by the bounty, not only in every
particular year diminishes the home, just as much as it extends the foreign
market and consumption, but, by restraining the population and industry of the
country, its final tendency is to stint and restrain the gradual extension of
the home market; and thereby, in the long-run, rather to diminish than to
augment the whole market and consumption of corn.

This enhancement of the money price of corn, however, it has been thought, by
rendering that commodity more profitable to the farmer, must necessarily
encourage its production.

I answer, that this might be the case, if the effect of the bounty was to raise
the real price of corn, or to enable the farmer, with an equal quantity of it,
to maintain a greater number of labourers in the same manner, whether liberal,
moderate, or scanty, than other labourers are commonly maintained in his
neighbourhood. But neither the bounty, it is evident, nor any other human
institution, can have any such effect. It is not the real, but the nominal
price of corn, which can in any considerable degree be affected by the bounty.
And though the tax, which that institution imposes upon the whole body of the
people, may be very burdensome to those who pay it, it is of very little
advantage to those who receive it.

The real effect of the bounty is not so much to raise the real value of corn,
as to degrade the real value of silver; or to make an equal quantity of it
exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn, but of all other home made
commodities; for the money price of corn regulates that of all other home made
commodities.

It regulates the money price of labour, which must always be such as to enable
the labourer to purchase a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain him and his
family, either in the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner, in which the
advancing, stationary, or declining, circumstances of the society, oblige his
employers to maintain him.

It regulates the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of
land, which, in every period of improvement, must bear a certain proportion to
that of corn, though this proportion is different in different periods. It
regulates, for example, the money price of grass and hay, of butcher’s
meat, of horses, and the maintenance of horses, of land carriage consequently,
or of the greater part of the inland commerce of the country.

By regulating the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of
land, it regulates that of the materials of almost all manufactures; by
regulating the money price of labour, it regulates that of manufacturing art
and industry; and by regulating both, it regulates that of the complete
manufacture. The money price of labour, and of every thing that is the produce,
either of land or labour, must necessarily either rise or fall in proportion to
the money price of corn.

Though in consequence of the bounty, therefore, the farmer should be enabled to
sell his corn for 4s. the bushel, instead of 3s:6d. and to pay his landlord a
money rent proportionable to this rise in the money price of his produce; yet
if, in consequence of this rise in the price of corn, 4s. will purchase no more
home made goods of any other kind than 3s. 6d. would have done before, neither
the circumstances of the farmer, nor those of the landlord, will be much mended
by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate much better; the
landlord will not be able to live much better. In the purchase of foreign
commodities, this enhancement in the price of corn may give them some little
advantage. In that of home made commodities, it can give them none at all. And
almost the whole expense of the farmer, and the far greater part even of that
of the landlord, is in home made commodities.

That degradation in the value of silver, which is the effect of the fertility
of the mines, and which operates equally, or very nearly equally, through the
greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little consequence to
any particular country. The consequent rise of all money prices, though it does
not make those who receive them really richer, does not make them really
poorer. A service of plate becomes really cheaper, and every thing else remains
precisely of the same real value as before.

But that degradation in the value of silver, which, being the effect either of
the peculiar situation or of the political institutions of a particular
country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of very great
consequence, which, far from tending to make anybody really richer, tends to
make every body really poorer. The rise in the money price of all commodities,
which is in this case peculiar to that country, tends to discourage more or
less every sort of industry which is carried on within it, and to enable
foreign nations, by furnishing almost all sorts of goods for a smaller quantity
of silver than its own workmen can afford to do, to undersell them, not only in
the foreign, but even in the home market.

It is the peculiar situation of Spain and Portugal, as proprietors of the
mines, to be the distributers of gold and silver to all the other countries of
Europe. Those metals ought naturally, therefore, to be somewhat cheaper in
Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe. The difference, however,
should be no more than the amount of the freight and insurance; and, on account
of the great value and small bulk of those metals, their freight is no great
matter, and their insurance is the same as that of any other goods of equal
value. Spain and Portugal, therefore, could suffer very little from their
peculiar situation, if they did not aggravate its disadvantages by their
political institutions.

Spain by taxing, and Portugal by prohibiting, the exportation of gold and
silver, load that exportation with the expense of smuggling, and raise the
value of those metals in other countries so much more above what it is in their
own, by the whole amount of this expense. When you dam up a stream of water, as
soon as the dam is full, as much water must run over the dam-head as if there
was no dam at all. The prohibition of exportation cannot detain a greater
quantity of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal, than what they can afford to
employ, than what the annual produce of their land and labour will allow them
to employ, in coin, plate, gilding, and other ornaments of gold and silver.
When they have got this quantity, the dam is full, and the whole stream which
flows in afterwards must run over. The annual exportation of gold and silver
from Spain and Portugal, accordingly, is, by all accounts, notwithstanding
these restraints, very near equal to the whole annual importation. As the
water, however, must always be deeper behind the dam-head than before it, so
the quantity of gold and silver which these restraints detain in Spain and
Portugal, must, in proportion to the annual produce of their land and labour,
be greater than what is to be found in other countries. The higher and stronger
the dam-head, the greater must be the difference in the depth of water behind
and before it. The higher the tax, the higher the penalties with which the
prohibition is guarded, the more vigilant and severe the police which looks
after the execution of the law, the greater must be the difference in the
proportion of gold and silver to the annual produce of the land and labour of
Spain and Portugal, and to that of other countries. It is said, accordingly, to
be very considerable, and that you frequently find there a profusion of plate
in houses, where there is nothing else which would in other countries be
thought suitable or correspondent to this sort of magnificence. The cheapness
of gold and silver, or, what is the same thing, the dearness of all
commodities, which is the necessary effect of this redundancy of the precious
metals, discourages both the agriculture and manufactures of Spain and
Portugal, and enables foreign nations to supply them with many sorts of rude,
and with almost all sorts of manufactured produce, for a smaller quantity of
gold and silver than what they themselves can either raise or make them for at
home. The tax and prohibition operate in two different ways. They not only
lower very much the value of the precious metals in Spain and Portugal, but by
detaining there a certain quantity of those metals which would otherwise flow
over other countries, they keep up their value in those other countries
somewhat above what it otherwise would be, and thereby give those countries a
double advantage in their commerce with Spain and Portugal. Open the
flood-gates, and there will presently be less water above, and more below the
dam-head, and it will soon come to a level in both places. Remove the tax and
the prohibition, and as the quantity of gold and silver will diminish
considerably in Spain and Portugal, so it will increase somewhat in other
countries; and the value of those metals, their proportion to the annual
produce of land and labour, will soon come to a level, or very near to a level,
in all. The loss which Spain and Portugal could sustain by this exportation of
their gold and silver, would be altogether nominal and imaginary. The nominal
value of their goods, and of the annual produce of their land and labour, would
fall, and would be expressed or represented by a smaller quantity of silver
than before; but their real value would be the same as before, and would be
sufficient to maintain, command, and employ the same quantity of labour. As the
nominal value of their goods would fall, the real value of what remained of
their gold and silver would rise, and a smaller quantity of those metals would
answer all the same purposes of commerce and circulation which had employed a
greater quantity before. The gold and silver which would go abroad would not go
abroad for nothing, but would bring back an equal value of goods of some kind
or other. Those goods, too, would not be all matters of mere luxury and
expense, to be consumed by idle people, who produce nothing in return for their
consumption. As the real wealth and revenue of idle people would not be
augmented by this extraordinary exportation of gold and silver, so neither
would their consumption be much augmented by it. Those goods would probably,
the greater part of them, and certainly some part of them, consist in
materials, tools, and provisions, for the employment and maintenance of
industrious people, who would reproduce, with a profit, the full value of their
consumption. A part of the dead stock of the society would thus be turned into
active stock, and would put into motion a greater quantity of industry than had
been employed before. The annual produce of their land and labour would
immediately be augmented a little, and in a few years would probably be
augmented a great deal; their industry being thus relieved from one of the most
oppressive burdens which it at present labours under.

The bounty upon the exportation of corn necessarily operates exactly in the
same way as this absurd policy of Spain and Portugal. Whatever be the actual
state of tillage, it renders our corn somewhat dearer in the home market than
it otherwise would be in that state, and somewhat cheaper in the foreign; and
as the average money price of corn regulates, more or less, that of all other
commodities, it lowers the value of silver considerably in the one, and tends
to raise it a little in the other. It enables foreigners, the Dutch in
particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwise could do, but
sometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own people can do upon the same
occasions; as we are assured by an excellent authority, that of Sir Matthew
Decker. It hinders our own workmen from furnishing their goods for so small a
quantity of silver as they otherwise might do, and enables the Dutch to furnish
theirs for a smaller. It tends to render our manufactures somewhat dearer in
every market, and theirs somewhat cheaper, than they otherwise would be, and
consequently to give their industry a double advantage over our own.

The bounty, as it raises in the home market, not so much the real, as the
nominal price of our corn; as it augments, not the quantity of labour which a
certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ, but only the quantity of
silver which it will exchange for; it discourages our manufactures, without
rendering any considerable service, either to our farmers or country gentlemen.
It puts, indeed, a little more money into the pockets of both, and it will
perhaps be somewhat difficult to persuade the greater part of them that this is
not rendering them a very considerable service. But if this money sinks in its
value, in the quantity of labour, provisions, and home-made commodities of all
different kinds which it is capable of purchasing, as much as it rises in its
quantity, the service will be little more than nominal and imaginary.

There is, perhaps, but one set of men in the whole commonwealth to whom the
bounty either was or could be essentially serviceable. These were the corn
merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of plenty, the bounty
necessarily occasioned a greater exportation than would otherwise have taken
place; and by hindering the plenty of the one year from relieving the scarcity
of another, it occasioned in years of scarcity a greater importation than would
otherwise have been necessary. It increased the business of the corn merchant
in both; and in the years of scarcity, it not only enabled him to import a
greater quantity, but to sell it for a better price, and consequently with a
greater profit, than he could otherwise have made, if the plenty of one year
had not been more or less hindered from relieving the scarcity of another. It
is in this set of men, accordingly, that I have observed the greatest zeal for
the continuance or renewal of the bounty.

Our country gentlemen, when they imposed the high duties upon the exportation
of foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, and
when they established the bounty, seem to have imitated the conduct of our
manufacturers. By the one institution, they secured to themselves the monopoly
of the home market, and by the other they endeavoured to prevent that market
from ever being overstocked with their commodity. By both they endeavoured to
raise its real value, in the same manner as our manufacturers had, by the like
institutions, raised the real value of many different sorts of manufactured
goods. They did not, perhaps, attend to the great and essential difference
which nature has established between corn and almost every other sort of goods.
When, either by the monopoly of the home market, or by a bounty upon
exportation, you enable our woollen or linen manufacturers to sell their goods
for somewhat a better price than they otherwise could get for them, you raise,
not only the nominal, but the real price of those goods; you render them
equivalent to a greater quantity of labour and subsistence; you increase not
only the nominal, but the real profit, the real wealth and revenue of those
manufacturers; and you enable them, either to live better themselves, or to
employ a greater quantity of labour in those particular manufactures. You
really encourage those manufactures, and direct towards them a greater quantity
of the industry of the country than what would properly go to them of its own
accord. But when, by the like institutions, you raise the nominal or money
price of corn, you do not raise its real value; you do not increase the real
wealth, the real revenue, either of our farmers or country gentlemen; you do
not encourage the growth of corn, because you do not enable them to maintain
and employ more labourers in raising it. The nature of things has stamped upon
corn a real value, which cannot be altered by merely altering its money price.
No bounty upon exportation, no monopoly of the home market, can raise that
value. The freest competition cannot lower it, Through the world in general,
that value is equal to the quantity of labour which it can maintain, and in
every particular place it is equal to the quantity of labour which it can
maintain in the way, whether liberal, moderate, or scanty, in which labour is
commonly maintained in that place. Woollen or linen cloth are not the
regulating commodities by which the real value of all other commodities must be
finally measured and determined; corn is. The real value of every other
commodity is finally measured and determined by the proportion which its
average money price bears to the average money price of corn. The real value of
corn does not vary with those variations in its average money price, which
sometimes occur from one century to another; it is the real value of silver
which varies with them.

Bounties upon the exportation of any homemade commodity are liable, first, to
that general objection which may be made to all the different expedients of the
mercantile system; the objection of forcing some part of the industry of the
country into a channel less advantageous than that in which it would run of its
own accord; and, secondly, to the particular objection of forcing it not only
into a channel that is less advantageous, but into one that is actually
disadvantageous; the trade which cannot be carried on but by means of a bounty
being necessarily a losing trade. The bounty upon the exportation of corn is
liable to this further objection, that it can in no respect promote the raising
of that particular commodity of which it was meant to encourage the production.
When our country gentlemen, therefore, demanded the establishment of the
bounty, though they acted in imitation of our merchants and manufacturers, they
did not act with that complete comprehension of their own interest, which
commonly directs the conduct of those two other orders of people. They loaded
the public revenue with a very considerable expense: they imposed a very heavy
tax upon the whole body of the people; but they did not, in any sensible
degree, increase the real value of their own commodity; and by lowering
somewhat the real value of silver, they discouraged, in some degree, the
general industry of the country, and, instead of advancing, retarded more or
less the improvement of their own lands, which necessarily depend upon the
general industry of the country.

To encourage the production of any commodity, a bounty upon production, one
should imagine, would have a more direct operation than one upon exportation.
It would, besides, impose only one tax upon the people, that which they must
contribute in order to pay the bounty. Instead of raising, it would tend to
lower the price of the commodity in the home market; and thereby, instead of
imposing a second tax upon the people, it might, at least in part, repay them
for what they had contributed to the first. Bounties upon production, however,
have been very rarely granted. The prejudices established by the commercial
system have taught us to believe, that national wealth arises more immediately
from exportation than from production. It has been more favoured, accordingly,
as the more immediate means of bringing money into the country. Bounties upon
production, it has been said too, have been found by experience more liable to
frauds than those upon exportation. How far this is true, I know not. That
bounties upon exportation have been abused, to many fraudulent purposes, is
very well known. But it is not the interest of merchants and manufacturers, the
great inventors of all these expedients, that the home market should be
overstocked with their goods; an event which a bounty upon production might
sometimes occasion. A bounty upon exportation, by enabling them to send abroad
their surplus part, and to keep up the price of what remains in the home
market, effectually prevents this. Of all the expedients of the mercantile
system, accordingly, it is the one of which they are the fondest. I have known
the different undertakers of some particular works agree privately among
themselves to give a bounty out of their own pockets upon the exportation of a
certain proportion of the goods which they dealt in. This expedient succeeded
so well, that it more than doubled the price of their goods in the home market,
notwithstanding a very considerable increase in the produce. The operation of
the bounty upon corn must have been wonderfully different, if it has lowered
the money price of that commodity.

Something like a bounty upon production, however, has been granted upon some
particular occasions. The tonnage bounties given to the white herring and whale
fisheries may, perhaps, be considered as somewhat of this nature. They tend
directly, it may be supposed, to render the goods cheaper in the home market
than they otherwise would be. In other respects, their effects, it must be
acknowledged, are the same as those of bounties upon exportation. By means of
them, a part of the capital of the country is employed in bringing goods to
market, of which the price does not repay the cost, together with the ordinary
profits of stock.

But though the tonnage bounties to those fisheries do not contribute to the
opulence of the nation, it may, perhaps, be thought that they contribute to its
defence, by augmenting the number of its sailors and shipping. This, it may be
alleged, may sometimes be done by means of such bounties, at a much smaller
expense than by keeping up a great standing navy, if I may use such an
expression, in the same way as a standing army.

Notwithstanding these favourable allegations, however, the following
considerations dispose me to believe, that in granting at least one of these
bounties, the legislature has been very grossly imposed upon:

First, The herring-buss bounty seems too large.

From the commencement of the winter fishing 1771, to the end of the winter
fishing 1781, the tonnage bounty upon the herring-buss fishery has been at
thirty shillings the ton. During these eleven years, the whole number of
barrels caught by the herring-buss fishery of Scotland amounted to 378,347. The
herrings caught and cured at sea are called sea-sticks. In order to render them
what are called merchantable herrings, it is necessary to repack them with an
additional quantity of salt; and in this case, it is reckoned, that three
barrels of sea-sticks are usually repacked into two barrels of merchantable
herrings. The number of barrels of merchantable herrings, therefore, caught
during these eleven years, will amount only, according to this account, to
252,231¼. During these eleven years, the tonnage bounties paid amounted to
£155,463:11s. or 8s:2¼d. upon every barrel of sea-sticks, and to 12s:3¾d. upon
every barrel of merchantable herrings.

The salt with which these herrings are cured is sometimes Scotch, and sometimes
foreign salt; both which are delivered, free of all excise duty, to the
fish-curers. The excise duty upon Scotch salt is at present 1s:6d., that upon
foreign salt 10s. the bushel. A barrel of herrings is supposed to require about
one bushel and one-fourth of a bushel foreign salt. Two bushels are the
supposed average of Scotch salt. If the herrings are entered for exportation,
no part of this duty is paid up; if entered for home consumption, whether the
herrings were cured with foreign or with Scotch salt, only one shilling the
barrel is paid up. It was the old Scotch duty upon a bushel of salt, the
quantity which, at a low estimation, had been supposed necessary for curing a
barrel of herrings. In Scotland, foreign salt is very little used for any other
purpose but the curing of fish. But from the 5th April 1771 to the 5th April
1782, the quantity of foreign salt imported amounted to 936,974 bushels, at
eighty-four pounds the bushel; the quantity of Scotch salt delivered from the
works to the fish-curers, to no more than 168,226, at fifty-six pounds the
bushel only. It would appear, therefore, that it is principally foreign salt
that is used in the fisheries. Upon every barrel of herrings exported, there
is, besides, a bounty of 2s:8d. and more than two-thirds of the buss-caught
herrings are exported. Put all these things together, and you will find that,
during these eleven years, every barrel of buss-caught herrings, cured with
Scotch salt, when exported, has cost government 17s:11¾d.; and, when entered
for home consumption, 14s:3¾d.; and that every barrel cured with foreign salt,
when exported, has cost government £1:7:5¾d.; and, when entered for home
consumption, £1:3:9¾d. The price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings runs
from seventeen and eighteen to four and five-and-twenty shillings; about a
guinea at an average. {See the accounts at the end of this Book.}

Secondly, The bounty to the white-herring fishery is a tonnage bounty, and is
proportioned to the burden of the ship, not to her diligence or success in the
fishery; and it has, I am afraid, been too common for the vessels to fit out
for the sole purpose of catching, not the fish but the bounty. In the year
1759, when the bounty was at fifty shillings the ton, the whole buss fishery of
Scotland brought in only four barrels of sea-sticks. In that year, each barrel
of sea-sticks cost government, in bounties alone, £113:15s.; each barrel of
merchantable herrings £159:7:6.

Thirdly, The mode of fishing, for which this tonnage bounty in the white
herring fishery has been given (by busses or decked vessels from twenty to
eighty tons burden ), seems not so well adapted to the situation of Scotland,
as to that of Holland, from the practice of which country it appears to have
been borrowed. Holland lies at a great distance from the seas to which herrings
are known principally to resort, and can, therefore, carry on that fishery only
in decked vessels, which can carry water and provisions sufficient for a voyage
to a distant sea; but the Hebrides, or Western Islands, the islands of
Shetland, and the northern and north-western coasts of Scotland, the countries
in whose neighbourhood the herring fishery is principally carried on, are
everywhere intersected by arms of the sea, which run up a considerable way into
the land, and which, in the language of the country, are called sea-lochs. It
is to these sea-lochs that the herrings principally resort during the seasons
in which they visit these seas; for the visits of this, and, I am assured, of
many other sorts of fish, are not quite regular and constant. A boat-fishery,
therefore, seems to be the mode of fishing best adapted to the peculiar
situation of Scotland, the fishers carrying the herrings on shore as fast as
they are taken, to be either cured or consumed fresh. But the great
encouragement which a bounty of 30s. the ton gives to the buss-fishery, is
necessarily a discouragement to the boat-fishery, which, having no such bounty,
cannot bring its cured fish to market upon the same terms as the buss-fishery.
The boat-fishery; accordingly, which, before the establishment of the
buss-bounty, was very considerable, and is said to have employed a number of
seamen, not inferior to what the buss-fishery employs at present, is now gone
almost entirely to decay. Of the former extent, however, of this now ruined and
abandoned fishery, I must acknowledge that I cannot pretend to speak with much
precision. As no bounty was-paid upon the outfit of the boat-fishery, no
account was taken of it by the officers of the customs or salt duties.

Fourthly, In many parts of Scotland, during certain seasons of the year,
herrings make no inconsiderable part of the food of the common people. A bounty
which tended to lower their price in the home market, might contribute a good
deal to the relief of a great number of our fellow-subjects, whose
circumstances are by no means affluent. But the herring-bus bounty contributes
to no such good purpose. It has ruined the boat fishery, which is by far the
best adapted for the supply of the home market; and the additional bounty of
2s:8d. the barrel upon exportation, carries the greater part, more than
two-thirds, of the produce of the buss-fishery abroad. Between thirty and forty
years ago, before the establishment of the buss-bounty, 16s. the barrel, I have
been assured, was the common price of white herrings. Between ten and fifteen
years ago, before the boat-fishery was entirely ruined, the price was said to
have run from seventeen to twenty shillings the barrel. For these last five
years, it has, at an average, been at twenty-five shillings the barrel. This
high price, however, may have been owing to the real scarcity of the herrings
upon the coast of Scotland. I must observe, too, that the cask or barrel, which
is usually sold with the herrings, and of which the price is included in all
the foregoing prices, has, since the commencement of the American war, risen to
about double its former price, or from about 3s. to about 6s. I must likewise
observe, that the accounts I have received of the prices of former times, have
been by no means quite uniform and consistent, and an old man of great accuracy
and experience has assured me, that, more than fifty years ago, a guinea was
the usual price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings; and this, I imagine,
may still be looked upon as the average price. All accounts, however, I think,
agree that the price has not been lowered in the home market in consequence of
the buss-bounty.

When the undertakers of fisheries, after such liberal bounties have been
bestowed upon them, continue to sell their commodity at the same, or even at a
higher price than they were accustomed to do before, it might be expected that
their profits should be very great; and it is not improbable that those of some
individuals may have been so. In general, however, I have every reason to
believe they have been quite otherwise. The usual effect of such bounties is,
to encourage rash undertakers to adventure in a business which they do not
understand; and what they lose by their own negligence and ignorance, more than
compensates all that they can gain by the utmost liberality of government. In
1750, by the same act which first gave the bounty of 30s. the ton for the
encouragement of the white herring fishery (the 23d Geo. II. chap. 24), a joint
stock company was erected, with a capital of £500,000, to which the subscribers
(over and above all other encouragements, the tonnage bounty just now
mentioned, the exportation bounty of 2s:8d. the barrel, the delivery of both
British and foreign salt duty free) were, during the space of fourteen years,
for every hundred pounds which they subscribed and paid into the stock of the
society, entitled to three pounds a-year, to be paid by the receiver-general of
the customs in equal half-yearly payments. Besides this great company, the
residence of whose governor and directors was to be in London, it was declared
lawful to erect different fishing chambers in all the different out-ports of
the kingdom, provided a sum not less than £10,000 was subscribed into the
capital of each, to be managed at its own risk, and for its own profit and
loss. The same annuity, and the same encouragements of all kinds, were given to
the trade of those inferior chambers as to that of the great company. The
subscription of the great company was soon filled up, and several different
fishing chambers were erected in the different out-ports of the kingdom. In
spite of all these encouragements, almost all those different companies, both
great and small, lost either the whole or the greater part of their capitals;
scarce a vestige now remains of any of them, and the white-herring fishery is
now entirely, or almost entirely, carried on by private adventurers.

If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defence of the
society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours for the
supply; and if such manufacture could not otherwise be supported at home, it
might not be unreasonable that all the other branches of industry should be
taxed in order to support it. The bounties upon the exportation of British made
sail-cloth, and British made gunpowder, may, perhaps, both be vindicated upon
this principle.

But though it can very seldom be reasonable to tax the industry of the great
body of the people, in order to support that of some particular class of
manufacturers; yet, in the wantonness of great prosperity, when the public
enjoys a greater revenue than it knows well what to do with, to give such
bounties to favourite manufactures, may, perhaps, be as natural as to incur any
other idle expense. In public, as well as in private expenses, great wealth,
may, perhaps, frequently be admitted as an apology for great folly. But there
must surely be something more than ordinary absurdity in continuing such
profusion in times of general difficulty and distress.

What is called a bounty, is sometimes no more than a drawback, and,
consequently, is not liable to the same objections as what is properly a
bounty. The bounty, for example, upon refined sugar exported, may be considered
as a drawback of the duties upon the brown and Muscovado sugars, from which it
is made; the bounty upon wrought silk exported, a drawback of the duties upon
raw and thrown silk imported; the bounty upon gunpowder exported, a drawback of
the duties upon brimstone and saltpetre imported. In the language of the
customs, those allowances only are called drawbacks which are given upon goods
exported in the same form in which they are imported. When that form has been
so altered by manufacture of any kind as to come under a new denomination, they
are called bounties.

Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacturers, who excel in their
particular occupations, are not liable to the same objections as bounties. By
encouraging extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity, they serve to keep up the
emulation of the workmen actually employed in those respective occupations, and
are not considerable enough to turn towards any one of them a greater share of
the capital of the country than what would go to it of its own accord. Their
tendency is not to overturn the natural balance of employments, but to render
the work which is done in each as perfect and complete as possible. The expense
of premiums, besides, is very trifling, that of bounties very great. The bounty
upon corn alone has sometimes cost the public, in one year, more than £300,000.

Bounties are sometimes called premiums, as drawbacks are sometimes called
bounties. But we must, in all cases, attend to the nature of the thing, without
paying any regard to the word.

Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws.

I cannot conclude this chapter concerning bounties, without observing, that the
praises which have been bestowed upon the law which establishes the bounty upon
the exportation of corn, and upon that system of regulations which is connected
with it, are altogether unmerited. A particular examination of the nature of
the corn trade, and of the principal British laws which relate to it, will
sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this assertion. The great importance of
this subject must justify the length of the digression.

The trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different branches, which,
though they may sometimes be all carried on by the same person, are, in their
own nature, four separate and distinct trades. These are, first, the trade of
the inland dealer; secondly, that of the merchant-importer for home
consumption; thirdly, that of the merchant-exporter of home produce for foreign
consumption; and, fourthly, that of the merchant-carrier, or of the importer of
corn, in order to export it again.

I. The interest of the inland dealer, and that of the great body of the people,
how opposite soever they may at first appear, are, even in years of the
greatest scarcity, exactly the same. It is his interest to raise the price of
his corn as high as the real scarcity of the season requires, and it can never
be his interest to raise it higher. By raising the price, he discourages the
consumption, and puts every body more or less, but particularly the inferior
ranks of people, upon thrift and good management. If, by raising it too high,
he discourages the consumption so much that the supply of the season is likely
to go beyond the consumption of the season, and to last for some time after the
next crop begins to come in, he runs the hazard, not only of losing a
considerable part of his corn by natural causes, but of being obliged to sell
what remains of it for much less than what he might have had for it several
months before. If, by not raising the price high enough, he discourages the
consumption so little, that the supply of the season is likely to fall short of
the consumption of the season, he not only loses a part of the profit which he
might otherwise have made, but he exposes the people to suffer before the end
of the season, instead of the hardships of a dearth, the dreadful horrors of a
famine. It is the interest of the people that their daily, weekly, and monthly
consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the supply of the
season. The interest of the inland corn dealer is the same. By supplying them,
as nearly as he can judge, in this proportion, he is likely to sell all his
corn for the highest price, and with the greatest profit; and his knowledge of
the state of the crop, and of his daily, weekly, and monthly sales, enables him
to judge, with more or less accuracy, how far they really are supplied in this
manner. Without intending the interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by
a regard to his own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty
much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged
to treat his crew. When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he
puts them upon short allowance. Though from excess of caution he should
sometimes do this without any real necessity, yet all the inconveniencies which
his crew can thereby suffer are inconsiderable, in comparison of the danger,
misery, and ruin, to which they might sometimes be exposed by a less provident
conduct. Though, from excess of avarice, in the same manner, the inland corn
merchant should sometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the
scarcity of the season requires, yet all the inconveniencies which the people
can suffer from this conduct, which effectually secures them from a famine in
the end of the season, are inconsiderable, in comparison of what they might
have been exposed to by a more liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it
the corn merchant himself is likely to suffer the most by this excess of
avarice; not only from the indignation which it generally excites against him,
but, though he should escape the effects of this indignation, from the quantity
of corn which it necessarily leaves upon his hands in the end of the season,
and which, if the next season happens to prove favourable, he must always sell
for a much lower price than he might otherwise have had.

Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants to possess
themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country, it might perhaps be their
interest to deal with it, as the Dutch are said to do with the spiceries of the
Moluccas, to destroy or throw away a considerable part of it, in order to keep
up the price of the rest. But it is scarce possible, even by the violence of
law, to establish such an extensive monopoly with regard to corn; and wherever
the law leaves the trade free, it is of all commodities the least liable to be
engrossed or monopolised by the force a few large capitals, which buy up the
greater part of it. Not only its value far exceeds what the capitals of a few
private men are capable of purchasing; but, supposing they were capable of
purchasing it, the manner in which it is produced renders this purchase
altogether impracticable. As, in every civilized country, it is the commodity
of which the annual consumption is the greatest; so a greater quantity of
industry is annually employed in producing corn than in producing any other
commodity. When it first comes from the ground, too, it is necessarily divided
among a greater number of owners than any other commodity; and these owners can
never be collected into one place, like a number of independent manufacturers,
but are necessarily scattered through all the different corners of the country.
These first owners either immediately supply the consumers in their own
neighbourhood, or they supply other inland dealers, who supply those consumers.
The inland dealers in corn, therefore, including both the farmer and the baker,
are necessarily more numerous than the dealers in any other commodity; and
their dispersed situation renders it altogether impossible for them to enter
into any general combination. If, in a year of scarcity, therefore, any of them
should find that he had a good deal more corn upon hand than, at the current
price, he could hope to dispose of before the end of the season, he would never
think of keeping up this price to his own loss, and to the sole benefit of his
rivals and competitors, but would immediately lower it, in order to get rid of
his corn before the new crop began to come in. The same motives, the same
interests, which would thus regulate the conduct of any one dealer, would
regulate that of every other, and oblige them all in general to sell their corn
at the price which, according to the best of their judgment, was most suitable
to the scarcity or plenty of the season.

Whoever examines, with attention, the history of the dearths and famines which
have afflicted any part of Europe during either the course of the present or
that of the two preceding centuries, of several of which we have pretty exact
accounts, will find, I believe, that a dearth never has arisen from any
combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor from any other cause but a
real scarcity, occasioned sometimes, perhaps, and in some particular places, by
the waste of war, but in by far the greatest number of cases by the fault of
the seasons; and that a famine has never arisen from any other cause but the
violence of government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the
inconveniencies of a dearth.

In an extensive corn country, between all the different parts of which there is
a free commerce and communication, the scarcity occasioned by the most
unfavourable seasons can never be so great as to produce a famine; and the
scantiest crop, if managed with frugality and economy, will maintain, through
the year, the same number of people that are commonly fed in a more affluent
manner by one of moderate plenty. The seasons most unfavourable to the crop are
those of excessive drought or excessive rain. But as corn grows equally upon
high and low lands, upon grounds that are disposed to be too wet, and upon
those that are disposed to be too dry, either the drought or the rain, which is
hurtful to one part of the country, is favourable to another; and though, both
in the wet and in the dry season, the crop is a good deal less than in one more
properly tempered; yet, in both, what is lost in one part of the country is in
some measure compensated by what is gained in the other. In rice countries,
where the crop not only requires a very moist soil, but where, in a certain
period of its growing, it must be laid under water, the effects of a drought
are much more dismal. Even in such countries, however, the drought is, perhaps,
scarce ever so universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the government
would allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal, a few years ago, might
probably have occasioned a very great dearth. Some improper regulations, some
injudicious restraints, imposed by the servants of the East India Company upon
the rice trade, contributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine.

When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniencies of a dearth, orders
all the dealers to sell their corn at what it supposes a reasonable price, it
either hinders them from bringing it to market, which may sometimes produce a
famine even in the beginning of the season; or, if they bring it thither, it
enables the people, and thereby encourages them to consume it so fast as must
necessarily produce a famine before the end of the season. The unlimited,
unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventive
of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the
inconveniencies of a dearth; for the inconveniencies of a real scarcity cannot
be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade deserves more the full
protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much; because no trade is so
much exposed to popular odium.

In years of scarcity, the inferior ranks of people impute their distress to the
avarice of the corn merchant, who becomes the object of their hatred and
indignation. Instead of making profit upon such occasions, therefore, he is
often in danger of being utterly ruined, and of having his magazines plundered
and destroyed by their violence. It is in years of scarcity, however, when
prices are high, that the corn merchant expects to make his principal profit.
He is generally in contract with some farmers to furnish him, for a certain
number of years, with a certain quantity of corn, at a certain price. This
contract price is settled according to what is supposed to be the moderate and
reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price, which, before the late
years of scarcity, was commonly about 28s. for the quarter of wheat, and for
that of other grain in proportion. In years of scarcity, therefore, the corn
merchant buys a great part of his corn for the ordinary price, and sells it for
a much higher. That this extraordinary profit, however, is no more than
sufficient to put his trade upon a fair level with other trades, and to
compensate the many losses which he sustains upon other occasions, both from
the perishable nature of the commodity itself, and from the frequent and
unforeseen fluctuations of its price, seems evident enough, from this single
circumstance, that great fortunes are as seldom made in this as in any other
trade. The popular odium, however, which attends it in years of scarcity, the
only years in which it can be very profitable, renders people of character and
fortune averse to enter into it. It is abandoned to an inferior set of dealers;
and millers, bakers, meal-men, and meal-factors, together with a number of
wretched hucksters, are almost the only middle people that, in the home market,
come between the grower and the consumer.

The ancient policy of Europe, instead of discountenancing this popular odium
against a trade so beneficial to the public, seems, on the contrary, to have
authorised and encouraged it.

By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI cap. 14, it was enacted, that whoever should
buy any corn or grain, with intent to sell it again, should be reputed an
unlawful engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months
imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second, suffer six
months imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and, for the third, be set
in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king’s pleasure, and
forfeit all his goods and chattels. The ancient policy of most other parts of
Europe was no better than that of England.

Our ancestors seem to have imagined, that the people would buy their corn
cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant, who, they were afraid, would
require, over and above the price which he paid to the farmer, an exorbitant
profit to himself. They endeavoured, therefore, to annihilate his trade
altogether. They even endeavoured to hinder, as much as possible, any middle
man of any kind from coming in between the grower and the consumer; and this
was the meaning of the many restraints which they imposed upon the trade of
those whom they called kidders, or carriers of corn; a trade which nobody was
allowed to exercise without a licence, ascertaining his qualifications as a man
of probity and fair dealing. The authority of three justices of the peace was,
by the statute of Edward VI. necessary in order to grant this licence. But even
this restraint was afterwards thought insufficient, and, by a statute of
Elizabeth, the privilege of granting it was confined to the quarter-sessions.

The ancient policy of Europe endeavoured, in this manner, to regulate
agriculture, the great trade of the country, by maxims quite different from
those which it established with regard to manufactures, the great trade of the
towns. By leaving a farmer no other customers but either the consumers or their
immediate factors, the kidders and carriers of corn, it endeavoured to force
him to exercise the trade, not only of a farmer, but of a corn merchant, or
corn retailer. On the contrary, it, in many cases, prohibited the manufacturer
from exercising the trade of a shopkeeper, or from selling his own goods by
retail. It meant, by the one law, to promote the general interest of the
country, or to render corn cheap, without, perhaps, its being well understood
how this was to be done. By the other, it meant to promote that of a particular
order of men, the shopkeepers, who would be so much undersold by the
manufacturer, it was supposed, that their trade would be ruined, if he was
allowed to retail at all.

The manufacturer, however, though he had been allowed to keep a shop, and to
sell his own goods by retail, could not have undersold the common shopkeeper.
Whatever part of his capital he might have placed in his shop, he must have
withdrawn it from his manufacture. In order to carry on his business on a level
with that of other people, as he must have had the profit of a manufacturer on
the one part, so he must have had that of a shopkeeper upon the other. Let us
suppose, for example, that in the particular town where he lived, ten per cent.
was the ordinary profit both of manufacturing and shopkeeping stock; he must in
this case have charged upon every piece of his own goods, which he sold in his
shop, a profit of twenty per cent. When he carried them from his workhouse to
his shop, he must have valued them at the price for which he could have sold
them to a dealer or shopkeeper, who would have bought them by wholesale. If he
valued them lower, he lost a part of the profit of his manufacturing capital.
When, again, he sold them from his shop, unless he got the same price at which
a shopkeeper would have sold them, he lost a part of the profit of his
shop-keeping capital. Though he might appear, therefore, to make a double
profit upon the same piece of goods, yet, as these goods made successively a
part of two distinct capitals, he made but a single profit upon the whole
capital employed about them; and if he made less than his profit, he was a
loser, and did not employ his whole capital with the same advantage as the
greater part of his neighbours.

What the manufacturer was prohibited to do, the farmer was in some measure
enjoined to do; to divide his capital between two different employments; to
keep one part of it in his granaries and stack-yard, for supplying the
occasional demands of the market, and to employ the other in the cultivation of
his land. But as he could not afford to employ the latter for less than the
ordinary profits of farming stock, so he could as little afford to employ the
former for less than the ordinary profits of mercantile stock. Whether the
stock which really carried on the business of a corn merchant belonged to the
person who was called a farmer, or to the person who was called a corn
merchant, an equal profit was in both cases requisite, in order to indemnify
its owner for employing it in this manner, in order to put his business on a
level with other trades, and in order to hinder him from having an interest to
change it as soon as possible for some other. The farmer, therefore, who was
thus forced to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, could not afford to sell
his corn cheaper than any other corn merchant would have been obliged to do in
the case of a free competition.

The dealer who can employ his whole stock in one single branch of business, has
an advantage of the same kind with the workman who can employ his whole labour
in one single operation. As the latter acquires a dexterity which enables him,
with the same two hands, to perform a much greater quantity of work, so the
former acquires so easy and ready a method of transacting his business, of
buying and disposing of his goods, that with the same capital he can transact a
much greater quantity of business. As the one can commonly afford his work a
good deal cheaper, so the other can commonly afford his goods somewhat cheaper,
than if his stock and attention were both employed about a greater variety of
objects. The greater part of manufacturers could not afford to retail their own
goods so cheap as a vigilant and active shopkeeper, whose sole business it was
to buy them by wholesale and to retail them again. The greater part of farmers
could still less afford to retail their own corn, to supply the inhabitants of
a town, at perhaps four or five miles distance from the greater part of them,
so cheap as a vigilant and active corn merchant, whose sole business it was to
purchase corn by wholesale, to collect it into a great magazine, and to retail
it again.

The law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a
shopkeeper, endeavoured to force this division in the employment of stock to go
on faster than it might otherwise have done. The law which obliged the farmer
to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, endeavoured to hinder it from going
on so fast. Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore
unjust; and they were both, too, as impolitic as they were unjust. It is the
interest of every society, that things of this kind should never either he
forced or obstructed. The man who employs either his labour or his stock in a
greater variety of ways than his situation renders necessary, can never hurt
his neighbour by underselling him. He may hurt himself, and he generally does
so. Jack-of-all-trades will never be rich, says the proverb. But the law ought
always to trust people with the care of their own interest, as in their local
situations they must generally be able to judge better of it than the
legislature can do. The law, however, which obliged the farmer to exercise the
trade of a corn merchant was by far the most pernicious of the two.

It obstructed not only that division in the employment of stock which is so
advantageous to every society, but it obstructed likewise the improvement and
cultivation of the land. By obliging the farmer to carry on two trades instead
of one, it forced him to divide his capital into two parts, of which one only
could be employed in cultivation. But if he had been at liberty to sell his
whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he could thresh it out, his whole
capital might have returned immediately to the land, and have been employed in
buying more cattle, and hiring more servants, in order to improve and cultivate
it better. But by being obliged to sell his corn by retail, he was obliged to
keep a great part of his capital in his granaries and stack-yard through the
year, and could not therefore cultivate so well as with the same capital he
might otherwise have done. This law, therefore, necessarily obstructed the
improvement of the land, and, instead of tending to render corn cheaper, must
have tended to render it scarcer, and therefore dearer, than it would otherwise
have been.

After the business of the farmer, that of the corn merchant is in reality the
trade which, if properly protected and encouraged, would contribute the most to
the raising of corn. It would support the trade of the farmer, in the same
manner as the trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the manufacturer.

The wholesale dealer, by affording a ready market to the manufacturer, by
taking his goods off his hand as fast as he can make them, and by sometimes
even advancing their price to him before he has made them, enables him to keep
his whole capital, and sometimes even more than his whole capital, constantly
employed in manufacturing, and consequently to manufacture a much greater
quantity of goods than if he was obliged to dispose of them himself to the
immediate consumers, or even to the retailers. As the capital of the wholesale
merchant, too, is generally sufficient to replace that of many manufacturers,
this intercourse between him and them interests the owner of a large capital to
support the owners of a great number of small ones, and to assist them in those
losses and misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them.

An intercourse of the same kind universally established between the farmers and
the corn merchants, would be attended with effects equally beneficial to the
farmers. They would be enabled to keep their whole capitals, and even more than
their whole capitals constantly employed in cultivation. In case of any of
those accidents to which no trade is more liable than theirs, they would find
in their ordinary customer, the wealthy corn merchant, a person who had both an
interest to support them, and the ability to do it; and they would not, as at
present, be entirely dependent upon the forbearance of their landlord, or the
mercy of his steward. Were it possible, as perhaps it is not, to establish this
intercourse universally, and all at once; were it possible to turn all at once
the whole farming stock of the kingdom to its proper business, the cultivation
of land, withdrawing it from every other employment into which any part of it
may be at present diverted; and were it possible, in order to support and
assist, upon occasion, the operations of this great stock, to provide all at
once another stock almost equally great; it is not, perhaps, very easy to
imagine how great, how extensive, and how sudden, would be the improvement
which this change of circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of
the country.

The statute of Edward VI. therefore, by prohibiting as much as possible any
middle man from coming in between the grower and the consumer, endeavoured to
annihilate a trade, of which the free exercise is not only the best palliative
of the inconveniencies of a dearth, but the best preventive of that calamity;
after the trade of the farmer, no trade contributing so much to the growing of
corn as that of the corn merchant.

The rigour of this law was afterwards softened by several subsequent statutes,
which successively permitted the engrossing of corn when the price of wheat
should not exceed 20s. and 24s. 32s. and 40s. the quarter. At last, by the 15th
of Charles II. c.7, the engrossing or buying of corn, in order to sell it
again, as long as the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the quarter, and that
of other grain in proportion, was declared lawful to all persons not being
forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market within three
months. All the freedom which the trade of the inland corn dealer has ever yet
enjoyed was bestowed upon it by this statute. The statute of the twelfth of the
present king, which repeals almost all the other ancient laws against
engrossers and forestallers, does not repeal the restrictions of this
particular statute, which therefore still continue in force.

This statute, however, authorises in some measure two very absurd popular
prejudices.

First, It supposes, that when the price of wheat has risen so high as 48s. the
quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, corn is likely to be so
engrossed as to hurt the people. But, from what has been already said, it seems
evident enough, that corn can at no price be so engrossed by the inland dealers
as to hurt the people; and 48s. the quarter, besides, though it may be
considered as a very high price, yet, in years of scarcity, it is a price which
frequently takes place immediately after harvest, when scarce any part of the
new crop can be sold off, and when it is impossible even for ignorance to
suppose that any part of it can be so engrossed as to hurt the people.

Secondly, It supposes that there is a certain price at which corn is likely to
be forestalled, that is, bought up in order to be sold again soon after in the
same market, so as to hurt the people. But if a merchant ever buys up corn,
either going to a particular market, or in a particular market, in order to
sell it again soon after in the same market, it must be because he judges that
the market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole season as upon
that particular occasion, and that the price, therefore, must soon rise. If he
judges wrong in this, and if the price does not rise, he not only loses the
whole profit of the stock which he employs in this manner, but a part of the
stock itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the storing and
keeping of corn. He hurts himself, therefore, much more essentially than he can
hurt even the particular people whom he may hinder from supplying themselves
upon that particular market day, because they may afterwards supply themselves
just as cheap upon any other market day. If he judges right, instead of hurting
the great body of the people, he renders them a most important service. By
making them feel the inconveniencies of a dearth somewhat earlier than they
otherwise might do, he prevents their feeling them afterwards so severely as
they certainly would do, if the cheapness of price encouraged them to consume
faster than suited the real scarcity of the season. When the scarcity is real,
the best thing that can be done for the people is, to divide the inconvenience
of it as equally as possible, through all the different months and weeks and
days of the year. The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this
as exactly as he can; and as no other person can have either the same interest,
or the same knowledge, or the same abilities, to do it so exactly as he, this
most important operation of commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him; or,
in other words, the corn trade, so far at least as concerns the supply of the
home market, ought to be left perfectly free.

The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be compared to the popular
terrors and suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate wretches accused of this
latter crime were not more innocent of the misfortunes imputed to them, than
those who have been accused of the former. The law which put an end to all
prosecutions against witchcraft, which put it out of any man’s power to
gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of that imaginary crime, seems
effectually to have put an end to those fears and suspicions, by taking away
the great cause which encouraged and supported them. The law which would
restore entire freedom to the inland trade of corn, would probably prove as
effectual to put an end to the popular fears of engrossing and forestalling.

The 15th of Charles II. c. 7, however, with all its imperfections, has,
perhaps, contributed more, both to the plentiful supply of the home market, and
to the increase of tillage, than any other law in the statute book. It is from
this law that the inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and protection
which it has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of the home market and the
interest of tillage are much more effectually promoted by the inland, than
either by the importation or exportation trade.

The proportion of the average quantity of all sorts of grain imported into
Great Britain to that of all sorts of grain consumed, it has been computed by
the author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, does not exceed that of one to
five hundred and seventy. For supplying the home market, therefore, the
importance of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as five
hundred and seventy to one.

The average quantity of all sorts of grain exported from Great Britain does
not, according to the same author, exceed the one-and-thirtieth part of the
annual produce. For the encouragement of tillage, therefore, by providing a
market for the home produce, the importance of the inland trade must be to that
of the exportation trade as thirty to one.

I have no great faith in political arithmetic, and I mean not to warrant the
exactness of either of these computations. I mention them only in order to show
of how much less consequence, in the opinion of the most judicious and
experienced persons, the foreign trade of corn is than the home trade. The
great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preceding the establishment of
the bounty may, perhaps with reason, he ascribed in some measure to the
operation of this statute of Charles II. which had been enacted about
five-and-twenty years before, and which had, therefore, full time to produce
its effect.

A very few words will sufficiently explain all that I have to say concerning
the other three branches of the corn trade.

II. The trade of the merchant-importer of foreign corn for home consumption,
evidently contributes to the immediate supply of the home market, and must so
far be immediately beneficial to the great body of the people. It tends,
indeed, to lower somewhat the average money price of corn, but not to diminish
its real value, or the quantity of labour which it is capable of maintaining.
If importation was at all times free, our farmers and country gentlemen would
probably, one year with another, get less money for their corn than they do at
present, when importation is at most times in effect prohibited; but the money
which they got would be of more value, would buy more goods of all other kinds,
and would employ more labour. Their real wealth, their real revenue, therefore,
would be the same as at present, though it might be expressed by a smaller
quantity of silver, and they would neither be disabled nor discouraged from
cultivating corn as much as they do at present. On the contrary, as the rise in
the real value of silver, in consequence of lowering the money price of corn,
lowers somewhat the money price of all other commodities, it gives the industry
of the country where it takes place some advantage in all foreign markets and
thereby tends to encourage and increase that industry. But the extent of the
home market for corn must be in proportion to the general industry of the
country where it grows, or to the number of those who produce something else,
and therefore, have something else, or, what comes to the same thing, the price
of something else, to give in exchange for corn. But in every country, the home
market, as it is the nearest and most convenient, so is it likewise the
greatest and most important market for corn. That rise in the real value of
silver, therefore, which is the effect of lowering the average money price of
corn, tends to enlarge the greatest and most important market for corn, and
thereby to encourage, instead of discouraging its growth.

By the 22d of Charles II. c. 13, the importation of wheat, whenever the price
in the home market did not exceed 53s:4d. the quarter, was subjected to a duty
of 16s. the quarter; and to a duty of 8s. whenever the price did not exceed £4.
The former of these two prices has, for more than a century past, taken place
only in times of very great scarcity; and the latter has, so far as I know, not
taken place at all. Yet, till wheat has risen above this latter price, it was,
by this statute, subjected to a very high duty; and, till it had risen above
the former, to a duty which amounted to a prohibition. The importation of other
sorts of grain was restrained at rates and by duties, in proportion to the
value of the grain, almost equally high. Before the 13th of the present king,
the following were the duties payable upon the importation of the different
sorts of grain:

Grain. Duties. Duties Duties.
Beans to 28s. per qr. 19s:10d. after till 40s. 16s:8d. then 12d.
Barley to 28s. – 19s:10d. – 32s. 16s. – 12d.
Malt is prohibited by the annual malt-tax bill.
Oats to 16s. – 5s:10d. after – 9½d.
Pease to 40s. – 16s: 0d. after – 9¾d.
Rye to 36s. – 19s:10d. till 40s. 16s:8d – 12d.
Wheat to 44s. – 21s: 9d. till 53s:4d. 17s. – 8s.
till £4, and after that about 1s:4d.
Buck-wheat to 32s. per qr. to pay 16s.

These different duties were imposed, partly by the 22d of Charles II. in place
of the old subsidy, partly by the new subsidy, by the one-third and two-thirds
subsidy, and by the subsidy 1747. Subsequent laws still further increased those
duties.

The distress which, in years of scarcity, the strict execution of those laws
might have brought upon the people, would probably have been very great; but,
upon such occasions, its execution was generally suspended by temporary
statutes, which permitted, for a limited time, the importation of foreign corn.
The necessity of these temporary statutes sufficiently demonstrates the
impropriety of this general one.

These restraints upon importation, though prior to the establishment of the
bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by the same principles, which
afterwards enacted that regulation. How hurtful soever in themselves, these, or
some other restraints upon importation, became necessary in consequence of that
regulation. If, when wheat was either below 48s. the quarter, or not much above
it, foreign corn could have been imported, either duty free, or upon paying
only a small duty, it might have been exported again, with the benefit of the
bounty, to the great loss of the public revenue, and to the entire perversion
of the institution, of which the object was to extend the market for the home
growth, not that for the growth of foreign countries.

III. The trade of the merchant-exporter of corn for foreign consumption,
certainly does not contribute directly to the plentiful supply of the home
market. It does so, however, indirectly. From whatever source this supply maybe
usually drawn, whether from home growth, or from foreign importation, unless
more corn is either usually grown, or usually imported into the country, than
what is usually consumed in it, the supply of the home market can never be very
plentiful. But unless the surplus can, in all ordinary cases, be exported, the
growers will be careful never to grow more, and the importers never to import
more, than what the bare consumption of the home market requires. That market
will very seldom be overstocked; but it will generally be understocked; the
people, whose business it is to supply it, being generally afraid lest their
goods should be left upon their hands. The prohibition of exportation limits
the improvement and cultivation of the country to what the supply of its own
inhabitants require. The freedom of exportation enables it to extend
cultivation for the supply of foreign nations.

By the 12th of Charles II. c.4, the exportation of corn was permitted whenever
the price of wheat did not exceed 40s. the quarter, and that of other grain in
proportion. By the 15th of the same prince, this liberty was extended till the
price of wheat exceeded 48s. the quarter; and by the 22d, to all higher prices.
A poundage, indeed, was to be paid to the king upon such exportation; but all
grain was rated so low in the book of rates, that this poundage amounted only,
upon wheat to 1s., upon oats to 4d., and upon all other grain to 6d. the
quarter. By the 1st of William and Mary, the act which established this bounty,
this small duty was virtually taken off whenever the price of wheat did not
exceed 48s. the quarter; and by the 11th and 12th of William III. c. 20, it was
expressly taken off at all higher prices.

The trade of the merchant-exporter was, in this manner, not only encouraged by
a bounty, but rendered much more free than that of the inland dealer. By the
last of these statutes, corn could be engrossed at any price for exportation;
but it could not be engrossed for inland sale, except when the price did not
exceed 48s. the quarter. The interest of the inland dealer, however, it has
already been shown, can never be opposite to that of the great body of the
people. That of the merchant-exporter may, and in fact sometimes is. If, while
his own country labours under a dearth, a neighbouring country should be
afflicted with a famine, it might be his interest to carry corn to the latter
country, in such quantities as might very much aggravate the calamities of the
dearth. The plentiful supply of the home market was not the direct object of
those statutes; but, under the pretence of encouraging agriculture, to raise
the money price of corn as high as possible, and thereby to occasion, as much
as possible, a constant dearth in the home market. By the discouragement of
importation, the supply of that market; even in times of great scarcity, was
confined to the home growth; and by the encouragement of exportation, when the
price was so high as 48s. the quarter, that market was not, even in times of
considerable scarcity, allowed to enjoy the whole of that growth. The temporary
laws, prohibiting, for a limited time, the exportation of corn, and taking off,
for a limited time, the duties upon its importation, expedients to which Great
Britain has been obliged so frequently to have recourse, sufficiently
demonstrate the impropriety of her general system. Had that system been good,
she would not so frequently have been reduced to the necessity of departing
from it.

Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free
importation, the different states into which a great continent was divided,
would so far resemble the different provinces of a great empire. As among the
different provinces of a great empire, the freedom of the inland trade appears,
both from reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a dearth, but
the most effectual preventive of a famine; so would the freedom of the
exportation and importation trade be among the different states into which a
great continent was divided. The larger the continent, the easier the
communication through all the different parts of it, both by land and by water,
the less would any one particular part of it ever be exposed to either of these
calamities, the scarcity of any one country being more likely to be relieved by
the plenty of some other. But very few countries have entirely adopted this
liberal system. The freedom of the corn trade is almost everywhere more or less
restrained, and in many countries is confined by such absurd regulations, as
frequently aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth into the dreadful
calamity of a famine. The demand of such countries for corn may frequently
become so great and so urgent, that a small state in their neighbourhood, which
happened at the same time to be labouring under some degree of dearth, could
not venture to supply them without exposing itself to the like dreadful
calamity. The very bad policy of one country may thus render it, in some
measure, dangerous and imprudent to establish what would otherwise be the best
policy in another. The unlimited freedom of exportation, however, would be much
less dangerous in great states, in which the growth being much greater, the
supply could seldom be much affected by any quantity or corn that was likely to
be exported. In a Swiss canton, or in some of the little states in Italy, it
may, perhaps, sometimes be necessary to restrain the exportation of corn. In
such great countries as France or England, it scarce ever can. To hinder,
besides, the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is
evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public
utility, to a sort of reasons of state; an act or legislative authority which
ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only, in cases of the most
urgent necessity. The price at which exportation of corn is prohibited, if it
is ever to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.

The laws concerning corn may everywhere be compared to the laws concerning
religion. The people feel themselves so much interested in what relates either
to their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to come,
that government must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to preserve the
public tranquillity, establish that system which they approve of. It is upon
this account, perhaps, that we so seldom find a reasonable system established
with regard to either of those two capital objects.

IV. The trade of the merchant-carrier, or of the importer of foreign corn, in
order to export it again, contributes to the plentiful supply of the home
market. It is not, indeed, the direct purpose of his trade to sell his corn
there; but he will generally be willing to do so, and even for a good deal less
money than he might expect in a foreign market; because he saves in this manner
the expense of loading and unloading, of freight and insurance. The inhabitants
of the country which, by means of the carrying trade, becomes the magazine and
storehouse for the supply of other countries, can very seldom be in want
themselves. Though the carrying trade must thus contribute to reduce the
average money price of corn in the home market, it would not thereby lower its
real value; it would only raise somewhat the real value of silver.

The carrying trade was in effect prohibited in Great Britain, upon all ordinary
occasions, by the high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, of the
greater part of which there was no drawback; and upon extraordinary occasions,
when a scarcity made it necessary to suspend those duties by temporary
statutes, exportation was always prohibited. By this system of laws, therefore,
the carrying trade was in effect prohibited.

That system of laws, therefore, which is connected with the establishment of
the bounty, seems to deserve no part of the praise which has been bestowed upon
it. The improvement and prosperity of Great Britain, which has been so often
ascribed to those laws, may very easily be accounted for by other causes. That
security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man, that he shall enjoy
the fruits of his own labour, is alone sufficient to make any country flourish,
notwithstanding these and twenty other absurd regulations of commerce; and this
security was perfected by the Revolution, much about the same time that the
bounty was established. The natural effort of every individual to better his
own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so
powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only
capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting
a hundred impertinent obstructions, with which the folly of human laws too
often encumbers its operations: though the effect of those obstructions is
always, more or less, either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its
security. In Great Britain industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far
from being perfectly free, it is as free or freer than in any other part of
Europe.

Though the period of the greatest prosperity and improvement of Great Britain
has been posterior to that system of laws which is connected with the bounty,
we must not upon that account, impute it to those laws. It has been posterior
likewise to the national debt; but the national debt has most assuredly not
been the cause of it.

Though the system of laws which is connected with the bounty, has exactly the
same tendency with the practice of Spain and Portugal, to lower somewhat the
value of the precious metals in the country where it takes place; yet Great
Britain is certainly one of the richest countries in Europe, while Spain and
Portugal are perhaps amongst the most beggarly. This difference of situation,
however, may easily be accounted for from two different causes. First, the tax
in Spain, the prohibition in Portugal of exporting gold and silver, and the
vigilant police which watches over the execution of those laws, must, in two
very poor countries, which between them import annually upwards of six millions
sterling, operate not only more directly, but much more forcibly, in reducing
the value of those metals there, than the corn laws can do in Great Britain.
And, secondly, this bad policy is not in those countries counterbalanced by the
general liberty and security of the people. Industry is there neither free nor
secure; and the civil and ecclesiastical governments of both Spain and Portugal
are such as would alone be sufficient to perpetuate their present state of
poverty, even though their regulations of commerce were as wise as the greatest
part of them are absurd and foolish.

The 13th of the present king, c. 43, seems to have established a new system
with regard to the corn laws, in many respects better than the ancient one, but
in one or two respects perhaps not quite so good.

By this statute, the high duties upon importation for home consumption are
taken off, so soon as the price of middling wheat rises to 48s. the quarter;
that of middling rye, pease, or beans, to 32s.; that of barley to 24s.; and
that of oats to 16s.; and instead of them, a small duty is imposed of only 6d
upon the quarter of wheat, and upon that or other grain in proportion. With
regard to all those different sorts of grain, but particularly with regard to
wheat, the home market is thus opened to foreign supplies, at prices
considerably lower than before.

By the same statute, the old bounty of 5s. upon the exportation of wheat,
ceases so soon as the price rises to 44s. the quarter, instead of 48s. the
price at which it ceased before; that of 2s:6d. upon the exportation of barley,
ceases so soon as the price rises to 22s. instead of 24s. the price at which it
ceased before; that of 2s:6d. upon the exportation of oatmeal, ceases so soon
as the price rises to 14s. instead of 15s. the price at which it ceased before.
The bounty upon rye is reduced from 3s:6d. to 3s. and it ceases so soon as the
price rises to 28s. instead of 32s. the price at which it ceased before. If
bounties are as improper as I have endeavoured to prove them to be, the sooner
they cease, and the lower they are, so much the better.

The same statute permits, at the lowest prices, the importation of corn in
order to be exported again, duty free, provided it is in the mean time lodged
in a warehouse under the joint locks of the king and the importer. This
liberty, indeed, extends to no more than twenty-five of the different ports of
Great Britain. They are, however, the principal ones; and there may not,
perhaps, be warehouses proper for this purpose in the greater part of the
others.

So far this law seems evidently an improvement upon the ancient system.

But by the same law, a bounty of 2s. the quarter is given for the exportation
of oats, whenever the price does not exceed fourteen shillings. No bounty had
ever been given before for the exportation of this grain, no more than for that
of pease or beans.

By the same law, too, the exportation of wheat is prohibited so soon as the
price rises to forty-four shillings the quarter; that of rye so soon as it
rises to twenty-eight shillings; that of barley so soon as it rises to
twenty-two shillings; and that of oats so soon as they rise to fourteen
shillings. Those several prices seem all of them a good deal too low; and there
seems to be an impropriety, besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether at
those precise prices at which that bounty, which was given in order to force
it, is withdrawn. The bounty ought certainly either to have been withdrawn at a
much lower price, or exportation ought to have been allowed at a much higher.

So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the ancient system. With
all its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of it what was said of the
laws of Solon, that though not the best in itself, it is the best which the
interest, prejudices, and temper of the times, would admit of. It may perhaps
in due time prepare the way for a better.

CHAPTER VI.
OF TREATIES OF COMMERCE.

When a nation binds itself by treaty, either to permit the entry of certain
goods from one foreign country which it prohibits from all others, or to exempt
the goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those of all others,
the country, or at least the merchants and manufacturers of the country, whose
commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great advantage from the
treaty. Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy a sort of monopoly in the
country which is so indulgent to them. That country becomes a market, both more
extensive and more advantageous for their goods: more extensive, because the
goods of other nations being either excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it
takes off a greater quantity of theirs; more advantageous, because the
merchants of the favoured country, enjoying a sort of monopoly there, will
often sell their goods for a better price than if exposed to the free
competition of all other nations.

Such treaties, however, though they may be advantageous to the merchants and
manufacturers of the favoured, are necessarily disadvantageous to those of the
favouring country. A monopoly is thus granted against them to a foreign nation;
and they must frequently buy the foreign goods they have occasion for, dearer
than if the free competition of other nations was admitted. That part of its
own produce with which such a nation purchases foreign goods, must consequently
be sold cheaper; because, when two things are exchanged for one another, the
cheapness of the one is a necessary consequence, or rather is the same thing,
with the dearness of the other. The exchangeable value of its annual produce,
therefore, is likely to be diminished by every such treaty. This diminution,
however, can scarce amount to any positive loss, but only to a lessening of the
gain which it might otherwise make. Though it sells its goods cheaper than it
otherwise might do, it will not probably sell them for less than they cost;
nor, as in the case of bounties, for a price which will not replace the capital
employed in bringing them to market, together with the ordinary profits of
stock. The trade could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring country,
therefore, may still gain by the trade, though less than if there was a free
competition.

Some treaties of commerce, however, have been supposed advantageous, upon
principles very different from these; and a commercial country has sometimes
granted a monopoly of this kind, against itself, to certain goods of a foreign
nation, because it expected, that in the whole commerce between them, it would
annually sell more than it would buy, and that a balance in gold and silver
would be annually returned to it. It is upon this principle that the treaty of
commerce between England and Portugal, concluded in 1703 by Mr Methuen, has
been so much commended. The following is a literal translation of that treaty,
which consists of three articles only.

ART. I. His sacred royal majesty of Portugal promises, both in his own name and
that of his successors, to admit for ever hereafter, into Portugal, the woollen
cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of the British, as was
accustomed, till they were prohibited by the law; nevertheless upon this
condition:

ART. II. That is to say, that her sacred royal majesty of Great Britain shall,
in her own name, and that of her successors, be obliged, for ever hereafter, to
admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain; so that at no time,
whether there shall be peace or war between the kingdoms of Britain and France,
any thing more shall be demanded for these wines by the name of custom or duty,
or by whatsoever other title, directly or indirectly, whether they shall be
imported into Great Britain in pipes or hogsheads, or other casks, than what
shall be demanded for the like quantity or measure of French wine, deducting or
abating a third part of the custom or duty. But if, at any time, this deduction
or abatement of customs, which is to be made as aforesaid, shall in any manner
be attempted and prejudiced, it shall be just and lawful for his sacred royal
majesty of Portugal, again to prohibit the woollen cloths, and the rest of the
British woollen manufactures.

ART. III. The most excellent lords the plenipotentiaries promise and take upon
themselves, that their above named masters shall ratify this treaty; and within
the space of two months the ratification shall be exchanged.

By this treaty, the crown of Portugal becomes bound to admit the English
woollens upon the same footing as before the prohibition; that is, not to raise
the duties which had been paid before that time. But it does not become bound
to admit them upon any better terms than those of any other nation, of France
or Holland, for example. The crown of Great Britain, on the contrary, becomes
bound to admit the wines of Portugal, upon paying only two-thirds of the duty
which is paid for those of France, the wines most likely to come into
competition with them. So far this treaty, therefore, is evidently advantageous
to Portugal, and disadvantageous to Great Britain.

It has been celebrated, however, as a masterpiece of the commercial policy of
England. Portugal receives annually from the Brazils a greater quantity of gold
than can be employed in its domestic commerce, whether in the shape of coin or
of plate. The surplus is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle and locked up
in coffers; and as it can find no advantageous market at home, it must,
notwithstanding; any prohibition, be sent abroad, and exchanged for something
for which there is a more advantageous market at home. A large share of it
comes annually to England, in return either for English goods, or for those of
other European nations that receive their returns through England. Mr Barretti
was informed, that the weekly packet-boat from Lisbon brings, one week with
another, more than £50,000 in gold to England. The sum had probably been
exaggerated. It would amount to more than £2,600,000 a year, which is more than
the Brazils are supposed to afford.

Our merchants were, some years ago, out of humour with the crown of Portugal.
Some privileges which had been granted them, not by treaty, but by the free
grace of that crown, at the solicitation, indeed, it is probable, and in return
for much greater favours, defence and protection from the crown of Great
Britain, had been either infringed or revoked. The people, therefore, usually
most interested in celebrating the Portugal trade, were then rather disposed to
represent it as less advantageous than it had commonly been imagined. The far
greater part, almost the whole, they pretended, of this annual importation of
gold, was not on account of Great Britain, but of other European nations; the
fruits and wines of Portugal annually imported into Great Britain nearly
compensating the value of the British goods sent thither.

Let us suppose, however, that the whole was on account of Great Britain, and
that it amounted to a still greater sum than Mr Barretti seems to imagine; this
trade would not, upon that account, be more advantageous than any other, in
which, for the same value sent out, we received an equal value of consumable
goods in return.

It is but a very small part of this importation which, it can be supposed, is
employed as an annual addition, either to the plate or to the coin of the
kingdom. The rest must all be sent abroad, and exchanged for consumable goods
of some kind or other. But if those consumable goods were purchased directly
with the produce of English industry, it would be more for the advantage of
England, than first to purchase with that produce the gold of Portugal, and
afterwards to purchase with that gold those consumable goods. A direct foreign
trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a round-about one; and to
bring the same value of foreign goods to the home market requires a much
smaller capital in the one way than in the ether. If a smaller share of its
industry, therefore, had been employed in producing goods fit for the Portugal
market, and a greater in producing those lit for the other markets, where those
consumable goods for which there is a demand in Great Britain are to be had, it
would have been more for the advantage of England. To procure both the gold
which it wants for its own use, and the consumable goods, would, in this way,
employ a much smaller capital than at present. There would be a spare capital,
therefore, to be employed for other purposes, in exciting an additional
quantity of industry, and in raising a greater annual produce.

Though Britain were entirely excluded from the Portugal trade, it could find
very little difficulty in procuring all the annual supplies of gold which it
wants, either for the purposes of plate, or of coin, or of foreign trade. Gold,
like every other commodity, is always somewhere or another to be got for its
value by those who have that value to give for it. The annual surplus of gold
in Portugal, besides, would still be sent abroad, and though not carried away
by Great Britain, would be carried away by some other nation, which would be
glad to sell it again for its price, in the same manner as Great Britain does
at present. In buying gold of Portugal, indeed, we buy it at the first hand;
whereas, in buying it of any other nation, except Spain, we should buy it at
the second, and might pay somewhat dearer. This difference, however, would
surely be too insignificant to deserve the public attention.

Almost all our gold, it is said, comes from Portugal. With other nations, the
balance of trade is either against as, or not much in our favour. But we should
remember, that the more gold we import from one country, the less we must
necessarily import from all others. The effectual demand for gold, like that
for every other commodity, is in every country limited to a certain quantity.
If nine-tenths of this quantity are imported from one country, there remains a
tenth only to be imported from all others. The more gold, besides, that is
annually imported from some particular countries, over and above what is
requisite for plate and for coin, the more must necessarily be exported to some
others: and the more that most insignificant object of modern policy, the
balance of trade, appears to be in our favour with some particular countries,
the more it must necessarily appear to be against us with many others.

It was upon this silly notion, however, that England could not subsist without
the Portugal trade, that, towards the end of the late war, France and Spain,
without pretending either offence or provocation, required the king of Portugal
to exclude all British ships from his ports, and, for the security of this
exclusion, to receive into them French or Spanish garrisons. Had the king of
Portugal submitted to those ignominious terms which his brother-in-law the king
of Spain proposed to him, Britain would have been freed from a much greater
inconveniency than the loss of the Portugal trade, the burden of supporting a
very weak ally, so unprovided of every thing for his own defence, that the
whole power of England, had it been directed to that single purpose, could
scarce, perhaps, have defended him for another campaign. The loss of the
Portugal trade would, no doubt, have occasioned a considerable embarrassment to
the merchants at that time engaged in it, who might not, perhaps, have found
out, for a year or two, any other equally advantageous method of employing
their capitals; and in this would probably have consisted all the inconveniency
which England could have suffered from this notable piece of commercial policy.

The great annual importation of gold and silver is neither for the purpose of
plate nor of coin, but of foreign trade. A round-about foreign trade of
consumption can be carried on more advantageously by means of these metals than
of almost any other goods. As they are the universal instruments of commerce,
they are more readily received in return for all commodities than any other
goods; and, on account of their small bulk and great value, it costs less to
transport them backward and forward from one place to another than almost any
other sort of merchandize, and they lose less of their value by being so
transported. Of all the commodities, therefore, which are bought in one foreign
country, for no other purpose but to be sold or exchanged again for some other
goods in another, there are none so convenient as gold and silver. In
facilitating all the different round-about foreign trades of consumption which
are carried on in Great Britain, consists the principal advantage of the
Portugal trade; and though it is not a capital advantage, it is, no doubt, a
considerable one.

That any annual addition which, it can reasonably be supposed, is made either
to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom, could require but a very small
annual importation of gold and silver, seems evident enough; and though we had
no direct trade with Portugal, this small quantity could always, somewhere or
another, be very easily got.

Though the goldsmiths trade be very considerable in Great Britain, the far
greater part of the new plate which they annually sell, is made from other old
plate melted down; so that the addition annually made to the whole plate of the
kingdom cannot be very great, and could require but a very small annual
importation.

It is the same case with the coin. Nobody imagines, I believe, that even the
greater part of the annual coinage, amounting, for ten years together, before
the late reformation of the gold coin, to upwards of £800,000 a-year in gold,
was an annual addition to the money before current in the kingdom. In a country
where the expense of the coinage is defrayed by the government, the value of
the coin, even when it contains its full standard weight of gold and silver,
can never be much greater than that of an equal quantity of those metals
uncoined, because it requires only the trouble of going to the mint, and the
delay, perhaps, of a few weeks, to procure for any quantity of uncoined gold
and silver an equal quantity of those metals in coin; but in every country the
greater part of the current coin is almost always more or less worn, or
otherwise degenerated from its standard. In Great Britain it was, before the
late reformation, a good deal so, the gold being more than two per cent., and
the silver more than eight per cent. below its standard weight. But if
forty-four guineas and a-half, containing their full standard weight, a pound
weight of gold, could purchase very little more than a pound weight of uncoined
gold; forty-four guineas and a-half, wanting a part of their weight, could not
purchase a pound weight, and something was to be added, in order to make up the
deficiency. The current price of gold bullion at market, therefore, instead of
being the same with the mint price, or £46:14:6, was then about £47:14s., and
sometimes about £48. When the greater part of the coin, however, was in this
degenerate condition, forty four guineas and a-half, fresh from the mint, would
purchase no more goods in the market than any other ordinary guineas; because,
when they came into the coffers of the merchant, being confounded with other
money, they could not afterwards be distinguished without more trouble than the
difference was worth. Like other guineas, they were worth no more than
£46:14:6. If thrown into the melting pot, however, they produced, without any
sensible loss, a pound weight of standard gold, which could be sold at any time
for between £47:14s. and £48, either in gold or silver, as fit for all the
purposes of coin as that which had been melted down. There was an evident
profit, therefore, in melting down new-coined money; and it was done so
instantaneously, that no precaution of government could prevent it. The
operations of the mint were, upon this account, somewhat like the web of
Penelope; the work that was done in the day was undone in the night. The mint
was employed, not so much in making daily additions to the coin, as in
replacing the very best part of it, which was daily melted down.

Were the private people who carry their gold and silver to the mint to pay
themselves for the coinage, it would add to the value of those metals, in the
same manner as the fashion does to that of plate. Coined gold and silver would
be more valuable than uncoined. The seignorage, if it was not exorbitant, would
add to the bullion the whole value of the duty; because, the government having
everywhere the exclusive privilege of coining, no coin can come to market
cheaper than they think proper to afford it. If the duty was exorbitant,
indeed, that is, if it was very much above the real value of the labour and
expense requisite for coinage, false coiners, both at home and abroad, might be
encouraged, by the great difference between the value of bullion and that of
coin, to pour in so great a quantity of counterfeit money as might reduce the
value of the government money. In France, however, though the seignorage is
eight per cent., no sensible inconveniency of this kind is found to arise from
it. The dangers to which a false coiner is everywhere exposed, if he lives in
the country of which he counterfeits the coin, and to which his agents or
correspondents are exposed, if he lives in a foreign country, are by far too
great to be incurred for the sake of a profit of six or seven per cent.

The seignorage in France raises the value of the coin higher than in proportion
to the quantity of pure gold which it contains. Thus, by the edict of January
1726, the mint price of fine gold of twenty-four carats was fixed at seven
hundred and forty livres nine sous and one denier one-eleventh the mark of
eight Paris ounces. {See Dictionnaire des Monnoies, tom. ii. article
Seigneurage, p. 439, par 81. Abbot de Bazinghen, Conseiller-Commissaire en la
Cour des Monnoies à Paris.} The gold coin of France, making an allowance for
the remedy of the mint, contains twenty-one carats and three-fourths of fine
gold, and two carats one-fourth of alloy. The mark of standard gold, therefore,
is worth no more than about six hundred and seventy-one livres ten deniers. But
in France this mark of standard gold is coined into thirty louis d’ors of
twenty-four livres each, or into seven hundred and twenty livres. The coinage,
therefore, increases the value of a mark of standard gold bullion, by the
difference between six hundred and seventy-one livres ten deniers and seven
hundred and twenty livres, or by forty-eight livres nineteen sous and two
deniers.

A seignorage will, in many cases, take away altogether, and will in all cases
diminish, the profit of melting down the new coin. This profit always arises
from the difference between the quantity of bullion which the common currency
ought to contain and that which it actually does contain. If this difference is
less than the seignorage, there will be loss instead of profit. If it is equal
to the seignorage, there will be neither profit nor loss. If it is greater than
the seignorage, there will, indeed, be some profit, but less than if there was
no seignorage. If, before the late reformation of the gold coin, for example,
there had been a seignorage of five per cent. upon the coinage, there would
have been a loss of three per cent. upon the melting down of the gold coin. If
the seignorage had been two per cent., there would have been neither profit nor
loss. If the seignorage had been one per cent., there would have been a profit
but of one per cent. only, instead of two per cent. Wherever money is received
by tale, therefore, and not by weight, a seignorage is the most effectual
preventive of the melting down of the coin, and, for the same reason, of its
exportation. It is the best and heaviest pieces that are commonly either melted
down or exported, because it is upon such that the largest profits are made.

The law for the encouragement of the coinage, by rendering it duty-free, was
first enacted during the reign of Charles II. for a limited time, and
afterwards continued, by different prolongations, till 1769, when it was
rendered perpetual. The bank of England, in order to replenish their coffers
with money, are frequently obliged to carry bullion to the mint; and it was
more for their interest, they probably imagined, that the coinage should be at
the expense of the government than at their own. It was probably out of
complaisance to this great company, that the government agreed to render this
law perpetual. Should the custom of weighing gold, however, come to be disused,
as it is very likely to be on account of its inconveniency; should the gold
coin of England come to be received by tale, as it was before the late
recoinage this great company may, perhaps, find that they have, upon this, as
upon some other occasions, mistaken their own interest not a little.

Before the late recoinage, when the gold currency of England was two per cent.
below its standard weight, as there was no seignorage, it was two per cent.
below the value of that quantity of standard gold bullion which it ought to
have contained. When this great company, therefore, bought gold bullion in
order to have it coined, they were obliged to pay for it two per cent. more
than it was worth after the coinage. But if there had been a seignorage of two
per cent. upon the coinage, the common gold currency, though two per cent.
below its standard weight, would, notwithstanding, have been equal in value to
the quantity of standard gold which it ought to have contained; the value of
the fashion compensating in this case the diminution of the weight. They would,
indeed, have had the seignorage to pay, which being two per cent., their loss
upon the whole transaction would have been two per cent., exactly the same, but
no greater than it actually was.

If the seignorage had been five per cent. and the gold currency only two per
cent. below its standard weight, the bank would, in this case, have gained
three per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would have had a
seignorage of five per cent. to pay upon the coinage, their loss upon the whole
transaction would, in the same manner, have been exactly two per cent.

If the seignorage had been only one per cent., and the gold currency two per
cent. below its standard weight, the bank would, in this case, have lost only
one per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would likewise have
had a seignorage of one per cent. to pay, their loss upon the whole transaction
would have been exactly two per cent., in the same manner as in all other
cases.

If there was a reasonable seignorage, while at the same time the coin contained
its full standard weight, as it has done very nearly since the late recoinage,
whatever the bank might lose by the seignorage, they would gain upon the price
of the bullion; and whatever they might gain upon the price of the bullion,
they would lose by the seignorage. They would neither lose nor gain, therefore,
upon the whole transaction, and they would in this, as in all the foregoing
cases, be exactly in the same situation as if there was no seignorage.

When the tax upon a commodity is so moderate as not to encourage smuggling, the
merchant who deals in it, though he advances, does not properly pay the tax, as
he gets it back in the price of the commodity. The tax is finally paid by the
last purchaser or consumer. But money is a commodity, with regard to which
every man is a merchant. Nobody buys it but in order to sell it again; and with
regard to it there is, in ordinary cases, no last purchaser or consumer. When
the tax upon coinage, therefore, is so moderate as not to encourage false
coining, though every body advances the tax, nobody finally pays it; because
every body gets it back in the advanced value of the coin.

A moderate seignorage, therefore, would not, in any case, augment the expense
of the bank, or of any other private persons who carry their bullion to the
mint in order to be coined; and the want of a moderate seignorage does not in
any case diminish it. Whether there is or is not a seignorage, if the currency
contains its full standard weight, the coinage costs nothing to anybody; and if
it is short of that weight, the coinage must always cost the difference between
the quantity of bullion which ought to be contained in it, and that which
actually is contained in it.

The government, therefore, when it defrays the expense of coinage, not only
incurs some small expense, but loses some small revenue which it might get by a
proper duty; and neither the bank, nor any other private persons, are in the
smallest degree benefited by this useless piece of public generosity.

The directors of the bank, however, would probably be unwilling to agree to the
imposition of a seignorage upon the authority of a speculation which promises
them no gain, but only pretends to insure them from any loss. In the present
state of the gold coin, and as long as it continues to be received by weight,
they certainly would gain nothing by such a change. But if the custom of
weighing the gold coin should ever go into disuse, as it is very likely to do,
and if the gold coin should ever fall into the same state of degradation in
which it was before the late recoinage, the gain, or more properly the savings,
of the bank, in consequence of the imposition of a seignorage, would probably
be very considerable. The bank of England is the only company which sends any
considerable quantity of bullion to the mint, and the burden of the annual
coinage falls entirely, or almost entirely, upon it. If this annual coinage had
nothing to do but to repair the unavoidable losses and necessary wear and tear
of the coin, it could seldom exceed fifty thousand, or at most a hundred
thousand pounds. But when the coin is degraded below its standard weight, the
annual coinage must, besides this, fill up the large vacuities which
exportation and the melting pot are continually making in the current coin. It
was upon this account, that during the ten or twelve years immediately
preceding the late reformation of the gold coin, the annual coinage amounted,
at an average, to more than £850,000. But if there had been a seignorage of
four or five per cent. upon the gold coin, it would probably, even in the state
in which things then were, have put an effectual stop to the business both of
exportation and of the melting pot. The bank, instead of losing every year
about two and a half per cent. upon the bullion which was to be coined into
more than eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds, or incurring an annual loss
of more than £21,250 pounds, would not probably have incurred the tenth part of
that loss.

The revenue allotted by parliament for defraying the expense of the coinage is
but fourteen thousand pounds a-year; and the real expense which it costs the
government, or the fees of the officers of the mint, do not, upon ordinary
occasions, I am assured, exceed the half of that sum. The saving of so very
small a sum, or even the gaining of another, which could not well be much
larger, are objects too inconsiderable, it may be thought, to deserve the
serious attention of government. But the saving of eighteen or twenty thousand
pounds a-year, in case of an event which is not improbable, which has
frequently happened before, and which is very likely to happen again, is surely
an object which well deserves the serious attention, even of so great a company
as the bank of England.

Some of the foregoing reasonings and observations might, perhaps, have been
more properly placed in those chapters of the first book which treat of the
origin and use of money, and of the difference between the real and the nominal
price of commodities. But as the law for the encouragement of coinage derives
its origin from those vulgar prejudices which have been introduced by the
mercantile system, I judged it more proper to reserve them for this chapter.
Nothing could be more agreeable to the spirit of that system than a sort of
bounty upon the production of money, the very thing which, it supposes,
constitutes the wealth of every nation. It is one of its many admirable
expedients for enriching the country.

CHAPTER VII.
OF COLONIES.

PART I. Of the Motives for Establishing New Colonies.

The interest which occasioned the first settlement of the different European
colonies in America and the West Indies, was not altogether so plain and
distinct as that which directed the establishment of those of ancient Greece
and Rome.

All the different states of ancient Greece possessed, each of them, but a very
small territory; and when the people in anyone of them multiplied beyond what
that territory could easily maintain, a part of them were sent in quest of a
new habitation, in some remote and distant part of the world; the warlike
neighbours who surrounded them on all sides, rendering it difficult for any of
them to enlarge very much its territory at home. The colonies of the Dorians
resorted chiefly to Italy and Sicily, which, in the times preceding the
foundation of Rome, were inhabited by barbarous and uncivilized nations; those
of the Ionians and Aeolians, the two other great tribes of the Greeks, to Asia
Minor and the islands of the Aegean sea, of which the inhabitants sewn at that
time to have been pretty much in the same state as those of Sicily and Italy.
The mother city, though she considered the colony as a child, at all times
entitled to great favour and assistance, and owing in return much gratitude and
respect, yet considered it as an emancipated child, over whom she pretended to
claim no direct authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of
government, enacted its own laws, elected its own magistrates, and made peace
or war with its neighbours, as an independent state, which had no occasion to
wait for the approbation or consent of the mother city. Nothing can be more
plain and distinct than the interest which directed every such establishment.

Rome, like most of the other ancient republics, was originally founded upon an
agrarian law, which divided the public territory, in a certain proportion,
among the different citizens who composed the state. The course of human
affairs, by marriage, by succession, and by alienation, necessarily deranged
this original division, and frequently threw the lands which had been allotted
for the maintenance of many different families, into the possession of a single
person. To remedy this disorder, for such it was supposed to be, a law was
made, restricting the quantity of land which any citizen could possess to five
hundred jugera; about 350 English acres. This law, however, though we read of
its having been executed upon one or two occasions, was either neglected or
evaded, and the inequality of fortunes went on continually increasing. The
greater part of the citizens had no land; and without it the manners and
customs of those times rendered it difficult for a freeman to maintain his
independency. In the present times, though a poor man has no land of his own,
if he has a little stock, he may either farm the lands of another, or he may
carry on some little retail trade; and if he has no stock, he may find
employment either as a country labourer, or as an artificer. But among the
ancient Romans, the lands of the rich were all cultivated by slaves, who
wrought under an overseer, who was likewise a slave; so that a poor freeman had
little chance of being employed either as a farmer or as a labourer. All trades
and manufactures, too, even the retail trade, were carried on by the slaves of
the rich for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, authority, and
protection, made it difficult for a poor freeman to maintain the competition
against them. The citizens, therefore, who had no land, had scarce any other
means of subsistence but the bounties of the candidates at the annual
elections. The tribunes, when they had a mind to animate the people against the
rich and the great, put them in mind of the ancient divisions of lands, and
represented that law which restricted this sort of private property as the
fundamental law of the republic. The people became clamorous to get land, and
the rich and the great, we may believe, were perfectly determined not to give
them any part of theirs. To satisfy them in some measure, therefore, they
frequently proposed to send out a new colony. But conquering Rome was, even
upon such occasions, under no necessity of turning out her citizens to seek
their fortune, if one may so, through the wide world, without knowing where
they were to settle. She assigned them lands generally in the conquered
provinces of Italy, where, being within the dominions of the republic, they
could never form any independent state, but were at best but a sort of
corporation, which, though it had the power of enacting bye-laws for its own
government, was at all times subject to the correction, jurisdiction, and
legislative authority of the mother city. The sending out a colony of this kind
not only gave some satisfaction to the people, but often established a sort of
garrison, too, in a newly conquered province, of which the obedience might
otherwise have been doubtful. A Roman colony, therefore, whether we consider
the nature of the establishment itself, or the motives for making it, was
altogether different from a Greek one. The words, accordingly, which in the
original languages denote those different establishments, have very different
meanings. The Latin word (colonia) signifies simply a plantation. The Greek
word (apoixia), on the contrary, signifies a separation of dwelling, a
departure from home, a going out of the house. But though the Roman colonies
were, in many respects, different from the Greek ones, the interest which
prompted to establish them was equally plain and distinct. Both institutions
derived their origin, either from irresistible necessity, or from clear and
evident utility.

The establishment of the European colonies in America and the West Indies arose
from no necessity; and though the utility which has resulted from them has been
very great, it is not altogether so clear and evident. It was not understood at
their first establishment, and was not the motive, either of that
establishment, or of the discoveries which gave occasion to it; and the nature,
extent, and limits of that utility, are not, perhaps, well understood at this
day.

The Venetians, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, carried on a very
advantageous commerce in spiceries and other East India goods, which they
distributed among the other nations of Europe. They purchased them chiefly in
Egypt, at that time under the dominion of the Mamelukes, the enemies of the
Turks, of whom the Venetians were the enemies; and this union of interest,
assisted by the money of Venice, formed such a connexion as gave the Venetians
almost a monopoly of the trade.

The great profits of the Venetians tempted the avidity of the Portuguese. They
had been endeavouring, during the course of the fifteenth century, to find out
by sea a way to the countries from which the Moors brought them ivory and gold
dust across the desert. They discovered the Madeiras, the Canaries, the Azores,
the Cape de Verd islands, the coast of Guinea, that of Loango, Congo, Angola,
and Benguela, and, finally, the Cape of Good Hope. They had long wished to
share in the profitable traffic of the Venetians, and this last discovery
opened to them a probable prospect of doing so. In 1497, Vasco de Gamo sailed
from the port of Lisbon with a fleet of four ships, and, after a navigation of
eleven months, arrived upon the coast of Indostan; and thus completed a course
of discoveries which had been pursued with great steadiness, and with very
little interruption, for near a century together.

Some years before this, while the expectations of Europe were in suspense about
the projects of the Portuguese, of which the success appeared yet to be
doubtful, a Genoese pilot formed the yet more daring project of sailing to the
East Indies by the west. The situation of those countries was at that time very
imperfectly known in Europe. The few European travellers who had been there,
had magnified the distance, perhaps through simplicity and ignorance; what was
really very great, appearing almost infinite to those who could not measure it;
or, perhaps, in order to increase somewhat more the marvellous of their own
adventures in visiting regions so immensely remote from Europe. The longer the
way was by the east, Columbus very justly concluded, the shorter it would be by
the west. He proposed, therefore, to take that way, as both the shortest and
the surest, and he had the good fortune to convince Isabella of Castile of the
probability of his project. He sailed from the port of Palos in August 1492,
near five years before the expedition of Vasco de Gamo set out from Portugal;
and, after a voyage of between two and three months, discovered first some of
the small Bahama or Lucyan islands, and afterwards the great island of St.
Domingo.

But the countries which Columbus discovered, either in this or in any of his
subsequent voyages, had no resemblance to those which he had gone in quest of.
Instead of the wealth, cultivation, and populousness of China and Indostan, he
found, in St. Domingo, and in all the other parts of the new world which he
ever visited, nothing but a country quite covered with wood, uncultivated, and
inhabited only by some tribes of naked and miserable savages. He was not very
willing, however, to believe that they were not the same with some of the
countries described by Marco Polo, the first European who had visited, or at
least had left behind him any description of China or the East Indies; and a
very slight resemblance, such as that which he found between the name of Cibao,
a mountain in St. Domingo, and that of Cipange, mentioned by Marco Polo, was
frequently sufficient to make him return to this favourite prepossession,
though contrary to the clearest evidence. In his letters to Ferdinand and
Isabella, he called the countries which he had discovered the Indies. He
entertained no doubt but that they were the extremity of those which had been
described by Marco Polo, and that they were not very distant from the Ganges,
or from the countries which had been conquered by Alexander. Even when at last
convinced that they were different, he still flattered himself that those rich
countries were at no great distance; and in a subsequent voyage, accordingly,
went in quest of them along the coast of Terra Firma, and towards the Isthmus
of Darien.

In consequence of this mistake of Columbus, the name of the Indies has stuck to
those unfortunate countries ever since; and when it was at last clearly
discovered that the new were altogether different from the old Indies, the
former were called the West, in contradistinction to the latter, which were
called the East Indies.

It was of importance to Columbus, however, that the countries which he had
discovered, whatever they were, should be represented to the court of Spain as
of very great consequence; and, in what constitutes the real riches of every
country, the animal and vegetable productions of the soil, there was at that
time nothing which could well justify such a representation of them.

The cori, something between a rat and a rabbit, and supposed by Mr Buffon to be
the same with the aperea of Brazil, was the largest viviparous quadruped in St.
Domingo. This species seems never to have been very numerous; and the dogs and
cats of the Spaniards are said to have long ago almost entirely extirpated it,
as well as some other tribes of a still smaller size. These, however, together
with a pretty large lizard, called the ivana or iguana, constituted the
principal part of the animal food which the land afforded.

The vegetable food of the inhabitants, though, from their want of industry, not
very abundant, was not altogether so scanty. It consisted in Indian corn, yams,
potatoes, bananas, etc., plants which were then altogether unknown in Europe,
and which have never since been very much esteemed in it, or supposed to yield
a sustenance equal to what is drawn from the common sorts of grain and pulse,
which have been cultivated in this part of the world time out of mind.

The cotton plant, indeed, afforded the material of a very important
manufacture, and was at that time, to Europeans, undoubtedly the most valuable
of all the vegetable productions of those islands. But though, in the end of
the fifteenth century, the muslins and other cotton goods of the East Indies
were much esteemed in every part of Europe, the cotton manufacture itself was
not cultivated in any part of it. Even this production, therefore, could not at
that time appear in the eyes of Europeans to be of very great consequence.

Finding nothing, either in the animals or vegetables of the newly discovered
countries which could justify a very advantageous representation of them,
Columbus turned his view towards their minerals; and in the richness of their
productions of this third kingdom, he flattered himself he had found a full
compensation for the insignificancy of those of the other two. The little bits
of gold with which the inhabitants ornamented their dress, and which, he was
informed, they frequently found in the rivulets and torrents which fell from
the mountains, were sufficient to satisfy him that those mountains abounded
with the richest gold mines. St. Domingo, therefore, was represented as a
country abounding with gold, and upon that account (according to the prejudices
not only of the present times, but of those times), an inexhaustible source of
real wealth to the crown and kingdom of Spain. When Columbus, upon his return
from his first voyage, was introduced with a sort of triumphal honours to the
sovereigns of Castile and Arragon, the principal productions of the countries
which he had discovered were carried in solemn procession before him. The only
valuable part of them consisted in some little fillets, bracelets, and other
ornaments of gold, and in some bales of cotton. The rest were mere objects of
vulgar wonder and curiosity; some reeds of an extraordinary size, some birds of
a very beautiful plumage, and some stuffed skins of the huge alligator and
manati; all of which were preceded by six or seven of the wretched natives,
whose singular colour and appearance added greatly to the novelty of the show.

In consequence of the representations of Columbus, the council of Castile
determined to take possession of the countries of which the inhabitants were
plainly incapable of defending themselves. The pious purpose of converting them
to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of
finding treasures of gold there was the sole motive which prompted to undertake
it; and to give this motive the greater weight, it was proposed by Columbus,
that the half of all the gold and silver that should be found there, should
belong to the crown. This proposal was approved of by the council.

As long as the whole, or the greater part of the gold which the first
adventurers imported into Europe was got by so very easy a method as the
plundering of the defenceless natives, it was not perhaps very difficult to pay
even this heavy tax; but when the natives were once fairly stript of all that
they had, which, in St. Domingo, and in all the other countries discovered by
Columbus, was done completely in six or eight years, and when, in order to find
more, it had become necessary to dig for it in the mines, there was no longer
any possibility of paying this tax. The rigorous exaction of it, accordingly,
first occasioned, it is said, the total abandoning of the mines of St. Domingo,
which have never been wrought since. It was soon reduced, therefore, to a
third; then to a fifth; afterwards to a tenth; and at last to a twentieth part
of the gross produce of the gold mines. The tax upon silver continued for a
long time to be a fifth of the gross produce. It was reduced to a tenth only in
the course of the present century. But the first adventurers do not appear to
have been much interested about silver. Nothing less precious than gold seemed
worthy of their attention.

All the other enterprizes of the Spaniards in the New World, subsequent to
those of Columbus, seem to have been prompted by the same motive. It was the
sacred thirst of gold that carried Ovieda, Nicuessa, and Vasco Nugnes de
Balboa, to the Isthmus of Darien; that carried Cortes to Mexico, Almagro and
Pizarro to Chili and Peru. When those adventurers arrived upon any unknown
coast, their first inquiry was always if there was any gold to be found there;
and according to the information which they received concerning this
particular, they determined either to quit the country or to settle in it.

Of all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring bankruptcy
upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is none, perhaps,
more perfectly ruinous than the search after new silver and gold mines. It is,
perhaps, the most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or the one in which the
gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion to the loss of
those who draw the blanks; for though the prizes are few, and the blanks many,
the common price of a ticket is the whole fortune of a very rich man. Projects
of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them, together with the
ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and profit. They are
the projects, therefore, to which, of all others, a prudent lawgiver, who
desired to increase the capital of his nation, would least choose to give any
extraordinary encouragement, or to turn towards them a greater share of that
capital than what would go to them of its own accord. Such, in reality, is the
absurd confidence which almost all men have in their own good fortune, that
wherever there is the least probability of success, too great a share of it is
apt to go to them of its own accord.

But though the judgment of sober reason and experience concerning such projects
has always been extremely unfavourable, that of human avidity has commonly been
quite otherwise. The same passion which has suggested to so many people the
absurd idea of the philosopher’s stone, has suggested to others the
equally absurd one of immense rich mines of gold and silver. They did not
consider that the value of those metals has, in all ages and nations, arisen
chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen from the very
small quantities of them which nature has anywhere deposited in one place, from
the hard and intractable substances with which she has almost everywhere
surrounded those small quantities, and consequently from the labour and expense
which are everywhere necessary in order to penetrate, and get at them. They
flattered themselves that veins of those metals might in many places be found,
as large and as abundant as those which are commonly found of lead, or copper,
or tin, or iron. The dream of Sir Waiter Raleigh, concerning the golden city
and country of El Dorado, may satisfy us, that even wise men are not always
exempt from such strange delusions. More than a hundred years after the death
of that great man, the Jesuit Gumila was still convinced of the reality of that
wonderful country, and expressed, with great warmth, and, I dare say, with
great sincerity, how happy he should be to carry the light of the gospel to a
people who could so well reward the pious labours of their missionary.

In the countries first discovered by the Spaniards, no gold and silver mines
are at present known which are supposed to be worth the working. The quantities
of those metals which the first adventurers are said to have found there, had
probably been very much magnified, as well as the fertility of the mines which
were wrought immediately after the first discovery. What those adventurers were
reported to have found, however, was sufficient to inflame the avidity of all
their countrymen. Every Spaniard who sailed to America expected to find an El
Dorado. Fortune, too, did upon this what she has done upon very few other
occasions. She realized in some measure the extravagant hopes of her votaries;
and in the discovery and conquest of Mexico and Peru (of which the one happened
about thirty, and the other about forty, years after the first expedition of
Columbus), she presented them with something not very unlike that profusion of
the precious metals which they sought for.

A project of commerce to the East Indies, therefore, gave occasion to the first
discovery of the West. A project of conquest gave occasion to all the
establishments of the Spaniards in those newly discovered countries. The motive
which excited them to this conquest was a project of gold and silver mines; and
a course of accidents which no human wisdom could foresee, rendered this
project much more successful than the undertakers had any reasonable grounds
for expecting.

The first adventurers of all the other nations of Europe who attempted to make
settlements in America, were animated by the like chimerical views; but they
were not equally successful. It was more than a hundred years after the first
settlement of the Brazils, before any silver, gold, or diamond mines, were
discovered there. In the English, French, Dutch, and Danish colonies, none have
ever yet been discovered, at least none that are at present supposed to be
worth the working. The first English settlers in North America, however,
offered a fifth of all the gold and silver which should be found there to the
king, as a motive for granting them their patents. In the patents of Sir Waiter
Raleigh, to the London and Plymouth companies, to the council of Plymouth, etc.
this fifth was accordingly reserved to the crown. To the expectation of finding
gold and silver mines, those first settlers, too, joined that of discovering a
north-west passage to the East Indies. They have hitherto been disappointed in
both.

PART II. Causes of the Prosperity of New Colonies.

The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession either of a waste
country, or of one so thinly inhabited that the natives easily give place to
the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other
human society.

The colonies carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful
arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord, in the course of many
centuries, among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with them, too,
the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular government which takes
place in their own country, of the system of laws which support it, and of a
regular administration of justice; and they naturally establish something of
the same kind in the new settlement. But among savage and barbarous nations,
the natural progress of law and government is still slower than the natural
progress of arts, after law and government have been so far established as is
necessary for their protection. Every colonist gets more land than he can
possibly cultivate. He has no rent, and scarce any taxes, to pay. No landlord
shares with him in its produce, and, the share of the sovereign is commonly but
a trifle. He has every motive to render as great as possible a produce which is
thus to be almost entirely his own. But his land is commonly so extensive,
that, with all his own industry, and with all the industry of other people whom
he can get to employ, he can seldom make it produce the tenth part of what it
is capable of producing. He is eager, therefore, to collect labourers from all
quarters, and to reward them with the most liberal wages. But those liberal
wages, joined to the plenty and cheapness of land, soon make those labourers
leave him, in order to become landlords themselves, and to reward with equal
liberality other labourers, who soon leave them for the same reason that they
left their first master. The liberal reward of labour encourages marriage. The
children, during the tender years of infancy, are well fed and properly taken
care of; and when they are grown up, the value of their labour greatly overpays
their maintenance. When arrived at maturity, the high price of labour, and the
low price of land, enable them to establish themselves in the same manner as
their fathers did before them.

In other countries, rent and profit eat up wages, and the two superior orders
of people oppress the inferior one; but in new colonies, the interest of the
two superior orders obliges them to treat the inferior one with more generosity
and humanity, at least where that inferior one is not in a state of slavery.
Waste lands, of the greatest natural fertility, are to be had for a trifle. The
increase of revenue which the proprietor, who is always the undertaker, expects
from their improvement, constitutes his profit, which, in these circumstances,
is commonly very great; but this great profit cannot be made, without employing
the labour of other people in clearing and cultivating the land; and the
disproportion between the great extent of the land and the small number of the
people, which commonly takes place in new colonies, makes it difficult for him
to get this labour. He does not, therefore, dispute about wages, but is willing
to employ labour at any price. The high wages of labour encourage population.
The cheapness and plenty of good land encourage improvement, and enable the
proprietor to pay those high wages. In those wages consists almost the whole
price of the land; and though they are high, considered as the wages of labour,
they are low, considered as the price of what is so very valuable. What
encourages the progress of population and improvement, encourages that of real
wealth and greatness.

The progress of many of the ancient Greek colonies towards wealth and greatness
seems accordingly to have been very rapid. In the course of a century or two,
several of them appear to have rivalled, and even to have surpassed, their
mother cities. Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, Tarentum and Locri in Italy,
Ephesus and Miletus in Lesser Asia, appear, by all accounts, to have been at
least equal to any of the cities of ancient Greece. Though posterior in their
establishment, yet all the arts of refinement, philosophy, poetry, and
eloquence, seem to have been cultivated as early, and to have been improved as
highly in them as in any part of the mother country. The schools of the two
oldest Greek philosophers, those of Thales and Pythagoras, were established, it
is remarkable, not in ancient Greece, but the one in an Asiatic, the other in
an Italian colony. All those colonies had established themselves in countries
inhabited by savage and barbarous nations, who easily gave place to the new
settlers. They had plenty of good land; and as they were altogether independent
of the mother city, they were at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way
that they judged was most suitable to their own interest.

The history of the Roman colonies is by no means so brilliant. Some of them,
indeed, such as Florence, have, in the course of many ages, and after the fall
of the mother city, grown up to be considerable states. But the progress of no
one of them seems ever to have been very rapid. They were all established in
conquered provinces, which in most cases had been fully inhabited before. The
quantity of land assigned to each colonist was seldom very considerable, and,
as the colony was not independent, they were not always at liberty to manage
their own affairs in the way that they judged was most suitable to their own
interest.

In the plenty of good land, the European colonies established in America and
the West Indies resemble, and even greatly surpass, those of ancient Greece. In
their dependency upon the mother state, they resemble those of ancient Rome;
but their great distance from Europe has in all of them alleviated more or less
the effects of this dependency. Their situation has placed them less in the
view, and less in the power of their mother country. In pursuing their interest
their own way, their conduct has upon many occasions been overlooked, either
because not known or not understood in Europe; and upon some occasions it has
been fairly suffered and submitted to, because their distance rendered it
difficult to restrain it. Even the violent and arbitrary government of Spain
has, upon many occasions, been obliged to recall or soften the orders which had
been given for the government of her colonies, for fear of a general
insurrection. The progress of all the European colonies in wealth, population,
and improvement, has accordingly been very great.

The crown of Spain, by its share of the gold and silver, derived some revenue
from its colonies from the moment of their first establishment. It was a
revenue, too, of a nature to excite in human avidity the most extravagant
expectation of still greater riches. The Spanish colonies, therefore, from the
moment of their first establishment, attracted very much the attention of their
mother country; while those of the other European nations were for a long time
in a great measure neglected. The former did not, perhaps, thrive the better in
consequence of this attention, nor the latter the worse in consequence of this
neglect. In proportion to the extent of the country which they in some measure
possess, the Spanish colonies are considered as less populous and thriving than
those of almost any other European nation. The progress even of the Spanish
colonies, however, in population and improvement, has certainly been very rapid
and very great. The city of Lima, founded since the conquest, is represented by
Ulloa as containing fifty thousand inhabitants near thirty years ago. Quito,
which had been but a miserable hamlet of Indians, is represented by the same
author as in his time equally populous. Gemel i Carreri, a pretended traveller,
it is said, indeed, but who seems everywhere to have written upon extreme good
information, represents the city of Mexico as containing a hundred thousand
inhabitants; a number which, in spite of all the exaggerations of the Spanish
writers, is probably more than five times greater than what it contained in the
time of Montezuma. These numbers exceed greatly those of Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia, the three greatest cities of the English colonies. Before the
conquest of the Spaniards, there were no cattle fit for draught, either in
Mexico or Peru. The lama was their only beast of burden, and its strength seems
to have been a good deal inferior to that of a common ass. The plough was
unknown among them. They were ignorant of the use of iron. They had no coined
money, nor any established instrument of commerce of any kind. Their commerce
was carried on by barter. A sort of wooden spade was their principal instrument
of agriculture. Sharp stones served them for knives and hatchets to cut with;
fish bones, and the hard sinews of certain animals, served them with needles to
sew with; and these seem to have been their principal instruments of trade. In
this state of things, it seems impossible that either of those empires could
have been so much improved or so well cultivated as at present, when they are
plentifully furnished with all sorts of European cattle, and when the use of
iron, of the plough, and of many of the arts of Europe, have been introduced
among them. But the populousness of every country must be in proportion to the
degree of its improvement and cultivation. In spite of the cruel destruction of
the natives which followed the conquest, these two great empires are probably
more populous now than they ever were before; and the people are surely very
different; for we must acknowledge, I apprehend, that the Spanish creoles are
in many respects superior to the ancient Indians.

After the settlements of the Spaniards, that of the Portuguese in Brazil is the
oldest of any European nation in America. But as for a long time after the
first discovery neither gold nor silver mines were found in it, and as it
afforded upon that account little or no revenue to the crown, it was for a long
time in a great measure neglected; and during this state of neglect, it grew up
to be a great and powerful colony. While Portugal was under the dominion of
Spain, Brazil was attacked by the Dutch, who got possession of seven of the
fourteen provinces into which it is divided. They expected soon to conquer the
other seven, when Portugal recovered its independency by the elevation of the
family of Braganza to the throne. The Dutch, then, as enemies to the Spaniards,
became friends to the Portuguese, who were likewise the enemies of the
Spaniards. They agreed, therefore, to leave that part of Brazil which they had
not conquered to the king of Portugal, who agreed to leave that part which they
had conquered to them, as a matter not worth disputing about, with such good
allies. But the Dutch government soon began to oppress the Portuguese
colonists, who, instead of amusing themselves with complaints, took arms
against their new masters, and by their own valour and resolution, with the
connivance, indeed, but without any avowed assistance from the mother country,
drove them out of Brazil. The Dutch, therefore, finding it impossible to keep
any part of the country to themselves, were contented that it should be
entirely restored to the crown of Portugal. In this colony there are said to be
more than six hundred thousand people, either Portuguese or descended from
Portuguese, creoles, mulattoes, and a mixed race between Portuguese and
Brazilians. No one colony in America is supposed to contain so great a number
of people of European extraction.

Towards the end of the fifteenth, and during the greater part of the sixteenth
century, Spain and Portugal were the two great naval powers upon the ocean; for
though the commerce of Venice extended to every part of Europe, its fleet had
scarce ever sailed beyond the Mediterranean. The Spaniards, in virtue of the
first discovery, claimed all America as their own; and though they could not
hinder so great a naval power as that of Portugal from settling in Brazil, such
was at that time the terror of their name, that the greater part of the other
nations of Europe were afraid to establish themselves in any other part of that
great continent. The French, who attempted to settle in Florida, were all
murdered by the Spaniards. But the declension of the naval power of this latter
nation, in consequence of the defeat or miscarriage of what they called their
invincible armada, which happened towards the end of the sixteenth century, put
it out of their power to obstruct any longer the settlements of the other
European nations. In the course of the seventeenth century, therefore, the
English, French, Dutch, Danes, and Swedes, all the great nations who had any
ports upon the ocean, attempted to make some settlements in the new world.

The Swedes established themselves in New Jersey; and the number of Swedish
families still to be found there sufficiently demonstrates, that this colony
was very likely to prosper, had it been protected by the mother country. But
being neglected by Sweden, it was soon swallowed up by the Dutch colony of New
York, which again, in 1674, fell under the dominion of the English.

The small islands of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz, are the only countries in the
new world that have ever been possessed by the Danes. These little settlements,
too, were under the government of an exclusive company, which had the sole
right, both of purchasing the surplus produce of the colonies, and of supplying
them with such goods of other countries as they wanted, and which, therefore,
both in its purchases and sales, had not only the power of oppressing them, but
the greatest temptation to do so. The government of an exclusive company of
merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all governments for any country whatever.
It was not, however, able to stop altogether the progress of these colonies,
though it rendered it more slow and languid. The late king of Denmark dissolved
this company, and since that time the prosperity of these colonies has been
very great.

The Dutch settlements in the West, as well as those in the East Indies, were
originally put under the government of an exclusive company. The progress of
some of them, therefore, though it has been considerable in comparison with
that of almost any country that has been long peopled and established, has been
languid and slow in comparison with that of the greater part of new colonies.
The colony of Surinam, though very considerable, is still inferior to the
greater part of the sugar colonies of the other European nations. The colony of
Nova Belgia, now divided into the two provinces of New York and New Jersey,
would probably have soon become considerable too, even though it had remained
under the government of the Dutch. The plenty and cheapness of good land are
such powerful causes of prosperity, that the very worst government is scarce
capable of checking altogether the efficacy of their operation. The great
distance, too, from the mother country, would enable the colonists to evade
more or less, by smuggling, the monopoly which the company enjoyed against
them. At present, the company allows all Dutch ships to trade to Surinam, upon
paying two and a-half per cent. upon the value of their cargo for a license;
and only reserves to itself exclusively, the direct trade from Africa to
America, which consists almost entirely in the slave trade. This relaxation in
the exclusive privileges of the company, is probably the principal cause of
that degree of prosperity which that colony at present enjoys. Curacoa and
Eustatia, the two principal islands belonging to the Dutch, are free ports,
open to the ships of all nations; and this freedom, in the midst of better
colonies, whose ports are open to those of one nation only, has been the great
cause of the prosperity of those two barren islands.

The French colony of Canada was, during the greater part of the last century,
and some part of the present, under the government of an exclusive company.
Under so unfavourable an administration, its progress was necessarily very
slow, in comparison with that of other new colonies; but it became much more
rapid when this company was dissolved, after the fall of what is called the
Mississippi scheme. When the English got possession of this country, they found
in it near double the number of inhabitants which father Charlevoix had
assigned to it between twenty and thirty years before. That jesuit had
travelled over the whole country, and had no inclination to represent it as
less inconsiderable than it really was.

The French colony of St. Domingo was established by pirates and freebooters,
who, for a long time, neither required the protection, nor acknowledged the
authority of France; and when that race of banditti became so far citizens as
to acknowledge this authority, it was for a long time necessary to exercise it
with very great gentleness. During this period, the population and improvement
of this colony increased very fast. Even the oppression of the exclusive
company, to which it was for some time subjected with all the other colonies of
France, though it no doubt retarded, had not been able to stop its progress
altogether. The course of its prosperity returned as soon as it was relieved
from that oppression. It is now the most important of the sugar colonies of the
West Indies, and its produce is said to be greater than that of all the English
sugar colonies put together. The other sugar colonies of France are in general
all very thriving.

But there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than that
of the English in North America.

Plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way,
seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies.

In the plenty of good land, the English colonies of North America, though no
doubt very abundantly provided, are, however, inferior to those of the
Spaniards and Portuguese, and not superior to some of those possessed by the
French before the late war. But the political institutions of the English
colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and cultivation of this
land, than those of the other three nations.

First, The engrossing of uncultivated land, though it has by no means been
prevented altogether, has been more restrained in the English colonies than in
any other. The colony law, which imposes upon every proprietor the obligation
of improving and cultivating, within a limited time, a certain proportion of
his lands, and which, in case of failure, declares those neglected lands
grantable to any other person; though it has not perhaps been very strictly
executed, has, however, had some effect.

Secondly, In Pennsylvania there is no right of primogeniture, and lands, like
moveables, are divided equally among all the children of the family. In three
of the provinces of New England, the oldest has only a double share, as in the
Mosaical law. Though in those provinces, therefore, too great a quantity of
land should sometimes be engrossed by a particular individual, it is likely, in
the course of a generation or two, to be sufficiently divided again. In the
other English colonies, indeed, the right of primogeniture takes place, as in
the law of England: But in all the English colonies, the tenure of the lands,
which are all held by free soccage, facilitates alienation; and the grantee of
an extensive tract of land generally finds it for his interest to alienate, as
fast as he can, the greater part of it, reserving only a small quit-rent. In
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, what is called the right of majorazzo
takes place in the succession of all those great estates to which any title of
honour is annexed. Such estates go all to one person, and are in effect
entailed and unalienable. The French colonies, indeed, are subject to the
custom of Paris, which, in the inheritance of land, is much more favourable to
the younger children than the law of England. But, in the French colonies, if
any part of an estate, held by the noble tenure of chivalry and homage, is
alienated, it is, for a limited time, subject to the right of redemption,
either by the heir of the superior, or by the heir of the family; and all the
largest estates of the country are held by such noble tenures, which
necessarily embarrass alienation. But, in a new colony, a great uncultivated
estate is likely to be much more speedily divided by alienation than by
succession. The plenty and cheapness of good land, it has already been
observed, are the principal causes of the rapid prosperity of new colonies. The
engrossing of land, in effect, destroys this plenty and cheapness. The
engrossing of uncultivated land, besides, is the greatest obstruction to its
improvement; but the labour that is employed in the improvement and cultivation
of land affords the greatest and most valuable produce to the society. The
produce of labour, in this case, pays not only its own wages and the profit of
the stock which employs it, but the rent of the land too upon which it is
employed. The labour of the English colonies, therefore, being more employed in
the improvement and cultivation of land, is likely to afford a greater and more
valuable produce than that of any of the other three nations, which, by the
engrossing of land, is more or less diverted towards other employments.

Thirdly, The labour of the English colonists is not only likely to afford a
greater and more valuable produce, but, in consequence of the moderation of
their taxes, a greater proportion of this produce belongs to themselves, which
they may store up and employ in putting into motion a still greater quantity of
labour. The English colonists have never yet contributed any thing towards the
defence of the mother country, or towards the support of its civil government.
They themselves, on the contrary, have hitherto been defended almost entirely
at the expense of the mother country; but the expense of fleets and armies is
out of all proportion greater than the necessary expense of civil government.
The expense of their own civil government has always been very moderate. It has
generally been confined to what was necessary for paying competent salaries to
the governor, to the judges, and to some other officers of police, and for
maintaining a few of the most useful public works. The expense of the civil
establishment of Massachusetts Bay, before the commencement of the present
disturbances, used to be but about £18;000 a-year; that of New Hampshire and
Rhode Island, £3500 each; that of Connecticut, £4000; that of New York and
Pennsylvania, £4500 each; that of New Jersey, £1200; that of Virginia and South
Carolina, £8000 each. The civil establishments of Nova Scotia and Georgia are
partly supported by an annual grant of parliament; but Nova Scotia pays,
besides, about £7000 a-year towards the public expenses of the colony, and
Georgia about £2500 a-year. All the different civil establishments in North
America, in short, exclusive of those of Maryland and North Carolina, of which
no exact account has been got, did not, before the commencement of the present
disturbances, cost the inhabitants above £64,700 a-year; an ever memorable
example, at how small an expense three millions of people may not only be
governed but well governed. The most important part of the expense of
government, indeed, that of defence and protection, has constantly fallen upon
the mother country. The ceremonial, too, of the civil government in the
colonies, upon the reception of a new governor, upon the opening of a new
assembly, etc. though sufficiently decent, is not accompanied with any
expensive pomp or parade. Their ecclesiastical government is conducted upon a
plan equally frugal. Tithes are unknown among them; and their clergy, who are
far from being numerous, are maintained either by moderate stipends, or by the
voluntary contributions of the people. The power of Spain and Portugal, on the
contrary, derives some support from the taxes levied upon their colonies.
France, indeed, has never drawn any considerable revenue from its colonies, the
taxes which it levies upon them being generally spent among them. But the
colony government of all these three nations is conducted upon a much more
extensive plan, and is accompanied with a much more expensive ceremonial. The
sums spent upon the reception of a new viceroy of Peru, for example, have
frequently been enormous. Such ceremonials are not only real taxes paid by the
rich colonists upon those particular occasions, but they serve to introduce
among them the habit of vanity and expense upon all other occasions. They are
not only very grievous occasional taxes, but they contribute to establish
perpetual taxes, of the same kind, still more grievous; the ruinous taxes of
private luxury and extravagance. In the colonies of all those three nations,
too, the ecclesiastical government is extremely oppressive. Tithes take place
in all of them, and are levied with the utmost rigour in those of Spain and
Portugal. All of them, besides, are oppressed with a numerous race of mendicant
friars, whose beggary being not only licensed but consecrated by religion, is a
most grievous tax upon the poor people, who are most carefully taught that it
is a duty to give, and a very great sin to refuse them their charity. Over and
above all this, the clergy are, in all of them, the greatest engrossers of
land.

Fourthly, In the disposal of their surplus produce, or of what is over and
above their own consumption, the English colonies have been more favoured, and
have been allowed a more extensive market, than those of any other European
nation. Every European nation has endeavoured, more or less, to monopolize to
itself the commerce of its colonies, and, upon that account, has prohibited the
ships of foreign nations from trading to them, and has prohibited them from
importing European goods from any foreign nation. But the manner in which this
monopoly has been exercised in different nations, has been very different.

Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies to an exclusive
company, of whom the colonists were obliged to buy all such European goods as
they wanted, and to whom they were obliged to sell the whole of their surplus
produce. It was the interest of the company, therefore, not only to sell the
former as dear, and to buy the latter as cheap as possible, but to buy no more
of the latter, even at this low price, than what they could dispose of for a
very high price in Europe. It was their interest not only to degrade in all
cases the value of the surplus produce of the colony, but in many cases to
discourage and keep down the natural increase of its quantity. Of all the
expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new
colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual. This,
however, has been the policy of Holland, though their company, in the course of
the present century, has given up in many respects the exertion of their
exclusive privilege. This, too, was the policy of Denmark, till the reign of
the late king. It has occasionally been the policy of France; and of late,
since 1755, after it had been abandoned by all other nations on account of its
absurdity, it has become the policy of Portugal, with regard at least to two of
the principal provinces of Brazil, Pernambucco, and Marannon.

Other nations, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined the
whole commerce of their colonies to a particular port of the mother country,
from whence no ship was allowed to sail, but either in a fleet and at a
particular season, or, if single, in consequence of a particular license, which
in most cases was very well paid for. This policy opened, indeed, the trade of
the colonies to all the natives of the mother country, provided they traded
from the proper port, at the proper season, and in the proper vessels. But as
all the different merchants, who joined their stocks in order to fit out those
licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the trade
which was carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted very nearly
upon the same principles as that of an exclusive company. The profit of those
merchants would be almost equally exorbitant and oppressive. The colonies would
be ill supplied, and would be obliged both to buy very dear, and to sell very
cheap. This, however, till within these few years, had always been the policy
of Spain; and the price of all European goods, accordingly, is said to have
been enormous in the Spanish West Indies. At Quito, we are told by Ulloa, a
pound of iron sold for about 4s:6d., and a pound of steel for about 6s:9d.
sterling. But it is chiefly in order to purchase European goods that the
colonies part with their own produce. The more, therefore, they pay for the
one, the less they really get for the other, and the dearness of the one is the
same thing with the cheapness of the other. The policy of Portugal is, in this
respect, the same as the ancient policy of Spain, with regard to all its
colonies, except Pernambucco and Marannon; and with regard to these it has
lately adopted a still worse.

Other nations leave the trade of their colonies free to all their subjects, who
may carry it on from all the different ports of the mother country, and who
have occasion for no other license than the common despatches of the
custom-house. In this case the number and dispersed situation of the different
traders renders it impossible for them to enter into any general combination,
and their competition is sufficient to hinder them from making very exorbitant
profits. Under so liberal a policy, the colonies are enabled both to sell their
own produce, and to buy the goods of Europe at a reasonable price; but since
the dissolution of the Plymouth company, when our colonies were but in their
infancy, this has always been the policy of England. It has generally, too,
been that of France, and has been uniformly so since the dissolution of what in
England is commonly called their Mississippi company. The profits of the trade,
therefore, which France and England carry on with their colonies, though no
doubt somewhat higher than if the competition were free to all other nations,
are, however, by no means exorbitant; and the price of European goods,
accordingly, is not extravagantly high in the greater past of the colonies of
either of those nations.

In the exportation of their own surplus produce, too, it is only with regard to
certain commodities that the colonies of Great Britain are confined to the
market of the mother country. These commodities having been enumerated in the
act of navigation, and in some other subsequent acts, have upon that account
been called enumerated commodities. The rest are called non-enumerated, and may
be exported directly to other countries, provided it is in British or
plantation ships, of which the owners and three fourths of the mariners are
British subjects.

Among the non-enumerated commodities are some of the most important productions
of America and the West Indies, grain of all sorts, lumber, salt provisions,
fish, sugar, and rum.

Grain is naturally the first and principal object of the culture of all new
colonies. By allowing them a very extensive market for it, the law encourages
them to extend this culture much beyond the consumption of a thinly inhabited
country, and thus to provide beforehand an ample subsistence for a continually
increasing population.

In a country quite covered with wood, where timber consequently is of little or
no value, the expense of clearing the ground is the principal obstacle to
improvement. By allowing the colonies a very extensive market for their lumber,
the law endeavours to facilitate improvement by raising the price of a
commodity which would otherwise be of little value, and thereby enabling them
to make some profit of what would otherwise be mere expense.

In a country neither half peopled nor half cultivated, cattle naturally
multiply beyond the consumption of the inhabitants, and are often, upon that
account, of little or no value. But it is necessary, it has already been shown,
that the price of cattle should bear a certain proportion to that of corn,
before the greater part of the lands of any country can be improved. By
allowing to American cattle, in all shapes, dead and alive, a very extensive
market, the law endeavours to raise the value of a commodity, of which the high
price is so very essential to improvement. The good effects of this liberty,
however, must be somewhat diminished by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15, which puts
hides and skins among the enumerated commodities, and thereby tends to reduce
the value of American cattle.

To increase the shipping and naval power of Great Britain by the extension of
the fisheries of our colonies, is an object which the legislature seems to have
had almost constantly in view. Those fisheries, upon this account, have had all
the encouragement which freedom can give them, and they have flourished
accordingly. The New England fishery, in particular, was, before the late
disturbances, one of the most important, perhaps, in the world. The whale
fishery which, notwithstanding an extravagant bounty, is in Great Britain
carried on to so little purpose, that in the opinion of many people ( which I
do not, however, pretend to warrant), the whole produce does not much exceed
the value of the bounties which are annually paid for it, is in New England
carried on, without any bounty, to a very great extent. Fish is one of the
principal articles with which the North Americans trade to Spain, Portugal, and
the Mediterranean.

Sugar was originally an enumerated commodity, which could only be exported to
Great Britain; but in 1751, upon a representation of the sugar-planters, its
exportation was permitted to all parts of the world. The restrictions, however,
with which this liberty was granted, joined to the high price of sugar in Great
Britain, have rendered it in a great measure ineffectual. Great Britain and her
colonies still continue to be almost the sole market for all sugar produced in
the British plantations. Their consumption increases so fast, that, though in
consequence of the increasing improvement of Jamaica, as well as of the ceded
islands, the importation of sugar has increased very greatly within these
twenty years, the exportation to foreign countries is said to be not much
greater than before.

Rum is a very important article in the trade which the Americans carry on to
the coast of Africa, from which they bring back negro slaves in return.

If the whole surplus produce of America, in grain of all sorts, in salt
provisions, and in fish, had been put into the enumeration, and thereby forced
into the market of Great Britain, it would have interfered too much with the
produce of the industry of our own people. It was probably not so much from any
regard to the interest of America, as from a jealousy of this interference,
that those important commodities have not only been kept out of the
enumeration, but that the importation into Great Britain of all grain, except
rice, and of all salt provisions, has, in the ordinary state of the law, been
prohibited.

The non-enumerated commodities could originally be exported to all parts of the
world. Lumber and rice having been once put into the enumeration, when they
were afterwards taken out of it, were confined, as to the European market, to
the countries that lie south of Cape Finisterre. By the 6th of George III. c.
52, all non-enumerated commodities were subjected to the like restriction. The
parts of Europe which lie south of Cape Finisterre are not manufacturing
countries, and we are less jealous of the colony ships carrying home from them
any manufactures which could interfere with our own.

The enumerated commodities are of two sorts; first, such as are either the
peculiar produce of America, or as cannot be produced, or at least are not
produced in the mother country. Of this kind are molasses, coffee, cocoa-nuts,
tobacco, pimento, ginger, whalefins, raw silk, cotton, wool, beaver, and other
peltry of America, indigo, fustick, and other dyeing woods; secondly, such as
are not the peculiar produce of America, but which are, and may be produced in
the mother country, though not in such quantities as to supply the greater part
of her demand, which is principally supplied from foreign countries. Of this
kind are all naval stores, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and
turpentine, pig and bar iron, copper ore, hides and skins, pot and pearl ashes.
The largest importation of commodities of the first kind could not discourage
the growth, or interfere with the sale, of any part of the produce of the
mother country. By confining them to the home market, our merchants, it was
expected, would not only be enabled to buy them cheaper in the plantations, and
consequently to sell them with a better profit at home, but to establish
between the plantations and foreign countries an advantageous carrying trade,
of which Great Britain was necessarily to be the centre or emporium, as the
European country into which those commodities were first to be imported. The
importation of commodities of the second kind might be so managed too, it was
supposed, as to interfere, not with the sale of those of the same kind which
were produced at home, but with that of those which were imported from foreign
countries; because, by means of proper duties, they might be rendered always
somewhat dearer than the former, and yet a good deal cheaper than the latter.
By confining such commodities to the home market, therefore, it was proposed to
discourage the produce, not of Great Britain, but of some foreign countries
with which the balance of trade was believed to be unfavourable to Great
Britain.

The prohibition of exporting from the colonies to any other country but Great
Britain, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, naturally
tended to lower the price of timber in the colonies, and consequently to
increase the expense of clearing their lands, the principal obstacle to their
improvement. But about the beginning of the present century, in 1703, the pitch
and tar company of Sweden endeavoured to raise the price of their commodities
to Great Britain, by prohibiting their exportation, except in their own ships,
at their own price, and in such quantities as they thought proper. In order to
counteract this notable piece of mercantile policy, and to render herself as
much as possible independent, not only of Sweden, but of all the other northern
powers, Great Britain gave a bounty upon the importation of naval stores from
America; and the effect of this bounty was to raise the price of timber in
America much more than the confinement to the home market could lower it; and
as both regulations were enacted at the same time, their joint effect was
rather to encourage than to discourage the clearing of land in America.

Though pig and bar iron, too, have been put among the enumerated commodities,
yet as, when imported from America, they are exempted from considerable duties
to which they are subject when imported front any other country, the one part
of the regulation contributes more to encourage the erection of furnaces in
America than the other to discourage it. There is no manufacture which
occasions so great a consumption of wood as a furnace, or which can contribute
so much to the clearing of a country overgrown with it.

The tendency of some of these regulations to raise the value of timber in
America, and thereby to facilitate the clearing of the land, was neither,
perhaps, intended nor understood by the legislature. Though their beneficial
effects, however, have been in this respect accidental, they have not upon that
account been less real.

The most perfect freedom of trade is permitted between the British colonies of
America and the West Indies, both in the enumerated and in the non-enumerated
commodities Those colonies are now become so populous and thriving, that each
of them finds in some of the others a great and extensive market for every part
of its produce. All of them taken together, they make a great internal market
for the produce of one another.

The liberality of England, however, towards the trade of her colonies, has been
confined chiefly to what concerns the market for their produce, either in its
rude state, or in what may be called the very first stage of manufacture. The
more advanced or more refined manufactures, even of the colony produce, the
merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain chuse to reserve to themselves,
and have prevailed upon the legislature to prevent their establishment in the
colonies, sometimes by high duties, and sometimes by absolute prohibitions.

While, for example, Muscovado sugars from the British plantations pay, upon
importation, only 6s:4d. the hundred weight, white sugars pay £1:1:1; and
refined, either double or single, in loaves, £4:2:5 8/20ths. When those high
duties were imposed, Great Britain was the sole, and she still continues to be,
the principal market, to which the sugars of the British colonies could be
exported. They amounted, therefore, to a prohibition, at first of claying or
refining sugar for any foreign market, and at present of claying or refining it
for the market which takes off, perhaps, more than nine-tenths of the whole
produce. The manufacture of claying or refining sugar, accordingly, though it
has flourished in all the sugar colonies of France, has been little cultivated
in any of those of England, except for the market of the colonies themselves.
While Grenada was in the hands of the French, there was a refinery of sugar, by
claying, at least upon almost every plantation. Since it fell into those of the
English, almost all works of this kind have been given up; and there are at
present (October 1773), I am assured, not above two or three remaining in the
island. At present, however, by an indulgence of the custom-house, clayed or
refined sugar, if reduced from loaves into powder, is commonly imported as
Muscovado.

While Great Britain encourages in America the manufacturing of pig and bar
iron, by exempting them from duties to which the like commodities are subject
when imported from any other country, she imposes an absolute prohibition upon
the erection of steel furnaces and slit-mills in any of her American
plantations. She will not suffer her colonies to work in those more refined
manufactures, even for their own consumption; but insists upon their purchasing
of her merchants and manufacturers all goods of this kind which they have
occasion for.

She prohibits the exportation from one province to another by water, and even
the carriage by land upon horseback, or in a cart, of hats, of wools, and
woollen goods, of the produce of America; a regulation which effectually
prevents the establishment of any manufacture of such commodities for distant
sale, and confines the industry of her colonists in this way to such coarse and
household manufactures as a private family commonly makes for its own use, or
for that of some of its neighbours in the same province.

To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of every
part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the
way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of
the most sacred rights of mankind. Unjust, however, as such prohibitions may
be, they have not hitherto been very hurtful to the colonies. Land is still so
cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among them, that they can import from
the mother country almost all the more refined or more advanced manufactures
cheaper than they could make them for themselves. Though they had not,
therefore, been prohibited from establishing such manufactures, yet, in their
present state of improvement, a regard to their own interest would probably
have prevented them from doing so. In their present state of improvement, those
prohibitions, perhaps, without cramping their industry, or restraining it from
any employment to which it would have gone of its own accord, are only
impertinent badges of slavery imposed upon them, without any sufficient reason,
by the groundless jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers of the mother
country. In a more advanced state, they might be really oppressive and
insupportable.

Great Britain, too, as she confines to her own market some of the most
important productions of the colonies, so, in compensation, she gives to some
of them an advantage in that market, sometimes by imposing higher duties upon
the like productions when imported from other countries, and sometimes by
giving bounties upon their importation from the colonies. In the first way, she
gives an advantage in the home market to the sugar, tobacco, and iron of her
own colonies; and, in the second, to their raw silk, to their hemp and flax, to
their indigo, to their naval stores, and to their building timber. This second
way of encouraging the colony produce, by bounties upon importation, is, so far
as I have been able to learn, peculiar to Great Britain: the first is not.
Portugal does not content herself with imposing higher duties upon the
importation of tobacco from any other country, but prohibits it under the
severest penalties.

With regard to the importation of goods from Europe, England has likewise dealt
more liberally with her colonies than any other nation.

Great Britain allows a part, almost always the half, generally a larger
portion, and sometimes the whole, of the duty which is paid upon the
importation of foreign goods, to be drawn back upon their exportation to any
foreign country. No independent foreign country, it was easy to foresee, would
receive them, if they came to it loaded with the heavy duties to which almost
all foreign goods are subjected on their importation into Great Britain.
Unless, therefore, some part of those duties was drawn back upon exportation,
there was an end of the carrying trade; a trade so much favoured by the
mercantile system.

Our colonies, however, are by no means independent foreign countries; and Great
Britain having assumed to herself the exclusive right of supplying them with
all goods from Europe, might have forced them (in the same manner as other
countries have done their colonies) to receive such goods loaded with all the
same duties which they paid in the mother country. But, on the contrary, till
1763, the same drawbacks were paid upon the exportation of the greater part of
foreign goods to our colonies, as to any independent foreign country. In 1763,
indeed, by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15, this indulgence was a good deal abated,
and it was enacted, “That no part of the duty called the old subsidy
should be drawn back for any goods of the growth, production, or manufacture of
Europe or the East Indies, which should be exported from this kingdom to any
British colony or plantation in America; wines, white calicoes, and muslins,
excepted.” Before this law, many different sorts of foreign goods might
have been bought cheaper in the plantations than in the mother country, and
some may still.

Of the greater part of the regulations concerning the colony trade, the
merchants who carry it on, it must be observed, have been the principal
advisers. We must not wonder, therefore, if, in a great part of them, their
interest has been more considered than either that of the colonies or that of
the mother country. In their exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies with
all the goods which they wanted from Europe, and of purchasing all such parts
of their surplus produce as could not interfere with any of the trades which
they themselves carried on at home, the interest of the colonies was sacrificed
to the interest of those merchants. In allowing the same drawbacks upon the
re-exportation of the greater part of European and East India goods to the
colonies, as upon their re-exportation to any independent country, the interest
of the mother country was sacrificed to it, even according to the mercantile
ideas of that interest. It was for the interest of the merchants to pay as
little as possible for the foreign goods which they sent to the colonies, and,
consequently, to get back as much as possible of the duties which they advanced
upon their importation into Great Britain. They might thereby be enabled to
sell in the colonies, either the same quantity of goods with a greater profit,
or a greater quantity with the same profit, and, consequently, to gain
something either in the one way or the other. It was likewise for the interest
of the colonies to get all such goods as cheap, and in as great abundance as
possible. But this might not always be for the interest of the mother country.
She might frequently suffer, both in her revenue, by giving back a great part
of the duties which had been paid upon the importation of such goods; and in
her manufactures, by being undersold in the colony market, in consequence of
the easy terms upon which foreign manufactures could be carried thither by
means of those drawbacks. The progress of the linen manufacture of Great
Britain, it is commonly said, has been a good deal retarded by the drawbacks
upon the re-exportation of German linen to the American colonies.

But though the policy of Great Britain, with regard to the trade of her
colonies, has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other
nations, it has, however, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive
than that of any of them.

In every thing except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists
to manage their own affairs their own way, is complete. It is in every respect
equal to that of their fellow-citizens at home, and is secured in the same
manner, by an assembly of the representatives of the people, who claim the sole
right of imposing taxes for the support of the colony government. The authority
of this assembly overawes the executive power; and neither the meanest nor the
most obnoxious colonist, as long as he obeys the law, has any thing to fear
from the resentment, either of the governor, or of any other civil or military
officer in the province. The colony assemblies, though, like the house of
commons in England, they are not always a very equal representation of the
people, yet they approach more nearly to that character; and as the executive
power either has not the means to corrupt them, or, on account of the support
which it receives from the mother country, is not under the necessity of doing
so, they are, perhaps, in general more influenced by the inclinations of their
constituents. The councils, which, in the colony legislatures, correspond to
the house of lords in Great Britain, are not composed of a hereditary nobility.
In some of the colonies, as in three of the governments of New England, those
councils are not appointed by the king, but chosen by the representatives of
the people. In none of the English colonies is there any hereditary nobility.
In all of them, indeed, as in all other free countries, the descendant of an
old colony family is more respected than an upstart of equal merit and fortune;
but he is only more respected, and he has no privileges by which he can be
troublesome to his neighbours. Before the commencement of the present
disturbances, the colony assemblies had not only the legislative, but a part of
the executive power. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, they elected the
governor. In the other colonies, they appointed the revenue officers, who
collected the taxes imposed by those respective assemblies, to whom those
officers were immediately responsible. There is more equality, therefore, among
the English colonists than among the inhabitants of the mother country. Their
manners are more re publican; and their governments, those of three of the
provinces of New England in particular, have hitherto been more republican too.

The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the contrary, take
place in their colonies; and the discretionary powers which such governments
commonly delegate to all their inferior officers are, on account of the great
distance, naturally exercised there with more than ordinary violence. Under all
absolute governments, there is more liberty in the capital than in any other
part of the country. The sovereign himself can never have either interest or
inclination to pervert the order of justice, or to oppress the great body of
the people. In the capital, his presence overawes, more or less, all his
inferior officers, who, in the remoter provinces, from whence the complaints of
the people are less likely to reach him, can exercise their tyranny with much
more safety. But the European colonies in America are more remote than the most
distant provinces of the greatest empires which had ever been known before. The
government of the English colonies is, perhaps, the only one which, since the
world began, could give perfect security to the inhabitants of so very distant
a province. The administration of the French colonies, however, has always been
conducted with much more gentleness and moderation than that of the Spanish and
Portuguese. This superiority of conduct is suitable both to the character of
the French nation, and to what forms the character of every nation, the nature
of their government, which, though arbitrary and violent in comparison with
that of Great Britain, is legal and free in comparison with those of Spain and
Portugal.

It is in the progress of the North American colonies, however, that the
superiority of the English policy chiefly appears. The progress of the sugar
colonies of France has been at least equal, perhaps superior, to that of the
greater part of those of England; and yet the sugar colonies of England enjoy a
free government, nearly of the same kind with that which takes place in her
colonies of North America. But the sugar colonies of France are not
discouraged, like those of England, from refining their own sugar; and what is
still of greater importance, the genius of their government naturally
introduces a better management of their negro slaves.

In all European colonies, the culture of the sugar-cane is carried on by negro
slaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate climate
of Europe could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground
under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the sugar-cane, as
it is managed at present, is all hand labour; though, in the opinion of many,
the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the
profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle,
depend very much upon the good management of those cattle; so the profit and
success of that which is carried on by slaves must depend equally upon the good
management of those slaves; and in the good management of their slaves the
French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are superior to the English.
The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the
violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the
government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether
free. In every country where the unfortunate law of slavery is established, the
magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the
management of the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where
the master is, perhaps, either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector
of such a member, he dares not do this but with the greatest caution and
circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders
it more difficult for him to protect the slave. But in a country where the
government is in a great measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the
magistrate to intermeddle even in the management of the private property of
individuals, and to send them, perhaps, a lettre de cachet, if they do not
manage it according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some
protection to the slave; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do so.
The protection of the magistrate renders the slave less contemptible in the
eyes of his master, who is thereby induced to consider him with more regard,
and to treat him with more gentleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only
more faithful, but more intelligent, and, therefore, upon a double account,
more useful. He approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may
possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his master’s interest;
virtues which frequently belong to free servants, but which never can belong to
a slave, who is treated as slaves commonly are in countries where the master is
perfectly free and secure.

That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under a free
government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In
the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to
protect the slave from the violence of his master, is under the emperors. When
Vidius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, who had
committed a slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his fish-pond,
in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to
emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the others that belonged
to him. Under the republic no magistrate could have had authority enough to
protect the slave, much less to punish the master.

The stock, it is to be observed, which has improved the sugar colonies of
France, particularly the great colony of St Domingo, has been raised almost
entirely from the gradual improvement and cultivation of those colonies. It has
been almost altogether the produce of the soil and of the industry of the
colonists, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of that produce,
gradually accumulated by good management, and employed in raising a still
greater produce. But the stock which has improved and cultivated the sugar
colonies of England, has, a great part of it, been sent out from England, and
has by no means been altogether the produce of the soil and industry of the
colonists. The prosperity of the English sugar colonies has been in a great
measure owing to the great riches of England, of which a part has overflowed,
if one may say so, upon these colonies. But the prosperity of the sugar
colonies of France has been entirely owing to the good conduct of the
colonists, which must therefore have had some superiority over that of the
English; and this superiority has been remarked in nothing so much as in the
good management of their slaves.

Such have been the general outlines of the policy of the different European
nations with regard to their colonies.

The policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to boast of, either in the
original establishment, or, so far as concerns their internal government, in
the subsequent prosperity of the colonies of America.

Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and
directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of hunting
after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of a
country whose harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people of
Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and
hospitality.

The adventurers, indeed, who formed some of the latter establishments, joined
to the chimerical project of finding gold and silver mines, other motives more
reasonable and more laudable; but even these motives do very little honour to
the policy of Europe.

The English puritans, restrained at home, fled for freedom to America, and
established there the four governments of New England. The English catholics,
treated with much greater injustice, established that of Maryland; the quakers,
that of Pennsylvania. The Portuguese Jews, persecuted by the inquisition,
stript of their fortunes, and banished to Brazil, introduced, by their example,
some sort of order and industry among the transported felons and strumpets by
whom that colony was originally peopled, and taught them the culture of the
sugar-cane. Upon all these different occasions, it was not the wisdom and
policy, but the disorder and injustice of the European governments, which
peopled and cultivated America.

In effectuation some of the most important of these establishments, the
different governments of Europe had as little merit as in projecting them. The
conquest of Mexico was the project, not of the council of Spain, but of a
governor of Cuba; and it was effectuated by the spirit of the bold adventurer
to whom it was entrusted, in spite of every thing which that governor, who soon
repented of having trusted such a person, could do to thwart it. The conquerors
of Chili and Peru, and of almost all the other Spanish settlements upon the
continent of America, carried out with them no other public encouragement, but
a general permission to make settlements and conquests in the name of the king
of Spain. Those adventures were all at the private risk and expense of the
adventurers. The government of Spain contributed scarce any thing to any of
them. That of England contributed as little towards effectuating the
establishment of some of its most important colonies in North America.

When those establishments were effectuated, and had become so considerable as
to attract the attention of the mother country, the first regulations which she
made with regard to them, had always in view to secure to herself the monopoly
of their commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their
expense, and, consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than to quicken and
forward the course of their prosperity. In the different ways in which this
monopoly has been exercised, consists one of the most essential differences in
the policy of the different European nations with regard to their colonies. The
best of them all, that of England, is only somewhat less illiberal and
oppressive than that of any of the rest.

In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the
first establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America? In
one way, and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. Magna virum
mater! It bred and formed the men who were capable of achieving such great
actions, and of laying the foundation of so great an empire; and there is no
other quarter of the world; of which the policy is capable of forming, or has
ever actually, and in fact, formed such men. The colonies owe to the policy of
Europe the education and great views of their active and enterprizing founders;
and some of the greatest and most important of them, so far as concerns their
internal government, owe to it scarce anything else.

PART III. Of the Advantages which Europe has derived From the Discovery of
America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good
Hope.

Such are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived from the
policy of Europe.

What are those which Europe has derived from the discovery and colonization of
America?

Those advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages which
Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from those great events;
and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each colonizing country has
derived from the colonies which particularly belong to it, in consequence of
the authority or dominion which it exercises over them.

The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country, has
derived from the discovery and colonization of America, consist, first, in the
increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the augmentation of its industry.

The surplus produce of America imported into Europe, furnishes the inhabitants
of this great continent with a variety of commodities which they could not
otherwise have possessed; some for conveniency and use, some for pleasure, and
some for ornament; and thereby contributes to increase their enjoyments.

The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed, have
contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries which trade to
it directly, such as Spain, Portugal, France, and England; and, secondly, of
all those which, without trading to it directly, send, through the medium of
other countries, goods to it of their own produce, such as Austrian Flanders,
and some provinces of Germany, which, through the medium of the countries
before mentioned, send to it a considerable quantity of linen and other goods.
All such countries have evidently gained a more extensive market for their
surplus produce, and must consequently have been encouraged to increase its
quantity.

But that those great events should likewise have contributed to encourage the
industry of countries such as Hungary and Poland, which may never, perhaps,
have sent a single commodity of their own produce to America, is not, perhaps,
altogether so evident. That those events have done so, however, cannot be
doubted. Some part of the produce of America is consumed in Hungary and Poland,
and there is some demand there for the sugar, chocolate, and tobacco, of that
new quarter of the world. But those commodities must be purchased with
something which is either the produce of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or
with something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Those
commodities of America are new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary
and Poland, to be exchanged there for the surplus produce of these countries.
By being carried thither, they create a new and more extensive market for that
surplus produce. They raise its value, and thereby contribute to encourage its
increase. Though no part of it may ever be carried to America, it may be
carried to other countries, which purchase it with a part of their share of the
surplus produce of America, and it may find a market by means of the
circulation of that trade which was originally put into motion by the surplus
produce of America.

Those great events may even have contributed to increase the enjoyments, and to
augment the industry, of countries which not only never sent any commodities to
America, but never received any from it. Even such countries may have received
a greater abundance of other commodities from countries, of which the surplus
produce had been augmented by means of the American trade. This greater
abundance, as it must necessarily have increased their enjoyments, so it must
likewise have augmented their industry. A greater number of new equivalents, of
some kind or other, must have been presented to them to be exchanged for the
surplus produce of that industry. A more extensive market must have been
created for that surplus produce, so as to raise its value, and thereby
encourage its increase. The mass of commodities annually thrown into the great
circle of European commerce, and by its various revolutions annually
distributed among all the different nations comprehended within it, must have
been augmented by the whole surplus produce of America. A greater share of this
greater mass, therefore, is likely to have fallen to each of those nations, to
have increased their enjoyments, and augmented their industry.

The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or at least to
keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and
industry of all those nations in general, and of the American colonies in
particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of one of the great springs
which puts into motion a great part of the business of mankind. By rendering
the colony produce dearer in all other countries, it lessens its consumption,
and thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the enjoyments and
the industry of all other countries, which both enjoy less when they pay more
for what they enjoy, and produce less when they get less for what they produce.
By rendering the produce of all other countries dearer in the colonies, it
cramps in the same manner the industry of all other colonies, and both the
enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It is a clog which, for the
supposed benefit of some particular countries, embarrasses the pleasures and
encumbers the industry of all other countries, but of the colonies more than of
any other. It not only excludes as much as possible all other countries from
one particular market, but it confines as much as possible the colonies to one
particular market; and the difference is very great between being excluded from
one particular market when all others are open, and being confined to one
particular market when all others are shut up. The surplus produce of the
colonies, however, is the original source of all that increase of enjoyments
and industry which Europe derives from the discovery and colonization of
America, and the exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to render this
source much less abundant than it otherwise would be.

The particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from the
colonies which particularly belong to it, are of two different kinds; first,
those common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces subject
to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar advantages which are supposed to
result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of
America.

The common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces subject to
its dominion consist, first, in the military force which they furnish for its
defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they furnish for the support of
its civil government. The Roman colonies furnished occasionally both the one
and the other. The Greek colonies sometimes furnished a military force, but
seldom any revenue. They seldom acknowledged themselves subject to the dominion
of the mother city. They were generally her allies in war, but very seldom her
subjects in peace.

The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military force
for the defence of the mother country. The military force has never yet been
sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in which the mother
countries have been engaged, the defence of their colonies has generally
occasioned a very considerable distraction of the military force of those
countries. In this respect, therefore, all the European colonies have, without
exception, been a cause rather of weakness than of strength to their respective
mother countries.

The colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue towards
the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil government. The
taxes which have been levied upon those of other European nations, upon those
of England in particular, have seldom been equal to the expense laid out upon
them in time of peace, and never sufficient to defray that which they
occasioned in time of war. Such colonies, therefore, have been a source of
expense, and not of revenue, to their respective mother countries.

The advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries, consist
altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result from
provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of America; and
the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the sole source of all those
peculiar advantages.

In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the surplus produce of
the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are called enumerated
commodities, can be sent to no other country but England. Other countries must
afterwards buy it of her. It must be cheaper, therefore, in England than it can
be in any other country, and must contribute more to increase the enjoyments of
England than those of any other country. It must likewise contribute more to
encourage her industry. For all those parts of her own surplus produce which
England exchanges for those enumerated commodities, she must get a better price
than any other countries can get for the like parts of theirs, when they
exchange them for the same commodities. The manufactures of England, for
example, will purchase a greater quantity of the sugar and tobacco of her own
colonies than the like manufactures of other countries can purchase of that
sugar and tobacco. So far, therefore, as the manufactures of England and those
of other countries are both to be exchanged for the sugar and tobacco of the
English colonies, this superiority of price gives an encouragement to the
former beyond what the latter can, in these circumstances, enjoy. The exclusive
trade of the colonies, therefore, as it diminishes, or at least keeps down
below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and the industry
of the countries which do not possess it, so it gives an evident advantage to
the countries which do possess it over those other countries.

This advantage, however, will, perhaps, be found to be rather what may be
called a relative than an absolute advantage, and to give a superiority to the
country which enjoys it, rather by depressing the industry and produce of other
countries, than by raising those of that particular country above what they
would naturally rise to in the case of a free trade.

The tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the monopoly
which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England than it can do
to France to whom England commonly sells a considerable part of it. But had
France and all other European countries been at all times allowed a free trade
to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of those colonies might by this time have
come cheaper than it actually does, not only to all those other countries, but
likewise to England. The produce of tobacco, in consequence of a market so much
more extensive than any which it has hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably
would, by this time have been so much increased as to reduce the profits of a
tobacco plantation to their natural level with those of a corn plantation,
which it is supposed they are still somewhat above. The price of tobacco might,
and probably would, by this time have fallen somewhat lower than it is at
present. An equal quantity of the commodities, either of England or of those
other countries, might have purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater
quantity of tobacco than it can do at present, and consequently have been sold
there for so much a better price. So far as that weed, therefore, can, by its
cheapness and abundance, increase the enjoyments, or augment the industry,
either of England or of any other country, it would probably, in the case of a
free trade, have produced both these effects in somewhat a greater degree than
it can do at present. England, indeed, would not, in this case, have had any
advantage over other countries. She might have bought the tobacco of her
colonies somewhat cheaper, and consequently have sold some of her own
commodities somewhat dearer, than she actually does; but she could neither have
bought the one cheaper, nor sold the other dearer, than any other country might
have done. She might, perhaps, have gained an absolute, but she would certainly
have lost a relative advantage.

In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade, in
order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding, as much as
possible, other nations from any share in it, England, there are very probable
reasons for believing, has not only sacrificed a part of the absolute advantage
which she, as well as every other nation, might have derived from that trade,
but has subjected herself both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in
almost every other branch of trade.

When, by the act of navigation, England assumed to herself the monopoly of the
colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been employed in it, were
necessarily withdrawn from it. The English capital, which had before carried on
but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole. The capital which had before
supplied the colonies with but a part of the goods which they wanted from
Europe, was now all that was employed to supply them with the whole. But it
could not supply them with the whole; and the goods with which it did supply
them were necessarily sold very dear. The capital which had before bought but a
part of the surplus produce of the colonies, was now all that was employed to
buy the whole. But it could not buy the whole at any thing near the old price;
and therefore, whatever it did buy, it necessarily bought very cheap. But in an
employment of capital, in which the merchant sold very dear, and bought very
cheap, the profit must have been very great, and much above the ordinary level
of profit in other branches of trade. This superiority of profit in the colony
trade could not fail to draw from other branches of trade a part of the capital
which had before been employed in them. But this revulsion of capital, as it
must have gradually increased the competition of capitals in the colony trade,
so it must have gradually diminished that competition in all those other
branches of trade; as it must have gradually lowered the profits of the one, so
it must have gradually raised those of the other, till the profits of all came
to a new level, different from, and somewhat higher, than that at which they
had been before.

This double effect of drawing capital from all other trades, and of raising the
rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would have been in all trades,
was not only produced by this monopoly upon its first establishment, but has
continued to be produced by it ever since.

First, This monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all other
trades, to be employed in that of the colonies.

Though the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much since the
establishment of the act of navigation, it certainly has not increased in the
same proportion as that or the colonies. But the foreign trade of every country
naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its surplus produce in
proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain having engrossed to herself
almost the whole of what may be called the foreign trade of the colonies, and
her capital not having increased in the same proportion as the extent of that
trade, she could not carry it on without continually withdrawing from other
branches of trade some part of the capital which had before been employed in
them, as well as withholding from them a great deal more which would otherwise
have gone to them. Since the establishment of the act of navigation,
accordingly, the colony trade has been continually increasing, while many other
branches of foreign trade, particularly of that to other parts of Europe, have
been continually decaying. Our manufactures for foreign sale, instead of being
suited, as before the act of navigation, to the neighbouring market of Europe,
or to the more distant one of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean
sea, have the greater part of them, been accommodated to the still more distant
one of the colonies; to the market in which they have the monopoly, rather than
to that in which they have many competitors. The causes of decay in other
branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew Decker and other writers, have
been sought for in the excess and improper mode of taxation, in the high price
of labour, in the increase of luxury, etc. may all be found in the overgrowth
of the colony trade. The mercantile capital of Great Britain, though very
great, yet not being infinite, and though greatly increased since the act of
navigation, yet not being increased in the same proportion as the colony trade,
that trade could not possibly be carried on without withdrawing some part of
that capital from other branches of trade, nor consequently without some decay
of those other branches.

England, it must be observed, was a great trading country, her mercantile
capital was very great, and likely to become still greater and greater every
day, not only before the act of navigation had established the monopoly of the
corn trade, but before that trade was very considerable. In the Dutch war,
during the government of Cromwell, her navy was superior to that of Holland;
and in that which broke out in the beginning of the reign of Charles II., it
was at least equal, perhaps superior to the united navies of France and
Holland. Its superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in the present
times, at least if the Dutch navy were to bear the same proportion to the Dutch
commerce now which it did then. But this great naval power could not, in either
of those wars, be owing to the act of navigation. During the first of them, the
plan of that act had been but just formed; and though, before the breaking out
of the second, it had been fully enacted by legal authority, yet no part of it
could have had time to produce any considerable effect, and least of all that
part which established the exclusive trade to the colonies. Both the colonies
and their trade were inconsiderable then, in comparison of what they are how.
The island of Jamaica was an unwholesome desert, little inhabited, and less
cultivated. New York and New Jersey were in the possession of the Dutch, the
half of St. Christopher’s in that of the French. The island of Antigua,
the two Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia, were not planted.
Virginia, Maryland, and New England were planted; and though they were very
thriving colonies, yet there was not perhaps at that time, either in Europe or
America, a single person who foresaw, or even suspected, the rapid progress
which they have since made in wealth, population, and improvement. The island
of Barbadoes, in short, was the only British colony of any consequence, of
which the condition at that time bore any resemblance to what it is at present.
The trade of the colonies, of which England, even for some time after the act
of navigation, enjoyed but a part (for the act of navigation was not very
strictly executed till several years after it was enacted), could not at that
time be the cause of the great trade of England, nor of the great naval power
which was supported by that trade. The trade which at that time supported that
great naval power was the trade of Europe, and of the countries which lie round
the Mediterranean sea. But the share which Great Britain at present enjoys of
that trade could not support any such great naval power. Had the growing trade
of the colonies been left free to all nations, whatever share of it might have
fallen to Great Britain, and a very considerable share would probably have
fallen to her, must have been all an addition to this great trade of which she
was before in possession. In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the
colony trade has not so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great
Britain had before, as a total change in its direction.

Secondly, This monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the rate of
profit, in all the different branches of British trade, higher than it
naturally would have been, had all nations been allowed a free trade to the
British colonies.

The monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew towards that trade a
greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would have gone to
it of its own accord, so, by the expulsion of all foreign capitals, it
necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital employed in that trade below
what it naturally would have been in the case of a free trade. But, by
lessening the competition of capitals in that branch of trade, it necessarily
raised the rate of profit in that branch. By lessening, too, the competition of
British capitals in all other branches of trade, it necessarily raised the rate
of British profit in all those other branches. Whatever may have been, at any
particular period since the establishment of the act of navigation, the state
or extent of the mercantile capital of Great Britain, the monopoly of the
colony trade must, during the continuance of that state, have raised the
ordinary rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been, both
in that and in all the other branches of British trade. If, since the
establishment of the act of navigation, the ordinary rate of British profit has
fallen considerably, as it certainly has, it must have fallen still lower, had
not the monopoly established by that act contributed to keep it up.

But whatever raises, in any country, the ordinary rate of profit higher than it
otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country both to an absolute, and
to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which she has not the
monopoly.

It subjects her to an absolute disadvantage; because, in such branches of
trade, her merchants cannot get this greater profit without selling dearer than
they otherwise would do, both the goods of foreign countries which they import
into their own, and the goods of their own country which they export to foreign
countries. Their own country must both buy dearer and sell dearer; must both
buy less, and sell less; must both enjoy less and produce less, than she
otherwise would do.

It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because, in such branches of trade,
it sets other countries, which are not subject to the same absolute
disadvantage, either more above her or less below her, than they otherwise
would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to produce more, in proportion
to what she enjoys and produces. It renders their superiority greater, or their
inferiority less, than it otherwise would be. By raising the price of her
produce above what it otherwise would be, it enables the merchants of other
countries to undersell her in foreign markets, and thereby to justle her out of
almost all those branches of trade, of which she has not the monopoly.

Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour, as the
cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets; but they are
silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the extravagant gain
of other people; but they say nothing of their own. The high profits of British
stock, however, may contribute towards raising the price of British
manufactures, in many cases, as much, and in some perhaps more, than the high
wages of British labour.

It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly say, has
partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part of the different
branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly; from the trade of Europe,
in particular, and from that of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean
sea.

It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade, by the attraction of
superior profit in the colony trade, in consequence of the continual increase
of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the capital which had
carried it on one year to carry it on the next.

It has partly been driven from them, by the advantage which the high rate of
profit established in Great Britain gives to other countries, in all the
different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the monopoly.

As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other branches a part
of the British capital, which would otherwise have been employed in them, so it
has forced into them many foreign capitals which would never have gone to them,
had they not been expelled from the colony trade. In those other branches of
trade, it has diminished the competition of British capitals, and thereby
raised the rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been. On
the contrary, it has increased the competition of foreign capitals, and thereby
sunk the rate of foreign profit lower than it otherwise would have been. Both
in the one way and in the other, it must evidently have subjected Great Britain
to a relative disadvantage in all those other branches of trade.

The colony trade, however, it may perhaps be said, is more advantageous to
Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that trade a
greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would otherwise
have gone to it, has turned that capital into an employment, more advantageous
to the country than any other which it could have found.

The most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to which it
belongs, is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of productive
labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land and labour of
that country. But the quantity of productive labour which any capital employed
in the foreign trade of consumption can maintain, is exactly in proportion, it
has been shown in the second book, to the frequency of its returns. A capital
of a thousand pounds, for example, employed in a foreign trade of consumption,
of which the returns are made regularly once in the year, can keep in constant
employment, in the country to which it belongs, a quantity of productive
labour, equal to what a thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. If the
returns are made twice or thrice in the year, it can keep in constant
employment a quantity of productive labour, equal to what two or three thousand
pounds can maintain there for a year. A foreign trade of consumption carried on
with a neighbouring, is, upon that account, in general, more advantageous than
one carried on with a distant country; and, for the same reason, a direct
foreign trade of consumption, as it has likewise been shown in the second book,
is in general more advantageous than a round-about one.

But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the
employment of the capital of Great Britain, has, in all cases, forced some part
of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring, to
one carried on with a more distant country, and in many cases from a direct
foreign trade of consumption to a round-about one.

First, The monopoly of the colony trade has, in all cases, forced some part of
the capital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of consumption carried on
with a neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant country.

It has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade with
Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, to that
with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies; from which the
returns are necessarily less frequent, not only on account of the greater
distance, but on account of the peculiar circumstances of those countries. New
colonies, it has already been observed, are always understocked. Their capital
is always much less than what they could employ with great profit and advantage
in the improvement and cultivation of their land. They have a constant demand,
therefore, for more capital than they have of their own; and, in order to
supply the deficiency of their own, they endeavour to borrow as much as they
can of the mother country, to whom they are, therefore, always in debt. The
most common way in which the colonies contract this debt, is not by borrowing
upon bond of the rich people of the mother country, though they sometimes do
this too, but by running as much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply
them with goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow them. Their
annual returns frequently do not amount to more than a third, and sometimes not
to so great a proportion of what they owe. The whole capital, therefore, which
their correspondents advance to them, is seldom returned to Britain in less
than three, and sometimes not in less than four or five years. But a British
capital of a thousand pounds, for example, which is returned to Great Britain
only once in five years, can keep in constant employment only one-fifth part of
the British industry which it could maintain, if the whole was returned once in
the year; and, instead of the quantity of industry which a thousand pounds
could maintain for a year, can keep in constant employment the quantity only
which two hundred pounds can maintain for a year. The planter, no doubt, by the
high price which he pays for the goods from Europe, by the interest upon the
bills which he grants at distant dates, and by the commission upon the renewal
of those which he grants at near dates, makes up, and probably more than makes
up, all the loss which his correspondent can sustain by this delay. But, though
he make up the loss of his correspondent, he cannot make up that of Great
Britain. In a trade of which the returns are very distant, the profit of the
merchant may be as great or greater than in one in which they are very frequent
and near; but the advantage of the country in which he resides, the quantity of
productive labour constantly maintained there, the annual produce of the land
and labour, must always be much less. That the returns of the trade to America,
and still more those of that to the West Indies, are, in general, not only more
distant, but more irregular and more uncertain, too, than those of the trade to
any part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean
sea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by everybody who has any experience of
those different branches of trade.

Secondly, The monopoly of the colony trade, has, in many cases, forced some
part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of
consumption, into a round-about one.

Among the enumerated commodities which can be sent to no other market but Great
Britain, there are several of which the quantity exceeds very much the
consumption of Great Britain, and of which, a part, therefore, must be exported
to other countries. But this cannot be done without forcing some part of the
capital of Great Britain into a round-about foreign trade of consumption.
Maryland, and Virginia, for example, send annually to Great Britain upwards of
ninety-six thousand hogsheads of tobacco, and the consumption of Great Britain
is said not to exceed fourteen thousand. Upwards of eighty-two thousand
hogsheads, therefore, must be exported to other countries, to France, to
Holland, and, to the countries which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean
seas. But that part of the capital of Great Britain which brings those
eighty-two thousand hogsheads to Great Britain, which re-exports them from
thence to those other countries, and which brings back from those other
countries to Great Britain either goods or money in return, is employed in a
round-about foreign trade of consumption; and is necessarily forced into this
employment, in order to dispose of this great surplus. If we would compute in
how many years the whole of this capital is likely to come back to Great
Britain, we must add to the distance of the American returns that of the
returns from those other countries. If, in the direct foreign trade of
consumption which we carry on with America, the whole capital employed
frequently does not come back in less than three or four years, the whole
capital employed in this round-about one is not likely to come back in less
than four or five. If the one can keep in constant employment but a third or a
fourth part of the domestic industry which could be maintained by a capital
returned once in the year, the other can keep in constant employment but a
fourth or a fifth part of that industry. At some of the outports a credit is
commonly given to those foreign correspondents to whom they export them
tobacco. At the port of London, indeed, it is commonly sold for ready money:
the rule is Weigh and pay. At the port of London, therefore, the final returns
of the whole round-about trade are more distant than the returns from America,
by the time only which the goods may lie unsold in the warehouse; where,
however, they may sometimes lie long enough. But, had not the colonies been
confined to the market of Great Britain for the sale of their tobacco, very
little more of it would probably have come to us than what was necessary for
the home consumption. The goods which Great Britain purchases at present for
her own consumption with the great surplus of tobacco which she exports to
other countries, she would, in this case, probably have purchased with the
immediate produce of her own industry, or with some part of her own
manufactures. That produce, those manufactures, instead of being almost
entirely suited to one great market, as at present, would probably have been
fitted to a great number of smaller markets. Instead of one great round-about
foreign trade of consumption, Great Britain would probably have carried on a
great number of small direct foreign trades of the same kind. On account of the
frequency of the returns, a part, and probably but a small part, perhaps not
above a third or a fourth of the capital which at present carries on this great
round-about trade, might have been sufficient to carry on all those small
direct ones; might have kept in constant employment an equal quantity of
British industry; and have equally supported the annual produce of the land and
labour of Great Britain. All the purposes of this trade being, in this manner,
answered by a much smaller capital, there would have been a large spare capital
to apply to other purposes; to improve the lands, to increase the manufactures,
and to extend the commerce of Great Britain; to come into competition at least
with the other British capitals employed in all those different ways, to reduce
the rate of profit in them all, and thereby to give to Great Britain, in all of
them, a superiority over other countries, still greater than what she at
present enjoys.

The monopoly of the colony trade, too, has forced some part of the capital of
Great Britain from all foreign trade of consumption to a carrying trade; and,
consequently from supporting more or less the industry of Great Britain, to be
employed altogether in supporting partly that of the colonies, and partly that
of some other countries.

The goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great surplus of
eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported from Great
Britain, are not all consumed in Great Britain. Part of them, linen from
Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies for their
particular consumption. But that part of the capital of Great Britain which
buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards bought, is necessarily
withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great Britain, to be employed
altogether in supporting, partly that of the colonies, and partly that of the
particular countries who pay for this tobacco with the produce of their own
industry.

The monopoly of the colony trade, besides, by forcing towards it a much greater
proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would naturally have gone
to it, seems to have broken altogether that natural balance which would
otherwise have taken place among all the different branches of British
industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of being accommodated to a
great number of small markets, has been principally suited to one great market.
Her commerce, instead of running in a great number of small channels, has been
taught to run principally in one great channel. But the whole system of her
industry and commerce has thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state of
her body politic less healthful than it otherwise would have been. In her
present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in
which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are
liable to many dangerous disorders, scarce incident to those in which all the
parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel,
which has been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through
which an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has
been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous
disorders upon the whole body politic. The expectation of a rupture with the
colonies, accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more terror
than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French invasion. It was this
terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered the repeal of the stamp
act, among the merchants at least, a popular measure. In the total exclusion
from the colony market, was it to last only for a few years, the greater part
of our merchants used to fancy that they foresaw an entire stop to their trade;
the greater part of our master manufacturers, the entire ruin of their
business; and the greater part of our workmen, an end of their employment. A
rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent, though likely, too, to
occasion some stop or interruption in the employments of some of all these
different orders of people, is foreseen, however, without any such general
emotion. The blood, of which the circulation is stopt in some of the smaller
vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater, without occasioning any
dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the greater vessels,
convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and unavoidable
consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures, which, by means
either of bounties or of the monopoly of the home and colony markets, have been
artificially raised up to any unnatural height, finds some small stop or
interruption in its employment, it frequently occasions a mutiny and disorder
alarming to government, and embarrassing even to the deliberations of the
legislature. How great, therefore, would be the disorder and confusion, it was
thought, which must necessarily be occasioned by a sudden and entire stop in
the employment of so great a proportion of our principal manufacturers?

Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great Britain
the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a great measure
free, seems to be the only expedient which can, in all future times, deliver
her from this danger; which can enable her, or even force her, to withdraw some
part of her capital from this overgrown employment, and to turn it, though with
less profit, towards other employments; and which, by gradually diminishing one
branch of her industry, and gradually increasing all the rest, can, by degrees,
restore all the different branches of it to that natural, healthful, and proper
proportion, which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and which perfect
liberty can alone preserve. To open the colony trade all at once to all
nations, might not only occasion some transitory inconveniency, but a great
permanent loss, to the greater part of those whose industry or capital is at
present engaged in it. The sudden loss of the employment, even of the ships
which import the eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco, which are over and
above the consumption of Great Britain, might alone be felt very sensibly. Such
are the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system.
They not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the body
politic, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without
occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders. In what manner,
therefore, the colony trade ought gradually to be opened; what are the
restraints which ought first, and what are those which ought last, to be taken
away; or in what manner the natural system of perfect liberty and justice ought
gradually to be restored, we must leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and
legislators to determine.

Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very fortunately
concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, so sensibly as it was generally
expected she would, the total exclusion which has now taken place for more than
a year (from the first of December 1774) from a very important branch of the
colony trade, that of the twelve associated provinces of North America. First,
those colonies, in preparing themselves for their non-importation agreement,
drained Great Britain completely of all the commodities which were fit for
their market; secondly, the extra ordinary demand of the Spanish flota has,
this year, drained Germany and the north of many commodities, linen in
particular, which used to come into competition, even in the British market,
with the manufactures of Great Britain; thirdly, the peace between Russia and
Turkey has occasioned an extraordinary demand from the Turkey market, which,
during the distress of the country, and while a Russian fleet was cruizing in
the Archipelago, had been very poorly supplied; fourthly, the demand of the
north of Europe for the manufactures of Great Britain has been increasing from
year to year, for some time past; and, fifthly, the late partition, and
consequential pacification of Poland, by opening the market of that great
country, have, this year, added an extraordinary demand from thence to the
increasing demand of the north. These events are all, except the fourth, in
their nature transitory and accidental; and the exclusion from so important a
branch of the colony trade, if unfortunately it should continue much longer,
may still occasion some degree of distress. This distress, however, as it will
come on gradually, will be felt much less severely than if it had come on all
at once; and, in the mean time, the industry and capital of the country may
find a new employment and direction, so as to prevent this distress from ever
rising to any considerable height.

The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, so far as it has turned towards
that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would
otherwise have gone to it, has in all cases turned it, from a foreign trade of
consumption with a neighbouring, into one with a more distant country; in many
cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption into a round-about one; and,
in some cases, from all foreign trade of consumption into a carrying trade. It
has, in all cases, therefore, turned it from a direction in which it would have
maintained a greater quantity of productive labour, into one in which it can
maintain a much smaller quantity. By suiting, besides, to one particular market
only, so great a part of the industry and commerce of Great Britain, it has
rendered the whole state of that industry and commerce more precarious and less
secure, than if their produce had been accommodated to a greater variety of
markets.

We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and those
of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily
beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But the former are so
beneficial, that the colony trade, though subject to a monopoly, and,
notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still, upon the whole,
beneficial, and greatly beneficial, though a good deal less so than it
otherwise would be.

The effect of the colony trade, in its natural and free state, is to open a
great though distant market, for such parts of the produce of British industry
as may exceed the demand of the markets nearer home, of those of Europe, and of
the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. In its natural and free
state, the colony trade, without drawing from those markets any part of the
produce which had ever been sent to them, encourages Great Britain to increase
the surplus continually, by continually presenting new equivalents to be
exchanged for it. In its natural and free state, the colony trade tends to
increase the quantity of productive labour in Great Britain, but without
altering in any respect the direction of that which had been employed there
before. In the natural and free state of the colony trade, the competition of
all other nations would hinder the rate of profit from rising above the common
level, either in the new market, or in the new employment. The new market,
without drawing any thing from the old one, would create, if one may say so, a
new produce for its own supply; and that new produce would constitute a new
capital for carrying on the new employment, which, in the same manner, would
draw nothing from the old one.

The monopoly of the colony trade, on the contrary, by excluding the competition
of other nations, and thereby raising the rate of profit, both in the new
market and in the new employment, draws produce from the old market, and
capital from the old employment. To augment our share of the colony trade
beyond what it otherwise would be, is the avowed purpose of the monopoly. If
our share of that trade were to be no greater with, than it would have been
without the monopoly, there could have been no reason for establishing the
monopoly. But whatever forces into a branch of trade, of which the returns are
slower and more distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a
greater proportion of the capital of any country, than what of its own accord
would go to that branch, necessarily renders the whole quantity of productive
labour annually maintained there, the whole annual produce of the land and
labour of that country, less than they otherwise would be. It keeps down the
revenue of the inhabitants of that country below what it would naturally rise
to, and thereby diminishes their power of accumulation. It not only hinders, at
all times, their capital from maintaining so great a quantity of productive
labour as it would otherwise maintain, but it hinders it from increasing so
fast as it would otherwise increase, and, consequently, from maintaining a
still greater quantity of productive labour.

The natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than counterbalance
to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly; so that, monopoly and
altogether, that trade, even as it is carried on at present, is not only
advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new market and the new employment
which are opened by the colony trade, are of much greater extent than that
portion of the old market and of the old employment which is lost by the
monopoly. The new produce and the new capital which has been created, if one
may say so, by the colony trade, maintain in Great Britain a greater quantity
of productive labour than what can have been thrown out of employment by the
revulsion of capital from other trades of which the returns are more frequent.
If the colony trade, however, even as it is carried on at present, is
advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means of the monopoly, but in spite
of the monopoly.

It is rather for the manufactured than for the rude produce of Europe, that the
colony trade opens a new market. Agriculture is the proper business of all new
colonies; a business which the cheapness of land renders more advantageous than
any other. They abound, therefore, in the rude produce of land; and instead of
importing it from other countries, they have generally a large surplus to
export. In new colonies, agriculture either draws hands from all other
employments, or keeps them from going to any other employment. There are few
hands to spare for the necessary, and none for the ornamental manufactures. The
greater part of the manufactures of both kinds they find it cheaper to purchase
of other countries than to make for themselves. It is chiefly by encouraging
the manufactures of Europe, that the colony trade indirectly encourages its
agriculture. The manufacturers of Europe, to whom that trade gives employment,
constitute a new market for the produce of the land, and the most advantageous
of all markets; the home market for the corn and cattle, for the bread and
butcher’s meat of Europe, is thus greatly extended by means of the trade
to America.

But that the monopoly of the trade of populous and thriving colonies is not
alone sufficient to establish, or even to maintain, manufactures in any
country, the examples of Spain and Portugal sufficiently demonstrate. Spain and
Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any considerable
colonies. Since they had the richest and most fertile in the world, they have
both ceased to be so.

In Spain and Portugal, the bad effects of the monopoly, aggravated by other
causes, have, perhaps, nearly overbalanced the natural good effects of the
colony trade. These causes seem to be other monopolies of different kinds: the
degradation of the value of gold and silver below what it is in most other
countries; the exclusion from foreign markets by improper taxes upon
exportation, and the narrowing of the home market, by still more improper taxes
upon the transportation of goods from one part of the country to another; but
above all, that irregular and partial administration of justice which often
protects the rich and powerful debtor from the pursuit of his injured creditor,
and which makes the industrious part of the nation afraid to prepare goods for
the consumption of those haughty and great men, to whom they dare not refuse to
sell upon credit, and from whom they are altogether uncertain of repayment.

In England, on the contrary, the natural good effects of the colony trade,
assisted by other causes, have in a great measure conquered the bad effects of
the monopoly. These causes seem to be, the general liberty of trade, which,
notwithstanding some restraints, is at least equal, perhaps superior, to what
it is in any other country; the liberty of exporting, duty free, almost all
sorts of goods which are the produce of domestic industry, to almost any
foreign country; and what, perhaps, is of still greater importance, the
unbounded liberty of transporting them from one part of our own country to any
other, without being obliged to give any account to any public office, without
being liable to question or examination of any kind; but, above all, that equal
and impartial administration of justice, which renders the rights of the
meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, and which, by securing to
every man the fruits of his own industry, gives the greatest and most effectual
encouragement to every sort of industry.

If the manufactures of Great Britain, however, have been advanced, as they
certainly have, by the colony trade, it has not been by means of the monopoly
of that trade, but in spite of the monopoly. The effect of the monopoly has
been, not to augment the quantity, but to alter the quality and shape of a part
of the manufactures of Great Britain, and to accommodate to a market, from
which the returns are slow and distant, what would otherwise have been
accommodated to one from which the returns are frequent and near. Its effect
has consequently been, to turn a part of the capital of Great Britain from an
employment in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of
manufacturing industry, to one in which it maintains a much smaller, and
thereby to diminish, instead of increasing, the whole quantity of manufacturing
industry maintained in Great Britain.

The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, like all the other mean and
malignant expedients of the mercantile system, depresses the industry of all
other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least
increasing, but on the contrary diminishing, that of the country in whose
favour it is established.

The monopoly hinders the capital of that country, whatever may, at any
particular time, be the extent of that capital, from maintaining so great a
quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, and from
affording so great a revenue to the industrious inhabitants as it would
otherwise afford. But as capital can be increased only by savings from revenue,
the monopoly, by hindering it from affording so great a revenue as it would
otherwise afford, necessarily hinders it from increasing so fast as it would
otherwise increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater quantity
of productive labour, and affording a still greater revenue to the industrious
inhabitants of that country. One great original source of revenue, therefore,
the wages of labour, the monopoly must necessarily have rendered, at all times,
less abundant than it otherwise would have been.

By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discourages the
improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the difference
between what the land actually produces, and what, by the application of a
certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this difference affords a
greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal capital in any mercantile
employment, the improvement of land will draw capital from all mercantile
employments. If the profit is less, mercantile employments will draw capital
from the improvement of land. Whatever, therefore, raises the rate of
mercantile profit, either lessens the superiority, or increases the inferiority
of the profit of improvement: and, in the one case, hinders capital from going
to improvement, and in the other draws capital from it; but by discouraging
improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards the natural increase of another
great original source of revenue, the rent of land. By raising the rate of
profit, too, the monopoly necessarily keeps up the market rate of interest
higher than it otherwise would be. But the price of land, in proportion to the
rent which it affords, the number of years purchase which is commonly paid for
it, necessarily falls as the rate of interest rises, and rises as the rate of
interest falls. The monopoly, therefore, hurts the interest of the landlord two
different ways, by retarding the natural increase, first, of his rent, and,
secondly, of the price which he would get for his land, in proportion to the
rent which it affords.

The monopoly, indeed, raises the rate of mercantile profit and thereby augments
somewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the natural increase of
capital, it tends rather to diminish than to increase the sum total of the
revenue which the inhabitants of the country derive from the profits of stock;
a small profit upon a great capital generally affording a greater revenue than
a great profit upon a small one. The monopoly raises the rate of profit, but it
hinders the sum of profit from rising so high as it otherwise would do.

All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of land, and
the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant than they
otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little order of men
in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of men in that
country, and of all the men in all other countries.

It is solely by raising the ordinary rate of profit, that the monopoly either
has proved, or could prove, advantageous to any one particular order of men.
But besides all the bad effects to the country in general, which have already
been mentioned as necessarily resulting from a higher rate of profit, there is
one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put together, but which, if we may
judge from experience, is inseparably connected with it. The high rate of
profit seems everywhere to destroy that parsimony which, in other
circumstances, is natural to the character of the merchant. When profits are
high, that sober virtue seems to be superfluous, and expensive luxury to suit
better the affluence of his situation. But the owners of the great mercantile
capitals are necessarily the leaders and conductors of the whole industry of
every nation; and their example has a much greater influence upon the manners
of the whole industrious part of it than that of any other order of men. If his
employer is attentive and parsimonious, the workman is very likely to be so
too; but if the master is dissolute and disorderly, the servant, who shapes his
work according to the pattern which his master prescribes to him, will shape
his life, too, according to the example which he sets him. Accumulation is thus
prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally the most disposed to
accumulate; and the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour,
receive no augmentation from the revenue of those who ought naturally to
augment them the most. The capital of the country, instead of increasing,
gradually dwindles away, and the quantity of productive labour maintained in it
grows every day less and less. Have the exorbitant profits of the merchants of
Cadiz and Lisbon augmented the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they
alleviated the poverty, have they promoted the industry, of those two beggarly
countries? Such has been the tone of mercantile expense in those two trading
cities, that those exorbitant profits, far from augmenting the general capital
of the country, seem scarce to have been sufficient to keep up the capitals
upon which they were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves,
if I may say so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is to
expel those foreign capitals from a trade which their own grows every day more
and more insufficient for carrying on, that the Spaniards and Portuguese
endeavour every day to straiten more and more the galling bands of their absurd
monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz and Lisbon with those of
Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how differently the conduct and character
of merchants are affected by the high and by the low profits of stock. The
merchants of London, indeed, have not yet generally become such magnificent
lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon; but neither are they in general such
attetitive and parsimonious burghers as those of Amsterdam. They are supposed,
however, many of them, to be a good deal richer than the greater part of the
former, and not quire so rich as many of the latter: but the rate of their
profit is commonly much lower than that of the former, and a good deal higher
than that of the latter. Light come, light go, says the proverb; and the
ordinary tone of expense seems everywhere to be regulated, not so much
according to the real ability of spending, as to the supposed facility of
getting money to spend.

It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a single
order of men, is in many different ways hurtful to the general interest of the
country.

To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of
customers, may at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of
shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of
shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by
shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of fancying
that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and treasure of their
fellow-citizens, to found and maintain such an empire. Say to a shopkeeper, Buy
me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes at your shop, even though I
should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have them for at other shops; and
you will not find him very forward to embrace your proposal. But should any
other person buy you such an estate, the shopkeeper will be much obliged to
your benefactor if he would enjoin you to buy all your clothes at his shop.
England purchased for some of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy at
home, a great estate in a distant country. The price, indeed, was very small,
and instead of thirty years purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present
times, it amounted to little more than the expense of the different equipments
which made the first discovery, reconnoitered the coast, and took a fictitious
possession of the country. The land was good, and of great extent; and the
cultivators having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time
at liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became, in the course of
little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660), so numerous and
thriving a people, that the shopkeepers and other traders of England wished to
secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without pretending,
therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original purchase money,
or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they petitioned the parliament,
that the cultivators of America might for the future be confined to their shop;
first, for buying all the goods which they wanted from Europe; and, secondly,
for selling all such parts of their own produce as those traders might find it
convenient to buy. For they did not find it convenient to buy every part of it.
Some parts of it imported into England, might have interfered with some of the
trades which they themselves carried on at home. Those particular parts of it,
therefore, they were willing that the colonists should sell where they could;
the farther off the better; and upon that account proposed that their market
should be confined to the countries south of Cape Finisterre. A clause in the
famous act of navigation established this truly shopkeeper proposal into a law.

The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more
properly, perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain
assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed, consists the
great advantage of provinces, which have never yet afforded either revenue or
military force for the support of the civil government, or the defence of the
mother country. The monopoly is the principal badge of their dependency, and it
is the sole fruit which has hitherto been gathered from that dependency.
Whatever expense Great Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this
dependency, has really been laid out in order to support this monopoly. The
expense of the ordinary peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before
the commencement of the present disturbances to the pay of twenty regiments of
foot; to the expense of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions,
with which it was necessary to supply them; and to the expense of a very
considerable naval force, which was constantly kept up, in order to guard from
the smuggling vessels of other nations, the immense coast of North America, and
that of our West Indian islands. The whole expense of this peace establishment
was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the
smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother country.
If we would know the amount of the whole, we must add to the annual expense of
this peace establishment, the interest of the sums which, in consequence of
their considering her colonies as provinces subject to her dominion, Great
Britain has, upon different occasions, laid out upon their defence. We must add
to it, in particular, the whole expense of the late war, and a great part of
that of the war which preceded it. The late war was altogether a colony
quarrel; and the whole expense of it, in whatever part of the world it might
have been laid out, whether in Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be
stated to the account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions
sterling, including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two
shillings in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were every year
borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war which began in 1739 was
principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the search of
the colony ships, which carried on a contraband trade with the Spanish Main.
This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty which has been given in order to
support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was to encourage the
manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great Britain. But its real
effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile profit, and to enable our
merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of which the returns are more slow
and distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater
proportion of their capital than they otherwise would have done; two events
which, if a bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very well
worth while to give such a bounty.

Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives
nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.

To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her
colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own
laws, and to make peace and war, as they might think proper, would be to
propose such a measure as never was, and never will be, adopted by any nation
in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province,
how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the
revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expense which it
occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might frequently be agreeable to the
interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation; and, what is
perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private
interest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the
disposal of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring
wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the
great body of the people, the most unprofitable province, seldom fails to
afford. The most visionary enthusiasts would scarce be capable of proposing
such a measure, with any serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If
it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from
the whole annual expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might
settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a
free trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so
to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus
parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother
country, which, perhaps, our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished,
would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect, for whole
centuries together, that treaty of commerce which they had concluded with us at
parting, but to favour us in war as well as in trade, and instead of turbulent
and factious subjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate, and generous
allies; and the same sort of parental affection on the one side, and filial
respect on the other, might revive between Great Britain and her colonies,
which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece and the mother city from
which they descended.

In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it belongs,
it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the public, sufficient not
only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace establishment, but for
contributing its proportion to the support of the general government of the
empire. Every province necessarily contributes, more or less, to increase the
expense of that general government. If any particular province, therefore, does
not contribute its share towards defraying this expense, an unequal burden must
be thrown upon some other part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue, too,
which every province affords to the public in time of war, ought, from parity
of reason, to bear the same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the
whole empire, which its ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither
the ordinary nor extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her
colonies, bears this proportion to the whole revenue of the British empire,
will readily be allowed. The monopoly, it has been supposed, indeed, by
increasing the private revenue of the people of Great Britain, and thereby
enabling them to pay greater taxes, compensates the deficiency of the public
revenue of the colonies. But this monopoly, I have endeavoured to show, though
a very grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue
of a particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes, instead of
increasing, that of the great body of the people, and consequently diminishes,
instead of increasing, the ability of the great body of the people to pay
taxes. The men, too, whose revenue the monopoly increases, constitute a
particular order, which it is both absolutely impossible to tax beyond the
proportion of other orders, and extremely impolitic even to attempt to tax
beyond that proportion, as I shall endeavour to show in the following book. No
particular resource, therefore, can be drawn from this particular order.

The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies, or by the parliament
of Great Britain.

That the colony assemblies can never be so managed as to levy upon their
constituents a public revenue, sufficient, not only to maintain at all times
their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their proper proportion
of the expense of the general government of the British empire, seems not very
probable. It was a long time before even the parliament of England, though
placed immediately under the eye of the sovereign, could be brought under such
a system of management, or could be rendered sufficiently liberal in their
grants for supporting the civil and military establishments even of their own
country. It was only by distributing among the particular members of parliament
a great part either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices arising
from this civil and military establishment, that such a system of management
could be established, even with regard to the parliament of England. But the
distance of the colony assemblies from the eye of the sovereign, their number,
their dispersed situation, and their various constitutions, would render it
very difficult to manage them in the same manner, even though the sovereign had
the same means of doing it; and those means are wanting. It would be absolutely
impossible to distribute among all the leading members of all the colony
assemblies such a share, either of the offices, or of the disposal of the
offices, arising from the general government of the British empire, as to
dispose them to give up their popularity at home, and to tax their constituents
for the support of that general government, of which almost the whole
emoluments were to be divided among people who were strangers to them. The
unavoidable ignorance of administration, besides, concerning the relative
importance of the different members of those different assemblies, the offences
which must frequently be given, the blunders which must constantly be
committed, in attempting to manage them in this manner, seems to render such a
system of management altogether impracticable with regard to them.

The colony assemblies, besides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of what is
necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire. The care of that
defence and support is not entrusted to them. It is not their business, and
they have no regular means of information concerning it. The assembly of a
province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge very properly concerning the
affairs of its own particular district, but can have no proper means of judging
concerning those of the whole empire. It cannot even judge properly concerning
the proportion which its own province bears to the whole empire, or concerning
the relative degree of its wealth and importance, compared with the other
provinces; because those other provinces are not under the inspection and
superintendency of the assembly of a particular province. What is necessary for
the defence and support of the whole empire, and in what proportion each part
ought to contribute, can be judged of only by that assembly which inspects and
super-intends the affairs of the whole empire.

It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by
requisition, the parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which each
colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing and levying it in
the way that suited best the circumstances of the province. What concerned the
whole empire would in this way be determined by the assembly which inspects and
superintends the affairs of the whole empire; and the provincial affairs of
each colony might still be regulated by its own assembly. Though the colonies
should, in this case, have no representatives in the British parliament, yet,
if we may judge by experience, there is no probability that the parliamentary
requisition would be unreasonable. The parliament of England has not, upon any
occasion, shewn the smallest disposition to overburden those parts of the
empire which are not represented in parliament. The islands of Guernsey and
Jersey, without any means of resisting the authority of parliament, are more
lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain. Parliament, in attempting to
exercise its supposed right, whether well or ill grounded, of taxing the
colonies, has never hitherto demanded of them anything which even approached to
a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow subjects at home. If the
contribution of the colonies, besides, was to rise or fall in proportion to the
rise or fall of the land-tax, parliament could not tax them without taxing, at
the same time, its own constituents, and the colonies might, in this case, be
considered as virtually represented in parliament.

Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces are
not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in which the
sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay, and in some
provinces assesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while in others he leaves
it to be assessed and levied as the respective states of each province shall
determine. In some provinces of France, the king not only imposes what taxes he
thinks proper, but assesses and levies them in the way he thinks proper. From
others he demands a certain sum, but leaves it to the states of each province
to assess and levy that sum as they think proper. According to the scheme of
taxing by requisition, the parliament of Great Britain would stand nearly in
the same situation towards the colony assemblies, as the king of France does
towards the states of those provinces which still enjoy the privilege of having
states of their own, the provinces of France which are supposed to be the best
governed.

But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just reason to
fear that their share of the public burdens should ever exceed the proper
proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home, Great Britain might have
just reason to fear that it never would amount to that proper proportion. The
parliament of Great Britain has not, for some time past, had the same
established authority in the colonies, which the French king has in those
provinces of France which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their
own. The colony assemblies, if they were not very favourably disposed (and
unless more skilfully managed than they ever have been hitherto, they are not
very likely to be so), might still find many pretences for evading or rejecting
the most reasonable requisitions of parliament. A French war breaks out, we
shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be raised, in order to defend the
seat of the empire. This sum must be borrowed upon the credit of some
parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying the interest. Part of this fund
parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be levied in Great Britain; and part
of it by a requisition to all the different colony assemblies of America and
the West Indies. Would people readily advance their money upon the credit of a
fund which partly depended upon the good humour of all those assemblies, far
distant from the seat of the war, and sometimes, perhaps, thinking themselves
not much concerned in the event of it? Upon such a fund, no more money would
probably be advanced than what the tax to be levied in Great Britain might be
supposed to answer for. The whole burden of the debt contracted on account of
the war would in this manner fall, as it always has done hitherto, upon Great
Britain; upon a part of the empire, and not upon the whole empire. Great
Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only state which, as it has
extended its empire, has only increased its expense, without once augmenting
its resources. Other states have generally disburdened themselves, upon their
subject and subordinate provinces, of the most considerable part of the expense
of defending the empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and
subordinate provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole
expense. In order to put Great Britain upon a footing of equality with her own
colonies, which the law has hitherto supposed to be subject and subordinate, it
seems necessary, upon the scheme of taxing them by parliamentary requisition,
that parliament should have some means of rendering its requisitions
immediately effectual, in case the colony assemblies should attempt to evade or
reject them; and what those means are, it is not very easy to conceive, and it
has not yet been explained.

Should the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully
established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the
consent of their own assemblies, the importance of those assemblies would, from
that moment, be at an end, and with it, that of all the leading men of British
America. Men desire to have some share in the management of public affairs,
chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them. Upon the power which
the greater part of the leading men, the natural aristocracy of every country,
have of preserving or defending their respective importance, depends the
stability and duration of every system of free government. In the attacks which
those leading men are continually making upon the importance of one another,
and in the defence of their own, consists the whole play of domestic faction
and ambition. The leading men of America, like those of all other countries,
desire to preserve their own importance. They feel, or imagine, that if their
assemblies, which they are fond of calling parliaments, and of considering as
equal in authority to the parliament of Great Britain, should be so far
degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive officers of that
parliament, the greater part of their own importance would be at an end. They
have rejected, therefore, the proposal of being taxed by parliamentary
requisition, and, like other ambitious and high-spirited men, have rather
chosen to draw the sword in defence of their own importance.

Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who had borne
the principal burden of defending the state and extending the empire, demanded
to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens. Upon being refused, the
social war broke out. During the course of that war, Rome granted those
privileges to the greater part of them, one by one, and in proportion as they
detached themselves from the general confederacy. The parliament of Great
Britain insists upon taxing the colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a
parliament in which they are not represented. If to each colony which should
detach itself from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow such a
number of representatives as suited the proportion of what it contributed to
the public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its being subjected to the
same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its
fellow-subjects at home; the number of its representatives to be augmented as
the proportion of its contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of
acquiring importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition, would be
presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the little
prizes which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony
faction, they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally have in
their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which
sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of British politics.
Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and there seems to be none
more obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the
ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will
ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider, that the blood which
must be shed in forcing them to do so, is, every drop of it, the blood either
of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow citizens.
They are very weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to which things
have come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons
who now govern the resolutions of what they call their continental congress,
feel in themselves at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the
greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, trades men, and
attorneys, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in
contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they
flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to
become, one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world.
Five hundred different people, perhaps, who, in different ways, act immediately
under the continental congress, and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act
under those five hundred, all feel, in the same manner, a proportionable rise
in their own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in
America fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station superior, not only to
what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and
unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his
leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of that
station.

It is a remark of the President Heynaut, that we now read with pleasure the
account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which, when they happened,
were not, perhaps, considered as very important pieces of news. But everyman
then, says he, fancied himself of some importance; and the innumerable memoirs
which have come down to us from those times, were the greater part of them
written by people who took pleasure in recording and magnifying events, in
which they flattered themselves they had been considerable actors. How
obstinately the city of Paris, upon that occasion, defended itself, what a
dreadful famine it supported, rather than submit to the best, and afterwards
the most beloved of all the French kings, is well known. The greater part of
the citizens, or those who governed the greater part of them, fought in defence
of their own importance, which, they foresaw, was to be at an end whenever the
ancient government should be re-established. Our colonies, unless they can be
induced to consent to a union, are very likely to defend themselves, against
the best of all mother countries, as obstinately as the city of Paris did
against one of the best of kings.

The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the people of one
state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they had no other
means of exercising that right, but by coming in a body to vote and deliberate
with the people of that other state. The admission of the greater part of the
inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens, completely ruined the
Roman republic. It was no longer possible to distinguish between who was, and
who was not, a Roman citizen. No tribe could know its own members. A rabble of
any kind could be introduced into the assemblies of the people, could drive out
the real citizens, and decide upon the affairs of the republic, as if they
themselves had been such. But though America were to send fifty or sixty new
representatives to parliament, the door-keeper of the house of commons could
not find any great difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not
a member. Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined by
the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the least
probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great
Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be
completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which
deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in
order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from
every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or
that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I
do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable.
The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the nature of things, but from the
prejudices and opinions of the people, both on this and on the other side of
the Atlantic.

We on this side the water are afraid lest the multitude of American
representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and increase
too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or the force of the
democracy on the other. But if the number of American representatives were to
be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of people to
be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the means of managing them,
and the means of managing to the number of people to be managed. The
monarchical and democratical parts of the constitution would, after the union,
stand exactly in the same degree of relative force with regard to one another
as they had done before.

The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their distance from
the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions; but their
representatives in parliament, of which the number ought from the first to be
considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all oppression. The
distance could not much weaken the dependency of the representative upon the
constituent, and the former would still feel that he owed his seat in
parliament, and all the consequence which he derived from it, to the good-will
of the latter. It would be the interest of the former, therefore, to cultivate
that good-will, by complaining, with all the authority of a member of the
legislature, of every outrage which any civil or military officer might be
guilty of in those remote parts of the empire. The distance of America from the
seat of government, besides, the natives of that country might flatter
themselves, with some appearance of reason too, would not be of very long
continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that country in
wealth, population, and improvement, that in the course of little more than a
century, perhaps, the produce of the American might exceed that of the British
taxation. The seat of the empire would then naturally remove itself to that
part of the empire which contributed most to the general defence and support of
the whole.

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape
of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the
history of mankind. Their consequences have already been great; but, in the
short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these
discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their
consequences can have been seen. What benefits or what misfortunes to mankind
may hereafter result from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee. By
uniting in some measure the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them
to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s
enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general
tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East
and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those
events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have
occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from
accident than from any thing in the nature of those events themselves. At the
particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force
happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to
commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries.
Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those
of Europe may grow weaker; and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of
the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring
mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some
sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to
establish this equality of force, than that mutual communication of knowledge,
and of all sorts of improvements, which an extensive commerce from all
countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with
it.

In the mean time, one of the principal effects of those discoveries has been,
to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and glory which it
could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of that system to
enrich a great nation, rather by trade and manufactures than by the improvement
and cultivation of land, rather by the industry of the towns than by that of
the country. But in consequence of those discoveries, the commercial towns of
Europe, instead of being the manufacturers and carriers for but a very small
part of the world (that part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic ocean,
and the countries which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas), have now
become the manufacturers for the numerous and thriving cultivators of America,
and the carriers, and in some respects the manufacturers too, for almost all
the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been
opened to their industry, each of them much greater and more extensive than the
old one, and the market of one of them growing still greater and greater every
day.

The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade directly
to the East Indies, enjoy indeed the whole show and splendour of this great
commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the invidious
restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently enjoy a greater
share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for
example, give more real encouragement to the industry of other countries than
to that of Spain and Portugal. In the single article of linen alone, the
consumption of those colonies amounts, it is said (but I do not pretend to
warrant the quantity ), to more than three millions sterling a-year. But this
great consumption is almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders, Holland, and
Germany. Spain and Portugal furnish but a small part of it. The capital which
supplies the colonies with this great quantity of linen, is annually
distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to, the inhabitants of those other
countries. The profits of it only are spent in Spain and Portugal, where they
help to support the sumptuous profusion of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon.

Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself the
exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to the
countries in favour of which they are established, than to those against which
they are established. The unjust oppression of the industry of other countries
falls back, if I may say so, upon the heads of the oppressors, and crushes
their industry more than it does that of those other countries. By those
regulations, for example, the merchant of Hamburg must send the linen which he
destines for the American market to London, and he must bring back from thence
the tobacco which he destines for the German market; because he can neither
send the one directly to America, nor bring the other directly from thence. By
this restraint he is probably obliged to sell the one somewhat cheaper, and to
buy the other somewhat dearer, than he otherwise might have done; and his
profits are probably somewhat abridged by means of it. In this trade, however,
between Hamburg and London, he certainly receives the returns of his capital
much more quickly than he could possibly have done in the direct trade to
America, even though we should suppose, what is by no means the case, that the
payments of America were as punctual as those of London. In the trade,
therefore, to which those regulations confine the merchant of Hamburg, his
capital can keep in constant employment a much greater quantity of German
industry than he possibly could have done in the trade from which he is
excluded. Though the one employment, therefore, may to him perhaps be less
profitable than the other, it cannot be less advantageous to his country. It is
quite otherwise with the employment into which the monopoly naturally attracts,
if I may say so, the capital of the London merchant. That employment may,
perhaps, be more profitable to him than the greater part of other employments;
but on account of the slowness of the returns, it cannot be more advantageous
to his country.

After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to engross
to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies, no country has
yet been able to engross to itself any thing but the expense of supporting in
time of peace, and of defending in time of war, the oppressive authority which
it assumes over them. The inconveniencies resulting from the possession of its
colonies, every country has engrossed to itself completely. The advantages
resulting from their trade, it has been obliged to share with many other
countries.

At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America
naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To the undiscerning
eye of giddy ambition it naturally presents itself, amidst the confused
scramble of politics and war, as a very dazzling object to fight for. The
dazzling splendour of the object, however, the immense greatness of the
commerce, is the very quality which renders the monopoly of it hurtful, or
which makes one employment, in its own nature necessarily less advantageous to
the country than the greater part of other employments, absorb a much greater
proportion of the capital of the country than what would otherwise have gone to
it.

The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second book,
naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most advantageous to that
country. If it is employed in the carrying trade, the country to which it
belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all the countries whose trade that
stock carries on. But the owner of that stock necessarily wishes to dispose of
as great a part of those goods as he can at home. He thereby saves himself the
trouble, risk, and expense of exportation; and he will upon that account be
glad to sell them at home, not only for a much smaller price, but with somewhat
a smaller profit, than he might expect to make by sending them abroad. He
naturally, therefore, endeavours as much as he can to turn his carrying trade
into a foreign trade of consumption, If his stock, again, is employed in a
foreign trade of consumption, he will, for the same reason, be glad to dispose
of, at home, as great a part as he can of the home goods which he collects in
order to export to some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour, as much as
he can, to turn his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. The
mercantile stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the near, and
shuns the distant employment: naturally courts the employment in which the
returns are frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant and slow;
naturally courts the employment in which it can maintain the greatest quantity
of productive labour in the country to which it belongs, or in which its owner
resides, and shuns that in which it can maintain there the smallest quantity.
It naturally courts the employment which in ordinary cases is most
advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary cases is least advantageous to
that country.

But if, in any one of those distant employments, which in ordinary cases are
less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rise somewhat
higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference which is given
to nearer employments, this superiority of profit will draw stock from those
nearer employments, till the profits of all return to their proper level. This
superiority of profit, however, is a proof that, in the actual circumstances of
the society, those distant employments are somewhat understocked in proportion
to other employments, and that the stock of the society is not distributed in
the properest manner among all the different employments carried on in it. It
is a proof that something is either bought cheaper or sold dearer than it ought
to be, and that some particular class of citizens is more or less oppressed,
either by paying more, or by getting less than what is suitable to that
equality which ought to take place, and which naturally does take place, among
all the different classes of them. Though the same capital never will maintain
the same quantity of productive labour in a distant as in a near employment,
yet a distant employment maybe as necessary for the welfare of the society as a
near one; the goods which the distant employment deals in being necessary,
perhaps, for carrying on many of the nearer employments. But if the profits of
those who deal in such goods are above their proper level, those goods will be
sold dearer than they ought to be, or somewhat above their natural price, and
all those engaged in the nearer employments will be more or less oppressed by
this high price. Their interest, therefore, in this case, requires, that some
stock should be withdrawn from those nearer employments, and turned towards
that distant one, in order to reduce its profits to their proper level, and the
price of the goods which it deals in to their natural price. In this
extraordinary case, the public interest requires that some stock should be
withdrawn from those employments which, in ordinary cases, are more
advantageous, and turned towards one which, in ordinary cases, is less
advantageous to the public; and, in this extraordinary case, the natural
interests and inclinations of men coincide as exactly with the public interests
as in all other ordinary cases, and lead them to withdraw stock from the near,
and to turn it towards the distant employments.

It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally
dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary
cases, are most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural
preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the fall
of profit in them, and the rise of it in all others, immediately dispose them
to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore,
the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and
distribute the stock of every society among all the different employments
carried on in it; as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most
agreeable to the interest of the whole society.

All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily derange more
or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But those
which concern the trade to America and the East Indies derange it, perhaps,
more than any other; because the trade to those two great continents absorbs a
greater quantity of stock than any two other branches of trade. The
regulations, however, by which this derangement is effected in those two
different branches of trade, are not altogether the same. Monopoly is the great
engine of both; but it is a different sort of monopoly. Monopoly of one kind or
another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system.

In the trade to America, every nation endeavours to engross as much as possible
the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all other nations
from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of the sixteenth
century, the Portuguese endeavoured to manage the trade to the East Indies in
the same manner, by claiming the sole right of sailing in the Indian seas, on
account of the merit of having first found out the road to them. The Dutch
still continue to exclude all other European nations from any direct trade to
their spice islands. Monopolies of this kind are evidently established against
all other European nations, who are thereby not only excluded from a trade to
which it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are
obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in, somewhat dearer than if
they could import them themselves directly from the countries which produced
them.

But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has claimed the
exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the principal ports are
now open to the ships of all European nations. Except in Portugal, however, and
within these few years in France, the trade to the East Indies has, in every
European country, been subjected to an exclusive company. Monopolies of this
kind are properly established against the very nation which erects them. The
greater part of that nation are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which
it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are
obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in somewhat dearer than if it
was open and free to all their countrymen. Since the establishment of the
English East India company, for example, the other inhabitants of England, over
and above being excluded from the trade, must have paid, in the price of the
East India goods which they have consumed, not only for all the extraordinary
profits which the company may have made upon those goods in consequence of
their monopoly, but for all the extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse
inseparable from the management of the affairs of so great a company must
necessarily have occasioned. The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly,
therefore, is much more manifest than that of the first.

Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural distribution of
the stock of the society; but they do not always derange it in the same way.

Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in which
they are established a greater proportion of the stock of the society than what
would go to that trade of its own accord.

Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the
particular trade in which they are established, and sometimes repel it from
that trade, according to different circumstances. In poor countries, they
naturally attract towards that trade more stock than would otherwise go to it.
In rich countries, they naturally repel from it a good deal of stock which
would otherwise go to it.

Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would probably have
never sent a single ship to the East Indies, had not the trade been subjected
to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a company necessarily
encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them against all competitors in
the home market, and they have the same chance for foreign markets with the
traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows them the certainty of a great
profit upon a considerable quantity of goods, and the chance of a considerable
profit upon a great quantity. Without such extraordinary encouragement, the
poor traders of such poor countries would probably never have thought of
hazarding their small capitals in so very distant and uncertain an adventure as
the trade to the East Indies must naturally have appeared to them.

Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the case of
a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it actually does.
The limited stock of the Dutch East India company probably repels from that
trade many great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to it. The
mercantile capital of Holland is so great, that it is, as it were, continually
overflowing, sometimes into the public funds of foreign countries, sometimes
into loans to private traders and adventurers of foreign countries, sometimes
into the most round-about foreign trades of consumption, and sometimes into the
carrying trade. All near employments being completely filled up, all the
capital which can be placed in them with any tolerable profit being already
placed in them, the capital of Holland necessarily flows towards the most
distant employments. The trade to the East Indies, if it were altogether free,
would probably absorb the greater part of this redundant capital. The East
Indies offer a market both for the manufactures of Europe, and for the gold and
silver, as well as for the several other productions of America, greater and
more extensive than both Europe and America put together.

Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily hurtful
to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from a
particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by attracting
towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it. If,
without any exclusive company, the trade of Holland to the East Indies would be
greater than it actually is, that country must suffer a considerable loss, by
part of its capital being excluded from the employment most convenient for that
port. And, in the same manner, if, without an exclusive company, the trade of
Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies would be less than it actually is, or,
what perhaps is more probable, would not exist at all, those two countries must
likewise suffer a considerable loss, by part of their capital being drawn into
an employment which must be more or less unsuitable to their present
circumstances. Better for them, perhaps, in the present circumstances, to buy
East India goods of other nations, even though they should pay somewhat dearer,
than to turn so great a part of their small capital to so very distant a trade,
in which the returns are so very slow, in which that capital can maintain so
small a quantity of productive labour at home, where productive labour is so
much wanted, where so little is done, and where so much is to do.

Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country should not
be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it will not from
thence follow, that such a company ought to be established there, but only that
such a country ought not, in these circumstances, to trade directly to the East
Indies. That such companies are not in general necessary for carrying on the
East India trade, is sufficiently demonstrated by the experience of the
Portuguese, who enjoyed almost the whole of it for more than a century
together, without any exclusive company.

No private merchant, it has been said, could well have capital sufficient to
maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the East Indies, in order
to provide goods for the ships which he might occasionally send thither; and
yet, unless he was able to do this, the difficulty of finding a cargo might
frequently make his ships lose the season for returning; and the expense of so
long a delay would not only eat up the whole profit of the adventure, but
frequently occasion a very considerable loss. This argument, however, if it
proved any thing at all, would prove that no one great branch of trade could be
carried on without an exclusive company, which is contrary to the experience of
all nations. There is no great branch of trade, in which the capital of any one
private merchant is sufficient for carrying on all the subordinate branches
which must be carried on, in order to carry on the principal one. But when a
nation is ripe for any great branch of trade, some merchants naturally turn
their capitals towards the principal, and some towards the subordinate branches
of it; and though all the different branches of it are in this manner carried
on, yet it very seldom happens that they are all carried on by the capital of
one private merchant. If a nation, therefore, is ripe for the East India trade,
a certain portion of its capital will naturally divide itself among all the
different branches of that trade. Some of its merchants will find it for their
interest to reside in the East Indies, and to employ their capitals there in
providing goods for the ships which are to be sent out by other merchants who
reside in Europe. The settlements which different European nations have
obtained in the East Indies, if they were taken from the exclusive companies to
which they at present belong, and put under the immediate protection of the
sovereign, would render this residence both safe and easy, at least to the
merchants of the particular nations to whom those settlements belong. If, at
any particular time, that part of the capital of any country which of its own
accord tended and inclined, if I may say so, towards the East India trade, was
not sufficient for carrying on all those different branches of it, it would be
a proof that, at that particular time, that country was not ripe for that
trade, and that it would do better to buy for some time, even at a higher
price, from other European nations, the East India goods it had occasion for,
than to import them itself directly from the East Indies. What it might lose by
the high price of those goods, could seldom be equal to the loss which it would
sustain by the distraction of a large portion of its capital from other
employments more necessary, or more useful, or more suitable to its
circumstances and situation, than a direct trade to the East Indies.

Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon the coast
of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established, in either of
those countries, such numerous and thriving colonies as those in the islands
and continent of America. Africa, however, as well as several of the countries
comprehended under the general name of the East Indies, is inhabited by
barbarous nations. But those nations were by no means so weak and defenceless
as the miserable and helpless Americans; and in proportion to the natural
fertility of the countries which they inhabited, they were, besides, much more
populous. The most barbarous nations either of Africa or of the East Indies,
were shepherds; even the Hottentots were so. But the natives of every part of
America, except Mexico and Peru, were only hunters and the difference is very
great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent
of equally fertile territory can maintain. In Africa and the East Indies,
therefore, it was more difficult to displace the natives, and to extend the
European plantations over the greater part of the lands of the original
inhabitants. The genius of exclusive companies, besides, is unfavourable, it
has already been observed, to the growth of new colonies, and has probably been
the principal cause of the little progress which they have made in the East
Indies. The Portuguese carried on the trade both to Africa and the East Indies,
without any exclusive companies; and their settlements at Congo, Angola, and
Benguela, on the coast of Africa, and at Goa in the East Indies though much
depressed by superstition and every sort of bad government, yet bear some
resemblance to the colonies of America, and are partly inhabited by Portuguese
who have been established there for several generations. The Dutch settlements
at the Cape of Good Hope and at Batavia, are at present the most considerable
colonies which the Europeans have established, either in Africa or in the East
Indies; and both those settlements are peculiarly fortunate in their situation.
The Cape of Good Hope was inhabited by a race of people almost as barbarous,
and quite as incapable of defending themselves, as the natives of America. It
is, besides, the half-way house, if one may say so, between Europe and the East
Indies, at which almost every European ship makes some stay, both in going and
returning. The supplying of those ships with every sort of fresh provisions,
with fruit, and sometimes with wine, affords alone a very extensive market for
the surplus produce of the colonies. What the Cape of Good Hope is between
Europe and every part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal
countries of the East Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from
Indostan to China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way upon that road. Almost
all the ships too, that sail between Europe and China, touch at Batavia; and it
is, over and above all this, the centre and principal mart of what is called
the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it which is
carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians;
and vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan, of Tonquin,
Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are frequently to be seen in
its port. Such advantageous situations have enabled those two colonies to
surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an exclusive company
may have occasionally opposed to their growth. They have enabled Batavia to
surmount the additional disadvantage of perhaps the most unwholesome climate in
the world.

The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no considerable
colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made considerable conquests
in the East Indies. But in the manner in which they both govern their new
subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive company has shewn itself most
distinctly. In the spice islands, the Dutch are said to burn all the spiceries
which a fertile season produces, beyond what they expect to dispose of in
Europe with such a profit as they think sufficient. In the islands where they
have no settlements, they give a premium to those who collect the young
blossoms and green leaves of the clove and nutmeg trees, which naturally grow
there, but which this savage policy has now, it is said, almost completely
extirpated. Even in the islands where they have settlements, they have very
much reduced, it is said, the number of those trees. If the produce even of
their own islands was much greater than what suited their market, the natives,
they suspect, might find means to convey some part of it to other nations; and
the best way, they imagine, to secure their own monopoly, is to take care that
no more shall grow than what they themselves carry to market. By different arts
of oppression, they have reduced the population of several of the Moluccas
nearly to the number which is sufficient to supply with fresh provisions, and
other necessaries of life, their own insignificant garrisons, and such of their
ships as occasionally come there for a cargo of spices. Under the government
even of the Portuguese, however, those islands are said to have been tolerably
well inhabited. The English company have not yet had time to establish in
Bengal so perfectly destructive a system. The plan of their government,
however, has had exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I am well
assured, for the chief, that is, the first clerk or a factory, to order a
peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies, and sow it with rice, or some
other grain. The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the
real reason, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a
large quantity of opium which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon other
occasions, the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other grain
has been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation of poppies, when
the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be made by opium. The
servants of the company have, upon several occasions, attempted to establish in
their own favour the monopoly of some of the most important branches, not only
of the foreign, but of the inland trade of the country. Had they been allowed
to go on, it is impossible that they should not, at some time or another, have
attempted to restrain the production of the particular articles of which they
had thus usurped the monopoly, not only to the quantity which they themselves
could purchase, but to that which they could expect to sell with such a profit
as they might think sufficient. In the course of a century or two, the policy
of the English company would, in this manner, have probably proved as
completely destructive as that of the Dutch.

Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of those
companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which they have
conquered, than this destructive plan. In almost all countries, the revenue of
the sovereign is drawn from that of the people. The greater the revenue of the
people, therefore, the greater the annual produce of their land and labour, the
more they can afford to the sovereign. It is his interest, therefore, to
increase as much as possible that annual produce. But if this is the interest
of every sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like that of the
sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent must
necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the produce; and both
the one and the other must depend upon the extent of the market. The quantity
will always be suited, with more or less exactness, to the consumption of those
who can afford to pay for it; and the price which they will pay will always be
in proportion to the eagerness of their competition. It is the interest of such
a sovereign, therefore, to open the most extensive market for the produce of
his country, to allow the most perfect freedom of commerce, in order to
increase as much as possible the number and competition of buyers; and upon
this account to abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints upon the
transportation of the home produce from one part of the country to another,
upon its exportation to foreign countries, or upon the importation of goods of
any kind for which it can be exchanged. He is in this manner most likely to
increase both the quantity and value of that produce, and consequently of his
own share of it, or of his own revenue.

But a company of merchants, are, it seems, incapable of considering themselves
as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or buying in order to
sell again, they still consider as their principal business, and by a strange
absurdity, regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of
the merchant; as something which ought to be made subservient to it, or by
means of which they may be enabled to buy cheaper in India, and thereby to sell
with a better profit in Europe. They endeavour, for this purpose, to keep out
as much as possible all competitors from the market of the countries which are
subject to their government, and consequently to reduce, at least, some part of
the surplus produce of those countries to what is barely sufficient for
supplying their own demand, or to what they can expect to sell in Europe, with
such a profit as they may think reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them
in this manner, almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon
all ordinary occasions, the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to
the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign; and would gradually lead them
to treat the countries subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat
the Moluccas. It is the interest of the East India company, considered as
sovereigns, that the European goods which are carried to their Indian dominions
should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian goods which are
brought from thence should bring there as good a price, or should be sold there
as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is their interest as merchants. As
sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with that of the country which
they govern. As merchants, their interest is directly opposite to that
interest.

But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns its direction
in Europe, is in this manner essentially, and perhaps incurably faulty, that of
its administration in India is still more so. That administration is
necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a profession no doubt extremely
respectable, but which in no country in the world carries along with it that
sort of authority which naturally overawes the people, and without force
commands their willing obedience. Such a council can command obedience only by
the military force with which they are accompanied; and their government is,
therefore, necessarily military and despotical. Their proper business, however,
is that of merchants. It is to sell, upon their master’s account, the
European goods consigned to them, and to buy, in return, Indian goods for the
European market. It is to sell the one as dear, and to buy the other as cheap
as possible, and consequently to exclude, as much as possible, all rivals from
the particular market where they keep their shop. The genius of the
administration, therefore, so far as concerns the trade of the company, is the
same as that of the direction. It tends to make government subservient to the
interest of monopoly, and consequently to stunt the natural growth of some
parts, at least, of the surplus produce of the country, to what is barely
sufficient for answering the demand of the company.

All the members of the administration besides, trade more or less upon their
own account; and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing so. Nothing can be
more completely foolish than to expect that the clerk of a great
counting-house, at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently almost quite
out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their master, give up at once
doing any sort of business upon their own account abandon for ever all hopes of
making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands; and content
themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters allow them, and
which, moderate as they are, can seldom be augmented, being commonly as large
as the real profits of the company trade can afford. In such circumstances, to
prohibit the servants of the company from trading upon their own account, can
have scarce any other effect than to enable its superior servants, under
pretence of executing their master’s order, to oppress such of the
inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The
servants naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of their
own private trade as of the public trade of the company. If they are suffered
to act as they could wish, they will establish this monopoly openly and
directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles
in which they choose to deal; and this, perhaps, is the best and least
oppressive way of establishing it. But if, by an order from Europe, they are
prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish
a monopoly of the same kind secretly and indirectly, in a way that is much more
destructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of government,
and pervert the administration of Justice, in order to harass and ruin those
who interfere with them in any branch of commerce, which by means of agents,
either concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they may choose to carry on.
But the private trade of the servants will naturally extend to a much greater
variety of articles than the public trade of the company. The public trade of
the company extends no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a
part only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the
servants may extend to all the different branches both of its inland and
foreign trade. The monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the natural
growth of that part of the surplus produce which, in the case of a free trade,
would be exported to Europe. That of the servants tends to stunt the natural
growth of every part of the produce in which they choose to deal; of what is
destined for home consumption, as well as of what is destined for exportation;
and consequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce
the number of its inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every sort of
produce, even that of the necessaries of life, whenever the servants of the
country choose to deal in them, to what those servants can both afford to buy
and expect to sell with such a profit as pleases them.

From the nature of their situation, too, the servants must be more disposed to
support with rigourous severity their own interest, against that of the country
which they govern, than their masters can be to support theirs. The country
belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid having some regard for the interest
of what belongs to them; but it does not belong to the servants. The real
interest of their masters, if they were capable of understanding it, is the
same with that of the country; {The interest of every proprietor of India
stock, however, is by no means the same with that of the country in the
government of which his vote gives him some influence.—See book v, chap.
1, part ii.}and it is from ignorance chiefly, and the meanness of mercantile
prejudice, that they ever oppress it. But the real interest of the servants is
by no means the same with that of the country, and the most perfect information
would not necessarily put an end to their oppressions. The regulations,
accordingly, which have been sent out from Europe, though they have been
frequently weak, have upon most occasions been well meaning. More intelligence,
and perhaps less good meaning, has sometimes appeared in those established by
the servants in India. It is a very singular government in which every member
of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to
have done with the government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the
day after he has left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is
perfectly indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an
earthquake.

I mean not, however, by any thing which I have here said, to throw any odious
imputation upon the general character of the servants of the East India
company, and touch less upon that of any particular persons. It is the system
of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I mean to censure,
not the character of those who have acted in it. They acted as their situation
naturally directed, and they who have clamoured the loudest against them would
probably not have acted better themselves. In war and negotiation, the councils
of Madras and Calcutta, have upon several occasions, conducted themselves with
a resolution and decisive wisdom, which would have done honour to the senate of
Rome in the best days of that republic. The members of those councils, however,
had been bred to professions very different from war and politics. But their
situation alone, without education, experience, or even example, seems to have
formed in them all at once the great qualities which it required, and to have
inspired them both with abilities and virtues which they themselves could not
well know that they possessed. If upon some occasions, therefore, it has
animated them to actions of magnanimity which could not well have been expected
from them, we should not wonder if, upon others, it has prompted them to
exploits of somewhat a different nature.

Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect; always
more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are established, and
destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under their government.

CHAPTER VIII.
CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM.

Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of importation,
are the two great engines by which the mercantile system proposes to enrich
every country, yet, with regard to some particular commodities, it seems to
follow an opposite plan: to discourage exportation, and to encourage
importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is always the same, to
enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade. It discourages the
exportation of the materials of manufacture, and of the instruments of trade,
in order to give our own workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell
those of other nations in all foreign markets; and by restraining, in this
manner, the exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it proposes to
occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of others. It encourages
the importation of the materials of manufacture, in order that our own people
may be enabled to work them up more cheaply, and thereby prevent a greater and
more valuable importation of the manufactured commodities. I do not observe, at
least in our statute book, any encouragement given to the importation of the
instruments of trade. When manufactures have advanced to a certain pitch of
greatness, the fabrication of the instruments of trade becomes itself the
object of a great number of very important manufactures. To give any particular
encouragement to the importation of such instruments, would interfere too much
with the interest of those manufactures. Such importation, therefore, instead
of being encouraged, has frequently been prohibited. Thus the importation of
wool cards, except from Ireland, or when brought in as wreck or prize goods,
was prohibited by the 3rd of Edward IV.; which prohibition was renewed by the
39th of Elizabeth, and has been continued and rendered perpetual by subsequent
laws.

The importation of the materials of manufacture has sometimes been encouraged
by an exemption from the duties to which other goods are subject, and sometimes
by bounties.

The importation of sheep’s wool from several different countries, of
cotton wool from all countries, of undressed flax, of the greater part of
dyeing drugs, of the greater part of undressed hides from Ireland, or the
British colonies, of seal skins from the British Greenland fishery, of pig and
bar iron from the British colonies, as well as of several other materials of
manufacture, has been encouraged by an exemption from all duties, if properly
entered at the custom-house. The private interest of our merchants and
manufacturers may, perhaps, have extorted from the legislature these
exemptions, as well as the greater part of our other commercial regulations.
They are, however, perfectly just and reasonable; and if, consistently with the
necessities of the state, they could be extended to all the other materials of
manufacture, the public would certainly be a gainer.

The avidity of our great manufacturers, however, has in some cases extended
these exemptions a good deal beyond what can justly be considered as the rude
materials of their work. By the 24th Geo. II. chap. 46, a small duty of only
1d. the pound was imposed upon the importation of foreign brown linen yarn,
instead of much higher duties, to which it had been subjected before, viz. of
6d. the pound upon sail yarn, of 1s. the pound upon all French and Dutch yarn,
and of £2:13:4 upon the hundred weight of all spruce or Muscovia yarn. But our
manufacturers were not long satisfied with this reduction: by the 29th of the
same king, chap. 15, the same law which gave a bounty upon the exportation of
British and Irish linen, of which the price did not exceed 18d. the yard, even
this small duty upon the importation of brown linen yarn was taken away. In the
different operations, however, which are necessary for the preparation of linen
yarn, a good deal more industry is employed, than in the subsequent operation
of preparing linen cloth from linen yarn. To say nothing of the industry of the
flax-growers and flaxdressers, three or four spinners at least are necessary in
order to keep one weaver in constant employment; and more than four-fifths of
the whole quantity of labour necessary for the preparation of linen cloth, is
employed in that of linen yarn; but our spinners are poor people; women
commonly scattered about in all different parts of the country, without support
or protection. It is not by the sale of their work, but by that of the complete
work of the weavers, that our great master manufacturers make their profits. As
it is their interest to sell the complete manufacture as dear, so it is to buy
the materials as cheap as possible. By extorting from the legislature bounties
upon the exportation of their own linen, high duties upon the importation of
all foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home consumption of some
sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their own goods as dear as
possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign linen yarn, and thereby
bringing it into competition with that which is made by our own people, they
endeavour to buy the work of the poor spinners as cheap as possible. They are
as intent to keep down the wages of their own weavers, as the earnings of the
poor spinners; and it is by no means for the benefit of the workmen that they
endeavour either to raise the price of the complete work, or to lower that of
the rude materials. It is the industry which is carried on for the benefit of
the rich and the powerful, that is principally encouraged by our mercantile
system. That which is carried on for the benefit of the poor and the indigent
is too often either neglected or oppressed.

Both the bounty upon the exportation of linen, and the exemption from the duty
upon the importation of foreign yarn, which were granted only for fifteen
years, but continued by two different prolongations, expire with the end of the
session of parliament which shall immediately follow the 24th of June 1786.

The encouragement given to the importation of the materials of manufacture by
bounties, has been principally confined to such as were imported from our
American plantations.

The first bounties of this kind were those granted about the beginning of the
present century, upon the importation of naval stores from America. Under this
denomination were comprehended timber fit for masts, yards, and bowsprits;
hemp, tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty, however, of £1 the ton upon
masting-timber, and that of £6 the ton upon hemp, were extended to such as
should be imported into England from Scotland. Both these bounties continued,
without any variation, at the same rate, till they were severally allowed to
expire; that upon hemp on the 1st of January 1741, and that upon masting-timber
at the end of the session of parliament immediately following the 24th June
1781.

The bounties upon the importation of tar, pitch, and turpentine, underwent,
during their continuance, several alterations. Originally, that upon tar was £4
the ton; that upon pitch the same; and that upon turpentine £3 the ton. The
bounty of £4 the ton upon tar was afterwards confined to such as had been
prepared in a particular manner; that upon other good, clean, and merchantable
tar was reduced to £2:4s. the ton. The bounty upon pitch was likewise reduced
to £1, and that upon turpentine to £1:10s. the ton.

The second bounty upon the importation of any of the materials of manufacture,
according to the order of time, was that granted by the 21st Geo. II. chap.30,
upon the importation of indigo from the British plantations. When the
plantation indigo was worth three-fourths of the price of the best French
indigo, it was, by this act, entitled to a bounty of 6d. the pound. This
bounty, which, like most others, was granted only for a limited time, was
continued by several prolongations, but was reduced to 4d. the pound. It was
allowed to expire with the end of the session of parliament which followed the
25th March 1781.

The third bounty of this kind was that granted (much about the time that we
were beginning sometimes to court, and sometimes to quarrel with our American
colonies), by the 4th. Geo. III. chap. 26, upon the importation of hemp, or
undressed flax, from the British plantations. This bounty was granted for
twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1764 to the 24th June 1785. For the first
seven years, it was to be at the rate of £8 the ton; for the second at £6; and
for the third at £4. It was not extended to Scotland, of which the climate
(although hemp is sometimes raised there in small quantities, and of an
inferior quality) is not very fit for that produce. Such a bounty upon the
importation of Scotch flax in England would have been too great a
discouragement to the native produce of the southern part of the united
kingdom.

The fourth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 5th Geo. III. chap. 45,
upon the importation of wood from America. It was granted for nine years from
the 1st January 1766 to the 1st January 1775. During the first three years, it
was to be for every hundred-and-twenty good deals, at the rate of £1, and for
every load containing fifty cubic feet of other square timber, at the rate of
12s. For the second three years, it was for deals, to be at the rate of 15s.,
and for other squared timber at the rate of 8s.; and for the third three years,
it was for deals, to be at the rate of 10s.; and for every other squared timber
at the rate of 5s.

The fifth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 9th Geo. III. chap. 38,
upon the importation of raw silk from the British plantations. It was granted
for twenty-one years, from the 1st January 1770, to the 1st January 1791. For
the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of £25 for every hundred pounds
value; for the second, at £20; and for the third, at £15. The management of the
silk-worm, and the preparation of silk, requires so much hand-labour, and
labour is so very dear in America, that even this great bounty, I have been
informed, was not likely to produce any considerable effect.

The sixth Bounty of this kind was that granted by 11th Geo. III. chap. 50, for
the importation of pipe, hogshead, and barrelstaves and leading from the
British plantations. It was granted for nine years, from 1st January 1772 to
the 1st January 1781. For the first three years, it was, for a certain quantity
of each, to be at the rate of £6; for the second three years at £4; and for the
third three years at £2.

The seventh and last bounty of this kind was that granted by the 19th Geo. III
chap. 37, upon the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was granted in the same
manner as that for the importation of hemp and undressed flax from America, for
twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1779 to the 24th June 1800. The term is
divided likewise into three periods, of seven years each; and in each of those
periods, the rate of the Irish bounty is the same with that of the American. It
does not, however, like the American bounty, extend to the importation of
undressed flax. It would have been too great a discouragement to the
cultivation of that plant in Great Britain. When this last bounty was granted,
the British and Irish legislatures were not in much better humour with one
another, than the British and American had been before. But this boon to
Ireland, it is to be hoped, has been granted under more fortunate auspices than
all those to America. The same commodities, upon which we thus gave bounties,
when imported from America, were subjected to considerable duties when imported
from any other country. The interest of our American colonies was regarded as
the same with that of the mother country. Their wealth was considered as our
wealth. Whatever money was sent out to them, it was said, came all back to us
by the balance of trade, and we could never become a farthing the poorer by any
expense which we could lay out upon them. They were our own in every respect,
and it was an expense laid out upon the improvement of our own property, and
for the profitable employment of our own people. It is unnecessary, I
apprehend, at present to say anything further, in order to expose the folly of
a system which fatal experience has now sufficiently exposed. Had our American
colonies really been a part of Great Britain, those bounties might have been
considered as bounties upon production, and would still have been liable to all
the objections to which such bounties are liable, but to no other.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture is sometimes discouraged by
absolute prohibitions, and sometimes by high duties.

Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other class of
workmen, in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the nation
depended upon the success and extension of their particular business. They have
not only obtained a monopoly against the consumers, by an absolute prohibition
of importing woollen cloths from any foreign country; but they have likewise
obtained another monopoly against the sheep farmers and growers of wool, by a
similar prohibition of the exportation of live sheep and wool. The severity of
many of the laws which have been enacted for the security of the revenue is
very justly complained of, as imposing heavy penalties upon actions which,
antecedent to the statutes that declared them to be crimes, had always been
understood to be innocent. But the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will
venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison to some of those which
the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has extorted from the
legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies.
Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood.

By the 8th of Elizabeth, chap. 3, the exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams, was
for the first offence, to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer a
year’s imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off in a market
town, upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the second offence, to
be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly. To prevent the breed of
our sheep from being propagated in foreign countries, seems to have been the
object of this law. By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap. 18, the
exportation of wool was made felony, and the exporter subjected to the same
penalties and forfeitures as a felon.

For the honour of the national humanity, it is to be hoped that neither of
these statutes was ever executed. The first of them, however, so far as I know,
has never been directly repealed, and serjeant Hawkins seems to consider it as
still in force. It may, however, perhaps be considered as virtually repealed by
the 12th of Charles II. chap. 32, sect. 3, which, without expressly taking away
the penalties imposed by former statutes, imposes a new penalty, viz. that of
20s. for every sheep exported, or attempted to be exported, together with the
forfeiture of the sheep, and of the owner’s share of the sheep. The
second of them was expressly repealed by the 7th and 8th of William III. chap.
28, sect. 4, by which it is declared that “Whereas the statute of the
13th and 14th of king Charles II. made against the exportation of wool, among
other things in the said act mentioned, doth enact the same to be deemed
felony, by the severity of which penalty the prosecution of offenders hath not
been so effectually put in execution; be it therefore enacted, by the authority
aforesaid, that so much of the said act, which relates to the making the said
offence felony, be repealed and made void.”

The penalties, however, which are either imposed by this milder statute, or
which, though imposed by former statutes, are not repealed by this one, are
still sufficiently severe. Besides the forfeiture of the goods, the exporter
incurs the penalty of 3s. for every pound weight of wool, either exported or
attempted to be exported, that is, about four or five times the value. Any
merchant, or other person convicted of this offence, is disabled from requiring
any debt or account belonging to him from any factor or other person. Let his
fortune be what it will, whether he is or is not able to pay those heavy
penalties, the law means to ruin him completely. But, as the morals of the
great body of the people are not yet so corrupt as those of the contrivers of
this statute, I have not heard that any advantage has ever been taken of this
clause. If the person convicted of this offence is not able to pay the
penalties within three months after judgment, he is to be transported for seven
years; and if he returns before the expiration of that term, he is liable to
the pains of felony, without benefit of clergy. The owner of the ship, knowing
this offence, forfeits all his interest in the ship and furniture. The master
and mariners, knowing this offence, forfeit all their goods and chattels, and
suffer three months imprisonment. By a subsequent statute, the master suffers
six months imprisonment.

In order to prevent exportation, the whole inland commerce of wool is laid
under very burdensome and oppressive restrictions. It cannot be packed in any
box, barrel, cask, case, chest, or any other package, but only in packs of
leather or pack-cloth, on which must be marked on the outside the words WOOL or
YARN, in large letters, not less than three inches long, on pain of forfeiting
the same and the package, and 8s. for every pound weight, to be paid by the
owner or packer. It cannot be loaden on any horse or cart, or carried by land
within five miles of the coast, but between sun-rising, and sun-setting, on
pain of forfeiting the same, the horses and carriages. The hundred next
adjoining to the sea coast, out of, or through which the wool is carried or
exported, forfeits £20, if the wool is under the value of £10; and if of
greater value, then treble that value, together with treble costs, to be sued
for within the year. The execution to be against any two of the inhabitants,
whom the sessions must reimburse, by an assessment on the other inhabitants, as
in the cases of robbery. And if any person compounds with the hundred for less
than this penalty, he is to be imprisoned for five years; and any other person
may prosecute. These regulations take place through the whole kingdom.

But in the particular counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are still
more troublesome. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the sea coast must
give an account in writing, three days after shearing, to the next officer of
the customs, of the number of his fleeces, and of the places where they are
lodged. And before he removes any part of them, he must give the like notice of
the number and weight of the fleeces, and of the name and abode of the person
to whom they are sold, and of the place to which it is intended they should be
carried. No person within fifteen miles of the sea, in the said counties, can
buy any wool, before he enters into bond to the king, that no part of the wool
which he shall so buy shall be sold by him to any other person within fifteen
miles of the sea. If any wool is found carrying towards the sea side in the
said counties, unless it has been entered and security given as aforesaid, it
is forfeited, and the offender also forfeits 3s. for every pound weight, if any
person lay any wool, not entered as aforesaid, within fifteen miles of the sea,
it must be seized and forfeited; and if, after such seizure, any person shall
claim the same, he must give security to the exchequer, that if he is cast upon
trial he shall pay treble costs, besides all other penalties.

When such restrictions are imposed upon the inland trade, the coasting trade,
we may believe, cannot be left very free. Every owner of wool, who carrieth, or
causeth to be carried, any wool to any port or place on the sea coast, in order
to be from thence transported by sea to any other place or port on the coast,
must first cause an entry thereof to be made at the port from whence it is
intended to be conveyed, containing the weight, marks, and number, of the
packages, before he brings the same within five miles of that port, on pain of
forfeiting the same, and also the horses, carts, and other carriages; and also
of suffering and forfeiting, as by the other laws in force against the
exportation of wool. This law, however (1st of William III. chap. 32), is so
very indulgent as to declare, that this shall not hinder any person from
carrying his wool home from the place of shearing, though it be within five
miles of the sea, provided that in ten days after shearing, and before he
remove the wool, he do under his hand certify to the next officer of the
customs the true number of fleeces, and where it is housed; and do not remove
the same, without certifying to such officer, under his hand, his intention so
to do, three days before. Bond must be given that the wool to be carried
coast-ways is to be landed at the particular port for which it is entered
outwards; and if my part of it is landed without the presence of an officer,
not only the forfeiture of the wool is incurred, as in other goods, but the
usual additional penalty of 3s. for every pound weight is likewise incurred.

Our woollen manufacturers, in order to justify their demand of such
extraordinary restrictions and regulations, confidently asserted, that English
wool was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other country; that the
wool of other countries could not, without some mixture of it, be wrought up
into any tolerable manufacture; that fine cloth could not be made without it;
that England, therefore, if the exportation of it could be totally prevented,
could monopolize to herself almost the whole woollen trade of the world; and
thus, having no rivals, could sell at what price she pleased, and in a short
time acquire the most incredible degree of wealth by the most advantageous
balance of trade. This doctrine, like most other doctrines which are
confidently asserted by any considerable number of people, was, and still
continues to be, most implicitly believed by a much greater number: by almost
all those who are either unacquainted with the woollen trade, or who have not
made particular inquiries. It is, however, so perfectly false, that English
wool is in any respect necessary for the making of fine cloth, that it is
altogether unfit for it. Fine cloth is made altogether of Spanish wool. English
wool, cannot be even so mixed with Spanish wool, as to enter into the
composition without spoiling and degrading, in some degree, the fabric of the
cloth.

It has been shown in the foregoing part of this work, that the effect of these
regulations has been to depress the price of English wool, not only below what
it naturally would be in the present times, but very much below what it
actually was in the time of Edward III. The price of Scotch wool, when, in
consequence of the Union, it became subject to the same regulations, is said to
have fallen about one half. It is observed by the very accurate and intelligent
author of the Memoirs of Wool, the Reverend Mr. John Smith, that the price of
the best English wool in England, is generally below what wool of a very
inferior quality commonly sells for in the market of Amsterdam. To depress the
price of this commodity below what may be called its natural and proper price,
was the avowed purpose of those regulations; and there seems to be no doubt of
their having produced the effect that was expected from them.

This reduction of price, it may perhaps be thought, by discouraging the growing
of wool, must have reduced very much the annual produce of that commodity,
though not below what it formerly was, yet below what, in the present state of
things, it would probably have been, had it, in consequence of an open and free
market, been allowed to rise to the natural and proper price. I am, however,
disposed to believe, that the quantity of the annual produce cannot have been
much, though it may, perhaps, have been a little affected by these regulations.
The growing of wool is not the chief purpose for which the sheep farmer employs
his industry and stock. He expects his profit, not so much from the price of
the fleece, as from that of the carcase; and the average or ordinary price of
the latter must even, in many cases, make up to him whatever deficiency there
may be in the average or ordinary price of the former. It has been observed, in
the foregoing part of this work, that ‘whatever regulations tend to sink
the price, either of wool or of raw hides, below what it naturally would be,
must, in an improved and cultivated country, have some tendency to raise the
price of butcher’s meat. The price, both of the great and small cattle
which are fed on improved and cultivated land, must be sufficient to pay the
rent which the landlord, and the profit which the farmer, has reason to expect
from improved and cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed
them. Whatever part of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the
hide, must be paid by the carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the more
must be paid for the other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the
different parts of the beast, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers,
provided it is all paid to them. In an improved and cultivated country,
therefore, their interest as landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by
such regulations, though their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the
price of provisions.’ According to this reasoning, therefore, this
degradation in the price of wool is not likely, in an improved and cultivated
country, to occasion any diminution in the annual produce of that commodity;
except so far as, by raising the price of mutton, it may somewhat diminish the
demand for, and consequently the production of, that particular species of
butcher’s meat, Its effect, however, even in this way, it is probable, is
not very considerable.

But though its effect upon the quantity of the annual produce may not have been
very considerable, its effect upon the quality, it may perhaps be thought, must
necessarily have been very great. The degradation in the quality of English
wool, if not below what it was in former times, yet below what it naturally
would have been in the present state of improvement and cultivation, must have
been, it may perhaps be supposed, very nearly in proportion to the degradation
of price. As the quality depends upon the breed, upon the pasture, and upon the
management and cleanliness of the sheep, during the whole progress of the
growth of the fleece, the attention to these circumstances, it may naturally
enough be imagined, can never be greater than in proportion to the recompence
which the price of the fleece is likely to make for the labour and expense
which that attention requires. It happens, however, that the goodness of the
fleece depends, in a great measure, upon the health, growth, and bulk of the
animal: the same attention which is necessary for the improvement of the
carcase is, in some respect, sufficient for that of the fleece. Notwithstanding
the degradation of price, English wool is said to have been improved
considerably during the course even of the present century. The improvement,
might, perhaps, have been greater if the price had been better; but the lowness
of price, though it may have obstructed, yet certainly it has not altogether
prevented that improvement.

The violence of these regulations, therefore, seems to have affected neither
the quantity nor the quality of the annual produce of wool, so much as it might
have been expected to do (though I think it probable that it may have affected
the latter a good deal more than the former); and the interest of the growers
of wool, though it must have been hurt in some degree, seems upon the whole, to
have been much less hurt than could well have been imagined.

These considerations, however, will not justify the absolute prohibition of the
exportation of wool; but they will fully justify the imposition of a
considerable tax upon that exportation.

To hurt, in any degree, the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other
purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that
justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the different
orders of his subjects. But the prohibition certainly hurts, in some degree,
the interest of the growers of wool, for no other purpose but to promote that
of the manufacturers.

Every different order of citizens is bound to contribute to the support of the
sovereign or commonwealth. A tax of five, or even of ten shillings, upon the
exportation of every tod of wool, would produce a very considerable revenue to
the sovereign. It would hurt the interest of the growers somewhat less than the
prohibition, because it would not probably lower the price of wool quite so
much. It would afford a sufficient advantage to the manufacturer, because,
though he might not buy his wool altogether so cheap as under the prohibition,
he would still buy it at least five or ten shillings cheaper than any foreign
manufacturer could buy it, besides saving the freight and insurance which the
other would be obliged to pay. It is scarce possible to devise a tax which
could produce any considerable revenue to the sovereign, and at the same time
occasion so little inconveniency to anybody.

The prohibition, notwithstanding all the penalties which guard it, does not
prevent the exportation of wool. It is exported, it is well known, in great
quantities. The great difference between the price in the home and that in the
foreign market, presents such a temptation to smuggling, that all the rigour of
the law cannot prevent it. This illegal exportation is advantageous to nobody
but the smuggler. A legal exportation, subject to a tax, by affording a revenue
to the sovereign, and thereby saving the imposition of some other, perhaps more
burdensome and inconvenient taxes, might prove advantageous to all the
different subjects of the state.

The exportation of fuller’s earth, or fuller’s clay, supposed to be
necessary for preparing and cleansing the woollen manufactures, has been
subjected to nearly the same penalties as the exportation of wool. Even
tobacco-pipe clay, though acknowledged to be different from fuller’s
clay, yet, on account of their resemblance, and because fuller’s clay
might sometimes be exported as tobacco-pipe clay, has been laid under the same
prohibitions and penalties.

By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap, 7, the exportation, not only of raw
hides, but of tanned leather, except in the shape of boots, shoes, or slippers,
was prohibited; and the law gave a monopoly to our boot-makers and shoe-makers,
not only against our graziers, but against our tanners. By subsequent statutes,
our tanners have got themselves exempted from this monopoly, upon paying a
small tax of only one shilling on the hundred weight of tanned leather,
weighing one hundred and twelve pounds. They have obtained likewise the
drawback of two-thirds of the excise duties imposed upon their commodity, even
when exported without further manufacture. All manufactures of leather may be
exported duty free; and the exporter is besides entitled to the drawback of the
whole duties of excise. Our graziers still continue subject to the old
monopoly. Graziers, separated from one another, and dispersed through all the
different corners of the country, cannot, without great difficulty, combine
together for the purpose either of imposing monopolies upon their
fellow-citizens, or of exempting themselves from such as may have been imposed
upon them by other people. Manufacturers of all kinds, collected together in
numerous bodies in all great cities, easily can. Even the horns of cattle are
prohibited to be exported; and the two insignificant trades of the horner and
comb-maker enjoy, in this respect, a monopoly against the graziers.

Restraints, either by prohibitions, or by taxes, upon the exportation of goods
which are partially, but not completely manufactured, are not peculiar to the
manufacture of leather. As long as anything remains to be done, in order to fit
any commodity for immediate use and consumption, our manufacturers think that
they themselves ought to have the doing of it. Woollen yarn and worsted are
prohibited to be exported, under the same penalties as wool even white cloths
we subject to a duty upon exportation; and our dyers have so far obtained a
monopoly against our clothiers. Our clothiers would probably have been able to
defend themselves against it; but it happens that the greater part of our
principal clothiers are themselves likewise dyers. Watch-cases, clock-cases,
and dial-plates for clocks and watches, have been prohibited to be exported.
Our clock-makers and watch-makers are, it seems, unwilling that the price of
this sort of workmanship should be raised upon them by the competition of
foreigners.

By some old statutes of Edward III, Henry VIII. and Edward VI. the exportation
of all metals was prohibited. Lead and tin were alone excepted, probably on
account of the great abundance of those metals; in the exportation of which a
considerable part of the trade of the kingdom in those days consisted. For the
encouragement of the mining trade, the 5th of William and Mary, chap.17,
exempted from this prohibition iron, copper, and mundic metal made from British
ore. The exportation of all sorts of copper bars, foreign as well as British,
was afterwards permitted by the 9th and 10th of William III. chap 26. The
exportation of unmanufactured brass, of what is called gun-metal, bell-metal,
and shroff metal, still continues to be prohibited. Brass manufactures of all
sorts may be exported duty free.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture, where it is not altogether
prohibited, is, in many cases, subjected to considerable duties.

By the 8th Geo. I. chap.15, the exportation of all goods, the produce of
manufacture of Great Britain, upon which any duties had been imposed by former
statutes, was rendered duty free. The following goods, however, were excepted:
alum, lead, lead-ore, tin, tanned leather, copperas, coals, wool, cards, white
woollen cloths, lapis calaminaris, skins of all sorts, glue, coney hair or
wool, hares wool, hair of all sorts, horses, and litharge of lead. If you
except horses, all these are either materials of manufacture, or incomplete
manufactures (which may be considered as materials for still further
manufacture), or instruments of trade. This statute leaves them subject to all
the old duties which had ever been imposed upon them, the old subsidy, and one
per cent. outwards.

By the same statute, a great number of foreign drugs for dyers use are exempted
from all duties upon importation. Each of them, however, is afterwards
subjected to a certain duty, not indeed a very heavy one, upon exportation. Our
dyers, it seems, while they thought it for their interest to encourage the
importation of those drugs, by an exemption from all duties, thought it
likewise for their own interest to throw some small discouragement upon their
exportation. The avidity, however, which suggested this notable piece of
mercantile ingenuity, most probably disappointed itself of its object. It
necessarily taught the importers to be more careful than they might otherwise
have been, that their importation should not exceed what was necessary for the
supply of the home market. The home market was at all times likely to be more
scantily supplied; the commodities were at all times likely to be somewhat
dearer there than they would have been, had the exportation been rendered as
free as the importation.

By the above-mentioned statute, gum senega, or gum arabic, being among the
enumerated dyeing drugs, might be imported duty free. They were subjected,
indeed, to a small poundage duty, amounting only to threepence in the hundred
weight, upon their re-exportation. France enjoyed, at that time, an exclusive
trade to the country most productive of those drugs, that which lies in the
neighbourhood of the Senegal; and the British market could not be easily
supplied by the immediate importation of them from the place of growth. By the
25th Geo. II. therefore, gum senega was allowed to be imported (contrary to the
general dispositions of the act of navigation) from any part of Europe. As the
law, however, did not mean to encourage this species of trade, so contrary to
the general principles of the mercantile policy of England, it imposed a duty
of ten shillings the hundred weight upon such importation, and no part of this
duty was to be afterwards drawn back upon its exportation. The successful war
which began in 1755 gave Great Britain the same exclusive trade to those
countries which France had enjoyed before. Our manufactures, as soon as the
peace was made, endeavoured to avail themselves of this advantage, and to
establish a monopoly in their own favour both against the growers and against
the importers of this commodity. By the 5th of Geo. III. therefore, chap. 37,
the exportation of gum senega, from his majesty’s dominions in Africa,
was confined to Great Britain, and was subjected to all the same restrictions,
regulations, forfeitures, and penalties, as that of the enumerated commodities
of the British colonies in America and the West Indies. Its importation,
indeed, was subjected to a small duty of sixpence the hundred weight; but its
re-exportation was subjected to the enormous duty of one pound ten shillings
the hundred weight. It was the intention of our manufacturers, that the whole
produce of those countries should be imported into Great Britain; and in order
that they themselves might be enabled to buy it at their own price, that no
part of it should be exported again, but at such an expense as would
sufficiently discourage that exportation. Their avidity, however, upon this, as
well as upon many other occasions, disappointed itself of its object. This
enormous duty presented such a temptation to smuggling, that great quantities
of this commodity were clandestinely exported, probably to all the
manufacturing countries of Europe, but particularly to Holland, not only from
Great Britain, but from Africa. Upon this account, by the 14th Geo. III.
chap.10, this duty upon exportation was reduced to five shillings the hundred
weight.

In the book of rates, according to which the old subsidy was levied, beaver
skins were estimated at six shillings and eight pence a piece; and the
different subsidies and imposts which, before the year 1722, had been laid upon
their importation, amounted to one-fifth part of the rate, or to sixteen pence
upon each skin; all of which, except half the old subsidy, amounting only to
twopence, was drawn back upon exportation. This duty, upon the importation of
so important a material of manufacture, had been thought too high; and, in the
year 1722, the rate was reduced to two shillings and sixpence, which reduced
the duty upon importation to sixpence, and of this only one-half was to be
drawn back upon exportation. The same successful war put the country most
productive of beaver under the dominion of Great Britain; and beaver skins
being among the enumerated commodities, the exportation from America was
consequently confined to the market of Great Britain. Our manufacturers soon
bethought themselves of the advantage which they might make of this
circumstance; and in the year 1764, the duty upon the importation of beaver
skin was reduced to one penny, but the duty upon exportation was raised to
sevenpence each skin, without any drawback of the duty upon importation. By the
same law, a duty of eighteen pence the pound was imposed upon the exportation
of beaver wool or woumbs, without making any alteration in the duty upon the
importation of that commodity, which, when imported by British, and in British
shipping, amounted at that time to between fourpence and fivepence the piece.

Coals may be considered both as a material of manufacture, and as an instrument
of trade. Heavy duties, accordingly, have been imposed upon their exportation,
amounting at present (1783) to more than five shillings the ton, or more than
fifteen shillings the chaldron, Newcastle measure; which is, in most cases,
more than the original value of the commodity at the coal-pit, or even at the
shipping port for exportation.

The exportation, however, of the instruments of trade, properly so called, is
commonly restrained, not by high duties, but by absolute prohibitions. Thus, by
the 7th and 8th of William III chap.20, sect.8, the exportation of frames or
engines for knitting gloves or stockings, is prohibited, under the penalty, not
only of the forfeiture of such frames or engines, so exported, or attempted to
be exported, but of forty pounds, one half to the king, the other to the person
who shall inform or sue for the same. In the same manner, by the 14th Geo. III.
chap. 71, the exportation to foreign parts, of any utensils made use of in the
cotton, linen, woollen, and silk manufactures, is prohibited under the penalty,
not only of the forfeiture of such utensils, but of two hundred pounds, to be
paid by the person who shall offend in this manner; and likewise of two hundred
pounds, to be paid by the master of the ship, who shall knowingly suffer such
utensils to be loaded on board his ship.

When such heavy penalties were imposed upon the exportation of the dead
instruments of trade, it could not well be expected that the living instrument,
the artificer, should be allowed to go free. Accordingly, by the 5th Geo. I.
chap. 27, the person who shall be convicted of enticing any artificer, of or in
any of the manufactures of Great Britain, to go into any foreign parts, in
order to practise or teach his trade, is liable, for the first offence, to be
fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred pounds, and to three months
imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the second offence, to
be fined in any sum, at the discretion of the court, and to imprisonment for
twelve months, and until the fine shall be paid. By the 23d Geo. II. chap. 13,
this penalty is increased, for the first offence, to five hundred pounds for
every artificer so enticed, and to twelve months imprisonment, and until the
fine shall be paid; and for the second offence, to one thousand pounds, and to
two years imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid.

By the former of these two statutes, upon proof that any person has been
enticing any artificer, or that any artificer has promised or contracted to go
into foreign parts, for the purposes aforesaid, such artificer may be obliged
to give security, at the discretion of the court, that he shall not go beyond
the seas, and may be committed to prison until he give such security.

If any artificer has gone beyond the seas, and is exercising or teaching his
trade in any foreign country, upon warning being given to him by any of his
majesty’s ministers or consuls abroad, or by one of his majesty’s
secretaries of state, for the time being, if he does not, within six months
after such warning, return into this realm, and from henceforth abide and
inhabit continually within the same, he is from thenceforth declared incapable
of taking any legacy devised to him within this kingdom, or of being executor
or administrator to any person, or of taking any lands within this kingdom, by
descent, devise, or purchase. He likewise forfeits to the king all his lands,
goods, and chattels; is declared an alien in every respect; and is put out of
the king’s protection.

It is unnecessary, I imagine, to observe how contrary such regulations are to
the boasted liberty of the subject, of which we affect to be so very jealous;
but which, in this case, is so plainly sacrificed to the futile interests of
our merchants and manufacturers.

The laudable motive of all these regulations, is to extend our own
manufactures, not by their own improvement, but by the depression of those of
all our neighbours, and by putting an end, as much as possible, to the
troublesome competition of such odious and disagreeable rivals. Our master
manufacturers think it reasonable that they themselves should have the monopoly
of the ingenuity of all their countrymen. Though by restraining, in some
trades, the number of apprentices which can be employed at one time, and by
imposing the necessity of a long apprenticeship in all trades, they endeavour,
all of them, to confine the knowledge of their respective employments to as
small a number as possible; they are unwilling, however, that any part of this
small number should go abroad to instruct foreigners.

Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of
the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for
promoting that of the consumer.

The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to
prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is almost
constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider
production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry
and commerce.

In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign commodities which can
come into competition with those of our own growth or manufacture, the interest
of the home consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the producer. It is
altogether for the benefit of the latter, that the former is obliged to pay
that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost always occasions.

It is altogether for the benefit of the producer, that bounties are granted
upon the exportation of some of his productions. The home consumer is obliged
to pay, first the tax which is necessary for paying the bounty; and, secondly,
the still greater tax which necessarily arises from the enhancement of the
price of the commodity in the home market.

By the famous treaty of commerce with Portugal, the consumer is prevented by
duties from purchasing of a neighbouring country, a commodity which our own
climate does not produce; but is obliged to purchase it of a distant country,
though it is acknowledged, that the commodity of the distant country is of a
worse quality than that of the near one. The home consumer is obliged to submit
to this inconvenience, in order that the producer may import into the distant
country some of his productions, upon more advantageous terms than he otherwise
would have been allowed to do. The consumer, too, is obliged to pay whatever
enhancement in the price of those very productions this forced exportation may
occasion in the home market.

But in the system of laws which has been established for the management of our
American and West Indian colonies, the interest of the home consumer has been
sacrificed to that of the producer, with a more extravagant profusion than in
all our other commercial regulations. A great empire has been established for
the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers, who should be obliged to
buy, from the shops of our different producers, all the goods with which these
could supply them. For the sake of that little enhancement of price which this
monopoly might afford our producers, the home consumers have been burdened with
the whole expense of maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose,
and for this purpose only, in the two last wars, more than two hundred millions
have been spent, and a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy millions has
been contracted, over and above all that had been expended for the same purpose
in former wars. The interest of this debt alone is not only greater than the
whole extraordinary profit which, it never could be pretended, was made by the
monopoly of the colony trade, but than the whole value of that trade, or than
the whole value of the goods which, at an average, have been annually exported
to the colonies.

It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this
whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has
been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so
carefully attended to; and among this latter class, our merchants and
manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile
regulations which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of
our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest, not
so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has been
sacrificed to it.

CHAPTER IX.
OF THE AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, OR OF THOSE SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WHICH
REPRESENT THE PRODUCE OF LAND, AS EITHER THE SOLE OR THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF
THE REVENUE AND WEALTH OF EVERY COUNTRY.

The agricultural systems of political economy will not require so long an
explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the
mercantile or commercial system.

That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the
revenue and wealth of every country, has so far as I know, never been adopted
by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a few men
of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be worth while
to examine at great length the errors of a system which never has done, and
probably never will do, any harm in any part of the world. I shall endeavour to
explain, however, as distinctly as I can, the great outlines of this very
ingenious system.

Mr. Colbert, the famous minister of Lewis XIV. was a man of probity, of great
industry, and knowledge of detail; of great experience and acuteness in the
examination of public accounts; and of abilities, in short, every way fitted
for introducing method and good order into the collection and expenditure of
the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately embraced all the prejudices
of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a system of restraint and
regulation, and such as could scarce fail to be agreeable to a laborious and
plodding man of business, who had been accustomed to regulate the different
departments of public offices, and to establish the necessary checks and
controls for confining each to its proper sphere. The industry and commerce of
a great country, he endeavoured to regulate upon the same model as the
departments of a public office; and instead of allowing every man to pursue his
own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and
justice, he bestowed upon certain branches of industry extraordinary
privileges, while he laid others under as extraordinary restraints. He was not
only disposed, like other European ministers, to encourage more the industry of
the towns than that of the country; but, in order to support the industry of
the towns, he was willing even to depress and keep down that of the country. In
order to render provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the towns, and thereby
to encourage manufactures and foreign commerce, he prohibited altogether the
exportation of corn, and thus excluded the inhabitants of the country from
every foreign market, for by far the most important part of the produce of
their industry. This prohibition, joined to the restraints imposed by the
ancient provincial laws of France upon the transportation of corn from one
province to another, and to the arbitrary and degrading taxes which are levied
upon the cultivators in almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept down the
agriculture of that country very much below the state to which it would
naturally have risen in so very fertile a soil, and so very happy a climate.
This state of discouragement and depression was felt more or less in every
different part of the country, and many different inquiries were set on foot
concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared to be the preference
given, by the institutions of Mr. Colbert, to the industry of the towns above
that of the country.

If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb, in order to make it
straight, you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who have
proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source of the
revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this proverbial
maxim; and, as in the plan of Mr. Colbert, the industry of the towns was
certainly overvalued in comparison with that of the country, so in their system
it seems to be as certainly under-valued.

The different orders of people, who have ever been supposed to contribute in
any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour of the country,
they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the proprietors of
land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of farmers and country
labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar appellation of the productive
class. The third is the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, whom
they endeavour to degrade by the humiliating appellation of the barren or
unproductive class.

The class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce, by the expense
which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land, upon the
buildings, drains, inclosures, and other ameliorations, which they may either
make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators are enabled,
with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and consequently to pay a
greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered as the interest or profit
due to the proprietor, upon the expense or capital which he thus employs in the
improvement of his land. Such expenses are in this system called ground
expenses (depenses foncieres).

The cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce, by what are in
this system called the original and annual expenses (depenses primitives, et
depenses annuelles), which they lay out upon the cultivation of the land. The
original expenses consist in the instruments of husbandry, in the stock of
cattle, in the seed, and in the maintenance of the farmer’s family,
servants, and cattle, during at least a great part of the first year of his
occupancy, or till he can receive some return from the land. The annual
expenses consist in the seed, in the wear and tear of instruments of husbandry,
and in the annual maintenance of the farmer’s servants and cattle, and of
his family too, so far as any part of them can be considered as servants
employed in cultivation. That part of the produce of the land which remains to
him after paying the rent, ought to be sufficient, first, to replace to him,
within a reasonable time, at least during the term of his occupancy, the whole
of his original expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock; and,
secondly, to replace to him annually the whole of his annual expenses, together
likewise with the ordinary profits of stock. Those two sorts of expenses are
two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation; and unless they are
regularly restored to him, together with a reasonable profit, he cannot carry
on his employment upon a level with other employments; but, from a regard to
his own interest, must desert it as soon as possible, and seek some other. That
part of the produce of the land which is thus necessary for enabling the farmer
to continue his business, ought to be considered as a fund sacred to
cultivation, which, if the landlord violates, he necessarily reduces the
produce of his own land, and, in a few years, not only disables the farmer from
paying this racked rent, but from paying the reasonable rent which he might
otherwise have got for his land. The rent which properly belongs to the
landlord, is no more than the neat produce which remains after paying, in the
completest manner, all the necessary expenses which must be previously laid
out, in order to raise the gross or the whole produce. It is because the labour
of the cultivators, over and above paying completely all those necessary
expenses, affords a neat produce of this kind, that this class of people are in
this system peculiarly distinguished by the honourable appellation of the
productive class. Their original and annual expenses are for the same reason
called, In this system, productive expenses, because, over and above replacing
their own value, they occasion the annual reproduction of this neat produce.

The ground expenses, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out upon the
improvement of his land, are, in this system, too, honoured with the
appellation of productive expenses. Till the whole of those expenses, together
with the ordinary profits of stock, have been completely repaid to him by the
advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced rent ought to be
regarded as sacred and inviolable, both by the church and by the king; ought to
be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it is otherwise, by
discouraging the improvement of land, the church discourages the future
increase of her own tithes, and the king the future increase of his own taxes.
As in a well ordered state of things, therefore, those ground expenses, over
and above reproducing in the completest manner their own value, occasion
likewise, after a certain time, a reproduction of a neat produce, they are in
this system considered as productive expenses.

The ground expenses of the landlord, however, together with the original and
the annual expenses of the farmer, are the only three sorts of expenses which
in this system are considered as productive. All other expenses, and all other
orders of people, even those who, in the common apprehensions of men, are
regarded as the most productive, are, in this account of things, represented as
altogether barren and unproductive.

Artificers and manufacturers, in particular, whose industry, in the common
apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude produce of land,
are in this system represented as a class of people altogether barren and
unproductive. Their labour, it is said, replaces only the stock which employs
them, together with its ordinary profits. That stock consists in the materials,
tools, and wages, advanced to them by their employer; and is the fund destined
for their employment and maintenance. Its profits are the fund destined for the
maintenance of their employer. Their employer, as he advances to them the stock
of materials, tools, and wages, necessary for their employment, so he advances
to himself what is necessary for his own maintenance; and this maintenance he
generally proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of
their work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to
himself, as well as the materials, tools, and wages, which he advances to his
workmen, it evidently does not repay to him the whole expense which he lays out
upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock, therefore, are not, like the rent
of land, a neat produce which remains after completely repaying the whole
expense which must be laid out in order to obtain them. The stock of the farmer
yields him a profit, as well as that of the master manufacturer; and it yields
a rent likewise to another person, which that of the master manufacturer does
not. The expense, therefore, laid out in employing and maintaining artificers
and manufacturers, does no more than continue, if one may say so, the existence
of its own value, and does not produce any new value. It is, therefore,
altogether a barren and unproductive expense. The expense, on the contrary,
laid out in employing farmers and country labourers, over and above continuing
the existence of its own value, produces a new value the rent of the landlord.
It is, therefore, a productive expense.

Mercantile stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing stock.
It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing any new
value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which its employer
advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or till he receives the
returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part of the expense which must
be laid out in employing it.

The labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds any thing to the value of
the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds, indeed,
greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the consumption which,
in the mean time, it occasions of other parts, is precisely equal to the value
which it adds to those parts; so that the value of the whole amount is not, at
any one moment of time, in the least augmented by it. The person who works the
lace of a pair of fine ruffles for example, will sometimes raise the value of,
perhaps, a pennyworth of flax to £30 sterling. But though, at first sight, he
appears thereby to multiply the value of a part of the rude produce about seven
thousand and two hundred times, he in reality adds nothing to the value of the
whole annual amount of the rude produce. The working of that lace costs him,
perhaps, two years labour. The £30 which he gets for it when it is finished, is
no more than the repayment of the subsistence which he advances to himself
during the two years that he is employed about it. The value which, by every
day’s, month’s, or year’s labour, he adds to the flax, does
no more than replace the value of his own consumption during that day, month,
or year. At no moment of time, therefore, does he add any thing to the value of
the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land: the portion of that
produce which he is continually consuming, being always equal to the value
which he is continually producing. The extreme poverty of the greater part of
the persons employed in this expensive, though trifling manufacture, may
satisfy us that the price of their work does not, in ordinary cases, exceed the
value of their subsistence. It is otherwise with the work of farmers and
country labourers. The rent of the landlord is a value which, in ordinary
cases, it is continually producing over and above replacing, in the most
complete manner, the whole consumption, the whole expense laid out upon the
employment and maintenance both of the workmen and of their employer.

Artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, can augment the revenue and wealth of
their society by parsimony only; or, as it is expressed in this system, by
privation, that is, by depriving themselves of a part of the funds destined for
their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing but those funds. Unless,
therefore, they annually save some part of them, unless they annually deprive
themselves of the enjoyment of some part of them, the revenue and wealth of
their society can never be, in the smallest degree, augmented by means of their
industry. Farmers and country labourers, on the contrary, may enjoy completely
the whole funds destined for their own subsistence, and yet augment, at the
same time, the revenue and wealth of their society. Over and above what is
destined for their own subsistence, their industry annually affords a neat
produce, of which the augmentation necessarily augments the revenue and wealth
of their society. Nations, therefore, which, like France or England, consist in
a great measure, of proprietors and cultivators, can be enriched by industry
and enjoyment. Nations, on the contrary, which, like Holland and Hamburgh, are
composed chiefly of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, can grow rich
only through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations so differently
circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common character of the
people. In those of the former kind, liberality, frankness, and good
fellowship, naturally make a part of their common character; in the latter,
narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all social pleasure
and enjoyment.

The unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, is
maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the two other classes, of
that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish it both with the
materials of its work, and with the fund of its subsistence, with the corn and
cattle which it consumes while it is employed about that work. The proprietors
and cultivators finally pay both the wages of all the workmen of the
unproductive class, and the profits of all their employers. Those workmen and
their employers are properly the servants of the proprietors and cultivators.
They are only servants who work without doors, as menial servants work within.
Both the one and the other, however, are equally maintained at the expense of
the same masters. The labour of both is equally unproductive. It adds nothing
to the value of the sum total of the rude produce of the land. Instead of
increasing the value of that sum total, it is a charge and expense which must
be paid out of it.

The unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful, to the
other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can purchase both the foreign
goods and the manufactured produce of their own country, which they have
occasion for, with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour,
than what they would be obliged to employ, if they were to attempt, in an
awkward and unskilful manner, either to import the one, or to make the other,
for their own use. By means of the unproductive class, the cultivators are
delivered from many cares, which would otherwise distract their attention from
the cultivation of land. The superiority of produce, which in consequence of
this undivided attention, they are enabled to raise, is fully sufficient to pay
the whole expense which the maintenance and employment of the unproductive
class costs either the proprietors or themselves. The industry of merchants,
artificers, and manufacturers, though in its own nature altogether
unproductive, yet contributes in this manner indirectly to increase the produce
of the land. It increases the productive powers of productive labour, by
leaving it at liberty to confine itself to its proper employment, the
cultivation of land; and the plough goes frequently the easier and the better,
by means of the labour of the man whose business is most remote from the
plough.

It can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators, to restrain or
to discourage, in any respect, the industry of merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this unproductive class enjoys,
the greater will be the competition in all the different trades which compose
it, and the cheaper will the other two classes be supplied, both with foreign
goods and with the manufactured produce of their own country.

It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the other two
classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains after deducting
the maintenance, first of the cultivators, and afterwards of the proprietors,
that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The greater this surplus,
the greater must likewise be the maintenance and employment of that class. The
establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of perfect equality,
is the very simple secret which most effectually secures the highest degree of
prosperity to all the three classes.

The merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states, which,
like Holland and Hamburgh, consist chiefly of this unproductive class, are in
the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the
proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference is, that those
proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them, placed at a most
inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, whom
they supply with the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence;
are the inhabitants of other countries, and the subjects of other governments.

Such mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful, to
the inhabitants of those other countries. They fill up, in some measure, a very
important void; and supply the place of the merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers, whom the inhabitants of those countries ought to find at home,
but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do not find at home.

It can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them so, to
discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states, by imposing high
duties upon their trade, or upon the commodities which they furnish. Such
duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve only to sink the
real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with which, or, what comes
to the same thing, with the price of which those commodities are purchased.
Such duties could only serve to discourage the increase of that surplus
produce, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land.
The most effectual expedient, on the contrary, for raising the value of that
surplus produce, for encouraging its increase, and consequently the improvement
and cultivation of their own land, would be to allow the most perfect freedom
to the trade of all such mercantile nations.

This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient for
supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers, and
merchants, whom they wanted at home; and for filling up, in the properest and
most advantageous manner, that very important void which they felt there.

The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land would, in due time,
create a greater capital than what would be employed with the ordinary rate of
profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and the surplus part of it
would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers and manufacturers,
at home. But these artificers and manufacturers, finding at home both the
materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, might immediately,
even with much less art and skill be able to work as cheap as the little
artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, who had both to bring
from a greater distance. Even though, from want of art and skill, they might
not for some time be able to work as cheap, yet, finding a market at home, they
might be able to sell their work there as cheap as that of the artificers and
manufacturers of such mercantile states, which could not be brought to that
market but from so great a distance; and as their art and skill improved, they
would soon be able to sell it cheaper. The artificers and manufacturers of such
mercantile states, therefore, would immediately be rivalled in the market of
those landed nations, and soon after undersold and justled out of it
altogether. The cheapness of the manufactures of those landed nations, in
consequence of the gradual improvements of art and skill, would, in due time,
extend their sale beyond the home market, and carry them to many foreign
markets, from which they would, in the same manner, gradually justle out many
of the manufacturers of such mercantile nations.

This continual increase, both of the rude and manufactured produce of those
landed nations, would, in due time, create a greater capital than could, with
the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture or in
manufactures. The surplus of this capital would naturally turn itself to
foreign trade and be employed in exporting, to foreign countries, such parts of
the rude and manufactured produce of its own country, as exceeded the demand of
the home market. In the exportation of the produce of their own country, the
merchants of a landed nation would have an advantage of the same kind over
those of mercantile nations, which its artificers and manufacturers had over
the artificers and manufacturers of such nations; the advantage of finding at
home that cargo, and those stores and provisions, which the others were obliged
to seek for at a distance. With inferior art and skill in navigation,
therefore, they would be able to sell that cargo as cheap in foreign markets as
the merchants of such mercantile nations; and with equal art and skill they
would be able to sell it cheaper. They would soon, therefore, rival those
mercantile nations in this branch of foreign trade, and, in due time, would
justle them out of it altogether.

According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most advantageous
method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers, manufacturers, and
merchants of its own, is to grant the most perfect freedom of trade to the
artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other nations. It thereby
raises the value of the surplus produce of its own land, of which the continual
increase gradually establishes a fund, which, in due time, necessarily raises
up all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, whom it has occasion for.

When a landed nation on the contrary, oppresses, either by high duties or by
prohibitions, the trade of foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its own
interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all foreign
goods, and of all sorts of manufactures, it necessarily sinks the real value of
the surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what comes to the same
thing, with the price of which, it purchases those foreign goods and
manufactures. Secondly, by giving a sort of monopoly of the home market to its
own merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, it raises the rate of mercantile
and manufacturing profit, in proportion to that of agricultural profit; and,
consequently, either draws from agriculture a part of the capital which had
before been employed in it, or hinders from going to it a part of what would
otherwise have gone to it. This policy, therefore, discourages agriculture in
two different ways; first, by sinking the real value of its produce, and
thereby lowering the rate of its profits; and, secondly, by raising the rate of
profit in all other employments. Agriculture is rendered less advantageous, and
trade and manufactures more advantageous, than they otherwise would be; and
every man is tempted by his own interest to turn, as much as he can, both his
capital and his industry from the former to the latter employments.

Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raise up
artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own, somewhat sooner than it
could do by the freedom of trade; a matter, however, which is not a little
doubtful; yet it would raise them up, if one may say so, prematurely, and
before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raising up too hastily one species of
industry, it would depress another more valuable species of industry. By
raising up too hastily a species of industry which duly replaces the stock
which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would depress a species
of industry which, over and above replacing that stock, with its profit,
affords likewise a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. It would depress
productive labour, by encouraging too hastily that labour which is altogether
barren and unproductive.

In what manner, according to this system, the sum total of the annual produce
of the land is distributed among the three classes above mentioned, and in what
manner the labour of the unproductive class does no more than replace the value
of its own consumption, without increasing in any respect the value of that sum
total, is represented by Mr Quesnai, the very ingenious and profound author of
this system, in some arithmetical formularies. The first of these formularies,
which, by way of eminence, he peculiarly distinguishes by the name of the
Economical Table, represents the manner in which he supposes this distribution
takes place, in a state of the most perfect liberty, and, therefore, of the
highest prosperity; in a state where the annual produce is such as to afford
the greatest possible neat produce, and where each class enjoys its proper
share of the whole annual produce. Some subsequent formularies represent the
manner in which he supposes this distribution is made in different states of
restraint and regulation; in which, either the class of proprietors, or the
barren and unproductive class, is more favoured than the class of cultivators;
and in which either the one or the other encroaches, more or less, upon the
share which ought properly to belong to this productive class. Every such
encroachment, every violation of that natural distribution, which the most
perfect liberty would establish, must, according to this system, necessarily
degrade, more or less, from one year to another, the value and sum total of the
annual produce, and must necessarily occasion a gradual declension in the real
wealth and revenue of the society; a declension, of which the progress must be
quicker or slower, according to the degree of this encroachment, according as
that natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, is
more or less violated. Those subsequent formularies represent the different
degrees of declension which, according to this system, correspond to the
different degrees in which this natural distribution of things is violated.

Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the human
body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet and exercise,
of which every, the smallest violation, necessarily occasioned some degree of
disease or disorder proportionate to the degree of the violation. Experience,
however, would seem to shew, that the human body frequently preserves, to all
appearance at least, the most perfect state of health under a vast variety of
different regimens; even under some which are generally believed to be very far
from being perfectly wholesome. But the healthful state of the human body, it
would seem, contains in itself some unknown principle of preservation, capable
either of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even
of a very faulty regimen. Mr Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very
speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind
concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and
prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect
liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered, that in the
political body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to
better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing
and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy, in
some degree both partial and oppressive. Such a political economy, though it no
doubt retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping altogether, the
natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less of
making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of
perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which
could ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature
has fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of
the folly and injustice of man; it the same manner as it has done in the
natural body, for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance.

The capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its representing the
class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, as altogether barren and
unproductive. The following observations may serve to shew the impropriety of
this representation:—

First, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces annually the value of its own
annual consumption, and continues, at least, the existence of the stock or
capital which maintains and employs it. But, upon this account alone, the
denomination of barren or unproductive should seem to be very improperly
applied to it. We should not call a marriage barren or unproductive, though it
produced only a son and a daughter, to replace the father and mother, and
though it did not increase the number of the human species, but only continued
it as it was before. Farmers and country labourers, indeed, over and above the
stock which maintains and employs them, reproduce annually a neat produce, a
free rent to the landlord. As a marriage which affords three children is
certainly more productive than one which affords only two, so the labour of
farmers and country labourers is certainly more productive than that of
merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. The superior produce of the one
class, however, does not, render the other barren or unproductive.

Secondly, it seems, on this account, altogether improper to consider
artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, in the same light as menial servants.
The labour of menial servants does not continue the existence of the fund which
maintains and employs them. Their maintenance and employment is altogether at
the expense of their masters, and the work which they perform is not of a
nature to repay that expense. That work consists in services which perish
generally in the very instant of their performance, and does not fix or realize
itself in any vendible commodity, which can replace the value of their wages
and maintenance. The labour, on the contrary, of artificers, manufacturers, and
merchants, naturally does fix and realize itself in some such vendible
commodity. It is upon this account that, in the chapter in which I treat of
productive and unproductive labour, I have classed artificers, manufacturers,
and merchants among the productive labourers, and menial servants among the
barren or unproductive.

Thirdly, it seems, upon every supposition, improper to say, that the labour of
artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, does not increase the real revenue of
the society. Though we should suppose, for example, as it seems to be supposed
in this system, that the value of the daily, monthly, and yearly consumption of
this class was exactly equal to that of its daily, monthly, and yearly
production; yet it would not from thence follow, that its labour added nothing
to the real revenue, to the real value of the annual produce of the land and
labour of the society. An artificer, for example, who, in the first six months
after harvest, executes ten pounds worth of work, though he should, in the same
time, consume ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, yet really adds
the value of ten pounds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
society. While he has been consuming a half-yearly revenue of ten pounds worth
of corn and other necessaries, he has produced an equal value of work, capable
of purchasing, either to himself, or to some other person, an equal half-yearly
revenue. The value, therefore, of what has been consumed and produced during
these six months, is equal, not to ten, but to twenty pounds. It is possible,
indeed, that no more than ten pounds worth of this value may ever have existed
at any one moment of time. But if the ten pounds worth of corn and other
necessaries which were consumed by the artificer, had been consumed by a
soldier, or by a menial servant, the value of that part of the annual produce
which existed at the end of the six months, would have been ten pounds less
than it actually is in consequence of the labour of the artificer. Though the
value of what the artificer produces, therefore, should not, at any one moment
of time, be supposed greater than the value he consumes, yet, at every moment
of time, the actually existing value of goods in the market is, in consequence
of what he produces, greater than it otherwise would be.

When the patrons of this system assert, that the consumption of artificers,
manufacturers, and merchants, is equal to the value of what they produce, they
probably mean no more than that their revenue, or the fund destined for their
consumption, is equal to it. But if they had expressed themselves more
accurately, and only asserted, that the revenue of this class was equal to the
value of what they produced, it might readily have occurred to the reader, that
what would naturally be saved out of this revenue, must necessarily increase
more or less the real wealth of the society. In order, therefore, to make out
something like an argument, it was necessary that they should express
themselves as they have done; and this argument, even supposing things actually
were as it seems to presume them to be, turns out to be a very inconclusive
one.

Fourthly, farmers and country labourers can no more augment, without parsimony,
the real revenue, the annual produce of the land and labour of their society,
than artificers, manufacturers, and merchants. The annual produce of the land
and labour of any society can be augmented only in two ways; either, first, by
some improvement in the productive powers of the useful labour actually
maintained within it; or, secondly, by some increase in the quantity of that
labour.

The improvement in the productive powers of useful labour depends, first, upon
the improvement in the ability of the workman; and, secondly, upon that of the
machinery with which he works. But the labour of artificers and manufacturers,
as it is capable of being more subdivided, and the labour of each workman
reduced to a greater simplicity of operation, than that of farmers and country
labourers; so it is likewise capable of both these sorts of improvement in a
much higher degree {See book i chap. 1.} In this respect, therefore, the class
of cultivators can have no sort of advantage over that of artificers and
manufacturers.

The increase in the quantity of useful labour actually employed within any
society must depend altogether upon the increase of the capital which employs
it; and the increase of that capital, again, must be exactly equal to the
amount of the savings from the revenue, either of the particular persons who
manage and direct the employment of that capital, or of some other persons, who
lend it to them. If merchants, artificers, and manufacturers are, as this
system seems to suppose, naturally more inclined to parsimony and saving than
proprietors and cultivators, they are, so far, more likely to augment the
quantity of useful labour employed within their society, and consequently to
increase its real revenue, the annual produce of its land and labour.

Fifthly and lastly, though the revenue of the inhabitants of every country was
supposed to consist altogether, as this system seems to suppose, in the
quantity of subsistence which their industry could procure to them; yet, even
upon this supposition, the revenue of a trading and manufacturing country must,
other things being equal, always be much greater than that of one without trade
or manufactures. By means of trade and manufactures, a greater quantity of
subsistence can be annually imported into a particular country, than what its
own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The
inhabitants of a town, though they frequently possess no lands of their own,
yet draw to themselves, by their industry, such a quantity of the rude produce
of the lands of other people, as supplies them, not only with the materials of
their work, but with the fund of their subsistence. What a town always is with
regard to the country in its neighbourhood, one independent state or country
may frequently be with regard to other independent states or countries. It is
thus that Holland draws a great part of its subsistence from other countries;
live cattle from Holstein and Jutland, and corn from almost all the different
countries of Europe. A small quantity of manufactured produce, purchases a
great quantity of rude produce. A trading and manufacturing country, therefore,
naturally purchases, with a small part of its manufactured produce, a great
part of the rude produce of other countries; while, on the contrary, a country
without trade and manufactures is generally obliged to purchase, at the expense
of a great part of its rude produce, a very small part of the manufactured
produce of other countries. The one exports what can subsist and accommodate
but a very few, and imports the subsistence and accommodation of a great
number. The other exports the accommodation and subsistence of a great number,
and imports that of a very few only. The inhabitants of the one must always
enjoy a much greater quantity of subsistence than what their own lands, in the
actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of the other
must always enjoy a much smaller quantity.

This system, however, with all its imperfections, is perhaps the nearest
approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of
political economy; and is upon that account, well worth the consideration of
every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that very
important science. Though in representing the labour which is employed upon
land as the only productive labour, the notions which it inculcates are,
perhaps, too narrow and confined; yet in representing the wealth of nations as
consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the consumable
goods annually reproduced by the labour of the society, and in representing
perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this annual
reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine seems to be in every respect
as just as it is generous and liberal. Its followers are very numerous; and as
men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what surpasses the
comprehensions of ordinary people, the paradox which it maintains, concerning
the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has not, perhaps, contributed
a little to increase the number of its admirers. They have for some years past
made a pretty considerable sect, distinguished in the French republic of
letters by the name of the Economists. Their works have certainly been of some
service to their country; not only by bringing into general discussion, many
subjects which had never been well examined before, but by influencing, in some
measure, the public administration in favour of agriculture. It has been in
consequence of their representations, accordingly, that the agriculture of
France has been delivered from several of the oppressions which it before
laboured under. The term, during which such a lease can be granted, as will be
valid against every future purchaser or proprietor of the land, has been
prolonged from nine to twenty-seven years. The ancient provincial restraints
upon the transportation of corn from one province of the kingdom to another,
have been entirely taken away; and the liberty of exporting it to all foreign
countries, has been established as the common law of the kingdom in all
ordinary cases. This sect, in their works, which are very numerous, and which
treat not only of what is properly called Political Economy, or of the nature
and causes or the wealth of nations, but of every other branch of the system of
civil government, all follow implicitly, and without any sensible variation,
the doctrine of Mr. Qttesnai. There is, upon this account, little variety in
the greater part of their works. The most distinct and best connected account
of this doctrine is to be found in a little book written by Mr. Mercier de la
Riviere, some time intendant of Martinico, entitled, The natural and essential
Order of Political Societies. The admiration of this whole sect for their
master, who was himself a man of the greatest modesty and simplicity, is not
inferior to that of any of the ancient philosophers for the founders of their
respective systems. ‘There have been since the world began,’ says a
very diligent and respectable author, the Marquis de Mirabeau, ‘three
great inventions which have principally given stability to political societies,
independent of many other inventions which have enriched and adorned them. The
first is the invention of writing, which alone gives human nature the power of
transmitting, without alteration, its laws, its contracts, its annals, and its
discoveries. The second is the invention of money, which binds together all the
relations between civilized societies. The third is the economical table, the
result of the other two, which completes them both by perfecting their object;
the great discovery of our age, but of which our posterity will reap the
benefit.’

As the political economy of the nations of modern Europe has been more
favourable to manufactures and foreign trade, the industry of the towns, than
to agriculture, the industry of the country; so that of other nations has
followed a different plan, and has been more favourable to agriculture than to
manufactures and foreign trade.

The policy of China favours agriculture more than all other employments. In
China, the condition of a labourer is said to be as much superior to that of an
artificer, as in most parts of Europe that of an artificer is to that of a
labourer. In China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of a
little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are there said
to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently secured to the
lessees. The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly
commerce! was the language in which the mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr.
De Lange, the Russian envoy, concerning it {See the Journal of Mr. De Lange, in
Bell’s Travels, vol. ii. p. 258, 276, 293.}. Except with Japan, the
Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign
trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even
admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade, therefore, is, in China,
every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it would
naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their own
ships, or in those of foreign nations.

Manufactures, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value, and can
upon that account be transported at less expense from one country to another
than most parts of rude produce, are, in almost all countries, the principal
support of foreign trade. In countries, besides, less extensive, and less
favourably circumstanced for inferior commerce than China, they generally
require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign market, they
could not well flourish, either in countries so moderately extensive as to
afford but a narrow home market, or in countries where the communication
between one province and another was so difficult, as to render it impossible
for the goods of any particular place to enjoy the whole of that home market
which the country could afford. The perfection of manufacturing industry, it
must be remembered, depends altogether upon the division of labour; and the
degree to which the division of labour can be introduced into any manufacture,
is necessarily regulated, it has already been shewn, by the extent of the
market. But the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its
inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in its
different provinces, and the easy communication by means of water-carriage
between the greater part of them, render the home market of that country of so
great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and
to admit of very considerable subdivisions of labour. The home market of China
is, perhaps, in extent, not much inferior to the market of all the different
countries of Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however,
which to this great home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the
world, especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on in
Chinese ships, could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of
China, and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing
industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn the
art of using and constructing, themselves, all the different machines made use
of in other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and industry
which are practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon their present
plan, they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of
any other nation, except that of the Japanese.

The policy of ancient Egypt, too, and that of the Gentoo government of
Indostan, seem to have favoured agriculture more than all other employments.

Both in ancient Egypt and Indostan, the whole body of the people was divided
into different casts or tribes each of which was confined, from father to son,
to a particular employment, or class of employments. The son of a priest was
necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier; the son of a labourer, a
labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son of a tailor, a tailor, etc. In
both countries, the cast of the priests holds the highest rank, and that of the
soldiers the next; and in both countries the cast of the farmers and labourers
was superior to the casts of merchants and manufacturers.

The government of both countries was particularly attentive to the interest of
agriculture. The works constructed by the ancient sovereigns of Egypt, for the
proper distribution of the waters of the Nile, were famous in antiquity, and
the ruined remains of some of them are still the admiration of travellers.
Those of the same kind which were constructed by the ancient sovereigns of
Indostan, for the proper distribution of the waters of the Ganges, as well as
of many other rivers, though they have been less celebrated, seem to have been
equally great. Both countries, accordingly, though subject occasionally to
dearths, have been famous for their great fertility. Though both were extremely
populous, yet, in years of moderate plenty, they were both able to export great
quantities of grain to their neighbours.

The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the
Gentoo religion does not permit its followers to light a fire, nor consequently
to dress any victuals, upon the water, it, in effect, prohibits them from all
distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and Indians must have depended almost
altogether upon the navigation of other nations for the exportation of their
surplus produce; and this dependency, as it must have confined the market, so
it must have discouraged the increase of this surplus produce. It must have
discouraged, too, the increase of the manufactured produce, more than that of
the rude produce. Manufactures require a much more extensive market than the
most important parts of the rude produce of the land. A single shoemaker will
make more than 300 pairs of shoes in the year; and his own family will not,
perhaps, wear out six pairs. Unless, therefore, he has the custom of, at least,
50 such families as his own, he cannot dispose of the whole product of his own
labour. The most numerous class of artificers will seldom, in a large country,
make more than one in 50, or one in a 100, of the whole number of families
contained in it. But in such large countries, as France and England, the number
of people employed in agriculture has, by some authors been computed at a half,
by others at a third and by no author that I know of, at less that a fifth of
the whole inhabitants of the country. But as the produce of the agriculture of
both France and England is, the far greater part of it, consumed at home, each
person employed in it must, according to these computations, require little
more than the custom of one, two, or, at most, of four such families as his
own, in order to dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. Agriculture,
therefore, can support itself under the discouragement of a confined market
much better than manufactures. In both ancient Egypt and Indostan, indeed, the
confinement of the foreign market was in some measure compensated by the
conveniency of many inland navigations, which opened, in the most advantageous
manner, the whole extent of the home market to every part of the produce of
every different district of those countries. The great extent of Indostan, too,
rendered the home market of that country very great, and sufficient to support
a great variety of manufactures. But the small extent of ancient Egypt, which
was never equal to England, must at all times, have rendered the home market of
that country too narrow for supporting any great variety of manufactures.
Bengal accordingly, the province of Indostan which commonly exports the
greatest quantity of rice, has always been more remarkable for the exportation
of a great variety of manufactures, than for that of its grain. Ancient Egypt,
on the contrary, though it exported some manufactures, fine linen in
particular, as well as some other goods, was always most distinguished for its
great exportation of grain. It was long the granary of the Roman empire.

The sovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms into
which Indostan has, at different times, been divided, have always derived the
whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue, from some sort
of land tax or land rent. This land tax, or land rent, like the tithe in
Europe, consisted in a certain proportion, a fifth, it is said, of the produce
of the land, which was either delivered in kind, or paid in money, according to
a certain valuation, and which, therefore, varied from year to year, according
to all the variations of the produce. It was natural, therefore, that the
sovereigns of those countries should be particularly attentive to the interests
of agriculture, upon the prosperity or declension of which immediately depended
the yearly increase or diminution of their own revenue.

The policy of the ancient republics of Greece, and that of Rome, though it
honoured agriculture more than manufactures or foreign trade, yet seems rather
to have discouraged the latter employments, than to have given any direct or
intentional encouragement to the former. In several of the ancient states of
Greece, foreign trade was prohibited altogether; and in several others, the
employments of artificers and manufacturers were considered as hurtful to the
strength and agility of the human body, as rendering it incapable of those
habits which their military and gymnastic exercises endeavoured to form in it,
and as thereby disqualifying it, more or less, for undergoing the fatigues and
encountering the dangers of war. Such occupations were considered as fit only
for slaves, and the free citizens of the states were prohibited from exercising
them. Even in those states where no such prohibition took place, as in Rome and
Athens, the great body of the people were in effect excluded from all the
trades which are now commonly exercised by the lower sort of the inhabitants of
towns. Such trades were, at Athens and Rome, all occupied by the slaves of the
rich, who exercised them for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, power,
and protection, made it almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a market
for his work, when it came into competition with that of the slaves of the
rich. Slaves, however, are very seldom inventive; and all the most important
improvements, either in machinery, or in the arrangement and distribution of
work, which facilitate and abridge labour have been the discoveries of freemen.
Should a slave propose any improvement of this kind, his master would be very
apt to consider the proposal as the suggestion of laziness, and of a desire to
save his own labour at the master’s expense. The poor slave, instead of
reward would probably meet with much abuse, perhaps with some punishment. In
the manufactures carried on by slaves, therefore, more labour must generally
have been employed to execute the same quantity of work, than in those carried
on by freemen. The work of the farmer must, upon that account, generally have
been dearer than that of the latter. The Hungarian mines, it is remarked by Mr.
Montesquieu, though not richer, have always been wrought with less expense, and
therefore with more profit, than the Turkish mines in their neighbourhood. The
Turkish mines are wrought by slaves; and the arms of those slaves are the only
machines which the Turks have ever thought of employing. The Hungarian mines
are wrought by freemen, who employ a great deal of machinery, by which they
facilitate and abridge their own labour. From the very little that is known
about the price of manufactures in the times of the Greeks and Romans, it would
appear that those of the finer sort were excessively dear. Silk sold for its
weight in gold. It was not, indeed, in those times an European manufacture; and
as it was all brought from the East Indies, the distance of the carriage may in
some measure account for the greatness of the price. The price, however, which
a lady, it is said, would sometimes pay for a piece of very fine linen, seems
to have been equally extravagant; and as linen was always either an European,
or at farthest, an Egyptian manufacture, this high price can be accounted for
only by the great expense of the labour which must have been employed about It,
and the expense of this labour again could arise from nothing but the
awkwardness of the machinery which is made use of. The price of fine woollens,
too, though not quite so extravagant, seems, however, to have been much above
that of the present times. Some cloths, we are told by Pliny {Plin. 1.
ix.c.39.}, dyed in a particular manner, cost a hundred denarii, or £3:6s:8d.
the pound weight. Others, dyed in another manner, cost a thousand denarii the
pound weight, or £33:6s:8d. The Roman pound, it must be remembered, contained
only twelve of our avoirdupois ounces. This high price, indeed, seems to have
been principally owing to the dye. But had not the cloths themselves been much
dearer than any which are made in the present times, so very expensive a dye
would not probably have been bestowed upon them. The disproportion would have
been too great between the value of the accessory and that of the principal.
The price mentioned by the same author {Plin. 1. viii.c.48.}, of some
triclinaria, a sort of woollen pillows or cushions made use of to lean upon as
they reclined upon their couches at table, passes all credibility; some of them
being said to have cost more than £30,000, others more than £300,000. This high
price, too, is not said to have arisen from the dye. In the dress of the people
of fashion of both sexes, there seems to have been much less variety, it is
observed by Dr. Arbuthnot, in ancient than in modern times; and the very little
variety which we find in that of the ancient statues, confirms his observation.
He infers from this, that their dress must, upon the whole, have been cheaper
than ours; but the conclusion does not seem to follow. When the expense of
fashionable dress is very great, the variety must be very small. But when, by
the improvements in the productive powers of manufacturing art and industry,
the expense of any one dress comes to be very moderate, the variety will
naturally be very great. The rich, not being able to distinguish themselves by
the expense of any one dress, will naturally endeavour to do so by the
multitude and variety of their dresses.

The greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation, it has
already been observed, is that which is carried on between the inhabitants of
the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the town draw from the
country the rude produce, which constitutes both the materials of their work
and the fund of their subsistence; and they pay for this rude produce, by
sending back to the country a certain portion of it manufactured and prepared
for immediate use. The trade which is carried on between these two different
sets of people, consists ultimately in a certain quantity of rude produce
exchanged for a certain quantity of manufactured produce. The dearer the
latter, therefore, the cheaper the former; and whatever tends in any country to
raise the price of manufactured produce, tends to lower that of the rude
produce of the land, and thereby to discourage agriculture. The smaller the
quantity of manufactured produce, which any given quantity of rude produce, or,
what comes to the same thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude
produce, is capable of purchasing, the smaller the exchangeable value of that
given quantity of rude produce; the smaller the encouragement which either the
landlord has to increase its quantity by improving, or the farmer by
cultivating the land. Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in any country the
number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home market, the
most important of all markets, for the rude produce of the land, and thereby
still further to discourage agriculture.

Those systems, therefore, which preferring agriculture to all other
employments, in order to promote it, impose restraints upon manufactures and
foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and indirectly
discourage that very species of industry which they mean to promote. They are
so far, perhaps, more inconsistent than even the mercantile system. That
system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign trade more than agriculture,
turns a certain portion of the capital of the society, from supporting a more
advantageous, to support a less advantageous species of industry. But still it
really, and in the end, encourages that species of industry which it means to
promote. Those agricultural systems, on the contrary, really, and in the end,
discourage their own favourite species of industry.

It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary
encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share
of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it, or, by
extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some
share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is, in reality,
subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, instead
of accelerating the progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness;
and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of
its land and labour.

All systems, either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty
establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate
the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own
way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of
any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a
duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to
innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which, no human wisdom
or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry
of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to
the interests of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the
sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance,
indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of
protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent
societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member
of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or
the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the
duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works, and certain public
institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or
small number of individuals to erect and maintain; because the profit could
never repay the expense to any individual, or small number of individuals,
though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

The proper performance of those several duties of the sovereign necessarily
supposes a certain expense; and this expense again necessarily requires a
certain revenue to support it. In the following book, therefore, I shall
endeavour to explain, first, what are the necessary expenses of the sovereign
or commonwealth; and which of those expenses ought to be defrayed by the
general contribution of the whole society; and which of them, by that of some
particular part only, or of some particular members of the society: secondly,
what are the different methods in which the whole society may be made to
contribute towards defraying the expenses incumbent on the whole society; and
what are the principal advantages and inconveniencies of each of those methods:
and thirdly, what are the reasons and causes which have induced almost all
modern governments to mortgage some part of this revenue, or to contract debts;
and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual
produce of the land and labour of the society. The following book, therefore,
will naturally be divided into three chapters.

APPENDIX TO BOOK IV

The two following accounts are subjoined, in order to illustrate and confirm
what is said in the fifth chapter of the fourth book, concerning the Tonnage
Bounty to the Whit-herring Fishery. The reader, I believe, may depend upon the
accuracy of both accounts.

An account of Busses fitted out in Scotland for eleven Years, with the Number
of empty Barrels carried out, and the Number of Barrels of Herrings caught;
also the Bounty, at a Medium, on each Barrel of Sea-sricks, and on each Barrel
when fully packed.

Years Number of Empty Barrels Barrels of Her- Bounty paid on
Busses carried out rings caught the Busses
£. s. d.
1771 29 5,948 2,832 2,885 0 0
1772 168 41,316 22,237 11,055 7 6
1773 190 42,333 42,055 12,510 8 6
1774 240 59,303 56,365 26,932 2 6
1775 275 69,144 52,879 19,315 15 0
1776 294 76,329 51,863 21,290 7 6
1777 240 62,679 43,313 17,592 2 6
1778 220 56,390 40,958 16,316 2 6
1779 206 55,194 29,367 15,287 0 0
1780 181 48,315 19,885 13,445 12 6
1781 135 33,992 16,593 9,613 15 6

Totals 2,186 550,943 378,347 £165,463 14 0

Sea-sticks 378,347 Bounty, at a medium, for each
barrel of sea-sticks, £ 0 8 2¼
But a barrel of sea-sticks
being only reckoned two thirds
of a barrel fully packed, one
third to be deducted, which
¹/³deducted 126,115 brings the bounty to £ 0 12 3¾
Barrels fully
packed 252,231

And if the herrings are exported, there is besides a
premium of £ 0 2 8
So the bounty paid by government in money for each
barrel is £ 0 14 11¾

But if to this, the duty of the salt usually taken
credit for as expended in curing each barrel, which
at a medium, is, of foreign, one bushel and one-
fourth of a bushel, at 10s. a-bushel, be added, viz 0 12 6
the bounty on each barrel would amount to £ 1 7 5¾

If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will
stand thus, viz.
Bounty as before £ 0 14 11¾
But if to this bounty, the duty on two bushels of
Scotch salt, at 1s.6d. per bushel, supposed to be
the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each
barrel is added, viz. 0 3 0
The bounty on each barrel will amount to £ 0 17 11¾

And when buss herrings are entered for home
consumption in Scotland, and pay the shilling a
barrel of duty, the bounty stands thus, to wit,
as before £ 0 12 3¾
From which the shilling a barrel is to be deducted 0 1 0
£ 0 11 3¾

But to that there is to be added again, the duty of
the foreign salt used curing a barrel of herring viz 0 12 6
So that the premium allowed for each barrel of her-
rings entered for home consumption is £ 1 3 9¾

If the herrings are cured in British salt, it will
stand as follows viz.
Bounty on each barrel brought in by the busses, as
above £ 0 12 3¾
From which deduct 1s. a-barrel, paid at the time
they are entered for home consumption 0 1 0
£ 0 11 3¾

But if to the bounty, the the duty on two bushel
of Scotch salt, at 1s.6d. per bushel supposed to
be the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each
barrel, is added, viz 0 3 0
the premium for each barrel entered for home
consumption will be £ 1 14 3¾

Though the loss of duties upon herrings exported cannot, perhaps, properly be
considered as bounty, that upon herrings entered for home consumption certainly
may.

An account of the Quantity of Foreign Salt imported into Scotland, and of
Scotch Salt delivered Duty-free from the Works there, for the Fishery, from the
5th. of April 1771 to the 5th. of April 1782 with the Medium of both for one
Year.

Foreign Salt Scotch Salt delivered
PERIOD imported from the Works
Bushels Bushels

From 5th. April 1771 to
5th. April 1782 936,974 168,226
Medium for one year 85,159½ 15,293¼

It is to be observed, that the bushel of foreign salt weighs 48lbs., that of
British weighs 56lbs. only.

BOOK V.
OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER I.
OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.

PART I. Of the Expense of Defence.

The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the
violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by
means of a military force. But the expense both of preparing this military
force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is very different
in the different states of society, in the different periods of improvement.

Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we
find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior, as
well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his society, or to
revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other societies, he
maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as when he lives at
home. His society (for in this state of things there is properly neither
sovereign nor commonwealth) is at no sort of expense, either to prepare him for
the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we find
it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner, a warrior.
Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in tents, or in
a sort of covered waggons, which are easily transported from place to place.
The whole tribe, or nation, changes its situation according to the different
seasons of the year, as well as according to other accidents. When its herds
and flocks have consumed the forage of one part of the country, it removes to
another, and from that to a third. In the dry season, it comes down to the
banks of the rivers; in the wet season, it retires to the upper country. When
such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust their herds and flocks
to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children; and their old
men, their women and children, will not be left behind without defence, and
without subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering
life, even in time of peace, easily takes the field in time of war. Whether it
marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen, the way of life is
nearly the same, though the object proposed by it be very different. They all
go to war together, therefore, and everyone does as well as he can. Among the
Tartars, even the women have been frequently known to engage in battle. If they
conquer, whatever belongs to the hostile tribe is the recompence of the
victory; but if they are vanquished, all is lost; and not only their herds and
flocks, but their women and children become the booty of the conqueror. Even
the greater part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him
for the sake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated and
dispersed in the desert.

The ordinary life, the ordinary exercise of a Tartar or Arab, prepares him
sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the javelin,
drawing the bow, etc. are the common pastimes of those who live in the open
air, and are all of them the images of war. When a Tartar or Arab actually goes
to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks, which he carries with
him, in the same manner as in peace. His chief or sovereign (for those nations
have all chiefs or sovereigns) is at no sort of expense in preparing him for
the field; and when he is in it, the chance of plunder is the only pay which he
either expects or requires.

An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men. The precarious
subsistence which the chace affords, could seldom allow a greater number to
keep together for any considerable time. An army of shepherds, on the contrary,
may sometimes amount to two or three hundred thousand. As long as nothing stops
their progress, as long as they can go on from one district, of which they have
consumed the forage, to another, which is yet entire; there seems to be scarce
any limit to the number who can march on together. A nation of hunters can
never be formidable to the civilized nations in their neighbourhood; a nation
of shepherds may. Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North
America; nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion
has frequently been in Asia. The judgment of Thucydides, that both Europe and
Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been verified by the experience
of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceless plains of
Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the dominion of the chief
of some conquering horde or clan; and the havock and devastation of Asia have
always signalized their union. The inhabitants of the inhospitable deserts of
Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds, have never been united but once,
under Mahomet and his immediate successors. Their union, which was more the
effect of religious enthusiasm than of conquest, was signalized in the same
manner. If the hunting nations of America should ever become shepherds, their
neighbourhood would be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is
at present.

In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen who
have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures but those coarse and
household ones, which almost every private family prepares for its own use,
every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior, or easily becomes such.
Those who live by agriculture generally pass the whole day in the open air,
exposed to all the inclemencies of the seasons. The hardiness of their ordinary
life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to some of which their necessary
occupations bear a great analogy. The necessary occupation of a ditcher
prepares him to work in the trenches, and to fortify a camp, as well as to
inclose a field. The ordinary pastimes of such husbandmen are the same as those
of shepherds, and are in the same manner the images of war. But as husbandmen
have less leisure than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those
pastimes. They are soldiers but soldiers not quite so much masters of their
exercise. Such as they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or
commonwealth any expense to prepare them for the field.

Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement, some
sort of fixed habitation, which cannot be abandoned without great loss. When a
nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole people cannot take
the field together. The old men, the women and children, at least, must remain
at home, to take care of the habitation. All the men of the military age,
however, may take the field, and in small nations of this kind, have frequently
done so. In every nation, the men of the military age are supposed to amount to
about a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people. If the
campaign, too, should begin after seedtime, and end before harvest, both the
husbandman and his principal labourers can be spared from the farm without much
loss. He trusts that the work which must be done in the mean time, can be well
enough executed by the old men, the women, and the children. He is not
unwilling, therefore, to serve without pay during a short campaign; and it
frequently costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the
field as to prepare him for it. The citizens of all the different states of
ancient Greece seem to have served in this manner till after the second Persian
war; and the people of Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian war. The
Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field in the summer,
and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman people, under their kings, and
during the first ages of the republic, served in the same manner. It was not
till the seige of Veii, that they who staid at home began to contribute
something towards maintaining those who went to war. In the European
monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before,
and for some time after, the establishment of what is properly called the
feudal law, the great lords, with all their immediate dependents, used to serve
the crown at their own expense. In the field, in the same manner as at home,
they maintained themselves by their own revenue, and not by any stipend or pay
which they received from the king upon that particular occasion.

In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to render
it altogether impossible that they who take the field should maintain
themselves at their own expense. Those two causes are, the progress of
manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it begins
after seedtime, and ends before harvest, the interruption of his business will
not always occasion any considerable diminution of his revenue. Without the
intervention of his labour, Nature does herself the greater part of the work
which remains to be done. But the moment that an artificer, a smith, a
carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his workhouse, the sole source of
his revenue is completely dried up. Nature does nothing for him; he does all
for himself. When he takes the field, therefore, in defence of the public, as
he has no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the
public. But in a country, of which a great part of the inhabitants are
artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be
drawn from those classes, and must, therefore, be maintained by the public as
long as they are employed in its service.

When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate and
complicated science; when the event of war ceases to be determined, as in the
first ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle; but when the
contest is generally spun out through several different campaigns, each of
which lasts during the greater part of the year; it becomes universally
necessary that the public should maintain those who serve the public in war, at
least while they are employed in that service. Whatever, in time of peace,
might be the ordinary occupation of those who go to war, so very tedious and
expensive a service would otherwise be by far too heavy a burden upon them.
After the second Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens seem to have
been generally composed of mercenary troops, consisting, indeed, partly of
citizens, but partly, too, of foreigners; and all of them equally hired and
paid at the expense of the state. From the time of the siege of Veii, the
armies of Rome received pay for their service during the time which they
remained in the field. Under the feudal governments, the military service, both
of the great lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after a certain
period, universally exchanged for a payment in money, which was employed to
maintain those who served in their stead.

The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number of the
people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a rude state of
society. In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained altogether by
the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the former can never
exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above maintaining, in a manner
suitable to their respective stations, both themselves and the other officers
of government and law, whom they are obliged to maintain. In the little
agrarian states of ancient Greece, a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body
of the people considered the themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is
said, take the field. Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is
commonly computed, that not more than the one hundredth part of the inhabitants
of any country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which
pays the expense of their service.

The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become
considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the field
had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all the different
republics of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises, was a necessary
part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen. In every city
there seems to have been a public field, in which, under the protection of the
public magistrate, the young people were taught their different exercises by
different masters. In this very simple institution consisted the whole expense
which any Grecian state seems ever to have been at, in preparing its citizens
for war. In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same
purpose with those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under the feudal
governments, the many public ordinances, that the citizens of every district
should practise archery, as well as several other military exercises, were
intended for promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so
well. Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution
of those ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been
universally neglected; and in the progress of all those governments, military
exercises seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great body of the
people.

In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of their
existence, and under the feudal governments, for a considerable time after
their first establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a separate, distinct
trade, which constituted the sole or principal occupation of a particular class
of citizens; every subject of the state, whatever might be the ordinary trade
or occupation by which he gained his livelihood, considered himself, upon all
ordinary occasions, as fit likewise to exercise the trade of a soldier, and,
upon many extraordinary occasions, as bound to exercise it.

The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so, in the
progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated
among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as some other arts, with which
it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is
capable of being carried at any particular time. But in order to carry it to
this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or
principal occupation of a particular class of citizens; and the division of
labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art. Into
other arts, the division of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of
individuals, who find that they promote their private interest better by
confining themselves to a particular trade, than by exercising a great number.
But it is the wisdom of the state only, which can render the trade of a soldier
a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others. A private citizen,
who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular encouragement from
the public, should spend the greater part of his time in military exercises,
might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in them, and amuse himself very
well; but he certainly would not promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of
the state only, which can render it for his interest to give up the greater
part of his time to this peculiar occupation; and states have not always had
this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become such, that the
preservation of their existence required that they should have it.

A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of
husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The first
may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exercises;
the second may employ some part of it; but the last cannot employ a single hour
in them without some loss, and his attention to his own interest naturally
leads him to neglect them altogether. Those improvements in husbandry, too,
which the progress of arts and manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the
husbandman as little leisure as the artificer. Military exercises come to be as
much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and
the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the
same time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and
manufactures, and which, in reality, is no more than the accumulated produce of
those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbours. An
industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all nations the
most likely to be attacked; and unless the state takes some new measure for the
public defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether
incapable of defending themselves.

In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the state can
make any tolerable provision for the public defence.

It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the
whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people, enforce the
practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the
military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of
a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on.

Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the
constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a
particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military
force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist
in a standing army. The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal
occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay which
the state affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence.
The practice of military exercises is only the occasional occupation of the
soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of their
subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the
labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier; in a
standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and
in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two
different species of military force.

Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries, the citizens
destined for defending the state seem to have been exercised only, without
being, if I may say so, regimented; that is, without being divided into
separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which performed its exercises
under its own proper and permanent officers. In the republics of ancient Greece
and Rome, each citizen, as long as he remained at home, seems to have practised
his exercises, either separately and independently, or with such of his equals
as he liked best; and not to have been attached to any particular body of
troops, till he was actually called upon to take the field. In other countries,
the militia has not only been exercised, but regimented. In England, in
Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any
imperfect military force of this kind has been established, every militiaman
is, even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which
performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the soldiers
had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the use of their
arms. Strength and agility of body were of the highest consequence, and
commonly determined the fate of battles. But this skill and dexterity in the
use of their arms could be acquired only, in the same manner as fencing is at
present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each man separately, in a
particular school, under a particular master, or with his own particular equals
and companions. Since the invention of fire-arms, strength and agility of body,
or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they are
far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less consequence. The nature
of the weapon, though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the
skilful, puts him more nearly so than he ever was before. All the dexterity and
skill, it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough
acquired by practising in great bodies.

Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which, in
modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles,
than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their arms. But the
noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels
himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and
frequently a long time before the battle can be well said to be engaged, must
render it very difficult to maintain any considerable degree of this
regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern
battle. In an ancient battle, there was no noise but what arose from the human
voice; there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of wounds or death.
Every man, till some mortal weapon actually did approach him, saw clearly that
no such weapon was near him. In these circumstances, and among troops who had
some confidence in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it
must have been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity
and order, not only in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an
ancient battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the
habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired
only by troops which are exercised in great bodies.

A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or
exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well
exercised standing army.

The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a-month, can never be
so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised every day, or
every other day; and though this circumstance may not be of so much consequence
in modern, as it was in ancient times, yet the acknowledged superiority of the
Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very much to their superior expertness in
their exercise, may satisfy us that it is, even at this day, of very
considerable consequence.

The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a-week, or once
a-month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs
their own way, without being, in any respect, accountable to him, can never be
under the same awe in his presence, can never have the same disposition to
ready obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day directed
by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at least retire to their
quarters, according to his orders. In what is called discipline, or in the
habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still more inferior to a
standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise,
or in the management and use of its arms. But, in modern war, the habit of
ready and instant obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable
superiority in the management of arms.

Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the same
chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the best. In
respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they approach
nearest to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served under its own
chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind. As the Highlanders, however,
were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as they had all a fixed
habitation, and were not, in peaceable times, accustomed to follow their
chieftain from place to place; so, in time of war, they were less willing to
follow him to any considerable distance, or to continue for any long time in
the field. When they had acquired any booty, they were eager to return home,
and his authority was seldom sufficient to detain them. In point of obedience,
they were always much inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As
the Highlanders, too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in
the open air, they were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were
less expert in the use of their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for
several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a standing
army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and, being
constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the same
prompt obedience which takes place in standing armies. What they were before
they took the field, is of little importance. They necessarily become in every
respect a standing army, after they have passed a few campaigns in it. Should
the war in America drag out through another campaign, the American militia may
become, in every respect, a match for that standing army, of which the valour
appeared, in the last war at least, not inferior to that of the hardiest
veterans of France and Spain.

This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will be
found, hears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well regulated
standing army has over a militia.

One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct account in any
well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars
with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities in the
neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning
were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing army. When he was
at peace, which he was very seldom, and never for any long time together, he
was careful not to disband that army. It vanquished and subdued, after a long
and violent struggle, indeed, the gallant and well exercised militias of the
principal republics of ancient Greece; and afterwards, with very little
struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia of the great Persian empire.
The fall of the Greek republics, and of the Persian empire was the effect of
the irresistible superiority which a standing arm has over every other sort of
militia. It is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which
history has preserved any distinct and circumstantial account.

The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second. All
the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very well be
accounted for from the same cause.

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the
armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three
great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Amilcar, his
son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal: first in chastising their own
rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa; and
lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Annibal led
from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been
gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans, in the
meantime, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not,
during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence; and
their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The
Roman armies which Annibal encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were
militia opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable,
contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles.

The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the like
superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it; and, in a few
years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal, expelled them
almost entirely from that country.

Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually in the
field, became, in the progress of the war, a well disciplined and well
exercised standing army; and the superiority of Annibal grew every day less and
less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole, of
the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the assistance of his brother
in Italy. In this march, he is said to have been misled by his guides; and in a
country which he did not know, was surprised and attacked, by another standing
army, in every respect equal or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him but
a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia, and, in
the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well disciplined
and well exercised standing army. That standing army was afterwards carried to
Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose it. In order to defend
Carthage, it became necessary to recal the standing army of Annibal. The
disheartened and frequently defeated African militia joined it, and, at the
battle of Zama, composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal. The event
of that day determined the fate of the two rival republics.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman
republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The
standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms. In the height of
their grandeur, it cost them two great wars, and three great battles, to subdue
that little kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have been still more
difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last king. The militias of
all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of Syria, and of
Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the standing armies of Rome. The
militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The
Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of
the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most formidable enemies whom the Romans
had to encounter after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German
militias, too, were always respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very
considerable advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when
the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much
superior; and if the Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia
or Germany, it was probably because they judged that it was not worth while to
add those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too large. The
ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar
extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners of their
ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of
wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same chiefs whom they were
accustomed to follow in peace. ‘Their militia was exactly of the same
kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were probably
descended.

Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman armies.
Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the days of their
grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their heavy armour
was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were
neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman emperors, besides, the
standing armies of Rome, those particularly which guarded the German and
Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their masters, against whom they used
frequently to set up their own generals. In order to render them less
formidable, according to some authors, Dioclesian, according to others,
Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always
before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each,
and dispersed them in small bodies through the different provincial towns, from
whence they were scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an
invasion. Small bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing
towns, and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves trades men,
artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military
character; and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a
corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the
attack of the German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the
western empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of those nations to
oppose to that of others, that the emperors were for some time able to defend
themselves. The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in the
affairs of mankind, of which ancient history has preserved any distinct or
circumstantial account. It was brought about by the irresistible superiority
which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the
militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen,
artificers, and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias
have generally been, not over standing armies, but over other militias, in
exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such were the victories which
the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire; and such, too, were
those which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that of the
Austrians and Burgundians.

The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established
themselves upon ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be of
the same kind in their new settlements, as it had been in their original
country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war,
took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was accustomed
to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well exercised, and tolerably
well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, however, the authority of the
chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to
spare for military exercises. Both the discipline and the exercise of the
feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and standing armies were
gradually introduced to supply the place of it. When the expedient of a
standing army, besides, had once been adopted by one civilized nation, it
became necessary that all its neighbours should follow the example. They soon
found that their safety depended upon their doing so, and that their own
militia was altogether incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet
have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops, and, the
very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face the hardiest and
most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland,
the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of the
Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and most experienced
veterans in Europe. The Russian empire, however, had enjoyed a profound peace
for near twenty years before, and could at that time have very few soldiers who
had ever seen an enemy. When the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had
enjoyed a profound peace for about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of her
soldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more
distinguished than in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate
exploit of that unfortunate war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may
sometimes forget their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been
kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all
times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in
its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries in
Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which
the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A well
regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such an army, as it can
best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend
such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is
only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any
country can be perpetuated, or even preserved, for any considerable time.

As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a civilized
country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country
can be suddenly and tolerably civilized. A standing army establishes, with an
irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of
the empire, and maintains some degree of regular government in countries which
could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever examines with attention, the
improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Russian empire, will
find that they almost all resolve themselves into the establishment of a well
regulated standing army. It is the instrument which executes and maintains all
his other regulations. That degree of order and internal peace, which that
empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that
army.

Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army, as dangerous
to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the general, and that
of the principal officers, are not necessarily connected with the support of
the constitution of the state. The standing army of Caesar destroyed the Roman
republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of
doors. But where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal
nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army; where the
military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest
interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves
the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to
liberty. On the contrary, it may, in some cases, be favourable to liberty. The
security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome
jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest
actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen.
Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by the principal people
of the country, is endangered by every popular discontent; where a small tumult
is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole
authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur
and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself
supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well
regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most
licentious remonstrances, can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or
neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes
him to do so. That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be
tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated
standing army. It is in such countries only, that the public safety does not
require that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power, for
suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from
the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more
and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization. The military force
of the society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense, either in time
of peace, or in time of war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be
maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace.

The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire-arms,
has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and disciplining any
particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in
time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A
musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon
or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta. The powder which is spent in a
modern review is lost irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expense.
The javelins and arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could
easily be picked up again, and were, besides, of very little value. The cannon
and the mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the
balista or catapulta; and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them
for the field, but to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern
artillery, too, over that of the ancients, is very great; it has become much
more difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town, so as
to resist, even for a few weeks, the attack of that superior artillery. In
modern times, many different causes contribute to render the defence of the
society more expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of
improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great
revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of
gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

In modern war, the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to the
nation which can best afford that expense; and, consequently, to an opulent and
civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times, the opulent and
civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and
barbarous nations. In modern times, the poor and barbarous find it difficult to
defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of
fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is
certainly favourable, both to the permanency and to the extension of
civilization.

PART II. Of the Expense of Justice

The second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of
it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires
two very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.

Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none
that exceeds the value of two or three days labour; so there is seldom any
established magistrate, or any regular administration of justice. Men who have
no property, can injure one another only in their persons or reputations. But
when one man kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to whom the
injury is done suffers, he who does it receives no benefit. It is otherwise
with the injuries to property. The benefit of the person who does the injury is
often equal to the loss of him who suffers it. Envy, malice, or resentment, are
the only passions which can prompt one man to injure another in his person or
reputation. But the greater part of men are not very frequently under the
influence of those passions; and the very worst men are so only occasionally.
As their gratification, too, how agreeable soever it may be to certain
characters, is not attended with any real or permanent advantage, it is, in the
greater part of men, commonly restrained by prudential considerations. Men may
live together in society with some tolerable degree of security, though there
is no civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of those passions.
But avarice and ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the
love of present ease and enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade
property; passions much more steady in their operation, and much more universal
in their influence. Wherever there is a great property, there is great
inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor,
and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence
of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by
want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. It is only under the
shelter of the civil magistrate, that the owner of that valuable property,
which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive
generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times
surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never
appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm
of the civil magistrate, continually held up to chastise it. The acquisition of
valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the
establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least none
that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not so
necessary.

Civil government supposes a certain subordination. But as the necessity of
civil government gradually grows up with the acquisition of valuable property;
so the principal causes, which naturally introduce subordination, gradually
grow up with the growth of that valuable property.

The causes or circumstances which naturally introduce subordination, or which
naturally and antecedent to any civil institution, give some men some
superiority over the greater part of their brethren, seem to be four in number.

The first of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of personal
qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body; of wisdom and virtue;
of prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind. The qualifications of
the body, unless supported by those of the mind, can give little authority in
any period of society. He is a very strong man, who, by mere strength of body,
can force two weak ones to obey him. The qualifications of the mind can alone
give very great authority. They are however, invisible qualities; always
disputable, and generally disputed. No society, whether barbarous or civilized,
has ever found it convenient to settle the rules of precedency of rank and
subordination, according to those invisible qualities; but according to
something that is more plain and palpable.

The second of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of age. An old
man, provided his age is not so far advanced as to give suspicion of dotage, is
everywhere more respected than a young man of equal rank, fortune, and
abilities. Among nations of hunters, such as the native tribes of North
America, age is the sole foundation of rank and precedency. Among them, father
is the appellation of a superior; brother, of an equal; and son, of an
inferior. In the most opulent and civilized nations, age regulates rank among
those who are in every other respect equal; and among whom, therefore, there is
nothing else to regulate it. Among brothers and among sisters, the eldest
always takes place; and in the succession of the paternal estate, every thing
which cannot be divided, but must go entire to one person, such as a title of
honour, is in most cases given to the eldest. Age is a plain and palpable
quality, which admits of no dispute.

The third of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of fortune. The
authority of riches, however, though great in every age of society, is,
perhaps, greatest in the rudest ages of society, which admits of any
considerable inequality of fortune. A Tartar chief, the increase of whose
flocks and herds is sufficient to maintain a thousand men, cannot well employ
that increase in any other way than in maintaining a thousand men. The rude
state of his society does not afford him any manufactured produce any trinkets
or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of his rude produce
which is over and above his own consumption. The thousand men whom he thus
maintains, depending entirely upon him for their subsistence, must both obey
his orders in war, and submit to his jurisdiction in peace. He is necessarily
both their general and their judge, and his chieftainship is the necessary
effect of the superiority of his fortune. In an opulent and civilized society,
a man may possess a much greater fortune, and yet not be able to command a
dozen of people. Though the produce of his estate may be sufficient to
maintain, and may, perhaps, actually maintain, more than a thousand people,
yet, as those people pay for every thing which they get from him, as he gives
scarce any thing to any body but in exchange for an equivalent, there is scarce
anybody who considers himself as entirely dependent upon him, and his authority
extends only over a few menial servants. The authority of fortune, however, is
very great, even in an opulent and civilized society. That it is much greater
than that either of age or of personal qualities, has been the constant
complaint of every period of society which admitted of any considerable
inequality of fortune. The first period of society, that of hunters, admits of
no such inequality. Universal poverty establishes their universal equality; and
the superiority, either of age or of personal qualities, are the feeble, but
the sole foundations of authority and subordination. There is, therefore,
little or no authority or subordination in this period of society. The second
period of society, that of shepherds, admits of very great inequalities of
fortune, and there is no period in which the superiority of fortune gives so
great authority to those who possess it. There is no period, accordingly, in
which authority and subordination are more perfectly established. The authority
of an Arabian scherif is very great; that of a Tartar khan altogether
despotical.

The fourth of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of birth.
Superiority of birth supposes an ancient superiority of fortune in the family
of the person who claims it. All families are equally ancient; and the
ancestors of the prince, though they may be better known, cannot well be more
numerous than those of the beggar. Antiquity of family means everywhere the
antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatness which is commonly either
founded upon wealth, or accompanied with it. Upstart greatness is everywhere
less respected than ancient greatness. The hatred of usurpers, the love of the
family of an ancient monarch, are in a great measure founded upon the contempt
which men naturally have for the former, and upon their veneration for the
latter. As a military officer submits, without reluctance, to the authority of
a superior by whom he has always been commanded, but cannot bear that his
inferior should be set over his head; so men easily submit to a family to whom
they and their ancestors have always submitted; but are fired with indignation
when another family, in whom they had never acknowledged any such superiority,
assumes a dominion over them.

The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can
have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in
fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The son of a wise and
brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man
of equal merit, who has the misfortune to be the son of a fool or a coward. The
difference, however will not be very great; and there never was, I believe, a
great family in the world, whose illustration was entirely derived from the
inheritance of wisdom and virtue.

The distinction of birth not only may, but always does, take place among
nations of shepherds. Such nations are always strangers to every sort of
luxury, and great wealth can scarce ever be dissipated among them by
improvident profusion. There are no nations, accordingly, who abound more in
families revered and honoured on account of their descent from a long race of
great and illustrious ancestors; because there are no nations among whom wealth
is likely to continue longer in the same families.

Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally set one
man above another. They are the two great sources of personal distinction, and
are, therefore, the principal causes which naturally establish authority and
subordination among men. Among nations of shepherds, both those causes operate
with their full force. The great shepherd or herdsman, respected on account of
his great wealth, and of the great number of those who depend upon him for
subsistence, and revered on account of the nobleness of his birth, and of the
immemorial antiquity or his illustrious family, has a natural authority over
all the inferior shepherds or herdsmen of his horde or clan. He can command the
united force of a greater number of people than any of them. His military power
is greater than that of any of them. In time of war, they are all of them
naturally disposed to muster themselves under his banner, rather than under
that of any other person; and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to
him some sort of executive power. By commanding, too, the united force of a
greater number of people than any of them, he is best able to compel any one of
them, who may have injured another, to compensate the wrong. He is the person,
therefore, to whom all those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally
look up for protection. It is to him that they naturally complain of the
injuries which they imagine have been done to them; and his interposition, in
such cases, is more easily submitted to, even by the person complained of, than
that of any other person would be. His birth and fortune thus naturally procure
him some sort of judicial authority.

It is in the age of shepherds, in the second period of society, that the
inequality of fortune first begins to take place, and introduces among men a
degree of authority and subordination, which could not possibly exist before.
It thereby introduces some degree of that civil government which is
indispensably necessary for its own preservation; and it seems to do this
naturally, and even independent of the consideration of that necessity. The
consideration of that necessity comes, no doubt, afterwards, to contribute very
much to maintain and secure that authority and subordination. The rich, in
particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things, which
can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages. Men of
inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in the possession of
their property, in order that men of superior wealth may combine to defend them
in the possession of theirs. All the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel, that
the security of their own herds and flocks depends upon the security of those
of the great shepherd or herdsman; that the maintenance of their lesser
authority depends upon that of his greater authority; and that upon their
subordination to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in
subordination to them. They constitute a sort of little nobility, who feel
themselves interested to defend the property, and to support the authority, of
their own little sovereign, in order that he may be able to defend their
property, and to support their authority. Civil government, so far as it is
instituted for the security of property, is, in reality, instituted for the
defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property
against those who have none at all.

The judicial authority of such a sovereign, however, far from being a cause of
expense, was, for a long time, a source of revenue to him. The persons who
applied to him for justice were always willing to pay for it, and a present
never failed to accompany a petition. After the authority of the sovereign,
too, was thoroughly established, the person found guilty, over and above the
satisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party, was like-wise forced to
pay an amercement to the sovereign. He had given trouble, he had disturbed, he
had broke the peace of his lord the king, and for those offences an amercement
was thought due. In the Tartar governments of Asia, in the governments of
Europe which were founded by the German and Scythian nations who overturned the
Roman empire, the administration of justice was a considerable source of
revenue, both to the sovereign, and to all the lesser chiefs or lords who
exercised under him any particular jurisdiction, either over some particular
tribe or clan, or over some particular territory or district. Originally, both
the sovereign and the inferior chiefs used to exercise this jurisdiction in
their own persons. Afterwards, they universally found it convenient to delegate
it to some substitute, bailiff, or judge. This substitute, however, was still
obliged to account to his principal or constituent for the profits of the
jurisdiction. Whoever reads the instructions (They are to be found in
Tyrol’s History of England) which were given to the judges of the circuit
in the time of Henry II will see clearly that those judges were a sort of
itinerant factors, sent round the country for the purpose of levying certain
branches of the king’s revenue. In those days, the administration of
justice not only afforded a certain revenue to the sovereign, but, to procure
this revenue, seems to have been one of the principal advantages which he
proposed to obtain by the administration of justice.

This scheme of making the administration of justice subservient to the purposes
of revenue, could scarce fail to be productive of several very gross abuses.
The person who applied for justice with a large present in his hand, was likely
to get something more than justice; while he who applied for it with a small
one was likely to get something less. Justice, too, might frequently be
delayed, in order that this present might be repeated. The amercement, besides,
of the person complained of, might frequently suggest a very strong reason for
finding him in the wrong, even when he had not really been so. That such abuses
were far from being uncommon, the ancient history of every country in Europe
bears witness.

When the sovereign or chief exercises his judicial authority in his own person,
how much soever he might abuse it, it must have been scarce possible to get any
redress; because there could seldom be any body powerful enough to call him to
account. When he exercised it by a bailiff, indeed, redress might sometimes be
had. If it was for his own benefit only, that the bailiff had been guilty of an
act of injustice, the sovereign himself might not always be unwilling to punish
him, or to oblige him to repair the wrong. But if it was for the benefit of his
sovereign; if it was in order to make court to the person who appointed him,
and who might prefer him, that he had committed any act of oppression; redress
would, upon most occasions, be as impossible as if the sovereign had committed
it himself. In all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all those ancient
governments of Europe in particular, which were founded upon the ruins of the
Roman empire, the administration of justice appears for a long time to have
been extremely corrupt; far from being quite equal and impartial, even under
the best monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worst.

Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the greatest
shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the same manner
as any of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own herds or flocks.
Among those nations of husbandmen, who are but just come out of the shepherd
state, and who are not much advanced beyond that state, such as the Greek
tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and
Scythian ancestors, when they first settled upon the ruins of the western
empire; the sovereign or chief is, in the same manner, only the greatest
landlord of the country, and is maintained in the same manner as any other
landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private estate, or from what, in
modern Europe, was called the demesne of the crown. His subjects, upon ordinary
occasions, contribute nothing to his support, except when, in order to protect
them from the oppression of some of their fellow-subjects, they stand in need
of his authority. The presents which they make him upon such occasions
constitute the whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which,
except, perhaps, upon some very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his
dominion over them. When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles, for his
friendship, the sovereignty of seven Greek cities, the sole advantage which he
mentions as likely to be derived from it was, that the people would honour him
with presents. As long as such presents, as long as the emoluments of justice,
or what may be called the fees of court, constituted, in this manner, the whole
ordinary revenue which the sovereign derived from his sovereignty, it could not
well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed, that he should give
them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he should
regulate and ascertain them. But after they had been so regulated and
ascertained, how to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending them
beyond those regulations, was still very difficult, not to say impossible.
During the continuance of this state of things, therefore, the corruption of
justice, naturally resulting from the arbitrary and uncertain nature of those
presents, scarce admitted of any effectual remedy.

But when, from different causes, chiefly from the continually increasing
expense of defending the nation against the invasion of other nations, the
private estate of the sovereign had become altogether insufficient for
defraying the expense of the sovereignty; and when it had become necessary that
the people should, for their own security, contribute towards this expense by
taxes of different kinds; it seems to have been very commonly stipulated, that
no present for the administration of justice should, under any pretence, be
accepted either by the sovereign, or by his bailiffs and substitutes, the
judges. Those presents, it seems to have been supposed, could more easily be
abolished altogether, than effectually regulated and ascertained. Fixed
salaries were appointed to the judges, which were supposed to compensate to
them the loss of whatever might have been their share of the ancient emoluments
of justice; as the taxes more than compensated to the sovereign the loss of
his. Justice was then said to be administered gratis.

Justice, however, never was in reality administered gratis in any country.
Lawyers and attorneys, at least, must always be paid by the parties; and if
they were not, they would perform their duty still worse than they actually
perform it. The fees annually paid to lawyers and attorneys, amount, in every
court, to a much greater sum than the salaries of the judges. The circumstance
of those salaries being paid by the crown, can nowhere much diminish the
necessary expense of a law-suit. But it was not so much to diminish the
expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were
prohibited from receiving my present or fee from the parties.

The office of judge is in itself so very honourable, that men are willing to
accept of it, though accompanied with very small emoluments. The inferior
office of justice of peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and in
most cases with no emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the greater
part of our country gentlemen. The salaries of all the different judges, high
and low, together with the whole expense of the administration and execution of
justice, even where it is not managed with very good economy, makes, in any
civilized country, but a very inconsiderable part of the whole expense of
government.

The whole expense of justice, too, might easily be defrayed by the fees of
court; and, without exposing the administration of justice to any real hazard
of corruption, the public revenue might thus be entirely discharged from a
certain, though perhaps but a small incumbrance. It is difficult to regulate
the fees of court effectually, where a person so powerful as the sovereign is
to share in them and to derive any considerable part of his revenue from them.
It is very easy, where the judge is the principal person who can reap any
benefit from them. The law can very easily oblige the judge to respect the
regulation though it might not always be able to make the sovereign respect it.
Where the fees of court are precisely regulated and ascertained where they are
paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the hands of a
cashier or receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known proportions
among the different judges after the process is decided and not till it is
decided; there seems to be no more danger of corruption than when such fees are
prohibited altogether. Those fees, without occasioning any considerable
increase in the expense of a law-suit, might be rendered fully sufficient for
defraying the whole expense of justice. But not being paid to the judges till
the process was determined, they might be some incitement to the diligence of
the court in examining and deciding it. In courts which consisted of a
considerable number of judges, by proportioning the share of each judge to the
number of hours and days which he had employed in examining the process, either
in the court, or in a committee, by order of the court, those fees might give
some encouragement to the diligence of each particular judge. Public services
are never better performed, than when their reward comes only in consequence of
their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in
performing them. In the different parliaments of France, the fees of court
(called epices and vacations) constitute the far greater part of the emoluments
of the judges. After all deductions are made, the neat salary paid by the crown
to a counsellor or judge in the parliament of Thoulouse, in rank and dignity
the second parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to 150 livres, about £6:11s.
sterling a-year. About seven years ago, that sum was in the same place the
ordinary yearly wages of a common footman. The distribution of these epices,
too, is according to the diligence of the judges. A diligent judge gains a
comfortable, though moderate revenue, by his office; an idle one gets little
more than his salary. Those parliaments are, perhaps, in many respects, not
very convenient courts of justice; but they have never been accused; they seem
never even to have been suspected of corruption.

The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the
different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to
itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to
take cognizance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under
its jurisdiction. The court of king’s bench, instituted for the trial of
criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending
that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass
or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the
king’s revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were
due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the planitiff
alleging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant would not pay
him. In consequence of such fictions, it came, in many cases, to depend
altogether upon the parties, before what court they would choose to have their
cause tried, and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality,
to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present admirable
constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally, in a
great measure, formed by this emulation, which anciently took place between
their respective judges: each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the
speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit, for every sort
of injustice. Originally, the courts of law gave damages only for breach of
contract. The court of chancery, as a court of conscience, first took upon it
to enforce the specific performance of agreements. When the breach of contract
consisted in the non-payment of money, the damage sustained could be
compensated in no other way than by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a
specific performance of the agreement. In such cases, therefore, the remedy of
the courts of law was sufficient. It was not so in others. When the tenant sued
his lord for having unjustly outed him of his lease, the damages which he
recovered were by no means equivalent to the possession of the land. Such
causes, therefore, for some time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no
small loss of the courts of law. It was to draw back such causes to themselves,
that the courts of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious
writ of ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or
dispossession of land.

A stamp-duty upon the law proceedings of each particular court, to be levied by
that court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges, and other
officers belonging to it, might in the same manner, afford a revenue sufficient
for defraying the expense of the administration of justice, without bringing
any burden upon the general revenue of the society. The judges, indeed, might
in this case, be under the temptation of multiplying unnecessarily the
proceedings upon every cause, in order to increase, as much as possible, the
produce of such a stamp-duty. It has been the custom in modern Europe to
regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the attorneys and clerks of court
according to the number of pages which they had occasion to write; the court,
however, requiring that each page should contain so many lines, and each line
so many words. In order to increase their payment, the attorneys and clerks
have contrived to multiply words beyond all necessity, to the corruption of the
law language of, I believe, every court of justice in Europe. A like temptation
might, perhaps, occasion a like corruption in the form of law proceedings.

But whether the administration of justice be so contrived as to defray its own
expense, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed salaries paid to them
from some other fund, it does not seen necessary that the person or persons
entrusted with the executive power should be charged with the management of
that fund, or with the payment of those salaries. That fund might arise from
the rent of landed estates, the management of each estate being entrusted to
the particular court which was to be maintained by it. That fund might arise
even from the interest of a sum of money, the lending out of which might, in
the same manner, be entrusted to the court which was to be maintained by it. A
part, though indeed but a small part of the salary of the judges of the court
of session in Scotland, arises from the interest of a sum of money. The
necessary instability of such a fund seems, however, to render it an improper
one for the maintenance of an institution which ought to last for ever.

The separation of the judicial from the executive power, seems originally to
have arisen from the increasing business of the society, in consequence of its
increasing improvement. The administration of justice became so laborious and
so complicated a duty, as to require the undivided attention of the person to
whom it was entrusted. The person entrusted with the executive power, not
having leisure to attend to the decision of private causes himself, a deputy
was appointed to decide them in his stead. In the progress of the Roman
greatness, the consul was too much occupied with the political affairs of the
state, to attend to the administration of justice. A praetor, therefore, was
appointed to administer it in his stead. In the progress of the European
monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the
sovereigns and the great lords came universally to consider the administration
of justice as an office both too laborious and too ignoble for them to execute
in their own persons. They universally, therefore, discharged themselves of it,
by appointing a deputy, bailiff or judge.

When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that
justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called
politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even
without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those
interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of
justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his
own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure
in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary
that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it
should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge
should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of
that power. The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good
will, or even upon the good economy of that power.

PART III. Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.

The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth, is that of erecting
and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which though
they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are,
however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expense to any
individual, or small number of individuals; and which it, therefore, cannot be
expected that any individual, or small number of individuals, should erect or
maintain. The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of
expense in the different periods of society.

After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence of the
society, and for the administration of justice, both of which have already been
mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly for
facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the
instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction are of two kinds:
those for the education of the youth, and those for the instruction of people
of all ages. The consideration of the manner in which the expense of those
different sorts of public works and institutions may be most properly defrayed
will divide this third part of the present chapter into three different
articles.

ARTICLE I.—Of the public Works and Institutions for facilitating the
Commerce of the Society.

And, first, of those which are necessary for facilitating Commerce in general.

That the erection and maintenance of the public works which facilitate the
commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable canals,
harbours, etc. must require very different degrees of expense in the different
periods of society, is evident without any proof. The expense of making and
maintaining the public roads of any country must evidently increase with the
annual produce of the land and labour of that country, or with the quantity and
weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to fetch and carry upon those
roads. The strength of a bridge must be suited to the number and weight of the
carriages which are likely to pass over it. The depth and the supply of water
for a navigable canal must be proportioned to the number and tonnage of the
lighters which are likely to carry goods upon it; the extent of a harbour, to
the number of the shipping which are likely to take shelter in it.

It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public works should be
defrayed from that public revenue, as it is commonly called, of which the
collection and application are in most countries, assigned to the executive
power. The greater part of such public works may easily be so managed, as to
afford a particular revenue, sufficient for defraying their own expense without
bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.

A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may, in most cases, be
both made add maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make use of
them; a harbour, by a moderate port-duty upon the tonnage of the shipping which
load or unload in it. The coinage, another institution for facilitating
commerce, in many countries, not only defrays its own expense, but affords a
small revenue or a seignorage to the sovereign. The post-office, another
institution for the same purpose, over and above defraying its own expense,
affords, in almost all countries, a very considerable revenue to the sovereign.

When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters
which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or
their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of those public works exactly in
proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce
possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works. This tax or
toll, too, though it is advanced by the carrier, is finally paid by the
consumer, to whom it must always be charged in the price of the goods. As the
expense of carriage, however, is very much reduced by means of such public
works, the goods, notwithstanding the toll, come cheaper to the consumer than
they could otherwise have done, their price not being so much raised by the
toll, as it is lowered by the cheapness of the carriage. The person who finally
pays this tax, therefore, gains by the application more than he loses by the
payment of it. His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain. It is, in
reality, no more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up, in
order to get the rest. It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method
of raising a tax. When the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches,
post-chaises, etc. is made somewhat higher in proportion to their weight, than
upon carriages of necessary use, such as carts, waggons, etc. the indolence and
vanity of the rich is made to contribute, in a very easy manner, to the relief
of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the
different parts of the country.

When high-roads, bridges, canals, etc. are in this manner made and supported by
the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can be made only where
that commerce requires them, and, consequently, where it is proper to make
them. Their expense, too, their grandeur and magnificence, must be suited to
what that commerce can afford to pay. They must be made, consequently, as it is
proper to make them. A magnificent high-road cannot be made through a desert
country, where there is little or no commerce, or merely because it happens to
lead to the country villa of the intendant of the province, or to that of some
great lord, to whom the intendant finds it convenient to make his court. A
great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where nobody passes, or
merely to embellish the view from the windows of a neighbouring palace; things
which sometimes happen in countries, where works of this kind are carried on by
any other revenue than that which they themselves are capable of affording.

In several different parts of Europe, the toll or lock-duty upon a canal is the
property of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to keep up the
canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily ceases
altogether, and, along with it, the whole profit which they can make by the
tolls. If those tolls were put under the management of commissioners, who had
themselves no interest in them, they might be less attentive to the maintenance
of the works which produced them. The canal of Languedoc cost the king of
France and the province upwards of thirteen millions of livres, which (at
twenty-eight livres the mark of silver, the value of French money in the end of
the last century) amounted to upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds sterling.
When that great work was finished, the most likely method, it was found, of
keeping it in constant repair, was to make a present of the tolls to Riquet,
the engineer who planned and conducted the work. Those tolls constitute, at
present, a very large estate to the different branches of the family of that
gentleman, who have, therefore, a great interest to keep the work in constant
repair. But had those tolls been put under the management of commissioners, who
had no such interest, they might perhaps, have been dissipated in ornamental
and unnecessary expenses, while the most essential parts of the works were
allowed to go to ruin.

The tolls for the maintenance of a highroad cannot, with any safety, be made
the property of private persons. A high-road, though entirely neglected, does
not become altogether impassable, though a canal does. The proprietors of the
tolls upon a high-road, therefore, might neglect altogether the repair of the
road, and yet continue to levy very nearly the same tolls. It is proper,
therefore, that the tolls for the maintenance of such a work should be put
under the management of commissioners or trustees.

In Great Britain, the abuses which the trustees have committed in the
management of those tolls, have, in many cases, been very justly complained of.
At many turnpikes, it has been said, the money levied is more than double of
what is necessary for executing, in the completest manner, the work, which is
often executed in a very slovenly manner, and sometimes not executed at all.
The system of repairing the high-roads by tolls of this kind, it must be
observed, is not of very long standing. We should not wonder, therefore, if it
has not yet been brought to that degree of perfection of which it seems
capable. If mean and improper persons are frequently appointed trustees; and if
proper courts of inspection and account have not yet been established for
controlling their conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely
sufficient for executing the work to be done by them; the recency of the
institution both accounts and apologizes for those defects, of which, by the
wisdom of parliament, the greater part may, in due time, be gradually remedied.

The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain, is supposed to
exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the roads, that the savings
which, with proper economy, might be made from it, have been considered, even
by some ministers, as a very great resource, which might, at some time or
another, be applied to the exigencies of the state. Government, it has been
said, by taking the management of the turnpikes into its own hands, and by
employing the soldiers, who would work for a very small addition to their pay,
could keep the roads in good order, at a much less expense than it can be done
by trustees, who have no other workmen to employ, but such as derive their
whole subsistence from their wages. A great revenue, half a million, perhaps
{Since publishing the two first editions of this book, I have got good reasons
to believe that all the turnpike tolls levied in Great Britain do not produce a
neat revenue that amounts to half a million; a sum which, under the management
of government, would not be sufficient to keep in repair five of the principal
roads in the kingdom}, it has been pretended, might in this manner be gained,
without laying any new burden upon the people; and the turnpike roads might be
made to contribute to the general expense of the state, in the same manner as
the post-office does at present.

That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no doubt,
though probably not near so much as the projectors of this plan have supposed.
The plan itself, however, seems liable to several very important objections.

First, If the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be considered
as one of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the state, they would
certainly be augmented as those exigencies were supposed to require. According
to the policy of Great Britain, therefore, they would probably he augmented
very fast. The facility with which a great revenue could be drawn from them,
would probably encourage administration to recur very frequently te this
resource. Though it may, perhaps, be more than doubtful whether half a million
could by any economy be saved out of the present tolls, it can scarcely be
doubted, but that a million might be saved out of them, if they were doubled;
and perhaps two millions, if they were tripled {I have now good reason to
believe that all these conjectural sums are by much too large.}. This great
revenue, too, might be levied without the appointment of a single new officer
to collect and receive it. But the turnpike tolls, being continually augmented
in this manner, instead of facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as
at present, would soon become a very great incumbrance upon it. The expense of
transporting all heavy goods from one part of the country to another, would
soon be so much increased, the market for all such goods, consequently, would
soon be so much narrowed, that their production would be in a great measure
discouraged, and the most important branches of the domestic industry of the
country annihilated altogether.

Secondly, A tax upon carriages, in proportion to their weight, though a very
equal tax when applied to the sole purpose of repairing the roads, is a very
unequal one when applied to any other purpose, or to supply the common
exigencies of the state. When it is applied to the sole purpose above
mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the wear and tear which
that carriage occasions of the roads. But when it is applied to any other
purpose, each carriage is supposed to pay for more than that wear and tear, and
contributes to the supply of some other exigency of the state. But as the
turnpike toll raises the price of goods in proportion to their weight and not
to their value, it is chiefly paid by the consumers of coarse and bulky, not by
those of precious and light commodities. Whatever exigency of the state,
therefore, this tax might be intended to supply, that exigency would be chiefly
supplied at the expense of the poor, not of the rich; at the expense of those
who are least able to supply it, not of those who are most able.

Thirdly, If government should at any time neglect the reparation of the
high-roads, it would be still more difficult, than it is at present, to compel
the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue might
thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being applied to the
only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be applied.
If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of turnpike roads render it
sometimes difficult, at present, to oblige them to repair their wrong; their
wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case which is
here supposed.

In France, the funds destined for the reparation of the high-roads are under
the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist, partly in
a certain number of days labour, which the country people are in most parts of
Europe obliged to give to the reparation of the highways; and partly in such a
portion of the general revenue of the state as the king chooses to spare from
his other expenses.

By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of Europe,
the labour of the country people was under the direction of a local or
provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the king’s
council. But, by the present practice, both the labour of the country people,
and whatever other fund the king may choose to assign for the reparation of the
high-roads in any particular province or generality, are entirely under the
management of the intendant; an officer who is appointed and removed by the
king’s council who receives his orders from it, and is in constant
correspondence with it. In the progress of despotism, the authority of the
executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in the state, and
assumes to itself the management of every branch of revenue which is destined
for any public purpose. In France, however, the great post-roads, the roads
which make the communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in
general kept in good order; and, in some provinces, are even a good deal
superior to the greater part of the turnpike roads of England. But what we call
the cross roads, that is, the far greater part of the roads in the country, are
entirely neglected, and are in many places absolutely impassable for any heavy
carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to travel on horseback, and mules
are the only conveyance which can safely be trusted. The proud minister of an
ostentatious court, may frequently take pleasure in executing a work of
splendour and magnificence, such as a great highway, which is frequently seen
by the principal nobility, whose applauses not only flatter his vanity, but
even contribute to support his interest at court. But to execute a great number
of little works, in which nothing that can be done can make any great
appearance, or excite the smallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and
which, in short, have nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a
business which appears, in every respect, too mean and paltry to merit the
attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an administration therefore,
such works are almost always entirely neglected.

In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power charges
itself both with the reparation of the high-roads, and with the maintenance of
the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to the governor of
each province, those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him,
and the judgment which the court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by
the attention which he appears to have paid to this part of his instructions.
This branch of public police, accordingly, is said to be very much attended to
in all those countries, but particularly in China, where the high-roads, and
still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing
of the same kind which is known in Europe. The accounts of those works,
however, which have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by
weak and wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If
they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts of them
had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not, perhaps, appear
to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of some works of this kind
in Indostan, falls very short of what had been reported of them by other
travellers, more disposed to the marvellous than he was. It may too, perhaps,
be in those countries, as it is in France, where the great roads, the great
communications, which are likely to be the subjects of conversation at the
court and in the capital, are attended to, and all the rest neglected. In
China, besides, in Indostan, and in several other governments of Asia, the
revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land tax or land rent,
which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce of the land.
The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such
countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the
land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But
in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it
is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and
consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive
communication between all the different parts of the country; which can be done
only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But the revenue
of the sovereign does not, in any part of Europe, arise chiefly from a land tax
or land rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the greater part of
it may ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: but that dependency is
neither so immediate nor so evident. In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does
not feel himself so directly called upon to promote the increase, both in
quantity and value of the produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads
and canals, to provide the most extensive market for that produce. Though it
should be true, therefore, what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in
some parts of Asia this department of the public police is very properly
managed by the executive power, there is not the least probability that, during
the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any
part of Europe.

Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any
revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly
confined to some particular place or district, are always better maintained by
a local or provincial revenue, under the management of a local and provincial
administration, than by the general revenue of the state, of which the
executive power must always have the management. Were the streets of London to
be lighted and paved at the expense of the treasury, is there any probability
that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at
so small an expense? The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local
tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district in
London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the
state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of
the kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no sort of benefit from the
lighting and paving of the streets of London.

The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial administration
of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever they may appear, are in
reality, however, almost always very trifling in comparison of those which
commonly take place in the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a
great empire. They are, besides, much more easily corrected. Under the local or
provincial administration of the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the
six days labour which the country people are obliged to give to the reparation
of the highways, is not always, perhaps, very judiciously applied, but it is
scarce ever exacted with any circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In France,
under the administration of the intendants, the application is not always more
judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such
corvees, as they are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny
by which those officers chastise any parish or communeaute, which has had the
misfortune to fall under their displeasure.

Of the public Works and Institution which are necessary for facilitating
particular Branches of Commerce.

The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned, is to
facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some particular
branches of it, particular institutions are necessary, which again require a
particular and extraordinary expense.

Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with barbarous and
uncivilized nations, require extraordinary protection. An ordinary store or
counting-house could give little security to the goods of the merchants who
trade to the western coast of Africa. To defend them from the barbarous
natives, it is necessary that the place where they are deposited should be in
some measure fortified. The disorders in the government of Indostan have been
supposed to render a like precaution necessary, even among that mild and gentle
people; and it was under pretence of securing their persons and property from
violence, that both the English and French East India companies were allowed to
erect the first forts which they possessed in that country. Among other
nations, whose vigorous government will suffer no strangers to possess any
fortified place within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain some
ambassador, minister, or consul, who may both decide, according to their own
customs, the differences arising among his own countrymen, and, in their
disputes with the natives, may by means of his public character, interfere with
more authority and afford them a more powerful protection than they could
expect from any private man. The interests of commerce have frequently made it
necessary to maintain ministers in foreign countries, where the purposes either
of war or alliance would not have required any. The commerce of the Turkey
company first occasioned the establishment of an ordinary ambassador at
Constantinople. The first English embassies to Russia arose altogether from
commercial interests. The constant interference with those interests,
necessarily occasioned between the subjects of the different states of Europe,
has probably introduced the custom of keeping, in all neighbouring countries,
ambassadors or ministers constantly resident, even in the time of peace. This
custom, unknown to ancient times, seems not to be older than the end of the
fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century; that is, than the time when
commerce first began to extend itself to the greater part of the nations of
Europe, and when they first began to attend to its interests.

It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expense which the protection
of any particular branch of commerce may occasion, should be defrayed by a
moderate tax upon that particular branch; by a moderate fine, for example, to
be paid by the traders when they first enter into it; or, what is more equal,
by a particular duty of so much per cent. upon the goods which they either
import into, or export out of, the particular countries with which it is
carried on. The protection of trade, in general, from pirates and freebooters,
is said to have given occasion to the first institution of the duties of
customs. But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in
order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general, it should seem
equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a particular branch of trade,
in order to defray the extraordinary expense of protecting that branch.

The protection of trade, in general, has always been considered as essential to
the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that account, a necessary part of
the duty of the executive power. The collection and application of the general
duties of customs, therefore, have always been left to that power. But the
protection of any particular branch of trade is a part of the general
protection of trade; a part, therefore, of the duty of that power; and if
nations always acted consistently, the particular duties levied for the
purposes of such particular protection, should always have been left equally to
its disposal. But in this respect, as well as in many others, nations have not
always acted consistently; and in the greater part of the commercial states of
Europe, particular companies of merchants have had the address to persuade the
legislature to entrust to them the performance of this part of the duty of the
sovereign, together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with
it.

These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful for the first
introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at their own expense, an
experiment which the state might not think it prudent to make, have in the
long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless, and have either
mismanaged or confined the trade.

When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged to admit
any person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain fine, and agreeing to
submit to the regulations of the company, each member trading upon his own
stock, and at his own risk, they are called regulated companies. When they
trade upon a joint stock, each member sharing in the common profit or loss, in
proportion to his share in this stock, they are called joint-stock companies.
Such companies, whether regulated or joint-stock, sometimes have, and sometimes
have not, exclusive privileges.

Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the corporation of trades, so
common in the cities and towns of all the different countries of Europe; and
are a sort of enlarged monopolies of the same kind. As no inhabitant of a town
can exercise an incorporated trade, without first obtaining his freedom in the
incorporation, so, in most cases, no subject of the state can lawfully carry on
any branch of foreign trade, for which a regulated company is established,
without first becoming a member of that company. The monopoly is more or less
strict, according as the terms of admission are more or less difficult, and
according as the directors of the company have more or less authority, or have
it more or less in their power to manage in such a manner as to confine the
greater part of the trade to themselves and their particular friends. In the
most ancient regulated companies, the privileges of apprenticeship were the
same as in other corporations, and entitled the person who had served his time
to a member of the company, to become himself a member, either without paying
any fine, or upon paying a much smaller one than what was exacted of other
people. The usual corporation spirit, wherever the law does not restrain it,
prevails in all regulated companies. When they have been allowed to act
according to their natural genius, they have always, in order to confine the
competition to as small a number of persons as possible, endeavoured to subject
the trade to many burdensome regulations. When the law has restrained them from
doing this, they have become altogether useless and insignificant.

The regulated companies for foreign commerce which at present subsist in Great
Britain, are the ancient merchant-adventurers company, now commonly called the
Hamburgh company, the Russia company, the Eastland company, the Turkey company,
and the African company.

The terms of admission into the Hamburgh company are now said to be quite easy;
and the directors either have it not in their power to subject the trade to any
troublesome restraint or regulations, or, at least, have not of late exercised
that power. It has not always been so. About the middle of the last century,
the fine for admission was fifty, and at one time one hundred pounds, and the
conduct of the company was said to be extremely oppressive. In 1643, in 1645,
and in 1661, the clothiers and free traders of the west of England complained
of them to parliament, as of monopolists, who confined the trade, and oppressed
the manufactures of the country. Though those complaints produced no act of
parliament, they had probably intimidated the company so far, as to oblige them
to reform their conduct. Since that time, at least, there have been no
complaints against them. By the 10th and 11th of William III. c.6, the fine for
admission into the Russia company was reduced to five pounds; and by the 25th
of Charles II. c.7, that for admission into the Eastland company to forty
shillings; while, at the same time, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, all the
countries on the north side of the Baltic, were exempted from their exclusive
charter. The conduct of those companies had probably given occasion to those
two acts of parliament. Before that time, Sir Josiah Child had represented both
these and the Hamburgh company as extremely oppressive, and imputed to their
bad management the low state of the trade, which we at that time carried on to
the countries comprehended within their respective charters. But though such
companies may not, in the present times, be very oppressive, they are certainly
altogether useless. To be merely useless, indeed, is perhaps, the highest
eulogy which can ever justly be bestowed upon a regulated company; and all the
three companies above mentioned seem, in their present state, to deserve this
eulogy.

The fine for admission into the Turkey company was formerly twenty-five pounds
for all persons under twenty-six years of age, and fifty pounds for all persons
above that age. Nobody but mere merchants could be admitted; a restriction
which excluded all shop-keepers and retailers. By a bye-law, no British
manufactures could be exported to Turkey but in the general ships of the
company; and as those ships sailed always from the port of London, this
restriction confined the trade to that expensive port, and the traders to those
who lived in London and in its neighbourhood. By another bye-law, no person
living within twenty miles of London, and not free of the city, could be
admitted a member; another restriction which, joined to the foregoing,
necessarily excluded all but the freemen of London. As the time for the loading
and sailing of those general ships depended altogether upon the directors, they
could easily fill them with their own goods, and those of their particular
friends, to the exclusion of others, who, they might pretend, had made their
proposals too late. In this state of things, therefore, this company was, in
every respect, a strict and oppressive monopoly. Those abuses gave occasion to
the act of the 26th of George II. c. 18, reducing the fine for admission to
twenty pounds for all persons, without any distinction of ages, or any
restriction, either to mere merchants, or to the freemen of London; and
granting to all such persons the liberty of exporting, from all the ports of
Great Britain, to any port in Turkey, all British goods, of which the
exportation was not prohibited, upon paying both the general duties of customs,
and the particular duties assessed for defraying the necessary expenses of the
company; and submitting, at the same time, to the lawful authority of the
British ambassador and consuls resident in Turkey, and to the bye-laws of the
company duly enacted. To prevent any oppression by those bye-laws, it was by
the same act ordained, that if any seven members of the company conceived
themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which should be enacted after the passing
of this act, they might appeal to the board of trade and plantations (to the
authority of which a committee of the privy council has now succeeded),
provided such appeal was brought within twelve months after the bye-law was
enacted; and that, if any seven members conceived themselves aggrieved by any
bye-law which had been enacted before the passing of this act, they might bring
a like appeal, provided it was within twelve months after the day on which this
act was to take place. The experience of one year, however, may not always be
sufficient to discover to all the members of a great company the pernicious
tendency of a particular bye-law; and if several of them should afterwards
discover it, neither the board of trade, nor the committee of council, can
afford them any redress. The object, besides, of the greater part of the
bye-laws of all regulated companies, as well as of all other corporations, is
not so much to oppress those who are already members, as to discourage others
from becoming so; which may be done, not only by a high fine, but by many other
contrivances. The constant view of such companies is always to raise the rate
of their own profit as high as they can; to keep the market, both for the goods
which they export, and for those which they import, as much understocked as
they can; which can be done only by restraining the competition, or by
discouraging new adventurers from entering into the trade. A fine, even of
twenty pounds, besides, though it may not, perhaps, be sufficient to discourage
any man from entering into the Turkey trade, with an intention to continue in
it, may be enough to discourage a speculative merchant from hazarding a single
adventure in it. In all trades, the regular established traders, even though
not incorporated, naturally combine to raise profits, which are noway so likely
to be kept, at all times, down to their proper level, as by the occasional
competition of speculative adventurers. The Turkey trade, though in some
measure laid open by this act of parliament, is still considered by many people
as very far from being altogether free. The Turkey company contribute to
maintain an ambassador and two or three consuls, who, like other public
ministers, ought to be maintained altogether by the state, and the trade laid
open to all his majesty’s subjects. The different taxes levied by the
company, for this and other corporation purposes, might afford a revenue much
more than sufficient to enable a state to maintain such ministers.

Regulated companies, it was observed by Sir Josiah Child, though they had
frequently supported public ministers, had never maintained any forts or
garrisons in the countries to which they traded; whereas joint-stock companies
frequently had. And, in reality, the former seem to be much more unfit for this
sort of service than the latter. First, the directors of a regulated company
have no particular interest in the prosperity of the general trade of the
company, for the sake of which such forts and garrisons are maintained. The
decay of that general trade may even frequently contribute to the advantage of
their own private trade; as, by diminishing the number of their competitors, it
may enable them both to buy cheaper, and to sell dearer. The directors of a
joint-stock company, on the contrary, having only their share in the profits
which are made upon the common stock committed to their management, have no
private trade of their own, of which the interest can be separated from that of
the general trade of the company. Their private interest is connected with the
prosperity of the general trade of the company, and with the maintenance of the
forts and garrisons which are necessary for its defence. They are more likely,
therefore, to have that continual and careful attention which that maintenance
necessarily requires. Secondly, The directors of a joint-stock company have
always the management of a large capital, the joint stock of the company, a
part of which they may frequently employ, with propriety, in building,
repairing, and maintaining such necessary forts and garrisons. But the
directors of a regulated company, having the management of no common capital,
have no other fund to employ in this way, but the casual revenue arising from
the admission fines, and from the corporation duties imposed upon the trade of
the company. Though they had the same interest, therefore, to attend to the
maintenance of such forts and garrisons, they can seldom have the same ability
to render that attention effectual. The maintenance of a public minister,
requiring scarce any attention, and but a moderate and limited expense, is a
business much more suitable both to the temper and abilities of a regulated
company.

Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, however, in 1750, a regulated company
was established, the present company of merchants trading to Africa; which was
expressly charged at first with the maintenance of all the British forts and
garrisons that lie between Cape Blanc and the Cape of Good Hope, and afterwards
with that of those only which lie between Cape Rouge and the Cape of Good Hope.
The act which establishes this company (the 23rd of George II. c.51 ), seems to
have had two distinct objects in view; first, to restrain effectually the
oppressive and monopolizing spirit which is natural to the directors of a
regulated company; and, secondly, to force them, as much as possible, to give
an attention, which is not natural to them, towards the maintenance of forts
and garrisons.

For the first of these purposes, the fine for admission is limited to forty
shillings. The company is prohibited from trading in their corporate capacity,
or upon a joint stock; from borrowing money upon common seal, or from laying
any restraints upon the trade, which may be carried on freely from all places,
and by all persons being British subjects, and paying the fine. The government
is in a committee of nine persons, who meet at London, but who are chosen
annually by the freemen of the company at London, Bristol, and Liverpool; three
from each place. No committeeman can be continued in office for more than three
years together. Any committee-man might be removed by the board of trade and
plantations, now by a committee of council, after being heard in his own
defence. The committee are forbid to export negroes from Africa, or to import
any African goods into Great Britain. But as they are charged with the
maintenance of forts and garrisons, they may, for that purpose export from
Great Britain to Africa goods and stores of different kinds. Out of the moneys
which they shall receive from the company, they are allowed a sum, not
exceeding eight hundred pounds, for the salaries of their clerks and agents at
London, Bristol, and Liverpool, the house-rent of their offices at London, and
all other expenses of management, commission, and agency, in England. What
remains of this sum, after defraying these different expenses, they may divide
among themselves, as compensation for their trouble, in what manner they think
proper. By this constitution, it might have been expected, that the spirit of
monopoly would have been effectually restrained, and the first of these
purposes sufficiently answered. It would seem, however, that it had not. Though
by the 4th of George III. c.20, the fort of Senegal, with all its dependencies,
had been invested in the company of merchants trading to Africa, yet, in the
year following (by the 5th of George III. c.44), not only Senegal and its
dependencies, but the whole coast, from the port of Sallee, in South Barbary,
to Cape Rouge, was exempted from the jurisdiction of that company, was vested
in the crown, and the trade to it declared free to all his majesty’s
subjects. The company had been suspected of restraining the trade and of
establishing some sort of improper monopoly. It is not, however, very easy to
conceive how, under the regulations of the 23d George II. they could do so. In
the printed debates of the house of commons, not always the most authentic
records of truth, I observe, however, that they have been accused of this. The
members of the committee of nine being all merchants, and the governors and
factors in their different forts and settlements being all dependent upon them,
it is not unlikely that the latter might have given peculiar attention to the
consignments and commissions of the former, which would establish a real
monopoly.

For the second of these purposes, the maintenance of the forts and garrisons,
an annual sum has been allotted to them by parliament, generally about £13,000.
For the proper application of this sum, the committee is obliged to account
annually to the cursitor baron of exchequer; which account is afterwards to be
laid before parliament. But parliament, which gives so little attention to the
application of millions, is not likely to give much to that of £13,000 a-year;
and the cursitor baron of exchequer, from his profession and education, is not
likely to be profoundly skilled in the proper expense of forts and garrisons.
The captains of his majesty’s navy, indeed, or any other commissioned
officers, appointed by the board of admiralty, may inquire into the condition
of the forts and garrisons, and report their observations to that board. But
that board seems to have no direct jurisdiction over the committee, nor any
authority to correct those whose conduct it may thus inquire into; and the
captains of his majesty’s navy, besides, are not supposed to be always
deeply learned in the science of fortification. Removal from an office, which
can be enjoyed only for the term of three years, and of which the lawful
emoluments, even during that term, are so very small, seems to be the utmost
punishment to which any committee-man is liable, for any fault, except direct
malversation, or embezzlement, either of the public money, or of that of the
company; and the fear of the punishment can never be a motive of sufficient
weight to force a continual and careful attention to a business to which he has
no other interest to attend. The committee are accused of having sent out
bricks and stones from England for the reparation of Cape Coast Castle, on the
coast of Guinea; a business for which parliament had several times granted an
extraordinary sum of money. These bricks and stones, too, which had thus been
sent upon so long a voyage, were said to have been of so bad a quality, that it
was necessary to rebuild, from the foundation, the walls which had been
repaired with them. The forts and garrisons which lie north of Cape Rouge, are
not only maintained at the expense of the state, but are under the immediate
government of the executive power; and why those which lie south of that cape,
and which, too, are, in part at least, maintained at the expense of the state,
should be under a different government, it seems not very easy even to imagine
a good reason. The protection of the Mediterranean trade was the original
purpose or pretence of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca; and the
maintenance and government of those garrisons have always been, very properly,
committed, not to the Turkey company, but to the executive power. In the extent
of its dominion consists, in a great measure, the pride and dignity of that
power; and it is not very likely to fail in attention to what is necessary for
the defence of that dominion. The garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca,
accordingly, have never been neglected. Though Minorca has been twice taken,
and is now probably lost for ever, that disaster has never been imputed to any
neglect in the executive power. I would not, however, be understood to
insinuate, that either of those expensive garrisons was ever, even in the
smallest degree, necessary for the purpose for which they were originally
dismembered from the Spanish monarchy. That dismemberment, perhaps, never
served any other real purpose than to alienate from England her natural ally
the king of Spain, and to unite the two principal branches of the house of
Bourbon in a much stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood
could ever have united them.

Joint-stock companies, established either by royal charter, or by act of
parliament, are different in several respects, not only from regulated
companies, but from private copartneries.

First, In a private copartnery, no partner without the consent of the company,
can transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new member into the
company. Each member, however, may, upon proper warning, withdraw from the
copartnery, and demand payment from them of his share of the common stock. In a
joint-stock company, on the contrary, no member can demand payment of his share
from the company; but each member can, without their consent, transfer his
share to another person, and thereby introduce a new member. The value of a
share in a joint stock is always the price which it will bring in the market;
and this may be either greater or less in any proportion, than the sum which
its owner stands credited for in the stock of the company.

Secondly, In a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the debts
contracted by the company, to the whole extent of his fortune. In a joint-stock
company, on the contrary, each partner is bound only to the extent of his
share.

The trade of a joint-stock company is always managed by a court of directors.
This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of
a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of these proprietors
seldom pretend to understand any thing of the business of the company; and when
the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them, give themselves no
trouble about it, but receive contentedly such halfyearly or yearly dividend as
the directors think proper to make to them. This total exemption front trouble
and front risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people to become
adventurers in joint-stock companies, who would, upon no account, hazard their
fortunes in any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly draw to
themselves much greater stocks, than any private copartnery can boast of. The
trading stock of the South Sea company at one time amounted to upwards of
thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds. The divided capital of the
Bank of England amounts, at present, to ten millions seven hundred and eighty
thousand pounds. The directors of such companies, however, being the managers
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.
Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small
matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves
a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. It
is upon this account, that joint-stock companies for foreign trade have seldom
been able to maintain the competition against private adventurers. They have,
accordingly, very seldom succeeded without an exclusive privilege; and
frequently have not succeeded with one. Without an exclusive privilege, they
have commonly mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege, they have both
mismanaged and confined it.

The Royal African company, the predecessors of the present African company, had
an exclusive privilege by charter; but as that charter had not been confirmed
by act of parliament, the trade, in consequence of the declaration of rights,
was, soon after the Revolution, laid open to all his majesty’s subjects.
The Hudson’s Bay company are, as to their legal rights, in the same
situation as the Royal African company. Their exclusive charter has not been
confirmed by act of parliament. The South Sea company, as long as they
continued to be a trading company, had an exclusive privilege confirmed by act
of parliament; as have likewise the present united company of merchants trading
to the East Indies.

The Royal African company soon found that they could not maintain the
competition against private adventurers, whom, notwithstanding the declaration
of rights, they continued for some time to call interlopers, and to persecute
as such. In 1698, however, the private adventurers were subjected to a duty of
ten per cent. upon almost all the different branches of their trade, to be
employed by the company in the maintenance of their forts and garrisons. But,
notwithstanding this heavy tax, the company were still unable to maintain the
competition. Their stock and credit gradually declined. In 1712, their debts
had become so great, that a particular act of parliament was thought necessary,
both for their security and for that of their creditors. It was enacted, that
the resolution of two-thirds of these creditors in number and value should bind
the rust, both with regard to the time which should be allowed to the company
for the payment of their debts, and with regard to any other agreement which it
might be thought proper to make with them concerning those debts. In 1730,
their affairs were in so great disorder, that they were altogether incapable of
maintaining their forts and garrisons, the sole purpose and pretext of their
institution. From that year till their final dissolution, the parliament judged
it necessary to allow the annual sum of £10,000 for that purpose. In 1732,
after having been for many years losers by the trade of carrying negroes to the
West Indies, they at last resolved to give it up altogether; to sell to the
private traders to America the negroes which they purchased upon the coast; and
to employ their servants in a trade to the inland parts of Africa for gold
dust, elephants teeth, dyeing drugs, etc. But their success in this more
confined trade was not greater than in their former extensive one. Their
affairs continued to go gradually to decline, till at last, being in every
respect a bankrupt company, they were dissolved by act of parliament, and their
forts and garrisons vested in the present regulated company of merchants
trading to Africa. Before the erection of the Royal African company, there had
been three other joint-stock companies successively established, one after
another, for the African trade. They were all equally unsuccessful. They all,
however, had exclusive charters, which, though not confirmed by act of
parliament, were in those days supposed to convey a real exclusive privilege.

The Hudson’s Bay company, before their misfortunes in the late war, had
been much more fortunate than the Royal African company. Their necessary
expense is much smaller. The whole number of people whom they maintain in their
different settlements and habitations, which they have honoured with the name
of forts, is said not to exceed a hundred and twenty persons. This number,
however, is sufficient to prepare beforehand the cargo of furs and other goods
necessary for loading their ships, which, on account of the ice, can seldom
remain above six or eight weeks in those seas. This advantage of having a cargo
ready prepared, could not, for several years, be acquired by private
adventurers; and without it there seems to be no possibility of trading to
Hudson’s Bay. The moderate capital of the company, which, it is said,
does not exceed one hundred and ten thousand pounds, may, besides, be
sufficient to enable them to engross the whole, or almost the whole trade and
surplus produce, of the miserable though extensive country comprehended within
their charter. No private adventurers, accordingly, have ever attempted to
trade to that country in competition with them. This company, therefore, have
always enjoyed an exclusive trade, in fact, though they may have no right to it
in law. Over and above all this, the moderate capital of this company is said
to be divided among a very small number of proprietors. But a joint-stock
company, consisting of a small number of proprietors, with a moderate capital,
approaches very nearly to the nature of a private copartnery, and may be
capable of nearly the same degree of vigilance and attention. It is not to be
wondered at, therefore, if, in consequence of these different advantages, the
Hudson’s Bay company had, before the late war, been able to carry on
their trade with a considerable degree of success. It does not seem probable,
however, that their profits ever approached to what the late Mr Dobbs imagined
them. A much more sober and judicious writer, Mr Anderson, author of the
Historical and Chronological Deduction of Commerce, very justly observes, that
upon examining the accounts which Mr Dobbs himself has given for several years
together, of their exports and imports, and upon making proper allowances for
their extraordinary risk and expense, it does not appear that their profits
deserve to be envied, or that they can much, if at all, exceed the ordinary
profits of trade.

The South Sea company never had any forts or garrisons to maintain, and
therefore were entirely exempted from one great expense, to which other
joint-stock companies for foreign trade are subject; but they had an immense
capital divided among an immense number of proprietors. It was naturally to be
expected, therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion, should prevail in
the whole management of their affairs. The knavery and extravagance of their
stock-jobbing projects are sufficiently known, and the explication of them
would be foreign to the present subject. Their mercantile projects were not
much better conducted. The first trade which they engaged in, was that of
supplying the Spanish West Indies with negroes, of which (in consequence of
what was called the Assiento Contract granted them by the treaty of Utrecht)
they had the exclusive privilege. But as it was not expected that much profit
could be made by this trade, both the Portuguese and French companies, who had
enjoyed it upon the same terms before them, having been ruined by it, they were
allowed, as compensation, to send annually a ship of a certain burden, to trade
directly to the Spanish West Indies. Of the ten voyages which this annual ship
was allowed to make, they are said to have gained considerably by one, that of
the Royal Caroline, in 1731; and to have been losers, more or less, by almost
all the rest. Their ill success was imputed, by their factors and agents, to
the extortion and oppression of the Spanish government; but was, perhaps,
principally owing to the profusion and depredations of those very factors and
agents; some of whom are said to have acquired great fortunes, even in one
year. In 1734, the company petitioned the king, that they might be allowed to
dispose of the trade and tonnage of their annual ship, on account of the little
profit which they made by it, and to accept of such equivalent as they could
obtain from the king of Spain.

In 1724, this company had undertaken the whale fishery. Of this, indeed, they
had no monopoly; but as long as they carried it on, no other British subjects
appear to have engaged in it. Of the eight voyages which their ships made to
Greenland, they were gainers by one, and losers by all the rest. After their
eighth and last voyage, when they had sold their ships, stores, and utensils,
they found that their whole loss upon this branch, capital and interest
included, amounted to upwards of £237,000.

In 1722, this company petitioned the parliament to be allowed to divide their
immense capital of more than thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand
pounds, the whole of which had been lent to government, into two equal parts;
the one half, or upwards of £16,900,000, to be put upon the same footing with
other government annuities, and not to be subject to the debts contracted, or
losses incurred, by the directors of the company, in the prosecution of their
mercantile projects; the other half to remain as before, a trading stock, and
to be subject to those debts and losses. The petition was too reasonable not to
be granted. In 1733, they again petitioned the parliament, that three-fourths
of their trading stock might be turned into annuity stock, and only one-fourth
remain as trading stock, or exposed to the hazards arising from the bad
management of their directors. Both their annuity and trading stocks had, by
this time, been reduced more than two millions each, by several different
payments from government; so that this fourth amounted only to £3,662,784:8:6.
In 1748, all the demands of the company upon the king of Spain, in consequence
of the assiento contract, were, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, given up for
what was supposed an equivalent. An end was put to their trade with the Spanish
West Indies; the remainder of their trading stock was turned into an annuity
stock; and the company ceased, in every respect, to be a trading company.

It ought to be observed, that in the trade which the South Sea company carried
on by means of their annual ship, the only trade by which it ever was expected
that they could make any considerable profit, they were not without
competitors, either in the foreign or in the home market. At Carthagena, Porto
Bello, and La Vera Cruz, they had to encounter the competition of the Spanish
merchants, who brought from Cadiz to those markets European goods, of the same
kind with the outward cargo of their ship; and in England they had to encounter
that of the English merchants, who imported from Cadiz goods of the Spanish
West Indies, of the same kind with the inward cargo. The goods, both of the
Spanish and English merchants, indeed, were, perhaps, subject to higher duties.
But the loss occasioned by the negligence, profusion, and malversation of the
servants of the company, had probably been a tax much heavier than all those
duties. That a joint-stock company should be able to carry on successfully any
branch of foreign trade, when private adventurers can come into any sort of
open and fair competition with them, seems contrary to all experience.

The old English East India company was established in 1600, by a charter from
Queen Elizabeth. In the first twelve voyages which they fitted out for India,
they appear to have traded as a regulated company, with separate stocks, though
only in the general ships of the company. In 1612, they united into a joint
stock. Their charter was exclusive, and, though not confirmed by act of
parliament, was in those days supposed to convey a real exclusive privilege.
For many years, therefore, they were not much disturbed by interlopers. Their
capital, which never exceeded £744,000, and of which £50 was a share, was not
so exorbitant, nor their dealings so extensive, as to afford either a pretext
for gross negligence and profusion, or a cover to gross malversation.
Notwithstanding some extraordinary losses, occasioned partly by the malice of
the Dutch East India company, and partly by other accidents, they carried on
for many years a successful trade. But in process of time, when the principles
of liberty were better understood, it became every day more and more doubtful,
how far a royal charter, not confirmed by act of parliament, could convey an
exclusive privilege. Upon this question the decisions of the courts of justice
were not uniform, but varied with the authority of government, and the humours
of the times. Interlopers multiplied upon them; and towards the end of the
reign of Charles II., through the whole of that of James II., and during a part
of that of William III., reduced them to great distress. In 1698, a proposal
was made to parliament, of advancing two millions to government, at eight per
cent. provided the subscribers were erected into a new East India company, with
exclusive privileges. The old East India company offered seven hundred thousand
pounds, nearly the amount of their capital, at four per cent. upon the same
conditions. But such was at that time the state of public credit, that it was
more convenient for government to borrow two millions at eight per cent. than
seven hundred thousand pounds at four. The proposal of the new subscribers was
accepted, and a new East India company established in consequence. The old East
India company, however, had a right to continue their trade till 1701. They
had, at the same time, in the name of their treasurer, subscribed very artfully
three hundred and fifteen thousand pounds into the stock of the new. By a
negligence in the expression of the act of parliament, which vested the East
India trade in the subscribers to this loan of two millions, it did not appear
evident that they were all obliged to unite into a joint stock. A few private
traders, whose subscriptions amounted only to seven thousand two hundred
pounds, insisted upon the privilege of trading separately upon their own
stocks, and at their own risks. The old East India company had a right to a
separate trade upon their own stock till 1701; and they had likewise, both
before and after that period, a right, like that or other private traders, to a
separate trade upon the £315,000, which they had subscribed into the stock of
the new company. The competition of the two companies with the private traders,
and with one another, is said to have well nigh ruined both. Upon a subsequent
occasion, in 1750, when a proposal was made to parliament for putting the trade
under the management of a regulated company, and thereby laying it in some
measure open, the East India company, in opposition to this proposal,
represented, in very strong terms, what had been, at this time, the miserable
effects, as they thought them, of this competition. In India, they said, it
raised the price of goods so high, that they were not worth the buying; and in
England, by overstocking the market, it sunk their price so low, that no profit
could be made by them. That by a more plentiful supply, to the great advantage
and conveniency of the public, it must have reduced very much the price of
India goods in the English market, cannot well be doubted; but that it should
have raised very much their price in the Indian market, seems not very
probable, as all the extraordinary demand which that competition could occasion
must have been but as a drop of water in the immense ocean of Indian commerce.
The increase of demand, besides, though in the beginning it may sometimes raise
the price of goods, never fails to lower it in the long-run. It encourages
production, and thereby increases the competition of the producers, who, in
order to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions or labour and
new improvements of art, which might never otherwise have been thought of. The
miserable effects of which the company complained, were the cheapness of
consumption, and the encouragement given to production; precisely the two
effects which it is the great business of political economy to promote. The
competition, however, of which they gave this doleful account, had not been
allowed to be of long continuance. In 1702, the two companies were, in some
measure, united by an indenture tripartite, to which the queen was the third
party; and in 1708, they were by act of parliament, perfectly consolidated into
one company, by their present name of the United Company of Merchants trading
to the East Indies. Into this act it was thought worth while to insert a
clause, allowing the separate traders to continue their trade till Michaelmas
1711; but at the same time empowering the directors, upon three years notice,
to redeem their little capital of seven thousand two hundred pounds, and
thereby to convert the whole stock of the company into a joint stock. By the
same act, the capital of the company, in consequence of a new loan to
government, was augmented from two millions to three millions two hundred
thousand pounds. In 1743, the company advanced another million to government.
But this million being raised, not by a call upon the proprietors, but by
selling annuities and contracting bond-debts, it did not augment the stock upon
which the proprietors could claim a dividend. It augmented, however, their
trading stock, it being equally liable with the other three millions two
hundred thousand pounds, to the losses sustained, and debts contracted by the
company in prosecution of their mercantile projects. From 1708, or at least
from 1711, this company, being delivered from all competitors, and fully
established in the monopoly of the English commerce to the East Indies, carried
on a successful trade, and from their profits, made annually a moderate
dividend to their proprietors. During the French war, which began in 1741, the
ambition of Mr. Dupleix, the French governor of Pondicherry, involved them in
the wars of the Carnatic, and in the politics of the Indian princes. After many
signal successes, and equally signal losses, they at last lost Madras, at that
time their principal settlement in India. It was restored to them by the treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle; and, about this time the spirit of war and conquest seems
to have taken possession of their servants in India, and never since to have
left them. During the French war, which began in 1755, their arms partook of
the general good fortune of those of Great Britain. They defended Madras, took
Pondicherry, recovered Calcutta, and acquired the revenues of a rich and
extensive territory, amounting, it was then said, to upwards of three millions
a-year. They remained for several years in quiet possession of this revenue;
but in 1767, administration laid claim to their territorial acquisitions, and
the revenue arising from them, as of right belonging to the crown; and the
company, in compensation for this claim, agreed to pay to government £400,000
a-year. They had, before this, gradually augmented their dividend from about
six to ten per cent.; that is, upon their capital of three millions two hundred
thousand pounds, they had increased it by £128,000, or had raised it from one
hundred and ninety-two thousand to three hundred and twenty thousand pounds
a-year. They were attempting about this time to raise it still further, to
twelve and a-half per cent., which would have made their annual payments to
their proprietors equal to what they had agreed to pay annually to government,
or to £400,000 a-year. But during the two years in which their agreement with
government was to take place, they were restrained from any further increase of
dividend by two successive acts of parliament, of which the object was to
enable them to make a speedier progress in the payment of their debts, which
were at this time estimated at upwards of six or seven millions sterling. In
1769, they renewed their agreement with government for five years more, and
stipulated, that during the course of that period, they should be allowed
gradually to increase their dividend to twelve and a-half per cent; never
increasing it, however, more than one per cent. in one year. This increase of
dividend, therefore, when it had risen to its utmost height, could augment
their annual payments, to their proprietors and government together, but by
£680,000, beyond what they had been before their late territorial acquisitions.
What the gross revenue of those territorial acquisitions was supposed to amount
to, has already been mentioned; and by an account brought by the Cruttenden
East Indiaman in 1769, the neat revenue, clear of all deductions and military
charges, was stated at two millions forty-eight thousand seven hundred and
forty-seven pounds. They were said, at the same time, to possess another
revenue, arising partly from lands, but chiefly from the customs established at
their different settlements, amounting to £439,000. The profits of their trade,
too, according to the evidence of their chairman before the house of commons,
amounted, at this time, to at least £400,000 a-year; according to that of their
accountant, to at least £500,000; according to the lowest account, at least
equal to the highest dividend that was to be paid to their proprietors. So
great a revenue might certainly have afforded an augmentation of £680,000 in
their annual payments; and, at the same time, have left a large sinking fund,
sufficient for the speedy reduction of their debt. In 1773, however, their
debts, instead of being reduced, were augmented by an arrear to the treasury in
the payment of the four hundred thousand pounds; by another to the custom-house
for duties unpaid; by a large debt to the bank, for money borrowed; and by a
fourth, for bills drawn upon them from India, and wantonly accepted, to the
amount of upwards of twelve hundred thousand pounds. The distress which these
accumulated claims brought upon them, obliged them not only to reduce all at
once their dividend to six per cent. but to throw themselves upon the mercy of
govermnent, and to supplicate, first, a release from the further payment of the
stipulated £400,000 a-year; and, secondly, a loan of fourteen hundred thousand,
to save them from immediate bankruptcy. The great increase of their fortune
had, it seems, only served to furnish their servants with a pretext for greater
profusion, and a cover for greater malversation, than in proportion even to
that increase of fortune. The conduct of their servants in India, and the
general state of their affairs both in India and in Europe, became the subject
of a parliamentary inquiry: in consequence of which, several very important
alterations were made in the constitution of their government, both at home and
abroad. In India, their principal settlements or Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta,
which had before been altogether independent of one another, were subjected to
a governor-general, assisted by a council of four assessors, parliament
assuming to itself the first nomination of this governor and council, who were
to reside at Calcutta; that city having now become, what Madras was before, the
most important of the English settlements in India. The court of the Mayor of
Calcutta, originally instituted for the trial of mercantile causes, which arose
in the city and neighbourhood, had gradually extended its jurisdiction with the
extension of the empire. It was now reduced and confined to the original
purpose of its institution. Instead of it, a new supreme court of judicature
was established, consisting of a chief justice and three judges, to be
appointed by the crown. In Europe, the qualification necessary to entitle a
proprietor to vote at their general courts was raised, from five hundred
pounds, the original price of a share in the stock of the company, to a
thousand pounds. In order to vote upon this qualification, too, it was declared
necessary, that he should have possessed it, if acquired by his own purchase,
and not by inheritance, for at least one year, instead of six months, the term
requisite before. The court of twenty-four directors had before been chosen
annually; but it was now enacted, that each director should, for the future, be
chosen for four years; six of them, however, to go out of office by rotation
every year, and not be capable of being re-chosen at the election of the six
new directors for the ensuing year. In consequence of these alterations, the
courts, both of the proprietors and directors, it was expected, would be likely
to act with more dignity and steadiness than they had usually done before. But
it seems impossible, by any alterations, to render those courts, in any
respect, fit to govern, or even to share in the government of a great empire;
because the greater part of their members must always have too little interest
in the prosperity of that empire, to give any serious attention to what may
promote it. Frequently a man of great, sometimes even a man of small fortune,
is willing to purchase a thousand pounds share in India stock, merely for the
influence which he expects to aquire by a vote in the court of proprietors. It
gives him a share, though not in the plunder, yet in the appointment of the
plunderers of India; the court of directors, though they make that appointment,
being necessarily more or less under the influence of the proprietors, who not
only elect those directors, but sometimes over-rule the appointments of their
servants in India. Provided he can enjoy this influence for a few years, and
thereby provide for a certain number of his friends, he frequently cares little
about the dividend, or even about the value of the stock upon which his vote is
founded. About the prosperity of the great empire, in the government of which
that vote gives him a share, he seldom cares at all. No other sovereigns ever
were, or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent
about the happiness or misery of their subjects, the improvement or waste of
their dominions, the glory or disgrace of their administration, as, from
irresistible moral causes, the greater part of the proprietors of such a
mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. This indifference, too, was
more likely to be increased than diminished by some of the new regulations
which were made in consequence of the parliamentary inquiry. By a resolution of
the house of commons, for example, it was declared, that when the £1,400,000
lent to the company by government, should be paid, and their bond-debts be
reduced to £1,500,000, they might then, and not till then, divide eight per
cent. upon their capital; and that whatever remained of their revenues and neat
profits at home should be divided into four parts; three of them to be paid
into the exchequer for the use of the public, and the fourth to be reserved as
a fund, either for the further reduction of their bond-debts, or for the
discharge of other contingent exigencies which the company might labour under.
But if the company were bad stewards and bad sovereigns, when the whole of
their neat revenue and profits belonged to themselves, and were at their own
disposal, they were surely not likely to be better when three-fourths of them
were to belong to other people, and the other fourth, though to be laid out for
the benefit of the company, yet to be so under the inspection and with the
approbation of other people.

It might be more agreeable to the company, that their own servants and
dependants should have either the pleasure of wasting, or the profit of
embezzling, whatever surplus might remain, after paying the proposed dividend
of eight per cent. than that it should come into the hands of a set of people
with whom those resolutions could scarce fail to set them in some measure at
variance. The interest of those servants and dependants might so far
predominate in the court of proprietors, as sometimes to dispose it to support
the authors of depredations which had been committed in direct violation of its
own authority. With the majority of proprietors, the support even of the
authority of their own court might sometimes be a matter of less consequence
than the support of those who had set that authority at defiance.

The regulations of 1773, accordingly, did not put an end to the disorder of the
company’s government in India. Notwithstanding that, during a momentary
fit of good conduct, they had at one time collected into the treasury of
Calcutta more than £3,000,000 sterling; notwithstanding that they had
afterwards extended either their dominion or their depredations over a vast
accession of some of the richest and most fertile countries in India, all was
wasted and destroyed. They found themselves altogether unprepared to stop or
resist the incursion of Hyder Ali; and in consequence of those disorders, the
company is now (1784) in greater distress than ever; and, in order to prevent
immediate bankruptcy, is once more reduced to supplicate the assistance of
government. Different plans have been proposed by the different parties in
parliament for the better management of its affairs; and all those plans seem
to agree in supposing, what was indeed always abundantly evident, that it is
altogether unfit to govern its territorial possessions. Even the company itself
seems to be convinced of its own incapacity so far, and seems, upon that
account willing to give them up to government.

With the right of possessing forts and garrisons in distant and barbarous
countries is necessarily connected the right of making peace and war in those
countries. The joint-stock companies, which have had the one right, have
constantly exercised the other, and have frequently had it expressly conferred
upon them. How unjustly, how capriciously, how cruelly, they have commonly
exercised it, is too well known from recent experience.

When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to
establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be
unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint-stock company, and to grant them,
in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of
years. It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense
them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is
afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be
vindicated, upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new
machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But
upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the
forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken
into the hands of government, their value to be paid to the company, and the
trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual
monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very absurdly in two
different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free
trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion
from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for
many of them to carry on. It is for the most worthless of all purposes, too,
that they are taxed in this manner. It is merely to enable the company to
support the negligence, profusion, and malversation of their own servants,
whose disorderly conduct seldom allows the dividend of the company to exceed
the ordinary rate of profit in trades which are altogether free, and very
frequently makes a fall even a good deal short of that rate. Without a
monopoly, however, a joint-stock company, it would appear from experience,
cannot long carry on any branch of foreign trade. To buy in one market, in
order to sell with profit in another, when there are many competitors in both;
to watch over, not only the occasional variations in the demand, but the much
greater and more frequent variations in the competition, or in the supply which
that demand is likely to get from other people; and to suit with dexterity and
judgment both the quantity and quality of each assortment of goods to all these
circumstances, is a species of warfare, of which the operations are continually
changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted successfully, without such an
unremitting exertion of vigilance and attention as cannot long be expected from
the directors of a joint-stock company. The East India company, upon the
redemption of their funds, and the expiration of their exclusive privilege,
have a right, by act of parliament, to continue a corporation with a joint
stock, and to trade in their corporate capacity to the East Indies, in common
with the rest of their fellow subjects. But in this situation, the superior
vigilance and attention of a private adventurer would, in all probability, soon
make them weary of the trade.

An eminent French author, of great knowledge in matters of political economy,
the Abbe Morellet, gives a list of fifty-five joint-stock companies for foreign
trade, which have been established in different parts of Europe since the year
1600, and which, according to him, have all failed from mismanagement,
notwithstanding they had exclusive privileges. He has been misinformed with
regard to the history of two or three of them, which were not joint-stock
companies and have not failed. But, in compensation, there have been several
joint-stock companies which have failed, and which he has omitted.

The only trades which it seems possible for a joint-stock company to carry on
successfully, without an exclusive privilege, are those, of which all the
operations are capable of being reduced to what is called a routine, or to such
a uniformity of method as admits of little or no variation. Of this kind is,
first, the banking trade; secondly, the trade of insurance from fire and from
sea risk, and capture in time of war; thirdly, the trade of making and
maintaining a navigable cut or canal; and, fourthly, the similar trade of
bringing water for the supply of a great city.

Though the principles of the banking trade may appear somewhat abstruse, the
practice is capable of being reduced to strict rules. To depart upon any
occasion from those rules, in consequence of some flattering speculation of
extraordinary gain, is almost always extremely dangerous and frequently fatal
to the banking company which attempts it. But the constitution of joint-stock
companies renders them in general, more tenacious of established rules than any
private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, seem extremely well fitted for
this trade. The principal banking companies in Europe, accordingly, are
joint-stock companies, many of which manage their trade very successfully
without any exclusive privilege. The bank of England has no other exclusive
privilege, except that no other banking company in England shall consist of
more than six persons. The two banks of Edinburgh are joint-stock companies,
without any exclusive privilege.

The value of the risk, either from fire, or from loss by sea, or by capture,
though it cannot, perhaps, be calculated very exactly, admits, however, of such
a gross estimation, as renders it, in some degree, reducible to strict rule and
method. The trade of insurance, therefore, may be carried on successfully by a
joint-stock company, without any exclusive privilege. Neither the London
Assurance, nor the Royal Exchange Assurance companies have any such privilege.

When a navigable cut or canal has been once made, the management of it becomes
quite simple and easy, and it is reducible to strict rule and method. Even the
making of it is so, as it may be contracted for with undertakers, at so much a
mile, and so much a lock. The same thing may be said of a canal, an aqueduct,
or a great pipe for bringing water to supply a great city. Such under-takings,
therefore, may be, and accordingly frequently are, very successfully managed by
joint-stock companies, without any exclusive privilege.

To establish a joint-stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely
because such a company might be capable of managing it successfully; or, to
exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which take
place with regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable
of thriving, if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be reasonable.
To render such an establishment perfectly reasonable, with the circumstance of
being reducible to strict rule and method, two other circumstances ought to
concur. First, it ought to appear with the clearest evidence, that the
undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the greater part of
common trades; and, secondly, that it requires a greater capital than can
easily be collected into a private copartnery. If a moderate capital were
sufficient, the great utility of the undertaking would not be a sufficient
reason for establishing a joint-stock company; because, in this case, the
demand for what it was to produce, would readily and easily be supplied by
private adventurers. In the four trades above mentioned, both those
circumstances concur.

The great and general utility of the banking trade, when prudently managed, has
been fully explained in the second book of this Inquiry. But a public bank,
which is to support public credit, and, upon particular emergencies, to advance
to government the whole produce of a tax, to the amount, perhaps, of several
millions, a year or two before it comes in, requires a greater capital than can
easily be collected into any private copartnery.

The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private people,
and, by dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an individual,
makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society. In order to give this
security, however, it is necessary that the insurers should have a very large
capital. Before the establishment of the two joint-stock companies for
insurance in London, a list, it is said, was laid before the attorney-general,
of one hundred and fifty private usurers, who had failed in the course of a few
years.

That navigable cuts and canals, and the works which are sometimes necessary for
supplying a great city with water, are of great and general utility, while, at
the same time, they frequently require a greater expense than suits the
fortunes of private people, is sufficiently obvious.

Except the four trades above mentioned, I have not been able to recollect any
other, in which all the three circumstances requisite for rendering reasonable
the establishment of a joint-stock company concur. The English copper company
of London, the lead-smelting company, the glass-grinding company, have not even
the pretext of any great or singular utility in the object which they pursue;
nor does the pursuit of that object seem to require any expense unsuitable to
the fortunes of many private men. Whether the trade which those companies carry
on, is reducible to such strict rule and method as to render it fit for the
management of a joint-stock company, or whether they have any reason to boast
of their extraordinary profits, I do not pretend to know. The mine-adventurers
company has been long ago bankrupt. A share in the stock of the British Linen
company of Edinburgh sells, at present, very much below par, though less so
than it did some years ago. The joint-stock companies, which are established
for the public-spirited purpose of promoting some particular manufacture, over
and above managing their own affairs ill, to the diminution of the general
stock of the society, can, in other respects, scarce ever fail to do more harm
than good. Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the unavoidable
partiality of their directors to particular branches of the manufacture, of
which the undertakers mislead and impose upon them, is a real discouragement to
the rest, and necessarily breaks, more or less, that natural proportion which
would otherwise establish itself between judicious industry and profit, and
which, to the general industry of the country, is of all encouragements the
greatest and the most effectual.

ART. II.—Of the Expense of the Institution for the Education of Youth.

The institutions for the education of the youth may, in the same manner,
furnish a revenue sufficient for defraying their own expense. The fee or
honorary, which the scholar pays to the master, naturally constitutes a revenue
of this kind.

Even where the reward of the master does not arise altogether from this natural
revenue, it still is not necessary that it should be derived from that general
revenue of the society, of which the collection and application are, in most
countries, assigned to the executive power. Through the greater part of Europe,
accordingly, the endowment of schools and colleges makes either no charge upon
that general revenue, or but a very small one. It everywhere arises chiefly
from some local or provincial revenue, from the rent of some landed estate, or
from the interest of some sum of money, allotted and put under the management
of trustees for this particular purpose, sometimes by the sovereign himself,
and sometimes by some private donor.

Have those public endowments contributed in general, to promote the end of
their institution? Have they contributed to encourage the diligence, and to
improve the abilities, of the teachers? Have they directed the course of
education towards objects more useful, both to the individual and to the
public, than those to which it would naturally have gone of its own accord? It
should not seem very difficult to give at least a probable answer to each of
those questions.

In every profession, the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it,
is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that
exertion. This necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of their
profession are the only source from which they expect their fortune, or even
their ordinary revenue and subsistence. In order to acquire this fortune, or
even to get this subsistence, they must, in the course of a year, execute a
certain quantity of work of a known value; and, where the competition is free,
the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle one another
out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work with a
certain degree of exactness. The greatness of the objects which are to be
acquired by success in some particular professions may, no doubt, sometimes
animate the exertions of a few men of extraordinary spirit and ambition. Great
objects, however, are evidently not necessary, in order to occasion the
greatest exertions. Rivalship and emulation render excellency, even in mean
professions, an object of ambition, and frequently occasion the very greatest
exertions. Great objects, on the contrary, alone and unsupported by the
necessity of application, have seldom been sufficient to occasion any
considerable exertion. In England, success in the profession of the law leads
to some very great objects of ambition; and yet how few men, born to easy
fortunes, have ever in this country been eminent in that profession?

The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished, more or
less, the necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence, so far
as it arises from their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund, altogether
independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions.

In some universities, the salary makes but a part, and frequently but a small
part, of the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part arises from
the honoraries or fees of his pupils. The necessity of application, though
always more or less diminished, is not, in this case, entirely taken away.
Reputation in his profession is still of some importance to him, and he still
has some dependency upon the affection, gratitude, and favourable report of
those who have attended upon his instructions; and these favourable sentiments
he is likely to gain in no way so well as by deserving them, that is, by the
abilities and diligence with which he discharges every part of his duty.

In other universities, the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary or
fee from his pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which
he derives from his office. His interest is, in this case, set as directly in
opposition to his duty as it is possible to set it. It is the interest of every
man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his emoluments are to be
precisely the same, whether he does or does not perform some very laborious
duty, it is certainly his interest, at least as interest is vulgarly
understood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some
authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless
and slovenly a manner as that authority will permit. If he is naturally active
and a lover of labour, it is his interest to employ that activity in any way
from which he can derive some advantage, rather than in the performance of his
duty, from which he can derive none.

If the authority to which he is subject resides in the body corporate, the
college, or university, of which he himself is a member, and in which the
greater part of the other members are, like himself, persons who either are, or
ought to be teachers, they are likely to make a common cause, to be all very
indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that his neighbour may
neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to neglect his own. In the
university of Oxford, the greater part of the public professors have, for these
many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching.

If the authority to which he is subject resides, not so much in the body
corporate, of which he is a member, as in some other extraneous persons, in the
bishop of the diocese, for example, in the governor of the province, or,
perhaps, in some minister of state, it is not, indeed, in this case, very
likely that he will be suffered to neglect his duty altogether. All that such
superiors, however, can force him to do, is to attend upon his pupils a certain
number of hours, that is, to give a certain number of lectures in the week, or
in the year. What those lectures shall be, must still depend upon the diligence
of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportioned to the motives
which he has for exerting it. An extraneous jurisdiction of this kind, besides,
is liable to be exercised both ignorantly and capriciously. In its nature, it
is arbitrary and discretionary; and the persons who exercise it, neither
attending upon the lectures of the teacher themselves, nor perhaps
understanding the sciences which it is his business to teach, are seldom
capable of exercising it with judgment. From the insolence of office, too, they
are frequently indifferent how they exercise it, and are very apt to censure or
deprive him of his office wantonly and without any just cause. The person
subject to such jurisdiction is necessarily degraded by it, and, instead of
being one of the most respectable, is rendered one of the meanest and most
contemptible persons in the society. It is by powerful protection only, that he
can effectually guard himself against the bad usage to which he is at all times
exposed; and this protection he is most likely to gain, not by ability or
diligence in his profession, but by obsequiousness to the will of his
superiors, and by being ready, at all times, to sacrifice to that will the
rights, the interest, and the honour of the body corporate, of which he is a
member. Whoever has attended for any considerable time to the administration of
a French university, must have had occasion to remark the effects which
naturally result from an arbitrary and extraneous jurisdiction of this kind.

Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or university,
independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers, tends more or less to
diminish the necessity of that merit or reputation.

The privileges of graduates in arts, in law, physic, and divinity, when they
can be obtained only by residing a certain number of years in certain
universities, necessarily force a certain number of students to such
universities, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers. The
privileges of graduates are a sort of statutes of apprenticeship, which have
contributed to the improvement of education just as the other statutes of
apprenticeship have to that of arts and manufactures.

The charitable foundations of scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc.
necessarily attach a certain number of students to certain colleges,
independent altogether of the merit of those particular colleges. Were the
students upon such charitable foundations left free to choose what college they
liked best, such liberty might perhaps contribute to excite some emulation
among different colleges. A regulation, on the contrary, which prohibited even
the independent members of every particular college from leaving it, and going
to any other, without leave first asked and obtained of that which they meant
to abandon, would tend very much to extinguish that emulation.

If in each college, the tutor or teacher, who was to instruct each student in
all arts and sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student, but
appointed by the head of the college; and if, in case of neglect, inability, or
bad usage, the student should not be allowed to change him for another, without
leave first asked and obtained; such a regulation would not only tend very much
to extinguish all emulation among the different tutors of the same college, but
to diminish very much, in all of them, the necessity of diligence and of
attention to their respective pupils. Such teachers, though very well paid by
their students, might be as much disposed to neglect them, as those who are not
paid by them at all or who have no other recompense but their salary.

If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, it must be an unpleasant thing to
him to be conscious, while he is lecturing to his students, that he is either
speaking or reading nonsense, or what is very little better than nonsense. It
must, too, be unpleasant to him to observe, that the greater part of his
students desert his lectures; or perhaps, attend upon them with plain enough
marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. If he is obliged, therefore, to give
a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other interest,
might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones. Several
different expedients, however, may be fallen upon, which will effectually blunt
the edge of all those incitements to diligence. The teacher, instead of
explaining to his pupils himself the science in which he proposes to instruct
them, may read some book upon it; and if this book is written in a foreign and
dead language, by interpreting it to them into their own, or, what would give
him still less trouble, by making them interpret it to him, and by now and then
making an occasional remark upon it, he may flatter himself that he is giving a
lecture. The slightest degree of knowledge and application will enable him to
do this, without exposing himself to contempt or derision, by saying any thing
that is really foolish, absurd, or ridiculous. The discipline of the college,
at the same time, may enable him to force all his pupils to the most regular
attendance upon his sham lecture, and to maintain the most decent and
respectful behaviour during the whole time of the performance.

The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for
the benefit of the students, but for the interest, or, more properly speaking,
for the ease of the masters. Its object is, in all cases, to maintain the
authority of the master, and, whether he neglects or performs his duty, to
oblige the students in all cases to behave to him as if he performed it with
the greatest diligence and ability. It seems to presume perfect wisdom and
virtue in the one order, and the greatest weakness and folly in the other.
Where the masters, however, really perform their duty, there are no examples, I
believe, that the greater part of the students ever neglect theirs. No
discipline is ever requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are really
worth the attending, as is well known wherever any such lectures are given.
Force and restraint may, no doubt, be in some degree requisite, in order to
oblige children, or very young boys, to attend to those parts of education,
which it is thought necessary for them to acquire during that early period of
life; but after twelve or thirteen years of age, provided the master does his
duty, force or restraint can scarce ever be necessary to carry on any part of
education. Such is the generosity of the greater part of young men, that so far
from being disposed to neglect or despise the instructions of their master,
provided he shews some serious intention of being of use to them, they are
generally inclined to pardon a great deal of incorrectness in the performance
of his duty, and sometimes even to conceal from the public a good deal of gross
negligence.

Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there
are no public institutions, are generally the best taught. When a young man
goes to a fencing or a dancing school, he does not, indeed, always learn to
fence or to dance very well; but he seldom fails of learning to fence or to
dance. The good effects of the riding school are not commonly so evident. The
expense of a riding school is so great, that in most places it is a public
institution. The three most essential parts of literary education, to read,
write, and account, it still continues to be more common to acquire in private
than in public schools; and it very seldom happens, that anybody fails of
acquiring them to the degree in which it is necessary to acquire them.

In England, the public schools are much less corrupted than the universities.
In the schools, the youth are taught, or at least may be taught, Greek and
Latin; that is, everything which the masters pretend to teach, or which it is
expected they should teach. In the universities, the youth neither are taught,
nor always can find any proper means of being taught the sciences, which it is
the business of those incorporated bodies to teach. The reward of the
schoolmaster, in most cases, depends principally, in some cases almost
entirely, upon the fees or honoraries of his scholars. Schools have no
exclusive privileges. In order to obtain the honours of graduation, it is not
necessary that a person should bring a certificate of his having studied a
certain number of years at a public school. If, upon examination, he appears to
understand what is taught there, no questions are asked about the place where
he learnt it.

The parts of education which are commonly taught in universities, it may
perhaps be said, are not very well taught. But had it not been for those
institutions, they would not have been commonly taught at all; and both the
individual and the public would have suffered a good deal from the want of
those important parts of education.

The present universities of Europe were originally, the greater part of them,
ecclesiastical corporations, instituted for the education of churchmen. They
were founded by the authority of the pope; and were so entirely under his
immediate protection, that their members, whether masters or students, had all
of them what was then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were exempted from
the civil jurisdiction of the countries in which their respective universities
were situated, and were amenable only to the ecclesiastical tribunals. What was
taught in the greater part of those universities was suitable to the end of
their institution, either theology, or something that was merely preparatory to
theology.

When Christianity was first established by law, a corrupted Latin had become
the common language of all the western parts of Europe. The service of the
church, accordingly, and the translation of the Bible which were read in
churches, were both in that corrupted Latin; that is, in the common language of
the country, After the irruption of the barbarous nations who overturned the
Roman empire, Latin gradually ceased to be the language of any part of Europe.
But the reverence of the people naturally preserves the established forms and
ceremonies of religion long after the circumstances which first introduced and
rendered them reasonable, are no more. Though Latin, therefore, was no longer
understood anywhere by the great body of the people, the whole service of the
church still continued to be performed in that language. Two different
languages were thus established in Europe, in the same manner as in ancient
Egypt: a language of the priests, and a language of the people; a sacred and a
profane, a learned and an unlearned language. But it was necessary that the
priests should understand something of that sacred and learned language in
which they were to officiate; and the study of the Latin language therefore
made, from the beginning, an essential part of university education.

It was not so with that either of the Greek or of the Hebrew language. The
infallible decrees of the church had pronounced the Latin translation of the
Bible, commonly called the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally dictated by
divine inspiration, and therefore of equal authority with the Greek and Hebrew
originals. The knowledge of those two languages, therefore, not being
indispensably requisite to a churchman, the study of them did not for along
time make a necessary part of the common course of university education. There
are some Spanish universities, I am assured, in which the study of the Greek
language has never yet made any part of that course. The first reformers found
the Greek text of the New Testament, and even the Hebrew text of the Old, more
favourable to their opinions than the vulgate translation, which, as might
naturally be supposed, had been gradually accommodated to support the doctrines
of the Catholic Church. They set themselves, therefore, to expose the many
errors of that translation, which the Roman catholic clergy were thus put under
the necessity of defending or explaining. But this could not well be done
without some knowledge of the original languages, of which the study was
therefore gradually introduced into the greater part of universities; both of
those which embraced, and of those which rejected, the doctrines of the
reformation. The Greek language was connected with every part of that classical
learning, which, though at first principally cultivated by catholics and
Italians, happened to come into fashion much about the same time that the
doctrines of the reformation were set on foot. In the greater part of
universities, therefore, that language was taught previous to the study of
philosophy, and as soon as the student had made some progress in the Latin. The
Hebrew language having no connection with classical learning, and, except the
Holy Scriptures, being the language of not a single book in any esteem the
study of it did not commonly commence till after that of philosophy, and when
the student had entered upon the study of theology.

Originally, the first rudiments, both of the Greek and Latin languages, were
taught in universities; and in some universities they still continue to be so.
In others, it is expected that the student should have previously acquired, at
least, the rudiments of one or both of those languages, of which the study
continues to make everywhere a very considerable part of university education.

The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches; physics, or
natural philosophy; ethics, or moral philosophy; and logic. This general
division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.

The great phenomena of nature, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies,
eclipses, comets; thunder and lightning, and other extraordinary meteors; the
generation, the life, growth, and dissolution of plants and animals; are
objects which, as they necessarily excite the wonder, so they naturally call
forth the curiosity of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first
attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful
appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards
endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such as
mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those
great phenomena are the first objects of human curiosity, so the science which
pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first branch of
philosophy that was cultivated. The first philosophers, accordingly, of whom
history has preserved any account, appear to have been natural philosophers.

In every age and country of the world, men must have attended to the
characters, designs, and actions of one another; and many reputable rules and
maxims for the conduct of human life must have been laid down and approved of
by common consent. As soon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who
fancied themselves such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of
those established and respected maxims, and to express their own sense of what
was either proper or improper conduct, sometimes in the more artificial form of
apologues, like what are called the fables of Aesop; and sometimes in the more
simple one of apophthegms or wise sayings, like the proverbs of Solomon, the
verses of Theognis and Phocyllides, and some part of the works of Hesiod. They
might continue in this manner, for a long time, merely to multiply the number
of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting to arrange
them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to connect them
together by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible,
like effects from their natural causes. The beauty of a systematical
arrangement of different observations, connected by a few common principles,
was first seen in the rude essays of those ancient times towards a system of
natural philosophy. Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted in
morals. The maxims of common life were arranged in some methodical order, and
connected together by a few common principles, in the same manner as they had
attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The science which
pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles, is what is
properly called Moral Philosophy.

Different authors gave different systems, both of natural and moral philosophy.
But the arguments by which they supported those different systems, far from
being always demonstrations, were frequently at best but very slender
probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no other foundation but
the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Speculative systems, have, in
all ages of the world, been adopted for reasons too frivolous to have
determined the judgment of any man of common sense, in a matter of the smallest
pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the
opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in
these it has frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of natural
and moral philosophy, naturally endeavoured to expose the weakness of the
arguments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In
examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the difference
between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a fallacious and a
conclusive one; and logic, or the science of the general principles of good and
bad reasoning, necessarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of
this kind gave occasion to; though, in its origin, posterior both to physics
and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater
part of the ancient schools of philosophy, previously to either of those
sciences. The student, it seems to have been thought, ought to understand well
the difference between good and bad reasoning, before he was led to reason upon
subjects of so great importance.

This ancient division of philosophy into three parts was, in the greater part
of the universities of Europe, changed for another into five.

In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of
the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those
beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of
the great system of the universe, and parts, too, productive of the most
important effects. Whatever human reason could either conclude or conjecture
concerning them, made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very
important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin
and revolutions of the great system of the universe. But in the universities of
Europe, where philosophy was taught only as subservient to theology, it was
natural to dwell longer upon these two chapters than upon any other of the
science. They were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many
inferior chapters; till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can
be known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy as the
doctrine of bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning
those two subjects were considered as making two distinct sciences. What are
called metaphysics, or pneumatics, were set in opposition to physics, and were
cultivated not only as the more sublime, but, for the purposes of a particular
profession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper subject of
experiment and observation, a subject in which a careful attention is capable
of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected. The
subject in which, after a very few simple and almost obvious truths, the most
careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can
consequently produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly
cultivated.

When those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the
comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called
ontology, or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes which
were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties
and sophisms composed the greater part of the metaphysics or pneumatics of the
schools, they composed the whole of this cobweb science of ontology, which was
likewise sometimes called metaphysics.

Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not only as
an individual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the great
society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed
to investigate. In that philosophy, the duties of human life were treated of as
subservient to the happiness and perfection of human life, But when moral, as
well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology,
the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the
happiness of a life to come. In the ancient philosophy, the perfection of
virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who possessed
it, of the most perfect happiness in this life. In the modern philosophy, it
was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always,
inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life; and heaven was to be
earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a
monk, not by the liberal, generous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry,
and an ascetic morality, made up, in most cases, the greater part of the moral
philosophy of the schools. By far the most important of all the different
branches of philosophy became in this manner by far the most corrupted.

Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in the
greater part of the universities in Europe. Logic was taught first; ontology
came in the second place; pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning
the nature of the human soul and of the Deity, in the third; in the fourth
followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as
immediately connected with the doctrines of pneumatology, with the immortality
of the human soul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice
of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: a short and superficial
system of physics usually concluded the course.

The alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the
ancient course of philosophy were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics,
and to render it a more proper introduction to the study of theology. But the
additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and ascetic
morality which those alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render
it more for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely
either to improve the understanding or to mend the heart.

This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater
part of the universities of Europe, with more or less diligence, according as
the constitution of each particular university happens to render diligence more
or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed
universities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected
shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they commonly teach
very negligently and superficially.

The improvements which, in modern times have been made in several different
branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in
universities, though some, no doubt, have. The greater part of universities
have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements after they were
made; and several of those learned societies have chosen to remain, for a long
time, the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found
shelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every other corner of
the world. In general, the richest and best endowed universities have been
slowest in adopting those improvements, and the most averse to permit any
considerable change in the established plan of education. Those improvements
were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the
teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their
subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the
world.

But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally
intended only for the education of a particular profession, that of churchmen;
and though they were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils, even
in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that profession; yet they
gradually drew to themselves the education of almost all other people,
particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it
seems, could be fallen upon, of spending, with any advantage, the long interval
between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good
earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to employ them
during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught in
schools and universities, however, does not seem to be the most proper
preparation for that business.

In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to send young people
to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving school, and
without sending them to any university. Our young people, it is said, generally
return home much improved by their travels. A young man, who goes abroad at
seventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one-and-twenty, returns three or
four years older than he was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very
difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the course of
his travels, he generally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign
languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom sufficient to enable him
either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects, he commonly
returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and more
incapable of my serious application, either to study or to business, than he
could well have become in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling
so very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious
years of his life, at a distance from the inspection and control of his parents
and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education
might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being riveted and
confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or effaced. Nothing but the
discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall, could
ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling
at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers
himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a
son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.

Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education.

Different plans and different institutions for education seem to have taken
place in other ages and nations.

In the republics of ancient Greece, every free citizen was instructed, under
the direction of the public magistrate, in gymnastic exercises and in music. By
gymnastic exercises, it was intended to harden his body, to sharpen his
courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the
Greek militia was, by all accounts, one of the best that ever was in the world,
this part of their public education must have answered completely the purpose
for which it was intended. By the other part, music, it was proposed, at least
by the philosophers and historians, who have given us an account of those
institutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the temper, and to dispose it for
performing all the social and moral duties of public and private life.

In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose
as those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece, and they seem to have answered it
equally well. But among the Romans there was nothing which corresponded to the
musical education of the Greeks. The morals of the Romans, however, both in
private and public life, seem to have been, not only equal, but, upon the
whole, a good deal superior to those of the Greeks. That they were superior in
private life, we have the express testimony of Polybius, and of Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, two authors well acquainted with both nations; and the whole
tenor of the Greek and Roman history bears witness to the superiority of the
public morals of the Romans. The good temper and moderation of contending
factions seem to be the most essential circumstances in the public morals of a
free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almost always violent and
sanguinary; whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed
in any Roman faction; and from the time of the Gracchi, the Roman republic may
be considered as in reality dissolved. Notwithstanding, therefore, the very
respectable authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, and notwithstanding
the very ingenious reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to support that
authority, it seems probable that the musical education of the Greeks had no
great effect in mending their morals, since, without any such education, those
of the Romans were, upon the whole, superior. The respect of those ancient
sages for the institutions of their ancestors had probably disposed them to
find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely an ancient custom,
continued, without interruption, from the earliest period of those societies,
to the times in which they had arrived at a considerable degree of refinement.
Music and dancing are the great amusements of almost all barbarous nations, and
the great accomplishments which are supposed to fit any man for entertaining
his society. It is so at this day among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It
was so among the ancient Celtes, among the ancient Scandinavians, and, as we
may learn from Homer, among the ancient Greeks, in the times preceding the
Trojan war. When the Greek tribes had formed themselves into little republics,
it was natural that the study of those accomplishments should for a long time
make a part of the public and common education of the people.

The masters who instructed the young people, either in music or in military
exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state,
either in Rome or even at Athens, the Greek republic of whose laws and customs
we are the best informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit
himself for defending it in war, and should upon that account, learn his
military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such masters as he could
find; and it seems to have advanced nothing for this purpose, but a public
field or place of exercise, in which he should practise and perform them.

In the early ages, both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of
education seem to have consisted in learning to read, write, and account,
according to the arithmetic of the times. These accomplishments the richer
citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home, by the assistance of some
domestic pedagogue, who was, generally, either a slave or a freedman; and the
poorer citizens in the schools of such masters as made a trade of teaching for
hire. Such parts of education, however, were abandoned altogether to the care
of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the
state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of Solon,
indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining those parents who had
neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business.

In the progress of refinement, when philosophy and rhetoric came into fashion,
the better sort of people used to send their children to the schools of
philosophers and rhetoricians, in order to be instructed in these fashionable
sciences. But those schools were not supported by the public. They were, for a
long time, barely tolerated by it. The demand for philosophy and rhetoric was,
for a long time, so small, that the first professed teachers of either could
not find constant employment in any one city, but were obliged to travel about
from place to place. In this manner lived Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, Gorgias,
Hippias, and many others. As the demand increased, the school, both of
philosophy and rhetoric, became stationary, first in Athens, and afterwards in
several other cities. The state, however, seems never to have encouraged them
further, than by assigning to some of them a particular place to teach in,
which was sometimes done, too, by private donors. The state seems to have
assigned the Academy to Plato, the Lyceum to Aristotle, and the Portico to Zeno
of Citta, the founder of the Stoics. But Epicurus bequeathed his gardens to his
own school. Till about the time of Marcus Antoninus, however, no teacher
appears to have had any salary from the public, or to have had any other
emoluments, but what arose from the honorarius or fees of his scholars. The
bounty which that philosophical emperor, as we learn from Lucian, bestowed upon
one of the teachers of philosophy, probably lasted no longer than his own life.
There was nothing equivalent to the privileges of graduation; and to have
attended any of those schools was not necessary, in order to be permitted to
practise any particular trade or profession. If the opinion of their own
utility could not draw scholars to them, the law neither forced anybody to go
to them, nor rewarded anybody for having gone to them. The teachers had no
jurisdiction over their pupils, nor any other authority besides that natural
authority which superior virtue and abilities never fail to procure from young
people towards those who are entrusted with any part of their education.

At Rome, the study of the civil law made a part of the education, not of the
greater part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young
people, however, who wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public
school to go to, and had no other method of studying it, than by frequenting
the company of such of their relations and friends as were supposed to
understand it. It is, perhaps, worth while to remark, that though the laws of
the twelve tables were many of them copied from those of some ancient Greek
republics, yet law never seems to have grown up to be a science in any republic
of ancient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early, and gave a
considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of
understanding it. In the republics of ancient Greece, particularly in Athens,
the ordinary courts of justice consisted of numerous, and therefore disorderly,
bodies of people, who frequently decided almost at random, or as clamour,
faction, and party-spirit, happened to determine. The ignominy of an unjust
decision, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thousand, or fifteen
hundred people (for some of their courts were so very numerous), could not fall
very heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts
of justice consisted either of a single judge, or of a small number of judges,
whose characters, especially as they deliberated always in public, could not
fail to be very much affected by any rash or unjust decision. In doubtful cases
such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endeavour to
shelter themselves under the example or precedent of the judges who had sat
before them, either in the same or in some other court. This attention to
practice and precedent, necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular and
orderly system in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like
attention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where
such attention has taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over
that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their
courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those authors
ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been particularly distinguished for
their superior respect to an oath. But the people who were accustomed to make
oath only before some diligent and well informed court of justice, would
naturally be much more attentive to what they swore, than they who were
accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly assemblies.

The abilities, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Romans, will readily
be allowed to have been at least equal to those of any modern nation. Our
prejudice is perhaps rather to overrate them. But except in what related to
military exercises, the state seems to have been at no pains to form those
great abilities; for I cannot be induced to believe that the musical education
of the Greeks could be of much consequence in forming them. Masters, however,
had been found, it seems, for instructing the better sort of people among those
nations, in every art and science in which the circumstances of their society
rendered it necessary or convenient for them to be instructed. The demand for
such instruction produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it;
and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite,
appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. In the
attention which the ancient philosophers excited, in the empire which they
acquired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty
which they possessed of giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and
conversation of those auditors, they appear to have been much superior to any
modern teachers. In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or
less corrupted by the circumstances which render them more or less independent
of their success and reputation in their particular professions. Their
salaries, too, put the private teacher, who would pretend to come into
competition with them, in the same state with a merchant who attempts to trade
without a bounty, in competition with those who trade with a considerable one.
If he sells his goods at nearly the same price, he cannot have the same profit;
and poverty and beggary at least, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly
be his lot. If he attempts to sell them much dearer, he is likely to have so
few customers, that his circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges
of graduation, besides, are in many countries necessary, or at least extremely
convenient, to most men of learned professions, that is, to the far greater
part of those who have occasion for a learned education. But those privileges
can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the public teachers. The most
careful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any private teacher cannot
always give any title to demand them. It is from these different causes that
the private teacher of any of the sciences, which are commonly taught in
universities, is, in modern times, generally considered as in the very lowest
order of men of letters. A man of real abilities can scarce find out a more
humiliating or a more unprofitable employment to turn them to. The endowments
of schools and colleges have in this manner not only corrupted the diligence of
public teachers, but have rendered it almost impossible to have any good
private ones.

Were there no public institutions for education, no system, no science, would
be taught, for which there was not some demand, or which the circumstances of
the times did not render it either necessary or convenient, or at least
fashionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his account in
teaching either an exploded and antiquated system of a science acknowledged to
be useful, or a science universally believed to be a mere useless and pedantic
heap of sophistry and nonsense. Such systems, such sciences, can subsist
nowhere but in those incorporated societies for education, whose prosperity and
revenue are in a great measure independent of their industry. Were there no
public institutions for education, a gentleman, after going through, with
application and abilities, the most complete course of education which the
circumstances of the times were supposed to afford, could not come into the
world completely ignorant of everything which is the common subject of
conversation among gentlemen and men of the world.

There are no public institutions for the education of women, and there is
accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical, in the common course of
their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it
necessary or useful for them to learn, and they are taught nothing else. Every
part of their education tends evidently to some useful purpose; either to
improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to
reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy; to render them both likely to
became the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become
such. In every part of her life, a woman feels some conveniency or advantage
from every part of her education. It seldom happens that a man, in any part of
his life, derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the most laborious
and troublesome parts of his education.

Ought the public, therefore, to give no attention, it may be asked, to the
education of the people? Or, if it ought to give any, what are the different
parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the
people? and in what manner ought it to attend to them?

In some cases, the state of society necessarily places the greater part of
individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention
of government, almost all the abilities and virtues which that state requires,
or perhaps can admit of. In other cases, the state of the society does not
place the greater part of individuals in such situations; and some attention of
government is necessary, in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and
degeneracy of the great body of the people.

In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater
part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people,
comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two.
But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by
their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a
few simple operations, of which the effects, too, are perhaps always the same,
or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to
exercise his invention, in finding out expedients for removing difficulties
which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion,
and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human
creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of
relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any
generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just
judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the
great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of
judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him
otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The
uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind,
and makes him regard, with abhorrence, the irregular, uncertain, and
adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and
renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance in
any other employment, than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his
own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of
his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and
civilized society, this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is,
the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes
some pains to prevent it.

It is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of
hunters, of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of husbandry
which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the extension of foreign
commerce. In such societies, the varied occupations of every man oblige every
man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients for removing difficulties
which are continually occurring. Invention is kept alive, and the mind is not
suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity, which, in a civilized society,
seems to benumb the understanding of almost all the inferior ranks of people.
In those barbarous societies, as they are called, every man, it has already
been observed, is a warrior. Every man, too, is in some measure a statesman,
and can form a tolerable judgment concerning the interest of the society, and
the conduct of those who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in
peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to the observation of almost every
single man among them. In such a society, indeed, no man can well acquire that
improved and refined understanding which a few men sometimes possess in a more
civilized state. Though in a rude society there is a good deal of variety in
the occupations of every individual, there is not a great deal in those of the
whole society. Every man does, or is capable of doing, almost every thing which
any other man does, or is capable of being. Every man has a considerable degree
of knowledge, ingenuity, and invention but scarce any man has a great degree.
The degree, however, which is commonly possessed, is generally sufficient for
conducting the whole simple business of the society. In a civilized state, on
the contrary, though there is little variety in the occupations of the greater
part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety in those of the whole
society. These varied occupations present an almost infinite variety of objects
to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no particular
occupation themselves, have leisure and inclination to examine the occupations
of other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of objects necessarily
exercises their minds in endless comparisons and combinations, and renders
their understandings, in an extraordinary degree, both acute and
comprehensive. Unless those few, however, happen to be placed in some very
particular situations, their great abilities, though honourable to themselves,
may contribute very little to the good government or happiness of their
society. Notwithstanding the great abilities of those few, all the nobler parts
of the human character may be, in a great measure, obliterated and extinguished
in the great body of the people.

The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and
commercial society, the attention of the public, more than that of people of
some rank and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are generally eighteen
or nineteen years of age before they enter upon that particular business,
profession, or trade, by which they propose to distinguish themselves in the
world. They have, before that, full time to acquire, or at least to fit
themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment which can recommend
them to the public esteem, or render them worthy of it. Their parents or
guardians are generally sufficiently anxious that they should be so
accomplished, and are in most cases, willing enough to lay out the expense
which is necessary for that purpose. If they are not always properly educated,
it is seldom from the want of expense laid out upon their education, but from
the improper application of that expense. It is seldom from the want of
masters, but from the negligence and incapacity of the masters who are to be
had, and from the difficulty, or rather from the impossibility, which there is,
in the present state of things, of finding any better. The employments, too, in
which people of some rank or fortune spend the greater part of their lives, are
not, like those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are almost all
of them extremely complicated, and such as exercise the head more than the
hands. The understandings of those who are engaged in such employments, can
seldom grow torpid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank
and fortune, besides, are seldom such as harass them from morning to night.
They generally have a good deal of leisure, during which they may perfect
themselves in every branch, either of useful or ornamental knowledge, of which
they may have laid the foundation, or for which they may have acquired some
taste in the earlier part of life.

It is otherwise with the common people. They have little time to spare for
education. Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them, even in infancy.
As soon as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade, by which they
can earn their subsistence. That trade, too, is generally so simple and
uniform, as to give little exercise to the understanding; while, at the same
time, their labour is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them
little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of any thing
else.

But though the common people cannot, in any civilized society, be so well
instructed as people of some rank and fortune; the most essential parts of
education, however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so early a
period of life, that the greater part, even of those who are to be bred to the
lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in
those occupations. For a very small expense, the public can facilitate, can
encourage and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the
necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education.

The public can facilitate this acquisition, by establishing in every parish or
district a little school, where children maybe taught for a reward so moderate,
that even a common labourer may afford it; the master being partly, but not
wholly, paid by the public; because, if he was wholly, or even principally,
paid by it, he would soon learn to neglect his business. In Scotland, the
establishment of such parish schools has taught almost the whole common people
to read, and a very great proportion of them to write and account. In England,
the establishment of charity schools has had an effect of the same kind, though
not so universally, because the establishment is not so universal. If, in those
little schools, the books by which the children are taught to read, were a
little more instructive than they commonly are; and if, instead of a little
smattering in Latin, which the children of the common people are sometimes
taught there, and which can scarce ever be of any use to them, they were
instructed in the elementary parts of geometry and mechanics; the literary
education of this rank of people would, perhaps, be as complete as can be.
There is scarce a common trade, which does not afford some opportunities of
applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not,
therefore, gradually exercise and improve the common people in those
principles, the necessary introduction to the most sublime, as well as to the
most useful sciences.

The public can encourage the acquisition of those most essential parts of
education, by giving small premiums, and little badges of distinction, to the
children of the common people who excel in them.

The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people the necessity of
acquiring the most essential parts of education, by obliging every man to
undergo an examination or probation in them, before he can obtain the freedom
in any corporation, or be allowed to set up any trade, either in a village or
town corporate.

It was in this manner, by facilitating the acquisition of their military and
gymnastic exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the whole
body of the people the necessity of learning those exercises, that the Greek
and Roman republics maintained the martial spirit of their respective citizens.
They facilitated the acquisition of those exercises, by appointing a certain
place for learning and practising them, and by granting to certain masters the
privilege of teaching in that place. Those masters do not appear to have had
either salaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. Their reward consisted
altogether in what they got from their scholars; and a citizen, who had learnt
his exercises in the public gymnasia, had no sort of legal advantage over one
who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learned them equally
well. Those republics encouraged the acquisition of those exercises, by
bestowing little premiums and badges of distinction upon those who excelled in
them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic, Isthmian, or Nemaean games, gave
illustration, not only to the person who gained it, but to his whole family and
kindred. The obligation which every citizen was under, to serve a certain
number of years, if called upon, in the armies of the republic, sufficiently
imposed the necessity of learning those exercises, without which he could not
be fit for that service.

That in the progress of improvement, the practice of military exercises, unless
government takes proper pains to support it, goes gradually to decay, and,
together with it, the martial spirit of the great body of the people, the
example of modern Europe sufficiently demonstrates. But the security of every
society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great
body of the people. In the present times, indeed, that martial spirit alone,
and unsupported by a well-disciplined standing army, would not, perhaps, be
sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where every citizen
had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would surely be requisite.
That spirit, besides, would necessarily diminish very much the dangers to
liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended from a
standing army. As it would very much facilitate the operations of that army
against a foreign invader; so it would obstruct them as much, if unfortunately
they should ever be directed against the constitution of the state.

The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much more
effectual for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people,
than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. They
were much more simple. When they were once established, they executed
themselves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain
them in the most perfect vigour. Whereas to maintain, even in tolerable
execution, the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the
continual and painful attention of government, without which they are
constantly falling into total neglect and disuse. The influence, besides, of
the ancient institutions, was much more universal. By means of them, the whole
body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms; whereas it is
but a very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the regulations
of any modern militia, except, perhaps, that of Switzerland. But a coward, a
man incapable either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently wants one
of the most essential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated
and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either deprived of
some of its most essential members, or has lost the use of them. He is
evidently the more wretched and miserable of the two; because happiness and
misery, which reside altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon
the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than
upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no
use towards the defence of the society, yet, to prevent that sort of mental
mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves
in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would
still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as
it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy, or any other
loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from
spreading itself among them; though, perhaps, no other public good might result
from such attention, besides the prevention of so great a public evil.

The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a
civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the
inferior ranks of people. A man without the proper use of the intellectual
faculties of a man, is, if possible, more contemptible than even a coward, and
seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the
character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no advantage from the
instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its
attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The state, however,
derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are
instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and
superstition, which, among ignorant nations frequently occasion the most
dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always
more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves,
each individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of
their lawful superiors, and they are, therefore, more disposed to respect those
superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing
through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition; and they are, upon
that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition
to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of
government depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may
form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance, that they
should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.

Art. III.—Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Instruction of
People of all Ages.

The institutions for the instruction of people of all ages, are chiefly those
for religious instruction. This is a species of instruction, of which the
object is not so much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to
prepare them for another and a better world in the life to come. The teachers
of the doctrine which contains this instruction, in the same manner as other
teachers, may either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the voluntary
contributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from some other fund, to
which the law of their country may entitle them; such as a landed estate, a
tythe or land tax, an established salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal
and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in the
latter. In this respect, the teachers of a new religion have always had a
considerable advantage in attacking those ancient and established systems, of
which the clergy, reposing themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to
keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the people; and
having given themselves up to indolence, were become altogether incapable of
making any vigorous exertion in defence even of their own establishment. The
clergy of an established and well endowed religion frequently become men of
learning and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen, or which can
recommend them to the esteem of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose
the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with
the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original causes of
the success and establishment of their religion. Such a clergy, when attacked
by a set of popular and bold, though perhaps stupid and ignorant enthusiasts,
feel themselves as perfectly defenceless as the indolent, effeminate, and full
fed nations of the southern parts of Asia, when they were invaded by the
active, hardy, and hungry Tartars of the north. Such a clergy, upon such an
emergency, have commonly no other resource than to call upon the civil
magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their adversaries, as disturbers
of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman catholic clergy called upon the
civil magistrate to persecute the protestants, and the church of England to
persecute the dissenters; and that in general every religious sect, when it has
once enjoyed, for a century or two, the security of a legal establishment, has
found itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any new sect
which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon such occasions, the
advantage, in point of learning and good writing, may sometimes be on the side
of the established church. But the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining
proselytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries. In England, those
arts have been long neglected by the well endowed clergy of the established
church, and are at present chiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the
methodists. The independent provisions, however, which in many places have been
made for dissenting teachers, by means of voluntary subscriptions, of trust
rights, and other evasions of the law, seem very much to have abated the zeal
and activity of those teachers. They have many of them become very learned,
ingenious, and respectable men; but they have in general ceased to be very
popular preachers. The methodists, without half the learning of the dissenters,
are much more in vogue.

In the church of Rome the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy are kept
more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest, than perhaps in any
established protestant church. The parochial clergy derive many of them, a very
considerable part of their subsistence from the voluntary oblations of the
people; a source of revenue, which confession gives them many opportunities of
improving. The mendicant orders derive their whole subsistence from such
oblations. It is with them as with the hussars and light infantry of some
armies; no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are like those teachers whose
reward depends partly upon their salary, and partly upon the fees or honoraries
which they get from their pupils; and these must always depend, more or less,
upon their industry and reputation. The mendicant orders are like those
teachers whose subsistence depends altogether upon their industry. They are
obliged, therefore, to use every art which can animate the devotion of the
common people. The establishment of the two great mendicant orders of St
Dominic and St. Francis, it is observed by Machiavel, revived, in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the languishing faith and devotion of the
catholic church. In Roman catholic countries, the spirit of devotion is
supported altogether by the monks, and by the poorer parochial clergy. The
great dignitaries of the church, with all the accomplishments of gentlemen and
men of the world, and sometimes with those of men of learning, are careful to
maintain the necessary discipline over their inferiors, but seldom give
themselves any trouble about the instruction of the people.

“Most of the arts and professions in a state,” says by far the most
illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age, “are of such a
nature, that, while they promote the interests of the society, they are also
useful or agreeable to some individuals; and, in that case, the constant rule
of the magistrate, except, perhaps, on the first introduction of any art, is,
to leave the profession to itself, and trust its encouragement to the
individuals who reap the benefit of it. The artizans, finding their profits to
rise by the favour of their customers, increase, as much as possible, their
skill and industry; and as matters are not disturbed by any injudicious
tampering, the commodity is always sure to be at all times nearly proportioned
to the demand.

“But there are also some callings which, though useful and even necessary
in a state, bring no advantage or pleasure to any individual; and the supreme
power is obliged to alter its conduct with regard to the retainers of those
professions. It must give them public encouragement in order to their
subsistence; and it must provide against that negligence to which they will
naturally be subject, either by annexing particular honours to profession, by
establishing a long subordination of ranks, and a strict dependence, or by some
other expedient. The persons employed in the finances, fleets, and magistracy,
are instances of this order of men.

“It may naturally be thought, at first sight, that the ecclesiastics
belong to the first class, and that their encouragement, as well as that of
lawyers and physicians, may safely be entrusted to the liberality of
individuals, who are attached to their doctrines, and who find benefit or
consolation from their spiritual ministry and assistance. Their industry and
vigilance will, no doubt, be whetted by such an additional motive; and their
skill in the profession, as well as their address in governing the minds of the
people, must receive daily increase, from their increasing practice, study, and
attention.

“But if we consider the matter more closely, we shall find that this
interested diligence of the clergy is what every wise legislator will study to
prevent; because, in every religion except the true, it is highly pernicious,
and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the truth, by infusing into it a
strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion. Each ghostly practitioner,
in order to render himself more precious and sacred in the eyes of his
retainers, will inspire them with the most violent abhorrence of all other
sects, and continually endeavour, by some novelty, to excite the languid
devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid to truth, morals, or decency,
in the doctrines inculcated. Every tenet will be adopted that best suits the
disorderly affections of the human frame. Customers will be drawn to each
conventicle by new industry and address, in practising on the passions and
credulity of the populace. And, in the end, the civil magistrate will find that
he has dearly paid for his intended frugality, in saving a fixed establishment
for the priests; and that, in reality, the most decent and advantageous
composition, which he can make with the spiritual guides, is to bribe their
indolence, by assigning stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it
superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to prevent their flock
from straying in quest of new pastors. And in this manner ecclesiastical
establishments, though commonly they arose at first from religious views, prove
in the end advantageous to the political interests of society.”

But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision
of the clergy, it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any
view to those effects. Times of violent religious controversy have generally
been times of equally violent political faction. Upon such occasions, each
political party has either found it, or imagined it, for his interest, to
league itself with some one or other of the contending religious sects. But
this could be done only by adopting, or, at least, by favouring the tenets of
that particular sect. The sect which had the good fortune to be leagued with
the conquering party necessarily shared in the victory of its ally, by whose
favour and protection it was soon enabled, in some degree, to silence and
subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves
with the enemies of the conquering party, and were, therefore the enemies of
that party. The clergy of this particular sect having thus become complete
masters of the field, and their influence and authority with the great body of
the people being in its highest vigour, they were powerful enough to overawe
the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the civil magistrate
to respect their opinions and inclinations. Their first demand was generally
that he should silence and subdue all their adversaries; and their second, that
he should bestow an independent provision on themselves. As they had generally
contributed a good deal to the victory, it seemed not unreasonable that they
should have some share in the spoil. They were weary, besides, of humouring the
people, and of depending upon their caprice for a subsistence. In making this
demand, therefore, they consulted their own ease and comfort, without troubling
themselves about the effect which it might have, in future times, upon the
influence and authority of their order. The civil magistrate, who could comply
with their demand only by giving them something which he would have chosen much
rather to take, or to keep to himself, was seldom very forward to grant it.
Necessity, however, always forced him to submit at last, though frequently not
till after many delays, evasions, and affected excuses.

But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering
party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when it
had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially
with all the different sects, and have allowed every man to choose his own
priest, and his own religion, as he thought proper. There would, and, in this
case, no doubt, have been, a great multitude of religious sects. Almost every
different congregation might probably have had a little sect by itself, or have
entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher, would, no doubt,
have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of
using every art, both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples.
But as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity,
the success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great.
The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and
troublesome only where there is either but one sect tolerated in the society,
or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects;
the teachers of each acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and
subordination. But that zeal must be altogether innocent, where the society is
divided into two or three hundred, or, perhaps, into as many thousand small
sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb the public
tranquillity. The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all
sides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that
candour and moderation which are so seldom to be found among the teachers of
those great sects, whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are
held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and
empires, and who, therefore, see nothing round them but followers, disciples,
and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves
almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect; and
the concessions which they would mutually find in both convenient and agreeable
to make one to another, might in time, probably reduce the doctrine of the
greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every
mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have, in all
ages of the world, wished to see established; but such as positive law has,
perhaps, never yet established, and probably never will establish in any
country; because, with regard to religion, positive law always has been, and
probably always will be, more or less influenced by popular superstition and
enthusiasm. This plan of ecclesiastical government, or, more properly, of no
ecclesiastical government, was what the sect called Independents (a sect, no
doubt, of very wild enthusiasts), proposed to establish in England towards the
end of the civil war. If it had been established, though of a very
unphilosophical origin, it would probably, by this time, have been productive
of the most philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort
of religious principle. It has been established in Pennsylvania, where, though
the quakers happen to be the most numerous, the law, in reality, favours no one
sect more than another; and it is there said to have been productive of this
philosophical good temper and moderation.

But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this good
temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the religious
sects of a particular country; yet, provided those sects were sufficiently
numerous, and each of them consequently too small to disturb the public
tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each for its particular tenets could not
well be productive of any very hurtful effects, but, on the contrary, of
several good ones; and if the government was perfectly decided, both to let
them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is
little danger that they would not of their own accord, subdivide themselves
fast enough, so as soon to become sufficiently numerous.

In every civilized society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has
once been completely established, there have been always two different schemes
or systems of morality current at the same time; of which the one may be called
the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose
system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people; the
latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called the people of
fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of
levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the
excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to constitute the principal distinction
between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the liberal or loose system,
luxury, wanton, and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some
degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two
sexes, etc. provided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not
lead to falsehood and injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of
indulgence, and are easily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the
austere system, on the contrary, those excesses are regarded with the utmost
abhorrence and detestation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the
common people, and a single week’s thoughtlessness and dissipation is
often sufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through
despair, upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of
the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation
of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to
people of their condition. The disorder and extravagance of several years, on
the contrary, will not always ruin a man of fashion; and people of that rank
are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some degree of excess, as
one of the advantages of their fortune; and the liberty of doing so without
censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In
people of their own station, therefore, they regard such excesses with but a
small degree of disapprobation, and censure them either very slightly or not at
all.

Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they
have generally drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous proselytes.
The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects
almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It
was the system by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of
people, to whom they first proposed their plan of reformation upon what had
been before established. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have
even endeavoured to gain credit by refining upon this austere system, and by
carrying it to some degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour
has frequently recommended them, more than any thing else, to the respect and
veneration of the common people.

A man of rank and fortune is, by his station, the distinguished member of a
great society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige
him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration
depend very much upon the respect which this society bears to him. He dares not
do anything which would disgrace or discredit him in it; and he is obliged to a
very strict observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere,
which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and
fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a
distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country
village, his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it
himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is
called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is
sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by
nobody; and he is, therefore, very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon
himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice. He never emerges so
effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much the
attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small
religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he
never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect,
interested to observe his conduct; and, if he gives occasion to any scandal, if
he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always
require of one another, to punish him by what is always a very severe
punishment, even where no evil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication
from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the morals of the common
people have been almost always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much
more so than in the established church. The morals of those little sects,
indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial.

There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint
operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial or
disagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little sects into which the
country was divided.

The first of those remedies is the study of science and philosophy, which the
state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than
middling rank and fortune; not by giving salaries to teachers in order to make
them negligent and idle, but by instituting some sort of probation, even in the
higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he
was permitted to exercise any liberal profession, or before he could be
received as a candidate for any honourable office, of trust or profit. If the
state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have
no occasion to give itself any trouble about providing them with proper
teachers. They would soon find better teachers for themselves, than any whom
the state could provide for them. Science is the great antidote to the poison
of enthusiasm and superstition; and where all the superior ranks of people were
secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to it.

The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions.
The state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire liberty to all those who,
from their own interest, would attempt, without scandal or indecency, to amuse
and divert the people by painting, poetry, music, dancing; by all sorts of
dramatic representations and exhibitions; would easily dissipate, in the
greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always
the nurse of popular superstition and enthusiasm. Public diversions have always
been the objects of dread and hatred to all the fanatical promoters of those
popular frenzies. The gaiety and good humour which those diversions inspire,
were altogether inconsistent with that temper of mind which was fittest for
their purpose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations,
besides, frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes
even to public execration, were, upon that account, more than all other
diversions, the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.

In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than
those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have any
particular or immediate dependency upon the sovereign or executive power; or
that he should have anything to do either in appointing or in dismissing them
from their offices. In such a situation, he would have no occasion to give
himself any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them, in
the same manner as among the rest of his subjects, that is, to hinder them from
persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. But it is quite otherwise in
countries where there is an established or governing religion. The sovereign
can in this case never be secure, unless he has the means of influencing in a
considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion.

The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They
can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan, and with one
spirit as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are
frequently, too, under such direction. Their interest as an incorporated body
is never the same with that of the sovereign, and is sometimes directly
opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the
people, and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and importance
of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity of
adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid
eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to
deride, or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from
humanity, attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the
punctilious honour of a clergy, who have no sort of dependency upon him, is
immediately provoked to proscribe him as a profane person, and to employ all
the terrors of religion, in order to oblige the people to transfer their
allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppose any of
their pretensions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who
have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this
crime of rebellion, have generally been charged, too, with the additional crime
of heresy, notwithstanding their solemn protestations of their faith, and
humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them.
But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears
which it suggests conquer all other fears. When the authorized teachers of
religion propagate through the great body of the people, doctrines subversive
of the authority of the sovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a
standing army, that he can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot
in this case give him any lasting security; because if the soldiers are not
foreigners, which can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great body of the
people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon
corrupted by those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the
Greek clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople, as long as the
eastern empire subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several
centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in
every part of Europe, sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and insecure must
always be the situation of the sovereign, who has no proper means of
influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of his
country.

Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident
enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who,
though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be
so for instructing the people. With regard to such matters, therefore, his
authority can seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of
the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and his
own security, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think
proper to propagate concerning such matters. As he can seldom directly oppose
their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is necessary
that he should be able to influence it; and he can influence it only by the
fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part of the
individuals of the order. Those fears and expectations may consist in the fear
of deprivation or other punishment, and in the expectation of further
preferment.

In all Christian churches, the benefices of the clergy are a sort of freeholds,
which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life or good behaviour. If
they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out
upon every slight disobligation either of the sovereign or of his ministers, it
would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the
people, who would then consider them as mercenary dependents upon the court, in
the sincerity of whose instructions they could no longer have any confidence.
But should the sovereign attempt irregularly, and by violence, to deprive any
number of clergymen of their freeholds, on account, perhaps, of their having
propagated, with more than ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine,
he would only render, by such persecution, both them and their doctrine ten
times more popular, and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous,
than they had been before. Fear is in almost all cases a wretched instrument of
govermnent, and ought in particular never to be employed against any order of
men who have the smallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify
them, serves only to irritate their bad humour, and to confirm them in an
opposition, which more gentle usage, perhaps, might easily induce them either
to soften, or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French government
usually employed in order to oblige all their parliaments, or sovereign courts
of justice, to enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom succeeded. The means
commonly employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refractory members, one
would think, were forcible enough. The princes of the house of Stuart sometimes
employed the like means in order to influence some of the members of the
parliament of England, and they generally found them equally intractable. The
parliament of England is now managed in another manner; and a very small
experiment, which the duke of Choiseul made, about twelve years ago, upon the
parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently that all the parliaments of
France might have been managed still more easily in the same manner. That
experiment was not pursued. For though management and persuasion are always the
easiest and safest instruments of government as force and violence are the
worst and the most dangerous; yet such, it seems, is the natural insolence of
man, that he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, except when he
cannot or dare not use the bad one. The French government could and durst use
force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion. But there is
no order of men, it appears I believe, from the experience of all ages, upon
whom it is so dangerous or rather so perfectly ruinous, to employ force and
violence, as upon the respected clergy of an established church. The rights,
the privileges, the personal liberty of every individual ecclesiastic, who is
upon good terms with his own order, are, even in the most despotic governments,
more respected than those of any other person of nearly equal rank and fortune.
It is so in every gradation of despotism, from that of the gentle and mild
government of Paris, to that of the violent and furious government of
Constantinople. But though this order of men can scarce ever be forced, they
may be managed as easily as any other; and the security of the sovereign, as
well as the public tranquillity, seems to depend very much upon the means which
he has of managing them; and those means seem to consist altogether in the
preferment which he has to bestow upon them.

In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese
was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal
city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they
did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who,
in such spiritual matters, appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy,
however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it easier
to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was
elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of
abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the
diocese were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics
as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the
disposal of the church. The sovereign, though he might have some indirect
influence in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his
consent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or
sufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman
naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign as to his own
order, from which only he could expect preferment.

Through the greater part of Europe, the pope gradually drew to himself, first
the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbacies, or of what were called
consistorial benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences,
of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within each diocese,
little more being left to the bishop than what was barely necessary to give him
a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement the condition of
the sovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of all the
different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army,
dispersed in different quarters indeed, but of which all the movements and
operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform
plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered as a particular
detachment of that army, of which the operations could easily be supported and
seconded by all the other detachments quartered in the different countries
round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the
country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but
dependent upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against
the sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all
the other detachments.

Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient
state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth
of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people which
that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and
retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety both of
princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were
established, of the same kind with those of the great barons, and for the same
reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could
easily keep the peace, without the support or assistance either of the king or
of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the
peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions
of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally
independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the king’s courts,
as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like
those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon
their immediate lords, and, therefore, liable to be called out at pleasure, in
order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage
them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed in the
tithes a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every
kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both those species of rents were,
the greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, etc.
The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and
there were neither arts nor manufactures, for the produce of which they could
exchange the surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense
surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the
like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the
most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the ancient
clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintained
almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had
frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from
monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the
hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often
as numerous as those of the greatest lay-lords; and the retainers of all the
clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the
lay-lords. There was always much more union among the clergy than among the
lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the
papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination,
but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the
tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less
numerous than those of the great lay-lords, and their tenants were probably
much less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable.
The hospitality and charity of the clergy, too, not only gave them the command
of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their
spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and
veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were
constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Everything belonging or
related to so popular an order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines,
necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of the common people; and every
violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious
wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the sovereign
frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great
nobility, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the
united force of the clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the
clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances, the wonder is,
not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to
resist.

The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us, who live in
the present times, appear the most absurd), their total exemption from the
secular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of
clergy, were the natural, or rather the necessary, consequences of this state
of things. How dangerous must it have been for the sovereign to attempt to
punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his order were disposed to
protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for convicting
so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose
person had been rendered sacred by religion? The sovereign could, in such
circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical
courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as
much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even
from giving occasion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the
people.

In the state in which things were, through the greater part of Europe, during
the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both
before and after that period, the constitution of the church of Rome may be
considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the
authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty,
reason, and happiness of mankind, which can flourish only where civil
government is able to protect them. In that constitution, the grossest
delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by the private
interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from
any assault of human reason; because, though human reason might, perhaps, have
been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the
delusions of superstition, it could never have dissolved the ties of private
interest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the
feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured for ever. But that immense
and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have
shaken, much less have overturned, was, by the natural course of things, first
weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed; and is now likely, in the course of
a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether.

The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes
which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed, in the same manner,
through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal manufactures, and
commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something for which they
could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending
their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable
share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive,
their hospitality less liberal, or less profuse. Their retainers became
consequently less numerous, and, by degrees, dwindled away altogether. The
clergy, too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their
landed estates, in order to spend it, in the same manner, upon the
gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increase of rent
could be got only by granting leases to their tenants, who thereby became, in a
great measure, independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the
inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken
and dissolved. They were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which
bound the same ranks of people to the great barons; because the benefices of
the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of
the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend
the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through
the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the
clergy, the absolute command which they had once had over the great body of the
people was very much decayed. The power of the church was, by that time, very
nearly reduced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arose from their
spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened, when
it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The
inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as they had done
before; as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their
indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity,
luxury, and expense of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own
pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.

In this situation of things, the sovereigns in the different states of Europe
endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had in the disposal of
the great benefices of the church; by procuring to the deans and chapters of
each diocese the restoration of their ancient right of electing the bishop; and
to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re-establishing
this ancient order was the object of several statutes enacted in England during
the course of the fourteenth century, particularly of what is called the
statute of provisors; and of the pragmatic sanction, established in France in
the fifteenth century. In order to render the election valid, it was necessary
that the sovereign should both consent to it before hand, and afterwards
approve of the person elected; and though the election was still supposed to be
free, he had, however all the indirect means which his situation necessarily
afforded him, of influencing the clergy in his own dominions. Other
regulations, of a similar tendency, were established in other parts of Europe.
But the power of the pope, in the collation of the great benefices of the
church, seems, before the reformation, to have been nowhere so effectually and
so universally restrained as in France and England. The concordat afterwards,
in the sixteenth century, gave to the kings of France the absolute right of
presenting to all the great, or what are called the consistorial, benefices of
the Gallican church.

Since the establishment of the pragmatic sanction and of the concordat, the
clergy of France have in general shewn less respect to the decrees of the papal
court, than the clergy of any other catholic country. In all the disputes which
their sovereign has had with the pope, they have almost constantly taken part
with the former. This independency of the clergy of France upon the court of
Rome seems to be principally founded upon the pragmatic sanction and the
concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the clergy of France appear
to have been as much devoted to the pope as those of any other country. When
Robert, the second prince of the Capetian race, was most unjustly
excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants, it is said, threw the
victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and refused to taste any thing
themselves which had been polluted by the contact of a person in his situation.
They were taught to do so, it may very safely be presumed, by the clergy of his
own dominions.

The claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim in defence
of which the court of Rome had frequently shaken, and sometimes overturned, the
thrones of some of the greatest sovereigns in Christendom, was in this manner
either restrained or modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts
of Europe, even before the time of the reformation. As the clergy had now less
influence over the people, so the state had more influence over the clergy. The
clergy, therefore, had both less power, and less inclination, to disturb the
state.

The authority of the church of Rome was in this state of declension, when the
disputes which gave birth to the reformation began in Germany, and soon spread
themselves through every part of Europe. The new doctrines were everywhere
received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all
that enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party, when it
attacks established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps,
in other respects, not more learned than many of the divines who defended the
established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with
ecclesiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of
opinions upon which the authority of the church was established; and they had
thereby the advantage in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners
gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict
regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of
their own clergy. They possessed, too, in a much higher degree than their
adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes; arts which
the lofty and dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them
in a great measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to
some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy
to a still greater number: but the zealous, passionate, and fanatical, though
frequently coarse and rustic eloquence, with which they were almost everywhere
inculcated, recommended them to by far the greatest number.

The success of the new doctrines was almost everywhere so great, that the
princes, who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome,
were, by means of them, easily enabled, in their own dominions, to overturn the
church, which having lost the respect and veneration of the inferior ranks of
people, could make scarce any resistance. The court of Rome had disobliged some
of the smaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably
considered as too insignificant to be worth the managing. They universally,
therefore, established the reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of
Christiern II., and of Troll archbishop of Upsal, enabled Gustavus Vasa to
expel them both from Sweden. The pope favoured the tyrant and the archbishop,
and Gustavus Vasa found no difficulty in establishing the reformation in
Sweden. Christiern II. was afterwards deposed from the throne of Denmark, where
his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The pope, however, was
still disposed to favour him; and Frederic of Holstein, who had mounted the
throne in his stead, revenged himself, by following the example of Gustavus
Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with
the pope, established with great ease the reformation in their respective
cantons, where just before some of the clergy had, by an imposture somewhat
grosser than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible.

In this critical situation of its affairs the papal court was at sufficient
pains to cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and
Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their
assistance, it was enabled, though not without great difficulty, and much
bloodshed, either to suppress altogether, or to obstruct very much, the
progress of the reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined,
too, to be complaisant to the king of England. But from the circumstances of
the times, it could not be so without giving offence to a still greater
sovereign, Charles V., king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII.,
accordingly, though he did not embrace himself the greater part of the
doctrines of the reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to
suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of
Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no further,
gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the reformation, who, having got
possession of the government in the reign of his son and successor completed,
without any difficulty, the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular,
and not very firmly established, the reformation was strong enough to overturn,
not only the church, but the state likewise, for attempting to support the
church.

Among the followers of the reformation, dispersed in all the different
countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal, which, like that of the
court of Rome, or an oecumenical council, could settle all disputes among them,
and, with irresistible authority, prescribe to all of them the precise limits
of orthodoxy. When the followers of the reformation in one country, therefore,
happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge
to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many such disputes arose
among them. Those concerning the government of the church, and the right of
conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were perhaps the most interesting to the
peace and welfare of civil society. They gave birth, accordingly, to the two
principal parties or sects among the followers of the reformation, the Lutheran
and Calvinistic sects, the only sects among them, of which the doctrine and
discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of Europe.

The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England,
preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination
among the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the bishoprics, and
other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the
real head of the church; and without depriving the bishop of the right of
collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese, they, even to those
benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of presentation, both in
the sovereign and in all other lay patrons. This system of church government
was, from the beginning, favourable to peace and good order, and to submission
to the civil sovereign. It has never, accordingly, been the occasion of any
tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been established.
The church of England, in particular, has always valued herself, with great
reason, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under such a
government, the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the
sovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by
whose influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to
those patrons, sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery and assentation; but
frequently, too, by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, and which
are therefore most likely to gain them, the esteem of people of rank and
fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and
ornamental learning, by the decent liberality of their manners, by the social
good humour of their conversation, and by their avowed contempt of those absurd
and hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise,
in order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of
men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practise them, the
abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their
court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect
altogether the means of maintaining their influence and authority with the
lower. They are listened to, esteemed, and respected by their superiors; but
before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually,
and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate doctrines,
against the most ignorant enthusiast who chooses to attack them.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary,
bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the
right of electing their own pastor; and established, at the same time, the most
perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long
as it remained in vigour, seems to have been productive of nothing but disorder
and confusion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the
clergy and of the people. The latter part seems never to have had any effects
but what were perfectly agreeable.

As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their own
pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and
generally of the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order
to preserve their influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to
become, many of them, fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among the
people, and gave the preference almost always to the most fanatical candidate.
So small a matter as the appointment of a parish priest, occasioned almost
always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but in all the neighbouring
parishes who seldom failed to take part in the quarrel. When the parish
happened to be situated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into
two parties; and when that city happened, either to constitute itself a little
republic, or to be the head and capital of a little republic, as in the case
with many of the considerable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry
dispute of this kind, over and above exasperating the animosity of all their
other factions, threatened to leave behind it, both a new schism in the church,
and a new faction in the state. In those small republics, therefore, the
magistrate very soon found it necessary, for the sake of preserving the public
peace, to assume to himself the right of presenting to all vacant benefices. In
Scotland, the most extensive country in which this presbyterian form of church
government has ever been established, the rights of patronage were in effect
abolished by the act which established presbytery in the beginning of the reign
of William III. That act, at least, put in the power of certain classes of
people in each parish to purchase, for a very small price, the right of
electing their own pastor. The constitution which this act established, was
allowed to subsist for about two-and-twenty years, but was abolished by the
10th of queen Anne, ch.12, on account of the confusions and disorders which
this more popular mode of election had almost everywhere occasioned. In so
extensive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote parish was not
so likely to give disturbance to government as in a smaller state. The 10th of
queen Anne restored the rights of patronage. But though, in Scotland, the law
gives the benefice, without any exception to the person presented by the
patron; yet the church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been
very uniform in her decisions) a certain concurrence of the people, before she
will confer upon the presentee what is called the cure of souls, or the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the parish. She sometimes, at least, from an
affected concern for the peace of the parish, delays the settlement till this
concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of some of the neighbouring
clergy, sometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence,
and the popular arts which they cultivate, in order to enable them upon such
occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the causes which principally
keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical spirit, either in the clergy or
in the people of Scotland.

The equality which the presbyterian form of church government establishes among
the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or ecclesiastical
jurisdiction; and, secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all presbyterian
churches, the equality of authority is perfect; that of benefice is not so. The
difference, however, between one benefice and another, is seldom so
considerable, as commonly to tempt the possessor even of the small one to pay
court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and assentation, in order to
get a better. In all the presbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage
are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better arts, that the
established clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of their superiors;
by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the
faithful and diligent discharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently
complain of the independency of their spirit, which they are apt to construe
into ingratitude for past favours, but which, at worse, perhaps, is seldom
anymore than that indifference which naturally arises from the consciousness
that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is scarce,
perhaps, to be found anywhere in Europe, a more learned, decent, independent,
and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the presbyterian clergy of
Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

Where the church benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very
great; and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may be, no doubt, carried too
far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but exemplary morals
can give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of levity and vanity
necessarily render him ridiculous, and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him
as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged
to follow that system of morals which the common people respect the most. He
gains their esteem and affection, by that plan of life which his own interest
and situation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with
that kindness with which we naturally regard one who approaches somewhat to our
own condition, but who, we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness
naturally provokes his kindness. He becomes careful to instruct them, and
attentive to assist and relieve them. He does not even despise the prejudices
of people who are disposed to be so favourable to him, and never treats them
with those contemptuous and arrogant airs, which we so often meet with in the
proud dignitaries of opulent and well endowed churches. The presbyterian
clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people,
than perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is, accordingly, in
presbyterian countries only, that we ever find the common people converted,
without persecution completely, and almost to a man, to the established church.

In countries where church benefices are, the greater part of them, very
moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a
church benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and chusing
of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country,
constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where church
benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very considerable, the church
naturally draws from the universities the greater part of their eminent men of
letters; who generally find some patron, who does himself honour by procuring
them church preferment. In the former situation, we are likely to find the
universities filled with the most eminent men of letters that are to be found
in the country. In the latter, we are likely to find few eminent men among
them, and those few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely,
too, to be drained away from it, before they can have acquired experience and
knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It is observed by Mr. de Voltaire,
that father Porée, a jesuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters,
was the only professor they had ever had in France, whose works were worth the
reading. In a country which has produced so many eminent men of letters, it
must appear somewhat singular, that scarce one of them should have been a
professor in a university. The famous Cassendi was, in the beginning of his
life, a professor in the university of Aix. Upon the first dawning of his
genius, it was represented to him, that by going into the church he could
easily find a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better
situation for pursuing his studies; and he immediately followed the advice. The
observation of Mr. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France,
but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find in any of them
an eminent man of letters, who is a professor in a university, except, perhaps,
in the professions of law and physic; professions from which the church is not
so likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England is by far the
richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In England, accordingly, the
church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest
members; and an old college tutor who is known and distinguished in Europe as
an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman
catholic country, In Geneva, on the contrary, in the protestant cantons of
Switzerland, in the protestant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland,
in Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries
have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been
professors in universities. In those countries, the universities are
continually draining the church of all its most eminent men of letters.

It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark, that, if we except the poets, a few
orators, and a few historians, the far greater part of the other eminent men of
letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private
teachers; generally either of philosophy or of rhetoric. This remark will be
found to hold true, from the days of Lysias and Isocrates, of Plato and
Aristotle, down to those of Plutarch and Epictetus, Suetonius, and Quintilian.
To impose upon any man the necessity of teaching, year after year, in any
particular branch of science seems in reality to be the most effectual method
for rendering him completely master of it himself. By being obliged to go every
year over the same ground, if he is good for any thing, he necessarily becomes,
in a few years, well acquainted with every part of it, and if, upon any
particular point, he should form too hasty an opinion one year, when he comes,
in the course of his lectures to reconsider the same subject the year
thereafter, he is very likely to correct it. As to be a teacher of science is
certainly the natural employment of a mere man of letters; so is it likewise,
perhaps, the education which is most likely to render him a man of solid
learning and knowledge. The mediocrity of church benefices naturally tends to
draw the greater part of men of letters in the country where it takes place, to
the employment in which they can be the most useful to the public, and at the
same time to give them the best education, perhaps, they are capable of
receiving. It tends to render their learning both as solid as possible, and as
useful as possible.

The revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may arise
from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the
general revenue of the state, which is thus diverted to a purpose very
different from the defence of the state. The tithe, for example, is a real land
tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute so
largely towards the defence of the state as they otherwise might be able to do.
The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund; and, according
to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the
exigencies of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this fund that
is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It
may be laid down as a certain maxim, that all other things being supposed
equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the
sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all cases, the
less able must the state be to defend itself. In several protestant countries,
particularly in all the protestant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which
anciently belonged to the Roman catholic church, the tithes and church lands,
has been found a fund sufficient, not only to afford competent salaries to the
established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other
expenses of the state. The magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in
particular, have accumulated, out of the savings from this fund, a very large
sum, supposed to amount to several millions; part of which is deposited in a
public treasure, and part is placed at interest in what are called the public
funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in those of France
and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expense which the
church, either of Berne, or of any other protestant canton, costs the state, I
do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the
whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or
church lands, and the rent of their manses or dwelling-houses, estimated
according to a reasonable valuation, amounted only to £68,514:1:5 1/12d. This
very moderate revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and
forty-four ministers. The whole expense of the church, including what is
occasionally laid out for the building and reparation of churches, and of the
manses of ministers, cannot well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five
thousand pounds a-year. The most opulent church in Christendom does not
maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of
order, regularity, and austere morals, in the great body of the people, than
this very poorly endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil
and religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are
produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the
protestant churches of Switzerland, which, in general, are not better endowed
than the church of Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In
the greater part of the protestant cantons, there is not a single person to be
found, who does not profess himself to be of the established church. If he
professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the
canton. But so severe, or, rather, indeed, so oppressive a law, could never
have been executed in such free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy
beforehand converted to the established church the whole body of the people,
with the exception of, perhaps, a few individuals only. In some parts of
Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a protestant and
Roman catholic country, the conversion has not been so complete, both religions
are not only tolerated, but established by law.

The proper performance of every service seems to require, that its pay or
recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the
service. If any service is very much underpaid, it is very apt to suffer by the
meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If
it is very much overpaid, it is apt to suffer, perhaps still more, by their
negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his
profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to
spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation. But
in a clergyman, this train of life not only consumes the time which ought to be
employed in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of the common people,
destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character, which can alone enable him
to perform those duties with proper weight and authority.

PART IV. Of the Expense of supporting the Dignity of the Sovereign.

Over and above the expenses necessary for enabling the sovereign to perform his
several duties, a certain expense is requisite for the support of his dignity.
This expense varies, both with the different periods of improvement, and with
the different forms of government.

In an opulent and improved society, where all the different orders of people
are growing every day more expensive in their houses, in their furniture, in
their tables, in their dress, and in their equipage; it cannot well be expected
that the sovereign should alone hold out against the fashion. He naturally,
therefore, or rather necessarily, becomes more expensive in all those different
articles too. His dignity even seems to require that he should become so.

As, in point of dignity, a monarch is more raised above his subjects than the
chief magistrate of any republic is ever supposed to be above his
fellow-citizens; so a greater expense is necessary for supporting that higher
dignity. We naturally expect more splendour in the court of a king, than in the
mansion-house of a doge or burgo-master.

CONCLUSION.

The expense of defending the society, and that of supporting the dignity of the
chief magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole
society. It is reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the
general contribution of the whole society; all the different members
contributing, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective
abilities.

The expense of the administration of justice, too, may no doubt be considered
as laid out for the benefit of the whole society. There is no impropriety,
therefore, in its being defrayed by the general contribution of the whole
society. The persons, however, who give occasion to this expense, are those
who, by their injustice in one way or another, make it necessary to seek
redress or protection from the courts of justice. The persons, again, most
immediately benefited by this expense, are those whom the courts of justice
either restore to their rights, or maintain in their rights. The expense of the
administration of justice, therefore, may very properly be defrayed by the
particular contribution of one or other, or both, of those two different sets
of persons, according as different occasions may require, that is, by the fees
of court. It cannot be necessary to have recourse to the general contribution
of the whole society, except for the conviction of those criminals who have not
themselves any estate or fund sufficient for paying those fees.

Those local or provincial expenses, of which the benefit is local or provincial
(what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town or
district), ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and ought to
be no burden upon the general revenue of the society. It is unjust that the
whole society should contribute towards an expense, of which the benefit is
confined to a part of the society.

The expense of maintaining good roads and communications is, no doubt,
beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any injustice, be
defrayed by the general contributions of the whole society. This expense,
however, is most immediately and directly beneficial to those who travel or
carry goods from one place to another, and to those who consume such goods. The
turnpike tolls in England, and the duties called peages in other countries, lay
it altogether upon those two different sets of people, and thereby discharge
the general revenue of the society from a very considerable burden.

The expense of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is
likewise, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore,
without injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole
society. This expense, however, might, perhaps, with equal propriety, and even
with some advantage, be defrayed altogether by those who receive the immediate
benefit of such education and instruction, or by the voluntary contribution of
those who think they have occasion for either the one or the other.

When the institutions, or public works, which are beneficial to the whole
society, either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained
altogether, by the contribution of such particular members of the society as
are most immediately benefited by them; the deficiency must, in most cases, be
made up by the general contribution of the whole society. The general revenue
of the society, over and above defraying the expense of defending the society,
and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, must make up for the
deficiency of many particular branches of revenue. The sources of this general
or public revenue, I shall endeavour to explain in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.
OF THE SOURCES OF THE GENERAL OR PUBLIC REVENUE OF THE SOCIETY.

The revenue which must defray, not only the expense of defending the society
and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, but all the other
necessary expenses of government, for which the constitution of the state has
not provided any particular revenue may be drawn, either, first, from some fund
which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is
independent of the revenue of the people; or, secondly, from the revenue of the
people.

PART I. Of the Funds, or Sources, of Revenue, which may peculiarly belong
to the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

The funds, or sources, of revenue, which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign
or commonwealth, must consist, either in stock, or in land.

The sovereign, like, any other owner of stock, may derive a revenue from it,
either by employing it himself, or by lending it. His revenue is, in the one
case, profit, in the other interest.

The revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief consists in profit. It arises
principally from the milk and increase of his own herds and flocks, of which he
himself superintends the management, and is the principal shepherd or herdsman
of his own horde or tribe. It is, however, in this earliest and rudest state of
civil government only, that profit has ever made the principal part of the
public revenue of a monarchical state.

Small republics have sometimes derived a considerable revenue from the profit
of mercantile projects. The republic of Hamburgh is said to do so from the
profits of a public wine-cellar and apothecary’s shop. {See Memoires
concernant les Droits et Impositions en Europe, tome i. page 73. This work was
compiled by the order of the court, for the use of a commission employed for
some years past in considering the proper means for reforming the finances of
France. The account of the French taxes, which takes up three volumes in
quarto, may be regarded as perfectly authentic. That of those of other European
nations was compiled from such information as the French ministers at the
different courts could procure. It is much shorter, and probably not quite so
exact as that of the French taxes.} That state cannot be very great, of which
the sovereign has leisure to carry on the trade of a wine-merchant or an
apothecary. The profit of a public bank has been a source of revenue to more
considerable states. It has been so, not only to Hamburgh, but to Venice and
Amsterdam. A revenue of this kind has even by some people been thought not
below the attention of so great an empire as that of Great Britain. Reckoning
the ordinary dividend of the bank of England at five and a-half per cent., and
its capital at ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds, the neat
annual profit, after paying the expense of management, must amount, it is said,
to five hundred and ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds. Government, it is
pretended, could borrow this capital at three per cent. interest, and, by
taking the management of the bank into its own hands, might make a clear profit
of two hundred and sixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a-year. The orderly,
vigilant, and parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of
Venice and Amsterdam, is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the
management of a mercantile project of this kind. But whether such a government
as that of England, which, whatever may be its virtues, has never been famous
for good economy; which, in time of peace, has generally conducted itself with
the slothful and negligent profusion that is, perhaps, natural to monarchies;
and, in time of war, has constantly acted with all the thoughtless extravagance
that democracies are apt to fall into, could be safely trusted with the
management of such a project, must at least be a good deal more doubtful.

The post-office is properly a mercantile project. The government advances the
expense of establishing the different offices, and of buying or hiring the
necessary horses or carriages, and is repaid, with a large profit, by the
duties upon what is carried. It is, perhaps, the only mercantile project which
has been successfully managed by, I believe, every sort of government. The
capital to be advanced is not very considerable. There is no mystery in the
business. The returns are not only certain but immediate.

Princes, however, have frequently engaged in many other mercantile projects,
and have been willing, like private persons, to mend their fortunes, by
becoming adventurers in the common branches of trade. They have scarce ever
succeeded. The profusion with which the affairs of princes are always managed,
renders it almost impossible that they should. The agents of a prince regard
the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless at what price they
buy, are careless at what price they sell, are careless at what expense they
transport his goods from one place to another. Those agents frequently live
with the profusion of princes; and sometimes, too, in spite of that profusion,
and by a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire the fortunes of
princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that the agents of Lorenzo
of Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities, carried on his trade. The republic
of Florence was several times obliged to pay the debt into which their
extravagance had involved him. He found it convenient, accordingly to give up
the business of merchant, the business to which his family had originally owed
their fortune, and, in the latter part of his life, to employ both what
remained of that fortune, and the revenue of the state, of which he had the
disposal, in projects and expenses more suitable to his station.

No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign. If
the trading spirit of the English East India company renders them very bad
sovereigns, the spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered them equally bad
traders. While they were traders only, they managed their trade successfully,
and were able to pay from their profits a moderate dividend to the proprietors
of their stock. Since they became sovereigns, with a revenue which, it is said,
was originally more than three millions sterling, they have been obliged to beg
the ordinary assistance of government, in order to avoid immediate bankruptcy.
In their former situation, their servants in India considered themselves as the
clerks of merchants; in their present situation, those servants consider
themselves as the ministers of sovereigns.

A state may sometimes derive some part of its public revenue from the interest
of money, as well as from the profits of stock. If it has amassed a treasure,
it may lend a part of that treasure, either to foreign states, or to its own
subjects.

The canton of Berne derives a considerable revenue by lending a part of its
treasure to foreign states, that is, by placing it in the public funds of the
different indebted nations of Europe, chiefly in those of France and England.
The security of this revenue must depend, first, upon the security of the funds
in which it is placed, or upon the good faith of the government which has the
management of them; and, secondly, upon the certainty or probability of the
continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the case of a war, the very
first act of hostility on the part of the debtor nation might be the forfeiture
of the funds of its credit. This policy of lending money to foreign states is,
so far as I know peculiar to the canton of Berne.

The city of Hamburgh {See Memoire concernant les Droites et Impositions en
Europe tome i p. 73.}has established a sort of public pawn-shop, which lends
money to the subjects of the state, upon pledges, at six per cent. interest.
This pawn-shop, or lombard, as it is called, affords a revenue, it is
pretended, to the state, of a hundred and fifty thousand crowns, which, at four
and sixpence the crown, amounts to £33,750 sterling.

The government of Pennsylvania, without amassing any treasure, invented a
method of lending, not money, indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its
subjects. By advancing to private people, at interest, and upon land security
to double the value, paper bills of credit, to be redeemed fifteen years after
their date; and, in the mean time, made transferable from hand to hand, like
banknotes, and declared by act of assembly to be a legal tender in all payments
from one inhabitant of the province to another, it raised a moderate revenue,
which went a considerable way towards defraying an annual expense of about
£4,500, the whole ordinary expense of that frugal and orderly government. The
success of an expedient of this kind must have depended upon three different
circumstances: first, upon the demand for some other instrument of commerce,
besides gold and silver money, or upon the demand for such a quantity of
consumable stock as could not be had without sending abroad the greater part of
their gold and silver money, in order to purchase it; secondly, upon the good
credit of the government which made use of this expedient; and, thirdly, upon
the moderation with which it was used, the whole value of the paper bills of
credit never exceeding that of the gold and silver money which would have been
necessary for carrying on their circulation, had there been no paper bills of
credit. The same expedient was, upon different occasions, adopted by several
other American colonies; but, from want of this moderation, it produced, in the
greater part of them, much more disorder than conveniency.

The unstable and perishable nature of stock and credit, however, renders them
unfit to be trusted to as the principal funds of that sure, steady, and
permanent revenue, which can alone give security and dignity to government. The
government of no great nation, that was advanced beyond the shepherd state,
seems ever to have derived the greater part of its public revenue from such
sources.

Land is a fund of more stable and permanent nature; and the rent of public
lands, accordingly, has been the principal source of the public revenue of many
a great nation that was much advanced beyond the shepherd state. From the
produce or rent of the public lands, the ancient republics of Greece and Italy
derived for a long time the greater part of that revenue which defrayed the
necessary expenses of the commonwealth. The rent of the crown lands constituted
for a long time the greater part of the revenue of the ancient sovereigns of
Europe.

War, and the preparation for war, are the two circumstances which, in modern
times, occasion the greater part of the necessary expense or all great states.
But in the ancient republics of Greece and Italy, every citizen was a soldier,
and both served, and prepared himself for service, at his own expense. Neither
of those two circumstances, therefore, could occasion any very considerable
expense to the state. The rent of a very moderate landed estate might be fully
sufficient for defraying all the other necessary expenses of government.

In the ancient monarchies of Europe, the manners and customs of the time
sufficiently prepared the great body of the people for war; and when they took
the field, they were, by the condition of their feudal tenures, to be
maintained either at their own expense, or at that of their immediate lords,
without bringing any new charge upon the sovereign. The other expenses of
government were, the greater part of them, very moderate. The administration of
justice, it has been shewn, instead of being a cause of expense was a source of
revenue. The labour of the country people, for three days before, and for three
days after, harvest, was thought a fund sufficient for making and maintaining
all the bridges, highways, and other public works, which the commerce of the
country was supposed to require. In those days the principal expense of the
sovereign seems to have consisted in the maintenance of his own family and
household. The officers of his household, accordingly, were then the great
officers of state. The lord treasurer received his rents. The lord steward and
lord chamberlain looked after the expense of his family. The care of his
stables was committed to the lord constable and the lord marshal. His houses
were all built in the form of castles, and seem to have been the principal
fortresses which he possessed. The keepers of those houses or castles might be
considered as a sort of military governors. They seem to have been the only
military officers whom it was necessary to maintain in time of peace. In these
circumstances, the rent of a great landed estate might, upon ordinary
occasions, very well defray all the necessary expenses of government.

In the present state of the greater part of the civilized monarchies of Europe,
the rent of all the lands in the country, managed as they probably would be, if
they all belonged to one proprietor, would scarce, perhaps, amount to the
ordinary revenue which they levy upon the people even in peaceable times. The
ordinary revenue of Great Britain, for example, including not only what is
necessary for defraying the current expense of the year, but for paying the
interest of the public debts, and for sinking a part of the capital of those
debts, amounts to upwards of ten millions a-year. But the land tax, at four
shillings in the pound, falls short of two millions a-year. This land tax, as
it is called however, is supposed to be one-fifth, not only of the rent of all
the land, but of that of all the houses, and of the interest of all the capital
stock of Great Britain, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to
the public, or employed as farming stock in the cultivation of land. A very
considerable part of the produce of this tax arises from the rent of houses and
the interest of capital stock. The land tax of the city of London, for example,
at four shillings in the pound, amounts to £123,399: 6: 7; that of the city of
Westminster to £63,092: 1: 5; that of the palaces of Whitehall and St.
James’s, to £30,754: 6: 3. A certain proportion of the land tax is, in
the same manner, assessed upon all the other cities and towns corporate in the
kingdom; and arises almost altogether, either from the rent of houses, or from
what is supposed to be the interest of trading and capital stock. According to
the estimation, therefore, by which Great Britain is rated to the land tax, the
whole mass of revenue arising from the rent of all the lands, from that of all
the houses, and from the interest of all the capital stock, that part of it
only excepted which is either lent to the public, or employed in the
cultivation of land, does not exceed ten millions sterling a-year, the ordinary
revenue which government levies upon the people, even in peaceable times. The
estimation by which Great Britain is rated to the land tax is, no doubt, taking
the whole kingdom at an average, very much below the real value; though in
several particular counties and districts it is said to be nearly equal to that
value. The rent of the lands alone, exclusive of that of houses and of the
interest of stock, has by many people been estimated at twenty millions; an
estimation made in a great measure at random, and which, I apprehend, is as
likely to be above as below the truth. But if the lands of Great Britain, in
the present state of their cultivation, do not afford a rent of more than
twenty millions a-year, they could not well afford the half, most probably not
the fourth part of that rent, if they all belonged to a single proprietor, and
were put under the negligent, expensive, and oppressive management of his
factors and agents. The crown lands of Great Britain do not at present afford
the fourth part of the rent which could probably be drawn from them if they
were the property of private persons. If the crown lands were more extensive,
it is probable, they would be still worse managed.

The revenue which the great body of the people derives from land is, in
proportion, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. The whole annual
produce of the land of every country, if we except what is reserved for seed,
is either annually consumed by the great body of the people, or exchanged for
something else that is consumed by them. Whatever keeps down the produce of the
land below what it would otherwise rise to, keeps down the revenue of the great
body of the people, still more than it does that of the proprietors of land.
The rent of land, that portion of the produce which belongs to the proprietors,
is scarce anywhere in Great Britain supposed to be more than a third part of
the whole produce. If the land which, in one state of cultivation, affords a
revenue of ten millions sterling a-year, would in another afford a rent of
twenty millions; the rent being, in both cases, supposed a third part of the
produce, the revenue of the proprietors would be less than it otherwise might
be, by ten millions a-year only; but the revenue of the great body of the
people would be less than it otherwise might be, by thirty millions a-year,
deducting only what would be necessary for seed. The population of the country
would be less by the number of people which thirty millions a-year, deducting
always the seed, could maintain, according to the particular mode of living,
and expense which might take place in the different ranks of men, among whom
the remainder was distributed.

Though there is not at present in Europe, any civilized state of any kind which
derives the greater part of its public revenue from the rent of lands which are
the property of the state; yet, in all the great monarchies of Europe, there
are still many large tracts of land which belong to the crown. They are
generally forest, and sometimes forests where, after travelling several miles,
you will scarce find a single tree; a mere waste and loss of country, in
respect both of produce and population. In every great monarchy of Europe, the
sale of the crown lands would produce a very large sum of money, which, if
applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much
greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown. In
countries where lands, improved and cultivated very highly, and yielding, at
the time of sale, as great a rent as can easily be got from them, commonly sell
at thirty years purchase; the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown
lands, might well be expected to sell at forty, fifty, or sixty years purchase.
The crown might immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would
redeem from mortgage. In the course of a few years, it would probably enjoy
another revenue. When the crown lands had become private property, they would,
in the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated. The
increase of their produce would increase the population of the country, by
augmenting the revenue and consumption of the people. But the revenue which the
crown derives from the duties or custom and excise, would necessarily increase
with the revenue and consumption of the people.

The revenue which, in any civilized monarchy, the crown derives from the crown
lands, though it appears to cost nothing to individuals, in reality costs more
to the society than perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys. It
would, in all cases, be for the interest of the society, to replace this
revenue to the crown by some other equal revenue, and to divide the lands among
the people, which could not well be done better, perhaps, than by exposing them
to public sale.

Lands, for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence, parks, gardens, public
walks, etc. possessions which are everywhere considered as causes of expense,
not as sources of revenue, seem to be the only lands which, in a great and
civilized monarchy, ought to belong to the crown.

Public stock and public lands, therefore, the two sources of revenue which may
peculiarly belong to the sovereign or commonwealth, being both improper and
insufficient funds for defraying the necessary expense of any great and
civilized state; it remains that this expense must, the greater part of it, be
defrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the people contributing a part of
their own private revenue, in order to make up a public revenue to the
sovereign or commonwealth.

PART II. Of Taxes.

The private revenue of individuals, it has been shown in the first book of this
Inquiry, arises, ultimately from three different sources; rent, profit, and
wages. Every tax must finally be paid from some one or other of those three
different sources of revenue, or from all of them indifferently. I shall
endeavour to give the best account I can, first, of those taxes which, it is
intended should fall upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is intended should
fall upon profit; thirdly, of those which, it is intended should fall upon
wages; and fourthly, of those which, it is intended should fall indifferently
upon all those three different sources of private revenue. The particular
consideration of each of these four different sorts of taxes will divide the
second part of the present chapter into four articles, three of which will
require several other subdivisions. Many of these taxes, it will appear from
the following review, are not finally paid from the fund, or source of revenue,
upon which it is intended they should fall.

Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes, it is necessary to
premise the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities;
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a
great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great
estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective
interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim, consists
what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it must be
observed once for all, which falls finally upon one only of the three sorts of
revenue above mentioned, is necessarily unequal, in so far as it does not
affect the other two. In the following examination of different taxes, I shall
seldom take much farther notice of this sort of inequality; but shall, in most
cases, confine my observations to that inequality which is occasioned by a
particular tax falling unequally upon that particular sort of private revenue
which is affected by it.

2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay, ought to be certain and not
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid,
ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.
Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in
the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any
obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some
present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the
insolence, and favours the corruption, of an order of men who are naturally
unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of
what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great
importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I
believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a
very small degree of uncertainty.

3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is
most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent
of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually
paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the
contributor to pay; or when he is most likely to have wherewithall to pay.
Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally
paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for
him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As
he is at liberty too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be
his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such
taxes.

4. Every tax ought to be so contrived, as both to take out and to keep out of
the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings
into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of
the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public
treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may require a
great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the
produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax
upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and
discourage them from applying to certain branches of business which might give
maintenance and employment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to
pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some of the funds which might
enable them more easily to do so. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other
penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur, who attempt unsuccessfully
to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the
benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their
capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling. But the
penalties of smuggling must arise in proportion to the temptation. The law,
contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the
temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances
the punishment, too, in proportion to the very circumstance which ought
certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime. {See Sketches of
the History of Man page 474, and Seq.} Fourthly, by subjecting the people to
the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may
expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though
vexation is not, strictly speaking, expense, it is certainly equivalent to the
expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in
some one or other of these four different ways, that taxes are frequently so
much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign.

The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have recommended them,
more or less, to the attention of all nations. All nations have endeavoured, to
the best of their judgment, to render their taxes as equal as they could
contrive; as certain, as convenient to the contributor, both the time and the
mode of payment, and in proportion to the revenue which they brought to the
prince, as little burdensome to the people. The following short review of some
of the principal taxes which have taken place in different ages and countries,
will show, that the endeavours of all nations have not in this respect been
equally successful.

ARTICLE I.—Taxes upon Rent—Taxes upon the Rent of Land.

A tax upon the rent of land may either be imposed according to a certain canon,
every district being valued at a curtain rent, which valuation is not
afterwards to be altered; or it may be imposed in such a manner, as to vary
with every variation in the real rent of the land, and to rise or fall with the
improvement or declension of its cultivation.

A land tax which, like that of Great Britain, is assessed upon each district
according to a certain invariable canon, though it should be equal at the time
of its first establishment, necessarily becomes unequal in process of time,
according to the unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation
of the different parts of the country. In England, the valuation, according to
which the different counties and parishes were assessed to the land tax by the
4th of William and Mary, was very unequal even at its first establishment. This
tax, therefore, so far offends against the first of the four maxims above
mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It is perfectly
certain. The time of payment for the tax, being the same as that for the rent,
is as convenient as it can be to the contributor. Though the landlord is, in
all cases, the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to
whom the landlord is obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent. This tax
is levied by a much smaller number of officers than any other which affords
nearly the same revenue. As the tax upon each district does not rise with the
rise of the rent, the sovereign does not share in the profits of the
landlord’s improvements. Those improvements sometimes contribute, indeed,
to the discharge of the other landlords of the district. But the aggravation of
the tax, which this may sometimes occasion upon a particular estate, is always
so very small, that it never can discourage those improvements, nor keep down
the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to. As it has no
tendency to diminish the quantity, it can have none to raise the price of that
produce. It does not obstruct the industry of the people; it subjects the
landlord to no other inconveniency besides the unavoidable one of paying the
tax. The advantage, however, which the land-lord has derived from the
invariable constancy of the valuation, by which all the lands of Great Britain
are rated to the land-tax, has been principally owing to some circumstances
altogether extraneous to the nature of the tax.

It has been owing in part, to the great prosperity of almost every part of the
country, the rents of almost all the estates of Great Britain having, since the
time when this valuation was first established, been continually rising, and
scarce any of them having fallen. The landlords, therefore, have almost all
gained the difference between the tax which they would have paid, according to
the present rent of their estates, and that which they actually pay according
to the ancient valuation. Had the state of the country been different, had
rents been gradually falling in consequence of the declension of cultivation,
the landlords would almost all have lost this difference. In the state of
things which has happened to take place since the revolution, the constancy of
the valuation has been advantageous to the landlord and hurtful to the
sovereign. In a different state of things it might have been advantageous to
the sovereign and hurtful to the landlord.

As the tax is made payable in money, so the valuation of the land is expressed
in money. Since the establishment of this valuation, the value of silver has
been pretty uniform, and there has been no alteration in the standard of the
coin, either as to weight or fineness. Had silver risen considerably in its
value, as it seems to have done in the course of the two centuries which
preceded the discovery of the mines of America, the constancy of the valuation
might have proved very oppressive to the landlord. Had silver fallen
considerably in its value, as it certainly did for about a century at least
after the discovery of those mines, the same constancy of valuation would have
reduced very much this branch of the revenue of the sovereign. Had any
considerable alteration been made in the standard of the money, either by
sinking the same quantity of silver to a lower denomination, or by raising it
to a higher; had an ounce of silver, for example, instead of being coined into
five shillings and two pence, been coined either into pieces which bore so low
a denomination as two shillings and seven pence, or into pieces which bore so
high a one as ten shillings and four pence, it would, in the one case, have
hurt the revenue of the proprietor, in the other that of the sovereign.

In circumstances, therefore, somewhat different from those which have actually
taken place, this constancy of valuation might have been a very great
inconveniency, either to the contributors or to the commonwealth. In the course
of ages, such circumstances, however, must at some time or other happen. But
though empires, like all the other works of men, have all hitherto proved
mortal, yet every empire aims at immortality. Every constitution, therefore,
which it is meant should be as permanent as the empire itself, ought to be
convenient, not in certain circumstances only, but in all circumstances; or
ought to be suited, not to those circumstances which are transitory,
occasional, or accidental, but to those which are necessary, and therefore
always the same.

A tax upon the rent of land, which varies with every variation of the rent, or
which rises and falls according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation,
is recommended by that sect of men of letters in France, who call themselves
the economists, as the most equitable of all taxes. All taxes, they pretend,
fall ultimately upon the rent of land, and ought, therefore, to be imposed
equally upon the fund which must finally pay them. That all taxes ought to fall
as equally as possible upon the fund which must finally pay them, is certainly
true. But without entering into the disagreeable discussion of the metaphysical
arguments by which they support their very ingenious theory, it will
sufficiently appear, from the following review, what are the taxes which fall
finally upon the rent of the land, and what are those which fall finally upon
some other fund.

In the Venetian territory, all the arable lands which are given in lease to
farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent. {Memoires concernant les Droits, p.
240, 241.} The leases are recorded in a public register, which is kept by the
officers of revenue in each province or district. When the proprietor
cultivates his own lands, they are valued according to an equitable estimation,
and he is allowed a deduction of one-fifth of the tax; so that for such land he
pays only eight instead of ten per cent. of the supposed rent.

A land-tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax of England.
It might not, perhaps, be altogether so certain, and the assessment of the tax
might frequently occasion a good deal more trouble to the landlord. It might,
too, be a good deal more expensive in the levying.

Such a system of administration, however, might, perhaps, be contrived, as
would in a great measure both prevent this uncertainty, and moderate this
expense.

The landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to record their
lease in a public register. Proper penalties might be enacted against
concealing or misrepresenting any of the conditions; and if part of those
penalties were to be paid to either of the two parties who informed against and
convicted the other of such concealment or misrepresentation, it would
effectually deter them from combining together in order to defraud the public
revenue. All the conditions of the lease might be sufficiently known from such
a record.

Some landlords, instead of raising the rent, take a fine for the renewal of the
lease. This practice is, in most cases, the expedient of a spendthrift, who,
for a sum of ready money sells a future revenue of much greater value. It is,
in most cases, therefore, hurtful to the landlord; it is frequently hurtful to
the tenant; and it is always hurtful to the community. It frequently takes from
the tenant so great a part of his capital, and thereby diminishes so much his
ability to cultivate the land, that he finds it more difficult to pay a small
rent than it would otherwise have been to pay a great one. Whatever diminishes
his ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down, below what it would otherwise
have been, the most important part of the revenue of the community. By
rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal heavier than upon the ordinary
rent, this hurtful practice might be discouraged, to the no small advantage of
all the different parties concerned, of the landlord, of the tenant, of the
sovereign, and of the whole community.

Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of cultivation, and a
certain succession of crops, during the whole continuance of the lease. This
condition, which is generally the effect of the landlord’s conceit of his
own superior knowledge (a conceit in most cases very ill-founded), ought always
to be considered as an additional rent, as a rent in service, instead of a rent
in money. In order to discourage the practice, which is generally a foolish
one, this species of rent might be valued rather high, and consequently taxed
somewhat higher than common money-rents.

Some landlords, instead of a rent in money, require a rent in kind, in corn,
cattle, poultry, wine, oil, etc.; others, again, require a rent in service.
Such rents are always more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the
landlord. They either take more, or keep more out of the pocket of the former,
than they put into that of the latter. In every country where they take place,
the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according to the degree in which
they take place. By valuing, in the same manner, such rents rather high, and
consequently taxing them somewhat higher than common money-rents, a practice
which is hurtful to the whole community, might, perhaps, be sufficiently
discouraged.

When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own lands, the rent
might be valued according to an equitable arbitration of the farmers and
landlords in the neighbourhood, and a moderate abatement of the tax might be
granted to him, in the same manner as in the Venetian territory, provided the
rent of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain sum. It is of
importance that the landlord should be encouraged to cultivate a part of his
own land. His capital is generally greater than that of the tenant, and, with
less skill, he can frequently raise a greater produce. The landlord can afford
to try experiments, and is generally disposed to do so. His unsuccessful
experiments occasion only a moderate loss to himself. His successful ones
contribute to the improvement and better cultivation of the whole country. It
might be of importance, however, that the abatement of the tax should encourage
him to cultivate to a certain extent only. If the landlords should, the greater
part of them, be tempted to farm the whole of their own lands, the country
(instead of sober and industrious tenants, who are bound by their own interest
to cultivate as well as their capital and skill will allow them) would be
filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, whose abusive management would soon
degrade the cultivation, and reduce the annual produce of the land, to the
diminution, not only of the revenue of their masters, but of the most important
part of that of the whole society.

Such a system of administration might, perhaps, free a tax of this kind from
any degree of uncertainty, which could occasion either oppression or
inconveniency to the contributor; and might, at the same time, serve to
introduce into the common management of land such a plan of policy as might
contribute a good deal to the general improvement and good cultivation of the
country.

The expense of levying a land-tax, which varied with every variation of the
rent, would, no doubt, be somewhat greater than that of levying one which was
always rated according to a fixed valuation. Some additional expense would
necessarily be incurred, both by the different register-offices which it would
be proper to establish in the different districts of the country, and by the
different valuations which might occasionally be made of the lands which the
proprietor chose to occupy himself. The expense of all this, however, might be
very moderate, and much below what is incurred in the levying of many other
taxes, which afford a very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might
easily be drawn from a tax of this kind.

The discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give to the
improvement of land, seems to be the most important objection which can be made
to it. The landlord would certainly be less disposed to improve, when the
sovereign, who contributed nothing to the expense, was to share in the profit
of the improvement. Even this objection might, perhaps, be obviated, by
allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to ascertain, in
conjunction with the officers of revenue, the actual value of his lands,
according to the equitable arbitration of a certain number of landlords and
farmers in the neighbourhood, equally chosen by both parties: and by rating
him, according to this valuation, for such a number of years as might be fully
sufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the attention of the
sovereign towards the improvement of the land, from a regard to the increase of
his own revenue, is one or the principal advantages proposed by this species of
land-tax. The term, therefore, allowed, for the indemnification of the
landlord, ought not to be a great deal longer than what was necessary for that
purpose, lest the remoteness of the interest should discourage too much this
attention. It had better, however, be somewhat too long, than in any respect
too short. No incitement to the attention of the sovereign can ever
counterbalance the smallest discouragement to that of the landlord. The
attention of the sovereign can be, at best, but a very general and vague
consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the
greater part of his dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular
and minute consideration of what is likely to be the most advantageous
application of every inch of ground upon his estate. The principal attention of
the sovereign ought to be, to encourage, by every means in his power, the
attention both of the landlord and of the farmer, by allowing both to pursue
their own interest in their own way, and according to their own judgment; by
giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full
recompence of their own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive
market for every part of their produce, in consequence of establishing the
easiest and safest communications, both by land and by water, through every
part of his own dominions, as well as the most unbounded freedom of exportation
to the dominions of all other princes.

If, by such a system of administration, a tax of this kind could be so managed
as to give, not only no discouragement, but, on the contrary, some
encouragement to the improvement or land, it does not appear likely to occasion
any other inconveniency to the landlord, except always the unavoidable one of
being obliged to pay the tax. In all the variations of the state of the
society, in the improvement and in the declension of agriculture; in all the
variations in the value of silver, and in all those in the standard of the
coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own accord, and without any attention of
government, readily suit itself to the actual situation of things, and would be
equally just and equitable in all those different changes. It would, therefore,
be much more proper to be established as a perpetual and unalterable
regulation, or as what is called a fundamental law of the commonwealth, than
any tax which was always to be levied according to a certain valuation.

Some states, instead of the simple and obvious expedient of a register of
leases, have had recourse to the laborious and expensive one of an actual
survey and valuation of all the lands in the country. They have suspected,
probably, that the lessor and lessee, in order to defraud the public revenue,
might combine to conceal the real terms of the lease. Doomsday-book seems to
have been the result of a very accurate survey of this kind.

In the ancient dominions of the king of Prussia, the land-tax is assessed
according to an actual survey and valuation, which is reviewed and altered from
time to time. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. tom, i. p. 114, 115, 116,
etc.} According to that valuation, the lay proprietors pay from twenty to
twenty-five per cent. of their revenue; ecclesiastics from forty to forty-five
per cent. The survey and valuation of Silesia was made by order of the present
king, it is said, with great accuracy. According to that valuation, the lands
belonging to the bishop of Breslaw are taxed at twenty-five per cent. of their
rent. The other revenues of the ecclesiastics of both religions at fifty per
cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order, and of that of Malta, at forty
per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at thirty-eight and one-third per cent.
Lands held by a base tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent.

The survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work of more than
a hundred years. It was not perfected till after the peace of 1748, by the
orders of the present empress queen. {Id. tom i. p.85, 84.} The survey of the
duchy of Milan, which was begun in the time of Charles VI., was not perfected
till after 1760. It is esteemed one of the most accurate that has ever been
made. The survey of Savoy and Piedmont was executed under the orders of the
late king of Sardinia. {Id. p. 280, etc.; also p, 287. etc. to 316.}

In the dominions of the king of Prussia, the revenue of the church is taxed
much higher than that of lay proprietors. The revenue of the church is, the
greater part of it, a burden upon the rent of land. It seldom happens that any
part of it is applied towards the improvement of land; or is so employed as to
contribute, in any respect, towards increasing the revenue of the great body of
the people. His Prussian majesty had probably, upon that account, thought it
reasonable that it should contribute a good deal more towards relieving the
exigencies of the state. In some countries, the lands of the church are
exempted from all taxes. In others, they are taxed more lightly than other
lands. In the duchy of Milan, the lands which the church possessed before 1575,
are rated to the tax at a third only or their value.

In Silesia, lands held by a noble tenure are taxed three per cent. higher than
those held by a base tenure. The honours and privileges of different kinds
annexed to the former, his Prussian majesty had probably imagined, would
sufficiently compensate to the proprietor a small aggravation of the tax;
while, at the same time, the humiliating inferiority of the latter would be in
some measure alleviated, by being taxed somewhat more lightly. In other
countries, the system of taxation, instead of alleviating, aggravates this
inequality. In the dominions of the king of Sardinia, and in those provinces of
France which are subject to what is called the real or predial taille, the tax
falls altogether upon the lands held by a base tenure. Those held by a noble
one are exempted.

A land tax assessed according to a general survey and valuation, how equal
soever it may be at first, must, in the course of a very moderate period of
time, become unequal. To prevent its becoming so would require the continual
and painful attention of government to all the variations in the state and
produce of every different farm in the country. The governments of Prussia, of
Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the duchy of Milan, actually exert an attention of
this kind; an attention so unsuitable to the nature of government, that it is
not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is continued, will
probably, in the long-run, occasion much more trouble and vexation than it can
possibly bring relief to the contributors.

In 1666, the generality of Montauban was assessed to the real or predial
taille, according, it is said, to a very exact survey and valuation. {Memoires
concernant les Droits, etc. tom. ii p. 139, etc.} By 1727, this assessment had
become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconveniency, government
has found no better expedient, than to impose upon the whole generality an
additional tax of a hundred and twenty thousand livres. This additional tax is
rated upon all the different districts subject to the taille according to the
old assessment. But it is levied only upon those which, in the actual state of
things, are by that assessment under-taxed; and it is applied to the relief of
those which, by the same assessment, are over-taxed. Two districts, for
example, one of which ought, in the actual state of things, to be taxed at nine
hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres, are, by the old assessment, both
taxed at a thousand livres. Both these districts are, by the additional tax,
rated at eleven hundred livres each. But this additional tax is levied only
upon the district under-charged, and it is applied altogether to the relief of
that overcharged, which consequently pays only nine hundred livres. The
government neither gains nor loses by the additional tax, which is applied
altogether to remedy the inequalities arising from the old assessment. The
application is pretty much regulated according to the discretion of the
intendant of the generality, and must, therefore, be in a great measure
arbitrary.

Taxes which are proportioned, not in the Rent, but to the Produce of Land.

Taxes upon the produce of land are, In reality, taxes upon the rent; and though
they may be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the
landlord. When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax,
the farmer computes as well as he can, what the value of this portion is, one
year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a proportionable abatement
in the rent which he agrees to pay to the landlord. There is no farmer who does
not compute beforehand what the church tythe, which is a land tax of this kind,
is, one year with another, likely to amount to.

The tythe, and every other land tax of this kind, under the appearance of
perfect equality, are very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce
being in different situations, equivalent to a very different portion of the
rent. In some very rich lands, the produce is so great, that the one half of it
is fully sufficient to replace to the farmer his capital employed in
cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the
neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the same thing, the value of
the other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was no
tythe. But if a tenth of the produce is taken from him in the way of tythe, he
must require an abatement of the fifth part of his rent, otherwise he cannot
get back his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case, the rent of the
landlord, instead of amounting to a half, or five-tenths of the whole produce,
will amount only to four-tenths of it. In poorer lands, on the contrary, the
produce is sometimes so small, and the expense of cultivation so great, that it
requires four-fifths of the whole produce, to replace to the farmer his capital
with the ordinary profit. In this case, though there was no tythe, the rent of
the landlord could amount to no more than one-fifth or two-tenths of the whole
produce. But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the produce in the way of tythe,
he must require an equal abatement of the rent of the landlord, which will thus
be reduced to one-tenth only of the whole produce. Upon the rent of rich lands
the tythe may sometimes be a tax of no more than one-fifth part, or four
shillings in the pound; whereas upon that of poorer lands, it may sometimes be
a tax of one half, or of ten shillings in the pound.

The tythe, as it is frequently a very unequal tax upon the rent, so it is
always a great discouragement, both to the improvements of the landlord, and to
the cultivation of the farmer. The one cannot venture to make the most
important, which are generally the most expensive improvements; nor the other
to raise the most valuable, which are generally, too, the most expensive crops;
when the church, which lays out no part of the expense, is to share so very
largely in the profit. The cultivation of madder was, for a long time, confined
by the tythe to the United Provinces, which, being presbyterian countries, and
upon that account exempted from this destructive tax, enjoyed a sort of
monopoly of that useful dyeing drug against the rest of Europe. The late
attempts to introduce the culture of this plant into England, have been made
only in consequence of the statute, which enacted that five shillings an acre
should be received in lieu of all manner of tythe upon madder.

As through the greater part of Europe, the church, so in many different
countries of Asia, the state, is principally supported by a land tax,
proportioned not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. In China, the
principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of
all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very
moderately, that, in many provinces, it is said not to exceed a thirtieth part
of the ordinary produce. The land tax or land rent which used to be paid to the
Mahometan government of Bengal, before that country fell into the hands of the
English East India company, is said to have amounted to about a fifth part of
the produce. The land tax of ancient Egypt is said likewise to have amounted to
a fifth part.

In Asia, this sort of land tax is said to interest the sovereign in the
improvement and cultivation of land. The sovereigns of China, those of Bengal
while under the Mahometan govermnent, and those of ancient Egypt, are said,
accordingly, to have been extremely attentive to the making and maintaining of
good roads and navigable canals, in order to increase, as much as possible,
both the quantity and value of every part of the produce of the land, by
procuring to every part of it the most extensive market which their own
dominions could afford. The tythe of the church is divided into such small
portions that no one of its proprietors can have any interest of this kind. The
parson of a parish could never find his account, in making a road or canal to a
distant part of the country, in order to extend the market for the produce of
his own particular parish. Such taxes, when destined for the maintenance of the
state, have some advantages, which may serve in some measure to balance their
inconveniency. When destined for the maintenance of the church, they are
attended with nothing but inconveniency.

Taxes upon the produce of land may be levied, either in kind, or, according to
a certain valuation in money.

The parson of a parish, or a gentleman of small fortune who lives upon his
estate, may sometimes, perhaps find some advantage in receiving, the one his
tythe, and the other his rent, in kind. The quantity to be collected, and the
district within which it is to be collected, are so small, that they both can
oversee, with their own eyes, the collection and disposal of every part of what
is due to them. A gentleman of great fortune, who lived in the capital, would
be in danger of suffering much by the neglect, and more by the fraud, of his
factors and agents, if the rents of an estate in a distant province were to be
paid to him in this manner. The loss of the sovereign, from the abuse and
depredation of his tax-gatherers, would necessarily be much greater. The
servants of the most careless private person are, perhaps, more under the eye
of their master than those of the most careful prince; and a public revenue,
which was paid in kind, would suffer so much from the mismanagement of the
collectors, that a very small part of what was levied upon the people would
ever arrive at the treasury of the prince. Some part of the public revenue of
China, however, is said to be paid in this manner. The mandarins and other
tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice
of a payment, which is so much more liable to abuse than any payment in money.

A tax upon the produce of land, which is levied in money, may be levied, either
according to a valuation, which varies with all the variations of the market
price; or according to a fixed valuation, a bushel of wheat, for example, being
always valued at one and the same money price, whatever may be the state of the
market. The produce of a tax levied in the former way will vary only according
to the variations in the real produce of the land, according to the improvement
or neglect of cultivation. The produce of a tax levied in the latter way will
vary, not only according to the variations in the produce of the land, but
according both to those in the value of the precious metals, and those in the
quantity of those metals which is at different times contained in coin of the
same denomination. The produce of the former will always bear the same
proportion to the value of the real produce of the land. The produce of the
latter may, at different times, bear very different proportions to that value.

When, instead either of a certain portion of the produce of land, or of the
price of a certain portion, a certain sum of money is to be paid in full
compensation for all tax or tythe; the tax becomes, in this case, exactly of
the same nature with the land tax of England. It neither rises nor falls with
the rent of the land. It neither encourages nor discourages improvement. The
tythe in the greater part of those parishes which pay what is called a modus,
in lieu of all other tythe is a tax of this kind. During the Mahometan
government of Bengal, instead of the payment in kind of the fifth part of the
produce, a modus, and, it is said, a very moderate one, was established in the
greater part of the districts or zemindaries of the country. Some of the
servants of the East India company, under pretence of restoring the public
revenue to its proper value, have, in some provinces, exchanged this modus for
a payment in kind. Under their management, this change is likely both to
discourage cultivation, and to give new opportunities for abuse in the
collection of the public revenue, which has fallen very much below what it was
said to have been when it first fell under the management of the company. The
servants of the company may, perhaps, have profited by the change, but at the
expense, it is probable, both of their masters and of the country.

Taxes upon the Rent of Houses.

The rent of a house may be distinguished into two parts, of which the one may
very properly be called the building-rent; the other is commonly called the
ground-rent.

The building-rent is the interest or profit of the capital expended in building
the house. In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with other
trades, it is necessary that this rent should be sufficient, first, to pay him
the same interest which he would have got for his capital, if he had lent it
upon good security; and, secondly, to keep the house in constant repair, or,
what comes to the same thing, to replace, within a certain term of years, the
capital which had been employed in building it. The building-rent, or the
ordinary profit of building, is, therefore, everywhere regulated by the
ordinary interest of money. Where the market rate of interest is four per cent.
the rent of a house, which, over and above paying the ground-rent, affords six
or six and a-half per cent. upon the whole expense of building, may, perhaps,
afford a sufficient profit to the builder. Where the market rate of interest is
five per cent. it may perhaps require seven or seven and a half per cent. If,
in proportion to the interest of money, the trade of the builders affords at
any time much greater profit than this, it will soon draw so much capital from
other trades as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it affords at
any time much less than this, other trades will soon draw so much capital from
it as will again raise that profit.

Whatever part of the whole rent of a house is over and above what is sufficient
for affording this reasonable profit, naturally goes to the ground-rent; and,
where the owner of the ground and the owner of the building are two different
persons, is, in most cases, completely paid to the former. This surplus rent is
the price which the inhabitant of the house pays for some real or supposed
advantage of the situation. In country houses, at a distance from any great
town, where there is plenty of ground to chuse upon, the ground-rent is scarce
anything, or no more than what the ground which the house stands upon would
pay, if employed in agriculture. In country villas, in the neighbourhood of
some great town, it is sometimes a good deal higher; and the peculiar
conveniency or beauty of situation is there frequently very well paid for.
Ground-rents are generally highest in the capital, and in those particular
parts of it where there happens to be the greatest demand for houses, whatever
be the reason of that demand, whether for trade and business, for pleasure and
society, or for mere vanity and fashion.

A tax upon house-rent, payable by the tenant, and proportioned to the whole
rent of each house, could not, for any considerable time at least, affect the
building-rent. If the builder did not get his reasonable profit, he would be
obliged to quit the trade; which, by raising the demand for building, would, in
a short time, bring back his profit to its proper level with that of other
trades. Neither would such a tax fall altogether upon the ground-rent; but it
would divide itself in such a manner, as to fall partly upon the inhabitant of
the house, and partly upon the owner of the ground.

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular person judges that he can afford
for house-rent all expense of sixty pounds a-year; and let us suppose, too,
that a tax of four shillings in the pound, or of one-fifth, payable by the
inhabitant, is laid upon house-rent. A house of sixty pounds rent will, in that
case, cost him seventy-two pounds a-year, which is twelve pounds more than he
thinks he can afford. He will, therefore, content himself with a worse house,
or a house of fifty pounds rent, which, with the additional ten pounds that he
must pay for the tax, will make up the sum of sixty pounds a-year, the expense
which he judges he can afford, and, in order to pay the tax, he will give up a
part of the additional conveniency which he might have had from a house of ten
pounds a-year more rent. He will give up, I say, a part of this additional
conveniency; for he will seldom be obliged to give up the whole, but will, in
consequence of the tax, get a better house for fifty pounds a-year, than he
could have got if there had been no tax for as a tax of this kind, by taking
away this particular competitor, must diminish the competition for houses of
sixty pounds rent, so it must likewise diminish it for those of fifty pounds
rent, and in the same manner for those of all other rents, except the lowest
rent, for which it would for some time increase the competition. But the rents
of every class of houses for which the competition was diminished, would
necessarily be more or less reduced. As no part of this reduction, however,
could for any considerable time at least, affect the building-rent, the whole
of it must, in the long-run, necessarily fall upon the ground-rent. The final
payment of this tax, therefore, would fall partly upon the inhabitant of the
house, who, in order to pay his share, would be obliged to give up a part of
his conveniency; and partly upon the owner of the ground, who, in order to pay
his share, would be obliged to give up a part of his revenue. In what
proportion this final payment would be divided between them, it is not,
perhaps, very easy to ascertain. The division would probably be very different
in different circumstances, and a tax of this kind might, according to those
different circumstances, affect very unequally, both the inhabitant of the
house and the owner of the ground.

The inequality with which a tax of this kind might fall upon the owners of
different ground-rents, would arise altogether from the accidental inequality
of this division. But the inequality with which it might fall upon the
inhabitants of different houses, would arise, not only from this, but from
another cause. The proportion of the expense of house-rent to the whole expense
of living, is different in the different degrees of fortune. It is, perhaps,
highest in the highest degree, and it diminishes gradually through the inferior
degrees, so as in general to be lowest in the lowest degree. The necessaries of
life occasion the great expense of the poor. They find it difficult to get
food, and the greater part of their little revenue is spent in getting it. The
luxuries and vanities of life occasion the principal expense of the rich; and a
magnificent house embellishes and sets off to the best advantage all the other
luxuries and vanities which they possess. A tax upon house-rents, therefore,
would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; and in this sort of inequality
there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreasonable. It is not very
unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in
proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion.

The rent of houses, though it in some respects resembles the rent of land, is
in one respect essentially different from it. The rent of land is paid for the
use of a productive subject. The land which pays it produces it. The rent of
houses is paid for the use of an unproductive subject. Neither the house, nor
the ground which it stands upon, produce anything. The person who pays the
rent, therefore, must draw it from some other source of revenue, distinct from
and independent of this subject. A tax upon the rent of houses, so far as it
falls upon the inhabitants, must be drawn from the same source as the rent
itself, and must be paid from their revenue, whether derived from the wages of
labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land. So far as it falls upon the
inhabitants, it is one of those taxes which fall, not upon one only, but
indifferently upon all the three different sources of revenue; and is, in every
respect, of the same nature as a tax upon any other sort of consumable
commodities. In general, there is not perhaps, any one article of expense or
consumption by which the liberality or narrowness of a man’s whole
expense can be better judged of than by his house-rent. A proportional tax upon
this particular article of expense might, perhaps, produce a more considerable
revenue than any which has hitherto been drawn from it in any part of Europe.
If the tax, indeed, was very high, the greater part of people would endeavour
to evade it as much as they could, by contenting themselves with smaller
houses, and by turning the greater part of their expense into some other
channel.

The rent of houses might easily be ascertained with sufficient accuracy, by a
policy of the same kind with that which would be necessary for ascertaining the
ordinary rent of land. Houses not inhabited ought to pay no tax. A tax upon
them would fall altogether upon the proprietor, who would thus be taxed for a
subject which afforded him neither conveniency nor revenue. Houses inhabited by
the proprietor ought to be rated, not according to the expense which they might
have cost in building, but according to the rent which an equitable arbitration
might judge them likely to bring if leased to a tenant. If rated according to
the expense which they might have cost in building, a tax of three or four
shillings in the pound, joined with other taxes, would ruin almost all the rich
and great families of this, and, I believe, of every other civilized country.
Whoever will examine with attention the different town and country houses of
some of the richest and greatest families in this country, will find that, at
the rate of only six and a-half, or seven per cent. upon the original expense
of building, their house-rent is nearly equal to the whole neat rent of their
estates. It is the accumulated expense of several successive generations, laid
out upon objects of great beauty and magnificence, indeed, but, in proportion
to what they cost, of very small exchangeable value. {Since the first
publication of this book, a tax nearly upon the above-mentioned principles has
been imposed.}

Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of
houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rent of houses; it would
fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a
monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his
ground. More or less can be got for it, according as the competitors happen to
be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a particular spot
of ground at a greater or smaller expense. In every country, the greatest
number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there accordingly that
the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of those
competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they
would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the ground. Whether
the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant or by the owner of the ground,
would be of little importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for
the tax, the less he would incline to pay for the ground; so that the final
payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent. The
ground-rents of uninhabited houses ought to pay no tax. Both ground-rents, and
the ordinary rent of land, are a species of revenue which the owner, in many
cases, enjoys without any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this
revenue should be taken from him in order to defray the expenses of the state,
no discouragement will thereby be given to any sort of industry. The annual
produce of the land and labour of the society, the real wealth and revenue of
the great body of the people, might be the same after such a tax as before.
Ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are therefore, perhaps, the
species of revenue which can best bear to have a peculiar tax imposed upon
them.

Ground-rents seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar taxation,
than even the ordinary rent of land. The ordinary rent of land is, in many
cases, owing partly, at least, to the attention and good management of the
landlord. A very heavy tax might discourage, too much, this attention and good
management. Ground-rents, so far as they exceed the ordinary rent of land, are
altogether owing to the good government of the sovereign, which, by protecting
the industry either of the whole people or of the inhabitants of some
particular place, enables them to pay so much more than its real value for the
ground which they build their houses upon; or to make to its owner so much more
than compensation for the loss which he might sustain by this use of it.
Nothing can be more reasonable, than that a fund, which owes its existence to
the good government of the state, should be taxed peculiarly, or should
contribute something more than the greater part of other funds, towards the
support of that government.

Though, in many different countries of Europe, taxes have been imposed upon the
rent of houses, I do not know of any in which ground-rents have been considered
as a separate subject of taxation. The contrivers of taxes have, probably,
found some difficulty in ascertaining what part of the rent ought to be
considered as ground-rent, and what part ought to be considered as
building-rent. It should not, however, seem very difficult to distinguish those
two parts of the rent from one another.

In Great Britain the rent of houses is supposed to be taxed in the same
proportion as the rent of land, by what is called the annual land tax. The
valuation, according to which each different parish and district is assessed to
this tax, is always the same. It was originally extremely unequal, and it still
continues to be so. Through the greater part of the kingdom this tax falls
still more lightly upon the rent of houses than upon that of land. In some few
districts only, which were originally rated high, and in which the rents of
houses have fallen considerably, the land tax of three or four shillings in the
pound is said to amount to an equal proportion of the real rent of houses.
Untenanted houses, though by law subject to the tax, are, in most districts,
exempted from it by the favour of the assessors; and this exemption sometimes
occasions some little variation in the rate of particular houses, though that
of the district is always the same. Improvements of rent, by new buildings,
repairs, etc. go to the discharge of the district, which occasions still
further variations in the rate of particular houses.

In the province of Holland, {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. p. 223.}
every house is taxed at two and a-half per cent. of its value, without any
regard, either to the rent which it actually pays, or to the circumstance of
its being tenanted or untenanted. There seems to be a hardship in obliging the
proprietor to pay a tax for an untenanted house, from which he can derive no
revenue, especially so very heavy a tax. In Holland, where the market rate of
interest does not exceed three per cent., two and a-half per cent. upon the
whole value of the house must, in most cases, amount to more than a third of
the building-rent, perhaps of the whole rent. The valuation, indeed, according
to which the houses are rated, though very unequal, is said to be always below
the real value. When a house is rebuilt, improved, or enlarged, there is a new
valuation, and the tax is rated accordingly.

The contrivers of the several taxes which in England have, at different times,
been imposed upon houses, seem to have imagined that there was some great
difficulty in ascertaining, with tolerable exactness, what was the real rent of
every house. They have regulated their taxes, therefore, according to some more
obvious circumstance, such as they had probably imagined would, in most cases,
bear some proportion to the rent.

The first tax of this kind was hearth-money; or a tax of two shillings upon
every hearth. In order to ascertain how many hearths were in the house, it was
necessary that the tax-gatherer should enter every room in it. This odious
visit rendered the tax odious. Soon after the Revolution, therefore, it was
abolished as a badge of slavery.

The next tax of this kind was a tax of two shillings upon every dwelling-house
inhabited. A house with ten windows to pay four shillings more. A house with
twenty windows and upwards to pay eight shillings. This tax was afterwards so
far altered, that houses with twenty windows, and with less than thirty, were
ordered to pay ten shillings, and those with thirty windows and upwards to pay
twenty shillings. The number of windows can, in most cases, be counted from the
outside, and, in all cases, without entering every room in the house. The visit
of the tax-gatherer, therefore, was less offensive in this tax than in the
hearth-money.

This tax was afterwards repealed, and in the room of it was established the
window-tax, which has undergone two several alterations and augmentations. The
window tax, as it stands at present (January 1775), over and above the duty of
three shillings upon every house in England, and of one shilling upon every
house in Scotland, lays a duty upon every window, which in England augments
gradually from twopence, the lowest rate upon houses with not more than seven
windows, to two shillings, the highest rate upon houses with twenty-five
windows and upwards.

The principal objection to all such taxes is their inequality; an inequality of
the worst kind, as they must frequently fall much heavier upon the poor than
upon the rich. A house of ten pounds rent in a country town, may sometimes have
more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the
inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the
latter, yet, so far as his contribution is regulated by the window tax, he must
contribute more to the support of the state. Such taxes are, therefore,
directly contrary to the first of the four maxims above mentioned. They do not
seem to offend much against any of the other three.

The natural tendency of the window tax, and of all other taxes upon houses, is
to lower rents. The more a man pays for the tax, the less, it is evident, he
can afford to pay for the rent. Since the imposition of the window tax,
however, the rents of houses have, upon the whole, risen more or less, in
almost every town and village of Great Britain, with which I am acquainted.
Such has been, almost everywhere, the increase of the demand for houses, that
it has raised the rents more than the window tax could sink them; one of the
many proofs of the great prosperity of the country, and of the increasing
revenue of its inhabitants. Had it not been for the tax, rents would probably
have risen still higher.

ARTICLE II.—Taxes upon Profit, or upon the Revenue arising from Stock.

The revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two
parts; that which pays the interest, and which belongs to the owner of the
stock; and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for
paying the interest.

This latter part of profit is evidently a subject not taxable directly. It is
the compensation, and, in most cases, it is no more than a very moderate
compensation for the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer must
have this compensation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his own
interest, continue the employment. If he was taxed directly, therefore, in
proportion to the whole profit, he would be obliged either to raise the rate of
his profit, or to charge the tax upon the interest of money; that is, to pay
less interest. If he raised the rate of his profit in proportion to the tax,
the whole tax, though it might be advanced by him, would be finally paid by one
or other of two different sets of people, according to the different ways in
which he might employ the stock of which he had the management. If he employed
it as a farming stock, in the cultivation of land, he could raise the rate of
his profit only by retaining a greater portion, or, what comes to the same
thing, the price of a greater portion, of the produce of the land; and as this
could be done only by a reduction of rent, the final payment of the tax would
fall upon the landlord. If he employed it as a mercantile or manufacturing
stock, he could raise the rate of his profit only by raising the price of his
goods; in which case, the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon
the consumers of those goods. If he did not raise the rate of his profit, he
would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it which was
allotted for the interest of money. He could afford less interest for whatever
stock he borrowed, and the whole weight of the tax would, in this case, fall
ultimately upon the interest of money. So far as he could not relieve himself
from the tax in the one way, he would be obliged to relieve himself in the
other.

The interest of money seems, at first sight, a subject equally capable of being
taxed directly as the rent of land. Like the rent of land, it is a neat
produce, which remains, after completely compensating the whole risk and
trouble of employing the stock. As a tax upon the rent of land cannot raise
rents, because the neat produce which remains, after replacing the stock of the
farmer, together with his reasonable profit, cannot be greater after the tax
than before it, so, for the same reason, a tax upon the interest of money could
not raise the rate of interest; the quantity of stock or money in the country,
like the quantity of land, being supposed to remain the same after the tax as
before it. The ordinary rate of profit, it has been shewn, in the first book,
is everywhere regulated by the quantity of stock to be employed, in proportion
to the quantity of the employment, or of the business which must be done by it.
But the quantity of the employment, or of the business to be done by stock,
could neither be increased nor diminished by any tax upon the interest of
money. If the quantity of the stock to be employed, therefore, was neither
increased nor diminished by it, the ordinary rate of profit would necessarily
remain the same. But the portion of this profit, necessary for compensating the
risk and trouble of the employer, would likewise remain the same; that risk and
trouble being in no respect altered. The residue, therefore, that portion which
belongs to the owner of the stock, and which pays the interest of money, would
necessarily remain the same too. At first sight, therefore, the interest of
money seems to be a subject as fit to be taxed directly as the rent of land.

There are, however, two different circumstances, which render the interest of
money a much less proper subject of direct taxation than the rent of land.

First, the quantity and value of the land which any man possesses, can never be
a secret, and can always be ascertained with great exactness. But the whole
amount of the capital stock which he possesses is almost always a secret, and
can scarce ever be ascertained with tolerable exactness. It is liable, besides,
to almost continual variations. A year seldom passes away, frequently not a
month, sometimes scarce a single day, in which it does not rise or fall more or
less. An inquisition into every man’s private circumstances, and an
inquisition which, in order to accommodate the tax to them, watched over all
the fluctuations of his fortune, would be a source of such continual and
endless vexation as no person could support.

Secondly, land is a subject which cannot be removed; whereas stock easily may.
The proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in
which his estate lies. The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the
world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He would be
apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition,
in order to be assessed to a burdensome tax; and would remove his stock to some
other country, where he could either carry on his business, or enjoy his
fortune more at his ease. By removing his stock, he would put an end to all the
industry which it had maintained in the country which he left. Stock cultivates
land; stock employs labour. A tax which tended to drive away stock from any
particular country, would so far tend to dry up every source of revenue, both
to the sovereign and to the society. Not only the profits of stock, but the
rent of land, and the wages of labour, would necessarily be more or less
diminished by its removal.

The nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax the revenue arising from
stock, instead of any severe inquisition of this kind, have been obliged to
content themselves with some very loose, and, therefore, more or less arbitrary
estimation. The extreme inequality and uncertainty of a tax assessed in this
manner, can be compensated only by its extreme moderation; in consequence of
which, every man finds himself rated so very much below his real revenue, that
he gives himself little disturbance though his neighbour should be rated
somewhat lower.

By what is called the land tax in England, it was intended that the stock
should be taxed in the same proportion as land. When the tax upon land was at
four shillings in the pound, or at one-fifth of the supposed rent, it was
intended that stock should be taxed at one-fifth of the supposed interest. When
the present annual land tax was first imposed, the legal rate of interest was
six per cent. Every hundred pounds stock, accordingly, was supposed to be taxed
at twenty-four shillings, the fifth part of six pounds. Since the legal rate of
interest has been reduced to five per cent. every hundred pounds stock is
supposed to be taxed at twenty shillings only. The sum to be raised, by what is
called the land tax, was divided between the country and the principal towns.
The greater part of it was laid upon the country; and of what was laid upon the
towns, the greater part was assessed upon the houses. What remained to be
assessed upon the stock or trade of the towns (for the stock upon the land was
not meant to be taxed) was very much below the real value of that stock or
trade. Whatever inequalities, therefore, there might be in the original
assessment, gave little disturbance. Every parish and district still continues
to be rated for its land, its houses, and its stock, according to the original
assessment; and the almost universal prosperity of the country, which, in most
places, has raised very much the value of all these, has rendered those
inequalities of still less importance now. The rate, too, upon each district,
continuing always the same, the uncertainty of this tax, so far as it might he
assessed upon the stock of any individual, has been very much diminished, as
well as rendered of much less consequence. If the greater part of the lands of
England are not rated to the land tax at half their actual value, the greater
part of the stock of England is, perhaps, scarce rated at the fiftieth part of
its actual value. In some towns, the whole land tax is assessed upon houses; as
in Westminster, where stock and trade are free. It is otherwise in London.

In all countries, a severe inquisition into the circumstances of private
persons has been carefully avoided.

At Hamburg, {Memoires concernant les Droits, tom. i, p.74} every inhabitant is
obliged to pay to the state one fourth per cent. of all that he possesses; and
as the wealth of the people of Hamburg consists principally in stock, this tax
maybe considered as a tax upon stock. Every man assesses himself, and, in the
presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain sum
of money, which he declares upon oath, to be one fourth per cent. of all that
he possesses, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any
examination upon that subject. This tax is generally supposed to be paid with
great fidelity. In a small republic, where the people have entire confidence in
their magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for the support of
the state, and believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such
conscientious and voluntary payment may sometimes be expected. It is not
peculiar to the people of Hamburg.

The canton of Underwald, in Switzerland, is frequently ravaged by storms and
inundations, and it is thereby exposed to extraordinary expenses. Upon such
occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare with the
greatest frankness what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly. At
Zurich, the law orders, that in cases of necessity, every one should be taxed
in proportion to his revenue; the amount of which he is obliged to declare upon
oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of their fellow citizens
will deceive them. At Basil, the principal revenue of the state arises from a
small custom upon goods exported. All the citizens make oath, that they will
pay every three months all the taxes imposed by law. All merchants, and even
all inn-keepers, are trusted with keeping themselves the account of the goods
which they sell, either within or without the territory. At the end of every
three months, they send this account to the treasurer, with the amount of the
tax computed at the bottom of it. It is not suspected that the revenue suffers
by this confidence. {Memoires concernant les Droits, tom. i p. 163, 167,171.}

To oblige every citizen to declare publicly upon oath, the amount of his
fortune, must not, it seems, in those Swiss cantons, be reckoned a hardship. At
Hamburg it would be reckoned the greatest. Merchants engaged in the hazardous
projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being obliged, at all times,
to expose the real state of their circumstances. The ruin of their credit, and
the miscarriage of their projects, they foresee, would too often be the
consequence. A sober and parsimonious people, who are strangers to all such
projects, do not feel that they have occasion for any such concealment.

In Holland, soon after the exaltation of the late prince of Orange to the
stadtholdership, a tax of two per cent. or the fiftieth penny, as it was
called, was imposed upon the whole substance of every citizen. Every citizen
assesed himself, and paid his tax, in the same manner as at Hamburg, and it was
in general supposed to have been paid with great fidelity. The people had at
that time the greatest affection for their new government, which they had just
established by a general insurrection. The tax was to be paid but once, in
order to relieve the state in a particular exigency. It was, indeed, too heavy
to be permanent. In a country where the market rate of interest seldom exceeds
three per cent., a tax of two per cent. amounts to thirteen shillings and four
pence in the pound, upon the highest neat revenue which is commonly drawn from
stock. It is a tax which very few people could pay, without encroaching more or
less upon their capitals. In a particular exigency, the people may, from great
public zeal, make a great effort, and give up even a part of their capital, in
order to relieve the state. But it is impossible that they should continue to
do so for any considerable time; and if they did, the tax would soon ruin them
so completely, as to render them altogether incapable of supporting the state.

The tax upon stock, imposed by the land tax bill in England, though it is
proportioned to the capital, is not intended to diminish or, take away any part
of that capital. It is meant only to be a tax upon the interest of money,
proportioned to that upon the rent of land; so that when the latter is at four
shillings in the pound, the former may be at four shillings in the pound too.
The tax at Hamburg, and the still more moderate taxes of Underwald and Zurich,
are meant, in the same manner, to be taxes, not upon the capital, but upon the
interest or neat revenue of stock. That of Holland was meant to be a tax upon
the capital.

Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments.

In some countries, extraordinary taxes are imposed upon the profits of stock;
sometimes when employed in particular branches of trade, and sometimes when
employed in agriculture.

Of the former kind, are in England, the tax upon hawkers and pedlars, that upon
hackney-coaches and chairs, and that which the keepers of ale-houses pay for a
licence to retail ale and spiritous liquors. During the late war, another tax
of the same kind was proposed upon shops. The war having been undertaken, it
was said, in defence of the trade of the country, the merchants, who were to
profit by it, ought to contribute towards the support of it.

A tax, however, upon the profits of stock employed in any particular branch of
trade, can never fall finally upon the dealers (who must in all ordinary cases
have their reasonable profit, and, where the competition is free, can seldom
have more than that profit), but always upon the consumers, who must be obliged
to pay in the price of the goods the tax which the dealer advances; and
generally with some overcharge.

A tax of this kind, when it is proportioned to the trade of the dealer, is
finally paid by the consumer, and occasions no oppression to the dealer. When
it is not so proportioned, but is the same upon all dealers, though in this
case, too, it is finally paid by the consumer, yet it favours the great, and
occasions some oppression to the small dealer. The tax of five shillings a-week
upon every hackney coach, and that of ten shillings a-year upon every hackney
chair, so far as it is advanced by the different keepers of such coaches and
chairs, is exactly enough proportioned to the extent of their respective
dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppresses the smaller dealer. The
tax of twenty shillings a-year for a licence to sell ale; of forty shillings
for a licence to sell spiritous liquors; and of forty shillings more for a
licence to sell wine, being the same upon all retailers, must necessarily give
some advantage to the great, and occasion some oppression to the small dealers.
The former must find it more easy to get back the tax in the price of their
goods than the latter. The moderation of the tax, however, renders this
inequality of less importance; and it may to many people appear not improper to
give some discouragement to the multiplication of little ale-houses. The tax
upon shops, it was intended, should be the same upon all shops. It could not
well have been otherwise. It would have been impossible to proportion, with
tolerable exactness, the tax upon a shop to the extent of the trade carried on
in it, without such an inquisition as would have been altogether insupportable
in a free country. If the tax had been considerable, it would have oppressed
the small, and forced almost the whole retail trade into the hands of the great
dealers. The competition of the former being taken away, the latter would have
enjoyed a monopoly of the trade; and, like all other monopolists, would soon
have combined to raise their profits much beyond what was necessary for the
payment of the tax. The final payment, instead of falling upon the shop-keeper,
would have fallen upon the consumer, with a considerable overcharge to the
profit of the shop-keeper. For these reasons, the project of a tax upon shops
was laid aside, and in the room of it was substituted the subsidy, 1759.

What in France is called the personal taille, is perhaps, the most important
tax upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, that is levied in any
part of Europe.

In the disorderly state of Europe, during the prevalence of the feudal
government, the sovereign was obliged to content himself with taxing those who
were too weak to refuse to pay taxes. The great lords, though willing to assist
him upon particular emergencies, refused to subject themselves to any constant
tax, and he was not strong enough to force them. The occupiers of land all over
Europe were, the greater part of them, originally bond-men. Through the greater
part of Europe, they were gradually emancipated. Some of them acquired the
property of landed estates, which they held by some base or ignoble tenure,
sometimes under the king, and sometimes under some other great lord, like the
ancient copy-holders of England. Others, without acquiring the property,
obtained leases for terms of years, of the lands which they occupied under
their lord, and thus became less dependent upon him. The great lords seem to
have beheld the degree of prosperity and independency, which this inferior
order of men had thus come to enjoy, with a malignant and contemptuous
indignation, and willingly consented that the sovereign should tax them. In
some countries, this tax was confined to the lands which were held in property
by an ignoble tenure; and, in this case, the taille was said to be real. The
land tax established by the late king of Sardinia, and the taille in the
provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine, and Britanny; in the generality of
Montauban, and in the elections of Agen and Condom, as well as in some other
districts of France; are taxes upon lands held in property by an ignoble
tenure. In other countries, the tax was laid upon the supposed profits of all
those who held, in farm or lease, lands belonging to other people, whatever
might be the tenure by which the proprietor held them; and in this case, the
taille was said to be personal. In the greater part of those provinces of
France, which are called the countries of elections, the taille is of this
kind. The real taille, as it is imposed only upon a part of the lands of the
country, is necessarily an unequal, but it is not always an arbitrary tax,
though it is so upon some occasions. The personal taille, as it is intended to
be proportioned to the profits of a certain class of people, which can only be
guessed at, is necessarily both arbitrary and unequal.

In France, the personal taille at present (1775) annually imposed upon the
twenty generalities, called the countries of elections, amounts to 40,107,239
livres, 16 sous. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc tom. ii, p.17.} the
proportion in which this sum is assessed upon those different provinces, varies
from year to year, according to the reports which are made to the king’s
council concerning the goodness or badness of the crops, as well as other
circumstances, which may either increase or diminish their respective abilities
to pay. Each generality is divided into a certain number of elections; and the
proportion in which the sum imposed upon the whole generality is divided among
those different elections, varies likewise from year to year, according to the
reports made to the council concerning their respective abilities. It seems
impossible, that the council, with the best intentions, can ever proportion,
with tolerable exactness, either of these two assessments to the real abilities
of the province or district upon which they are respectively laid. Ignorance
and misinformation must always, more or less, mislead the most upright council.
The proportion which each parish ought to support of what is assessed upon the
whole election, and that which each individual ought to support of what is
assessed upon his particular parish, are both in the same manner varied from
year to year, according as circumstances are supposed to require. These
circumstances are judged of, in the one case, by the officers of the election,
in the other, by those of the parish; and both the one and the other are, more
or less, under the direction and influence of the intendant. Not only ignorance
and misinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private resentment,
are said frequently to mislead such assessors. No man subject to such a tax, it
is evident, can ever be certain, before he is assessed, of what he is to pay.
He cannot even be certain after he is assessed. If any person has been taxed
who ought to have been exempted, or if any person has been taxed beyond his
proportion, though both must pay in the mean time, yet if they complain, and
make good their complaints, the whole parish is reimposed next year, in order
to reimburse them. If any of the contributors become bankrupt or insolvent, the
collector is obliged to advance his tax; and the whole parish is reimposed next
year, in order to reimburse the collector. If the collector himself should
become bankrupt, the parish which elects him must answer for his conduct to the
receiver-general of the election. But, as it might be troublesome for the
receiver to prosecute the whole parish, he takes at his choice five or six of
the richest contributors, and obliges them to make good what had been lost by
the insolvency of the collector. The parish is afterwards reimposed, in order
to reimburse those five or six. Such reimpositions are always over and above
the taille of the particular year in which they are laid on.

When a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a particular branch of
trade, the traders are all careful to bring no more goods to market than what
they can sell at a price sufficient to reimburse them from advancing the tax.
Some of them withdraw a part of their stocks from the trade, and the market is
more sparingly supplied than before. The price of the goods rises, and the
final payment of the tax falls upon the consumer. But when a tax is imposed
upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, it is not the interest of
the farmers to withdraw any part of their stock from that employment. Each
farmer occupies a certain quantity of land, for which he pays rent. For the
proper cultivation of this land, a certain quantity of stock is necessary; and
by withdrawing any part of this necessary quantity, the farmer is not likely to
be more able to pay either the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it can
never be his interest to diminish the quantity of his produce, nor consequently
to supply the market more sparingly than before. The tax, therefore, will never
enable him to raise the price of his produce, so as to reimburse himself, by
throwing the final payment upon the consumer. The farmer, however, must have
his reasonable profit as well as every other dealer, otherwise he must give up
the trade. After the imposition of a tax of this kind, he can get this
reasonable profit only by paying less rent to the landlord. The more he is
obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he can afford to pay in the way of
rent. A tax of this kind, imposed during the currency of a lease, may, no
doubt, distress or ruin the farmer. Upon the renewal of the lease, it must
always fall upon the landlord.

In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the farmer is commonly
assessed in proportion to the stock which he appears to employ in cultivation.
He is, upon this account, frequently afraid to have a good team of horses or
oxen, but endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and most wretched
instruments of husbandry that he can. Such is his distrust in the justice of
his assessors, that he counterfeits poverty, and wishes to appear scarce able
to pay anything, for fear of being obliged to pay too much. By this miserable
policy, he does not, perhaps, always consult his own interest in the most
effectual manner; and he probably loses more by the diminution of his produce,
than he saves by that of his tax. Though, in consequence of this wretched
cultivation, the market is, no doubt, somewhat worse supplied; yet the small
rise of price which this may occasion, as it is not likely even to indemnify
the farmer for the diminution of his produce, it is still less likely to enable
him to pay more rent to the landlord. The public, the farmer, the landlord, all
suffer more or less by this degraded cultivation. That the personal taille
tends, in many different ways, to discourage cultivation, and consequently to
dry up the principal source of the wealth of every great country, I have
already had occasion to observe in the third book of this Inquiry.

What are called poll-taxes in the southern provinces of North America, and the
West India islands, annual taxes of so much a-head upon every negro, are
properly taxes upon the profits of a certain species of stock employed in
agriculture. As the planters, are the greater part of them, both farmers and
landlords, the final payment of the tax falls upon them in their quality of
landlords, without any retribution.

Taxes of so much a head upon the bondmen employed in cultivation, seem
anciently to have been common all over Europe. There subsists at present a tax
of this kind in the empire of Russia. It is probably upon this account that
poll-taxes of all kinds have often been represented as badges of slavery. Every
tax, however, is, to the person who pays it, a badge, not of slavery, but of
liberty. It denotes that he is subject to government, indeed; but that, as he
has some property, he cannot himself be the property of a master. A poll tax
upon slaves is altogether different from a poll-tax upon freemen. The latter is
paid by the persons upon whom it is imposed; the former, by a different set of
persons. The latter is either altogether arbitrary, or altogether unequal, and,
in most cases, is both the one and the other; the former, though in some
respects unequal, different slaves being of different values, is in no respect
arbitrary. Every master, who knows the number of his own slaves, knows exactly
what he has to pay. Those different taxes, however, being called by the same
name, have been considered as of the same nature.

The taxes which in Holland are imposed upon men and maid servants, are taxes,
not upon stock, but upon expense; and so far resemble the taxes upon consumable
commodities. The tax of a guinea a-head for every man-servant, which has lately
been imposed in Great Britain, is of the same kind. It falls heaviest upon the
middling rank. A man of two hundred a-year may keep a single man-servant. A man
of ten thousand a-year will not keep fifty. It does not affect the poor.

Taxes upon the profits of stock, in particular employments, can never affect
the interest of money. Nobody will lend his money for less interest to those
who exercise the taxed, than to those who exercise the untaxed employments.
Taxes upon the revenue arising from stock in all employments, where the
government attempts to levy them with any degree of exactness, will, in many
cases, fall upon the interest of money. The vingtieme, or twentieth penny, in
France, is a tax of the same kind with what is called the land tax in England,
and is assessed, in the same manner, upon the revenue arising upon land,
houses, and stock. So far as it affects stock, it is assessed, though not with
great rigour, yet with much more exactness than that part of the land tax in
England which is imposed upon the same fund. It, in many cases, falls
altogether upon the interest of money. Money is frequently sunk in France, upon
what are called contracts for the constitution of a rent; that is, perpetual
annuities, redeemable at any time by the debtor, upon payment of the sum
originally advanced, but of which this redemption is not exigible by the
creditor except in particular cases. The vingtieme seems not to have raised the
rate of those annuities, though it is exactly levied upon them all.

APPENDIX TO ARTICLES I. AND II.—Taxes upon the Capital Value of
Lands, Houses, and Stock.

While property remains in the possession of the same person, whatever permanent
taxes may have been imposed upon it, they have never been intended to diminish
or take away any part of its capital value, but only some part of the revenue
arising from it. But when property changes hands, when it is transmitted either
from the dead to the living, or from the living to the living, such taxes have
frequently been imposed upon it as necessarily take away some part of its
capital value.

The transference of all sorts of property from the dead to the living, and that
of immoveable property of land and houses from the living to the living, are
transactions which are in their nature either public and notorious, or such as
cannot be long concealed. Such transactions, therefore, may be taxed directly.
The transference of stock or moveable property, from the living to the living,
by the lending of money, is frequently a secret transaction, and may always be
made so. It cannot easily, therefore, be taxed directly. It has been taxed
indirectly in two different ways; first, by requiring that the deed, containing
the obligation to repay, should be written upon paper or parchment which had
paid a certain stamp duty, otherwise not to be valid; secondly, by requiring,
under the like penalty of invalidity, that it should be recorded either in a
public or secret register, and by imposing certain duties upon such
registration. Stamp duties, and duties of registration, have frequently been
imposed likewise upon the deeds transferring property of all kinds from the
dead to the living, and upon those transferring immoveable property from the
living to the living; transactions which might easily have been taxed directly.

The vicesima hereditatum, or the twentieth penny of inheritances, imposed by
Augustus upon the ancient Romans, was a tax upon the transference of property
from the dead to the living. Dion Cassius, { Lib. 55. See also Burman. de
Vectigalibus Pop. Rom. cap. xi. and Bouchaud de l’impot du vingtieme sur
les successions.} the author who writes concerning it the least indistinctly,
says, that it was imposed upon all successions, legacies and donations, in case
of death, except upon those to the nearest relations, and to the poor.

Of the same kind is the Dutch tax upon successions. {See Memoires concernant
les Droits, etc. tom i, p. 225.} Collateral successions are taxed according to
the degree of relation, from five to thirty per cent. upon the whole value of
the succession. Testamentary donations, or legacies to collaterals, are subject
to the like duties. Those from husband to wife, or from wife to husband, to the
fiftieth penny. The luctuosa hereditas, the mournful succession of ascendants
to descendants, to the twentieth penny only. Direct successions, or those of
descendants to ascendants, pay no tax. The death of a father, to such of his
children as live in the same house with him, is seldom attended with any
increase, and frequently with a considerable diminution of revenue; by the loss
of his industry, of his office, or of some life-rent estate, of which he may
have been in possession. That tax would be cruel and oppressive, which
aggravated their loss, by taking from them any part of his succession. It may,
however, sometimes be otherwise with those children, who, in the language of
the Roman law, are said to be emancipated; in that of the Scotch law, to be
foris-familiated; that is, who have received their portion, have got families
of their own, and are supported by funds separate and independent of those of
their father. Whatever part of his succession might come to such children,
would be a real addition to their fortune, and might, therefore, perhaps,
without more inconveniency than what attends all duties of this kind, be liable
to some tax. The casualties of the feudal law were taxes upon the transference
of land, both from the dead to the living, and from the living to the living.
In ancient times, they constituted, in every part of Europe, one of the
principal branches of the revenue of the crown.

The heir of every immediate vassal of the crown paid a certain duty, generally
a year’s rent, upon receiving the investiture of the estate. If the heir
was a minor, the whole rents of the estate, during the continuance of the
minority, devolved to the superior, without any other charge besides the
maintenance of the minor, and the payment of the widow’s dower, when
there happened to be a dowager upon the land. When the minor came to be of age,
another tax, called relief, was still due to the superior, which generally
amounted likewise to a year’s rent. A long minority, which, in the
present times, so frequently disburdens a great estate of all its incumbrances,
and restores the family to their ancient splendour, could in those times have
no such effect. The waste, and not the disincumbrance of the estate, was the
common effect of a long minority.

By a feudal law, the vassal could not alienate without the consent of his
superior, who generally extorted a fine or composition on granting it. This
fine, which was at first arbitrary, came, in many countries, to be regulated at
a certain portion of the price of the land. In some countries, where the
greater part of the other feudal customs have gone into disuse, this tax upon
the alienation of land still continues to make a very considerable branch of
the revenue of the sovereign. In the canton of Berne it is so high as a sixth
part of the price of all noble fiefs, and a tenth part of that of all ignoble
ones. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc, tom.i p.154} In the canton of
Lucern, the tax upon the sale of land is not universal, and takes place only in
certain districts. But if any person sells his land in order to remove out of
the territory, he pays ten per cent. upon the whole price of the sale. {id.
p.157.} Taxes of the same kind, upon the sale either of all lands, or of lands
held by certain tenures, take place in many other countries, and make a more or
less considerable branch of the revenue of the sovereign.

Such transactions may be taxed indirectly, by means either of stamp duties, or
of duties upon registration; and those duties either may, or may not, be
proportioned to the value of the subject which is transferred.

In Great Britain, the stamp duties are higher or lower, not so much according
to the value of the property transferred (an eighteen-penny or half-crown stamp
being sufficient upon a bond for the largest sum of money), as according to the
nature of the deed. The highest do not exceed six pounds upon every sheet of
paper, or skin of parchment; and these high duties fall chiefly upon grants
from the crown, and upon certain law proceedings, without any regard to the
value of the subject. There are, in Great Britain, no duties on the
registration of deeds or writings, except the fees of the officers who keep the
register; and these are seldom more than a reasonable recompence for their
labour. The crown derives no revenue from them.

In Holland {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. tom. i. p 223, 224, 225.}
there are both stamp duties and duties upon registration; which in some cases
are, and in some are not, proportioned to the value of the property
transferred. All testaments must be written upon stamped paper, of which the
price is proportioned to the property disposed of; so that there are stamps
which cost from three pence or three stivers a-sheet, to three hundred florins,
equal to about twenty-seven pounds ten shillings of our money. If the stamp is
of an inferior price to what the testator ought to have made use of, his
succession is confiscated. This is over and above all their other taxes on
succession. Except bills of exchange, and some other mercantile bills, all
other deeds, bonds, and contracts, are subject to a stamp duty. This duty,
however, does not rise in proportion to the value of the subject. All sales of
land and of houses, and all mortgages upon either, must be registered, and,
upon registration, pay a duty to the state of two and a-half per cent. upon the
amount of the price or of the mortgage. This duty is extended to the sale of
all ships and vessels of more than two tons burden, whether decked or undecked.
These, it seems, are considered as a sort of houses upon the water. The sale of
moveables, when it is ordered by a court of justice, is subject to the like
duty of two and a-half per cent.

In France, there are both stamp duties and duties upon registration. The former
are considered as a branch of the aids of excise, and, in the provinces where
those duties take place, are levied by the excise officers. The latter are
considered as a branch of the domain of the crown and are levied by a different
set of officers.

Those modes of taxation by stamp duties and by duties upon registration, are of
very modern invention. In the course of little more than a century, however,
stamp duties have, in Europe, become almost universal, and duties upon
registration extremely common. There is no art which one government sooner
learns of another, than that of draining money from the pockets of the people.

Taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the living, fall
finally, as well as immediately, upon the persons to whom the property is
transferred. Taxes upon the sale of land fall altogether upon the seller. The
seller is almost always under the necessity of selling, and must, therefore,
take such a price as he can get. The buyer is scarce ever under the necessity
of buying, and will, therefore, only give such a price as he likes. He
considers what the land will cost him, in tax and price together. The more he
is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he will be disposed to give in
the way of price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almost always upon a necessitous
person, and must, therefore, be frequently very cruel and oppressive. Taxes
upon the sale of new-built houses, where the building is sold without the
ground, fall generally upon the buyer, because the builder must generally have
his profit; otherwise he must give up the trade. If he advances the tax,
therefore, the buyer must generally repay it to him. Taxes upon the sale of old
houses, for the same reason as those upon the sale of land, fall generally upon
the seller; whom, in most cases, either conveniency or necessity obliges to
sell. The number of new-built houses that are annually brought to market, is
more or less regulated by the demand. Unless the demand is such as to afford
the builder his profit, after paying all expenses, he will build no more
houses. The number of old houses which happen at any time to come to market, is
regulated by accidents, of which the greater part have no relation to the
demand. Two or three great bankruptcies in a mercantile town, will bring many
houses to sale, which must be sold for what can be got for them. Taxes upon the
sale of ground-rents fall altogether upon the seller, for the same reason as
those upon the sale of lands. Stamp duties, and duties upon the registration of
bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the borrower, and,
in fact, are always paid by him. Duties of the same kind upon law proceedings
fall upon the suitors. They reduce to both the capital value of the subject in
dispute. The more it costs to acquire any property, the less must be the neat
value of it when acquired.

All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they
diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds
destined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all more or less
unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom
maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expense of the capital of the
people, which maintains none but productive.

Such taxes, even when they are proportioned to the value of the property
transferred, are still unequal; the frequency of transference not being always
equal in property of equal value. When they are not proportioned to this value,
which is the case with the greater part of the stamp duties and duties of
registration, they are still more so. They are in no respect arbitrary, but
are, or may be, in all cases, perfectly clear and certain. Though they
sometimes fall upon the person who is not very able to pay, the time of payment
is, in most cases, sufficiently convenient for him. When the payment becomes
due, he must, in most cases, have the more to pay. They are levied at very
little expense, and in general subject the contributors to no other
inconveniency, besides always the unavoidable one of paying the tax. In France,
the stamp duties are not much complained of. Those of registration, which they
call the Controle, are. They give occasion, it is pretended, to much extortion
in the officers of the farmers-general who collect the tax, which is in a great
measure arbitrary and uncertain. In the greater part of the libels which have
been written against the present system of finances in France, the abuses of
the controle make a principal article. Uncertainty, however, does not seem to
be necessarily inherent in the nature of such taxes. If the popular complaints
are well founded, the abuse must arise, not so much from the nature of the tax
as from the want of precision and distinctness in the words of the edicts or
laws which impose it.

The registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon immoveable
property, as it gives great security both to creditors and purchasers, is
extremely advantageous to the public. That of the greater part of deeds of
other kinds, is frequently inconvenient and even dangerous to individuals,
without any advantage to the public. All registers which, it is acknowledged,
ought to be kept secret, ought certainly never to exist. The credit of
individuals ought certainly never to depend upon so very slender a security, as
the probity and religion of the inferior officers of revenue. But where the
fees of registration have been made a source of revenue to the sovereign,
register-offices have commonly been multiplied without end, both for the deeds
which ought to be registered, and for those which ought not. In France there
are several different sorts of secret registers. This abuse, though not perhaps
a necessary, it must be acknowledged, is a very natural effect of such taxes.

Such stamp duties as those in England upon cards and dice, upon newspapers and
periodical pamphlets, etc. are properly taxes upon consumption; the final
payment falls upon the persons who use or consume such commodities. Such stamp
duties as those upon licences to retail ale, wine, and spiritous liquors,
though intended, perhaps, to fall upon the profits of the retailers, are
likewise finally paid by the consumers of those liquors. Such taxes, though
called by the same name, and levied by the same officers, and in the same
manner with the stamp duties above mentioned upon the transference of property,
are, however, of a quite different nature, and fall upon quite different funds.

ARTICLE III.—Taxes upon the Wages of Labour.

The wages of the inferior classes of work men, I have endeavoured to show in
the first book are everywhere necessarily regulated by two different
circumstances; the demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of
provisions. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be either
increasing stationary or declining; or to require an increasing, stationary, or
declining population, regulates the subsistence of the labourer, and determines
in what degree it shall be either liberal, moderate, or scanty. The ordinary
average price of provisions determines the quantity of money which must be paid
to the workman, in order to enable him, one year with another, to purchase this
liberal, moderate, or scanty subsistence. While the demand for the labour and
the price of provisions, therefore, remain the same, a direct tax upon the
wages of labour can have no other effect, than to raise them somewhat higher
than the tax. Let us suppose, for example, that, in a particular place, the
demand for labour and the price of provisions were such as to render ten
shillings a-week the ordinary wages of labour; and that a tax of one-fifth, or
four shillings in the pound, was imposed upon wages. If the demand for labour
and the price of provisions remained the same, it would still be necessary that
the labourer should, in that place, earn such a subsistence as could be bought
only for ten shillings a-week; so that, after paying the tax, he should have
ten shillings a-week free wages. But, in order to leave him such free wages,
after paying such a tax, the price of labour must, in that place, soon rise,
not to twelve shillings a week only, but to twelve and sixpence; that is, in
order to enable him to pay a tax of one-fifth, his wages must necessarily soon
rise, not one-fifth part only, but one-fourth. Whatever was the proportion of
the tax, the wages of labour must, in all cases rise, not only in that
proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the tax for example, was one-tenth,
the wages of labour must necessarily soon rise, not one-tenth part only, but
one-eighth.

A direct tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer might,
perhaps, pay it out of his hand, could not properly be said to be even advanced
by him; at least if the demand for labour and the average price of provisions
remained the same after the tax as before it. In all such cases, not only the
tax, but something more than the tax, would in reality be advanced by the
person who immediately employed him. The final payment would, in different
cases, fall upon different persons. The rise which such a tax might occasion in
the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the master manufacturer,
who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it, with a profit, upon the
price of his goods. The final payment of this rise of wages, therefore,
together with the additional profit of the master manufacturer would fall upon
the consumer. The rise which such a tax might occasion in the wages of country
labour would be advanced by the farmer, who, in order to maintain the same
number of labourers as before, would be obliged to employ a greater capital. In
order to get back this greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of
stock, it would be necessary that he should retain a larger portion, or, what
comes to the same thing, the price of a larger portion, of the produce of the
land, and, consequently, that he should pay less rent to the landlord. The
final payment of this rise of wages, therefore, would, in this case, fall upon
the landlord, together with the additional profit of the farmer who had
advanced it. In all cases, a direct tax upon the wages of labour must, in the
long-run, occasion both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater
rise in the price of manufactured goods than would have followed from the
proper assessment of a sum equal to the produce of the tax, partly upon the
rent of land, and partly upon consumable commodities.

If direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occasioned a
proportionable rise in those wages, it is because they have generally
occasioned a considerable fall in the demand of labour. The declension of
industry, the decrease of employment for the poor, the diminution of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country, have generally been the effects
of such taxes. In consequence of them, however, the price of labour must always
be higher than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the demand;
and this enhancement of price, together with the profit of those who advance
it, must always be finally paid by the landlords and consumers.

A tax upon the wages of country labour does not raise the price of the rude
produce of land in proportion to the tax; for the same reason that a tax upon
the farmer’s profit does not raise that price in that proportion.

Absurd and destructive as such taxes are, however, they take place in many
countries. In France, that part of the taille which is charged upon the
industry of workmen and day-labourers in country villages, is properly a tax of
this kind. Their wages are computed according to the common rate of the
district in which they reside; and, that they may be as little liable as
possible to any overcharge, their yearly gains are estimated at no more than
two hundred working days in the year. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc.
tom. ii. p. 108.} The tax of each individual is varied from year to year,
according to different circumstances, of which the collector or the commissary,
whom intendant appoints to assist him, are the judges. In Bohemia, in
consequence of the alteration in the system of finances which was begun in
1748, a very heavy tax is imposed upon the industry of artificers. They are
divided into four classes. The highest class pay a hundred florins a year,
which, at two-and-twenty pence half penny a-florin, amounts to £9:7:6. The
second class are taxed at seventy; the third at fifty; and the fourth,
comprehending artificers in villages, and the lowest class of those in towns,
at twenty-five florins. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. tom. iii. p. 87.}

The recompence of ingenious artists, and of men of liberal professions, I have
endeavoured to show in the first book, necessarily keeps a certain proportion
to the emoluments of inferior trades. A tax upon this recompence, therefore,
could have no other effect than to raise it somewhat higher than in proportion
to the tax. If it did not rise in this manner, the ingenious arts and the
liberal professions, being no longer upon a level with other trades, would be
so much deserted, that they would soon return to that level.

The emoluments of offices are not, like those of trades and professions,
regulated by the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore, always
bear a just proportion to what the nature of the employment requires. They are,
perhaps, in most countries, higher than it requires; the persons who have the
administration of government being generally disposed to regard both themselves
and their immediate dependents, rather more than enough. The emoluments of
offices, therefore, can, in most cases, very well bear to be taxed. The
persons, besides, who enjoy public offices, especially the more lucrative, are,
in all countries, the objects of general envy; and a tax upon their emoluments,
even though it should be somewhat higher than upon any other sort of revenue,
is always a very popular tax. In England, for example, when, by the land-tax,
every other sort of revenue was supposed to be assessed at four shillings in
the pound, it was very popular to lay a real tax of five shillings and sixpence
in the pound upon the salaries of offices which exceeded a hundred pounds
a-year; the pensions of the younger branches of the royal family, the pay of
the officers of the army and navy, and a few others less obnoxious to envy,
excepted. There are in England no other direct taxes upon the wages of labour.

ARTICLE IV.—Taxes which it is intended should fall indifferently upon
every different Species of Revenue.

The taxes which it is intended should fall indifferently upon every different
species of revenue, are capitation taxes, and taxes upon consumable
commodities. Those must be paid indifferently, from whatever revenue the
contributors may possess; from the rent of their land, from the profits of
their stock, or from the wages of their labour.

Capitation Taxes.

Capitation taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or
revenue of each contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The state of a
man’s fortune varies from day to day; and, without an inquisition, more
intolerable than any tax, and renewed at least once every year, can only be
guessed at. His assessment, therefore, must, in most cases, depend upon the
good or bad humour of his assessors, and must, therefore, be altogether
arbitrary and uncertain.

Capitation taxes, if they are proportioned, not to the supposed fortune, but to
the rank of each contributor, become altogether unequal; the degrees of fortune
being frequently unequal in the same degree of rank.

Such taxes, therefore, if it is attempted to render them equal, become
altogether arbitrary and uncertain; and if it is attempted to render them
certain and not arbitrary, become altogether unequal. Let the tax be light or
heavy, uncertainty is always a great grievance. In a light tax, a considerable
degree of inequality may be supported; in a heavy one, it is altogether
intolerable.

In the different poll-taxes which took place in England during the reign of
William III. the contributors were, the greater part of them, assessed
according to the degree of their rank; as dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts,
barons, esquires, gentlemen, the eldest and youngest sons of peers, etc. All
shop-keepers and tradesmen worth more than three hundred pounds, that is, the
better sort of them, were subject to the same assessment, how great soever
might be the difference in their fortunes. Their rank was more considered than
their fortune. Several of those who, in the first poll-tax, were rated
according to their supposed fortune were afterwards rated according to their
rank. Serjeants, attorneys, and proctors at law, who, in the first poll-tax,
were assessed at three shillings in the pound of their supposed income, were
afterwards assessed as gentlemen. In the assessment of a tax which was not very
heavy, a considerable degree of inequality had been found less insupportable
than any degree of uncertainty.

In the capitation which has been levied in France, without-any interruption,
since the beginning of the present century, the highest orders of people are
rated according to their rank, by an invariable tariff; the lower orders of
people, according to what is supposed to be their fortune, by an assessment
which varies from year to year. The officers of the king’s court, the
judges, and other officers in the superior courts of justice, the officers of
the troops, etc are assessed in the first manner. The inferior ranks of people
in the provinces are assessed in the second. In France, the great easily submit
to a considerable degree of inequality in a tax which, so far as it affects
them, is not a very heavy one; but could not brook the arbitrary assessment of
an intendant.

The inferior ranks of people must, in that country, suffer patiently the usage
which their superiors think proper to give them.

In England, the different poll-taxes never produced the sum which had been
expected from them, or which it was supposed they might have produced, had they
been exactly levied. In France, the capitation always produces the sum expected
from it. The mild government of England, when it assessed the different ranks
of people to the poll-tax, contented itself with what that assessment happened
to produce, and required no compensation for the loss which the state might
sustain, either by those who could not pay, or by those who would not pay (for
there were many such), and who, by the indulgent execution of the law, were not
forced to pay. The more severe government of France assesses upon each
generality a certain sum, which the intendant must find as he can. If any
province complains of being assessed too high, it may, in the assessment of
next year, obtain an abatement proportioned to the overcharge of the year
before; but it must pay in the mean time. The intendant, in order to be sure of
finding the sum assessed upon his generality, was empowered to assess it in a
larger sum, that the failure or inability of some of the contributors might be
compensated by the overcharge of the rest; and till 1765, the fixation of this
surplus assessment was left altogether to his discretion. In that year, indeed,
the council assumed this power to itself. In the capitation of the provinces,
it is observed by the perfectly well informed author of the Memoirs upon the
Impositions in France, the proportion which falls upon the nobility, and upon
those whose privileges exempt them from the taille, is the least considerable.
The largest falls upon those subject to the taille, who are assessed to the
capitation at so much a-pound of what they pay to that other tax. Capitation
taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of people, are direct
taxes upon the wages of labour, and are attended with all the inconveniencies
of such taxes.

Capitation taxes are levied at little expense; and, where they are rigorously
exacted, afford a very sure revenue to the state. It is upon this account that,
in countries where the case, comfort, and security of the inferior ranks of
people are little attended to, capitation taxes are very common. It is in
general, however, but a small part of the public revenue, which, in a great
empire, has ever been drawn from such taxes; and the greatest sum which they
have ever afforded, might always have been found in some other way much more
convenient to the people.

Taxes upon Consumable Commodities.

The impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to their revenue, by any
capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon
consumable commodities. The state not knowing how to tax, directly and
proportionably, the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by
taxing their expense, which, it is supposed, will, in most cases, be nearly in
proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed, by taxing the consumable
commodities upon which it is laid out.

Consumable commodities are either necessaries or luxuries.

By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensibly
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country
renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be
without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of
life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had
no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a
creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen
shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of
poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad
conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of
life in England. The poorest creditable person, of either sex, would be ashamed
to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a
necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of
women, who may, without any discredit, walk about barefooted. In France, they
are necessaries neither to men nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes
appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and
sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend, not only
those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of
decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things
I call luxuries, without meaning, by this appellation, to throw the smallest
degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example,
in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man
of any rank may, without any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such
liquors. Nature does not render them necessary for the support of life; and
custom nowhere renders it indecent to live without them.

As the wages of labour are everywhere regulated, partly by the demand for it,
and partly by the average price of the necessary articles of subsistence;
whatever raises this average price must necessarily raise those wages; so that
the labourer may still be able to purchase that quantity of those necessary
articles which the state of the demand for labour, whether increasing,
stationary, or declining, requires that he should have. {See book i.chap. 8} A
tax upon those articles necessarily raises their price somewhat higher than the
amount of the tax, because the dealer, who advances the tax, must generally get
it back, with a profit. Such a tax must, therefore, occasion a rise in the
wages of labour, proportionable to this rise of price.

It is thus that a tax upon the necessaries of life operates exactly in the same
manner as a direct tax upon the wages of labour. The labourer, though he may
pay it out of his hand, cannot, for any considerable time at least, be properly
said even to advance it. It must always, in the long-run, be advanced to him by
his immediate employer, in the advanced state of wages. His employer, if he is
a manufacturer, will charge upon the price of his goods the rise of wages,
together with a profit, so that the final payment of the tax, together with
this overcharge, will fall upon the consumer. If his employer is a farmer, the
final payment, together with a like overcharge, will fall upon the rent of the
landlord.

It is otherwise with taxes upon what I call luxuries, even upon those of the
poor. The rise in the price of the taxed commodities, will not necessarily
occasion any rise in the wages of labour. A tax upon tobacco, for example,
though a luxury of the poor, as well as of the rich, will not raise wages.
Though it is taxed in England at three times, and in France at fifteen times
its original price, those high duties seem to have no effect upon the wages of
labour. The same thing maybe said of the taxes upon tea and sugar, which, in
England and Holland, have become luxuries of the lowest ranks of people; and of
those upon chocolate, which, in Spain, is said to have become so.

The different taxes which, in Great Britain, have, in the course of the present
century, been imposed upon spiritous liquors, are not supposed to have had any
effect upon the wages of labour. The rise in the price of porter, occasioned by
an additional tax of three shillings upon the barrel of strong beer, has not
raised the wages of common labour in London. These were about eighteen pence or
twenty pence a-day before the tax, and they are not more now.

The high price of such commodities does not necessarily diminish the ability of
the inferior ranks of people to bring up families. Upon the sober and
industrious poor, taxes upon such commodities act as sumptuary laws, and
dispose them either to moderate, or to refrain altogether from the use of
superfluities which they can no longer easily afford. Their ability to bring up
families, in consequence of this forced frugality, instead of being diminished,
is frequently, perhaps, increased by the tax. It is the sober and industrious
poor who generally bring up the most numerous families, and who principally
supply the demand for useful labour. All the poor, indeed, are not sober and
industrious; and the dissolute and disorderly might continue to indulge
themselves in the use of such commodities, after this rise of price, in the
same manner as before, without regarding the distress which this indulgence
might bring upon their families. Such disorderly persons, however, seldom rear
up numerous families, their children generally perishing from neglect,
mismanagement, and the scantiness or unwholesomeness of their food. If by the
strength of their constitution, they survive the hardships to which the bad
conduct of their parents exposes them, yet the example of that bad conduct
commonly corrupts their morals; so that, instead of being useful to society by
their industry, they become public nuisances by their vices and disorders.
Through the advanced price of the luxuries of the poor, therefore, might
increase somewhat the distress of such disorderly families, and thereby
diminish somewhat their ability to bring up children, it would not probably
diminish much the useful population of the country.

Any rise in the average price of necessaries, unless it be compensated by a
proportionable rise in the wages of labour, must necessarily diminish, more or
less, the ability of the poor to bring up numerous families, and, consequently,
to supply the demand for useful labour; whatever may be the state of that
demand, whether increasing, stationary, or declining; or such as requires an
increasing, stationary, or declining population.

Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the price of any other
commodities, except that of the commodities taxed. Taxes upon necessaries, by
raising the wages of labour, necessarily tend to raise the price of all
manufactures, and consequently to diminish the extent of their sale and
consumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid by the consumers of the
commodities taxed, without any retribution. They fall indifferently upon every
species of revenue, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, and the rent of
land. Taxes upon necessaries, so far as they affect the labouring poor, are
finally paid, partly by landlords, in the diminished rent of their lands, and
partly by rich consumers, whether landlords or others, in the advanced price of
manufactured goods; and always with a considerable overcharge. The advanced
price of such manufactures as are real necessaries of life, and are destined
for the consumption of the poor, of coarse woollens, for example, must be
compensated to the poor by a farther advancement of their wages. The middling
and superior ranks of people, if they understood their own interest, ought
always to oppose all taxes upon the necessaries of life, as well as all taxes
upon the wages of labour. The final payment of both the one and the other falls
altogether upon themselves, and always with a considerable overcharge. They
fall heaviest upon the landlords, who always pay in a double capacity; in that
of landlords, by the reduction, of their rent; and in that of rich consumers,
by the increase of their expense. The observation of Sir Matthew Decker, that
certain taxes are, in the price of certain goods, sometimes repeated and
accumulated four or five times, is perfectly just with regard to taxes upon the
necessaries of life. In the price of leather, for example, you must pay not
only for the tax upon the leather of your own shoes, but for a part of that
upon those of the shoemaker and the tanner. You must pay, too, for the tax upon
the salt, upon the soap, and upon the candles which those workmen consume while
employed in your service; and for the tax upon the leather, which the
saltmaker, the soap-maker, and the candle-maker consume, while employed in
their service.

In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the necessaries of life, are those
upon the four commodities just now mentioned, salt, leather, soap, and candles.

Salt is a very ancient and a very universal subject of taxation. It was taxed
among the Romans, and it is so at present in, I believe, every part of Europe.
The quantity annually consumed by any individual is so small, and may be
purchased so gradually, that nobody, it seems to have been thought, could feel
very sensibly even a pretty heavy tax upon it. It is in England taxed at three
shillings and fourpence a bushel; about three times the original price of the
commodity. In some other countries, the tax is still higher. Leather is a real
necessary of life. The use of linen renders soap such. In countries where the
winter nights are long, candles are a necessary instrument of trade. Leather
and soap are in Great Britain taxed at three halfpence a-pound; candles at a
penny; taxes which, upon the original price of leather, may amount to about
eight or ten per cent.; upon that of soap, to about twenty or five-and-twenty
per cent.; and upon that of candles to about fourteen or fifteen per cent.;
taxes which, though lighter than that upon salt, are still very heavy. As all
those four commodities are real necessaries of life, such heavy taxes upon them
must increase somewhat the expense of the sober and industrious poor, and must
consequently raise more or less the wages of their labour.

In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great Britain, fuel is, during
that season, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not only
for the purpose of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable subsistence of
many different sorts of workmen who work within doors; and coals are the
cheapest of all fuel. The price of fuel has so important an influence upon that
of labour, that all over Great Britain, manufactures have confined themselves
principally to the coal counties; other parts of the country, on account of the
high price of this necessary article, not being able to work so cheap. In some
manufactures, besides, coal is a necessary instrument of trade; as in those of
glass, iron, and all other metals. If a bounty could in any case be reasonable,
it might perhaps be so upon the transportation of coals from those parts of the
country in which they abound, to those in which they are wanted. But the
legislature, instead of a bounty, has imposed a tax of three shillings and
threepence a-ton upon coals carried coastways; which, upon most sorts of coal,
is more than sixty per cent. of the original price at the coal pit. Coals
carried, either by land or by inland navigation, pay no duty. Where they are
naturally cheap, they are consumed duty free; where they are naturally dear,
they are loaded with a heavy duty.

Such taxes, though they raise the price of subsistence, and consequently the
wages of labour, yet they afford a considerable revenue to government, which it
might not be easy to find in any other way. There may, therefore, be good
reasons for continuing them. The bounty upon the exportation of corn, so far as
it tends, in the actual state of tillage, to raise the price of that necessary
article, produces all the like bad effects; and instead of affording any
revenue, frequently occasions a very great expense to government. The high
duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which, in years of moderate
plenty, amount to a prohibition; and the absolute prohibition of the
importation, either of live cattle, or of salt provisions, which takes place in
the ordinary state of the law, and which, on account of the scarcity, is at
present suspended for a limited time with regard to Ireland and the British
plantations, have all had the bad effects of taxes upon the necessaries of
life, and produce no revenue to government. Nothing seems necessary for the
repeal of such regulations, but to convince the public of the futility of that
system in consequence of which they have been established.

Taxes upon the necessaries of life are much higher in many other countries than
in Great Britain. Duties upon flour and meal when ground at the mill, and upon
bread when baked at the oven, take place in many countries. In Holland the
money-price of the bread consumed in towns is supposed to be doubled by means
of such taxes. In lieu of a part of them, the people who live in the country,
pay every year so much a-head, according to the sort of bread they are supposed
to consume. Those who consume wheaten bread pay three guilders fifteen stivers;
about six shillings and ninepence halfpenny. Those, and some other taxes of the
same kind, by raising the price of labour, are said to have ruined the greater
part of the manufactures of Holland {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. p.
210, 211.}. Similar taxes, though not quite so heavy, take place in the
Milanese, in the states of Genoa, in the duchy of Modena, in the duchies of
Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and the Ecclesiastical state. A French author
{Le Reformateur} of some note, has proposed to reform the finances of his
country, by substituting in the room of the greater part of other taxes, this
most ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing so absurd, says Cicero, which has
not sometimes been asserted by some philosophers.

Taxes upon butcher’s meat are still more common than those upon bread. It
may indeed be doubted, whether butcher’s meat is any where a necessary of
life. Grain and other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheese, and butter, or
oil, where butter is not to be had, it is known from experience, can, without
any butcher’s meat, afford the most plentiful, the most wholesome, the
most nourishing, and the most invigorating diet. Decency nowhere requires that
any man should eat butcher’s meat, as it in most places requires that he
should wear a linen shirt or a pair of leather shoes.

Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two
different ways. The consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his
using or consuming goods of a certain kind; or the goods may be taxed while
they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the
consumer. The consumable goods which last a considerable time before they are
consumed altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way; those of which the
consumption is either immediate or more speedy, in the other. The coach-tax and
plate tax are examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of
the other duties of excise and customs, of the latter.

A coach may, with good management, last ten or twelve years. It might be taxed,
once for all, before it comes out of the hands of the coach-maker. But it is
certainly more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a-year for the
privilege of keeping a coach, than to pay all at once forty or forty-eight
pounds additional price to the coach-maker; or a sum equivalent to what the tax
is likely to cost him during the time he uses the same coach. A service of
plate in the same manner, may last more than a century. It is certainly-easier
for the consumer to pay five shillings a-year for every hundred ounces of
plate, near one per cent. of the value, than to redeem this long annuity at
five-and-twenty or thirty years purchase, which would enhance the price at
least five-and-twenty or thirty per cent. The different taxes which affect
houses, are certainly more conveniently paid by moderate annual payments, than
by a heavy tax of equal value upon the first building or sale of the house.

It was the well-known proposal of Sir Matthew Decker, that all commodities,
even those of which the consumption is either immediate or speedy, should be
taxed in this manner; the dealer advancing nothing, but the consumer paying a
certain annual sum for the licence to consume certain goods. The object of his
scheme was to promote all the different branches of foreign trade, particularly
the carrying trade, by taking away all duties upon importation and exportation,
and thereby enabling the merchant to employ his whole capital and credit in the
purchase of goods and the freight of ships, no part of either being diverted
towards the advancing of taxes, The project, however, of taxing, in this
manner, goods of immediate or speedy consumption, seems liable to the four
following very important objections. First, the tax would be more unequal, or
not so well proportioned to the expense and consumption of the different
contributors, as in the way in which it is commonly imposed. The taxes upon
ale, wine, and spiritous liquors, which are advanced by the dealers, are
finally paid by the different consumers, exactly in proportion to their
respective consumption. But if the tax were to be paid by purchasing a licence
to drink those liquors, the sober would, in proportion to his consumption, be
taxed much more heavily than the drunken consumer. A family which exercised
great hospitality, would be taxed much more lightly than one who entertained
fewer guests. Secondly, this mode of taxation, by paying for an annual,
half-yearly, or quarterly licence to consume certain goods, would diminish very
much one of the principal conveniences of taxes upon goods of speedy
consumption; the piece-meal payment. In the price of threepence halfpenny,
which is at present paid for a pot of porter, the different taxes upon malt,
hops, and beer, together with the extraordinary profit which the brewer charges
for having advanced than, may perhaps amount to about three halfpence. If a
workman can conveniently spare those three halfpence, he buys a pot of porter.
If he cannot, he contents himself with a pint; and, as a penny saved is a penny
got, he thus gains a farthing by his temperance. He pays the tax piece-meal, as
he can afford to pay it, and when he can afford to pay it, and every act of
payment is perfectly voluntary, and what he can avoid if he chuses to do so.
Thirdly, such taxes would operate less as sumptuary laws. When the licence was
once purchased, whether the purchaser drunk much or drunk little, his tax would
be the same. Fourthly, if a workman were to pay all at once, by yearly,
half-yearly, or quarterly payments, a tax equal to what he at present pays,
with little or no inconveniency, upon all the different pots and pints of
porter which he drinks in any such period of time, the sum might frequently
distress him very much. This mode of taxation, therefore, it seems evident,
could never, without the most grievous oppression, produce a revenue nearly
equal to what is derived from the present mode without any oppression. In
several countries, however, commodities of an immediate or very speedy
consumption are taxed in this manner. In Holland, people pay so much a-head for
a licence to drink tea. I have already mentioned a tax upon bread, which, so
far as it is consumed in farm houses and country villages, is there levied in
the same manner.

The duties of excise are imposed chiefly upon goods of home produce, destined
for home consumption. They are imposed only upon a few sorts of goods of the
most general use. There can never be any doubt, either concerning the goods
which are subject to those duties, or concerning the particular duty which each
species of goods is subject to. They fall almost altogether upon what I call
luxuries, excepting always the four duties above mentioned, upon salt, soap,
leather, candles, and perhaps that upon green glass.

The duties of customs are much more ancient than those of excise. They seem to
have been called customs, as denoting customary payments, which had been in use
for time immemorial. They appear to have been originally considered as taxes
upon the profits of merchants. During the barbarous times of feudal anarchy,
merchants, like all the other inhabitants of burghs, were considered as little
better than emancipated bondmen, whose persons were despised, and whose gains
were envied. The great nobility, who had consented that the king should tallage
the profits of their own tenants, were not unwilling that he should tallage
likewise those of an order of men whom it was much less their interest to
protect. In those ignorant times, it was not understood, that the profits of
merchants are a subject not taxable directly; or that the final payment of all
such taxes must fall, with a considerable overcharge, upon the consumers.

The gains of alien merchants were looked upon more unfavourably than those of
English merchants. It was natural, therefore, that those of the former should
be taxed more heavily than those of the latter. This distinction between the
duties upon aliens and those upon English merchants, which was begun from
ignorance, has been continued front the spirit of monopoly, or in order to give
our own merchants an advantage, both in the home and in the foreign market.

With this distinction, the ancient duties of customs were imposed equally upon
all sorts of goods, necessaries as well its luxuries, goods exported as well as
goods imported. Why should the dealers in one sort of goods, it seems to have
been thought, be more favoured than those in another? or why should the
merchant exporter be more favoured than the merchant importer?

The ancient customs were divided into three branches. The first, and, perhaps,
the most ancient of all those duties, was that upon wool and leather. It seems
to have been chiefly or altogether an exportation duty. When the woollen
manufacture came to be established in England, lest the king should lose any
part of his customs upon wool by the exportation of woollen cloths, a like duty
was imposed upon them. The other two branches were, first, a duty upon wine,
which being imposed at so much a-ton, was called a tonnage; and, secondly, a
duty upon all other goods, which being imposed at so much a-pound of their
supposed value, was called a poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Edward
III., a duty of sixpence in the pound was imposed upon all goods exported and
imported, except wools, wool-felts, leather, and wines which were subject to
particular duties. In the fourteenth of Richard II., this duty was raised to
one shilling in the pound; but, three years afterwards, it was again reduced to
sixpence. It was raised to eightpence in the second year of Henry IV.; and, in
the fourth of the same prince, to one shilling. From this time to the ninth
year of William III., this duty continued at one shilling in the pound. The
duties of tonnage and poundage were generally granted to the king by one and
the same act of parliament, and were called the subsidy of tonnage and
poundage. The subsidy of poundage having continued for so long a time at one
shilling in the pound, or at five per cent., a subsidy came, in the language of
the customs, to denote a general duty of this kind of five per cent. This
subsidy, which is now called the old subsidy, still continues to be levied,
according to the book of rates established by the twelfth of Charles II. The
method of ascertaining, by a book of rates, the value of goods subject to this
duty, is said to be older than the time of James I. The new subsidy, imposed by
the ninth and tenth of William III., was an additional five per cent. upon the
greater part of goods. The one-third and the two-third subsidy made up between
them another five per cent. of which they were proportionable parts. The
subsidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent. upon the greater part of goods;
and that of 1759, a fifth upon some particular sorts of goods. Besides those
five subsidies, a great variety of other duties have occasionally been imposed
upon particular sorts of goods, in order sometimes to relieve the exigencies of
the state, and sometimes to regulate the trade of the country, according to the
principles of the mercantile system.

That system has come gradually more and more into fashion. The old subsidy was
imposed indifferently upon exportation, as well as importation. The four
subsequent subsidies, as well as the other duties which have since been
occasionally imposed upon particular sorts of goods, have, with a few
exceptions, been laid altogether upon importation. The greater part of the
ancient duties which had been imposed upon the exportation of the goods of home
produce and manufacture, have either been lightened or taken away altogether.
In most cases, they have been taken away. Bounties have even been given upon
the exportation of some of them. Drawbacks, too, sometimes of the whole, and,
in most cases, of a part of the duties which are paid upon the importation of
foreign goods, have been granted upon their exportation. Only half the duties
imposed by the old subsidy upon importation, are drawn back upon exportation;
but the whole of those imposed by the latter subsidies and other imposts are,
upon the greater parts of the goods, drawn back in the same manner. This
growing favour of exportation, and discouragement of importation, have suffered
only a few exceptions, which chiefly concern the materials of some
manufactures. These our merchants and manufacturers are willing should come as
cheap as possible to themselves, and as dear as possible to their rivals and
competitors in other countries. Foreign materials are, upon this account,
sometimes allowed to be imported duty-free; spanish wool, for example, flax,
and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of home produce, and of
those which are the particular produce of our colonies, has sometimes been
prohibited, and sometimes subjected to higher duties. The exportation of
English wool has been prohibited. That of beaver skins, of beaver wool, and of
gum-senega, has been subjected to higher duties; Great Britain, by the
conquests of Canada and Senegal, having got almost the monopoly of those
commodities.

That the mercantile system has not been very favourable to the revenue of the
great body of the people, to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
country, I have endeavoured to show in the fourth book of this Inquiry. It
seems not to have been more favourable to the revenue of the sovereign; so far,
at least, as that revenue depends upon the duties of customs.

In consequence of that system, the importation of several sorts of goods has
been prohibited altogether. This prohibition has, in some cases, entirely
prevented, and in others has very much diminished, the importation of those
commodities, by reducing the importers to the necessity of smuggling. It has
entirely prevented the importation of foreign wollens; and it has very much
diminished that of foreign silks and velvets, In both cases, it has entirely
annihilated the revenue of customs which might have been levied upon such
importation.

The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many different
sorts of foreign goods in order to discourage their consumption in Great
Britain, have, in many cases, served only to encourage smuggling, and, in all
cases, have reduced the revenues of the customs below what more moderate duties
would have afforded. The saying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the
customs, two and two, instead of making four, make sometimes only one, holds
perfectly true with regard to such heavy duties, which never could have been
imposed, had not the mercantile system taught us, in many cases, to employ
taxation as an instrument, not of revenue, but of monopoly.

The bounties which are sometimes given upon the exportation of home produce and
manufactures, and the drawbacks which are paid upon the re-exportation of the
greater part of foreign goods, have given occasion to many frauds, and to a
species of smuggling, more destructive of the public revenue than any other. In
order to obtain the bounty or drawback, the goods, it is well known, are
sometimes shipped, and sent to sea, but soon afterwards clandestinely re-landed
in some other part of the country. The defalcation of the revenue of customs
occasioned by bounties and drawbacks, of which a great part are obtained
fraudulently, is very great. The gross produce of the customs, in the year
which ended on the 5th of January 1755, amounted to £5,068,000. The bounties
which were paid out of this revenue, though in that year there was no bounty
upon corn, amounted to £167,806. The drawbacks which were paid upon debentures
and certificates, to £2,156,800. Bounties and drawbacks together amounted to
£2,324,600. In consequence of these deductions, the revenue of the customs
amounted only to £2,743,400; from which deducting £287,900 for the expense of
management, in salaries and other incidents, the neat revenue of the customs
for that year comes out to be £2,455,500. The expense of management, amounts,
in this manner, to between five and six per cent. upon the gross revenue of the
customs; and to something more than ten per cent. upon what remains of that
revenue, after deducting what is paid away in bounties and drawbacks.

Heavy duties being imposed upon almost all goods imported, our merchant
importers smuggle as much, and make entry of as little as they can. Our
merchant exporters, on the contrary, make entry of more than they export;
sometimes out of vanity, and to pass for great dealers in goods which pay no
duty gain a bounty back. Our exports, in consequence of these different frauds,
appear upon the custom-house books greatly to overbalance our imports, to the
unspeakable comfort of those politicians, who measure the national prosperity
by what they call the balance of trade.

All goods imported, unless particularly exempted, and such exemptions are not
very numerous, are liable to some duties of customs. If any goods are imported,
not mentioned in the book of rates, they are taxed at 4s:9¾d. for every twenty
shillings value, according to the oath of the importer, that is, nearly at five
subsidies, or five poundage duties. The book of rates is extremely
comprehensive, and enumerates a great variety of articles, many of them little
used, and, therefore, not well known. It is, upon this account, frequently
uncertain under what article a particular sort of goods ought to be classed,
and, consequently what duty they ought to pay. Mistakes with regard to this
sometimes ruin the custom-house officer, and frequently occasion much trouble,
expense, and vexation to the importer. In point of perspicuity, precision, and
distinctness, therefore, the duties of customs are much inferior to those of
excise.

In order that the greater part of the members of any society should contribute
to the public revenue, in proportion to their respective expense, it does not
seem necessary that every single article of that expense should be taxed. The
revenue which is levied by the duties of excise is supposed to fall as equally
upon the contributors as that which is levied by the duties of customs; and the
duties of excise are imposed upon a few articles only of the most general used
and consumption. It has been the opinion of many people, that, by proper
management, the duties of customs might likewise, without any loss to the
public revenue, and with great advantage to foreign trade, be confined to a few
articles only.

The foreign articles, of the most general use and consumption in Great Britain,
seem at present to consist chiefly in foreign wines and brandies; in some of
the productions of America and the West Indies, sugar, rum, tobacco,
cocoa-nuts, etc. and in some of those of the East Indies, tea, coffee,
china-ware, spiceries of all kinds, several sorts of piece-goods, etc. These
different articles afford, the greater part of the perhaps, at present, revenue
which is drawn from the duties of customs. The taxes which at present subsist
upon foreign manufactures, if you except those upon the few contained in the
foregoing enumeration, have, the greater part of them, been imposed for the
purpose, not of revenue, but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants an
advantage in the home market. By removing all prohibitions, and by subjecting
all foreign manufactures to such moderate taxes, as it was found from
experience, afforded upon each article the greatest revenue to the public, our
own workmen might still have a considerable advantage in the home market; and
many articles, some of which at present afford no revenue to government, and
others a very inconsiderable one, might afford a very great one.

High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities,
and sometimes by encouraging smuggling frequently afford a smaller revenue to
government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.

When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the diminution of consumption,
there can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering of the tax. When the
diminution of revenue is the effect of the encouragement given to smuggling, it
may, perhaps, be remedied in two ways; either by diminishing the temptation to
smuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of smuggling. The temptation to
smuggle can be diminished only by the lowering of the tax; and the difficulty
of smuggling can be increased only by establishing that system of
administration which is most proper for preventing it.

The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from experience, obstruct and embarrass
the operations of the smuggler much more effectually than those of the customs.
By introducing into the customs a system of administration as similar to that
of the excise as the nature of the different duties will admit, the difficulty
of smuggling might be very much increased. This alteration, it has been
supposed by many people, might very easily be brought about.

The importer of commodities liable to any duties of customs, it has been said,
might, at his option, be allowed either to carry them to his own private
warehouse; or to lodge them in a warehouse, provided either at his own expense
or at that of the public, but under the key of the custom-house officer, and
never to be opened but in his presence. If the merchant carried them to his own
private warehouse, the duties to be immediately paid, and never afterwards to
be drawn back; and that warehouse to be at all times subject to the visit and
examination of the custom-house officer, in order to ascertain how far the
quantity contained in it corresponded with that for which the duty had been
paid. If he carried them to the public warehouse, no duty to be paid till they
were taken out for home consumption. If taken out for exportation, to be
duty-free; proper security being always given that they should be so exported.
The dealers in those particular commodities, either by wholesale or retail, to
be at all times subject to the visit and examination of the custom-house
officer; and to be obliged to justify, by proper certificates, the payment of
the duty upon the whole quantity contained in their shops or warehouses. What
are called the excise duties upon rum imported, are at present levied in this
manner; and the same system of administration might, perhaps, be extended to
all duties upon goods imported; provided always that those duties were, like
the duties of excise, confined to a few sorts of goods of the most general use
and consumption. If they were extended to almost all sorts of goods, as at
present, public warehouses of sufficient extent could not easily be provided;
and goods of a very delicate nature, or of which the preservation required much
care and attention, could not safely be trusted by the merchant in any
warehouse but his own.

If, by such a system of administration, smuggling to any considerable extent
could be prevented, even under pretty high duties; and if every duty was
occasionally either heightened or lowered according as it was most likely,
either the one way or the other, to afford the greatest revenue to the state;
taxation being always employed as an instrument of revenue, and never of
monopoly; it seems not improbable that a revenue, at least equal to the present
neat revenue of the customs, might be drawn from duties upon the importation of
only a few sorts of goods of the most general use and consumption; and that the
duties of customs might thus be brought to the same degree of simplicity,
certainty, and precision, as those of excise. What the revenue at present loses
by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods, which are afterwards
re-landed and consumed at home, would, under this system, be saved altogether.
If to this saving, which would alone be very considerable, were added the
abolition of all bounties upon the exportation of home produce; in all cases in
which those bounties were not in reality drawbacks of some duties of excise
which had before been advanced; it cannot well be doubted, but that the neat
revenue of customs might, after an alteration of this kind, be fully equal to
what it had ever been before.

If, by such a change of system, the public revenue suffered no loss, the trade
and manufactures of the country would certainly gain a very considerable
advantage. The trade in the commodities not taxed, by far the greatest number
would be perfectly free, and might be carried on to and from all parts of the
world with every possible advantage. Among those commodities would be
comprehended all the necessaries of life, and all the materials of manufacture.
So far as the free importation of the necessaries of life reduced their average
money price in the home market, it would reduce the money price of labour, but
without reducing in any respect its real recompence. The value of money is in
proportion to the quantity of the necessaries of life which it will purchase.
That of the necessaries of life is altogether independent of the quantity of
money which can be had for them. The reduction in the money price of labour
would necessarily be attended with a proportionable one in that of all home
manufactures, which would thereby gain some advantage in all foreign markets.
The price of some manufactures would be reduced, in a still greater proportion,
by the free importation of the raw materials. If raw silk could be imported
from China and Indostan, duty-free, the silk manufacturers in England could
greatly undersell those of both France and Italy. There would be no occasion to
prohibit the importation of foreign silks and velvets. The cheapness of their
goods would secure to our own workmen, not only the possession of a home, but a
very great command of the foreign market. Even the trade in the commodities
taxed, would be carried on with much more advantage than at present. If those
commodities were delivered out of the public warehouse for foreign exportation,
being in this case exempted from all taxes, the trade in them would be
perfectly free. The carrying trade, in all sorts of goods, would, under this
system, enjoy every possible advantage. If these commodities were delivered out
for home consumption, the importer not being obliged to advance the tax till he
had an opportunity of selling his goods, either to some dealer, or to some
consumer, he could always afford to sell them cheaper than if he had been
obliged to advance it at the moment of importation. Under the same taxes, the
foreign trade of consumption, even in the taxed commodities, might in this
manner be carried on with much more advantage than it is at present.

It was the object of the famous excise scheme of Sir Robert Walpole, to
establish, with regard to wine and tobacco, a system not very unlike that which
is here proposed. But though the bill which was then brought into Parliament,
comprehended those two commodities only, it was generally supposed to be meant
as an introduction to a more extensive scheme of the same kind. Faction,
combined with the interest of smuggling merchants, raised so violent, though so
unjust a clamour, against that bill, that the minister thought proper to drop
it; and, from a dread of exciting a clamour of the same kind, none of his
successors have dared to resume the project.

The duties upon foreign luxuries, imported for home consumption, though they
sometimes fall upon the poor, fall principally upon people of middling or more
than middling fortune. Such are, for example, the duties upon foreign wines,
upon coffee, chocolate, tea, sugar, etc.

The duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home produce, destined for home
consumption, fall pretty equally upon people of all ranks, in proportion to
their respective expense. The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and
ale, upon their own consumption; the rich, upon both their own consumption and
that of their servants.

The whole consumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of those below the
middling rank, it must be observed, is, in every country, much greater, not
only in quantity, but in value, than that of the middling, and of those above
the middling rank. The whole expense of the inferior is much greater titan that
of the superior ranks. In the first place, almost the whole capital of every
country is annually distributed among the inferior ranks of people, as the
wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue, arising from
both the rent of land and the profits of stock, is annually distributed among
the same rank, in the wages and maintenance of menial servants, and other
unproductive labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits of stock belongs to
the same rank, as a revenue arising from the employment of their small
capitals. The amount of the profits annually made by small shopkeepers,
tradesmen, and retailers of all kinds, is everywhere very considerable, and
makes a very considerable portion of the annual produce. Fourthly and lastly,
some part even of the rent of land belongs to the same rank; a considerable
part to those who are somewhat below the middling rank, and a small part even
to the lowest rank; common labourers sometimes possessing in property an acre
or two of land. Though the expense of those inferior ranks of people,
therefore, taking them individually, is very small, yet the whole mass of it,
taking them collectively, amounts always to by much the largest portion of the
whole expense of the society; what remains of the annual produce of the land
and labour of the country, for the consumption of the superior ranks, being
always much less, not only in quantity, but in value. The taxes upon expense,
therefore, which fall chiefly upon that of the superior ranks of people, upon
the smaller portion of the annual produce, are likely to be much less
productive than either those which fall indifferently upon the expense of all
ranks, or even those which fall chiefly upon that of the inferior ranks, than
either those which fall indifferently upon the whole annual produce, or those
which fall chiefly upon the larger portion of it. The excise upon the materials
and manufacture of home-made fermented and spirituous liquors, is, accordingly,
of all the different taxes upon expense, by far the most productive; and this
branch of the excise falls very much, perhaps principally, upon the expense of
the common people. In the year which ended on the 5th of July 1775, the gross
produce of this branch of the excise amounted to £3,341,837:9:9.

It must always be remembered, however, that it is the luxuries, and not the
necessary expense of the inferior ranks of people, that ought ever to be taxed.
The final payment of any tax upon their necessary expense, would fall
altogether upon the superior ranks of people; upon the smaller portion of the
annual produce, and not upon the greater. Such a tax must, in all cases, either
raise the wages of labour, or lessen the demand for it. It could not raise the
wages of labour, without throwing the final payment of the tax upon the
superior ranks of people. It could not lessen the demand for labour, without
lessening the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, the fund
upon which all taxes must be finally paid. Whatever might be the state to which
a tax of this kind reduced the demand for labour, it must always raise wages
higher than they otherwise would be in that state; and the final payment of
this enhancement of wages must, in all cases, fall upon the superior ranks of
people.

Fermented liquors brewed, and spiritous liquors distilled, not for sale, but
for private use, are not in Great Britain liable to any duties of excise. This
exemption, of which the object is to save private families from the odious
visit and examination of the tax-gatherer, occasions the burden of those duties
to fall frequently much lighter upon the rich than upon the poor. It is not,
indeed, very common to distil for private use, though it is done sometimes. But
in the country, many middling and almost all rich and great families, brew
their own beer. Their strong beer, therefore, costs them eight shillings
a-barrel less than it costs the common brewer, who must have his profit upon
the tax, as well as upon all the other expense which he advances. Such
families, therefore, must drink their beer at least nine or ten shillings
a-barrel cheaper than any liquor of the same quality can be drank by the common
people, to whom it is everywhere more convenient to buy their beer, by little
and little, from the brewery or the ale-house. Malt, in the same manner, that
is made for the use of a private family, is not liable to the visit or
examination of the tax-gatherer but, in this case the family must compound at
seven shillings and sixpence a-head for the tax. Seven shillings and sixpence
are equal to the excise upon ten bushels of malt; a quantity fully equal to
what all the different members of any sober family, men, women, and children,
are, at an average, likely to consume. But in rich and great families, where
country hospitality is much practised, the malt liquors consumed by the members
of the family make but a small part of the consumption of the house. Either on
account of this composition, however, or for other reasons, it is not near so
common to malt as to brew for private use. It is difficult to imagine any
equitable reason, why those who either brew or distil for private use should
not be subject to a composition of the same kind.

A greater revenue than what is at present drawn from all the heavy taxes upon
malt, beer, and ale, might be raised, it has frequently been said, by a much
lighter tax upon malt; the opportunities of defrauding the revenue being much
greater in a brewery than in a malt-house; and those who brew for private use
being exempted from all duties or composition for duties, which is not the case
with those who malt for private use.

In the porter brewery of London, a quarter of malt is commonly brewed into more
than two barrels and a-half, sometimes into three barrels of porter. The
different taxes upon malt amount to six shillings a-quarter; those upon strong
ale and beer to eight shillings a-barrel. In the porter brewery, therefore, the
different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, amount to between twenty-six and
thirty shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. In the country brewery
for common country sale, a quarter of malt is seldom brewed into less than two
barrels of strong, and one barrel of small beer; frequently into two barrels
and a-half of strong beer. The different taxes upon small beer amount to one
shilling and fourpence a-barrel. In the country brewery, therefore, the
different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, seldom amount to less than
twenty-three shillings and fourpence, frequently to twenty-six shillings, upon
the produce of a quarter of malt. Taking the whole kingdom at an average,
therefore, the whole amount of the duties upon malt, beer, and ale, cannot be
estimated at less than twenty-four or twenty-five shillings upon the produce of
a quarter of malt. But by taking off all the different duties upon beer and
ale, and by trebling the malt tax, or by raising it from six to eighteen
shillings upon the quarter of malt, a greater revenue, it is said, might be
raised by this single tax, than what is at present drawn from all those heavier
taxes.

In 1772, the old malt tax produced……… £722,023: 11: 11
The additional… £356,776: 7: 9¾
In 1775, the old tax produced…………… £561,627: 3: 7½
The additional… £278,650: 15: 3¾
In 1774, the old tax produced ………… £624,614: 17: 5¾
The additional….£310,745: 2: 8½
In 1775, the old tax produced …………£657,357: 0: 8¼
The additional….£323,785: 12: 6¼
£5,855,580: 12: 0¾
Average of these four years ………….. £958,895: 3: 0

In 1772, the country excise produced…….£1,243,120: 5: 3
The London brewery 408,260: 7: 2¾
In 1773, the country excise…………….£1,245,808: 3: 3
The London brewery 405,406: 17: 10½
In 1774, the country excise…………….£1,246,373: 14: 5½
The London brewery 320,601: 18: 0¼
In 1775, the country excise…………….£1,214,583: 6: 1¼
The London brewery 463,670: 7: 0¼
4)£6,547,832: 19: 2¼
Average of these four years …………..£1,636,958: 4: 9½
To which adding the average malt tax…….. 958,895: 3: 0¼

The whole amount of those different
taxes comes out to be……..£2,595,835: 7: 10

But, by trebling the malt tax,
or by raising it from six to
eighteen shillings upon the quarter
of malt, that single tax would produce…..£2,876,685: 9: 0
A sum which exceeds the
foregoing by…. 280,832: 1: 3

Under the old malt tax, indeed, is comprehended a tax of four shillings upon
the hogshead of cyder, and another of ten shillings upon the barrel of mum. In
1774, the tax upon cyder produced only £3,083:6:8. It probably fell somewhat
short of its usual amount; all the different taxes upon cyder, having, that
year, produced less than ordinary. The tax upon mum, though much heavier, is
still less productive, on account of the smaller consumption of that liquor.
But to balance whatever may be the ordinary amount of those two taxes, there is
comprehended under what is called the country excise, first, the old excise of
six shillings and eightpence upon the hogshead of cyder; secondly, a like tax
of six shillings and eightpence upon the hogshead of verjuice; thirdly, another
of eight shillings and ninepence upon the hogshead of vinegar; and, lastly, a
fourth tax of elevenpence upon the gallon of mead or metheglin. The produce of
those different taxes will probably much more than counterbalance that of the
duties imposed, by what is called the annual malt tax, upon cyder and mum.

Malt is consumed, not only in the brewery of beer and ale, but in the
manufacture of low wines and spirits. If the malt tax were to be raised to
eighteen shillings upon the quarter, it might be necessary to make some
abatement in the different excises which are imposed upon those particular
sorts of low wines and spirits, of which malt makes any part of the materials.
In what are called malt spirits, it makes commonly but a third part of the
materials; the other two-thirds being either raw barley, or one-third barley
and one-third wheat. In the distillery of malt spirits, both the opportunity
and the temptation to smuggle are much greater than either in a brewery or in a
malt-house; the opportunity, on account of the smaller bulk and greater value
of the commodity, and the temptation, on account of the superior height of the
duties, which amounted to 3s. 10 2/3d. upon the gallon of spirits. {Though the
duties directly imposed upon proof spirits amount only to 2s. 6d per gallon,
these, added to the duties upon the low wines, from which they are distilled,
amount to 3s 10 2/3d. Both low wines and proof spirits are, to prevent frauds,
now rated according to what they gauge in the wash.}

By increasing the duties upon malt, and reducing those upon the distillery,
both the opportunities and the temptation to smuggle would be diminished, which
might occasion a still further augmentation of revenue.

It has for some time past been the policy of Great Britain to discourage the
consumption of spiritous liquors, on account of their supposed tendency to ruin
the health and to corrupt the morals of the common people. According to this
policy, the abatement of the taxes upon the distillery ought not to be so great
as to reduce, in any respect, the price of those liquors. Spiritous liquors
might remain as dear as ever; while, at the same time, the wholesome and
invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be considerably reduced in their
price. The people might thus be in part relieved from one of the burdens of
which they at present complain the most; while, at the same time, the revenue
might be considerably augmented.

The objections of Dr. Davenant to this alteration in the present system of
excise duties, seem to be without foundation. Those objections are, that the
tax, instead of dividing itself, as at present, pretty equally upon the profit
of the maltster, upon that of the brewer and upon that of the retailer, would
so far as it affected profit, fall altogether upon that of the maltster; that
the maltster could not so easily get back the amount of the tax in the advanced
price of his malt, as the brewer and retailer in the advanced price of their
liquor; and that so heavy a tax upon malt might reduce the rent and profit of
barley land.

No tax can ever reduce, for any considerable time, the rate of profit in any
particular trade, which must always keep its level with other trades in the
neighbourhood. The present duties upon malt, beer, and ale, do not affect the
profits of the dealers in those commodities, who all get back the tax with an
additional profit, in the enhanced price of their goods. A tax, indeed, may
render the goods upon which it is imposed so dear, as to diminish the
consumption of them. But the consumption of malt is in malt liquors; and a tax
of eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt could not well render those
liquors dearer than the different taxes, amounting to twenty-four or
twenty-five shillings, do at present. Those liquors, on the contrary, would
probably become cheaper, and the consumption of them would be more likely to
increase than to diminish.

It is not very easy to understand why it should be more difficult for the
maltster to get back eighteen shillings in the advanced price of his malt, than
it is at present for the brewer to get back twenty-four or twenty-five,
sometimes thirty shillings, in that of his liquor. The maltster, indeed,
instead of a tax of six shillings, would be obliged to advance one of eighteen
shilling upon every quarter of malt. But the brewer is at present obliged to
advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty shillings, upon
every quarter of malt which he brews. It could not be more inconvenient for the
maltster to advance a lighter tax, than it is at present for the brewer to
advance a heavier one. The maltster does not always keep in his granaries a
stock of malt, which it will require a longer time to dispose of than the stock
of beer and ale which the brewer frequently keeps in his cellars. The former,
therefore, may frequently get the returns of his money as soon as the latter.
But whatever inconveniency might arise to the maltster from being obliged to
advance a heavier tax, it could easily be remedied, by granting him a few
months longer credit than is at present commonly given to the brewer.

Nothing could reduce the rent and profit of barley land, which did not reduce
the demand for barley. But a change of system, which reduced the duties upon a
quarter of malt brewed into beer and ale, from twentyfour and twenty-five
shillings to eighteen shillings, would be more likely to increase than diminish
that demand. The rent and profit of barley land, besides, must always be nearly
equal to those of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. If
they were less, some part of the barley land would soon be turned to some other
purpose; and if they were greater, more land would soon be turned to the
raising of barley. When the ordinary price of any particular produce of land is
at what may be called a monopoly price, a tax upon it necessarily reduces the
rent and profit of the land which grows it. A tax upon the produce of those
precious vineyards, of which the wine falls so much short of the effectual
demand, that its price is always above the natural proportion to that of the
produce of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land, would
necessarily reduce the rent and profit of those vineyards. The price of the
wines being already the highest that could be got for the quantity commonly
sent to market, it could not be raised higher without diminishing that
quantity; and the quantity could not be diminished without still greater loss,
because the lands could not be turned to any other equally valuable produce.
The whole weight of the tax, therefore, would fall upon the rent and profit;
properly upon the rent of the vineyard. When it has been proposed to lay any
new tax upon sugar, our sugar planters have frequently complained that the
whole weight of such taxes fell not upon the consumer, but upon the producer;
they never having been able to raise the price of their sugar after the tax
higher than it was before. The price had, it seems, before the tax, been a
monopoly price; and the arguments adduced to show that sugar was an improper
subject of taxation, demonstrated perhaps that it was a proper one; the gains
of monopolists, whenever they can be come at, being certainly of all subjects
the most proper. But the ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly
price; and the rent and profit of barley land have never been above their
natural proportion to those of other equally fertile and equally well
cultivated land. The different taxes which have been imposed upon malt, beer,
and ale, have never lowered the price of barley; have never reduced the rent
and profit of barley land. The price of malt to the brewer has constantly risen
in proportion to the taxes imposed upon it; and those taxes, together with the
different duties upon beer and ale, have constantly either raised the price,
or, what comes to the same thing, reduced the quality of those commodities to
the consumer. The final payment of those taxes has fallen constantly upon the
consumer, and not upon the producer.

The only people likely to suffer by the change of system here proposed, are
those who brew for their own private use. But the exemption, which this
superior rank of people at present enjoy, from very heavy taxes which are paid
by the poor labourer and artificer, is surely most unjust and unequal, and
ought to be taken away, even though this change was never to take place. It has
probably been the interest of this superior order of people, however, which has
hitherto prevented a change of system that could not well fail both to increase
the revenue and to relieve the people.

Besides such duties as those of custom and excise above mentioned, there are
several others which affect the price of goods more unequally and more
indirectly. Of this kind are the duties, which, in French, are called peages,
which in old Saxon times were called the duties of passage, and which seem to
have been originally established for the same purpose as our turnpike tolls, or
the tolls upon our canals and navigable rivers, for the maintenance of the road
or of the navigation. Those duties, when applied to such purposes, are most
properly imposed according to the bulk or weight of the goods. As they were
originally local and provincial duties, applicable to local and provincial
purposes, the administration of them was, in most cases, entrusted to the
particular town, parish, or lordship, in which they were levied; such
communities being, in some way or other, supposed to be accountable for the
application. The sovereign, who is altogether unaccountable, has in many
countries assumed to himself the administration of those duties; and though he
has in most cases enhanced very much the duty, he has in many entirely
neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls of Great Britain should ever
become one of the resources of government, we may learn, by the example of many
other nations, what would probably be the consequence. Such tolls, no doubt,
are finally paid by the consumer; but the consumer is not taxed in proportion
to his expense, when he pays, not according to the value, but according to the
bulk or weight of what he consumes. When such duties are imposed, not according
to the bulk or weight, but according to the supposed value of the goods, they
become properly a sort of inland customs or excise, which obstruct very much
the most important of all branches of commerce, the interior commerce of the
country.

In some small states, duties similar to those passage duties are imposed upon
goods carried across the territory, either by land or by water, from one
foreign country to another. These are in some countries called transit-duties.
Some of the little Italian states which are situated upon the Po, and the
rivers which run into it, derive some revenue from duties of this kind, which
are paid altogether by foreigners, and which, perhaps, are the only duties that
one state can impose upon the subjects of another, without obstruction in any
respect, the industry or commerce of its own. The most important transit-duty
in the world, is that levied by the king of Denmark upon all merchant ships
which pass through the Sound.

Such taxes upon luxuries, as the greater part of the duties of customs and
excise, though they all fall indifferently upon every different species of
revenue, and are paid finally, or without any retribution, by whoever consumes
the commodities upon which they are imposed; yet they do not always fall
equally or proportionally upon the revenue of every individual. As every
man’s humour regulates the degree of his consumption, every man
contributes rather according to his humour, than proportion to his revenue: the
profuse contribute more, the parsimonious less, than their proper proportion.
During the minority of a man of great fortune, he contributes commonly very
little, by his consumption, towards the support of that state from whose
protection he derives a great revenue. Those who live in another country,
contribute nothing by their consumption towards the support of the government
of that country, in which is situated the source of their revenue. If in this
latter country there should be no land tax, nor any considerable duty upon the
transference either of moveable or immoveable property, as is the case in
Ireland, such absentees may derive a great revenue from the protection of a
government, to the support of which they do not contribute a single shilling.
This inequality is likely to be greatest in a country of which the government
is, in some respects, subordinate and dependant upon that of some other. The
people who possess the most extensive property in the dependant, will, in this
case, generally chuse to live in the governing country. Ireland is precisely in
this situation; and we cannot therefore wonder, that the proposal of a tax upon
absentees should be so very popular in that country. It might, perhaps, be a
little difficult to ascertain either what sort, or what degree of absence,
would subject a man to be taxed as an absentee, or at what precise time the tax
should either begin or end. If you except, however, this very peculiar
situation, any inequality in the contribution of individuals which can arise
from such taxes, is much more than compensated by the very circumstance which
occasions that inequality; the circumstance that every man’s contribution
is altogether voluntary; it being altogether in his power, either to consume,
or not to consume, the commodity taxed. Where such taxes, therefore, are
properly assessed, and upon proper commodities, they are paid with less
grumbling than any other. When they are advanced by the merchant or
manufacturer, the consumer, who finally pays them, soon comes to confound them
with the price of the commodities, and almost forgets that he pays any tax.
Such taxes are, or may be, perfectly certain; or may be assessed, so as to
leave no doubt concerning either what ought to be paid, or when it ought to be
paid; concerning either the quantity or the time of payment. What ever
uncertainty there may sometimes be, either in the duties of customs in Great
Britain, or in other duties of the same kind in other countries, it cannot
arise from the nature of those duties, but from the inaccurate or unskilful
manner in which the law that imposes them is expressed.

Taxes upon luxuries generally are, and always may be, paid piece-meal, or in
proportion as the contributors have occasion to purchase the goods upon which
they are imposed. In the time and mode of payment, they are, or may be, of all
taxes the most convenient. Upon the whole, such taxes, therefore, are perhaps
as agreeable to the three first of the four general maxims concerning taxation,
as any other. They offend in every respect against the fourth.

Such taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the public treasury of the
state, always take out, or keep out, of the pockets of the people, more than
almost any other taxes. They seem to do this in all the four different ways in
which it is possible to do it.

First, the levying of such taxes, even when imposed in the most judicious
manner, requires a great number of custom-house and excise officers, whose
salaries and perquisites are a real tax upon the people, which brings nothing
into the treasury of the state. This expense, however, it must be acknowledged,
is more moderate in Great Britain than in most other countries. In the year
which ended on the 5th of July, 1775, the gross produce of the different
duties, under the management of the commissioners of excise in England,
amounted to £5,507,308:18:8¼, which was levied at an expense of little more
than five and a-half per cent. From this gross produce, however, there must be
deducted what was paid away in bounties and drawbacks upon the exportation of
exciseable goods, which will reduce the neat produce below five millions. {The
neat produce of that year, after deducting all expenses and allowances,
amounted to £4,975,652:19:6.} The levying of the salt duty, and excise duty,
but under a different management, is much more expensive. The neat revenue of
the customs does not amount to two millions and a-half, which is levied at an
expense of more than ten per cent., in the salaries of officers and other
incidents. But the perquisites of custom-house officers are everywhere much
greater than their salaries; at some ports more than double or triple those
salaries. If the salaries of officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount
to more than ten per cent. upon the neat revenue of the customs, the whole
expense of levying that revenue may amount, in salaries and perquisites
together, to more than twenty or thirty per cent. The officers of excise
receive few or no perquisites; and the administration of that branch of the
revenue being of more recent establishment, is in general less corrupted than
that of the customs, into which length of time has introduced and authorised
many abuses. By charging upon malt the whole revenue which is at present levied
by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, a saving, it is supposed,
of more than £50,000, might be made in the annual expense of the excise. By
confining the duties of customs to a few sorts of goods, and by levying those
duties according to the excise laws, a much greater saving might probably be
made in the annual expense of the customs.

Secondly, such taxes necessarily occasion some obstruction or discouragement to
certain branches of industry. As they always raise the price of the commodity
taxed, they so far discourage its consumption, and consequently its production.
If it is a commodity of home growth or manufacture, less labour comes to be
employed in raising and producing it. If it is a foreign commodity of which the
tax increases in this manner the price, the commodities of the same kind which
are made at home may thereby, indeed, gain some advantage in the home market,
and a greater quantity of domestic industry may thereby be turned toward
preparing them. But though this rise of price in a foreign commodity, may
encourage domestic industry in one particular branch, it necessarily
discourages that industry in almost every other. The dearer the Birmingham
manufacturer buys his foreign wine, the cheaper he necessarily sells that part
of his hardware with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of
which, he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore, becomes of less value
to him, and he has less encouragement to work at it. The dearer the consumers
in one country pay for the surplus produce of another, the cheaper they
necessarily sell that part of their own surplus produce with which, or, what
comes to the same thing, with the price of which, they buy it. That part of
their own surplus produce becomes of less value to them, and they have less
encouragement to increase its quantity. All taxes upon consumable commodities,
therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of productive labour below what it
otherwise would be, either in preparing the commodities taxed, if they are home
commodities, or in preparing those with which they are purchased, if they are
foreign commodities. Such taxes, too, always alter, more or less, the natural
direction of national industry, and turn it into a channel always different
from, and generally less advantageous, than that in which it would have run of
its own accord.

Thirdly, the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling, gives frequent occasion
to forfeitures and other penalties, which entirely ruin the smuggler; a person
who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the laws of his country, is
frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would have
been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not the laws of his country
made that a crime which nature never meant to be so. In those corrupted
governments, where there is at least a general suspicion of much unnecessary
expense, and great misapplication of the public revenue, the laws which guard
it are little respected. Not many people are scrupulous about smuggling, when,
without perjury, they can find an easy and safe opportunity of doing so. To
pretend to have any scruple about buying smuggled goods, though a manifest
encouragement to the violation of the revenue laws, and to the perjury which
almost always attends it, would, in most countries, be regarded as one of those
pedantic pieces of hypocrisy which, instead of gaining credit with anybody,
serve only to expose the person who affects to practise them to the suspicion
of being a greater knave than most of his neighbours. By this indulgence of the
public, the smuggler is often encouraged to continue a trade, which he is thus
taught to consider as in some measure innocent; and when the severity of the
revenue laws is ready to fall upon him, he is frequently disposed to defend
with violence, what he has been accustomed to regard as his just property. From
being at first, perhaps, rather imprudent than criminal, he at last too often
becomes one of the hardiest and most determined violators of the laws of
society. By the ruin of the smuggler, his capital, which had before been
employed in maintaining productive labour, is absorbed either in the revenue of
the state, or in that of the revenue officer; and is employed in maintaining
unproductive, to the diminution of the general capital of the society, and of
the useful industry which it might otherwise have maintained.

Fourthly, such taxes, by subjecting at least the dealers in the taxed
commodities, to the frequent visits and odious examination of the
tax-gatherers, expose them sometimes, no doubt, to some degree of oppression,
and always to much trouble and vexation; and though vexation, as has already
been said, is not strictly speaking expense, it is certainly equivalent to the
expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. The laws
of excise, though more effectual for the purpose for which they were
instituted, are, in this respect, more vexatious than those of the customs.
When a merchant has imported goods subject to certain duties of customs; when
he has paid those duties, and lodged the goods in his warehouse; he is not, in
most cases, liable to any further trouble or vexation from the custom-house
officer. It is otherwise with goods subject to duties of excise. The dealers
have no respite from the continual visits and examination of the excise
officers. The duties of excise are, upon this account, more unpopular than
those of the customs; and so are the officers who levy them. Those officers, it
is pretended, though in general, perhaps, they do their duty fully as well as
those of the customs; yet, as that duty obliges them to be frequently very
troublesome to some of their neighbours, commonly contract a certain hardness
of character, which the others frequently have not. This observation, however,
may very probably be the mere suggestion of fraudulent dealers, whose smuggling
is either prevented or detected by their diligence.

The inconveniencies, however, which are, perhaps, in some degree inseparable
from taxes upon consumable communities, fall as light upon the people of Great
Britain as upon those of any other country of which the government is nearly as
expensive. Our state is not perfect, and might be mended; but it is as good, or
better, than that of most of our neighbours.

In consequence of the notion, that duties upon consumable goods were taxes upon
the profits of merchants, those duties have, in some countries, been repeated
upon every successive sale of the goods. If the profits of the
merchant-importer or merchant-manufacturer were taxed, equality seemed to
require that those of all the middle buyers, who intervened between either of
them and the consumer, should likewise be taxed. The famous alcavala of Spain
seems to have been established upon this principle. It was at first a tax of
ten per cent. afterwards of fourteen per cent. and it is at present only six
per cent. upon the sale of every sort of property whether moveable or
immoveable; and it is repeated every time the property is sold. {Memoires
concernant les Droits, etc. tom. i, p. 15} The levying of this tax requires a
multitude of revenue officers, sufficient to guard the transportation of goods,
not only from one province to another, but from one shop to another. It
subjects, not only the dealers in some sorts of goods, but those in all sorts,
every farmer, every manufacturer, every merchant and shopkeeper, to the
continual visit and examination of the tax-gatherers. Through the greater part
of the country in which a tax of this kind is established, nothing can be
produced for distant sale. The produce of every part of the country must be
proportioned to the consumption of the neighbourhood. It is to the alcavala,
accordingly, that Ustaritz imputes the ruin of the manufactures of Spain. He
might have imputed to it, likewise, the declension of agriculture, it being
imposed not only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the land.

In the kingdom of Naples, there is a similar tax of three per cent. upon the
value of all contracts, and consequently upon that of all contracts of sale. It
is both lighter than the Spanish tax, and the greater part of towns and
parishes are allowed to pay a composition in lieu of it. They levy this
composition in what manner they please, generally in a way that gives no
interruption to the interior commerce of the place. The Neapolitan tax,
therefore, is not near so ruinous as the Spanish one.

The uniform system of taxation, which, with a few exception of no great
consequence, takes place in all the different parts of the united kingdom of
Great Britain, leaves the interior commerce of the country, the inland and
coasting trade, almost entirely free. The inland trade is almost perfectly
free; and the greater part of goods may be carried from one end of the kingdom
to the other, without requiring any permit or let-pass, without being subject
to question, visit or examination, from the revenue officers. There are a few
exceptions, but they are such as can give no interruption to any important
branch of inland commerce of the country. Goods carried coastwise, indeed,
require certificates or coast-cockets. If you except coals, however, the rest
are almost all duty-free. This freedom of interior commerce, the effect of the
uniformity of the system of taxation, is perhaps one of the principal causes of
the prosperity of Great Britain; every great country being necessarily the best
and most extensive market for the greater part of the productions of its own
industry. If the same freedom in consequence of the same uniformity, could be
extended to Ireland and the plantations, both the grandeur of the state, and
the prosperity of every part of the empire, would probably be still greater
than at present.

In France, the different revenue laws which take place in the different
provinces, require a multitude of revenue officers to surround, not only the
frontiers of the kingdom, but those of almost each particular province, in
order either to prevent the importation of certain goods, or to subject it to
the payment of certain duties, to the no small interruption of the interior
commerce of the country. Some provinces are allowed to compound for the
gabelle, or salt tax; others are exempted from it altogether. Some provinces
are exempted from the exclusive sale of tobacco, which the farmers-general
enjoy through the greater part of the kingdom. The aides, which correspond to
the excise in England, are very different in different provinces. Some
provinces are exempted from them, and pay a composition or equivalent. In those
in which they take place, and are in farm, there are many local duties which do
not extend beyond a particular town or district. The traites, which correspond
to our customs, divide the kingdom into three great parts; first, the provinces
subject to the tariff of 1664, which are called the provinces of the five great
farms, and under which are comprehended Picardy, Normandy, and the greater part
of the interior provinces of the kingdom; secondly, the provinces subject to
the tariff of 1667, which are called the provinces reckoned foreign, and under
which are comprehended the greater part of the frontier provinces; and,
thirdly, those provinces which are said to be treated as foreign, or which,
because they are allowed a free commerce with foreign countries, are, in their
commerce with the other provinces of France, subjected to the same duties as
other foreign countries. These are Alsace, the three bishoprics of Mentz, Toul,
and Verdun, and the three cities of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseilles. Both in
the provinces of the five great farms (called so on account of an ancient
division of the duties of customs into five great branches, each of which was
originally the subject of a particular farm, though they are now all united
into one), and in those which are said to be reckoned foreign, there are many
local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or district. There
are some such even in the provinces which are said to be treated as foreign,
particularly in the city of Marseilles. It is unnecessary to observe how much
both the restraints upon the interior commerce of the country, and the number
of the revenue officers, must be multiplied, in order to guard the frontiers of
those different provinces and districts which are subject to such different
systems of taxation.

Over and above the general restraints arising from this complicated system of
revenue laws, the commerce of wine (after corn, perhaps, the most important
production of France) is, in the greater part of the provinces, subject to
particular restraints arising from the favour which has been shown to the
vineyards of particular provinces and districts above those of others. The
provinces most famous for their wines, it will be found, I believe, are those
in which the trade in that article is subject to the fewest restraints of this
kind. The extensive market which such provinces enjoy, encourages good
management both in the cultivation of their vineyards, and in the subsequent
preparation of their wines.

Such various and complicated revenue laws are not peculiar to France. The
little duchy of Milan is divided into six provinces, in each of which there is
a different system of taxation, with regard to several different sorts of
consumable goods. The still smaller territories of the duke of Parma are
divided into three or four, each of which has, in the same manner, a system of
its own. Under such absurd management, nothing but the great fertility of the
soil, and happiness of the climate, could preserve such countries from soon
relapsing into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism.

Taxes upon consumable commodities may either be levied by an administration, of
which the officers are appointed by govermnent, and are immediately accountable
to government, of which the revenue must, in this case, vary from year to year,
according to the occasional variations in the produce of the tax; or they may
be let in farm for a rent certain, the farmer being allowed to appoint his own
officers, who, though obliged to levy the tax in the manner directed by the
law, are under his immediate inspection, and are immediately accountable to
him. The best and most frugal way of levying a tax can never be by farm. Over
and above what is necessary for paying the stipulated rent, the salaries of the
officers, and the whole expense of administration, the farmer must always draw
from the produce of the tax a certain profit, proportioned at least to the
advance which he makes, to the risk which he runs, to the trouble which he is
at, and to the knowledge and skill which it requires to manage so very
complicated a concern. Government, by establishing an administration under
their own immediate inspection, of the same kind with that which the farmer
establishes, might at least save this profit, which is almost always
exorbitant. To farm any considerable branch of the public revenue requires
either a great capital, or a great credit; circumstances which would alone
restrain the competition for such an undertaking to a very small number of
people. Of the few who have this capital or credit, a still smaller number have
the necessary knowledge or experience; another circumstance which restrains the
competition still further. The very few who are in condition to become
competitors, find it more for their interest to combine together; to become
copartners, instead of competitors; and, when the farm is set up to auction, to
offer no rent but what is much below the real value. In countries where the
public revenues are in farm, the farmers are generally the most opulent people.
Their wealth would alone excite the public indignation; and the vanity which
almost always accompanies such upstart fortunes, the foolish ostentation with
which they commonly display that wealth, excite that indignation still more.

The farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too severe, which punish
any attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for the
contributors, who are not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it
should happen the day after the farm is expired, would not much affect their
interest. In the greatest exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the
sovereign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily the greatest,
they seldom fail to complain, that without laws more rigorous than those which
actually took place, it will be impossible for them to pay even the usual rent.
In those moments of public distress, their commands cannot be disputed. The
revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more and more severe. The most
sanguinary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of the
public revenue is in farm; the mildest, in countries where it is levied under
the immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more
compassion for his people than can ever be expected from the farmers of his
revenue. He knows that the permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the
prosperity of his people, and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for
the sake of any momentary interest of his own. It is otherwise with the farmers
of his revenue, whose grandeur may frequently be the effect of the ruin, and
not of the prosperity, of his people.

A tax is sometimes not only farmed for a certain rent, but the farmer has,
besides, the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France, the duties upon
tobacco and salt are levied in this manner. In such cases, the farmer, instead
of one, levies two exorbitant profits upon the people; the profit of the
farmer, and the still more exorbitant one of the monopolist. Tobacco being a
luxury, every man is allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuses; but salt being
a necessary, every man is obliged to buy of the farmer a certain quantity of
it; because, if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he would, it is
presumed, buy it of some smuggler. The taxes upon both commodities are
exorbitant. The temptation to smuggle, consequently, is to many people
irresistible; while, at the same time, the rigour of the law, and the vigilance
of the farmer’s officers, render the yielding to the temptation almost
certainly ruinous. The smuggling of salt and tobacco sends every year several
hundred people to the galleys, besides a very considerable number whom it sends
to the gibbet. Those taxes, levied in this manner, yield a very considerable
revenue to government. In 1767, the farm of tobacco was let for twenty-two
millions five hundred and forty-one thousand two hundred and seventy-eight
livres a-year; that of salt for thirty-six millions four hundred and ninety-two
thousand four hundred and four livres. The farm, in both cases, was to commence
in 1768, and to last for six years. Those who consider the blood of the people
as nothing, in comparison with the revenue of the prince, may, perhaps, approve
of this method of levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of salt and
tobacco have been established in many other countries, particularly in the
Austrian and Prussian dominions, and in the greater part of the states of
Italy.

In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is derived from
eight different sources; the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes, the
gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine, and the farm of tobacco. The
five last are, in the greater part of the provinces, under farm. The three
first are everywhere levied by an administration, under the immediate
inspection and direction of government; and it is universally acknowledged,
that in proportion to what they take out of the pockets of the people, they
bring more into the treasury of the prince than the other five, of which the
administration is much more wasteful and expensive.

The finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of three very
obvious reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and the capitation, and
by increasing the number of the vingtiemes, so as to produce an additional
revenue equal to the amount of those other taxes, the revenue of the crown
might be preserved; the expense of collection might be much diminished; the
vexation of the inferior ranks of people, which the taille and capitation
occasion, might be entirely prevented; and the superior ranks might not be more
burdened than the greater part of them are at present. The vingtieme, I have
already observed, is a tax very nearly of the same kind with what is called the
land tax of England. The burden of the taille, it is acknowledged, falls
finally upon the proprietors of land; and as the greater part of the capitation
is assessed upon those who are subject to the taille, at so much a-pound of
that other tax, the final payment of the greater part of it must likewise fall
upon the same order of people. Though the number of the vingtiemes, therefore,
was increased, so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of
both those taxes, the superior ranks of people might not be more burdened than
they are at present; many individuals, no doubt, would, on account of the great
inequalities with which the taille is commonly assessed upon the estates and
tenants of different individuals. The interest and opposition of such favoured
subjects, are the obstacles most likely to prevent this, or any other
reformation of the same kind. Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides,
the traites, the taxes upon tobacco, all the different customs and excises,
uniform in all the different parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied
at much less expense, and the interior commerce of the kingdom might be
rendered as free as that of England. Thirdly, and lastly, by subjecting all
those taxes to an administration under the immediate inspection and direction
or government, the exorbitant profits of the farmers-general might be added to
the revenue of the state. The opposition arising from the private interest of
individuals, is likely to be as effectual for preventing the two last as the
first-mentioned scheme of reformation.

The French system of taxation seems, in every respect, inferior to the British.
In Great Britain, ten millions sterling are annually levied upon less than
eight millions of people, without its being possible to say that any particular
order is oppressed. From the Collections of the Abbé Expilly, and the
observations of the author of the Essay upon the Legislation and Commerce of
Corn, it appears probable that France, including the provinces of Lorraine and
Bar, contains about twenty-three or twenty-four millions of people; three times
the number, perhaps, contained in Great Britain. The soil and climate of France
are better than those of Great Britain. The country has been much longer in a
state of improvement and cultivation, and is, upon that account, better stocked
with all those things which it requires a long time to raise up and accumulate;
such as great towns, and convenient and well-built houses, both in town and
country. With these advantages, it might be expected, that in France a revenue
of thirty millions might be levied for the support of the state, with as little
inconvenience as a revenue of ten millions is in Great Britain. In 1765 and
1766, the whole revenue paid into the treasury of France, according to the
best, though, I acknowledge, very imperfect accounts which I could get of it,
usually run between 308 and 325 millions of livres; that is, it did not amount
to fifteen millions sterling; not the half of what might have been expected,
had the people contributed in the same proportion to their numbers as the
people of Great Britain. The people of France, however, it is generally
acknowledged, are much more oppressed by taxes than the people of Great
Britain. France, however, is certainly the great empire in Europe, which, after
that of Great Britain, enjoys the mildest and most indulgent government.

In Holland, the heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life have ruined, it is
said, their principal manufacturers, and are likely to discourage, gradually,
even their fisheries and their trade in ship-building. The taxes upon the
necessaries of life are inconsiderable in Great Britain, and no manufacture has
hitherto been ruined by them. The British taxes which bear hardest on
manufactures, are some duties upon the importation of raw materials,
particularly upon that of raw silk. The revenue of the States-General and of
the different cities, however, is said to amount to more than five millions two
hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling; and as the inhabitants of the
United Provinces cannot well be supposed to amount to more than a third part of
those of Great Britain, they must, in proportion to their number, be much more
heavily taxed.

After all the proper subjects of taxation have been exhausted, if the
exigencies of the state still continue to require new taxes, they must be
imposed upon improper ones. The taxes upon the necessaries of life, therefore,
may be no impeachment of the wisdom of that republic, which, in order to
acquire and to maintain its independency, has, in spite of its meat frugality,
been involved in such expensive wars as have obliged it to contract great
debts. The singular countries of Holland and Zealand, besides, require a
considerable expense even to preserve their existence, or to prevent their
being swallowed up by the sea, which must have contributed to increase
considerably the load of taxes in those two provinces. The republican form of
government seems to be the principal support of the present grandeur of
Holland. The owners of great capitals, the great mercantile families, have
generally either some direct share, or some indirect influence, in the
administration of that government. For the sake of the respect and authority
which they derive from this situation, they are willing to live in a country
where their capital, if they employ it themselves, will bring them less profit,
and if they lend it to another, less interest; and where the very moderate
revenue which they can draw from it will purchase less of the necessaries and
conveniencies of life than in any other part of Europe. The residence of such
wealthy people necessarily keeps alive, in spite of all disadvantages, a
certain degree of industry in the country. Any public calamity which should
destroy the republican form of government, which should throw the whole
administration into the hands of nobles and of soldiers, which should
annihilate altogether the importance of those wealthy merchants, would soon
render it disagreeable to them to live in a country where they were no longer
likely to be much respected. They would remove both their residence and their
capital to some other country, and the industry and commerce of Holland would
soon follow the capitals which supported them.

CHAPTER III.
OF PUBLIC DEBTS.

In that rude state of society which precedes the extension of commerce and the
improvement of manufactures; when those expensive luxuries, which commerce and
manufactures can alone introduce, are altogether unknown; the person who
possesses a large revenue, I have endeavoured to show in the third book of this
Inquiry, can spend or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining
nearly as many people as it can maintain. A large revenue may at all times be
said to consist in the command of a large quantity of the necessaries of life.
In that rude state of things, it is commonly paid in a large quantity of those
necessaries, in the materials of plain food and coarse clothing, in corn and
cattle, in wool and raw hides. When neither commerce nor manufactures furnish
any thing for which the owner can exchange the greater part of those materials
which are over and above his own consumption, he can do nothing with the
surplus, but feed and clothe nearly as many people as it will feed and clothe.
A hospitality in which there is no luxury, and a liberality in which there is
no ostentation, occasion, in this situation of things, the principal expenses
of the rich and the great. But these I have likewise endeavoured to show, in
the same book, are expenses by which people are not very apt to ruin
themselves. There is not, perhaps, any selfish pleasure so frivolous, of which
the pursuit has not sometimes ruined even sensible men. A passion for
cock-fighting has ruined many. But the instances, I believe, are not very
numerous, of people who have been ruined by a hospitality or liberality of this
kind; though the hospitality of luxury, and the liberality of ostentation have
ruined many. Among our feudal ancestors, the long time during which estates
used to continue in the same family, sufficiently demonstrates the general
disposition of people to live within their income. Though the rustic
hospitality, constantly exercised by the great landholders, may not, to us in
the present times, seem consistent with that order which we are apt to consider
as inseparably connected with good economy; yet we must certainly allow them to
have been at least so far frugal, as not commonly to have spent their whole
income. A part of their wool and raw hides, they had generally an opportunity
of selling for money. Some part of this money, perhaps, they spent in
purchasing the few objects of vanity and luxury, with which the circumstances
of the times could furnish them; but some part of it they seem commonly to have
hoarded. They could not well, indeed, do any thing else but hoard whatever
money they saved. To trade, was disgraceful to a gentleman; and to lend money
at interest, which at that time was considered as usury, and prohibited bylaw,
would have been still more so. In those times of violence and disorder,
besides, it was convenient to have a hoard of money at hand, that in case they
should be driven from their own home, they might have something of known value
to carry with them to some place of safety. The same violence which made it
convenient to hoard, made it equally convenient to conceal the hoard. The
frequency of treasure-trove, or of treasure found, of which no owner was known,
sufficiently demonstrates the frequency, in those times, both of hoarding and
of concealing the hoard. Treasure-trove was then considered as an important
branch of the revenue of the sovereign. All the treasure-trove of the kingdom
would scarce, perhaps, in the present times, make an important branch of the
revenue of a private gentleman of a good estate.

The same disposition, to save and to hoard, prevailed in the sovereign, as well
as in the subjects. Among nations, to whom commerce and manufacture are little
known, the sovereign, it has already been observed in the Fourth book, is in a
situation which naturally disposes him to the parsimony requisite for
accumulation. In that situation, the expense, even of a sovereign, cannot be
directed by that vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court. The
ignorance of the times affords but few of the trinkets in which that finery
consists. Standing armies are not then necessary; so that the expense, even of
a sovereign, like that of any other great lord can be employed in scarce any
thing but bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty
and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always
does. All the ancient sovereigns of Europe, accordingly, it has already been
observed, had treasures. Every Tartar chief, in the present times, is said to
have one.

In a commercial country, abounding with every sort of expensive luxury, the
sovereign, in the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his
dominions, naturally spends a great part of his revenue in purchasing those
luxuries. His own and the neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all
the costly trinkets which compose the splendid, but insignificant, pageantry of
a court. For the sake of an inferior pageantry of the same kind, his nobles
dismiss their retainers, make their tenants independent, and become gradually
themselves as insignificant as the greater part of the wealthy burghers in his
dominions. The same frivolous passions, which influence their conduct,
influence his. How can it be supposed that he should be the only rich man in
his dominions who is insensible to pleasures of this kind? If he does not, what
he is very likely to do, spend upon those pleasures so great a part of his
revenue as to debilitate very much the defensive power of the state, it cannot
well be expected that he should not spend upon them all that part of it which
is over and above what is necessary for supporting that defensive power. His
ordinary expense becomes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it
does not frequently exceed it. The amassing of treasure can no longer be
expected; and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expenses, he
must necessarily call upon his subjects for an extraordinary aid. The present
and the late king of Prussia are the only great princes of Europe, who, since
the death of Henry IV. of France, in 1610, are supposed to have amassed any
considerable treasure. The parsimony which leads to accumulation has become
almost as rare in republican as in monarchical governments. The Italian
republics, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt. The canton
of Berne is the single republic in Europe which has amassed any considerable
treasure. The other Swiss republics have not. The taste for some sort of
pageantry, for splendid buildings, at least, and other public ornaments,
frequently prevails as much in the apparently sober senate-house of a little
republic, as in the dissipated court of the greatest king.

The want of parsimony, in time of peace, imposes the necessity of contracting
debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treasury, but
what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expense of the peace
establishment. In war, an establishment of three or four times that expense
becomes necessary for the defence of the state; and consequently, a revenue
three or four times greater than the peace revenue. Supposing that the
sovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of
augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expense; yet
still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must be
drawn, will not begin to come into the treasury, till perhaps ten or twelve
months after they are imposed. But the moment in which war begins, or rather
the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must be augmented, the
fleet must be fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of
defence; that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns, must be furnished with
arms, ammunition, and provisions. An immediate and great expense must be
incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the
gradual and slow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency, government can
have no other resource but in borrowing.

The same commercial state of society which, by the operation of moral causes,
brings government in this manner into the necessity of borrowing, produces in
the subjects both an ability and an inclination to lend. If it commonly brings
along with it the necessity of borrowing, it likewise brings with it the
facility of doing so.

A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, necessarily abounds with
a set of people through whose hands, not only their own capitals, but the
capitals of all those who either lend them money, or trust them with goods,
pass as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who,
without trade or business, lives upon his income, passes through his hands. The
revenue of such a man can regularly pass through his hands only once in a year.
But the whole amount of the capital and credit of a merchant, who deals in a
trade of which the returns are very quick, may sometimes pass through his hands
two, three, or four times in a year. A country abounding with merchants and
manufacturers, therefore, necessarily abounds with a set of people, who have it
at all times in their power to advance, if they chuse to do so, a very large
sum of money to government. Hence the ability in the subjects of a commercial
state to lend.

Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice; in which the people do not feel
themselves secure in the possession of their property; in which the faith of
contracts is not supported by law; and in which the authority of the state is
not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from
all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom
flourish in any state, in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in
the justice of government. The same confidence which disposes great merchants
and manufacturers upon ordinary occasions, to trust their property to the
protection of a particular government, disposes them, upon extraordinary
occasions, to trust that government with the use of their property. By lending
money to government, they do not even for a moment diminish their ability to
carry on their trade and manufactures; on the contrary, they commonly augment
it. The necessities of the state render government, upon most occasions willing
to borrow upon terms extremely advantageous to the lender. The security which
it grants to the original creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor;
and from the universal confidence in the justice of the state, generally sells
in the market for more than was originally paid for it. The merchant or monied
man makes money by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing,
increases his trading capital. He generally considers it as a favour,
therefore, when the administration admits him to a share in the first
subscription for a new loan. Hence the inclination or willingness in the
subjects of a commercial state to lend.

The government of such a state is very apt to repose itself upon this ability
and willingness of its subjects to lend it their money on extraordinary
occasions. It foresees the facility of borrowing, and therefore dispenses
itself from the duty of saving.

In a rude state of society, there are no great mercantile or manufacturing
capitals. The individuals, who hoard whatever money they can save, and who
conceal their hoard, do so from a distrust of the justice of government; from a
fear, that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to
be found, they would quickly be plundered. In such a state of things, few
people would be able, and nobody would be willing to lend their money to
government on extraordinary exigencies. The sovereign feels that he must
provide for such exigencies by saving, because he foresees the absolute
impossibility of borrowing. This foresight increases still further his natural
disposition to save.

The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the
long-run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe, has been pretty
uniform. Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what
may be called personal credit, without assigning or mortgaging any particular
fund for the payment of the debt; and when this resource has failed them, they
have gone on to borrow upon assignments or mortgages of particular funds.

What is called the unfunded debt of Great Britain, is contracted in the former
of those two ways. It consists partly in a debt which bears, or is supposed to
bear, no interest, and which resembles the debts that a private man contracts
upon account; and partly in a debt which bears interest, and which resembles
what a private man contracts upon his bill or promissory-note. The debts which
are due, either for extraordinary services, or for services either not provided
for, or not paid at the time when they are performed; part of the
extraordinaries of the army, navy, and ordnance, the arrears of subsidies to
foreign princes, those of seamen’s wages, etc. usually constitute a debt
of the first kind. Navy and exchequer bills, which are issued sometimes in
payment of a part of such debts, and sometimes for other purposes, constitute a
debt of the second kind; exchequer bills bearing interest from the day on which
they are issued, and navy bills six months after they are issued. The bank of
England, either by voluntarily discounting those bills at their current value,
or by agreeing with government for certain considerations to circulate
exchequer bills, that is, to receive them at par, paying the interest which
happens to be due upon them, keeps up their value, and facilitates their
circulation, and thereby frequently enables government to contract a very large
debt of this kind. In France, where there is no bank, the state bills (billets
d’etat {See Examen des Reflections Politiques sur les Finances.}) have
sometimes sold at sixty and seventy per cent. discount. During the great
recoinage in king William’s time, when the bank of England thought proper
to put a stop to its usual transactions, exchequer bills and tallies are said
to have sold from twenty-five to sixty per cent. discount; owing partly, no
doubt, to the supposed instability of the new government established by the
Revolution, but partly, too, to the want of the support of the bank of England.

When this resource is exhausted, and it becomes necessary, in order to raise
money, to assign or mortgage some particular branch of the public revenue for
the payment of the debt, government has, upon different occasions, done this in
two different ways. Sometimes it has made this assignment or mortgage for a
short period of time only, a year, or a few years, for example; and sometimes
for perpetuity. In the one case, the fund was supposed sufficient to pay,
within the limited time, both principal and interest of the money borrowed. In
the other, it was supposed sufficient to pay the interest only, or a perpetual
annuity equivalent to the interest, government being at liberty to redeem, at
any time, this annuity, upon paying back the principal sum borrowed. When money
was raised in the one way, it was said to be raised by anticipation; when in
the other, by perpetual funding, or, more shortly, by funding.

In Great Britain, the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated
every year, by virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inserted into the acts
which impose them. The bank of England generally advances at an interest,
which, since the Revolution, has varied from eight to three per cent., the sums
of which those taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce
gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which there always is, it is
provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year. The only considerable branch
of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged, is thus regularly spent
before it comes in. Like an improvident spendthrift, whose pressing occasions
will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the state is
in the constant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of
paying interest for the use of its own money.

In the reign of king William, and during a great part of that of queen Anne,
before we had become so familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual
funding, the greater part of the new taxes were imposed but for a short period
of time (for four, five, six, or seven years only), and a great part of the
grants of every year consisted in loans upon anticipations of the produce of
those taxes. The produce being frequently insufficient for paying, within the
limited term, the principal and interest of the money borrowed, deficiencies
arose; to make good which, it became necessary to prolong the term.

In 1697, by the 8th of William III., c. 20, the deficiencies of several taxes
were charged upon what was then called the first general mortgage or fund,
consisting of a prolongation to the first of August 1706, of several different
taxes, which would have expired within a shorter term, and of which the produce
was accumulated into one general fund. The deficiencies charged upon this
prolonged term amounted to £5,160,459: 14: 9½.

In 1701, those duties, with some others, were still further prolonged, for the
like purposes, till the first of August 1710, and were called the second
general mortgage or fund. The deficiencies charged upon it amounted to
£2,055,999: 7: 11½.

In 1707, those duties were still further prolonged, as a fund for new loans, to
the first of August 1712, and were called the third general mortgage or fund.
The sum borrowed upon it was £983,254:11:9¼.

In 1708, those duties were all (except the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage,
of which one moiety only was made a part of this fund, and a duty upon the
importation of Scotch linen, which had been taken off by the articles of union)
still further continued, as a fund for new loans, to the first of August 1714,
and were called the fourth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it
was £925,176:9:2¼.

In 1709, those duties were all ( except the old subsidy of tonnage and
poundage, which was now left out of this fund altogether ) still further
continued, for the same purpose, to the first of August 1716, and were called
the fifth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was £922,029:6s.

In 1710, those duties were again prolonged to the first of August 1720, and
were called the sixth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was
£1,296,552:9:11¾.

In 1711, the same duties (which at this time were thus subject to four
different anticipations), together with several others, were continued for
ever, and made a fund for paying the interest of the capital of the South-sea
company, which had that year advanced to government, for paying debts, and
making good deficiencies, the sum of £9,177,967:15:4d, the greatest loan which
at that time had ever been made.

Before this period, the principal, so far as I have been able to observe, the
only taxes, which, in order to pay the interest of a debt, had been imposed for
perpetuity, were those for paying the interest of the money which had been
advanced to government by the bank and East-India company, and of what it was
expected would be advanced, but which was never advanced, by a projected land
bank. The bank fund at this time amounted to £3,375,027:17:10½, for which was
paid an annuity or interest of £206,501:15:5d. The East-India fund amounted to
£3,200,000, for which was paid an annuity or interest of £160,000; the bank
fund being at six per cent., the East-India fund at five per cent. interest.

In 1715, by the first of George I., c. 12, the different taxes which had been
mortgaged for paying the bank annuity, together with several others, which, by
this act, were likewise rendered perpetual, were accumulated into one common
fund, called the aggregate fund, which was charged not only with the payment of
the bank annuity, but with several other annuities and burdens of different
kinds. This fund was afterwards augmented by the third of George I., c.8., and
by the fifth of George I., c. 3, and the different duties which were then added
to it were likewise rendered perpetual.

In 1717, by the third of George I., c. 7, several other taxes were rendered
perpetual, and accumulated into another common fund, called the general fund,
for the payment of certain annuities, amounting in the whole to £724,849:6:10½.

In consequence of those different acts, the greater part of the taxes, which
before had been anticipated only for a short term of years were rendered
perpetual, as a fund for paying, not the capital, but the interest only, of the
money which had been borrowed upon them by different successive anticipations.

Had money never been raised but by anticipation, the course of a few years
would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention of
government besides that of not overloading the fund, by charging it with more
debt than it could pay within the limited term, and not of anticipating a
second time before the expiration of the first anticipation. But the greater
part of European governments have been incapable of those attentions. They have
frequently overloaded the fund, even upon the first anticipation; and when this
happened not to be the case, they have generally taken care to overload it, by
anticipating a second and a third time, before the expiration of the first
anticipation. The fund becoming in this manner altogether insufficient for
paying both principal and interest of the money borrowed upon it, it became
necessary to charge it with the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equal to
the interest; and such improvident anticipations necessarily gave birth to the
more ruinous practice of perpetual funding. But though this practice
necessarily puts off the liberation of the public revenue from a fixed period,
to one so indefinite that it is not very likely ever to arrive; yet, as a
greater sum can, in all cases, be raised by this new practice than by the old
one of anticipation, the former, when men have once become familiar with it,
has, in the great exigencies of the state, been universally preferred to the
latter. To relieve the present exigency, is always the object which principally
interests those immediately concerned in the administration of public affairs.
The future liberation of the public revenue they leave to the care of
posterity.

During the reign of queen Anne, the market rate of interest had fallen from six
to five per cent.; and, in the twelfth year of her reign, five per cent. was
declared to be the highest rate which could lawfully be taken for money
borrowed upon private security. Soon after the greater part of the temporary
taxes of Great Britain had been rendered perpetual, and distributed into the
aggregate, South-sea, and general funds, the creditors of the public, like
those of private persons, were induced to accept of five per cent. for the
interest of their money, which occasioned a saving of one per cent. upon the
capital of the greater part or the debts which had been thus funded for
perpetuity, or of one-sixth of the greater part of the annuities which were
paid out of the three great funds above mentioned. This saving left a
considerable surplus in the produce of the different taxes which had been
accumulated into those funds, over and above what was necessary for paying the
annuities which were now charged upon them, and laid the foundation of what has
since been called the sinking fund. In 1717, it amounted to £523,454:7:7½. In
1727, the interest of the greater part of the public debts was still further
reduced to four per cent.; and, in 1753 and 1757, to three and a-half, and
three per cent., which reductions still further augmented the sinking fund.

A sinking fund, though instituted for the payment of old, facilitates very much
the contracting of new debts. It is a subsidiary fund, always at hand, to be
mortgaged in aid of any other doubtful fund, upon which money is proposed to be
raised in any exigency of the state. Whether the sinking fund of Great Britain
has been more frequently applied to the one or to other of those two purposes,
will sufficiently appear by and by.

Besides those two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by a perpetual
funding, there are two other methods, which hold a sort of middle place between
them; these are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that
of borrowing upon annuities for lives.

During the reigns of king William and queen Anne, large sums were frequently
borrowed upon annuities for terms of years, which were sometimes longer and
sometimes shorter. In 1695, an act was passed for borrowing one million upon an
annuity of fourteen per cent., or £140,000 a-year, for sixteen years. In 1691,
an act was passed for borrowing a million upon annuities for lives, upon terms
which, in the present times, would appear very advantageous; but the
subscription was not filled up. In the following year, the deficiency was made
good, by borrowing upon annuities for lives, at fourteen per cent. or a little
more than seven years purchase. In 1695, the persons who had purchased those
annuities were allowed to exchange them for others of ninety-six years, upon
paying into the exchequer sixty-three pounds in the hundred; that is, the
difference between fourteen per cent. for life, and fourteen per cent. for
ninety-six years, was sold for sixty-three pounds, or for four and a-half years
purchase. Such was the supposed instability of government, that even these
terms procured few purchasers. In the reign of queen Anne, money was, upon
different occasions, borrowed both upon annuities for lives, and upon annuities
for terms of thirty-two, of eighty-nine, of ninety-eight, and of ninety-nine
years. In 1719, the proprietors of the annuities for thirty-two years were
induced to accept, in lieu of them, South-sea stock to the amount of eleven and
a-half years purchase of the annuities, together with an additional quantity of
stock, equal to the arrears which happened then to be due upon them. In 1720,
the greater part of the other annuities for terms of years, both long and
short, were subscribed into the same fund. The long annuities, at that time,
amounted to £666,821: 8:3½ a-year. On the 5th of January 1775, the remainder of
them, or what was not subscribed at that time, amounted only to £136,453:12:8d.

During the two wars which began in 1739 and in 1755, little money was borrowed,
either upon annuities for terms of years, or upon those for lives. An annuity
for ninety-eight or ninety-nine years, however, is worth nearly as much as a
perpetuity, and should therefore, one might think, be a fund for borrowing
nearly as much. But those who, in order to make family settlements, and to
provide for remote futurity, buy into the public stocks, would not care to
purchase into one of which the value was continually diminishing; and such
people make a very considerable proportion, both of the proprietors and
purchasers of stock. An annuity for a long term of years, therefore, though its
intrinsic value may be very nearly the same with that of a perpetual annuity,
will not find nearly the same number of purchasers. The subscribers to a new
loan, who mean generally to sell their subscription as soon as possible, prefer
greatly a perpetual annuity, redeemable by parliament, to an irredeemable
annuity, for a long term of years, of only equal amount. The value of the
former may be supposed always the same, or very nearly the same; and it makes,
therefore, a more convenient transferable stock than the latter.

During the two last-mentioned wars, annuities, either for terms of years or for
lives, were seldom granted, but as premiums to the subscribers of a new loan,
over and above the redeemable annuity or interest, upon the credit of which the
loan was supposed to be made. They were granted, not as the proper fund upon
which the money was borrowed, but as an additional encouragement to the lender.

Annuities for lives have occasionally been granted in two different ways;
either upon separate lives, or upon lots of lives, which, in French, are called
tontines, from the name of their inventor. When annuities are granted upon
separate lives, the death of every individual annuitant disburdens the public
revenue, so far as it was affected by his annuity. When annuities are granted
upon tontines, the liberation of the public revenue does not commence till the
death of all the annuitants comprehended in one lot, which may sometimes
consist of twenty or thirty persons, of whom the survivors succeed to the
annuities of all those who die before them; the last survivor succeeding to the
annuities of the whole lot. Upon the same revenue, more money can always be
raised by tontines than by annuities for separate lives. An annuity, with a
right of survivorship, is really worth more than an equal annuity for a
separate life; and, from the confidence which every man naturally has in his
own good fortune, the principle upon which is founded the success of all
lotteries, such an annuity generally sells for something more than it is worth.
In countries where it is usual for government to raise money by granting
annuities, tontines are, upon this account, generally preferred to annuities
for separate lives. The expedient which will raise most money, is almost always
preferred to that which is likely to bring about, in the speediest manner, the
liberation of the public revenue.

In France, a much greater proportion of the public debts consists in annuities
for lives than in England. According to a memoir presented by the parliament of
Bourdeaux to the king, in 1764, the whole public debt of France is estimated at
twenty-four hundred millions of livres; of which the capital, for which
annuities for lives had been granted, is supposed to amount to three hundred
millions, the eighth part of the whole public debt. The annuities themselves
are computed to amount to thirty millions a-year, the fourth part of one
hundred and twenty millions, the supposed interest of that whole debt. These
estimations, I know very well, are not exact; but having been presented by so
very respectable a body as approximations to the truth, they may, I apprehend,
be considered as such. It is not the different degrees of anxiety in the two
governments of France and England for the liberation of the public revenue,
which occasions this difference in their respective modes of borrowing; it
arises altogether from the different views and interests of the lenders.

In England, the seat of government being in the greatest mercantile city in the
world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government.
By advancing it, they do not mean to diminish, but, on the contrary, to
increase their mercantile capitals; and unless they expected to sell, with some
profit, their share in the subscription for a new loan, they never would
subscribe. But if, by advancing their money, they were to purchase, instead of
perpetual annuities, annuities for lives only, whether their own or those of
other people, they would not always be so likely to sell them with a profit.
Annuities upon their own lives they would always sell with loss; because no man
will give for an annuity upon the life of another, whose age and state of
health are nearly the same with his own, the same price which he would give for
one upon his own. An annuity upon the life of a third person, indeed, is, no
doubt, of equal value to the buyer and the seller; but its real value begins to
diminish from the moment it is granted, and continues to do so, more and more,
as long as it subsists. It can never, therefore, make so convenient a
transferable stock as a perpetual annuity, of which the real value may be
supposed always the same, or very nearly the same.

In France, the seat of government not being in a great mercantile city,
merchants do not make so great a proportion of the people who advance money to
government. The people concerned in the finances, the farmers-general, the
receivers of the taxes which are not in farm, the court-bankers, etc. make the
greater part of those who advance their money in all public exigencies. Such
people are commonly men of mean birth, but of great wealth, and frequently of
great pride. They are too proud to marry their equals, and women of quality
disdain to marry them. They frequently resolve, therefore, to live bachelors;
and having neither any families of their own, nor much regard for those of
their relations, whom they are not always very fond of acknowledging, they
desire only to live in splendour during their own time, and are not unwilling
that their fortune should end with themselves. The number of rich people,
besides, who are either averse to marry, or whose condition of life renders it
either improper or inconvenient for them to do so, is much greater in France
than in England. To such people, who have little or no care for posterity,
nothing can be more convenient than to exchange their capital for a revenue,
which is to last just as long, and no longer, than they wish it to do.

The ordinary expense of the greater part of modern governments, in time of
peace, being equal, or nearly equal, to their ordinary revenue, when war comes,
they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to
the increase of their expense. They are unwilling, for fear of offending the
people, who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be
disgusted with the war; and they are unable, from not well knowing what taxes
would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of borrowing
delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would
otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing, they are enabled, with a very
moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money sufficient for
carrying on the war; and by the practice of perpetual funding, they are
enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the
largest possible sum of money. In great empires, the people who live in the
capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene of action, feel, many of
them, scarce any inconveniency from the war, but enjoy, at their ease, the
amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and
armies. To them this amusement compensates the small difference between the
taxes which they pay on account of the war, and those which they had been
accustomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly dissatisfied with the
return of peace, which puts an end to their amusement, and to a thousand
visionary hopes of conquest and national glory, from a longer continuance of
the war.

The return of peace, indeed, seldom relieves them from the greater part of the
taxes imposed during the war. These are mortgaged for the interest of the debt
contracted, in order to carry it on. If, over and above paying the interest of
this debt, and defraying the ordinary expense of government, the old revenue,
together with the new taxes, produce some surplus revenue, it may, perhaps, be
converted into a sinking fund for paying off the debt. But, in the first place,
this sinking fund, even supposing it should be applied to no other purpose, is
generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the course of any period during
which it can reasonably be expected that peace should continue, the whole debt
contracted during the war; and, in the second place, this fund is almost always
applied to other purposes.

The new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of paying the interest of the
money borrowed upon them. If they produce more, it is generally something which
was neither intended nor expected, and is, therefore, seldom very considerable.
Sinking funds have generally arisen, not so much from any surplus of the taxes
which was over and above what was necessary for paying the interest or annuity
originally charged upon them, as from a subsequent reduction of that interest;
that of Holland in 1655, and that of the ecclesiastical state in 1685, were
both formed in this manner. Hence the usual insufficiency of such funds.

During the most profound peace, various events occur, which require an
extraordinary expense; and government finds it always more convenient to defray
this expense by misapplying the sinking fund, than by imposing a new tax. Every
new tax is immediately felt more or less by the people. It occasions always
some murmur, and meets with some opposition. The more taxes may have been
multiplied, the higher they may have been raised upon every different subject
of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, the more
difficult it becomes, too, either to find out new subjects of taxation, or to
raise much higher the taxes already imposed upon the old. A momentary
suspension of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people, and
occasions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow of the sinking fund is always
an obvious and easy expedient for getting out of the present difficulty. The
more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more necessary it may have
become to study to reduce them; the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be
to misapply any part of the sinking fund; the less likely is the public debt to
be reduced to any considerable degree, the more likely, the more certainly, is
the sinking fund to be misapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary
expenses which occur in time of peace. When a nation is already overburdened
with taxes, nothing but the necessities of a new war, nothing but either the
animosity of national vengeance, or the anxiety for national security, can
induce the people to submit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax. Hence the
usual misapplication of the sinking fund.

In Great Britain, from the time that we had first recourse to the ruinous
expedient of perpetual funding, the reduction of the public debt, in time of
peace, has never borne any proportion to its accumulation in time of war. It
was in the war which began in 1668, and was concluded by the treaty of Ryswick,
in 1697, that the foundation of the present enormous debt of Great Britain was
first laid.

On the 31st of December 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, funded and
unfunded, amounted to £21,515,742:13:8½. A great part of those debts had been
contracted upon short anticipations, and some part upon annuities for lives; so
that, before the 31st of December 1701, in less than four years, there had
partly been paid off; and partly reverted to the public, the sum of
£5,121,041:12:0¾d; a greater reduction of the public debt than has ever since
been brought about in so short a period of time. The remaining debt, therefore,
amounted only to £16,394,701:1:7¼d.

In the war which began in 1702, and which was concluded by the treaty of
Utrecht, the public debts were still more accumulated. On the 31st of December
1714, they amounted to £53,681,076:5:6½. The subscription into the South-sea
fund, of the short and long annuities, increased the capital of the public
debt; so that, on the 31st of December 1722, it amounted to £55,282,978:1:3
5/6. The reduction of the debt began in 1723, and went on so slowly, that, on
the 31st of December 1739, during seventeen years-of profound peace, the whole
sum paid off was no more than £8,328,554:17:11 3/12, the capital of the public
debt, at that time, amounting to £46,954,623:3:4 7/12.

The Spanish war, which began in 1739, and the French war which soon followed
it, occasioned a further increase of the debt, which, on the 31st of December
1748, after the war had been concluded by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle,
amounted to £78,293,313:1:10¾. The most profound peace, of 17 years
continuance, had taken no more than £8,328,354, 17:11¼ from it. A war, of less
than nine years continuance, added £31,338,689:18: 6 1/6 to it. {See James
Postlethwaite’s History of the Public Revenue.}

During the administration of Mr. Pelham, the interest of the public debt was
reduced, or at least measures were taken for reducing it, from four to three
per cent.; the sinking fund was increased, and some part of the public debt was
paid off. In 1755, before the breaking out of the late war, the funded debt of
Great Britain amounted to £72,289,675. On the 5th of January 1763, at the
conclusion of the peace, the funded debt amounted debt to £122,603,336:8:2¼.
The unfunded debt has been stated at £13,927,589:2:2. But the expense
occasioned by the war did not end with the conclusion of the peace; so that,
though on the 5th of January 1764, the funded debt was increased (partly by a
new loan, and partly by funding a part of the unfunded debt) to
£129,586,789:10:1¾, there still remained (according to the very well informed
author of Considerations on the Trade and Finances of Great Britain) an
unfunded debt, which was brought to account in that and the following year, of
£9,975,017: 12:2 15/44d. In 1764, therefore, the public debt of Great Britain,
funded and unfunded together, amounted, according to this author, to
£139,561,807:2:4. The annuities for lives, too, which had been granted as
premiums to the subscribers to the new loans in 1757, estimated at fourteen
years purchase, were valued at £472,500; and the annuities for long terms of
years, granted as premiums likewise, in 1761 and 1762, estimated at
twenty-seven and a-half years purchase, were valued at £6,826,875. During a
peace of about seven years continuance, the prudent and truly patriotic
administration of Mr. Pelham was not able to pay off an old debt of six
millions. During a war of nearly the same continuance, a new debt of more than
seventy-five millions was contracted.

On the 5th of January 1775, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to
£124,996,086, 1:6¼d. The unfunded, exclusive of a large civil-list debt, to
£4,150,236:3:11 7/8. Both together, to £129,146,322:5:6. According to this
account, the whole debt paid off, during eleven years of profound peace,
amounted only to £10,415,476:16:9 7/8. Even this small reduction of debt,
however, has not been all made from the savings out of the ordinary revenue of
the state. Several extraneous sums, altogether independent of that ordinary
revenue, have contributed towards it. Amongst these we may reckon an additional
shilling in the pound land tax, for three years; the two millions received from
the East-India company, as indemnification for their territorial acquisitions;
and the one hundred and ten thousand pounds received from the bank for the
renewal of their charter. To these must be added several other sums, which, as
they arose out of the late war, ought perhaps to be considered as deductions
from the expenses of it. The principal are,

The produce of French prizes………….. £690,449: 18: 9
Composition for French prisoners……… 670,000: 0: 0

What has been received from the sale
of the ceded islands……………………. 95,500: 0: 0

Total, ……………………………….£1,455,949: 18: 9

If we add to this sum the balance of the earl of Chatham’s and Mr.
Calcraft’s accounts, and other army savings of the same kind, together
with what has been received from the bank, the East-India company, and the
additional shilling in the pound land tax, the whole must be a good deal more
than five millions. The debt, therefore, which, since the peace, has been paid
out of the savings from the ordinary revenue of the state, has not, one year
with another, amounted to half a million a-year. The sinking fund has, no
doubt, been considerably augmented since the peace, by the debt which had been
paid off, by the reduction of the redeemable four per cents to three per cents,
and by the annuities for lives which have fallen in; and, if peace were to
continue, a million, perhaps, might now be annually spared out of it towards
the discharge of the debt. Another million, accordingly, was paid in the course
of last year; but at the same time, a large civil-list debt was left unpaid,
and we are now involved in a new war, which, in its progress, may prove as
expensive as any of our former wars. {It has proved more expensive than any one
of our former wars, and has involved us in an additional debt of more than one
hundred millions. During a profound peace of eleven years, little more than ten
millions of debt was paid; during a war of seven years, more than one hundred
millions was contracted.} The new debt which will probably be contracted before
the end of the next campaign, may, perhaps, be nearly equal to all the old debt
which has been paid off from the savings out of the ordinary revenue of the
state. It would be altogether chimerical, therefore, to expect that the public
debt should ever be completely discharged, by any savings which are likely to
be made from that ordinary revenue as it stands at present.

The public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, particularly
those of England, have, by one author, been represented as the accumulation of
a great capital, superadded to the other capital of the country, by means of
which its trade is extended, its manufactures are multiplied, and its lands
cultivated and improved, much beyond what they could have been by means of that
other capital only. He does not consider that the capital which the first
creditors of the public advanced to government, was, from the moment in which
he advanced it, a certain portion of the annual produce, turned away from
serving in the function of a capital, to serve in that of a revenue; from
maintaining productive labourers, to maintain unproductive ones, and to be
spent and wasted, generally in the course of the year, without even the hope of
any future reproduction. In return for the capital which they advanced, they
obtained, indeed, an annuity of the public funds, in most cases, of more than
equal value. This annuity, no doubt, replaced to them their capital, and
enabled them to carry on their trade and business to the same, or, perhaps, to
a greater extent than before; that is, they were enabled, either to borrow of
other people a new capital, upon the credit of this annuity or, by selling it,
to get from other people a new capital of their own, equal, or superior, to
that which they had advanced to government. This new capital, however, which
they in this manner either bought or borrowed of other people, must have
existed in the country before, and must have been employed, as all capitals
are, in maintaining productive labour. When it came into the hands of those who
had advanced their money to government, though it was, in some respects, a new
capital to them, it was not so to the country, but was only a capital withdrawn
from certain employments, in order to be turned towards others. Though it
replaced to them what they had advanced to government, it did not replace it to
the country. Had they not advanced this capital to government, there would have
been in the country two capitals, two portions of the annual produce, instead
of one, employed in maintaining productive labour.

When, for defraying the expense of government, a revenue is raised within the
year, from the produce of free or unmortgaged taxes, a certain portion of the
revenue of private people is only turned away from maintaining one species of
unproductive labour, towards maintaining another. Some part of what they pay in
those taxes, might, no doubt, have been accumulated into capital, and
consequently employed in maintaining productive labour; but the greater part
would probably have been spent, and consequently employed in maintaining
unproductive labour. The public expense, however, when defrayed in this manner,
no doubt hinders, more or less, the further accumulation of new capital; but it
does not necessarily occasion the destruction of any actually-existing capital.

When the public expense is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the annual
destruction of some capital which had before existed in the country; by the
perversion of some portion of the annual produce which had before been destined
for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of unproductive labour.
As in this case, however, the taxes are lighter than they would have been, had
a revenue sufficient for defraying the same expense been raised within the
year; the private revenue of individuals is necessarily less burdened, and
consequently their ability to save and accumulate some part of that revenue
into capital, is a good deal less impaired. If the method of funding destroys
more old capital, it, at the same time, hinders less the accumulation or
acquisition of new capital, than that of defraying the public expense by a
revenue raised within the year. Under the system of funding, the frugality and
industry of private people can more easily repair the breaches which the waste
and extravagance of government may occasionally make in the general capital of
the society.

It is only during the continuance of war, however, that the system of funding
has this advantage over the other system. Were the expense of war to be
defrayed always by a revenue raised within the year, the taxes from which that
extraordinary revenue was drawn would last no longer than the war. The ability
of private people to accumulate, though less during the war, would have been
greater during the peace, than under the system of funding. War would not
necessarily have occasioned the destruction of any old capitals, and peace
would have occasioned the accumulation of many more new. Wars would, in
general, be more speedily concluded, and less wantonly undertaken. The people
feeling, during continuance of war, the complete burden of it, would soon grow
weary of it; and government, in order to humour them, would not be under the
necessity of carrying it on longer than it was necessary to do so. The
foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people
from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid interest to fight
for. The seasons during which the ability of private people to accumulate was
somewhat impaired, would occur more rarely, and be of shorter continuance.
Those, on the contrary, during which that ability was in the highest vigour
would be of much longer duration than they can well be under the system of
funding.

When funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the multiplication of taxes
which it brings along with it, sometimes impairs as much the ability of private
people to accumulate, even in time of peace, as the other system would in time
of war. The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at present to more than ten
millions a-year. If free and unmortgaged, it might be sufficient, with proper
management, and without contracting a shilling of new debt, to carry on the
most vigorous war. The private revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is
at present as much incumbered in time of peace, their ability to accumulate is
as much impaired, as it would have been in the time of the most expensive war,
had the pernicious system of funding never been adopted.

In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has been said, it is the
right hand which pays the left. The money does not go out of the country. It is
only a part of the revenue of one set of the inhabitants which is transferred
to another; and the nation is not a farthing the poorer. This apology is
founded altogether in the sophistry of the mercantile system; and, after the
long examination which I have already bestowed upon that system, it may,
perhaps, be unnecessary to say anything further about it. It supposes, besides,
that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the country, which
happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as several other foreign nations,
having a very considerable share in our public funds. But though the whole debt
were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not, upon that account,
be less pernicious.

Land and capital stock are the two original sources of all revenue, both
private and public. Capital stock pays the wages of productive labour, whether
employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce. The management of those two
original sources of revenue belongs to two different sets of people; the
proprietors of land, and the owners or employers of capital stock.

The proprietor of land is interested, for the sake of his own revenue, to keep
his estate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his
tenants houses, by making and maintaining the necessary drains and inclosures,
and all those other expensive improvements which it properly belongs to the
landlord to make and maintain. But, by different land taxes, the revenue of the
landlord may be so much diminished, and, by different duties upon the
necessaries and conveniencies of life, that diminished revenue may be rendered
of so little real value, that he may find himself altogether unable to make or
maintain those expensive improvements. When the landlord, however, ceases to do
his part, it is altogether impossible that the tenant should continue to do
his. As the distress of the landlord increases, the agriculture of the country
must necessarily decline.

When, by different taxes upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life, the
owners and employers of capital stock find, that whatever revenue they derive
from it, will not, in a particular country, purchase the same quantity of those
necessaries and conveniencies which an equal revenue would in almost any other,
they will be disposed to remove to some other. And when, in order to raise
those taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and manufacturers, that is,
all or the greater part of the employers of great capitals, come to be
continually exposed to the mortifying and vexatious visits of the
tax-gatherers, this disposition to remove will soon be changed into an actual
removing. The industry of the country will necessarily fall with the removal of
the capital which supported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will
follow the declension of agriculture.

To transfer from the owners of those two great sources of revenue, land, and
capital stock, from the persons immediately interested in the good condition of
every particular portion of land, and in the good management of every
particular portion of capital stock, to another set of persons (the creditors
of the public, who have no such particular interest ), the greater part of the
revenue arising from either, must, in the long-run, occasion both the neglect
of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock. A creditor of the public
has, no doubt, a general interest in the prosperity of the agriculture,
manufactures, and commerce of the country; and consequently in the good
condition of its land, and in the good management of its capital stock. Should
there be any general failure or declension in any of these things, the produce
of the different taxes might no longer be sufficient to pay him the annuity or
interest which is due to him. But a creditor of the public, considered merely
as such, has no interest in the good condition of any particular portion of
land, or in the good management of any particular portion of capital stock. As
a creditor of the public, he has no knowledge of any such particular portion.
He has no inspection of it. He can have no care about it. Its ruin may in some
cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.

The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which has adopted
it. The Italian republics seem to have begun it. Genoa and Venice, the only two
remaining which can pretend to an independent existence, have both been
enfeebled by it. Spain seems to have learned the practice from the Italian
republics, and (its taxes being probably less judicious than theirs) it has, in
proportion to its natural strength, been-still more enfeebled. The debts of
Spain are of very old standing. It was deeply in debt before the end of the
sixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a shilling.
France, notwithstanding all its natural resources, languishes under an
oppressive load of the same kind. The republic of the United Provinces is as
much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that, in
Great Britain alone, a practice, which has brought either weakness or
dissolution into every other country, should prove altogether innocent?

The system of taxation established in those different countries, it may be
said, is inferior to that of England. I believe it is so. But it ought to be
remembered, that when the wisest government has exhausted all the proper
subjects of taxation, it must, in cases of urgent necessity, have recourse to
improper ones. The wise republic of Holland has, upon some occasions, been
obliged to have recourse to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of those
of Spain. Another war, begun before any considerable liberation of the public
revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progress as expensive as the
last war, may, from irresistible necessity, render the British system of
taxation as oppressive as that of Holland, or even as that of Spain. To the
honour of our present system of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto given so
little embarrassment to industry, that, during the course even of the most
expensive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals seem to have been
able, by saving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the waste
and extravagance of government had made in the general capital of the society.
At the conclusion of the late war, the most expensive that Great Britain ever
waged, her agriculture was as flourishing, her manufacturers as numerous and as
fully employed, and her commerce as extensive, as they had ever been before.
The capital, therefore, which supported all those different branches of
industry, must have been equal to what it had ever been before. Since the
peace, agriculture has been still further improved; the rents of houses have
risen in every town and village of the country, a proof of the increasing
wealth and revenue of the people; and the annual amount of the greater part of
the old taxes, of the principal branches of the excise and customs, in
particular, has been continually increasing, an equally clear proof of an
increasing consumption, and consequently of an increasing produce, which could
alone support that consumption. Great Britain seems to support with ease, a
burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting,
Let us not, however, upon this account, rashly conclude that she is capable of
supporting any burden; nor even be too confident that she could support,
without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has already been
laid upon her.

When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is
scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having been fairly and completely
paid. The liberation of the public revenue, if it has ever been brought about
at all, has always been brought about by a bankruptcy; sometimes by an avowed
one, though frequently by a pretended payment.

The raising of the denomination of the coin has been the most usual expedient
by which a real public bankruptcy has been disguised under the appearance of a
pretended payment. If a sixpence, for example, should, either by act of
parliament or royal proclamation, be raised to the denomination of a shilling,
and twenty sixpences to that of a pound sterling; the person who, under the old
denomination, had borrowed twenty shillings, or near four ounces of silver,
would, under the new, pay with twenty sixpences, or with something less than
two ounces. A national debt of about a hundred and twenty-eight millions, near
the capital of the funded and unfunded debt of Great Britain, might, in this
manner, be paid with about sixty-four millions of our present money. It would,
indeed, be a pretended payment only, and the creditors of the public would
really be defrauded of ten shillings in the pound of what was due to them. The
calamity, too, would extend much further than to the creditors of the public,
and those of every private person would suffer a proportionable loss; and this
without any advantage, but in most cases with a great additional loss, to the
creditors of the public. If the creditors of the public, indeed, were generally
much in debt to other people, they might in some measure compensate their loss
by paying their creditors in the same coin in which the public had paid them.
But in most countries, the creditors of the public are, the greater part of
them, wealthy people, who stand more in the relation of creditors than in that
of debtors, towards the rest of their fellow citizens. A pretended payment of
this kind, therefore, instead of alleviating, aggravates, in most cases, the
loss of the creditors of the public; and, without any advantage to the public,
extends the calamity to a great number of other innocent people. It occasions a
general and most pernicious subversion of the fortunes of private people;
enriching, in most cases, the idle and profuse debtor, at the expense of the
industrious and frugal creditor; and transporting a great part of the national
capital from the hands which were likely to increase and improve it, to those
who are likely to dissipate and destroy it. When it becomes necessary for a
state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes
necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy, is
always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least
hurtful to the creditor. The honour of a state is surely very poorly provided
for, when, in order to cover the disgrace of a real bankruptcy, it has recourse
to a juggling trick of this kind, so easily seen through, and at the same time
so extremely pernicious.

Almost all states, however, ancient as well as modern, when reduced to this
necessity, have, upon some occasions, played this very juggling trick. The
Romans, at the end of the first Punic war, reduced the As, the coin or
denomination by which they computed the value of all their other coins, from
containing twelve ounces of copper, to contain only two ounces; that is, they
raised two ounces of copper to a denomination which had always before expressed
the value of twelve ounces. The republic was, in this manner, enabled to pay
the great debts which it had contracted with the sixth part of what it really
owed. So sudden and so great a bankruptcy, we should in the present times be
apt to imagine, must have occasioned a very violent popular clamour. It does
not appear to have occasioned any. The law which enacted it was, like all other
laws relating to the coin, introduced and carried through the assembly of the
people by a tribune, and was probably a very popular law. In Rome, as in all
other ancient republics, the poor people were constantly in debt to the rich
and the great, who, in order to secure their votes at the annual elections,
used to lend them money at exorbitant interest, which, being never paid, soon
accumulated into a sum too great either for the debtor to pay, or for any body
else to pay for him. The debtor, for fear of a very severe execution, was
obliged, without any further gratuity, to vote for the candidate whom the
creditor recommended. In spite of all the laws against bribery and corruption,
the bounty of the candidates, together with the occasional distributions of
coin which were ordered by the senate, were the principal funds from which,
during the latter times of the Roman republic, the poorer citizens derived
their subsistence. To deliver themselves from this subjection to their
creditors, the poorer citizens were continually calling out, either for an
entire abolition of debts, or for what they called new tables; that is, for a
law which should entitle them to a complete acquittance, upon paying only a
certain proportion of their accumulated debts. The law which reduced the coin
of all denominations to a sixth part of its former value, as it enabled them to
pay their debts with a sixth part of what they really owed, was equivalent to
the most advantageous new tables. In order to satisfy the people, the rich and
the great were, upon several different occasions, obliged to consent to laws,
both for abolishing debts, and for introducing new tables; and they probably
were induced to consent to this law, partly for the same reason, and partly
that, by liberating the public revenue, they might restore vigour to that
government, of which they themselves had the principal direction. An operation
of this kind would at once reduce a debt of £128,000,000 to £21,333,333:6:8. In
the course of the second Punic war, the As was still further reduced, first,
from two ounces of copper to one ounce, and afterwards from one ounce to half
an ounce; that is, to the twenty-fourth part of its original value. By
combining the three Roman operations into one, a debt of a hundred and
twenty-eight millions of our present money, might in this manner be reduced all
at once to a debt of £5,333,333:6:8. Even the enormous debt of Great Britain
might in this manner soon be paid.

By means of such expedients, the coin of, I believe, all nations, has been
gradually reduced more and more below its original value, and the same nominal
sum has been gradually brought to contain a smaller and a smaller quantity of
silver.

Nations have sometimes, for the same purpose, adulterated the standard of their
coin; that is, have mixed a greater quantity of alloy in it. If in the pound
weight of our silver coin, for example, instead of eighteen penny-weight,
according to the present standard, there were mixed eight ounces of alloy; a
pound sterling, or twenty shillings of such coin, would be worth little more
than six shillings and eightpence of our present money. The quantity of silver
contained in six shillings and eightpence of our present money, would thus be
raised very nearly to the denomination of a pound sterling. The adulteration of
the standard has exactly the same effect with what the French call an
augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin.

An augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin, always
is, and from its nature must be, an open and avowed operation. By means of it,
pieces of a smaller weight and bulk are called by the same name, which had
before been given to pieces of a greater weight and bulk. The adulteration of
the standard, on the contrary, has generally been a concealed operation. By
means of it, pieces are issued from the mint, of the same denomination, and, as
nearly as could be contrived, of the same weight, bulk, and appearance, with
pieces which had been current before of much greater value. When king John of
France, {See Du Cange Glossary, voce Moneta; the Benedictine Edition.} in order
to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were sworn
to secrecy. Both operations are unjust. But a simple augmentation is an
injustice of open violence; whereas an adulteration is an injustice of
treacherous fraud. This latter operation, therefore, as soon as it has been
discovered, and it could never be concealed very long, has always excited much
greater indignation than the former. The coin, after any considerable
augmentation, has very seldom been brought back to its former weight; but after
the greatest adulterations, it has almost always been brought back to its
former fineness. It has scarce ever happened, that the fury and indignation of
the people could otherwise be appeased.

In the end of the reign of Henry VIII., and in the beginning of that of Edward
VI., the English coin was not only raised in its denomination, but adulterated
in its standard. The like frauds were practised in Scotland during the minority
of James VI. They have occasionally been practised in most other countries.

That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be completely liberated, or
even that any considerable progress can ever be made towards that liberation,
while the surplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the
annual expense of the peace establishment, is so very small, it seems
altogether in vain to expect. That liberation, it is evident, can never be
brought about, without either some very considerable augmentation of the public
revenue, or some equally considerable reduction of the public expense.

A more equal land tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houses, and such
alterations in the present system of customs and excise as those which have
been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, might, perhaps, without increasing the
burden of the greater part of the people, but only distributing the weight of
it more equally upon the whole, produce a considerable augmentation of revenue.
The most sanguine projector, however, could scarce flatter himself, that any
augmentation of this kind would be such as could give any reasonable hopes,
either of liberating the public revenue altogether, or even of making such
progress towards that liberation in time of peace, as either to prevent or to
compensate the further accumulation of the public debt in the next war.

By extending the British system of taxation to all the different provinces of
the empire, inhabited by people either of British or European extraction, a
much greater augmentation of revenue might be expected. This, however, could
scarce, perhaps, be done, consistently with the principles of the British
constitution, without admitting into the British parliament, or, if you will,
into the states-general of the British empire, a fair and equal representation
of all those different provinces; that of each province bearing the same
proportion to the produce of its taxes, as the representation of Great Britain
might bear to the produce of the taxes levied upon Great Britain. The private
interest of many powerful individuals, the confirmed prejudices of great bodies
of people, seem, indeed, at present, to oppose to so great a change, such
obstacles as it may be very difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to
surmount. Without, however, pretending to determine whether such a union be
practicable or impracticable, it may not, perhaps, be improper, in a
speculative work of this kind, to consider how far the British system of
taxation might be applicable to all the different provinces of the empire; what
revenue might be expected from it, if so applied; and in what manner a general
union of this kind might be likely to affect the happiness and prosperity of
the different provinces comprehended within it. Such a speculation, can, at
worst, be regarded but as a new Utopia, less amusing, certainly, but no more
useless and chimerical than the old one.

The land-tax, the stamp duties, and the different duties of customs and excise,
constitute the four principal branches of the British taxes.

Ireland is certainly as able, and our American and West India plantations more
able, to pay a land tax, than Great Britain. Where the landlord is subject
neither to tythe nor poor’s rate, he must certainly be more able to pay
such a tax, than where he is subject to both those other burdens. The tythe,
where there is no modus, and where it is levied in kind, diminishes more what
would otherwise be the rent of the landlord, than a land tax which really
amounted to five shillings in the pound. Such a tythe will be found, in most
cases, to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of the land, or of
what remains after replacing completely the capital of the farmer, together
with his reasonable profit. If all moduses and all impropriations were taken
away, the complete church tythe of Great Britain and Ireland could not well be
estimated at less than six or seven millions. If there was no tythe either in
Great Britain or Ireland, the landlords could afford to pay six or seven
millions additional land tax, without being more burdened than a very great
part of them are at present. America pays no tythe, and could, therefore, very
well afford to pay a land tax. The lands in America and the West Indies,
indeed, are, in general, not tenanted nor leased out to farmers. They could
not, therefore, be assessed according to any rent roll. But neither were the
lands of Great Britain, in the 4th of William and Mary, assessed according to
any rent roll, but according to a very loose and inaccurate estimation. The
lands in America might be assessed either in the same manner, or according to
an equitable valuation, in consequence of an accurate survey, like that which
was lately made in the Milanese, and in the dominions of Austria, Prussia, and
Sardinia.

Stamp duties, it is evident, might be levied without any variation, in all
countries where the forms of law process, and the deeds by which property, both
real and personal, is transferred, are the same, or nearly the same.

The extension of the custom-house laws of Great Britain to Ireland and the
plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in justice it ought to be, with an
extension of the freedom of trade, would be in the highest degree advantageous
to both. All the invidious restraints which at present oppress the trade of
Ireland, the distinction between the enumerated and non-enumerated commodities
of America, would be entirely at an end. The countries north of Cape Finisterre
would be as open to every part of the produce of America, as those south of
that cape are to some parts of that produce at present. The trade between all
the different parts of the British empire would, in consequence of this
uniformity in the custom-house laws, be as free as the coasting trade of Great
Britain is at present. The British empire would thus afford, within itself, an
immense internal market for every part of the produce of all its different
provinces. So great an extension of market would soon compensate, both to
Ireland and the plantations, all that they could suffer from the increase of
the duties of customs.

The excise is the only part of the British system of taxation, which would
require to be varied in any respect, according as it was applied to the
different provinces of the empire. It might be applied to Ireland without any
variation; the produce and consumption of that kingdom being exactly of the
same nature with those of Great Britain. In its application to America and the
West Indies, of which the produce and consumption are so very different from
those of Great Britain, some modification might be necessary, in the same
manner as in its application to the cyder and beer counties of England.

A fermented liquor, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made
of molasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a considerable
part of the common drink of the people in America. This liquor, as it can be
kept only for a few days, cannot, like our beer, be prepared and stored up for
sale in great breweries; but every private family must brew it for their own
use, in the same manner as they cook their victuals. But to subject every
private family to the odious visits and examination of the tax-gatherers, in
the same manner as we subject the keepers of ale-houses and the brewers for
public sale, would be altogether inconsistent with liberty. If, for the sake of
equality, it was thought necessary to lay a tax upon this liquor, it might be
taxed by taxing the material of which it is made, either at the place of
manufacture, or, if the circumstances of the trade rendered such an excise
improper, by laying a duty upon its importation into the colony in which it was
to be consumed. Besides the duty of one penny a-gallon imposed by the British
parliament upon the importation of molasses into America, there is a provincial
tax of this kind upon their importation into Massachusetts Bay, in ships
belonging to any other colony, of eight-pence the hogshead; and another upon
their importation from the northern colonies into South Carolina, of five-pence
the gallon. Or, if neither of these methods was found convenient, each family
might compound for its consumption of this liquor, either according to the
number of persons of which it consisted, in the same manner as private families
compound for the malt tax in England; or according to the different ages and
sexes of those persons, in the same manner as several different taxes are
levied in Holland; or, nearly as Sir Matthew Decker proposes, that all taxes
upon consumable commodities should be levied in England. This mode of taxation,
it has already been observed, when applied to objects of a speedy consumption,
is not a very convenient one. It might be adopted, however, in cases where no
better could be done.

Sugar, rum, and tobacco, are commodities which are nowhere necessaries of life,
which are become objects of almost universal consumption, and which are,
therefore, extremely proper subjects of taxation. If a union with the colonies
were to take place, those commodities might be taxed, either before they go out
of the hands of the manufacturer or grower; or, if this mode of taxation did
not suit the circumstances of those persons, they might be deposited in public
warehouses, both at the place of manufacture, and at all the different ports of
the empire, to which they might afterwards be transported, to remain there,
under the joint custody of the owner and the revenue officer, till such time as
they should be delivered out, either to the consumer, to the merchant-retailer
for home consumption, or to the merchant-exporter; the tax not to be advanced
till such delivery. When delivered out for exportation, to go duty-free, upon
proper security being given, that they should really be exported out of the
empire. These are, perhaps, the principal commodities, with regard to which the
union with the colonies might require some considerable change in the present
system of British taxation.

What might be the amount of the revenue which this system of taxation, extended
to all the different provinces of the empire, might produce, it must, no doubt,
be altogether impossible to ascertain with tolerable exactness. By means of
this system, there is annually levied in Great Britain, upon less than eight
millions of people, more than ten millions of revenue. Ireland contains more
than two millions of people, and, according to the accounts laid before the
congress, the twelve associated provinces of America contain more than three.
Those accounts, however, may have been exaggerated, in order, perhaps, either
to encourage their own people, or to intimidate those of this country; and we
shall suppose, therefore, that our North American and West Indian colonies,
taken together, contain no more than three millions; or that the whole British
empire, in Europe and America, contains no more than thirteen millions of
inhabitants. If, upon less than eight millions of inhabitants, this system of
taxation raises a revenue of more than ten millions sterling; it ought, upon
thirteen millions of inhabitants, to raise a revenue of more than sixteen
millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. From this revenue,
supposing that this system could produce it, must be deducted the revenue
usually raised in Ireland and the plantations, for defraying the expense of the
respective civil governments. The expense of the civil and military
establishment of Ireland, together with the interest of the public debt,
amounts, at a medium of the two years which ended March 1775, to something less
than seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year. By a very exact account of
the revenue of the principal colonies of America and the West Indies, it
amounted, before the commencement of the present disturbances, to a hundred and
forty-one thousand eight hundred pounds. In this account, however, the revenue
of Maryland, of North Carolina, and of all our late acquisitions, both upon the
continent, and in the islands, is omitted; which may, perhaps, make a
difference of thirty or forty thousand pounds. For the sake of even numbers,
therefore, let us suppose that the revenue necessary for supporting the civil
government of Ireland and the plantations may amount to a million. There would
remain, consequently, a revenue of fifteen millions two hundred and fifty
thousand pounds, to be applied towards defraying the general expense of the
empire, and towards paying the public debt. But if, from the present revenue of
Great Britain, a million could, in peaceable times, be spared towards the
payment of that debt, six millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds could
very well be spared from this improved revenue. This great sinking fund, too,
might be augmented every year by the interest of the debt which had been
discharged the year before; and might, in this manner, increase so very
rapidly, as to be sufficient in a few years to discharge the whole debt, and
thus to restore completely the at-present debilitated and languishing vigour of
the empire. In the meantime, the people might be relieved from some of the most
burdensome taxes; from those which are imposed either upon the necessaries of
life, or upon the materials of manufacture. The labouring poor would thus be
enabled to live better, to work cheaper, and to send their goods cheaper to
market. The cheapness of their goods would increase the demand for them, and
consequently for the labour of those who produced them. This increase in the
demand for labour would both increase the numbers, and improve the
circumstances of the labouring poor. Their consumption would increase, and,
together with it, the revenue arising from all those articles of their
consumption upon which the taxes might be allowed to remain.

The revenue arising from this system of taxation, however, might not
immediately increase in proportion to the number of people who were subjected
to it. Great indulgence would for some time be due to those provinces of the
empire which were thus subjected to burdens to which they had not before been
accustomed; and even when the same taxes came to be levied everywhere as
exactly as possible, they would not everywhere produce a revenue proportioned
to the numbers of the people. In a poor country, the consumption of the
principal commodities subject to the duties of customs and excise, is very
small; and in a thinly inhabited country, the opportunities of smuggling are
very great. The consumption of malt liquors among the inferior ranks of people
in Scotland is very small; and the excise upon malt, beer, and ale, produces
less there than in England, in proportion to the numbers of the people and the
rate of the duties, which upon malt is different, on account of a supposed
difference of quality. In these particular branches of the excise, there is
not, I apprehend, much more smuggling in the one country than in the other. The
duties upon the distillery, and the greater part of the duties of customs, in
proportion to the numbers of people in the respective countries, produce less
in Scotland than in England, not only on account of the smaller consumption of
the taxed commodities, but of the much greater facility of smuggling. In
Ireland, the inferior ranks of people are still poorer than in Scotland, and
many parts of the country are almost as thinly inhabited. In Ireland,
therefore, the consumption of the taxed commodities might, in proportion to the
number of the people, be still less than in Scotland, and the facility of
smuggling nearly the same. In America and the West Indies, the white people,
even of the lowest rank, are in much better circumstances than those of the
same rank in England; and their consumption of all the luxuries in which they
usually indulge themselves, is probably much greater. The blacks, indeed, who
make the greater part of the inhabitants, both of the southern colonies upon
the continent and of the West India islands, as they are in a state of slavery,
are, no doubt, in a worse condition than the poorest people either in Scotland
or Ireland. We must not, however, upon that account, imagine that they are
worse fed, or that their consumption of articles which might be subjected to
moderate duties, is less than that even of the lower ranks of people in
England. In order that they may work well, it is the interest of their master
that they should be fed well, and kept in good heart, in the same manner as it
is his interest that his working cattle should be so. The blacks, accordingly,
have almost everywhere their allowance of rum, and of molasses or spruce-beer,
in the same manner as the white servants; and this allowance would not probably
be withdrawn, though those articles should be subjected to moderate duties. The
consumption of the taxed commodities, therefore, in proportion to the number of
inhabitants, would probably be as great in America and the West Indies as in
any part of the British empire. The opportunities of smuggling, indeed, would
be much greater; America, in proportion to the extent of the country, being
much more thinly inhabited than either Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue,
however, which is at present raised by the different duties upon malt and malt
liquors, were to be levied by a single duty upon malt, the opportunity of
smuggling in the most important branch of the excise would be almost entirely
taken away; and if the duties of customs, instead of being imposed upon almost
all the different articles of importation, were confined to a few of the most
general use and consumption, and if the levying of those duties were subjected
to the excise laws, the opportunity of smuggling, though not so entirely taken
away, would be very much diminished. In consequence of those two apparently
very simple and easy alterations, the duties of customs and excise might
probably produce a revenue as great, in proportion to the consumption of the
most thinly inhabited province, as they do at present, in proportion to that of
the most populous.

The Americans, it has been said, indeed, have no gold or silver money, the
interior commerce of the country being carried on by a paper currency; and the
gold and silver, which occasionally come among them, being all sent to Great
Britain, in return for the commodities which they receive from us. But without
gold and silver, it is added, there is no possibility of paying taxes. We
already get all the gold and silver which they have. How is it possible to draw
from them what they have not?

The present scarcity of gold and silver money in America, is not the effect of
the poverty of that country, or of the inability of the people there to
purchase those metals. In a country where the wages of labour are so much
higher, and the price of provisions so much lower than in England, the greater
part of the people must surely have wherewithal to purchase a greater quantity,
if it were either necessary or convenient for them to do so. The scarcity of
those metals, therefore, must be the effect of choice, and not of necessity.

It is for transacting either domestic or foreign business, that gold or silver
money is either necessary or convenient.

The domestic business of every country, it has been shewn in the second book of
this Inquiry, may, at least in peaceable times, be transacted by means of a
paper currency, with nearly the same degree of conveniency as by gold and
silver money. It is convenient for the Americans, who could always employ with
profit, in the improvement of their lands, a greater stock than they can easily
get, to save as much as possible the expense of so costly an instrument of
commerce as gold and silver; and rather to employ that part of their surplus
produce which would be necessary for purchasing those metals, in purchasing the
instruments of trade, the materials of clothing, several parts of household
furniture, and the iron work necessary for building and extending their
settlements and plantations; in purchasing not dead stock, but active and
productive stock. The colony governments find it for their interest to supply
the people with such a quantity of paper money as is fully sufficient, and
generally more than sufficient, for transacting their domestic business. Some
of those governments, that of Pennsylvania, particularly, derive a revenue from
lending this paper money to their subjects, at an interest of so much per cent.
Others, like that of Massachusetts Bay, advance, upon extraordinary
emergencies, a paper money of this kind for defraying the public expense; and
afterwards, when it suits the conveniency of the colony, redeem it at the
depreciated value to which it gradually falls. In 1747, {See Hutchinson’s
History of Massachusetts Bay vol. ii. page 436 et seq.} that colony paid in
this manner the greater part of its public debts, with the tenth part of the
money for which its bills had been granted. It suits the conveniency of the
planters, to save the expense of employing gold and silver money in their
domestic transactions; and it suits the conveniency of the colony governments,
to supply them with a medium, which, though attended with some very
considerable disadvantages, enables them to save that expense. The redundancy
of paper money necessarily banishes gold and silver from the domestic
transactions of the colonies, for the same reason that it has banished those
metals from the greater part of the domestic transactions in Scotland; and in
both countries, it is not the poverty, but the enterprizing and projecting
spirit of the people, their desire of employing all the stock which they can
get, as active and productive stock, which has occasioned this redundancy of
paper money.

In the exterior commerce which the different colonies carry on with Great
Britain, gold and silver are more or less employed, exactly in proportion as
they are more or less necessary. Where those metals are not necessary, they
seldom appear. Where they are necessary, they are generally found.

In the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies, the British
goods are generally advanced to the colonists at a pretty long credit, and are
afterwards paid for in tobacco, rated at a certain price. It is more convenient
for the colonists to pay in tobacco than in gold and silver. It would be more
convenient for any merchant to pay for the goods which his correspondents had
sold to him, in some other sort of goods which he might happen to deal in, than
in money. Such a merchant would have no occasion to keep any part of his stock
by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. He
could have, at all times, a larger quantity of goods in his shop or warehouse,
and he could deal to a greater extent. But it seldom happens to be convenient
for all the correspondents of a merchant to receive payment for the goods which
they sell to him, in goods of some other kind which he happens to deal in. The
British merchants who trade to Virginia and Maryland, happen to be a particular
set of correspondents, to whom it is more convenient to receive payment for the
goods which they sell to those colonies in tobacco, than in gold and silver.
They expect to make a profit by the sale of the tobacco; they could make none
by that of the gold and silver. Gold and silver, therefore, very seldom appear
in the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies. Maryland and
Virginia have as little occasion for those metals in their foreign, as in their
domestic commerce. They are said, accordingly, to have less gold and silver
money than any other colonies in America. They are reckoned, however, as
thriving, and consequently as rich, as any of their neighbours.

In the northern colonies, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, the four
governments of New England, etc. the value of their own produce which they
export to Great Britain is not equal to that of the manufactures which they
import for their own use, and for that of some of the other colonies, to which
they are the carriers. A balance, therefore, must be paid to the mother-country
in gold and silver and this balance they generally find.

In the sugar colonies, the value of the produce annually exported to Great
Britain is much greater than that of all the goods imported from thence. If the
sugar and rum annually sent to the mother-country were paid for in those
colonies, Great Britain would be obliged to send out, every year, a very large
balance in money; and the trade to the West Indies would, by a certain species
of politicians, be considered as extremely disadvantageous. But it so happens,
that many of the principal proprietors of the sugar plantations reside in Great
Britain. Their rents are remitted to them in sugar and rum, the produce of
their estates. The sugar and rum which the West India merchants purchase in
those colonies upon their own account, are not equal in value to the goods
which they annually sell there. A balance, therefore, must necessarily be paid
to them in gold and silver, and this balance, too, is generally found.

The difficulty and irregularity of payment from the different colonies to Great
Britain, have not been at all in proportion to the greatness or smallness of
the balances which were respectively due from them. Payments have, in general,
been more regular from the northern than from the tobacco colonies, though the
former have generally paid a pretty large balance in money, while the latter
have either paid no balance, or a much smaller one. The difficulty of getting
payment from our different sugar colonies has been greater or less in
proportion, not so much to the extent of the balances respectively due from
them, as to the quantity of uncultivated land which they contained; that is, to
the greater or smaller temptation which the planters have been under of
over-trading, or of undertaking the settlement and plantation of greater
quantities of waste land than suited the extent of their capitals. The returns
from the great island of Jamaica, where there is still much uncultivated land,
have, upon this account, been, in general, more irregular and uncertain than
those from the smaller islands of Barbadoes, Antigua, and St.
Christopher’s, which have, for these many years, been completely
cultivated, and have, upon that account, afforded less field for the
speculations of the planter. The new acquisitions of Grenada, Tobago, St.
Vincent’s, and Dominica, have opened a new field for speculations of this
kind; and the returns front those islands have of late been as irregular and
uncertain as those from the great island of Jamaica.

It is not, therefore, the poverty of the colonies which occasions, in the
greater part of them, the present scarcity of gold and silver money. Their
great demand for active and productive stock makes it convenient for them to
have as little dead stock as possible, and disposes them, upon that account, to
content themselves with a cheaper, though less commodious instrument of
commerce, than gold and silver. They are thereby enabled to convert the value
of that gold and silver into the instruments of trade, into the materials of
clothing, into household furniture, and into the iron work necessary for
building and extending their settlements and plantations. In those branches of
business which cannot be transacted without gold and silver money, it appears,
that they can always find the necessary quantity of those metals; and if they
frequently do not find it, their failure is generally the effect, not of their
necessary poverty, but of their unnecessary and excessive enterprise. It is not
because they are poor that their payments are irregular and uncertain, but
because they are too eager to become excessively rich. Though all that part of
the produce of the colony taxes, which was over and above what was necessary
for defraying the expense of their own civil and military establishments, were
to be remitted to Great Britain in gold and silver, the colonies have
abundantly wherewithal to purchase the requisite quantity of those metals. They
would in this case be obliged, indeed, to exchange a part of their surplus
produce, with which they now purchase active and productive stock, for dead
stock. In transacting their domestic business, they would be obliged to employ
a costly, instead of a cheap instrument of commerce; and the expense of
purchasing this costly instrument might damp somewhat the vivacity and ardour
of their excessive enterprise in the improvement of land. It might not,
however, be necessary to remit any part of the American revenue in gold and
silver. It might be remitted in bills drawn upon, and accepted by, particular
merchants or companies in Great Britain, to whom a part of the surplus produce
of America had been consigned, who would pay into the treasury the American
revenue in money, after having themselves received the value of it in goods;
and the whole business might frequently be transacted without exporting a
single ounce of gold or silver from America.

It is not contrary to justice, that both Ireland and America should contribute
towards the discharge of the public debt of Great Britain. That debt has been
contracted in support of the government established by the Revolution; a
government to which the protestants of Ireland owe, not only the whole
authority which they at present enjoy in their own country, but every security
which they possess for their liberty, their property, and their religion; a
government to which several of the colonies of America owe their present
charters, and consequently their present constitution; and to which all the
colonies of America owe the liberty, security, and property, which they have
ever since enjoyed. That public debt has been contracted in the defence, not of
Great Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of the empire. The
immense debt contracted in the late war in particular, and a great part of that
contracted in the war before, were both properly contracted in defence of
America.

By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom of
trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much more than
compensate any increase of taxes that might accompany that union. By the union
with England, the middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland gained a
complete deliverance from the power of an aristocracy, which had always before
oppressed them. By a union with Great Britain, the greater part of people of
all ranks in Ireland would gain an equally complete deliverance from a much
more oppressive aristocracy; an aristocracy not founded, like that of Scotland,
in the natural and respectable distinctions of birth and fortune, but in the
most odious of all distinctions, those of religious and political prejudices;
distinctions which, more than any other, animate both the insolence of the
oppressors, and the hatred and indignation of the oppressed, and which commonly
render the inhabitants of the same country more hostile to one another than
those of different countries ever are. Without a union with Great Britain, the
inhabitants of Ireland are not likely, for many ages, to consider themselves as
one people.

No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed in the colonies. Even they,
however, would, in point of happiness and tranquillity, gain considerably by a
union with Great Britain. It would, at least, deliver them from those
rancourous and virulent factions which are inseparable from small democracies,
and which have so frequently divided the affections of their people, and
disturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in their form so nearly
democratical. In the case of a total separation from Great Britain, which,
unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very likely to take place,
those factions would be ten times more virulent than ever. Before the
commencement of the present disturbances, the coercive power of the
mother-country had always been able to restrain those factions from breaking
out into any thing worse than gross brutality and insult. If that coercive
power were entirely taken away, they would probably soon break out into open
violence and bloodshed. In all great countries which are united under one
uniform government, the spirit of party commonly prevails less in the remote
provinces than in the centre of the empire. The distance of those provinces
from the capital, from the principal seat of the great scramble of faction and
ambition, makes them enter less into the views of any of the contending
parties, and renders them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the
conduct of all. The spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than in England.
In the case of a union, it would probably prevail less in Ireland than in
Scotland; and the colonies would probably soon enjoy a degree of concord and
unanimity, at present unknown in any part of the British empire. Both Ireland
and the colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any which
they at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful
application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national debt,
the greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance, and the
public revenue of Great Britain might soon be reduced to what was necessary for
maintaining a moderate peace-establishment.

The territorial acquisitions of the East India Company, the undoubted right of
the Crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain, might be rendered
another source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps, than all those already
mentioned. Those countries are represented as more fertile, more extensive,
and, in proportion to their extent, much richer and more populous than Great
Britain. In order to draw a great revenue from them, it would not probably be
necessary to introduce any new system of taxation into countries which are
already sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, taxed. It might, perhaps, be
more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of those unfortunate
countries, and to endeavour to draw a revenue from them, not by imposing new
taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and misapplication of the greater
part of those which they already pay.

If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any considerable
augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above mentioned, the only
resource which can remain to her, is a diminution of her expense. In the mode
of collecting and in that of expending the public revenue, though in both there
may be still room for improvement, Great Britain seems to be at least as
economical as any of her neighbours. The military establishment which she
maintains for her own defence in time of peace, is more moderate than that of
any European state, which can pretend to rival her either in wealth or in
power. None of these articles, therefore, seem to admit of any considerable
reduction of expense. The expense of the peace-establishment of the colonies
was, before the commencement of the present disturbances, very considerable,
and is an expense which may, and, if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought
certainly to be saved altogether. This constant expense in time of peace,
though very great, is insignificant in comparison with what the defence of the
colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken
altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it has already been
observed, upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of 1739 was principally
undertaken on their account; in which, and in the French war that was the
consequence of it, Great Britain, spent upwards of forty millions; a great part
of which ought justly to be charged to the colonies. In those two wars, the
colonies cost Great Britain much more than double the sum which the national
debt amounted to before the commencement of the first of them. Had it not been
for those wars, that debt might, and probably would by this time, have been
completely paid; and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those wars
might not, and the latter certainly would not, have been undertaken. It was
because the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British Empire, that
this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute neither
revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire, cannot be
considered as provinces. They may, perhaps, be considered as appendages, as a
sort of splendid and shewy equipage of the empire. But if the empire can no
longer support the expense of keeping up this equipage, it ought certainly to
lay it down; and if it cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expense,
it ought at least to accommodate its expense to its revenue. If the colonies,
notwithstanding their refusal to submit to British taxes, are still to be
considered as provinces of the British empire, their defence, in some future
war, may cost Great Britain as great an expense as it ever has done in any
former war. The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past,
amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on
the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in
imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an
empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has
cost, which continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has
been hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, without being likely to
bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has
been shewn, are to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit.
It is surely now time that our rulers should either realize this golden dream,
in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people;
or that they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken the
people. If the project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. If any of
the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the
support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free
herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of
supporting any part of their civil or military establishment in time of peace;
and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real
mediocrity of her circumstances.

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