Little is now known to the general public of the history of the attempt to
remove President Andrew Johnson in 1868, on his impeachment by the House
of Representatives and trial by the Senate for alleged high crimes and
misdemeanors in office, or of the causes that led to it. Yet it was one of
the most important and critical events, involving possibly the gravest
consequences, in the entire history of the country.

The constitutional power to impeach and remove the President had lain
dormant since the organization of the Government, and apparently had never
been thought of as a means for the satisfaction of political enmities or
for the punishment of alleged executive misdemeanors, even in the many
heated controversies between the President and Congress that had
theretofore arisen. Nor would any attempt at impeachment have been made at
that time but for the great numerical disparity then existing between the
respective representatives in Congress of the two political parties of the
country.

One-half the members of that Congress, both House and Senate, are now
dead, and with them have also gone substantially the same proportion of
the people at large, but many of the actors therein who have passed away,
lived long enough to see, and were candid enough to admit, that the
failure of the impeachment had brought no harm to the country, while the
general judgment practically of all has come to be that a grave and
threatening danger was thereby averted.

A new generation is now in control of public affairs and the destinies of
the Nation have fallen to new hands. New issues have developed and will
continue to develop from time to time; and new dangers will arise, with
increasing numbers and changing conditions, demanding in their turn the
same careful scrutiny, wisdom and patriotism in adjustment. But the
principles that underlie and constitute the basis of our political
organism, are and will remain the same; and will never cease to demand
constant vigilance for their perpetuation as the rock of safety upon which
our federative system is founded.

To those who in the study of the country’s past seek a broader and higher
conception of the duties of American citizenship, the facts pertaining to
the controversy between the Executive and Congress as to the restoration
and preservation of the Union, set out in the following pages, will be
interesting and instructive. No one is better fitted than the author of
this volume to discuss the period of reconstruction in which, as a member
of the Federal senate, he played so potent and patriotic a part, and it is
a pleasure to find that he has discharged his task with so much ability
and care. But it is profoundly hoped that no coming generation will be
called upon to utilize the experiences of the past in facing in their day,
in field or forum, the dangers of disruption and anarchy, mortal strife
and desolation, between those of one race, and blood, and nationality,
that marked the history of America thirty years ago.

DAVID B. HILL.

CHAPTER 1. — THE PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION.

MR. LINCOLN’S PLAN

The close of the War of the Rebellion, in 1865, found the country
confronted by a civil problem quite as grave as the contest of arms that
had been composed. It was that of reconstruction, or the restoration of
the States lately in revolt, to their constitutional relations to the
Union.

The country had just emerged from a gigantic struggle of physical force of
four years duration between the two great Northern and Southern sections.
That struggle had been from its inception to its close, a continuing
exhibition, on both sides, of stubborn devotion to a cause, and its annals
had been crowned with illustrations of the grandest race and personal
courage the history of the world records. Out of a population of thirty
million people, four million men were under arms, from first to last, and
sums of money quite beyond the limit of ordinary comprehension, were
expended in its prosecution. There was bloodshed without stint. Both sides
to the conflict fought for an idea—on the one side for so-called
State Rights and local self-government—on the other for national
autonomy as the surest guaranty of all rights—personal, local, and
general.

The institution of negro slavery, the basis of the productive industries
of the States of the South, which had from the organization of the
Government been a source of friction between the slave-holding and
nonslave-holding sections, and was in fact the underlying and potent cause
of the war, went under in the strife and was by national edict forever
prohibited.

The struggle being ended by the exhaustion of the insurgents, two
conspicuous problems demanding immediate solution were developed: The
status of the now ex-slaves, or freedmen—and the methods to be
adopted for the rehabilitation of the revolted States, including the
status of the revolted States themselves. The sword had declared that they
had no constitutional power to withdraw from the Union, and the result
demonstrated that they had not the physical power—and therefore that
they were in the anomalous condition of States of though not States
technically in the Union—and hence properly subject to the
jurisdiction of the General Government, and bound by its judgment in any
measures to be instituted by it for their future restoration to their
former condition of co-equal States.

The now ex-slaves had been liberated, not with the consent of their former
owners, but by the power of the conqueror as a war measure, who not
unnaturally insisted upon the right to declare absolutely the future
status of these persons without consultation with or in any way by the
intervention of their late owners. The majority of the gentlemen in
Congress representing the Northern States demanded the instant and
complete enfranchisement of these persons, as the natural and logical
sequence of their enfreedment. The people of the late slave States, as was
to have been foreseen, and not without reason, objected—especially
where, as was the case in many localities, the late slaves largely
out-numbered the people of the white race: and it is apparent from
subsequent developments that they had the sympathy of President Lincoln,
at least so far as to refuse his sanction to the earlier action of
Congress relative to restoration.

To add to the gravity of the situation and of the problem of
reconstruction, the people of the States lately in rebellion were
disfranchised in a mass, regardless of the fact that many of them refused
to sanction the rebellion only so far as was necessary to their personal
safety.

It was insisted by the dominant element of the party in control of
Congress, that these States were dead as political entities, having
committed political suicide, and their people without rights or the
protection of law, as malcontents.

It is of record that Mr. Lincoln objected to this doctrine, and to all
propositions that contemplated the treatment of the late rebellious States
simply as conquered provinces and their people as having forfeited all
rights under a common government, and under the laws of Nations entitled
to no concessions, or even to consideration, in any proposed measures of
restoration. That he had no sympathy with that theory is evidenced by the
plan of restoration he attempted to establish in Louisiana.

It was at this point that differences arose between Mr. Lincoln and his
party in Congress, which became more or less acute prior to his death and
continued between Congress and Mr. Johnson on his attempt to carry out Mr.
Lincoln’s plans for restoration.

The cessation of hostilities in the field thus developed a
politico-economic problem which had never before confronted any nation in
such magnitude and gravity. The situation was at once novel,
unprecedented, and in more senses than one, alarming. Without its due and
timely solution there was danger of still farther disturbance of a far
different and more alarming character than that of arms but lately ceased;
and of a vastly more insidious and dangerous complexion. The war had been
fought in the open. The record of the more than two thousand field and
naval engagements that had marked its progress and the march of the Union
armies to success, were heralded day by day to every household, and all
could forecast its trend and its results. But the controversy now
developed was insidious—its influences, its weapons, its designs,
and its possible end, were in a measure hidden from the public—public
opinion was divided, and its results, for good or ill, problematical. The
wisest political sagacity and the broadest statesmanship possible were
needed, and in their application no time was to be lost.

In his annual message to Congress, December 8th, 1863, Mr. Lincoln had to
a considerable extent outlined his plan of Reconstruction; principally by
a recital of what he had already done in that direction. That part of his
message pertinent to this connection is reproduced here to illustrate the
broad, humane, national and patriotic purpose that actuated him, quite as
well as his lack of sympathy with the extreme partisan aims and methods
that characterized the measures afterward adopted by Congress in
opposition to his well-known wishes and views, and, also, as an important
incident to the history of that controversy and of the time, and its
bearing upon the frictions that followed between Congress and Mr.
Lincoln’s successor on that subject. Mr. Lincoln said:

When Congress assembled a year ago the war had already lasted twenty
months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea, with
varying results. The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits;
yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad, was not
satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just past,
indicated uneasiness among ourselves, while, amid much that was cold and
menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of
pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce
was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from
foreign shores; and we were threatened with such additions from the same
quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We
had failed to elicit from European Governments anything hopeful upon this
subject. The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September,
was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month
later that final proclamation came, including the announcement that
colored men of suitable condition would be received into the army service.
The policy of emancipation, and of employing black soldiers, gave to the
future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in
uncertain conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of
civil administration, the General Government had no lawful power to effect
emancipation in any State; and for a long time it had been hoped that the
rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military
measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it
might come, and that, if it should, the crisis of the contest would then
be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, was followed by dark and
doubtful days. Eleven months have now passed, and we are permitted to take
another review. The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and by
the complete opening of the Mississippi the country dominated by the
rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication
between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of
insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and
advocates of slavery at the beginning of the rebellion, now declare openly
for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included
in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which
three years ago would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery
into the new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing
it within their own limits.

Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one
hundred thousand are now in the United States military service; about one
half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the
double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause, and
supplying the places which must otherwise be filled with so many white
men. So far as tested, it is difficult to say they are not as good
soldiers as any. No servile insurrection, or tendency to violence or
cruelty, has marked the measure of emancipation and arming the blacks.
Those measures have been discussed in foreign countries, and contemporary
with such discussion the tone of sentiment there is much improved. At home
the same measures have been fully discussed, and supported, criticised,
and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging
to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great
trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to
divide the friends of the Union is past.

Looking now to the present, and future, and with reference to a resumption
of national authority within the States wherein that authority has been
suspended, I have thought fit to issue a Proclamation, a copy of which is
herewith transmitted. On examination of this Proclamation it will appear,
as is believed, that nothing is attempted beyond what is amply justified
by the Constitution. True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is
coerced to take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he
voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the Executive to
grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion, and this
includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial
and other authorities.

It is also proffered that, if in any of the States named a State
Government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such Government shall
be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under it the
State shall, on the constitutional conditions, be protected against
invasion and domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of the
United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form
of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is explicit
and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only to a State
Government set up in this particular way? This section contemplates a case
wherein the element within a State favorable to a republican government,
in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile external to or
even within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which we are
dealing.

Any attempt to guaranty and protect a revived State Government,
constituted in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element
against whose hostility it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There
must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements, so as to build
only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which
accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former
unsoundness.

But if it be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political
body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and
to the Union under it, why also to the laws and Proclamation in regard to
slavery? Those laws and Proclamations were enacted and put forth for the
purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their
fullest effect, there had to be a pledge—for their maintenance. In
my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which
they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a
lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of
faith. I may add at this point, that while I remain in my present
position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation
Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the
terms of the Proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. For these
and other reasons it is thought best that support of these measures shall
be included in the oath; and it is believed the Executive may lawfully
claim it in return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, when he
has clear constitutional power to withhold altogether or grant upon terms
which he shall deem wisest for the public interest. It should be observed,
also, that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and
abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision.

The proposed acquiescence of the National Executive in any reasonable
temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view of
possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must, at best,
attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States.
It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people of those States may
be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to
this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no power of
the National Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition.

The suggestion in the Proclamation as to maintaining the political
frame-work of those States on what is called reconstruction, is made in
the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor
and avoid great confusion.

But why any proclamation on this subject? This question is beset with the
conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or taken too
soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for action,
but remain inactive apparently for want of a rallying point. Why shall A.
adopt the plan of B., rather than B. that of A.? And if A. and B. should
agree, how can they know but that the General Government here will reject
their plan? By the Proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted
by them as a rallying point, and which they may be assured in advance will
not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they
otherwise would.

The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the National
Executive consists in the danger of committals on points which could be
more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so shape
the document as to avoid embarrassment from this source. Saying that, on
certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights restored, it
is not said that other classes on other terms will never be included.
Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified
way, it is not saying it will not be accepted in any other way.

The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the States
not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of profound
gratulation, and while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so
earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain
unchanged, and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of
aiding these important steps to a great consummation.

In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of
the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power
alone can we look, for a time, to give confidence to the people in the
contested regions that the insurgent power will not again over-run them.
Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere
for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be
directed to the Army and Navy, who have thus far borne their hardest part
nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the
greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably
recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them,
to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home
of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged and perpetuated.

Abraham Lincoln. December 8, 1863.

The following is the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction referred
to in the foregoing Message, and further illustrates Mr. Lincoln’s plan
for the restoration of the Union:

PROCLAMATION OF AMNESTY AND RECONSTRUCTION. BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA.

Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided
that the President “shall have the power to grant reprieves and pardons
for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;”
and

Whereas, a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State governments of
several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have
committed, and are guilty of treason against the United States; and

Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been
enacted by Congress, declaring forfeitures and confiscations of property
and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated,
and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any time
thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have
participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof,
pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such
conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare; and

Whereas, the Congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon
accords with well established judicial exposition of the pardoning power;
and

Whereas, with reference to said rebellion, the President of the United
States has issued several proclamations, with provisions in regard to the
liberation of slaves; and

Whereas, it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said
rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to
reinaugurate loyal State Governments within and for their respective
States; therefore,

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare,
and make known to all persons who have, directly or by implication,
participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted,
that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with
restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves and in property
cases where rights of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the
condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and
thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate, and which oath shall
be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and
effect following, to-wit:

I, ___ __ ___, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I will
henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States, and the Union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in
like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed
during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far
as not repealed, modified or held void by Congress, or by the decision of
the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and
faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the
existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not
modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me
God.

The persons exempted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all
who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the
so-called Confederate Government: all who have left judicial stations
under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are or shall have
been military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate Government
above the rank of Colonel in the army or Lieutenant in the Navy; all who
have left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all
who resigned commissions in the army or navy of the United States and
afterward aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in
treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise
than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found
in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any capacity.

And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever, in any
of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee,
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina and North Carolina, a number of
persons, not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such State
at the Presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not having
since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election laws of the
State existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and
excluding all others, shall reestablish a State government which shall be
republican, and in no wise contravening said oath, such shall be
recognized as the true government of the State, and the State shall
receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision which
declares that “the United States shall guarantee to every state in this
Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion; and, on the application of the legislature, or the
executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence.”

And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known, that any provision
which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed
people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent
freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent as a
temporary arrangement with their present condition as a laboring,
landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the National
Executive.

And it is suggested as not improper that, in constructing a loyal State
government in any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the
subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws, as before
the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made
necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any,
not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by
those framing the new State government.

To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say, that whether members
sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats,
constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective houses, and not to
any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this proclamation
is intended to present to the people of the States wherein the National
authority has been suspended; and loyal State governments have been
subverted, a mode in and by which the National authority and loyal State
governments, may be re-established within said States, or, in any of them;
and while the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest, with
his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible
mode would be acceptable.

Given under my hand at the City of Washington, the eighth day of December,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of
the Independence of the United States of America, the eighty-eighth.

[L. S.]

By the President: Abraham Lincoln. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

How the revolted States could be most successfully and expeditiously
restored to their constitutional relations to the Union on the cessation
of hostilities, was the momentous question of the hour, upon which there
were views and schemes as varied and antagonistic as were the mental
differences and political disagreements of those who felt called upon to
engage in the stupendous work. As history had recorded no similar
conditions, and therefore no demand for the solution of such a problem,
there were no examples or historic lights for the guidance of those upon
whom the task had fallen.

It is apparent that Mr. Lincoln maintained the indestructibility of the
States and the indivisibility of the Union—that the resolutions of
secession were null and void, and that the States lately in rebellion were
never in fact but only in theory out of the Union—that they retained
inherently, though now dormant, their State autonomy and constitutional
rights as before their revolutionary acts, except as to slavery, and that
all their people had to do, to re-establish their former status, as he
declared to the Emperor of the French when that potentate was about to
recognize the Confederacy, was to resume their duties as loyal,
law-abiding citizens, and reorganize their State Governments on a basis of
loyalty to the Constitution and the Union. The terms he proposed to
formally offer them were first illustrated in the case of Louisiana, early
in 1863, and later in the foregoing Message and Proclamation; and clearly
indicated what was to be his policy and process of reconstruction.

Messrs. Flanders and Hahn were admitted to the House of Representatives as
members from Louisiana agreeably to the President’s views thus outlined.
They had been chosen at an election ordered by the Governor of the State
(Gov. Shepley), who had undoubtedly been permitted, if not specially
authorized by the President, to take this step, but they were the last to
be received from Louisiana under Mr. Lincoln’s plan, as the next Congress
resolved to receive no more members from the seceded States till joint
action by the two Houses therefor should be had.

Prior to the election at which these gentlemen were chosen, Mr. Lincoln
addressed a characteristic note to Gov. Shepley, which was in effect a
warning that Federal officials not citizens of Louisiana must not be
chosen to represent the State in Congress, “We do not,” said he, referring
to the South, “particularly need members of Congress from those States to
get along with legislation here. What we do want is the conclusive
evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing to be members
of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution, and that other
respectable citizens are willing to vote for them and send them. To send a
parcel of Northern men as Representatives, elected, as would be
understood, (and perhaps really so) at the point of the bayonet, would be
disgraceful and outrageous.”

Mr. Lincoln would tolerate none of the “carpet-bagging” that afterwards
became so conspicuous and offensive under the Congressional plan of
Reconstruction.

These steps for reconstruction in Louisiana were followed by the
assembling of a convention to frame a new constitution for that State. The
convention was organized early in 1864, and its most important act was the
prompt incorporation of an antislavery clause in its organic law. By a
vote of 70 to 16 the convention declared slavery to be forever abolished
in the State. The new Constitution was adopted by the people of the State
on the 5th day of the ensuing September by a vote of 6,836 in its favor,
to 1,566 against it. As the total vote of Louisiana in 1860 was 50,510,
the new government had fulfilled the requirement of the President’s
Proclamation. It was sustained by more than the required one-tenth vote.

In a personal note of congratulation to Gov. Hahn, of Louisiana, the
President, speaking of the coming convention, suggested that “some of the
colored people be let in, as for instance, the very intelligent, and
especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks.” “They would,”
said he, “probably help in some trying time in the future TO KEEP THE
JEWEL OF LIBERTY IN THE FAMILY OF FREEDOM.”

This action in regard to Louisiana was accompanied, indeed in some
particulars preceded, by similar action in Arkansas. A Governor was
elected, an anti-slavery Constitution adopted, a State Government duly
installed, and Senators and Representatives in Congress elected, but were
refused admission by Congress. Mr. Sumner, when the credentials of the
Senators-elect were presented, foreshadowing the position to be taken by
the Republican leaders, offered a resolution declaring that “a State
pretending to secede from the Union, and battling against the General
Government to maintain that position, must be regarded as a rebel State
subject to military occupation and without representation on this floor
until it has been readmitted by a vote of both Houses of Congress; and the
Senate will decline to receive any such application from any such rebel
State until after such a vote by both Houses.”

A few weeks later, on the 27th of June, 1864, this resolution was in
effect reported back to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, to which it
had been referred, and adopted by a vote of 27 to 6. The same action was
had in the House of Representatives on the application of the
Representatives-elect from Arkansas for admission to that body.

This was practically the declaration of a rupture between the President
and Congress on the question of Reconstruction. It was a rebuke to Mr.
Lincoln for having presumed to treat the seceded States as still in any
sense States of the Union. It was in effect a declaration that those
States had successfully seceded—that their elimination from the
Union was an accomplished fact—that the Union of the States had been
broken—and that the only method left for their return that would be
considered by Congress was as conquered and outlying provinces, not even
as Territories with the right of such to membership in the Union; and
should be governed accordingly until such time as Congress should see fit
(IF EVER, to use the language of Mr. Stevens in the House) to devise and
establish some form whereby they could be annexed to or re-incorporated
into the Union.

It was at this point—on the great question of Reconstruction, or
more properly of Restoration—that the disagreements originated
between the Executive and Congress which finally culminated in the
impeachment of Mr. Lincoln’s successor; and that condition of strained
relations was measurably intensified when, on the following July 4th, a
bill was passed by Congress making provision for the reorganization and
admission of the revolted States on the extreme lines indicated by the
above action of Congress and containing the very extraordinary provision
that the President, AFTER OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, shall
recognize the State Government so established. That measure was still
another and more marked rebuke by Congress to the President for having
presumed to initiate a system of restoration without its consultation and
advice. Naturally Mr. Lincoln was not in a mood to meekly accept the
rebuke so marked and manifestly intended; and so the bill not having
passed Congress till within the ten days preceding its adjournment allowed
by the Constitution for its consideration by the President, and as it
proposed to undo the work he had done, he failed to return it to Congress—”pocketed”
it—and it therefore fell. He was not in a mood to accept a
Congressional rebuke. He had given careful study to the duties, the
responsibilities, and the limitations of the respective Departments of,
the Government, and was not willing that his judgment should be revised,
or his course censured, however indirectly, by any of its co-ordinate
branches.

Four days after the session had closed, he issued a Proclamation in which
he treated the bill merely as the expression of an opinion by Congress as
to the best plan of Reconstruction—”which plan,” he remarked, “it is
now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration.”

He further stated in this Proclamation that he had already presented one
plan of restoration, and that he was “unprepared by a formal approval of
this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration,
and was unprepared to declare that the free State Constitutions and
Governments already adopted and installed in Louisiana and Arkansas, shall
be set aside and held for naught, thereby repelling and discouraging the
loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, and
unprepared to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish
slavery in the States, though sincerely hoping that a constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery in all the States might be adopted.”

While, with these objections, Mr. Lincoln could not approve the bill, he
concluded his Proclamation with these words:

“Nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the plan of restoration contained
in the bill as one very proper for the loyal people of any State choosing
to adopt it, and I am and at all times shall be prepared to give Executive
aid and assistance to any such people as soon as military resistance to
the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State and the
people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the
Constitution and laws of the United States—in which Military
Governors will be appointed with directions to proceed according to the
bill.”

“It must be frankly admitted,” says Mr. Blaine in reciting this record in
his ‘Thirty Years of Congress,’ “that Mr. Lincoln’s course was in some of
its respects extraordinary. It met with almost unanimous dissent on the
part of the Republican members, and violent criticism from the more
radical members of both Houses. * * * Fortunately, the Senators and
Representatives had returned to their States and Districts before the
Reconstruction Proclamation was issued, and found the people united and
enthusiastic in Mr. Lincoln’s support.”

In the last speech Mr. Lincoln ever made, (April 11th, 1865) referring to
the twelve thousand men who had organized the Louisiana Government, (on
the one-tenth basis) he said:

“If we now reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and
disperse them. We say to the white man, you are worthless, or worse. We
will neither help you or be helped by you. To the black man we say, ‘this
cup of liberty which these, your old masters hold to your lips, we will
dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the spilled and
scattered contents IN SOME VAGUE AND UNDEFINED WHEN AND WHERE AND HOW.’ If
this course, discouraging and paralyzing to both white and black, has any
tendency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the
Union, I have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, they
reorganize and sustain the new Government of Louisiana, the converse of
all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of
twelve thousand men to adhere to their work and argue for it, and
proselyte for it, and fight for it, and grow it, and ripen it to a
complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing all united for him, is
inspired with vigilance and with energy and daring to the same end. Grant
that he desires the elective franchise. HE WILL YET ATTAIN IT SOONER BY
SAVING THE ALREADY ADVANCED STEPS TOWARD IT THAN BY RUNNING BACK OVER
THEM. Concede that the new Government of Louisiana is only to what it
should be as the egg to the fowl; we shall sooner have the fowl by
hatching the egg than by smashing it.”

It is manifest that Mr. Lincoln intuitively foresaw the danger of a great
body of the people becoming accustomed to government by military power,
and sought to end it by the speediest practicable means. As he expressed
it, “We must begin and mould from disorganized and discordant elements:
nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people,
differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and measure of
reconstruction.”

Louisiana was wholly in possession of the Union forces and under loyal
influence in 1863, and in his judgment the time had come for
reconstructive action in that state—not merely for the purpose of
strengthening and crystallizing the Union sentiment there, at a great
gate-way of commerce, that would become a conspicuous object-lesson to
foreign governments in behalf of more favorable influences abroad, but
also to the encouragement of Union men and the discouragement of the
rebellion in all the other revolted States. He had fortified his own
judgment, as he frankly declared, “by submitting the Louisiana plan in
advance to every member of the Cabinet, and every member approved it.”

The steps taken in Louisiana were to be but a beginning. The nature of
subsequent proceedings on his part must be governed by the success of this—that
under then existing conditions it was inexpedient, in view of further
possible complications, to forecast further proceedings, and especially to
attempt to establish, at the outset, and under the chaotic conditions of
the time, a general system of reconstruction applicable to all the States
and to varying conditions. So the beginning was made in Louisiana. It is
manifest that the purpose of this immediate action was two-fold—not
only to restore Louisiana to the Union at the earliest practicable day—but
also to so far establish a process of general restoration before Congress
should reconvene at the coming December session, that there would be no
sufficient occasion or excuse for interfering with his work by the
application of the exasperating conditions that had been foreshadowed by
that body.

On this point Mr. Welles, his Secretary of the Navy, testifies that at the
close of a Cabinet meeting held immediately preceding Mr. Lincoln’s death,
“Mr. Stanton made some remarks on the general condition of affairs and the
new phase and duties upon which we were about to enter. He alluded to the
great solicitude which the President felt on this subject, his frequent
recurrence to the necessity of establishing civil governments and
preserving order in the rebel States. Like the rest of the Cabinet,
doubtless, he had given this subject much consideration, and with a view
of having something practical on which to base action, he had drawn up a
rough plan or ordinance which he had handed to the President.

“The President said he proposed to bring forward that subject, although he
had not had time as yet to give much attention to the details of the paper
which the Secretary of War had given him only the day before; but that it
was substantially, in its general scope, the plan which we had sometimes
talked over in Cabinet meetings. We should probably make some
modifications, prescribe further details; there were some suggestions
which he should wish to make, and he desired all to bring their minds to
the question, for no greater or more important one could come before us,
or any future Cabinet. He thought it providential that, this great
rebellion was crushed just as Congress had adjourned, AND THERE WERE NONE
OF THE DISTURBING ELEMENTS OF THAT BODY TO HINDER AND EMBARRASS US. If we
were wise and discreet, we should reanimate, the States and get their
governments in successful operation, with order prevailing and the Union
reestablished, BEFORE CONGRESS CAME TOGETHER IN DECEMBER. This he thought
important. We could do better, accomplish more without than with them.
There were men in Congress who, if their motives were good, were
nevertheless impracticable, and who possessed feelings of hate and
vindictiveness in which he did not sympathize and could not participate.
Each House of Congress, he said, had the undoubted right to receive or
reject members, the Executive had no control in this matter. But Congress
had NOTHING TO DO WITH THE STATE GOVERNMENTS, which the President could
recognize, and under existing laws treat as other States, give the same
mail facilities, collect taxes, appoint judges, marshals, collectors,
etc., subject, of course, to confirmation. There were men who objected to
these views, BUT THEY WERE NOT HERE, AND WE MUST MAKE HASTE TO DO OUR DUTY
BEFORE THEY CAME HERE.”

The subjugated States were in a condition that could not be safely
permitted to continue for any indefinite period. It would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the war, incongruous to the American system and idea
of government, and antagonistic to American political, or even commercial
or social autonomy. Naturally upon Mr. Lincoln would fall largely the duty
and responsibility of formulating and inaugurating some method of
restoration. With the abolition of slavery, the most difficult of
settlement of all the obstacles in the way of reconstruction had been
removed. Naturally, too, during the later months of the war, when it
became manifest that the end of the struggle was near, the question of
reconstruction and the methods whereby it could be most naturally,
speedily, and effectively accomplished, came uppermost in his mind. A
humane, just man, and a sincere, broad-brained, patriot and far-seeing
statesman, he instinctively rejected the many drastic schemes which filled
a large portion of the public press of the North and afterwards
characterized many of the suggestions of Congressional action. With him
the prime purpose of the war was the preservation of the political,
territorial and economic integrity of the Republic—in a word, to
restore the Union, without needless humiliation to the defeated party, or
the imposition of unnecessarily rigorous terms which could but result in
future frictions—without slavery—and yet with sufficient
safeguards against future disloyal association of the sections; and that
purpose had been approved by an overwhelming majority of the people in his
re-election in 1864.

In these purposes and methods Mr. Lincoln appears to have had the active
sympathy and co-operation of his entire Cabinet, more especially of Mr.
Stanton, his Secretary of War. Indeed, Mr. Stanton is understood, from the
record, to have been the joint author, with Mr. Lincoln, of the plan of
reconstruction agreed upon at the later meetings of the Cabinet
immediately prior to Mr. Lincoln’s death. Mr. Stanton proposed to put it
in the form of a military order—Mr. Lincoln made an Executive order.
The plan was embodied in what afterwards became known as the “North
Carolina Proclamation,” determined upon by Mr. Lincoln at his last Cabinet
meeting and promulgated by Mr. Johnson shortly after his accession to the
Presidency as Mr. Lincoln’s successor, and is inserted in a subsequent
chapter.

Mr. Lincoln unquestionably comprehended the peculiar conditions under
which the Republican party had come to the control of the legislative
branch of the Government, and fully realized the incapacity of the
dominant element in that control for the delicate work of restoration and
reconstruction—leading a conquered and embittered people back
peacefully and successfully, without unnecessary friction, into harmonious
relations to the Union.

No such responsibility, no such herculean task, had ever before, in the
history of civilization, devolved upon any ruler or political party.

Mr. Lincoln seems to have realized the incapacity of party leaders brought
to the surface by the tumult and demoralization of the time, whose only
exploits and experiences were in the line of destruction and who must
approach the task with divided counsel, to cope successfully with the
delicate and responsible work of restoration the close of the war had made
imperative. He comprehended the incongruities which characterized that
great party better than its professed leaders, and foresaw the futility of
any effort on its part, at that time and in its then temper, to the early
establishment of any coherent or successful method of restoration. Hence,
unquestionably, his prompt action in that behalf, and his failure to call
the Congress into special session, to the end that there should be no time
unnecessarily consumed and lost in the institution of some efficient form
of civil government in the returning States—some form that would
have the sanction of intelligent authority competent to restore and
enforce public order, without the dangers of delay and consequent disorder
that must result, and did afterwards result, from the protracted debates
sure to follow and did follow the sudden precipitation of the questions of
reconstruction and reconciliation upon a mass of Congressmen totally
inexperienced in the anomalous conditions of that time, or in the methods
most needed for their correction.

That Mr. Lincoln contemplated the ultimate and not remote enfranchisement
of the late slaves, is manifest from his suggestion to Gov. Hahn, of
Louisiana, hereinbefore quoted in connection with the then approaching
Convention for the re-establishment of State Government there, and again
still more manifest from his last public utterance on April 11, 1865,
deprecating the rejection by Congress of his plan for the restoration of
Louisiana, in which, he said, speaking of that action by Congress
rejecting the Louisiana bill: “Grant that the colored male desires the
elective franchise. He will attain it sooner by saving the already
advanced steps towards it than by running back over them.”

It is also apparent in the light of the succeeding history of that time
and of that question, that if Mr. Lincoln’s views had been seconded by
Congress, the enfranchisement of the negro would have been, though
delayed, as certain of accomplishment, and of a vastly higher and more
satisfactory plane—and the country saved the years of friction and
disgraceful public disorder that characterized the enforcement of the
Congressional plan afterwards adopted.

As to the success of Mr. Lincoln’s plans, had they been sanctioned, or
even had they not been repudiated by Congress, Mr. Blaine, in his book,
asserts that Mr. Lincoln, “By his four years of considerate and successful
administration, by his patient and positive trust in the ultimate triumph
of the Union, realized at last as he stood upon the edge of the grave—he
had acquired so complete an ascendancy over the public, control in the
loyal states, that ANY POLICY MATURED AND ANNOUNCED BY HIM WOULD HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED BY A VAST MAJORITY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN.”

It was indicative of the sagacious foresight of Mr. Lincoln that he did
not call the Congress into special session at the close of the war, as
would have been natural and usual, before attempting the establishment of
any method for the restoration of the revolted States. The fact that he
did not do so, but was making preparations to proceed immediately in that
work on his own lines and in accordance with his own ideas, and with the
hearty accord of his entire Cabinet, of itself affords proof that he was
apprehensive of obstruction from the same element of his party that
subsequently arose in opposition to Mr. Johnson on that question, and that
he preferred to put his plans into operation before the assembling of
Congress in the next regular winter session, in order that he might be
able then to show palpable results, and induce Congress to accept and
follow up a humane, peaceful and satisfactory system of reconstruction.
Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly hoped thus to avoid unnecessary friction. Having
the quite unlimited confidence of the great mass of the people of the
country, of both parties and on both sides of the line of hostilities,
there seem to be excellent reasons for believing that he would have
succeeded, and that the extraordinary and exasperating differences and
local turmoils that followed the drastic measures which were afterward
adopted by Congress over the President’s vetoes, would have been in a very
large degree avoided, and THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO IMPEACHMENT—either
of Mr. Lincoln had he lived, or of Mr. Johnson after him.

It was the misfortune of the time, and of the occasion, which determined
Mr. Lincoln to institute a plan of restoration during the interim of
Congress, that the Republican party, then in absolute control of Congress,
was in no sense equipped for such a work. Its first and great mission had
been the destruction of slavery. Though not phrased in formal fashion,
that was the logic of its creation and existence. It was brought into
being purely as an anti-slavery party, illustrated in the fact that its
membership included every pronounced anti-slavery man, known as
abolitionists, in the United States. All its energies, during all its life
up to the close of the war had been bent to that end. It had been born and
bred to the work of destruction. It came to destroy slavery, and its
forces had been nurtured, to the last day of the war, in pulling down—in
fact, did not then wholly cease.

The work of restoration—the rebuilding of fallen States—had
now come. The Republican party approached that work in the hot blood of
war and the elation of victory—a condition illy fitting the demands
of exalted statesmanship so essential to perfect political effort.

Never had nation or party thrust upon it a more delicate duty or graver
responsibility. It was that of leading a conquered people to build a new
civilization wholly different from the one in ruins. It was first to
reconcile two races totally different from each other, so far as possible
to move in harmony in supplanting servile by free labor, and the slave by
a free American citizen. The transition was sudden, and the elements
antagonistic in race, culture, self-governing power—indeed, in all
the qualities which characterize a free people.

There was a wide margin for honest differences between statesmen of
experience. A universal sentiment could not obtain. The accepted political
leaders of the time were illy equipped to meet the issue—much less
those who had been brought to prominence, and too often to control, in the
hot blood of war and the frictions of the time, when intemperate
denunciation and a free use of the epithets of “rebel,” and “traitor,” had
become a ready passport to public honors. It was a time when the
admonition to make haste slowly was of profound significance. A peril
greater than any other the civil war had developed, overhung the nation.
Greater than ever the demand for courage in conciliation—for
divesting the issues of all mere partyism, and the yielding of something
by the extremes, both of conservatism and radicalism.

CHAPTER II. — THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION.

LINCOLN AND JOHNSON NOT NOMINATED AS REPUBLICANS.

Mr. Lincoln had been elected President in 1860, distinctively as a
Republican. In 1864, however, the conditions had changed. The war had been
in progress some three years, during which the insurgents had illustrated
a measure of courage, endurance, and a command of the engineries of
successful warfare that had not been anticipated by the people of the
North. It was seen that to insure the success of the Union cause it was
imperative that there should be thorough unity and cooperation of the
loyal people of all parties—that it was no time for partisan
division among those who hoped ever to see a restored Republic—that
it was necessary to lay aside, as far as possible, mere partisan issues,
and to unite, in the then approaching campaign, upon a non-partisan,
distinctively Union ticket and platform.

Mr. Lincoln had given so satisfactory an administration so wisely,
efficiently, and patriotically had he conducted his great office, that he
was on all sides conceded to be the proper person for nomination and
election. The Convention of 1861 was not called as a Republican
Convention, but distinctively as a Union Convention.

“The undersigned,” so ran the call, “who by original appointment, or
subsequent delegation to fill vacancies, constitute the Executive
Committee created by the National Convention held at Chicago on the 10th
day of May, 1860, do hereby call upon all QUALIFIED VOTERS WHO DESIRE THE
UNCONDITIONAL MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION, THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE COMPLETE SUPPRESSION OF THE EXISTING REBELLION, WITH THE CAUSE
THEREOF, by vigorous war, and all apt and effective means; to send
delegates to a convention to assemble at Baltimore, on Tuesday, the 7th
day of June, 1864, at 12 o’clock noon, for the purpose of presenting
candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United
States.”

The delegates met pursuant to this call. Hon. Edwin D. Morgan, of New
York, Chairman of the Union National Committee, called the Convention to
order, and Robert J. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, was chosen temporary
Chairman. In the course of his introductory address, Mr. Breckinridge
said:

Passing over many things which it would be right for me to say, did the
time serve, and were this the occasion—let me add,—you are a
Union party. Your origin has been referred to as having occurred eight
years ago. In one sense it is true. But you are far older than that. I see
before me not only primitive Republicans and primitive Abolitionists, but
I see also primitive Democrats and primitive Whigs. * * * As a Union party
I will follow you to the ends of the earth, and to the gates of death. But
as an Abolition party—as a Republican party—as a Whig party—as
a Democratic party—as an American party, I will not follow you one
foot.

Mr. William Dennison, of Ohio, was chosen President of the Convention. On
taking the chair he said:

‘In no sense do we meet as members or representatives of either of the old
political parties which bound the people, or as the champions of any
principle or doctrine peculiar to either. The extraordinary condition of
the country since the outbreak of the rebellion has, from necessity, taken
from the issues of these parties their practical significance, and
compelled the formation of substantially new political organizations;
hence the organization of the Union Party—if party it can be called—of
which this Convention is for the purpose of its assembling, the accredited
representative, and the only test of membership in which is an unreserved,
unconditional loyalty to the Government and the Union.’

After perfecting its organization the Convention proceeded to ballot for a
nominee for the Presidency, and Mr. Lincoln was unanimously nominated—the
Missouri delegation at first casting its 22 votes for Gen. Grant, but
afterwards changing them to Mr. Lincoln, giving him the total vote of the
Convention—506—on the first and only ballot.

Nominations for the Vice Presidency being next in order, Mr. Lyman
Tremaine, of New York, an old time Democrat, nominated Daniel S.
Dickinson, another old time Democrat and a very distinguished citizen of
that State. In his nominating speech Mr. Tremaine again emphasized that
this Convention was a Union, and not a partisan body, in these words:

‘It was well said by the temporary and by the permanent Chairman, that we
meet not here as Republicans. If we do, I have no place in this
Convention; but, like Daniel S. Dickinson, when the first gun was fired on
Sumter, I felt that I should prove false to my revolutionary ancestry if I
could have hesitated to cast partisan ties to the breeze, and rally around
the flag of the Union for the preservation of the Government.’

The Indiana delegation nominated Andrew Johnson, also a Democrat, and the
nomination was seconded by Mr. Stone, speaking for the Iowa delegation.

In the earlier proceedings of the Convention there had seemed a
disposition to exclude the Tennessee delegation, and Parson Brownlow, an
old line Whig, being called on for a speech, evidenced in the course of
his remarks the small part which partisan considerations were permitted to
play in the purposes and proceedings of the Convention. He said:

‘There need be no detaining this Convention for two days in discussions of
various kinds, and the idea I suggest to you as an inducement not to
exclude our delegation is, that we may take it into our heads, before the
thing is over, to present a candidate from that State in rebellion, for
the second office in the gift of the people. We have a man down there whom
it has been my good luck and bad fortune to fight untiringly and
perseveringly for the past twenty-five years—Andrew Johnson. For the
first time, in the Providence of God, three years ago we got together on
the same platform, and we are fighting the devil, Tom Walker, and Jeff.
Davis, side by side.’

Mr. Horace Maynard, a conspicuous Republican of Tennessee, said:

‘Mr. President, we but represent the sentiment of those who sent here the
delegation from Tennessee, when we announce that if no one else had made
the nomination of Andrew Johnson, which is now before the Convention, it
would have been our duty to make it by one of our own delegation. That
citizen, known, honored, distinguished, has been presented to this
Convention for the second place in the gift of the American people. It
needs not that I should add words of commendation of him here. From the
time he rose in the Senate of the United States, where he then was, on the
17th day of December, 1860, and met the leaders of treason face to face,
and denounced them there, and declared that the laws of the country must
and should be enforced, for which he was hanged in a effigy in the City of
Memphis, in his own State, by the hands of a negro slave, and burned in
effigy, I know not in how many places throughout that portion of the
country—from that time, on during the residue of that session of the
Senate until he returned to Tennessee after the firing upon Fort Sumter,
when he was mobbed in the City of Lynchburg, Virginia—on through the
memorable canvass that followed in Tennessee, till he passed through
Cumberland Gap on his way North to invoke the aid of the Government for
his people—his position of determined and undying hostility to this
rebellion that now ravages the land, has been so well known that it is a
part of the household knowledge of many loyal families in the country. * *
* When he sees your resolutions that you have adopted here by acclamation,
he will respond to them as his sentiments, and I pledge myself by all that
I have to pledge before such an assemblage as this, that whether he be
elected to this high place, or whether he retire to private life, he will
adhere to those sentiments, and to the doctrine of those resolutions, as
long as his reason remains unimpaired, and as long as breath is given him
by his God.

Two ballots were taken on the nomination for Vice President. Mr. Johnson,
whose nomination was known to be desired by Mr. Lincoln and his friends
because of his prominence as a Southern Democrat and an influential
supporter of the Union cause in his State, received 200 votes on the first
ballot, and 404 on the second—the delegations of Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia,
Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Nevada, voting solidly for him—Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Kentucky, Wisconsin and Minnesota, only, being divided.

Thus a Republican and a Democrat were made the nominees of the Convention,
and its non-partisan character found further expression in the first three
Resolutions of the Platform adopted, which were as follows:

Resolved, 1st. That it is the highest duty of every American citizen to
maintain against all their enemies the integrity of the Union and the
paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States; and
that laying aside ALL DIFFERENCES OF POLITICAL OPINION, we pledge
ourselves as Union men, animated by a common sentiment and aiming at a
common object, to do everything in our power to aid the Government in
quelling by force of arms the rebellion now raging against its authority,
and in bringing to the punishment due to their crimes the rebels and
traitors arrayed against it.

2nd. That we approve the determination of the Government of the United
States not to compromise with Rebels, or to offer them any terms of peace,
except such as may be based upon an unconditional surrender of their
hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and that we call upon the Government to
maintain their position, and to prosecute the war with the utmost possible
vigor to the complete suppression of the Rebellion, in full reliance upon
the self-sacrificing patriotism, the heroic valor and the undying devotion
of the American people to their country and its free institutions.

3rd. That as slavery was the cause, and now constitutes the strength, of
this Rebellion, and as it must be, always and everywhere, hostile to the
principles of Republican Government, justice and the National safety
demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic;
and that, while we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamation by which
the Government in its own defense, has aimed a death blow at this gigantic
evil, we are in favor, furthermore, of such an amendment to the
Constitution, to be made by the people in conformity with its provisions,
as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within
the limits or jurisdiction of the United States.

So there seems to be good ground for saying that this was in no sense a
partisan Convention, but, on the contrary, that it was a Convention of the
loyal people of the Northern and Border States, of all parties, who were
ready to lay aside party creeds and partisan considerations, the better to
make common cause for the preservation of the Union.

Before the war, Mr. Johnson had been a Democratic Senator from Tennessee,
and during the war, a gentleman of great influence in support of the Union
cause. So pronounced and effective had been his loyalty that Mr. Lincoln
appointed him a Brigadier General and Military Governor of Tennessee, to
accept which he resigned his seat in the Senate, and so judicious and
successful had been his administration of that office in behalf of the
Union cause and of Union men, that Tennessee was the first of the revolted
States to be readmitted to representation in Congress after the close of
the war.

So it may be said of Mr. Johnson that he was a persistent and consistent
Union Democrat of the old school—for war so long as war might be
necessary to the preservation of the Union—for peace when the war
was ended by the abandonment of the struggle by the insurgents—and
for the restoration of the Union on terms consistent with then existing
conditions—without slavery, which was dead—and the return of
the people of the South to their loyalty to and support of the Government
without debasing exactions—after they had laid down their arms.
Aggressively radical so long as the people of the South continued in
rebellion, he was considerate and merciful so soon as they yielded
themselves to the authority of law and of the Union.

Like Mr. Lincoln, he opposed the idea strenuously advanced by Sumner, and
Stevens, and that wing of the Republican party which they led, that the
States in rebellion had committed suicide and were therefore dead and
without rights, or entitled to consideration, even, in any proposition
that might be adopted for their rehabilitation.

This record very effectually disposes of the criticisms of Mr. Johnson’s
course, so common after he came to the Presidency and growing out of his
disagreements with the extremists of Congress, that he had deserted and
betrayed the Republican party after it had elected him to the Vice
Presidency and thus made him Mr. Lincoln’s immediate successor—the
facts of history showing that neither Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Johnson were
elected by the Republican party as Republicans, nor by the Democratic
party as Democrats, but by a union of all parties of the North
distinctively as a Union party and on a Union ticket and platform for the
preservation of the Union and the destruction of slavery—and when
those purposes were accomplished, the war ended and the Union party
disbanded and was never heard of again. Mr. Lincoln, had he lived, would
doubtless have still been a Republican, as Mr. Johnson was still a
Democrat, as before the war—the purpose of that war and of the
Convention that nominated him having been accomplished—and under no
obligations, especially of a partisan character, to adopt or promote the
partisan purposes relative to reconstruction or otherwise, that came to
actuate the Republican party.

As stated. Mr..Johnson had, during the later years of the war, been acting
as Military Governor of Tennessee, of which State he had been a citizen
nearly all his life. His administration had been so efficient that
Tennessee was practically restored to the Union at the close of the War,
and so satisfactory to the loyal people of the country, that though an old
line Democrat and a Southern man, Mr. Johnson’s nomination by the National
Convention for Vice President on the ticket with Mr. Lincoln for
President, was, as has been shown, logical and consistent. Though a
pronounced State Rights Democrat and a citizen of a Southern State in
rebellion, he regarded himself as a citizen of the United States, to which
he owed his first allegiance. State Rights meant to him, the rights of the
States IN the Union, and not OUT of the Union.

In evidence of the confidence and esteem in which Mr. Johnson was
generally held by those who knew him and knew of the valuable services he
had rendered the cause of the Union, the following letter from Mr.
Stanton, then secretary of War under Mr. Lincoln, is here reproduced. It
was written to Mr. Johnson on his tender to the War Office of his
resignation of the Military Governorship of Tennessee to accept the office
of Vice President of the United States:

War Department, Washington, March 3, 1865.

Sir:—This Department has accepted your resignation as Brigadier
General and Military Governor of Tennessee. Permit me on this occasion to
tender to you the sincere thanks of this Department for your patriotic and
able services during the eventful period through which you have exercised
the highest trust committed to your charge. In one of the darkest hours of
the great struggle for National existence, against rebellious foes, the
Government called you from the comparatively safe and easy duties of civil
life to place you in front of the enemy and in a position of personal toil
and danger, perhaps more hazardous than was encountered by any citizen or
military officer of the United States. With patriotic promptness you
assumed the post, and maintained it under circumstances of unparalleled
trial, until recent events have brought safety and deliverance to your
State and to the integrity of the Constitutional Union, for which you so
long and so gallantly periled all that is dear to man on earth. That you
may be spared to enjoy the new honors and perform the high duties to which
you have been called by the people of the United States, is the sincere
wish of one who in every official and personal relation has found you
worthy of the confidence of the Government and the honor and esteem of
your fellow citizens.

Your obedient servant,

Edwin M. Stanton.

His Excellency, Andrew Johnson, Vice-President elect.

CHAPTER III. — MR. JOHNSON’S ACCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY.

THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA.

Mr. Johnson succeeded to the Presidential office on the death of Mr.
Lincoln, April 15th, 1865. The conditions of the time were extraordinary.
The war, so far as operations in the field were concerned, was at an end.
The armies of the rebellion had been vanquished and practically disbanded.
The States lately in revolt were prostrate at the feet of the conqueror,
powerless for further resistance. But the general rejoicing over the happy
termination of the strife had been inexpressibly saddened by the brutal
assassination of the President who had so wisely and successfully
conducted his great office and administered all its powers to the
attainment of that happy result, and it was not unnatural or strange that
the shocking event should greatly re-inflame the passions of the strife
that the joys of peace had at last well nigh laid.

It was an especial misfortune that he who had so wisely and safely
conducted the Nation through the conflict of arms and had foreshadowed his
beneficent measures of peace and the restoration of the shattered
Republic, was taken away as he and the Nation stood at last at the open
door of successful rehabilitation on a broader and grander basis than had
ever been reached in all previous efforts of man at Nation building. From
day to day he had watched, with his hand on the key-board, the development
and trend of events. They had resulted as he had planned, and he had
become the most conspicuous, the best loved, and the most masterful of
living man in the control of the future. In his death the Union lost its
most sagacious and best trusted leader, and, the South its ablest, truest,
and wisest friend.

It was under these circumstances that Mr. Johnson came to the Presidency
as Mr. Lincoln’s successor—without a moment of warning or an hour of
preparation for the discharge of the crushing responsibilities that had so
suddenly fallen to his direction.

Actuated, doubtless, and not unnaturally, by feelings of resentment over
the manner and circumstances of Mr. Lincoln’s death, Mr. Johnson at first
gave expression to a spirit of hostility toward the leaders of the
rebellion, and foreshadowed a somewhat rigorous policy in his methods of
Reconstruction in accordance with the views of the leaders of the
Republican party in Congress who had differed with Mr. Lincoln on that
subject; but later on, under the advice of his Cabinet—notably, it
is understood, of Mr. Seward—and under the responsibility of action—his
views became modified, till in time, it is not impossible, but by no means
certain, that he went even beyond the humane, natural and logical views
and purposes of Mr. Lincoln in that regard.

This did not comport with the purposes of the Congressional faction that
had opposed Mr. Lincoln’s plans, which faction, under the pressure of the
general indignation over his murder, quickly rose to the absolute control
of Congress. Mr. Lincoln no longer stood in their way, and Mr. Johnson was
then comparatively unknown to the great mass of the dominant party, and
therefore at a corresponding disadvantage in the controversy. He had risen
step by step to his new position from the humblest walks of Southern life,
and each succeeding step to advancement had been made through personal
conflicts such as few men in public life in this or any other country had
ever borne. It was not unnatural, therefore, that he should have faith in
himself, and in the superiority of his judgment, or little in that of
others—and more especially when he was approached by those who had
opposed Mr. Lincoln’s plans in an attitude of dictation, and with
suggestions and unsought advice as to the course he should pursue in the
then absorbing question of the restoration of the States lately in
rebellion—himself a citizen of one of those States, and for the
preservation of which, as a State in the Union, he had staked his life.

As with Mr. Lincoln, so with Mr. Johnson—the first thing to be done,
or sought, was the restoration of the Union by the return of the States in
rebellion to their allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the country.
Mr. Lincoln, to use one of his characteristic Western phrases, had “blazed
the way,” and Mr. Johnson took up that trail. A few weeks after his
inauguration he issued a Proclamation outlining a plan for the
reorganization of the State of North Carolina. That paper was confessedly
designed as a general plan and basis for Executive action in the
restoration of all the seceded States. Mr. Lincoln had, of course,
foreseen that that subject would come up very shortly, in the then
condition of affairs in the South, and it had therefore been considered in
his later Cabinet meetings, as stated, more especially at the meeting
immediately preceding his death, and a plan very similar to that
afterwards determined upon by Mr. Johnson, if not identically so, was at
that meeting finally adopted. That plan was set out in the North Carolina
Proclamation, the essential features and general character of which became
so conspicuous a factor in the subsequent controversies between the
President and Congress. It was as follows:

Whereas: The Fourth Section of the Fourth Article of the Constitution of
the United States declares that the United States shall guarantee to every
State in the Union a Republican form of Government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion and domestic violence; and whereas, the President
of the United States is, by the Constitution, made Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy, as well as chief civil executive officer of the United
States, and is bound by solemn oath faithfully to execute the office of
President of the United States, and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed; and whereas, the rebellion which has been waged by a
portion of the people of the United States against the properly
constituted authority of the Government thereof in the most violent and
revolting form, but whose organized and armed forces have now been almost
entirely overcome has, in its revolutionary progress, deprived the people
of the State of North Carolina of all civil government: and whereas, it
becomes necessary and proper to carry out and enforce the obligations of
the United States to the people of North Carolina in securing them it, the
enjoyment of a republican form of Government:

Now, therefore, in obedience to the high and solemn duties imposed upon me
by the Constitution of the United States, and for the purpose of enabling
the loyal people of said State to organize a State Government; whereby
justice may be established, domestic tranquility insured, I, Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, do hereby appoint William W. Holden
Provisional Governor of the State of North Carolina, whose duty it shall
be, at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper for convening it Convention,
composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion of the people of the
said State who are loyal all to the United States and no others, for the
purpose of altering or amending the Constitution thereof; and with
authority to exercise, within the limits of said State, all the powers
necessary and proper to enable such loyal people of the State of North
Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the
Federal Government, and to present such a republican form of State
Government as will entitle the said State to the guarantee of the United
States therefor, and its people to protection by the United States against
invasion, insurrection and domestic violence: PROVIDED, that in any
election that may be hereafter held for choosing delegates to any State
Convention as aforesaid, no person shall be qualified as an elector, or
shall be eligible as a member of such Convention, unless he shall have
previously taken and subscribed to the oath of amnesty, as set forth in
the President’s Proclamation of May 29th, A. D. 1865, and is a voter
qualified as prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the State of North
Carolina in force immediately before the 20th of May, A. D. 1861, the date
of the so-called ordinance of secession; and the said Convention, when
convened, or the legislature that may be thereafter assembled, will
prescribe the qualifications of electors, and the eligibility of persons
to hold office under the Constitution and laws of the State—a power
the people of the several States comprising the Federal Union have
rightfully exercised from the origin of the Government to the present
time. And I do hereby direct:

First—That the Military Commander of the Department, and all
officers in the Military and Naval service, aid and assist the said
Provisional Governor in carrying into effect this Proclamation, and they
are enjoined to abstain from, in any way, hindering, impeding, or
discouraging the loyal people from the organization of a State Government
as herein authorized.

Second—That the Secretary of State proceed to put in force all laws
of the United States, the administration whereof belongs to the State
Department, applicable to the geographical limits aforesaid.

Third—That the Secretary of the Treasury proceed to nominate for
appointment assessors of taxes, and collectors of customs and revenue, and
such other officers of the Treasury Department as are authorized by law,
and put in execution the revenue laws of the United States within the
provisional limits aforesaid. In making appointments, the preference shall
be given to qualified loyal persons residing in the districts where their
respective duties are to be performed. But if suitable residents of the
district shall not be found, then persons residing in other States or
districts shall be appointed.

Fourth—That the Postmaster General proceed to establish postoffices
and post routes, and put into execution the postal laws of the United
States within the said State, giving to loyal residents the preference of
appointments: but if suitable residents are not found, then to appoint
agents, etc., from other States.

Fifth—That District Judges for the judicial districts in which North
Carolina is included, proceed to hold courts within said State, in
accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress. The Attorney
General will instruct the proper officers to libel, and bring to judgment,
confiscation and sale, property subject to confiscation, and enforce the
administration of justice within said State in all matters within the
cognizance and jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.

Sixth—That the Secretary of the Navy take possession of all public
property belonging to the Navy Department within said geographical limits,
and put in operation all Acts of Congress in relation to naval affairs
having application to said State.

Seventh—That the Secretary of the Interior put in force all laws
relating to the Interior Department applicable to the geographical limits
aforesaid.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this 29th day of May, in the year, of our
Lord 1865, and of the Independence of the United States the 89th.

By the President: Andrew Johnson. William H. Seward. Secretary of State.

North Carolina was the first of the revolted States to which this
identical plan of reconstruction, or reorganization, was applied by Mr.
Johnson. Its application to the several States then lately in revolt, was
continued till the meeting of Congress in the following December, 1865.

On this matter Mr. Johnson, himself, testifies in his communication to the
Senate in 1867, relating to the removal of Mr. Stanton, that “This grave
subject (Reconstruction) had engaged the attention of Mr. Lincoln in the
last days of his life, and the plan according to which it was to be
managed had been prepared and was ready for adoption. A leading feature of
that plan was that it was to be carried out by Executive authority. * * *
The first business, transacted in the Cabinet after I became President was
this unfinished business of my predecessor. A plan or scheme of
reconstruction had been prepared for Mr. Lincoln by Mr. Stanton. It was
approved, and at the earliest moment practicable was applied, in the form
of a proclamation, to the State of North Carolina, and afterwards became
the basis of action in turn for the other States.”

Mr. Stanton also testified before the House Impeachment Committee of 1867,
that he had “entertained no doubt of the authority of the President to
take measures for the reorganization of the rebel States on the plan
proposed, during the vacation of Congress, and agreed in the plan
specified in the proclamation in the case of North Carolina.”

In the first attempt to impeach the President, in 1867, Mr. Johnson’s
method of Reconstruction was the most conspicuous feature of the
prosecution. It was insisted by the extremists that it was a departure
from Mr. Lincoln’s plan—an unwarranted assumption of authority by
Mr. Johnson—that its purpose was the recognition of the people of
the South as American citizens with the rights of such, and even as an act
not far removed from treason. In reference to this action of the
President, General Grant was called before the Committee and testified as
follows:

Question: I wish to know whether, at or about the time of the war being
ended, you advised the President that it was, in your judgment, best to
extend a liberal policy towards the people of the South, and to restore as
speedily as possible the fraternal relations that existed prior to the war
between the sections?

Answer: I know that immediately after the close of the rebellion there was
a very fine feeling manifested in the South, and I thought we ought to
take advantage of it as soon as possible.

Ques. I understood you to say that Mr. Lincoln had inaugurated a policy
intended to restore these governments?

Ans. Yes Sir.

Ques. You were present when the subject was brought before the Cabinet?

Ans. I was present, I think, twice before the assassination of Mr.
Lincoln, when a plan was read.

Ques. I want to know whether the plan adopted by Mr. Johnson was
substantially the plan which had been inaugurated by Mr. Lincoln as the
basis for his future action.

Ans. Yes sir: substantially. I do not know but that it was verbatim the
same.

Ques. I suppose the very paper of Mr. Lincoln was the one acted on?

Ans. I should think so. I think that the very paper which I heard read
twice while Mr. Lincoln was President, was the one which was carried right
through.

Ques. What paper was that?

Ans. The North Carolina Proclamation.

In additional testimony that Mr. Johnson was endeavoring to carry out Mr.
Lincoln’s methods of reconstruction, the following extracts from a speech
by Gov. O. P. Morton, of Indiana, delivered at Richmond, that State, Sept.
29th, 1865, are here inserted:

An impression has gotten abroad in the North that Mr. Johnson has devised
some new policy by which improper facilities are granted for the
restoration of the rebel States, and that he is presenting improperly and
unnecessarily hurrying forward the work of reconstruction, and that he is
offering improper facilities for restoring those who have been engaged in
the rebellion to the possession of their civil and political rights.

It is one of my purposes here this evening to show that so far as his
policy of amnesty and reconstruction is concerned, he has absolutely
presented nothing new, but that he has simply presented, and is simply
continuing THE POLICY WHICH MR. LINCOLN PRESENTED TO THE NATION ON THE 8TH
OF DECEMBER, 1863. Mr. Johnson’s policy differs from Mr. Lincoln’s in some
restrictions it contains, which Mr. Lincoln’s did not contain. His plan of
reconstruction is absolutely and simply that of Mr. Lincoln, nothing more
or less, with one difference only, that Mr. Lincoln required that
one-tenth of the people of the disloyal States should be willing to
embrace his plan of reconstruction, whereas Mr. Johnson says nothing about
the number; but, so far as it has been acted upon yet, it has been done by
a number much greater than one-tenth. * * * Their plans of amnesty and
reconstruction cannot be distinguished from each other except in the
particulars already mentioned, that Mr. Johnson proposed to restrict
certain persons from taking the oath, unless they have a special pardon
from him, whom Mr. Lincoln permitted to come forward and take the oath
without it. * * * That was Mr. Lincoln’s policy at the time he was
nominated for re-election by the Union Convention at Baltimore, last
summer; and in that convention the party sustained him and strongly
endorsed his whole policy, of which this was a prominent part. MR. LINCOLN
WAS TRIUMPHANTLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY RE-ELECTED UPON THAT POLICY.

In his last annual message to Congress, December, 1864, he again brings
forward this same policy of his, and presents it to the Nation.

Again, on the 12th of April, 1865, only two days before his death, he
referred to and presented this policy of amnesty and reconstruction. That
speech may be called his last speech, his dying words to his people. It
was after Richmond had been evacuated. It was the day after they had
received the news of Lee’s surrender. Washington City was illuminated. A
large crowd came in front of the White House and Mr. Lincoln spoke to them
from one of the windows. He referred to the organization of Louisiana
under his plan of amnesty and reconstruction, and in speaking of it he
gave the history of his policy. He said:

In my annual message of December, 1863, and accompanying the Proclamation,
I presented a plan of reconstruction, as the phrase goes, which I promised
if adopted by any State, would be acceptable and sustained by the
Executive Government of this Nation. I distinctively stated that this was
a plan which might possibly be acceptable, and also distinctively
protested that the Executive claimed no right to say when or whether
members should be admitted to seats in Congress from such States.

The new constitution of Louisiana, (said Mr. Lincoln) declaring
emancipation for the whole State, practically applies the Proclamation to
that part previously exempted. It does not adopt apprenticeship for freed
people, and is silent, as it could not well be otherwise, about the
admission of members to Congress. As it applied to Louisiana, every member
of the Cabinet approved the plan of the message. * * * Now, we find Mr.
Lincoln, just before his death; referring in warm and strong terms to his
policy of amnesty and reconstruction, and giving it his endorsement;
giving to the world that which had never been given before—the
history of that plan and policy—stating that it had been presented
and endorsed by every member of that able and distinguished Cabinet of
1863. Mr. Lincoln may be said to have died holding out to the Nation his
policy of amnesty and reconstruction. It was held out by him at the very
time the rebels laid down their arms. Mr. Lincoln died by the hand of an
assassin and Mr. Johnson came into power. He took Mr. Lincoln’s Cabinet as
he had left it and he took Mr. Lincoln’s policy of amnesty and
reconstruction as he had left it, and as he had presented it to the world
only two days before his death. MR. JOHNSON HAS HONESTLY AND FAITHFULLY
ATTEMPTED TO ADMINISTER THAT POLICY, which had been bequeathed by that man
around whose grave a whole world has gathered as mourners. I refer to
these for the purpose of showing that Mr. Johnson’s policy is not a new
one, but that he is simply carrying out a policy left to him by his
lamented predecessor—a policy that had been ENDORSED BY THE WHOLE
NATION IN THE REELECTION OF MR. LINCOLN.

Again Gov. Morton said:

An impression has gotten abroad in the North that Mr. Johnson has devised
some new policy by which improper facilities are granted for the
restoration of the rebel States and that he is presenting improperly and
unnecessarily hurrying forward the work of reconstruction, and that he is
offering improper facilities for restoring those who have been engaged in
rebellion, to the possession of their civil and political rights. It is
one of my purposes here this evening to show that so far as his policy of
amnesty and reconstruction is concerned, he has absolutely presented
nothing new, that he has simply presented, and is SIMPLY CONTINUING THE
POLICY WHICH MR. LINCOLN PRESENTED TO THE NATION ON THE 8TH OF DECEMBER,
1863.

The following are extracts from Mr. Johnson’s Message to Congress, in
December, 1865, on the re-assembling of that body—the first session
of the 39th Congress. Indicating, as it did, a policy of reconstruction at
variance with the views of the Congressional leaders, it may be said to
have been another incident out of which arose the conditions that finally,
led to his impeachment. Mr. Johnson said:

I found the States suffering from the effects of a civil war. Resistance
to the General Government appeared to have exhausted itself. The United
States had recovered possession of its forts and arsenals, and their
armies were in the occupation of every State which had attempted to
secede. Whether the territory within the limits of those States should be
held as conquered territory, under Military authority emanating from the
President as head of the Army, was the first question that presented
itself for decision. Military Governments, established for an indefinite
period, would have offered no security for the early suppression of
discontent; would have divided the people into the vanquishers and the
vanquished; and would have envenomed hatred rather than have restored
affection. Once established, no precise limit to their continuance was
conceivable. They would have occasioned an incalculable and exhausting
expense. * * * The powers of patronage and rule which would have been
exercised, under the President, over a vast and populous and naturally
wealthy region, are greater than, under a less extreme necessity, I should
be willing to entrust to any one man. They are such as, for myself, I
should never, unless on occasion of great emergency, consent to exercise.
The wilful use of such powers, if continued through a period of years,
would have endangered the purity of the General Administration and the
liberty of the States which remained loyal. * * * The policy of military
rule over conquered territory would have implied that the States whose
inhabitants may have taken part in the rebellion had, by the act of those
inhabitants, ceased to exist. But the true theory is, that ALL PRETENDED
ACTS OF SECESSION WERE, FROM THE BEGINNING, NULL AND VOID. THE STATES CAN
NOT COMMIT TREASON, nor screen the individual citizens who may have
committed treason, any more than they can make valid treaties, or engage
in lawful commerce with any foreign power. The States attempting to secede
placed themselves in a condition where their vitality was IMPAIRED, BUT
NOT EXTINGUISHED—THEIR FUNCTIONS SUSPENDED, BUT NOT DESTROYED.

Reports had been circulated in the North, and found ready credence with a
great many, that the people of the South were as a rule, insubordinate and
indisposed to accept the changed conditions there, and that
insubordination and turmoil were the rule. To ascertain the facts in this
regard, during the later months of 1865 Mr. Johnson commissioned General
Grant and others to make a tour of inspection and investigation of the
condition of affairs in the Southern States, especially as to their
disposition with reference to the acceptance by the people of those
States, of their changed relations to the Union, and to report to him the
results of their observations.

On the 10th of December, 1865, on motion of Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania,
the following resolution was adopted by the Senate:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby
requested to furnish the Senate information of the state of that portion
of the Union lately in rebellion; whether the rebellion has been
suppressed and the United States put again in possession of the States in
which it existed; whether the United States courts are restored, post
offices re-established and the revenue collected; and also whether the
people of those States have reorganized their State governments, and
whether they are yielding obedience to the laws and Government of the
United States. And at the same time furnish to the Senate copies of such
reports as he may have received from such officers or agents appointed to
visit that portion of the Union.

December 19th, 1865, in response to this resolution of the Senate, the
President transmitted the following Message to the Senate inclosing Gen.
Grant’s Report:

In reply to the resolution adopted by the Senate on the 12th inst., I have
the honor to state that the rebellion waged by a portion of the people
against the properly constituted authorities of the Government of the
United States has been suppressed; that the United States are in
possession of every State in which the insurrection existed; and that, as
far as could be done, the courts of the United States have been restored,
postoffices re-established, and steps taken to put into effective
operation the revenue laws of the country. As the result of the measures
instituted by the Executive, with the view of inducing a resumption of the
functions of the States comprehended in the inquiry of the Senate, the
people in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, have reorganized their respective
State Governments, and ‘are yielding their obedience to the laws and
Government of the United States’ with more willingness and greater
promptitude than under the circumstances could reasonably have been
anticipated. The proposed amendment to the Constitution, providing for the
abolition of slavery forever within the limits of the country, has been
ratified by each one of those States, with the exception of Mississippi,
from which no official information has yet been received; and in nearly
all of them measures have been adopted or are now pending, to confer upon
freedmen rights and privileges which are essential to their comfort,
protection and security. In Florida and Texas, the people are making
considerable progress in restoring their State Governments, and no doubt
is entertained that they will at the Federal Government. In that portion
of the Union lately in rebellion, the aspect of affairs is more promising
than, in view of all the circumstances, could have been expected. The
people throughout the entire South evince a laudable desire to renew their
allegiance to the Government, and to repair the devastations of war by a
prompt and cheerful return to peaceful pursuits. An abiding faith is
entertained that their actions will conform to their professions, and
that, in acknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the
United States, their loyalty will be given unreservedly to the Government;
whose leniency they cannot fail to appreciate, and whose fostering care
will soon restore them to a condition of prosperity. It is true, that in
some of the States the demoralizing effects of war are to be seen in
occasional disorders; but these are local in character, not frequent in
occurrence, and are really disappearing as the authority of the civil law
is extended and sustained. * * * From all the information in my
possession, and from that which I have recently derived from the most
reliable authority, I am induced to cherish the belief that sectional
animosity is surely and rapidly merging itself into a spirit of
nationality, and that representation, connected with a properly adjusted
system of taxation, will result in a harmonious restoration of the
relations of the States and the National Union.

Andrew Johnson.

The following is General Grant’s Report transmitted to Congress with the
foregoing Message:

Headquarters Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C., Dec. 18,
1865.

Sir:—In reply to your note of the 16th inst., requesting a report
from me giving such information as I may be possessed, coming within the
scope of the inquiries made by the Senate of the United States, in their
resolution of the 12th inst., I have the honor to submit the following:

With your approval, and also that of the Honorable Secretary of War, I
left Washington City on the 27th of last month for the purpose of making a
tour of inspection through some of the Southern States, or States lately
in rebellion, and to see what changes were necessary to be made in the
disposition of the Military forces of the country; how these forces could
be reduced and expenses curtailed, etc., and to learn as far as possible,
the feelings and intentions of the citizens of those States towards the
General Government.

The State of Virginia being so accessible to Washington City, and
information from this quarter therefore being readily obtained, I hastened
through the State without conversing or meeting with any of its citizens.
In Raleigh, North Carolina, I spent one day; in Charleston, South
Carolina, I spent two days; Savannah and Augusta, Georgia, each one day.
Both in traveling and while stopping, I saw much and conversed freely with
the citizens of those States, as well as with officers of the Army who
have been stationed among them. The following are the conclusions come to
by me:

I am satisfied that the mass of the thinking men of the South accept the
present situation of affairs in good faith. The questions which have
heretofore divided the sentiments of the people of the two sections—Slavery
and State Rights, or the right of a State to secede from the Union—they
regard as having been settled forever by the highest tribunal—arms—that
man can resort to. I was pleased to learn from the leading men whom I met,
that they not only accepted the decision arrived at, as final, but that
now, when the smoke of battle has cleared away, and time has been given
for reflection, this decision has been a fortunate one for the whole
country, they receiving like benefits from it with those who opposed them
in the field and in council.

Four years of war, during which law was executed only at the point of the
bayonet throughout the States in rebellion, have left the people possibly
in a condition not to yield that ready obedience to civil authority the
American people have been in the habit of generally yielding. This would
render the presence of small garrisons throughout those States necessary
until such time as labor returns to its proper channels and civil
authority is fully established. I did not meet anyone, either those
holding places under the Government or citizens of the Southern States,
who think it practicable to withdraw the Military from the South at
present. The white and black mutually require the protection of the
General Government. There is such universal acquiescence in the authority
of the General Government throughout the portions of the country visited
by me, that the mere presence of a military force, without regard to
numbers, is sufficient to maintain order. The good of the country and
economy require that the force kept in the interior where there are many
freedmen (elsewhere in the Southern States than at forts upon the sea
coast, no more is necessary,) should all be white troops. The reasons for
this are obvious without mentioning any of them. The presence of black
troops, lately slaves, demoralizes labor both by their advice and by
furnishing in their camps a resort for freedmen for long distances around.
White troops generally excite no opposition, and therefore a small number
of them can maintain order in a given district. Colored troops must be
kept in bodies sufficient to defend themselves. It is not thinking men who
would use violence towards any class of troops sent among them by the
General Government, but the ignorant in some cases might, and the late
slave seems to be imbued with the idea that the property of his late
master should of right belong to him, or at least should have no
protection from the colored soldiers. There is danger of collision being
brought on by such causes.

My observations lead me to the conclusion that the citizens of the
Southern States are anxious to return to self government within the Union
as soon as possible; that while reconstructing they want and require
protection from the Government; that they are in earnest in wishing to do
what they think is required by the Government, not humiliating to them as
citizens, and that if such is pointed out they would pursue it in good
faith. It is to be regretted that there cannot be a greater commingling at
this time between the citizens of the two sections, and particularly with
THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH THE LAWMAKING POWER.

I did not give, the operation of the Freedmen’s Bureau that attention I
would have done if more time had been at my disposal. Conversations on the
subject, however, with officers connected with the Bureau, led me to think
that in some of the States its affairs have not been conducted with good
judgment and economy, and that the belief, widely spread among the
freedmen of the Southern States, that the land of their former masters
will, at least in part, be divided among them, has come from the agents of
this Bureau. This belief is seriously interfering with the willingness of
the freedmen to make contracts for the coming year. In some form the
Freedmen’s Bureau is an absolute necessity until civil law is established
and enforced, securing to the freedmen their rights and full protection.
At present, however, it is independent of the Military establishment of
the country, and seems to be operated by the different agents of the
Bureau according to their individual notions, every where. Gen. Howard,
the able head of the Bureau, made friends by the just and fair
instructions and advice he gave; but the complaint in South Carolina was
that, when he left, things went on as before. Many, perhaps the majority
of the agents of the Bureau, advised the freedmen that by their industry
they must expect to live. To this end they endeavor to secure employment
for them: to see that both contracting parties comply with their
agreements. In some instances; I am sorry to say, the freedman’s mind does
not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has a right to live
without care or provision for the future. The effect of the belief in the
division of lands is idleness and accumulation in camps, towns, and
cities. In such cases, I think it will be found that vice and disease will
tend to the extermination, or great reduction of the colored race. It
cannot be expected that the opinions held by men at the South can be
changed in a day, and therefore the freedmen require for a few years not
only laws to protect them, but the fostering care of those who will give
them good counsel and in whom they can rely.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General.

This report was at once vigorously denounced in and out of Congress, by
the extremists. Mr. Sumner characterized it in the Senate, as a
“whitewashing report.” The standing of General Grant in the country at
large, however, was such that few had the indiscretion to attack him
openly.

The controlling element of the party which had elected Lincoln and
Johnson, had acquiesced for a time in the plan of reconstruction
foreshadowed by Mr. Lincoln and adopted by Mr. Johnson, but during the
summer of 1865, frictions developed between Mr. Johnson and those who on
Mr. Lincoln’s death had assumed the leadership in the work of
reconstruction and other matters of administration, came to take the
opposite ground, from the first occupied by Sumner and other extremists in
Congress—that the States lately in rebellion had destroyed
themselves by their own act of war, and had thereby forfeited all the
rights of Statehood and were but conquered provinces, subject solely to
the will of the conqueror.

From that point their ways parted and widened from month to month, till
bitter hostility, political and personal, came to mark even their official
intercourse.

Mr. Johnson was practically unknown to the great mass of the people of the
North till he succeeded to the Presidency. He was in no sense regarded as
or assumed to be the leader of the dominant party; while those who on Mr.
Lincoln’s death became leaders of the dominant party in opposition to Mr.
Johnson’s administration and policies, were widely known and of long
public experience, and had correspondingly the confidence of their party.

So, in the strife that ensued, as it became embittered with the lapse of
time, Mr. Johnson was at great disadvantage, and made little or no
headway, but rather lost ground as the controversy progressed. His
moderate, conservative views, radically expressed, in regard to what
should be the methods of reconstruction and the restoration of the Union,
found little favor with the mass of the veterans of the Union armies who
had but lately returned from the victorious fields of the South, their
blood not yet cooled after the fury and heat of the strife while to many,
who had witnessed the horrors of war at a safe distance, with the
cessation of hostilities in the field, to which they had been only anxious
spectators, became suddenly enthused over issues that others had fought
out in battle, and vigorously vicious towards Mr. Johnson for presuming to
treat the conquered people of the South as American citizens and entitled
to the rights of such, after having laid down their arms and peacefully
returned to their homes and their respective callings.

This temper, permeating, as it did, the dominant party of practically
every Northern State, was not unstintingly reflected upon the National
Capitol in the return to Congress of a large majority in both Houses, of
men who sympathized with and reflected back again upon their constituents
the most extreme views as to what should be the policy of the Government
towards the South.

These views characterized the legislation of the time. Partisan rancor was
unbridled, and found expression not only in coercive legislation of
various grades of severity, but in placing the Southern States generally
under almost absolute military control, and in the practical abrogation of
the common rights of American citizenship in most of them.

Quite every act of this sort of legislation was passed over the official
protest of the President, and each of these protests seemed but to add
emphasis to each succeeding act of Congress in that line, till it seemed
that there could be no end to the strife, so long as Mr. Johnson remained
in the Presidential office.

The ostensible basis of the disagreement which in a few months after the
accession of Mr. Johnson to the Presidency began to develop between
himself and the Republican leaders in Congress, was the plan of
reconstruction put in operation by him during the recess of Congress that
year, 1865, and outlined in his North Carolina Proclamation. It availed
not, that that plan had been adopted originally by Mr. Lincoln a few days
before his death—that it had been concurred in by his entire Cabinet
and would undoubtedly have been carried out successfully by him had he
lived that plan was made the ground of criticism of Mr. Johnson by the
extreme party element in control of Congress, which persistently accused
him of having abandoned the plan initiated by Mr. Lincoln, and of setting
up another of his own, for purely personal and ambitious purposes, and to
the detriment of the peace of the country.

Mr. Johnson may have been opinionated and headstrong, a characteristic of
a great many people of strong convictions of duty and purpose; while the
overwhelming numerical strength of the dominant party in and out of
Congress made it seemingly indifferent, reckless and inconsiderate of the
convictions, as of the rights and prerogatives of the Chief Executive
treating him more as a clerk whose sole duty it was to register without
suggestion the decrees of Congress.

That Mr. Lincoln, had he lived, would have pursued much the same policy of
reconstruction, is clearly indicated by the established fact that he had
determined to adopt precisely the initial measures thereto which Mr.
Johnson did inaugurate and attempt to carry out. But Mr. Lincoln’s
superior ability in statecraft, his rare tact and knowledge of men, and
his capacity for moulding and directing public opinion, seeming to follow
where he actually led, would doubtless have secured a more favorable
result. And more than all else, it can scarcely be doubted, that the
unbounded confidence of the people in his patriotism and capacity to
direct public affairs, would have enabled him to dictate terms of
reconstruction strictly on the lines he had marked out, and would have
commanded the general support of the country, regardless of partisan
divisions, notwithstanding the well known fact that at the time of his
death there were unmistakable indications of alienation from him of the
extreme element of his party because of his conservative views as to the
proper methods of reconstruction.

Meantime, in the effort to hamper the President, as far as it was possible
for Congress to do, the Tenure-of-Office Act was passed, early in 1867.
The ostensible purpose of that Act was to restrict the authority of the
President in the selection of his Cabinet advisers, and his power over
appointments generally. Its specific purpose, at least so far as the House
of Representatives was concerned, and measurably so in the Senate, was to
prevent his removal of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, with the
manifest if not avowed intent, as the sequel shows, to make that Secretary
not only independent of his chief, but also to make him the immediate
instrument of Congress in whatever disposition of the Army, or of military
affairs generally relating to the government of the Southern States, the
majority of Congress might dictate. In a word, the Congress, in that Act,
virtually assumed, or attempted to assume, that control of the Army which
the Constitution vests on the President.

The first effort to impeach the President, in 1867, was based upon a
general accusation of high crimes and misdemeanors without literal
specification. The second, in 1868, was based upon his alleged violation
of the Tenure-of-Office Act, in the removal of Mr. Stanton.

While it is undoubted, as already shown, that Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnson
were in accord as to the methods to be adopted for the restoration of the
revolted States, it was Mr. Johnson’s misfortune that he had not Mr.
Lincoln’s capacity for so great and so peculiar a task; though a gentleman
of proven patriotism, ability, of a kindly, genial nature, and with record
of valuable public service. Hampered by his lack of political finesse and
intricate knowledge of state-craft, and in view of the conditions of that
time, and the people with whom he had to deal, it was obvious from the
outset that the result of the controversy could hardly be otherwise than
disastrous to him. Mr. Lincoln would undoubtedly have been met by the same
character of opposition, and from the same source. But there would have
been the appearance at least of mutual concession, and while the
APPEARANCE of concession would have been on Mr. Lincoln’s side, the actual
concession, so far as essentials were involved, would have been on the
other.

Mr. Johnson was a Democrat of pronounced type and profound convictions,
and in no sense did he depart from his faith. He belonged to the school of
Jackson and Jefferson. He had not the electric intuitions and impetuous
will of the former, nor the culture and genius of the latter. He adhered
more religiously to the letter of the Constitution than either. To him it
was the one law of supreme obligation, that never ceased its guarantees.
As fittingly expressed by one of his Counsel, Mr. Groesbeck, in the trial:
“He was not learned and scholarly—not a man of many ideas or of much
speculation—but the Constitution had been the study of his life, and
by a law of the mind he was only the truer to that which he did know.”

As had Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Johnson keenly appreciated the importance of the
people of the South returning at once to the Union, free and independent
American citizens, clothed with all the rights, privileges and obligations
common to such. In his Cabinet Councils, and to a degree supreme in that
board sat William H. Seward, as he had throughout Mr. Lincoln’s
administration, than whom the Republic has produced no wiser, more
sagacious, or patriotic statesman. He gave the subject his intense
devotion in the maturity of his great powers.

There too, sat Secretary Welles, another of Mr. Lincoln’s advisers, and a
devoted friend of the Constitution and the sanctity of the Union. Each of
these men, thoroughly patriotic, and efficient, and untiring in the
administration of their respective Departments, had commenced with the
deluge of blood, and they now hoped to crown their official careers by a
triumphant peace that would Honor their lives and glorify the Nation.
These men had a salutary influence over Mr. Johnson, and greatly modified
the asperities of his disposition.

Mr. Johnson believed, as did Mr. Lincoln, that the revolted States were
still States of the Union—that all the pretended acts of secession
were null and void, and that the loyal people therein had the right to
reconstruct their State Governments on the basis proposed to them first by
Mr. Lincoln, and after him by Mr. Johnson, and thus the right to
representation in the General Government.

It was upon this question that parties divided during the reconstruction
period. Mr. Lincoln, foreseeing danger in such a division, was anxious to
bring those States into such relation that the people generally would
consider them as virtually in the Union, without reference to the abstract
question. It was with this view, undoubtedly, that he advocated the
admission of Members and Senators whenever one-tenth of the voting
population of 1860 should organize State Governments and ask for
readmission. He would not only not countenance, but repelled the doctrine
of “State Suicide,” as it was called, and which came to characterize the
methods of reconstruction subsequently adopted.

It is true, that on many occasions Mr. Johnson charged that the Congress
was only a Congress of part of the States, and that its acts were
therefore without validity. Yet he continued to execute those laws, and
what to him was a very unpleasant duty, the law which set aside the State
Governments organized under his own direction, so that notwithstanding his
violent denunciations of the acts of Congress, and his personal opinions,
he did not presume to act upon them. Angry and undignified language was
uttered on both sides. Many of his speeches were violent and in bad taste
and temper. So were a great many speeches uttered by senators and members
of the House, and those bodies too often acted upon them.

It is therefore but repeating recorded history to say that Mr. Johnson was
earnestly seeking to carry out Mr. Lincoln’s plan of reconstruction, which
was upon consultation with his entire Cabinet, more especially with Mr.
Stanton, adopted by him as the basis for the restoration of the revolted
States.

Yet, with these facts of record, that action was afterwards assailed by
the Republican leaders in and out of Congress, who assumed to have become
Mr. Lincoln’s executors in the work of reconstruction, as not only an
abandonment of the plan instituted by him, but a surrender of the issues
fought out and the results accomplished by the war just closed
notwithstanding very many of these critics of Mr. Johnson had but a few
months before criticised Mr. Lincoln with quite equal severity for his
suggestion of this same method of restoration.

Nor will it suffice to say that, though professing submission and loyalty,
the people of the South were still hostile to the Union, and that there
was no safety there for Union men. It is true that there came to be
violence and disorder there upon the rejection by Congress of Mr.
Johnson’s plan of restoration.

These were the inevitable results of the conditions. There would also have
been disorder and violence in the North and to a far greater degree, had
the results of the war been reversed—an arbitrary and tyrannical
system of restoration insisted upon—the established order of things
destroyed homes broken up the people impoverished, and hordes of
unscrupulous adventurers swarmed up from the South and overrun the country
in pursuit of schemes of political chicanery and personal ambition,
peculation and plunder, as was the South after the close of the war.

But when the fight was on, an overwhelmingly partisan House, as a last
resort, in the hope of at once ending, by removal, all opposition on the
part of the President to the views and aims of the dominant party in
Congress, resorted to the first project of impeachment set out in the
succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER IV. — FIRST ATTEMPT TO IMPEACH THE PRESIDENT.

THE ASHLEY INDICTMENT.

The initiation of formal proceedings for the impeachment and removal of
President Johnson occurred in the House of Representatives on January 7th,
1867, in the introduction of three separate resolutions for his
impeachment, by Messrs. Loan and Kelso, of Missouri, and Mr. Ashley of
Ohio. As Mr. Ashley’s Resolution was the only one acted on by the House,
only the proceedings had thereon are here given, as follows:

Mr. Speaker:—I rise to perform a painful but, nevertheless, to me,
an imperative duty; a duty which I think ought not longer to be postponed,
and which cannot, without criminality on our part, be neglected. I had
hoped, sir, that this duty would have devolved upon an older and more
experienced member of this House than myself. Prior to our adjournment I
asked a number of gentlemen to offer the resolution which I introduced,
but upon which I failed to obtain a suspension of the rules.

Confident, sir, that the loyal people of this country demand the adoption
of some such proposition as I am about to submit, I am determined that no
effort on my part shall be wanting to see that their expectations are not
disappointed. * * * On my responsibility as a Representative, and in the
presence of this House, and before the American people, I charge Andrew
Johnson, Vice President and acting President of the United States, with
the commission of acts which in contemplation of the Constitution, are
high crimes and misdemeanors, for which, in my judgment, he ought to be
impeached. I therefore submit the following:

I do impeach Andrew Johnson, Vice President and acting President of the
United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors:

I charge him with a usurpation of power and violation of law:

In that he has corruptly used the appointing power;

In that he has corruptly used the pardoning power;

In that he has corruptly used the veto power;

In that he has corruptly disposed of public property of the United States;

In that he has corruptly interfered in elections, and committed acts
which, in contemplation of the Constitution, are high crimes and
misdemeanors: Therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED, That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and they are
hereby, authorized to inquire into the official conduct of Andrew Johnson,
Vice President of the United States, discharging the powers and duties of
the office of President of the United States, and to report to this House,
whether, in their opinion, the said Andrew Johnson, while in said office,
has been guilty of acts which are designed or calculated to overthrow,
subvert, or corrupt the Government of the United States, or any department
or office thereof; and whether the said Andrew Johnson has been guilty of
any act, or has conspired with others to do acts, which, in contemplation
of the Constitution, are high crimes and misdemeanors, requiring the
interposition of the constitutional power of this House; and that said
committee have power to send for persons and papers, and to administer the
customary oath to witnesses.

The question was taken on agreeing to the Resolution; and it was decided
in the affirmative—yeas 107, nays 39, not voting 45.

On the 2nd of March, 1867, the subject of impeachment again came up in the
House, and the following proceedings were had:

Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, (Rep.)—I am directed by the Committee on the
Judiciary to present a report relative to the official conduct of the
President of the United States.

Mr. Eldridge, (Dem.)—Mr. Speaker, I wish to raise a question of
order: I see by the clock that it is almost three o’clock in the morning;
and I believe this is the Sabbath day. I think we should not do any more
business tonight, except it be business of necessity or charity.

The Speaker.—This, in parliamentary view, is Saturday. The clerk
will read the report submitted by the gentleman from Iowa.

The clerk read as follows:

The Committee on the Judiciary, charged by the House with examination of
certain allegations, of high crimes and misdemeanors against the President
of the United States, submit the following report:

On the 7th day of January, 1867, the House, on the motion of the Hon.
James M. Ashley, a Representative from the State of Ohio, adopted the
following preamble and resolutions, to-wit:

The duty imposed upon this committee by this action of the House, was of
the highest and gravest character. No committee during the entire history
of the Government, has ever been charged with a more important trust. The
responsibility which it imposed was of oppressive weight, and of a most
unpleasant nature. Gladly would the committee have escaped from the
arduous labor imposed upon it by the Resolution of the House; but once
imposed, prompt, deliberate, and faithful action, with a view to correct
results, became its duty, and to this end it has directed its efforts.

Soon after the adoption of the Resolution by the House, Hon. James M.
Ashley communicated to the committee, in support of his charges against
the President of the United States, such facts as were in his possession,
and the investigation was proceeded with, and has been continued almost
without, a day’s interruption. A large number of witnesses have been
examined, many documents collected, and everything done which could be
done to reach a conclusion of the case. But the investigation covers a
broad field, embraces many novel, interesting, and important questions,
and involves a multitude of facts, while most of the witnesses are distant
from the Capital, owing to which the committee, in view of the magnitude
of the interests involved in its action, have not been able to conclude
its labors, and is not therefore prepared to submit a definite and final
report. If the investigation had even approached completeness, the
committee would not feel authorized to present the result of the House at
this late period of the session, unless the charges had been so entirely
negative as to admit of no discussion, which, in the opinion of the
committee, is not the case.

Certainly no affirmative report could be properly considered in the
expiring hours of this Congress.

The committee not having fully investigated all the charges prepared
against the President of the United States, it is deemed inexpedient to
submit any conclusion beyond the statement that sufficient testimony has
been brought to its notice to justify and demand a further prosecution of
the investigation.

The testimony which the committee has taken will pass into the custody of
the Clerk of the House, and can go into the hands of such committee as may
be charged with the duty of bringing this investigation to a close, so
that the labor expended upon it may not have been in vain.

The committee regrets its inability definitely to dispose of the important
subject committed to its charge, and presents this report for its own
justification, and for the additional purpose of notifying the succeeding
Congress of the incompleteness of its labors, and that they should be
completed.

James F. Wilson, Chairman. Francis Thomas, D. Morris, F. E. Woodbridge,
George S. Boutwell, Thomas Williams, Burton C. Cook, William Lawrence,

Mr. Ancona, the only Democrat on the committee, presented a minority
report, as follows:

The subscriber, one of the Judiciary Committee, to which was referred by
the House the inquiry into the official conduct of His Excellency, the
President of the United States, with a view to his impeachment upon
certain charges made by Hon. James M. Ashley, begs leave to submit the
following report:

The Committee refuses to allow a Report to be made giving to the House at
this time upon grounds which are no doubt satisfactory to themselves;
therefore, I cannot report the evidence upon which my conclusion is based,
which I would gladly do did the Committee deem it expedient. The
examination of witnesses and the records was commenced, as appears by the
majority report, about the time of the reference, to-wit: on the 7th day
of January, 1867, and continued daily. A large number of witnesses has
been examined, and everything done that could be, to bring the case to a
close, as appears by the majority report: and the majority have come to
the conclusion “that sufficient testimony had been brought to its notice
to justify and demand a further prosecution of the investigation.” I have
carefully examined all the evidence in the case, and do report that there
is not one particle of evidence to sustain any of the charges which the
House charged the Committee to investigate, and that the case is wholly
without a particle of evidence upon which impeachment could be founded,
and that with all the effort that has been made, and the mass of evidence
that has been taken; the case is entirely void of proof. I furthermore
report that the most of the testimony that has been taken is of a
secondary character, and such as would not be admitted in a court of
justice.

In view of this conclusion I can see no good in a continuation of the
investigation. I am convinced that all the proof that can be produced has
been before the Committee, as no pains have been spared to give the case a
full investigation. Why, then, keep the country in a feverish state of
excitement upon this question any longer, as it is sure to end, in my
opinion, in a complete vindication of the President, if justice be done
him by the committee, of which I have no doubt,

A. J. Rogers.

The two reports were ordered printed and laid on the table.

This session of the House, and with it the Thirty-Ninth Congress, ended a
few hours later, the legislative day continuing till twelve o’clock, noon,
on Sunday, March 3rd. The House adjourned sine die at that hour, when all
unfinished business lapsed.

RENEWAL OF THE IMPEACHMENT.

The first session of the Fortieth Congress began on Monday, March 4th,
1867, and on the 7th, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Ashley (Rep.)
offered the following Preamble and Resolutions:

Whereas the House of Representatives of the Thirty-Ninth Congress adopted,
on the 7th of January, 1867, a Resolution authorizing an inquiry into
certain charges preferred against the President of the United States; and
whereas the Judiciary Committee, to whom said Resolution and charges were
referred, with authority to investigate the same, were unable for want of
time, to complete said investigation before the expiration of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress; and whereas in the report submitted by said
Judiciary Committee on the 2nd of March they declare that the evidence
taken is of such a character as to justify and demand a continuation of
the investigation by this Congress; therefore:

Be it Resolved by the House of Representatives, That the Judiciary
Committee, when appointed, be, and they are hereby, instructed to continue
the investigation authorized in said Resolution of Jan. 7th, 1867, and
that they have power to send for persons and papers, and to administer the
customary oath to witnesses; and that the committee have authority to sit
during the sessions of the House and during any recess which Congress or
this House may take.

Resolved, That the Speaker be requested to appoint the Committee on the
Judiciary forthwith, and that the Committee so appointed be directed to
take charge of the testimony taken by the Committee of the last Congress;
and that said Committee have power to appoint a clerk at a compensation
not to exceed six dollars per day, and employ the necessary stenographers.

At the close of the debate on Mr. Ashley’s Resolution, it was adopted
without a division, its form being changed to the following:

Resolved, That the Committee on Judiciary be requested to report on the
charges against the President as aforesaid, on the first day of the
meeting of the House after the recess hereafter to be determined.

Congress adjourned a few days later. It re-assembled on the 3rd of July,
and on the 11th the following resolutions was offered by Mr. Stevens,
(Rep.) of Pennsylvania:

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
Resolution and Documents relative to the Impeachment of the President, be
directed to report the evidence at this session, with leave to make
further report if they shall deem proper.

That the impeachment enterprise was waning, and that its forces had
received little encouragement during the recess of the Congress that had
just closed, was evidenced by the fact that there could not be mustered
ayes enough to put the resolution to a vote, and Mr. Wilson, of Iowa,
moved the following substitute:

Resolved, That the Committee on Judiciary be, and they are hereby,
authorized and directed to have the usual number of copies of the evidence
taken by said committee relative to the Impeachment of the President,
printed and laid on the desks of Members of the House on the first day of
the next Congress, whether adjourned or regular.

The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 85 to 48, whereupon Mr. Stevens
dejectedly remarked that, “after the vote which had been taken on this
resolution, indicating the views of a majority of the House in regard to
it, I am willing to abandon it. I therefore move that the Resolution as
amended be laid on the table,” which motion was agreed to.

On the 15th of July, 1867, Mr. Farnsworth, (Rep.) of Illinois, offered the
following resolution and demanded the previous question thereon:

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from the
further consideration of the question of the Impeachment of the President
of the United States, and that the testimony already taken by said
committee be printed for the use of the House.

The resolution was not seconded, and went over under the rules.

On the 25th of Nov. 1867, Mr. Boutwell (Rep.), on behalf of the Judiciary
Committee, submitted the report of the majority of that committee, of the
testimony taken in behalf of the proposed impeachment of the President.
The report recommended his impeachment.

Mr. Wilson, submitted the report of the minority of the Committee (himself
and Mr. Woodbridge), and moved the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from the
further consideration of the proposed impeachment of the President of the
United States, and that the subject be laid upon the table.

Mr. Marshall, on behalf of himself and Mr. Eldridge, the two Democratic
members of the committee, stated that though they had not signed the
minority report submitted by Mr. Wilson, they joined in support of the
resolution submitted by him, and asked leave to introduce and have printed
separate views.

This, the first session of the Fortieth Congress, then adjourned, Dec.
2nd, 1867.

The second session of the Fortieth Congress was begun on the same day, and
on the 5th, the impeachment question came up in its order in the House, on
the resolution reported from the Judiciary Committee:

That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high
crimes and misdemeanors.

After a brief discussion of the order of business, the House adjourned for
that day.

The debate was closed on the 6th, by Messrs. Boutwell and Wilson, the
members of the Committee on the Judiciary having Charge of the impeachment
measure. The closing passages of Mr. Boutwell’s speech were as follows:

What is our position to-day? Can this House and the Senate, with the
knowledge they have of the Presidents purposes and of the character of the
men who surround him, give him the necessary power? (to remove alleged
dishonest officials.) Do they not feel that if he be alloyed such power
these places will be given to worse men? Hence, I say that with Mr.
Johnson in office from this time until the 4th of March, 1869, there is no
remedy for these grievances. These are considerations why we should not
hesitate to do that which justice authorizes us to do if we believe that
the President has been guilty of impeachable offenses.

Mr. Speaker, all rests here. To this House is given by the Constitution
the sole power of impeachment; and this power of impeachment furnishes the
only means by which we can secure the execution of the laws, and those of
our fellow citizens who desire the administration of the law ought to
sustain this House while it executes that great law which is in its hands
and which is nowhere else, while it performs a high and solemn duty
resting on it by which that man who has been the chief violator of law
shall be removed, and without which there can be no execution of the law
any where. Therefore the whole responsibility, whatever it may be, for the
non-execution of the laws of the country, is, (in the presence of these
great facts) upon this House. * * * I think that we can not do otherwise
than believe, that he has disregarded that great injunction of the
Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, that there
is but one remedy. The remedy is with this House, and it is nowhere else.
If we neglect or refuse to use our powers when the case arises demanding
decisive action, the Government ceases to be a Government of law and
becomes a Government of men.

Mr. Wilson, Chairman of the Committee, closed the debate in the following
remarks:

The gentleman from Massachusetts has remarked that the President may
interfere with the next Presidential election in the Southern States; that
he may station soldiers at the voting places and overawe the loyal people
of those States, especially the colored vote: and we must, I suppose,
guard against the possibility of this by his impeachment and removal from
office. This position, if I state it correctly, is startling. Are we to
impeach the President for what he may do in the future? Do our fears
constitute in the President high crimes and misdemeanors? Are we to wander
beyond the record of this case and found our judgment on the possibilities
of the future? This would lead us beyond the conscience of this House.

Sir, we must be guided by some rule in this grave proceeding—something
more certain than an impossibility to arraign the President for a specific
crime—and when the gentleman from Massachusetts, in commenting on
one of the alleged offenses of the President, that we could not arraign
him for the specific crime, he disclosed the weakness of the case we are
now considering. If we cannot arraign the President for a specific crime,
for what are we to proceed against him? For a bundle of generalities such
as we have in the volume of testimony reported by the committee to the
House in this case? If we cannot state upon paper a specific crime, how
are we to carry this case to the Senate for trial?

At the close of his speech, Mr. Wilson moved to lay the subject of
impeachment on the table, and the yeas and nays were ordered.

Several motions were then made—to adjourn, to adjourn to a day
certain, etc.—which with roll calls practically consumed the day,
and the motion of Mr. Wilson went over.

The next day, Dec. 7th, the question again came up in its order, and after
several unsuccessful attempts to procure a vote on Mr. Wilson’s motion to
lay the Impeachment Resolution on the table, Mr. Wilson, by agreement,
withdrew his motion, and called for the yeas and nays on the adoption of
the resolution:

That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached for high
crimes and misdemeanors.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the vote was yeas 57, nays 108.

So the resolution to impeach the President was rejected by the very
emphatic vote of 67 to 108—nearly two to one—and by a House
two-thirds Republican.

So ended the first effort to impeach the President—the first formal
action to that end having been taken on January 7, 1867, and the final
vote at the close, and its abandonment, December 7, 1867.

For eleven months the overwhelming Republican majority of the House had
been vigorously active in its search for evidence of criminality on the
part of the President that would warrant the basing of an impeachment. No
effort was left untried—no resource that promised a possible hope of
successful exploitation was neglected. Republican partisans were set to
the work of sleuth-hounds in the search for testimony in maintenance of
the charges preferred, and an ever ready partisan press teemed from the
beginning to the end of that time with animadversions upon Mr. Johnson’s
administration and denunciation of his alleged desertion of Mr. Lincoln’s
plan of restoration, of treachery to the party that had elected him, and a
demand for his impeachment.

To be lukewarm in that controversy, or even to fail to join in the popular
denunciation of Mr. Johnson was to put one’s self at once under suspicion
with the great mass of the dominant party, and without the pale of its
consideration.

For eleven months the country was kept in the throes of partisan turmoil—and
for what? Simply to depose a President who had disappointed the partisan
and personal expectations and schemes of a rule or ruin faction which was
able, under the peculiar conditions of the time, to subordinate to its
purposes a large proportion of the dominant party of that day.

The following are the material portions of the testimony taken by the
House Committee on the Judiciary under authority of the resolutions passed
by the House of Representatives on March 7, 1867, for the impeachment of
Andrew Johnson.

Eighty-nine witnesses were summoned before the committee. All of them were
rigidly examined, and several of them were called and examined the second
and third times. Their testimony fills more than twelve hundred octavo
pages of print.

The first witness was Gen. L. C. Baker, of the War Department. His
testimony related principally to a certain letter alleged to have been
written by Mr. Johnson, in 1864.

The first question propounded to him by Mr. Ashley, was as follows:

I wish you to state to the committee the contents, as nearly as you can,
of a letter which you have in your possession, written by Andrew Johnson,
some time in the early part of 1864, to a Southern man, giving information
as to the troops about the Capitol and elsewhere, and advice to Jefferson
Davis. State where that letter is, and give the contents as nearly as you
can, the history of it.

Mr. Baker answered that he knew there was a letter of that kind,
purporting to have been written by Andrew Johnson, when he was acting
Governor of Tennessee. That the letter was dated at Nashville and directed
to Jefferson Davis, and related to some declared policy that had been
adopted by the Confederacy—that the letter was being used to secure
an appointment—that reference was made to troops, but nothing about
localities where stationed, or numbers, and nothing about shipment of
armor, and that the letter was stolen from Andrew Johnson’s table and
never sent.

The question was then asked of the witness by Mr. Ashley:

State whether the whole import of the letter written by Mr. Johnson, was
not to turn the whole power which he possessed in Tennessee, in a certain
contingency, over to the rebel cause?

Answer—No. I did not have that opinion of the letter exactly. From
what I recollect of it, the thing was that he was making a proposition
making suggestions as to what their policy should be.

Ques.—And if they accepted it?

Ans.—If they accepted it, my impression was that he was going with
them.

Ques.—With the rebels?

Ans.—Yes sir.

Question by the Chairman.—If there are any other letters that you
have seen of Mr. Johnson’s written by him to any person connected with the
Confederate Government, or proposing to change the Administration of the
Government in their favor after he became President, or anything of a
public nature affecting the interests of the United States, please state
it and state all you know about such letters.

Ans.—I do not know of any letters of that character—or of any
other letters.

This constituted the substance of Gen. Baker’s testimony. His examination
was very lengthy, embracing more of this character of testimony, and about
pardon brokerage, and other alleged corrupt practices—all evidencing
a determination and expectation to fix upon Mr. Johnson a disposition to
disloyalty and corruption, both before and after his succession to the
Presidency, but no such testimony was obtained.

A considerable portion of the investigation was devoted to Mr. Johnson’s
business and personal affairs, such as could have no possible connection
with or indicate implication in corrupt or disloyal practices of any sort.

A strenuous effort appears to have been made by the Committee throughout a
long and searching examination of witnesses, and constitutes a conspicuous
feature of that investigation, to establish the charges of corruption and
disloyalty in the sale of public property, railways, etc., that had been
constructed and equipped, or seized and operated, by the Government in
connection with its military operations in the South. Such an accusation
had been made with great pertinacity by Mr. Johnson’s opponents, and was
also then believed by a great many people to be true.

Among the parties examined by the committee, were Mr. James and Mr. Burns,
of Nashville, Tenn., and Senator Fowler, of that State, and also the
Secretary of war, Mr. Stanton. No facts whatever were elicited showing a
privity to corruption in these matters on the part of Mr. Johnson.

The information obtained from Mr. Stanton, however, put an effectual
estoppel to further investigation of the charge of corrupt or disloyal
disposal of public property by the President. The following are extracts
from Mr. Stanton’s testimony, as given on February 11, 1867:

Shortly after the surrender of the rebel armies, the attention of the War
Department was directed to the proper disposition to be made of the
railroads and railroad stock throughout the rebel States which came into
our possession, either by capture or construction. It was the subject of a
good deal of consultation and conference between the Secretary of War and
the Quartermaster General. It was the opinion of the Secretary of War that
it was wholly impracticable for the General Government to operate these
roads under any system, and that it would be greatly to the advantage of
the country to make such disposition as would allow them, its speedily as
possible, to become what they were designed for channels of commerce and
trade between the States, and that any terms on which that could be done
would be advantageous. This was especially the case in regard to the
Western and Southwestern roads, where it was said there were large amounts
of cotton that would be available to remove North, in exchange for
supplies to go South, of which it was said they were greatly in want.

Ques.—In case of the construction of a railroad by the Government,
the Government furnishing the material and the labor, what has been the
custom of the Department in surrendering such roads to the companies
claiming them?

Ans.—In all instances, I think such roads have been surrendered in
the same manner as if they had been constructed by the companies. That
subject was talked of a good deal in conference between myself and the
Quartermaster General. My own views, that the great object on the part of
the Government, was to get these roads operated; and that to go into an
inquiry as to the cost of construction, would be impracticable, either as
to the cost of construction or as to any certain rule of compensation,
because many of them were constructed under the pressure of war, and for
temporary Purposes. The object of arriving at the cash value or equivalent
for the roads was not only impracticable, but really of very little
practical interest in comparison with the great end of having the channels
of commerce in the rebel states opened and carried on, with a view of
getting out their produce, furnishing supplies, and getting commerce in
its regular channels. In my own view, that appeared to be the most,
certain and most speedy system of reconstruction we could adopt, and that
it would tend more to establish harmony than any other thing that could be
done by the Government. In view of all this, and after the most deliberate
consideration we could give it, it was the opinion of the Quartermaster
General and myself—certainly my own—that it would be
impracticable to make any distinction: and so far as I know, no
distinction was made in any part of the country in reference to roads
built by the Government and roads that had been constructed by Companies
before the war commenced.

Mr. Stanton was asked this question:

Suppose the Government, at his own expense, had constructed seventy miles
of railroad in one of the rebel States, and that, at the close of the war,
a company should apply to the Executive Department of the Government for a
transfer of the road so constructed to it; by what authority or provision
of law would Executive Department be authorized to transfer the road so
constructed to the company making the application?

Mr. Stanton answered:

I do not know of any act of Congress that directly, in terms, would
authorize any such transfer; but regarding the construction of the road,
in time of war, simply as a means, or instrument, of carrying on war, when
the war was over I would consider it strictly proven and within the scope
of the power of the General Commanding, or especially of the President of
the United States, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to render that
instrument as available for peace purposes as possible. And inasmuch as
the road would be entirely useless unless it was operated, and it would be
for the benefit and interest of the public, to have it operated as
speedily as possible, I think it would be in the interest of a wise
discretion, and exercising proper authority, to turn over that road to any
company or individual who would operate it; for, in that way, he would be
applying the war material to the only available use to which it could be
applied. * * * I would regard the rolling stock as coming, to a certain
extent, within the same principle. * * * No transfer of title was at any
time made, so far as I know, or could be made, but only possession turned
over. When the military use was no longer required, the railroads were
turned over to their original owners, or their representatives, with
permission to use them. These railroads, their plant and track fixtures,
real property, of which the military authorities had only the possessory
right and use, but the rolling stock and equipments, and iron not laid
down, were personal property, which, by capture, or purchase, or
construction, belonged to the United States. Sale could be made, and was
made, of the personal property at values estimated by the proper officers.
That which constituted real estate, to-wit, the railroad track, fixtures,
etc., the military authorities might abandon altogether, or relinquish
control and turn over possession to those who would make a beneficial use
of it by working the road. Being in the nature of real estate, no title of
the Government or of other persons could be divested and conveyed by
military authority, but only the control relinquished and the use
permitted during the existence of military authority in the department
where the roads were situated.

The trend of a large portion of the testimony of witnesses called by this
committee to testify as to the charges preferred against Mr. Johnson and
relating to other allegations of the indictment, quite clearly indicated
that the charges were based solely upon common street rumor, invented and
given currency in partisan antagonism and for partisan purposes, and that
the witnesses were called in the hope and expectation, on the part of the
majority of the House, of developing proof of disloyalty and corruption on
the part of the President, and, if not criminal connivance, at least,
criminal knowledge of a conspiracy for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln.

But these expectations and hopes, in all respects, were so utterly
disappointed, that there was pathos, at least, as the investigation was
protracted from month to month, with no indication of the hoped for
development, in the despondent inquiry of Mr. Thaddeus Stevens to one of
his colleagues of the Impeachment Committee, as the inquest approached a
close without results—”Well, HAVE YOU GOT ANYTHING, ANYHOW?” It was
more an ejaculation of anger and disgust at failure, than a query of one
seeking hoped for information.

CHAPTER V. — THE TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT.

ITS HISTORY AND PURPOSE—THE PRESIDENTS VETO MESSAGE.

Mr. Johnson’s alleged violation of the act of Congress known as the
Tenure-of-Office Act, constituted the ostensible basis of his impeachment
in 1868. As stated, it had been passed for the purpose of restricting the
power of the President over Executive appointments. That Act, therefore,
becomes a very important and conspicuous incident in the impeachment
affair, as its alleged violation constituted the only material accusation,
set out in various forms, in the entire list of charges.

The proceedings had on the passage of that bill are inserted at some
length here, as a technical knowledge of its history, character and
purpose, is essential to a correct apprehension of the controversy that
had arisen between the President and Congress.

The Tenure-of-Office bill was introduced in the Senate by Mr. Williams, of
Oregon, Dec. 3rd, 1866, and on the 5th was referred to the Committee on
Retrenchment. On the 10th Mr. Edmunds, in the name of the committee,
reported it back to the Senate with the following remarks:

The joint select Committee on Retrenchment, to whom was referred the bill
to regulate the tenure of offices, have had the same under consideration,
and have instructed me to report the bill back, with a recommendation of
certain amendments, which being adopted, the committee are of the opinion
that the bill ought to pass. I beg leave to say in connection with this
report that we have reported this bill and these amendments regulating
removals from office and appointments to office so far as concerns
officers whose nominations require the confirmation of the Senate, and
have adopted what appears to us to be a feasible scheme in that respect,
in no spirit of hostility to any party or administration whatever, but in
what we conceive to be the true Republican interest of the country, under
all administrations, under the domination of all parties in the growth
which is before us in the future; and in that spirit I shall ask the
attention of the Senate to the bill when it comes to be considered. I move
that the amendment be printed, and that the bill be made the special order
for Thursday next, at one o’clock.

On the 10th of January, 1867, on motion of Mr. Edmunds, the bill was taken
up for consideration. As the first section of the bill was the only
portion over which there was any serious controversy, or pertinent to this
recital, only that section is produced here. It is as follows:

That every person (excepting the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of
War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the
Attorney General), holding any civil office to which he has been appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who
shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly
qualified to act therein, is, and shall be, entitled to hold such office
until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly
qualified, except as herein otherwise provided.

Mr. Howe objected to the exception of the Cabinet officers from the
operation of the bill, and Mr. Edmunds responded that:

It did seem to the Committee, after a great deal of consultation and
reflection, that it was right and just that the Chief Executive of the
Nation, in selecting these named Secretaries, who, by law, and by the
practice of the country, and officers analogous to whom by the practice of
all other countries, are the confidential advisers of the Executive
respecting the administration of all his Departments, should be persons
who were personally agreeable to him, in whom he could place entire
confidence and reliance, and that whenever it should seem to him that the
state of relations, between him and any of them had become such as to
render this relation of confidence and trust and personal esteem
inharmonious, HE SHOULD IN SUCH CASE BE ALLOWED TO DISPENSE WITH THE
SERVICES OF THAT OFFICER IN VACATION AND HAVE SOME OTHER PERSON ACT IN HIS
STEAD. We thought that so much discretion, so much confidence, so much
respect ought to be properly attributed to the Chief Magistrate of the
Nation. It may happen that at some particular time—some people may
suppose that it has happened now—the Chief Magistrate for the time
being ought not to be invested with such powers; but the Committee have
recommended the adoption of this rule respecting the tenure-of-office as a
permanent and systematic, and as they believe, an appropriate regulation
of the Government for all administrations and for all time; and it did
appear to them (whether the reason may command itself to the Senate or
not), that it was just to the Executive, and on the whole best for the
interest of the Nation, that he should be allowed during a recess of the
Senate to change his confidential advisers if it should appear to him to
be fit, subject to that general responsibility which every officer must be
held to the public and to the Senate when they meet again.

Mr. Williams said:

I prepared the original bill in this case, which contains in different
words the exception contained in the amendment reported by the Committee.
I do not regard the exception as of any real practical consequence,
because I suppose if the President and any head of a Department should
disagree so as to make their relations unpleasant, and the President
should signify a desire that the head of a Department retire from the
Cabinet, THAT WOULD FOLLOW WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE ACT OF REMOVAL ON THE PART
OF THE PRESIDENT.

Mr. Fessenden said:

The Constitution imposes upon the President of the United States the duty
of executing the laws; it does not impose that duty upon the Secretaries.
They are creatures of the law and not of the Constitution directly. Some,
and perhaps the greater part, of their functions are as advisers of the
President and to aid him in executing the laws in their several
Departments. There are some duties that are specifically conferred upon
them by Congress. Their relation to the President, as has been well said
by gentlemen, is that mostly of confidential advisers. With the exception
of the particular duties imposed upon them by law, and on the Secretary of
the Treasury more than on the others, they do nothing of their own motion,
but act by order of the President in discharging the particular duties of
their office. * * * That being the peculiar condition of affairs it has
always been considered since the foundation of the Government, as a matter
of course, as a general rule—there may have been one or two
exceptions, and I think there have been, but I am not very positive on
that point—that the President might select such persons as he
pleased to be members of his Cabinet. Of course the confirmation of the
Senate is necessary; but the general idea of the Senate has been, whether
they liked the men or not, to confirm them without any difficulty, because
in executing the great and varied interests of this great country it is
exceedingly important that there should be the utmost harmony between
those who are charged with that execution.

The bill passed as reported and went to the House. That body amended it by
making Cabinet officers non-removable by the President without the consent
of the Senate, and sent the bill back to the Senate, when Mr. Sherman
said:

It (the Tenure-of-Office bill) ought to have been passed, and probably
would have been passed, long ago, if a different condition of affairs had
existed before. But when you propose to extend that principle to Cabinet
officers, a very different state of affairs arises, and different
circumstances apply to this subject. Now I say, that if a Cabinet officer
should attempt to hold his office for a moment beyond the time when he
retained the entire confidence of the President, I would not vote to
retain him, NOR WOULD I COMPEL THE PRESIDENT TO LEAVE ABOUT HIM IN THESE
HIGH POSITIONS A MAN IN WHOM HE DID NOT ENTIRELY TRUST, both personally
and politically. It would be unwise to require him to administer the
Government without agents of his own choosing. It seems to me, therefore,
that it would be unwise for the Senate to engraft in this bill a provision
that would enable a Cabinet officer to hold on to his office in violation
of the will of his Chief. * * * Suppose the personal relations between a
Cabinet officer and the President became so unpleasant that they could
have no personal intercourse. The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Howe), says
in such a case the Cabinet officer would resign. Suppose he should hold on
to his power and position—what then? There is no power to remove
him, and the President can have no intercourse with him. Would you compel
such a state of affairs? It seems to me that it would be unwise to do so.
That the Senate had no such purpose is shown by its vote twice to make
this exception. That this provision does not apply to the present case, is
shown by the fact that its language is so framed as NOT TO APPLY TO THE
PRESENT PRESIDENT. * * * It would not prevent the present President from
removing the present Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the
Secretary of State.

A considerable number of Senators participated in the debate, which was
able and exhaustive to an exceptional degree, on both sides, and occupied
several days in the various stages of the proceeding.

Mr. Edmunds closed the debate in the Senate with the following remarks:

I do not rise to prolong the debate, but only to express the hope that the
debate on this question may terminate—that we may come to a vote. *
* * While I should be glad to occupy some time in reply to some things
that have fallen in the course of this debate, I feel it to be due to the
business of the Senate to abstain. I hope the Senate will disagree to this
amendment, (made by the House) and adhere to the bill as it stands.

The vote was then taken, and resulted in 17 for agreeing to the House
amendment, and 28 against it.

The action of the Senate was reported to the House and Conference
Committees were appointed by the two houses.

On the 18th of February, the following substitute for the first section of
the bill was reported by the Committee of Conference and adopted by both
Houses, and the bill went to the President:

Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the
Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General and the Attorney
General, shall hold their offices respectively FOR AND DURING THE TERMS OF
THE PRESIDENT BY WHOM THEY MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED, and for one month
thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.

On Monday, March 2nd, 1867, the President returned the bill to the Senate,
in which house it had originated, with his objections thereto, as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

I have carefully examined the bill to regulate the tenure of certain civil
offices. The material portion of the bill is contained in the first
section, and is of the effect following, namely:

“That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who
shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly
qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office
until a successor shall have been appointed by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and duly qualified; and that the
Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the
Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General, shall hold
their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by
whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject
to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

These revisions are qualified by a reservation in the fourth section,
“that nothing contained in the bill shall be construed to extend the term
of any office the duration of which is limited by law.” In effect the bill
provides that the President shall not remove from their places any of the
civil officers whose terms of service are not limited by law without the
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States. The bill, in this
respect, conflicts, in my judgment, with the Constitution of the United
States. The question, as Congress is well aware, is by no means a new one.
That the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the President of
the United States is a principle which has been not more distinctly
declared by judicial authority and judicial commentators than it has been
uniformly practiced upon by the legislative and executive departments of
the Government. The question arose in the House of Representatives so
early as the 16th day of June, 1789, on the bill for establishing an
executive department, denominated “The Department of Foreign Affairs.” The
first clause of the bill, after recapitulating the functions of that
officer and defining his duties, had these words: “To be removable from
office by the President of the United States.” It was moved to strike out
these words, and the motion was sustained with great ability and vigor. It
was insisted that the President could not constitutionally exercise the
power of removal exclusive of the Senate; that the Federalist so
interpreted the Constitution when arguing for its adoption by the several
States; that the Constitution had nowhere given the President power of
removal, either expressly or by strong implication; but on the contrary,
had distinctly provided for removals from office by impeachment only. A
construction which denied the power of removal by the President was
further maintained by arguments drawn from the danger of the abuse of the
power; from the supposed tendency of an exposure of public officers to
capricious removal; to impair the efficiency of the civil service; from
the alleged injustice and hardship of displacing incumbents, dependent
upon their official stations, without sufficient consideration; from a
supposed want of responsibility on the part the President, and from an
imagined defect of guarantees against a vicious President, who might
incline to abuse the power.

On the other hand, an exclusive power of removal by the President was
defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution. It was
maintained that there are certain causes for which persons ought to be
removed from office without being guilty of treason, bribery, or
malfeasance, and that the nature of things demands that it should be so.
“Suppose,” it was said, “a man becomes insane by the visitation of God,
and is likely to ruin our affairs; are the hands of Government to be
confined front warding off the evil? Suppose a person in office not
possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the
appointment, is the error not to be corrected; suppose he acquire vicious
habits and incurable indolence, or totally neglect the duties of his
office, which shall work mischief to the public welfare, is there no way
to arrest the threatened danger? Suppose he become odious and unpopular by
reason of the measures he pursues, and this he may do without committing
any positive offense against the law, must he preserve his office in
despite of the popular will? Suppose him grasping for his own
aggrandizement and the elevation of his connections by every means short
of the treason defined by the Constitution, hurrying your affairs to the
precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquility,
plundering you of the means of defense, alienating the affections of your
allies, and promoting the spirit of discord, must the tardy, tedious,
desultory road, by way of impeachment, be traveled to overtake the man
who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in
drawing off the vital principle of the Government?” The nature of things,
the great objects of society, the express objects of the Constitution
itself require that this thing should be otherwise. To unite the Senate
with the President “in the exercise of the power” it was said, would
involve us in the most serious difficulty. “Suppose a discovery of any of
these events should take place when the Senate is not in session, how is
the remedy to be applied? The evil could be avoided in no other way than
by the Senate sitting always.” In regard to the danger of the power being
abused if exercised by one man, it was said “that the danger is as great
with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the
continent, with different impressions and opinions;” that such a body is
more likely to misuse the power of removal than the man whom the united
voice of America calls to the presidential chair. As the nature of
Government requires the power of removal, it was maintained “that it
should be exercised in this way by the hand capable of exerting itself
with effect, and the power must be conferred on the President by the
Constitution as the executive officer of the Government.” Mr. Madison,
whose adverse opinion in the Federalist had been relied upon by those who
denied the exclusive power, now participated in the debate. He declared
that he had reviewed his former opinions, and he summed up the whole case
as follows:

“The Constitution affirms that the executive power is vested in the
President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there are. The
Constitution says that in appointing to office the Senate shall be
associated with the President, unless, in the case of inferior officers,
when the law shall otherwise direct. Have we (that is, Congress) a right
to extend this exception? I believe not. If the Constitution has invested
all executive power in the President, I return to assert that the
Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority.
The question now resolves itself into this: is the power of displacing an
executive power? I conceive that if any power whatever is in the
Executive, it is in the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling
those who execute the laws. If the Constitution had not qualified the
power of the President in appointing to office by associating the Senate
with him in that business, would it not be clear that he would have the
right by virtue of his executive power to make such appointment? Should we
be authorized, in defiance of that clause in the Constitution—the
executive power shall be vested in the President—to unite the Senate
with the President in the appointment to office? I conceive not. It is
admitted that we should not be authorized to do this, I think it may be
disputed whether we have a right to associate there in removing persons
from office, the one power being as much of an executive nature as the
other; and the first is authorized by being excepted out of the general
rule established by the Constitution in these words: ‘The executive power
shall be vested in the President.'”

The question thus ably and exhaustively argued was decided by the House of
Representatives, by a vote of 34 to 20, in favor of the principle that the
executive power of removal is vested by the Constitution in the Executive,
and in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice President. The question
has often been raised in subsequent times of high excitement, and the
practice of the Government has nevertheless conformed in all cases to the
decision thus early made. * * * Chancellor Kent’s remarks on the subject
are as follows:

“On the first organization of the Government it was made a question
whether the power of removal in case of officers appointed to hold at
pleasure resided nowhere but in the body which appointed, and, of course,
whether the consent of the Senate was not requisite to remove. This was
the construction given to the Constitution while it was pending for
ratification before the State conventions by the author of the Federalist.
But the construction which was given to the Constitution by Congress,
after great consideration and discussion, was different. The words of the
act (establishing the Treasury Department) are: ‘And whenever the same
shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in
any other case of vacancy in the office, the assistant shall act.’ This
amounted to a legislative construction of the Constitution, and it has
ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon as decisive authority in the
case. It applies equally to every other officer of the Government
appointed by the President, whose term of duration is not specially
declared. It is supported by the weighty reason that the subordinate
officers in the executive department ought to hold at the pleasure of the
head of the Department, because he is invested generally with the
executive authority, and the participation in that authority by the Senate
was an exception to a general principle and ought to be taken strictly.
The President is the great responsible officer for the faithful execution
of the law, and the power of removal was incidental to that duty, and
might often be requisite to fulfill it.”

Thus has the important question presented by this bill been settled, in
the language of the late Daniel Webster (who, while dissenting from it,
admitted that it was settled), by construction, settled by precedent,
settled by the practice of the Government, and settled by statute.

The events of the last war furnished a practical confirmation of the
wisdom of the Constitution as it has hitherto been maintained in many of
its parts, including that which is now the subject of consideration. When
the war broke out rebel enemies, traitors, abettors, and sympathizers were
found in every department of the Government, as well in the civil service
as in the land and naval military service. They were found in Congress and
among the keepers of the Capitol, in foreign missions, in each and all of
the Executive Departments, in the judicial service, in the Post Office,
and among the agents for conducting Indian affairs; and upon probable
suspicion they were promptly displaced by my predecessor, so far as they
held their offices under executive authority, and their duties were
confided to new and loyal successors. No complaints against that power or
doubts of its wisdom, were entertained in any quarter.

Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the
executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the
concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in the
arguments now opposed to that construction or in any assumed necessity of
the times for changing those opinions. For these reasons I return the bill
to the Senate, in which House it originated, for the further consideration
of Congress, which the Constitution prescribes. Insomuch as the several
parts of the bill which I have not considered are matters chiefly of
detail, and are based altogether upon the theory of the Constitution from
which I am obliged to dissent, I have not thought it necessary to examine
them with a view to make them an occasion of distinct and special
objections. Experience, I think, has shown that it is the easiest, as it
is also the most attractive, of studies to frame constitutions for the
self-government of free States and nations.

But I think experience has equally shown that it is the most difficult of
all political labors to preserve and maintain such free constitutions of
self government when once happily established. I know no other way in
which they can be preserved and maintained except by a constant adherence
to them through the various vicissitudes of national existence, with such
adaptations as may become necessary, always to be effected, however,
through the agencies and in the forms prescribed in the original
constitutions themselves. Whenever administration fails or seems to fail
in securing any of the great ends for which Republican Government is
established, the proper course seems to be to renew the original spirit
and forms of the Constitution itself.

Andrew Johnson

The bill was promptly passed in both Houses over the President’s veto and
became a law.

As pertinent and incident to the history of this controversy, is the
communication of the President notifying the Senate of the suspension of
Mr. Stanton, Aug. 12, 1867. The President said:

The Tenure-of-Office Act did not pass without notice. Like other acts, it
was sent to the President for approval. As is my custom I submitted it to
the consideration of my Cabinet for their advice whether I should approve
it or not. I was a grave question of constitutional law, in which I would
of course rely mostly upon the opinion of the Attorney General, and of Mr.
Stanton, who had once been Attorney General. EVERY MEMBER OF MY CABINET
ADVISED ME THAT THE PROPOSED LAW WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All spoke without
doubt or reservation; but MR. STANTON’S CONDEMNATION OF THE LAW WAS THE
MOST ELABORATE AND EMPHATIC. He referred to the Constitutional provisions,
the debates in Congress, especially to the speech of Mr. Buchanan when a
Senator, to the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to the usage from the
beginning of the Government through every successive administration, all
concurring to establish the right of removal as vested in the President.
To all these he added the weight of his own deliberate judgment, and
advised me that it was my duty to defend the power of the President from
usurpation and veto the law.

During the recess of Congress in the Summer of 1867, the President
suspended Mr. Stanton from the War Office and appointed Gen. Grant
Secretary of War ad interim. Gen. Grant was then understood as supporting
the President in his controversy with Mr. Stanton, and promptly accepted
the appointment, holding it until the following December, when the change
was duly reported to the Senate. The Senate refused to sanction Mr.
Stanton’s suspension, and he consequently resumed his position of
Secretary of War and retained it until the close of the Impeachment trial—the
Senate then, in effect, by rejecting the Impeachment, declaring that the
President had the right to remove him.

Very naturally, after Mr. Stanton’s restoration to the War Office by the
refusal of the Senate to sanction his suspension, the relations between
himself and the President were embittered and many efforts were made by
mutual friends to induce Mr. Stanton to resign. Conspicuous among these
were Gen. Grant, the General of the Army, and Gen. Sherman, the next in
rank, as shown in the following note from Gen. Sherman to the President;
but a few weeks before the crisis came. It explains itself, as showing the
relations then subsisting between the parties mentioned:

332 K St., Washington, Jan, 18th.

I regretted, this morning, to say that I had agreed to go down to
Annapolis, to spend Monday with Admiral Porter. Gen. Grant has to leave
for Richmond on Monday morning at 6 o’clock. At a conversation with the
General, after an interview wherein I offered to go with him on Monday
morning to Mr. Stanton and say it was our joint opinion that he should
resign, it was found impossible by reason of his going to Richmond and my
going to Annapolis. The General proposed this course. He will tell you
to-morrow and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to say that for the good of the
service of the country he ought to resign—this on Sunday. On Monday,
I will call on you, and if you think it necessary, I will do the same—call
on Mr. Stanton and tell him he should resign. If he will not, then it will
be time to consider ulterior measures. In the meantime, it also happens
that no necessity exists for precipitating measures.

Yours truly, W. T. Sherman.

On Saturday, February 23, 1868, the day following the removal of Mr.
Stanton, Mr. Johnson sent to the Senate the name of Mr. Thomas Ewing,
senior, of Ohio, as his successor. The Senate had adjourned for the day
when the President’s Secretary reached the Capitol, between 12 and 1
o’clock, but the nomination was formally communicated on the following
Monday. Of this nomination, Mr. Blaine has written, that “no name could
have given better assurance of good intentions and upright conduct than
that of Mr. Ewing. He was a man of lofty character, of great eminence in
his profession of the law, and with wide and varied experience in public
life. He had held high rank as a Senator in the Augustan period of the
Senate’s learning and eloquence, and he had been one of the ablest members
of the distinguished Cabinets organized by the only two Presidents elected
by the Whig Party. He had reached the ripe age of seventy-eight years, but
still in complete possession of all his splendid faculties. He had voted
for Mr. Lincoln at both elections, had been a warm supporter of the
contest for the Union, and was represented by his own blood on many of the
great battlefields of the war.”

No notice was taken by the Senate of this nomination.

Here was offered an opportunity for the settlement of the dispute over the
War Office on fair and honorable terms to all parties concerned. But that
was not what the impeachers wanted. They wanted to get Mr. Johnson out.
They thought they had a pretext that they could sustain by making it a
party question, and did not want a settlement on any other terms—so
no attention was given to Mr. Ewing’s nomination. It was ignored and the
impeachment movement went on.

CHAPTER VI. — IMPEACHMENT AGREED TO BY THE HOUSE.

Mr. Johnson’s veto of the Tenure-of-Office Bill, and the passage of that
bill over his veto, of course intensified the antagonism between himself
and Congress. He not unnaturally regarded that Act as an infringement of
the Executive function which it was his duty to his office and to himself
to resent. The culmination came upon his official notification to the
Senate on February 21st, 1868, of his removal of Mr. Stanton from the
office of Secretary of War, and his appointment of Gen. Lorenzo Thomas as
Secretary ad interim, nothwithstanding the assumed interdiction of the
Tenure-of-Office Act.

Immediately on receipt of this notification, the Senate went into
executive session, and the following proceeding was had:

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION Senate of the United States February 21st, 1868

Whereas, The Senate have read and considered the communication of the
President, stating that he had removed Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War,
and had designated the Adjutant General of the Army to act as Secretary of
War ad interim. interim… Therefore,

Resolved, by the Senate of the United States, That under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, the President has no power to remove the
Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of
that office ad interim.

The journal of the Senate shows that this Resolution was adopted by the
following vote:

Yeas—Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Cole, Conkling, Cragin, Drake, Ferry,
Harlan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Patterson of New
Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Ross, Sprague, Stewart. Sumner. Thayer,
Tipton, Trumbull. Van Winkle, Wade, Willey Williams. Wilson. Yates—23.

Nays—Messrs. Buckalew, Davis, Doolittle, Edmunds, Hendricks,
Patterson of Tennessee—6.

Absent or not voting—20. Note. (Note—It is due to myself to
say here, that the entry of my name in the above vote, was incorrect. My
distinct recollection is, that though present, I declined to vote, and
from the consideration mentioned. I was totally unaware of my name being
recorded as voting on the proposition until long after I left the Senate,
when of course there was no opportunity to secure a correction of the
journal.)

This was an extraordinary proceeding. A proposition to impeach the
President had till recently been pending in the House for nearly a year,
and the ingenuity of the majority had been taxed to the utmost to find
some basis for an indictment upon which a successful impeachment might be
possible. There is ground for the suggestion that much was hoped for in
that direction from the Tenure-of-Office Bill, at least so far as the
House was concerned. That hoped for opportunity had now come—nor is
it an unreasonable surmise, that this very extraordinary action of the
Senate was forced by outside as well as inside influences for the purpose
of testing the Senate, and committing it in advance and in anticipation of
the preferment of another impeachment by the House.

As to the question of the guilt or innocence of the President of the
commission of an impeachable offense, this vote of the Senate was in the
nature of a vote of “guilty.” It was therefore to a degree an impeachment
and conviction combined by the Senate, prior to the bringing of an
accusation by the House of Representatives, the constitutional body for
the preferment of an impeachment of the President—and was an
improper, and not far removed from an indecent proceeding on the part of
the Senate. In effect, the President was thereby condemned by the Senate
without trial, and his later arraignment was simply to receive sentence-it
being solely upon the removal of Mr. Stanton that the impeachment was
brought by the House.

It is noticeable, and possibly indicative, that the names of twenty out of
fifty-four members of the Senate do not appear in this list—a very
unusual occurrence in divisions of that body; especially in the exciting
conditions that then prevailed. The absentees, or at least abstentions
from voting, were fifteen Republicans and five Democrats, more than
one-third of the body. That very unusual absence or abstention from voting
may well be attributed to the very proper hesitancy of Senators to commit
themselves in advance, either way, on a proposition that was reasonably
certain to lead to an impeachment of the President, then virtually pending
and imminent in the House, and upon which the Senate was equally certain
to be called upon to act.

The action of the President was also communicated to the House of
Representatives by Mr. Stanton, at the same hour of the same day, February
21st, 1868, in the following communication, enclosing a copy of the
President’s notification of his dismissal.

War Department, Washington City, Feb. 21, 1868.

Sir:—Gen. Thomas has just delivered to me a copy of the enclosed
order, which you will please communicate to the House of Representatives.

(Signed) E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Hon. Schuyler Colfax, Speaker
House of Representatives.

This gave new life to the impeachment cause, which had a few weeks before
been defeated in the House and since then had, for lack of material, been
laming, to the discouragement of many of its advocates: and the gleeful
ejaculations, on the floor of the House, in the lobbies, and on the
streets, on receipt of this news, and more especially after the action of
the Senate became known, which was not long in reaching the public, with a
common greeting slid clasping of hands: “Well, we’ve got him now!”

The communication of Mr. Stanton to the House of Representatives was
immediately, after reading, referred to the Committee on Reconstruction.

In the evening of the same day, Mr. Covode, of Pennsylvania, offered a
resolution to impeach the President, which was also referred to the same
Committee.

On the next day, Feb. 22d, 1868, Mr. Stevens, Chairman of that Committee,
made the following report:

The Committee on Reconstruction, to whom was referred, on the 27th day of
January last, the following resolution:

“Resolved, That the Committee on Reconstruction be authorized to inquire
what combinations have been made or attempted to be made to obstruct the
due execution of the laws; and to that end the committee have power to
send for persons and papers and to examine witnesses oil oath, and report
to this House what action, if any, they may deem necessary; and that said
committee bade leave to report at any time.”

And to whom was also referred, on the 21st day of February, instant, a
communication from Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, dated on said
21st day of February, together with a copy of a letter from Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, to the said Edwin M. Stanton, as
follows:

Executive Mansion, Washington. D. C., Feb. 21, 1868.

Sir:-By virtue of the power and authority vested in me, as President, by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby removed
from office as Secretary for the Department of War, and your functions as
such will terminate upon the receipt of this communication.

You will transfer to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General
of the Army, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as
Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public
property now in your custody and charge.

Respectfully yours. Andrew Johnson. Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Washington, D.
C.

And to whom was also referred by the House of Representatives the
following resolution, namely:

“Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be
impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors.”

Have considered the several subjects referred to them, and submit the
following report:

That in addition to the papers referred to the committee, the committee
find that the President, on the 21st day of February, 1868, signed and
issued a commission or letter of authority to one Lorenzo Thomas,
directing and authorizing said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad
interim, and to take possession of the books, records, and papers, and
other public property in the War Department, of which the following is a
copy:

Executive Mansion, Washington, Feb. 21, 1868.

Sir:—Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office
as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby authorized and
empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, and will immediately
enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office. Mr.
Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books,
papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.

To Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General of the United
States Army. Washington, District of Columbia.

Official copy respectfully furnished to Hon. Edwin M. Stanton.

L. Thomas. Secretary of War ad interim.

Upon the evidence collected by the committee, which is herewith presented,
and in virtue of the powers with which they have been invested by the
House, they are of the opinion that Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors. They
therefore recommend to the House the adoption of the accompanying
resolution. Thaddeus Stevens, George S. Boutwell, John A. Bingham, C. T.
Hulburd, John F. Farnsworth, F. C. Beaman, H. E. Paine.

Resolution providing for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of
the United States.

Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be
impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office.

The following is a brief synopsis of the debate which ensued: Mr. Stevens,
of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention in the first instance
to discuss this question; and if there be no desire on the other side to
discuss it we are willing that the question should be taken upon the
knowledge which the House already has. Indeed, the fact of removing a man
from office while the Senate was in session without the consent of the
Senate, if there were nothing else, is of itself, and always has been
considered, a high crime and misdemeanor, and was never before practiced.
But I will not discuss this question unless gentlemen on the other side
desire to discuss it. It they do, I shall for the present give way to them
and say what I have to say in conclusion.

Mr. Brooke, (Dem. of N. Y.) Mr. Speaker, I had hoped to have an
opportunity, at least, to submit a minority report before we entered upon
this august proceeding of impeaching the chief executive officer of this
Government. But after a session of the Committee on Reconstruction, hardly
an hour in length, violating an express rule of this House by sitting
during the session—for Rule 72, provides that no committee shall sit
during the session of the House without special leave—we have been
summoned upon a very partial submission of facts, without any
comprehension, in reality, of the charges which are made against the
President of they United States, upon a new indictment, in a new form once
more, and in a more alarming manner than ever, in this but a partial
Congress, representing but a section of a portion of the people—in
my judgment not representing the people of the United States at all—to
act as a grand jury, with a large portion of that grand jury excluded from
the jury-room here; and suddenly, impromptu perhaps, a vote is to be
forced this very day—to impeach the President of the United States!

I am utterly inadequate to discharge the duty which has devolved upon me
on this august day, the anniversary of the birthday of the Father of his
country. I am utterly unable upon this occasion either to do my duty to
the people or to express myself with that deep solemnity which I feel in
rising to resist this untoward, this unholy, this unconstitutional
proceeding. Indeed, I know not why the ghost of impeachment has appeared
here in a new form. We have attempted to lay it hitherto, and we have
successfully laid it upon the floor of this House. But a minority of the
party on the other side, forcing its influence and its power upon a
majority of a committee of this House, has at last succeeded in compelling
its party to approach the House itself in a united, and therefore in a
more solemn form, and to demand the impeachment of the President of the
United States.

Sir, we have long been in the midst of a revolution. Long, long has our
country been agitated by the throes of that revolution. But we are now
approaching the last and the final stage of that revolution in which, like
many revolutions that have preceded it, a legislative power not
representing the people attempts to depose the executive power, and thus
to overthrow that constitutional branch of the Government.

There is nothing new in all this. There is nothing new in what we are
doing, for men of the present but repeat the history of the past. We are
traversing over and over again the days of Cromwell and Charles I and
Charles II, and we are traversing over and over again the scenes of the
French revolution, baptized in blood in our introductory part, but I trust
in God never again to be baptized by any revolutionary proceeding on the
part of this House.

I have not and never have been a defender of all the opinions of General
Jackson, but those on the other side who pretend to hold him as authority
and those on this side who have ever held him as authority will find that
in uttering the opinions which I have I but reutter the opinions which he
advanced in his veto of July 10, 1832, when he said:

“The Congress, the Executive, and the court must each for itself be guided
by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes the
oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he
understands it, and not as it is understood by others.”

The President of the United States has given his opinion upon the official
tenure-of-office act and upon the Constitution of the United States by the
appointment of Adjutant General Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim. and
because of the exercise of that Constitutional right we are called upon
here at once to pronounce him guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors and
to demand his deposition and degradation therefor. * * * * *

Mr. Spalding, (Rep. of Ohio). Mr. Speaker, I feel myself to be in no
proper frame of mind or heart to attempt rhetorical display on this
occasion. I can appreciate the sentiments of the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Brooks] when he says the question before us is filled with solemnity;
but when he attempts by gasconade to deter members on this side of the
House from the conscientious discharge of their duty I say to my friend
that he has mistaken his calling. Sir, no more important duty could be
devolved upon this House of Representatives than that of considering the
question whether articles of impeachment shall be preferred against the
Chief Magistrate of the United States; and for long months, ay, for more
than a year, sir. I have resisted, with all my efforts and all my personal
influence, the approach of that crisis which is now upon us and before us.
The President has done many, very many, censurable acts: but I could not,
on my conscience, say that he should be holden to answer upon a charge of
“high crimes and misdemeanors” until something could be made tangible
whereby he had brought himself in open conflict with the Constitution and
laws of the Union.

It has seemed to me, sir, for weeks, that this high officer of our
government was inviting the very ordeal which, I am sorry to say, is now
upon us, and the dread consequences of which will speedily be upon him. He
has thrown himself violently in contact with an Act of Congress passed on
the 2d day of March last by the votes of the constitutional two-thirds of
the Senate and two-thirds of the House of Representatives over his veto
assigning his reasons for withholding his assent. Now, it matters not how
many acts can be found upon the statute books in years gone by that would
sanction the removal of a cabinet officer by the President; the gentleman
from New York numbers three. He may reckon up thirty or three hundred and
still if, within the last six or nine months, Congress has, in a
constitutional manner, made an enactment that prohibits such removal, and
the executive wantonly disregards such enactment and attempts to remove
the officer, he incurs the penalty as clearly and as certainly as if there
never had been any legislation to the contrary. That subsequent enactment,
if it be constitutional, repeals, by its own force, all other prior
enactments with which it may conflict; and in nothing is that enactment
more significant than in this, that the President shall not remove any
civil officer, who has been appointed by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, without the concurrence of that body, when it is itself in
session.

Mr. Bingham, (Rep.) of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, all right-minded men must
concede that the question under consideration is one of supreme moment to
till the people of the Republic. I protest for myself, sir, that I am
utterly incapable of approaching the discussion of this question in the
spirit of a partisan. I repel, sir, the intimation of the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Brooks, that I am careless of the obligation of my oath or
unconcerned about the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws. I look
upon the Constitution of the country as the very breath of the nation’s
life. I invoke this day upon the consideration of this great question the
matchless name of Washington, as did the gentleman, and ask him, in the
consideration of the matter now before us, to ponder upon those deathless
words of the Father of our Country, wherein he declares that “the
Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all”—upon
all sir, from the President to the humblest citizen—standing within
the jurisdiction of the Republic. Washington but echoed the words that
himself and his associates had imbedded in the text of the Constitution,
that “this Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof shall be
the supreme law of the land.” It shall be supreme over every officer; it
shall be supreme over every State; it shall be supreme over every
territory; it shall be supreme upon every deck covered by your flag in
every zone all round the globe. Every man within its jurisdiction,
official and unofficial, must bow to the supremacy of the Constitution.

The gentleman says that the issue involved is an issue about an office. I
beg the gentleman’s pardon. The issue involved is whether the supremacy of
the Constitution shall be maintained by the people’s Representatives. The
President of the United States has assumed, sir, to set himself above the
Constitution and the laws. He has assumed to defy the law, he has assumed
to challenge the people’s Representatives to sit in judgment upon his
malfeasance in office. Every man who has considered it worth while to
observe my conduct touching this question that has so long agitated this
House and agitated this country may have discovered that I have kept
myself back and have endeavored to keep others back from making any
unnecessary issue between the President and Representatives of the people
touching the manner in which he discharged the duties of his great office.
I had no desire, sir, to have resort unnecessarily to this highest power
reposed by the people in their Representatives and their Senators for the
vindication of their own violated Constitution and violated laws.
Notwithstanding there was much in the conduct of the President to endanger
the peace and repose of the country, yet, so long as there was any doubt
upon the question of his liability to impeachment within the text and
spirit of the Constitution, I was unwilling to utter one syllable to favor
such a proposition or to record a vote to advance it. * * *

Mr. Beck, (Dem. of Ky.) The single question upon which the decision of
this House is now to be made is that the President has attempted to test
the constitutionality of a law which he believes to be unconstitutional.
All the testimony heretofore presented upon which to base an impeachment
of the President was decided by even a majority of the Republican members
of this House to be insufficient to justify impeachment. All questions
growing out of the combinations and conspiracies lately charged upon the
President were ruled by the Reconstruction Committee to be insufficient,
and were not brought before this House. And the sole question now before
us is, is there anything in this last act of the President removing Mr.
Stanton and appointing Adjutant General Thomas Secretary of War ad interim
to justify his impeachment by this House?

I maintain that the President of the United States is in duty bound to
test the legality of every law which he thinks interferes with his rights
and powers as the Chief Magistrate of this nation. Whenever he has powers
conferred upon him by the Constitution of the United States, and an act of
Congress undertakes to deprive him of those powers, or any of them, he
would be false to his trust as the Chief Executive of this nation, false
to the interests of the people whom he represents, if he did not by every
means in his power seek to test the constitutionality of that law, and to
take whatever steps were necessary and proper to have it tested by the
highest tribunal in the land, and to ascertain whether he has a right
under the Constitution to do what he claims the right to do, or whether
Congress has the right to deprive him of the powers which he claims have
been vested in him by the Constitution of the United States, and that is
all that he proposes to do in this case. * * *

Mr. Logan, (Rep. of Ills.) Now, Mr. Speaker, let us examine this question
for a moment. It seems to me very plain and easy of solution. It is not
necessary, in order to decide whether this action of the President of the
United States comes within the purview and meaning of this statute, for us
to talk about revolutions or what this man or that man has said or
decided. What has been the act of the President is the question. The law
is plain. If the President shall appoint or shall give a letter of
authority or issue a commission to any person, without the consent of the
Senate, he is guilty of—what? The law says of a high misdemeanor.
And, under and by virtue of the Constitution, the President can be
impeached—for what? For high crimes or misdemeanors. This law
declares the issuing a commission to, or giving a letter of authority to,
or appointing to or removing from office, any person, without the advice
and consent of the Senate of the United States, shall be a high
misdemeanor, which is within the meaning and within the pale of the
Constitution of the United States.

Now, what is the evidence presented to this body by one of its committees?
It is of this character: The Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, has been
declared by a solemn vote of the Senate to be the Secretary of War, by
virtue of—what? By virtue of an appointment to that office; by
reason of the fact that Andrew Johnson did not relieve him from office
when he had the right to present the name of somebody else—soon
after his taking the presidential chair—not the right to turn him
out, but the right to nominate some one else to the senate and ask them to
confirm him to that office. That the President failed to do. Then, acting
under the provisions of this statute, the President suspended Mr. Stanton
as Secretary of War, but the Senate passed upon that act, and decided that
the reasons given by the President for suspending Mr. Stanton were not
satisfactory; and accordingly, by virtue of this law, Mr. Stanton was
confirmed and reinstated in his position as Secretary of War.

Now, all this having been done, it cannot certainly be claimed that the
President, in his recent course in regard to Mr. Stanton, has acted
without any intention of violating the law. Nor can it be claimed that the
President is ignorant of the law. * * *

Mr. Holman (Dem., Ind.) We have listened to much excited eloquence upon
this question. It is too manifest that Congress, moving on with that
impetus which is ever the result of excessive political power seeks to
usurp those powers which are by the Constitution vested in the other
Departments of the Government. I do not propose to discuss this subject or
answer the speech of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Logan] with any
words of my own. I have before me a paper which is full of mature wisdom
and patriotic counsel, a speech that comes from the solemn past, yet
speaks to every heart that beats for the Union of these States, and the
prosperity of the American people; a voice that is answered back from
every battlefield of the Revolution, and from the grave of every soldier
who has fallen in defense of American liberty. I ask that this speech may
be read to the House, as appropriate to this day, the 22nd of February, a
day once so venerated. I ask that this immortal address to the American
people, a speech that needs no revision: a speech in which there can be no
interruptions made in this moment of passion, be read to the American
Congress, for I can well afford to be silent while that great voice speaks
to the Representatives of the people of this Republic.

The Clerk commenced the reading of Washington’s Farewell Address.

Mr. Peters: I rise to a question of order. I insist that that address is
not germane to the question before the House.

Mr. Holman: I insist that it is exceedingly germane.

Mr. Lawrence, of Ohio: Allow me to suggest that it is germane, for the
reason that it relates to retirement from office. [Laughter.]

Mr. Peters: That is too remote.

The Speaker pro tempore, (Mr. Blaine, in the chair.) The Chair sustains
the point of order.

Mr. Holman: I hope no gentleman will object to the completion of the
reading: it will only occupy the time I am entitled to.

Mr. Peters: It is doubtless very instructive, and so would a chapter of
the Bible be, but it has nothing to do with the question before the House,
and I insist upon the point of order.

The Speaker pro tempore. Up to this point the discussion has been
pertinent and germane to the question—very closely so—and the
Chair is compelled to rule, the question of order being raised, that this
is not germane or in order. The gentleman from Indiana will proceed in
order.

Mr. Holman: I suppose, Mr. Speaker, the Constitution of the United States
would scarcely be in order. I will not ask to have it read.

The debate continued in the vein illustrated in the foregoing extracts,
from the morning of February 22, notwithstanding it was a National
Holiday, such was the haste of the impeachers, to the evening of the 24th,
almost without interruption. It was at times illustrated by marked
ability, and on the Republican side by intense bitterness and partisan
malignity. A large number of the members of the House participated in the
debate.

Mr. Thaddeus Stevens then closed the debate in the following arraignment
of the President:

Now in defiance of this law, (the Office-Tenure Act) Andrew Johnson, on
the 21st day of February, 1868, issued his commission or letter of
authority to one Lorenzo Thomas, appointing him Secretary of War ad
interim. and commanded him to take possession of the Department of War and
to eject the incumbent. E M. Stanton, then in lawful possession of said
office. Here, if this act stood alone, would be an undeniable official
misdemeanor—not only a misdemeanor per se, but declared to be so by
the act itself, and the party made indictable and punishable in a criminal
proceeding. If Andrew Johnson escapes with bare removal from office, if he
be not FINED AND INCARCERATED IN THE PENITENTIARY AFTERWARD UNDER CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS, he may thank the weakness or the clemency of Congress and not
his own innocence.

We shall propose to prove on the trial that Andrew Johnson was guilty of
misprision of bribery by offering to General Grant, if he would unite with
him in his lawless violence, to assume in his stead the penalties and to
endure the imprisonment denounced by the law Bribery is one of the
offenses specifically enumerated for which the President may be impeached
and removed from office. By the Constitution, article two, section two,
the President has power to nominate and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint all officers of the United States whose
appointments are not therein otherwise provided for and which shall be
established by law, and to fill up all vacancies that may happen during
the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at
the end of their nest session. Nowhere, either in the Constitution or by
statute, has the President power to create a vacancy during the session of
the Senate and fill it without the advice and consent of the Senate, and
yet, on the 21st day of February, 1868, while the Senate was in session,
he notified the head of the War Department that he was removed from office
and his successor ad interim appointed. Here is a plain, recorded
violation of the Constitution and laws, which, if it stood alone, would
make every honest and intelligent man give his vote for impeachment. The
President had persevered in his lawless course through along series of
unjustifiable acts. When the so called Confederate States of America were
conquered and had laid down their arms and surrendered their territory to
the victorious Union the government and final disposition of the conquered
country BELONGED TO CONGRESS ALONE, according to every principle of the
law of nations.

Neither the Executive nor the judiciary had any right to interfere with it
except so far as was necessary to control it by military rule until the
SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE NATION had provided for its civil administration.
No power but Congress had any right to say WHETHER EVER OR WHEN they
should be admitted to the Union as States and entitled to the privileges
of the Constitution of the United States. And yet Andrew Johnson, with
unblushing hardihood, undertook to rule them by his own power alone; to
lead them into full communion with the Union: direct them what governments
to erect and what constitutions to adopt, and to send Representatives and
Senators to Congress according to his instructions. When admonished by
express act of Congress, more than once repeated, he disregarded the
warning and continued his lawless usurpation. He is since known to have
obstructed the re-establishment of those governments by the authority of
Congress, and has advised the inhabitants to resist the legislation of
Congress. In my judgment his conduct with regard to that transaction was a
high-handed usurpation of power which ought long ago to have brought him
to impeachment and trial and to have removed him from his position of
great mischief.

I trust that when we come to vote upon this question we shall remember
that although it is the duty of the President to see that the laws be
executed, THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE NATION RESTS IN CONGRESS, who have
been placed around the executive as muniments to defend his rights, and as
watchmen to enforce his obedience to the law and the Constitution. His
oath to obey the Constitution and our duty to compel him to do it are a
tremendous obligation, heavier than was ever assumed by mortal rulers. We
are to protect or to destroy the liberty and happiness of a mighty people,
and to take care that they progress in civilization and defend themselves
against every kind of tyranny. As we deal with the first great political
malefactor so will be the result of our efforts to perpetuate the
happiness and good government of the human race. The God of our fathers,
who inspired them with the thought of universal freedom, will hold us
responsible for the noble institutions which they projected and expected
us to carry out.

The Clerk then read the Resolution and the House proceeded to vote, as
follows:

Resolution providing for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of
the United States:

Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be
impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office.

Yeas—Messrs. Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnell, Delos R. Ashley, James
M. Ashley, Bailey, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Beaman, Beatty, Benton, Bingham,
Blaine, Blair, Boutwell, Bromwell, Broomall. Buckland, Butler, Cake,
Churchill, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney Clarke, Cobb, Coburn, Cook, Cornell,
Covode, Cullom, Dawes, Dodge, Driggs, Eckley, Eggleston, Eliot,
Farnsworth, Ferries. Ferry, Fields, Gravely, Griswold, Halsy, Harding,
Higby, Hill, Hooper, Hopkins, Asahel W. Hubbard, Chester D. Hubbard,
Hulburd, Hunter, Ingersoll, Jenckes, Judd, Julian, Kelley, Kelsey,
Ketcham, Kitchen Laflin, George V. Lawrence, William Lawrence, Lincoln,
Loan, Logan, Loughridge, Lynch, Mallory, Marvin, McCarthy, McClurg,
Mercur, Miller, Moore, Moorhead, Morrell, Mullins, Myers, Newcomb, Nunn,
O’Neill, Orth, Paine, Perham, Peters, Pike, Pile, Plants, Poland, Polsley,
Price, Raum, Robertson, Sawyer, Schenck, Scofield, Selye, Shanks, Smith,
Spalding, Starkweather, Aaron F. Stevens, Thaddeus Stevens, Stokes, Taffe,
Taylor, Trowbridge, Twitchell, Upson, Van Aernam. Burt Van Horn, Van Wyck,
Ward, Cadwalader C. Washburn, Elihu B. Washburn, Williams, Washburn,
Welker, Thomas Williams, James F. Wilson, John T. Wilson, Stephen F.
Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge and the Speaker—126.

Nays—Messrs. Adams, Archer, Axtell, Barnes, Barnum, Beck, Boyer,
Brooks, Burr, Cary, Chanler, Eldridge, Fox, Getz, Glossbrenner, Galladay,
Grover, Haight, Holman, Hotchkiss, Richard D. Hubbard, Morrissey, Mungen,
Niblack, Nicholson, Phelps, Pruyn, Randall, Ross, Sitgreaves, Stewart,
Stone, Taber, Lawrence S. Trimble, Van Auken, Van Trump, Wood and Woodward—47.

On motion of Mr. Stevens the following resolutions were adopted:

Resolved, That a committee of two be appointed to go to the Senate and, at
the bar thereof, in the name of the House of Representatives and of all
the people of the United States, to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of
the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and acquaint
the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit
particular articles of impeachment against him and make good the same; and
that the committee do demand that the Senate take order for the appearance
of said Andrew Johnson to answer to said impeachment.

Resolved, That a committee of seven be appointed to prepare and report
articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, with power to send for persons, papers and records, and to take
testimony under oath.

The Speaker announced the following committee under these resolutions:

Committee to Communicate to the Senate to the Senate the action of the
House ordering AN IMPEACHMENT of the of the President of the United
States.—-Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, and John A. Bingham, of
Ohio.

Committee to declare articles of Articles of Impeachment against the
President of the United States.—George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts;
Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania; John A. Bingham, of Ohio; James F.
Wilson, of Iowa; John A. Logan, of Illinois; George W. Julian, of Indiana,
and Hamilton Ward, of New York.

CHAPTER VII. — IMPEACHMENT REPORTED TO THE SENATE.

THE PRESIDENT’S ANSWER.

On February 25th, 1868, Messrs. Stevens and Bingham, a committee of the
House, appeared at the bar of the Senate, and Mr. Stevens said:

Mr. President, in obedience to the order of the House of Representatives,
we appear before you, and in the name of the House of Representatives and
of all the people of the United States, we do impeach Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office;
and we further inform the Senate that the House of Representatives will in
due time exhibit particular articles of impeachment against hint and make
good the same; and in their name we demand that the Senate take order for
the appearance of said Andrew Johnson to answer said impeachment.

The committee retired, and after debate the following resolution was
adopted by the Senate:

Resolved, That the Message of the House of Representatives relating to the
impeachment of Andrew Johnson. President of the United States, be referred
to a select committee of seven, to consider and report thereon.

On the 26th, Mr. Howard, from the select committee appointed to consider
and report upon the Message of the House of Representatives in relation to
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
reported the following resolution:

Whereas, the House of Representatives on the 25th day of the present
month, by two of their members, Messrs. Thaddeus Stevens and John A.
Bingham, at the bar of the Senate, impeached Andrew Johnson, President of
the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and informed
the Senate that the House of Representatives will in due time exhibit
particular articles of impeachment against him and make good the same; and
likewise demanded that the Senate take order for the appearance of said
Andrew Johnson, to answer to the said impeachment: Therefore,

Resolved, That the Senate will take proper order thereon, of which due
notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.

On the 28th, Mr. Howard, of the Select Committee appointed to prepare
rules for the government of trials of impeachment, reported a series of
rules, which were adopted by the Senate on March 2nd, after a three days
debate.

On the same day, the following gentlemen were elected by the House of
Representatives as Managers to conduct the prosecution of the impeachment
of the President before the Senate: Hons. Jno. A. Bingham, of Ohio; George
S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts; James F. Wilson, of Iowa; Benj. F. Butler,
of Massachusetts; John A. Logan, of Illinois; Thomas Wilson, of
Pennsylvania, and Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania.

On March 3rd it was ordered by the Senate:

That the Secretary of the Senate inform the House of Representatives that
the Senate is ready to receive the managers appointed by the House of
Representatives to carry to the Senate articles of impeachment against
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

In the Senate, on the 4th, the following formal proceedings were had:

The managers of the impeachment on the part of the House of
Representatives appeared at the bar, and their presence was announced by
the Sergeant-at-Arms.

The President pro tempore: The managers of the impeachment will advance
within the bar and take the seats provided for them.

The managers came within the bar and took the seats assigned to them in
the area in front of the Vice President’s Chair.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives advanced and took a seat on
the right of the President pro tempore of the Senate.

Mr. Manager Bingham:

Mr. President, the managers on the part of the House of Representatives,
by order of the House, are ready at the bar of the Senate, whenever it may
please the Senate to hear them, to present articles of impeachment and in
maintenance of the impeachment preferred against Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, by the House of Representatives.

The President pro tempore:

The Sergeant-at-arms will make proclamation.

The Sergeant-at-arms:

Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of
imprisonment, while the House of Representatives is exhibiting to the
Senate of the United States, articles of impeachment against Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States.

The managers then rose and remained standing, with the exception of Mr.
Stevens, who was too feeble to do so, while Mr. Manager Bingham read the
articles of impeachment, as follows:

Articles exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States,
in the name of themselves and all the people of the United States, against
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, in maintenance and support
of their impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors in ofce.

ARTICLE I.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 21st day
of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, at
Washington, in the District of Columbia, unmindful of the high duties of
his office, of his oath of office, and of the requirement of the
Constitution that he should take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, did unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution and laws of
the United States issue an order in writing for the removal of Edwin M.
Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, said Edwin
M. Stanton having been theretofore duly appointed and commissioned by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, as such
secretary, and said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the
twelfth day of August in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven, and during the recess of said Senate, having suspended by his
order Edwin M. Stanton from said office, and within twenty days after the
first day of the next meeting of said Senate, that is to say, on the
twelfth day of December in the year last aforesaid having reported to said
Senate such suspension with the evidence and reasons for his action in the
case and the name of the person designated to perform the duties of such
office temporarily until the next meeting of the Senate, and said Senate
thereafterwards, on the thirteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord
eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, having duly considered the evidence and
reasons reported by said Andrew Johnson for said suspension, and having
refused to concur in said suspension, whereby and by force of the
provisions of an act entitled “An Act regulating the tenure of certain
civil offices,” passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven,
said Edwin M. Stanton did forthwith resume the functions of his office,
whereof the said Andrew Johnson had then and there due notice, and said
Edwin M. Stanton, by reason of the premises, on said 21st day of February,
being lawfully entitled to hold said office of Secretary for the
Department of War, which said order for the removal of said Edwin M.
Stanton is in substance as follows, that is to say:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Feb. 21, 1868.

Sir:—By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and laws of the United States you are hereby removed
from office as Secretary for the Department of War, and your functions as
such will terminate upon the receipt of this communication.

You will transfer to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General
of the army, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as
Secretary of War ad interim. all records, books, papers, and other public
property now in your custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson. To the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton,
Washington, D. C.

Which order was unlawfully issued with intent then and there to violate
the act entitled “An Act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,”
passed March 2d, 1867, and with the further intent contrary to the
provisions of said act, in violation thereof, and contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and without the
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, the said Senate
then and there being in session, to remove said Edwin M. Stanton from the
office of Secretary for the Department of War, the said. Edwin M. Stanton
being then and there Secretary for the Department of War, and being then
and there in the due and lawful execution and discharge of the duties of
said office, whereby said Andrew Johnson. President of the United States,
did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE II.

That on the said twenty-first of February, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of
Columbia, said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful
of the high duties of his office, of his oath of office, and in violation
of the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the provisions
of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil
offices,” passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, without
the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, said Senate
then and there being in session, and without authority of law, did, with
intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, and the act
aforesaid, issue and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority
in substance as follows, that is to say:

Executive Mansion. Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Sir:—The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from
office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby authorized
and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, and will immediately
enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books,
papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson. To Brevet Major General Lorenzo
Thomas. Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Then and there being no vacancy in said offce of Secretary for the
Department of War, whereby said Andrew Johnson. President of the United
States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in
office.

ARTICLE III.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the
twenty-first day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did
commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office in this, that,
without authority of law, while the Senate of the United States was then
and there in session, he did appoint one Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary
for the Department of War ad interim, without the advice and consent of
the Senate, and with intent to violate the Constitution of the United
States, and no vacancy having happened in said office of Secretary for the
Department of War during the recess of the Senate, and no vacancy existing
in said office at the time, and which said appointment, so made by said
Andrew Johnson, of said Lorenzo Thomas, is in substance as follows, that
is to say:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Feb. 21, 1868. Sir:—The Hon.
Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office as Secretary for
the Department of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as
Secretary of War ad interim, and will immediately enter upon the discharge
of the duties pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton, has been instructed to transfer to you all the records,
books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson. To Brevet Major General Lorenzo
Thomas, Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C

ARTICLE IV.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office and of his oath of office, in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, on the twenty-first day of
February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully
conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons to the House of
Representatives unknown, with intent, by intimidation and threats,
unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there the
Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed under the laws of the
United Stales, from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of
War, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the United
States, and of the provisions of an act entitled “An act to define and
punish certain conspiracies,” approved July thirty-first, eighteen hundred
and sixty-one, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high crime in
office.

ARTICLE V.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the twenty-first
day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, and on divers other days and times in said year, before the
second day of March, in the year, of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did
unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons to the
House of Representatives unknown, to prevent and hinder the execution of
an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,”
passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and in pursuance of
said conspiracy, did unlawfully attempt to prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then
and there being Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed and
commissioned under the laws of the United States, from holding said
office, whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the Unite States,
did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE VI.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the twenty-first
day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully
conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas by force to seize, take and possess the
property of the United States in the Department of War, and then and there
in the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary for said
Department, contrary to the provisions of an act entitled “An act to
define and punish certain conspiracies,” approved July thirty-one,
eighteen hundred and sixty one, and with intent to violate and disregard
an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,”
passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, whereby said Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit a high
crime in office.

ARTICLE VII.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the twenty-first
day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully
conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take,
and possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, in
the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton Secretary for said Department,
with intent to violate and disregard the act entitled “An act regulating
the tenure of certain civil offices” passed March second, eighteen hundred
and sixty-seven, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE VIII.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office and of his oath of office, with intent
unlawfully to control the disbursements of the moneys appropriated for the
military service and for the Department of War, on the twenty-first day of
February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully
and contrary to the provisions of an act entitled “An act regulating the
tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March second, eighteen hundred
and sixty-seven, and in violation of the Constitution of the United
States, and without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United
States, and while the Senate was then and there in session, there being no
vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and with
intent to violate and disregard the act aforesaid, then and there issue
and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority in writing, in
substance as follows, that is to say:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Feb. 21, 1868.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books,
papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson. To Brevet Major General Lorenzo
Thomas, Adjutant General, United States Army, Washington, D. C.

Whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and
there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE IX.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the
twenty-second day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, in
disregard of the Constitution, and the laws of the United States duly
enacted, as commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, dial
bring before himself then and there William H. Emory, a major-general by
brevet in the army of the United States, actually in command of the
department of Washington and the military forces thereof, and did then and
there, as such commander-in-chief, declare to and instruct said Emory that
part of a law of the United states, passed March second, eighteen hundred
and sixty-seven entitled “An act making appropriations for the support of
the army for the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and
sixty-eight and for other purposes,” especially the second section
thereof, which provides, among other things, that “all orders and
instructions relating to military operations, issued by the President or
Secretary of War, shall be issued through the General of the Army, and, in
case of his inability, through the next in rank,” was unconstitutional,
and in contravention of the commission of said Emory, and which said
provision of law had been theretofore duly and legally promulgated by
General Orders for the government and direction of the army of the United
States, as the said Andrew Johnson then and there well knew, with intent
thereby to induce said Emory, in his official capacity as commander of the
department of Washington, to violate the provisions of said act, and to
take and receive, act upon, and obey such orders as he, the said Andrew
Johnson, might make and give, and which should not be issued through the
General of the army of the United States, according to the provisions of
said act, and with the further intent thereby to enable him, the said
Andrew Johnson, to prevent the execution of the act entitled “An act
regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March second
eighteen hundred and sixty-seven and to unlawfully prevent Edwin M.
Stanton then being Secretary for the Department of War, from holding said
office and discharging the duties thereof, whereby said Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty
of a high misdemeanor in office.

And the House of Representatives by protestation saving to themselves the
liberty of exhibiting at any time hereafter any further articles, or other
accusation or impeachment against the said Andrew Johnson, President or
the United States, and also of replying to his answers which he shall wake
unto the articles herein preferred against him, and of offering proof to
the same, and every part thereof, and to all and every other article,
accusation, or impeachment which shall be exhibited by them, as the case
shall require, do demand that the said Andrew Johnson may be put to answer
the high crimes and misdemeanors in office herein charged against him, and
that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments may be
thereupon had and given as may be agreeable to law and justice.

ARTICLE X.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office, and the dignity and proprieties thereof, and of
the harmony and courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between
the executive and legislative branches of the government of the United
States, designing and intending to set aside the rightful authority and
powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred,
contempt and reproach, the Congress of the United States, and the several
branches thereof, to impair and destroy the regard and respect of all the
good people of the United States for the Congress and legislative powers
thereof, (which all officers of the government ought inviolably to
preserve and maintain.) and to excite the odium and resentment of all the
good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it duly
and constitutionally enacted; and in pursuance of his said design and
intent, openly and publicly, and before divers assemblages of the citizens
of the United States, convened in divers parts thereof to meet and receive
said Andrew Johnson as the Chief Magistrate of the United States, did, on
the eighteenth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-six, and on divers other days and times, as well before
as afterward, make and deliver, with a loud voice, certain intemperate,
inflammatory, and scandalous harangues, and did therein utter loud threats
and bitter menaces, as well against Congress as the laws of the United
States duly enacted thereby, amid the cries, jeer, and laughter of the
multitudes then assembled and in hearing.

ARTICLE XI.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the
high duties of his office, and of his oath of offce, and in disregard of
the Constitution and laws of the United States, did, heretofore, to wit,
on the eighteenth day of August, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-six, at
the City of Washington, and the District of Columbia, by public speech,
declare and affirm, in substance, that the thirty-ninth Congress of the
United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the
Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, but, on the
contrary, was a Congress of only part of the States, thereby denying, and
intending to deny, that the legislation of said Congress was valid or
obligatory upon him, the said Andrew Johnson, except in so far as he saw
fit to approve the same, and also thereby denying, and intending to deny,
the power of the said thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the United States; and, in pursuance of said declaration,
the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, afterwards,
to-wit, on the twenty first day of February, A. D. eighteen hundred and
sixty-eight, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, did,
unlawfully, and in disregard of the requirements of the Constitution that
he should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, attempt to
prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of
certain civil offices,” passed March second, eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven, by unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to
devise and contrive means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from
forthwith resuming the functions of the office of Secretary for the
Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in
the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of said Edwin M.
Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and,
also, by further unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to
devise and contrive means, then and there, to prevent the execution of an
act entitled “An act making appropriations for the support of the army for
the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight,
and for other purposes,” approved March second, eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven; and also, to prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act
to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,” passed
March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, whereby the said Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, did then, to wit, on the
twenty-first day of February, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, at
the city of Washington, commit, and was guilty of, a high misdemeanor in
office.

Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Attest: Edward
McPherson, Clerk of the House of Representatives.

At the conclusion of the reading of the Articles of Impeachment, the
President of the Senate responded that “the Senate will take order upon
the subject of impeachment, of which proper notice will be given to the
House of Representatives.”

In addition to the Speaker and Managers, a large number of the members of
the House of Representatives were present to witness the extraordinary and
impressive proceedings, and at its close all withdrew and the Senate
resumed the routine business of the day’s session.

On Monday, March 23rd, 1868, the President, by his attorneys, appeared at
the bar of the Senate and made answer to the several Articles of
Impeachment, as follows:

(Answer to only the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 11th Articles, are here given, as
the 2nd, 3rd and 11th were the only Articles put to vote—all others
being abandoned, and as the 1st Article, though never put to vote,
contained practically all there was of the impeachment.)

ANSWER TO ARTICLE I.

For answer to the first article he said: That Edwin M. Stanton was
appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January,
A. D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States,
during the first term of his presidency, and was commissioned, according
to the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hold the said office
during the pleasure of the President; that the office of Secretary for the
Department of War was created by an act of the first Congress in its first
session, passed on the 7th day of August, A.D. 1789, and in and by that
act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department
of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be
enjoined on and intrusted to him by the President of the United States,
agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope
of said department; and furthermore, that the Secretary shall conduct the
business of the said department in such a manner as the President of the
United States shall, from time to time, order and instruct.

And this respondent further answering, says that by force of the act
aforesaid and by reason of his appointment aforesaid the said Stanton
became the principal officer in one of the executive departments of the
government within the true, intent and meaning of the second section of
the second article of the Constitution of the United States, and according
to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of
the United States: and, in accordance with the settled and uniform
practice of each and every President of the United States, the said
Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said
office of Secretary for the Department of War must continue to be, one of
the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person
intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon
him or entrusted to him by the President touching the department
aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the
President, the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, made responsible.

And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the office of
President of the United States upon, and by reason of, the death of
Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 13th day of
April, 1865, and the said Stanton was then holding the said office of
Secretary for the Department of War under and by reason of the appointment
and commission aforesaid; and, not having been removed from the said
office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same
under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the
President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned: and at no
time received any appointment or commission save as above detailed.

And this respondent, further answering, says that on and prior to the 5th
day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United
States, responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of
War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the
person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult
public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, became satisfied that he could not allow the said
Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of
War without hazard of the public interest; that the relations between the
said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort
to him for advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely
responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by
law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the
President; and thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the
United States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to
control the conduct of the business of that executive department of the
government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did
necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no
longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. And
this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as
President of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, to give effect to such his decision and determination, did, on the
5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of
which the following is a true copy:

Sir:—Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say
that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

War Department, Washington, August 5, 1867.

Sir:-Your note of this day has been received, stating that public
considerations of a high character constrain you “to say that my
resignation its Secretary of War will be accepted.”

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high
character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this
department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War
before the next meeting of Congress.

Very respectfully yours. Edwin M. Stanton.

This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion
that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the
Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States
according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having
regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said
Secretary, and having regard to the permanent executive authority of the
office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests,
to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary
for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the
respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what
act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the
United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically
settled by the first Congress of the United States, and had been so
considered and uniformly and in great numbers of instances acted on by
each Congress and President of the United States, in succession, from
President Washington to, and including President Lincoln, and from the
first Congress to the thirty-ninth Congress, that the Constitution of the
United States conferred on the President, as part of the executive power
and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the
executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care
that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of
removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by
the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the
Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the
executive departments, upon this question of constitutional executive
power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said
Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution
of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the
President of the United States, and that consequently, it could be
lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof;
and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States,
and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best
judgment upon this question, did, in good faith and with an earnest desire
to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make
the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a
message dated on the 2nd day of March, 1867, that the power last mentioned
was conferred and the duty of exercising it, in fit cases, was imposed on
the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the
President could not be deprived of this, power or relieved of this duty,
nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate
jointly, either in part or whole.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of “An act
regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, by
a constitutional majority of both houses of Congress, it was enacted as
follows:

“That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who
shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly
qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office
until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly
qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the
Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the
Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General shall hold
their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by
whom they may have been appointed, and one month thereafter, subject to
removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended
to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was
passed, that the power to remove executive officers for cause might, by
law, be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly;
and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion
above expressed, and verily believed, as he still believes, that the said
first section of the last mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and
void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States,
yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority
in each of the two houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it
to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said
Stanton, on which it was this respondent’s duty to act, was within or
without the terms of that first section of the act; or, if within it,
whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the
act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the
Department of War, and having, in his capacity of President of the United
States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of
the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first
section of the last-named act.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that although a case thus
existed which, in his judgment as President of the United States, called
for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from
the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and although this
respondent was of the opinion, as is above shown, that under the
Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton
from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and
also this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the
case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the last
named act, and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this
respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of
President of the United States to come to some judgment and determination
thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired
and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and
effect of the said first section of the last named act, and also the
broader question of the executive power conferred on the President of the
United States, by the Constitution of the United States, to remove one of
the principal officers of one of the executive departments for cause
seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined
that if, from causes over which he could exert no control, it should
become absolutely necessary to raise and have, in some way, determined
either or both of the said last named questions, it was in accordance with
the Constitution of the United States, and was required of the President
thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the
legislative and executive departments of the government had disagreed,
which involved powers considered by all branches of the government, during
its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the
Constitution of the United States to the President, and to be necessary
for the complete and proper execution of his constitutional duties, should
be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the
government instrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by
it to the duty, not only of determining finally the construction of and
effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the
Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them inoperative when
found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted
for the government of all their servants. And to these ends, first, that,
through the action of the Senate of the United States, the absolute duty
of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as
one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official
conduct he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if,
possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the
questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed
then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise,
should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end
or purpose, this respondent, as President of the United States, on the
12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of
the said Stanton of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to
the said Stanton the order following namely:

Executive Mansion, Washington, August 12, 1867.

Sir:—By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby
suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any
and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day
been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all
records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and
charge. To Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply:

War Department, Washington City, August 12, 1867.

Sir:—Your note of this date has been received, informing me that, by
virtue of the powers vested in you as President by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, I am suspended from office as Secretary of War,
and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same,
and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who
has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad
interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my
custody and charge. Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny
your right, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without
the advice and consent of the senate, and without legal cause, to suspend
me from office as Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all
functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to
compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public
property in my custody as Secretary, But inasmuch as the General
commanding the Armies of the United has been appointed ad interim and has
notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative
but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

To the President.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that it is provided in and
by the second section of “An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil
offices,” that the President may suspend an officer from the performance
of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein
designated, until the next meeting of the Senate, and until the case shall
be acted on by the senate; that this respondent, as President of the
United States, was advised, and he verily believed and still believes,
that the executive power of removal from office confided to him by the
Constitution as aforesaid includes the power of suspension from office at
the pleasure of the President, and this respondent, by the order
aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next
meeting of the Senate, or until the Senate should have acted upon the
case, but by force of the power and authority vested in him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely and at the
pleasure of the President, and the order, in form aforesaid, was made
known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A.
D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in and by the act of
February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that,
in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War,
it shall be lawful for the President, in case he shall think it necessary,
to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a
successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term
of six months; and this respondent, being advised and believing that such
law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867,
did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the armies of the
United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim,
in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not
until the next meeting of the Senate and until the Senate should act on
the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the
limitation of six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a
copy of the last-named order was made known to the Senate of the United
States on the 12th day of December, 1867, as will be hereinafter more
fully stated: and in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if
it should become necessary to submit the said question to a judicial
determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned
order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of
the said question, or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in further pursuance of
his intention and design, if possible, to perform what he judged to be his
imperative duty, to prevent the said Stanton from longer holding the
office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time
avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of
removal from executive office confided to the President by the
Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the
construction and effect of the first section of the said “act regulating
the tenure of certain civil offices,” while he should not, by any act of
his, abandon and relinquish, either a power which he believed the
Constitution had conferred on the President of the United States, to
enable him to perform the duties of his office, or, a power designedly
left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid,
this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the
senate of the United States a message a copy whereof is hereunto annexed
and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons
which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it
material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated
his views concerning the constitutional power of removal vested in the
President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the
said first section of the last mentioned act, as respected the power of
the President to remove the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary
for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus
perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative
duty in reference to the said Stanton, without derogating from the powers
which this respondent believed were confided to the President, by the
Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising, judicially,
any questions respecting the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that this hope not having
been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said
Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the
settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid respecting the
powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution
of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid,
that the first section of the last mentioned act did not affect the case
of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President
that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the
said Stanton, for the said office of Secretary for the Department of War,
or else he was compelled to take such steps as might, in the judgment of
the President, be lawful and necessary to raise, for a judicial decision,
the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the
said office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to
quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the
same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the
21st day of February, 1868 issue the order for the removal of the said
Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order
authorizing the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad
interim, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial
allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said
Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of
the said ofce of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the
said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the
said office against the will of the President of the United States. He
denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was
unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to
violate the act entitled “An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil
offices.” He denies that the said order was a violation of the last
mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the
Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath
of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to
violate the Constitution of the United States or any law thereof, or this
respondent’s oath of office; and he respectfully, but earnestly insists
that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed
to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this
honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative
official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive matters, in the
said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein
stated and set forth, do, by law, constitute a high misdemeanor in office,
within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United
States.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE II.

And for answer to the second article, this respondent says that he admits
he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth
in said second article, bearing date at Washington, District of Columbia,
February 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas,
Adjutant General United States army, Washington, District of Columbia, and
he further admits that the same was so issued without the advice and
consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session; but he denies
that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States, or any law
thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the
United States or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this
respondent refers to his answer to said first articles for a full
statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued,
and adopts the same as part of his answer to this article; and he further
denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of
Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did then and there commit
or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent
maintains and will insist:

1. That at the date and delivery of said writing there was a vacancy
existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

2. That notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in
session, it was lawful and according to long and well established usage to
empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad
interim.

3. That if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be held to
be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by the issuing of
said order or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War
ad interim.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE III.

And for answer to said third article, this respondent says that he abides
by his answer to said first and second articles in so far as the same are
responsive to the allegations contained in the said third article, and,
without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as
an answer to this third article as fully as if here again set out at
length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that
this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the
Department of War ad interim, this respondent denies that he gave any
other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written
authority set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered
said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim; and
he denies that the same amounts to an appointment, and insists that it is
only a designation of an officer of that department to act temporarily as
Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, until an appointment
should be made. But whether the said written authority amounts to an
appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent
denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution
of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order
the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal
sense of that term. He further denies that there was no vacancy in said
office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said
written authority.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE XI.

And in answer to the eleventh article, this respondent denies that on the
18th day of August, in the year 1866, at the City of Washington, in the
District of Columbia, he did, by public speech or otherwise, declare or
affirm, in substance or at all, that the thirty-ninth Congress of the
United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the
constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, or that he did
then and there declare or affirm that the said thirty-ninth Congress was a
Congress of only part of the States in any sense or meaning other than
that ten States of the Union were denied representation therein; or that
he made any or either of the declarations or affirmations in this behalf,
in the said article alleged, as denying or intending to deny that the
legislation of said thirty-ninth Congress was valid or obligatory upon
this respondent, except so far as this respondent saw fit to approve the
same; and as to the allegation in said article, that he did thereby intend
or mean to be understood that the said Congress had not power to propose
amendments to the Constitution, this respondent says that in said address
he said nothing in reference to the subject of amendments of the
Constitution, nor was the question of the competency of the said Congress
to propose such amendments, without the participation of said excluded
States at the time of said address in any way mentioned or considered or
referred to by this respondent, nor in what he did say had he any intent
regarding the same, and he denies the allegation so made to the contrary
thereof. But this respondent, in further answer to, and in respect of, the
said allegations of the said eleventh article hereinbefore traversed and
denied, claims and insists upon his personal and official right of freedom
of opinion and freedom of speech, and his duty in his political relations
as President of the United States to the people of the United States in
the exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, in the same
manner, form and effect as he has in this behalf stated the same in his
answer to the said tenth article, and with the same effect as if he here
repeated the same; and he further claims and insists, as in said answer to
said tenth article he has claimed and insisted, that he is not subject to
question, inquisition, impeachment, or inculpation, in any form or manner,
of or concerning such rights of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech or
his alleged exercise thereof.

And this respondent further denies that on the 21st day of February, in
the year 1868, or at any other time, at the City of Washington, in the
District of Columbia, in pursuance of any such declaration as is in that
behalf in said eleventh article alleged, or otherwise, he did unlawfully,
and in disregard of the requirement of the Constitution that he should
take care that the laws should be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent
the execution of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain
civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising or
contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive, means by which he should
prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of
Secretary for the Department of War, or by lawfully devising or
contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive, means to prevent the
execution of an act entitled “An act making appropriations for the support
of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other
purposes,” approved March 2, 1867, or to prevent the execution of an act
entitled “An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel
States,” passed March 2, 1867.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, says
that he has, in his answer to the first article, set forth in detail the
acts, steps, and proceedings done and taken by this respondent to and
toward or in the matter of the suspension or removal of the said Edwin M.
Stanton in or from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, with
the times, modes, circumstances, intents, views, purposes, and opinions of
official obligation and duty under and with which such acts, steps, and
proceedings were done and taken; and he makes answer to this eleventh
article of the matters in his answer to the first article, pertaining to
the suspension or removal of said Edwin M. Stanton, to the same intent and
effect as if they were here repeated and set forth.

And this deponent, further answering the said eleventh article, denies
that by means or reason of anything in said article alleged, this
respondent, as President of the United States, did, on the 21st day of
February, 1868, or at any other day or time, commit, or that he was guilty
of, a high misdemeanor in office.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, says
that the same and the matters therein contained do not charge or allege
the commission of any act whatever by this respondent, in his office of
President of the United States, nor the omission by this respondent of any
act of official obligation or duty in his office of President of the
United States; nor does the said article nor the matters therein contained
name designate, describe, or define any act or mode or form of attempt,
device, contrivance, or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance or
means, whereby this respondent can know or understand what act or mode or
form of attempt, device, contrivance or means, or of attempt at device,
contrivance, or means are imputed to or charged against this respondent,
in his office of President of the United States, or intended so to be, or
whereby this respondent can more fully or definitely make answer unto the
said article than he hereby does.

And this respondent, in submitting to this honorable court this his answer
to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him, respectfully
reserves leave to amend and add to the same from time to time, as may
become necessary or proper, and when and as such necessity and propriety
shall appear. Andrew Johnson Henry Stanbery, B. R. Curtis, Thomas A. R.
Nelson, William M. Evarts. W. S. Groesbeck. Of Counsel.

CHAPTER VIII. — ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL

On Thursday, March 5th, 1868, the Senate of the United States was
organized for the trial of the charges brought against Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, by the House of Representatives—Honorable
Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice of the United States, presiding.

The following gentlemen appeared as managers of the prosecution on the
part of the House:

Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio; Hon. George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts;
Hon. James F. Wilson, of Iowa; Hon. John A. Logan, of Illinois; Hon.
Thomas F. Williams, of Pennsylvania; Hon. Benjamin F. Butler, of
Massachusetts; and Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania.

The following gentlemen appeared as counsel for the President:

Messrs. Henry Stanbery, of Kentucky; Benjamin R. Curtis, of Massachusetts;
Thomas A. R. Nelson, of Tennessee; William M. Evarts, of New York, and
William S. Groesbeck, of Ohio.

The following gentlemen comprised the United States Senate, sitting for
the trial of the President:

California-Cornelius Cole, (R)-John Conness, (R). Connecticut-James Dixon,
(D)-Orris S. Ferry, (R). Delaware-Willard Saulsbury, (D)-James A. Bayard,
(D). Illinois-Lyman Trumbull, (R)-Richard Yates, (R). Indiana-Oliver P.
Morton, (R)-Thomas A. Hendricks, (D). Iowa-James W. Grimes, (R)-James
Harlan, (R). Kansas-Samuel C. Pomeroy, (R)-Edmund G. Ross, (R).
Kentucky-Thomas C. McCreary, (D)-Garrett Davis, (D). Massachusetts-Charles
Sumner, (R)-Henry Wilson, (R). Maine-William Pitt Fessenden, (R)-Lot M.
Morrill, (R). Maryland-Reverdy Johnson, (D)-George Vickers, (D).
Michigan-Zachariah Chandler, (R)-Jacob M. Howard, (R). Missouri-John B.
Henderson, (R)-Charles D. Drake, (R). Minnesota-Alexander Ramsay,
(R)-Daniel S. Norton, (D). New York-Roscoe Conkling, (R)-Edwin D. Morgan,
(R). Nevada-James W. Nye, (R)-William M. Stewart, (R). Nebraska-Thomas W.
Tipton, (R)-John M. Thayer, (R). New Jersey-Alexander G. Cattell, (R)-F.
T. Frelinghuysen, (R). New Hampshire-Alexander H. Craigin, (R)-Jas. W.
Patterson, (R). Ohio-John Sherman, (R)-Benjamin F. Wade, (R). Oregon-Henry
W. Corbett, (R)-Geo. H. Williams, (R). Pennsylvania-Simon Cameron,
(R)-Charles R. Buckalew, (D). Rhode Island-Henry B. Anthony, (R)-William
Sprague, (R). Tennessee—David T. Patterson, (D)-Joseph S. Fowler,
(R). Vermont-George F. Edmunds, (R)-Justin S. Morrill, (R). West
Virginia-W. T. Willey,(R)-Peter (3. Van Winkle, (R). Wisconsin-James R.
Doolittle, (D)-Timothy O. Howe, (R). [Forty-two Republicans and twelve
Democrats.]

The House bringing the Impeachment was three-fourths Republican—the
Senate that tried it was more than three-fourths Republican—the
managers on the part of the House were all Republicans—the counsel
for the President were three Democrats and one Republican—the
President on trial was a Democrat—the interrogatories propounded to
witnesses were generally received or rejected, according as their probable
answers would make for or against the President—the people of the
country at large were, as a rule, rigidly divided on party lines relative
to the case, Republicans demanding the conviction of the President and
Democrats urging his acquittal. The Chief Justice presiding in the trial
was the only strictly nonpartisan factor in the case.

The answer of the President to the Articles of Impeachment having been
presented on the 23rd of March, 1868—the replication of the House
duly made, and all the preliminary steps completed, the proceedings in the
actual trial commenced on the 30th day of March, 1868. Gen. Butler, one of
the managers on the part of the House, made the opening argument for the
prosecution, from which the following extracts are taken:

The first eight articles set out in several distinct forms the acts of the
respondent removing Mr. Stanton from office, and appointing Mr. Thomas, ad
interim, differing in legal effect in the purposes for which and the
intent with which, either or both of the acts were done, and the legal
duties and rights infringed, and the acts of Congress violated in so
doing.

All the articles allege these acts to be in contravention of his oath of
office, and in disregard of the duties thereof.

If they are so, however, the President might have the POWER to do them
under the law; still, being so done, they are acts of official misconduct,
and as we have seen, impeachable.

The President has the legal power to do many acts which, if done in
disregard of his duty, or for improper purposes, then the exercise of that
power is an official misdemeanor.

Ex. gr: he has the power of pardon; if exercised in a given case for a
corrupt motive, as for the payment of money, or wantonly pardoning all
criminals, it would be a misdemeanor. Examples might be multiplied
indefinitely.

Article first, stripped of legal verbiage, alleges that, having suspended
Mr. Stanton and reported the same to the Senate, which refused to concur
in the suspension, and Stanton having rightfully resumed the duties of his
office, the respondent, with knowledge of the facts, issued an order which
is recited for Stanton’s removal, with intent to violate the act of March
2, 1867, to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices, and with the
further intent to remove Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, then
in the lawful discharge of its duties, in contravention of said act
without the advice and consent of the Senate, and against the Constitution
of the United States.

Article 2 charges that the President, without authority of law, on the
21st of February, 1868, issued letter of authority to Lorenzo Thomas to
act as Secretary of War ad interim, the Senate being in session, in
violation of the tenure-of-office act, and with intent to violate it and
the Constitution, there being no vacancy in the office of Secretary of
War.

Article 3 alleges the same act as done without authority of law, and
alleges an intent to violate the Constitution.

Article 4 charges that the President conspired with Lorenzo Thomas and
divers other persons, with intent, by INTIMIDATION AND THREATS, to prevent
Mr. Stanton from holding the office of Secretary of War, in violation of
the Constitution and of the act of July 31, 1861.

Article 5 charges the same conspiracy with Thomas to prevent Mr. Stanton’s
holding his office, and thereby to prevent the execution of the civil
tenure act.

Article 6 charges that the President conspired with Thomas to seize and
possess the property under the control of the War Department by FORCE, in
contravention of the act of July 31, 1861, and with intent to disregard
the civil tenure-of-office act.

Article 7 charges the same conspiracy, with intent only to violate the
civil tenure-of-office act.

Articles 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th may all be considered together, as to
to the proof to support them.

It will be shown that having removed Stanton and appointed Thomas, the
President sent Thomas to the War Office to obtain possession; that having
been met by Stanton with a denial of his rights, Thomas retired, and after
consultation with the President, Thomas asserted his purpose to take
possession of the War Office by force, making his boast in several public
places of his intentions so to do, but was prevented by being promptly
arrested by process from the court.

This will be shown by the evidence of Hon. Mr. Van Horn, a member of the
House, who was present when the demand for possession of the War office
was made by General Thomas, already made public.

By the testimony of the Hon. Mr. Burleigh, who, after that, in the evening
of the twenty-first of February, was told by Thomas that he intended to
take possession of the War Office by force the following morning, and
invited him up to see the performance. Mr. Burleigh attended, but the act
did not come off, for Thomas had been arrested and held to bail.

By Thomas boasting at Willard’s hotel on the same evening that he should
call on General Grant for military force to put him in possession of the
office, and he did not see how Grant could refuse it. Article 8 charges
that the appointment of Thomas was made for the purpose of getting control
of the disbursement of the moneys appropriated for the military service
and Department of War.

In addition to the proof already adduced, it will be shown that, after the
appointment of Thomas, which must have been known to the members of his
cabinet, the President caused a formal notice to be served on the
Secretary of the Treasury, to the end that the Secretary might answer the
requisitions for money of Thomas, and this was only prevented by the
firmness with which Stanton retained possession of the books and papers of
the War office. It will be seen that every fact charged in Article 1 is
admitted by the answer of the respondent; the intent also admitted as
charged; that is to say, to set aside the civil tenure-of-office act, and
to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of the Secretary for the Department
of War without the advice and consent of the Senate, and, if not
justified, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution itself.

The only question remaining is, does the respondent justify himself by the
Constitution and laws?

On this he avers, that by the Constitution, there is “conferred on the
President as a part of the executive power, the power at any and all times
of removing from office all executive officers for cause, to be judged of
by the President alone, and that he verily believes that the executive
power of removal from office, confided to him by the Constitution, as
aforesaid, includes the power of suspension from office indefinitely.”

Now, these offices, so vacated, must be filled, temporarily at least, by
his appointment, because government must go on; there can be no
interregnum in the execution of the laws in an organized government; he
claims, therefore, of necessity, the right to fill their places with
appointments of his choice, and that this power can not be restrained or
limited in any degree by any law of Congress, because, he avers, “that the
power was conferred, and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was
imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and
that the President could not be deprived of this power, or relieved of
this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the
Senate jointly, either in part or whole.”

This, then, is the plain and inevitable issue before the Senate and the
American people:

Has the President, under the Constitution, the more than kingly
prerogative at will to remove from office and suspend from office
indefinitely, all executive officers of the United States, either civil,
military or naval, at any and all times, and fill the vacancies with
creatures of his own appointment, for his own purposes, without any
restraint whatever, or possibility of restraint by the Senate or by
Congress through laws duly enacted?

The House of Representatives, in behalf of the people join this issue by
affirming that the exercise of such powers is a high misdemeanor in
office.

If the affirmative is maintained by the respondent, then, so far as the
first eight articles are concerned—unless such corrupt purposes are
shown as will of themselves make the exercise of a legal power a crime—the
respondent must go, and ought to go quit and free.

Therefore, by these articles and the answers thereto, the momentous
question, here and now, is raised whether the PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE ITSELF
(IF IT HAS THE PREROGATIVES AND POWER CLAIMED FOR IT) OUGHT, IN FACT, TO
EXIST AS APART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF A FREE PEOPLE, while by
the last three articles the simpler and less important inquiry is to be
determined, whether Andrew Johnson has so conducted himself that he ought
longer to held any constitutional office whatever. The latter sinks to
merited insignificance compared with the grandeur of the former.

If that is sustained, then a right and power hitherto unclaimed and
unknown to the people of the country is engrafted on the Constitution most
alarming in its extent, most corrupting in its influence, most dangerous
in its tendencies, and most tyrannical in its exercise.

Whoever, therefore, votes “not guilty” on these articles votes to enchain
our free institutions, and to prostrate them at the feet of any man who,
being President, may choose to control them.

A few days after this, Judge Curtis, of the President’s counsel, spoke on
behalf of the President. The first and principal Government of the
Articles of Impeachment against Mr. Johnson was violation of the
Office-Tenure Act, which had been passed the year before for the
undisguised purpose of restricting the President’s power to remove his
Cabinet officers, particularly, his War Minister, Mr. Stanton. It was
apparent that Mr. Butler had been embarassed in his plea by the proviso of
that Act, that members of the Cabinet should hold “during the term of the
President by WHOM THEY MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED and for one month longer.”

Mr. Butler had asked—By whom was Mr. Stanton appointed? By Mr.
Lincoln. Whose presidential term was he holding tinder when the bullet of
Booth became a proximate cause of this trial? Was not this appointment in
full force at that hour. Had any act of the respondent up to the 12th day
of August last vitiated or interfered with that appointment? Whose
Presidential term is the respondent now serving out? His own, or Mr.
Lincoln’s. If his own, he is entitled to four years up to the anniversary
of the murder, because each presidential term is four years by the
Constitution, and the regular recurrence of those terms is fixed by the
Act of May 8, 1792. If he is serving out the remainder of Mr. Lincoln’s
term, then his term of office expires on the 4th of March, 1869, if it
does not before.

Judge Curtis struck his first blow at the weak point of General Butler’s
speech. He said:

There is a question involved which enters deeply into the first eight
Articles of Impeachment and materially touches two of the others; and to
that question I desire in the first place to invite the attention of the
court, namely—whether MR. STANTON’S CASE COMES UNDER THE
TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACTS? * * * I must ask your attention therefore to the
construction and application of the first section of that act, as follows:
“that every person holding an official position to which he has been
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every
person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall
become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold
such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and
duly qualified, except as herein OTHERWISE PROVIDED.” Then comes what is
otherwise provided. “PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the Secretaries of State,
Treasury, War, Navy, and Interior Departments, the Postmaster General and
Attorney General, shall hold their offices respectively for AND DURING THE
TERM OF THE PRESIDENT BY WHOM THEY MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED.”

The first inquiry which arises on this language, is as to the meaning of
the words “for and during the term of the President.” Mr. Stanton, as
appears by the commission which has been put in the case by the Honorable
Managers, was appointed in January, 1862, during the first term of
President Lincoln. Are the words “during the term of the President,”
applicable to Mr. Stanton’s case? That depends upon whether an expounder
of this law, judicially, who finds set down in it as a part of the
descriptive words, “DURING THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT,” HAS ANY RIGHT TO
ADD, “AND DURING ANY OTHER TERM FOR WHICH HE MAY BE AFTERWARDS ELECTED.”

I respectfully submit no such judicial interpretation can be put on the
words. Then, if you please, take the next step: “During the term of the
President by whom he was appointed.” At the time when this order was
issued for the removal of Mr. Stanton, was he holding the term of the
President by whom he was appointed? The Honorable Managers say yes;
because, as they, say, Mr. Johnson is merely serving out the residue of
Mr. Lincoln’s term. But is that so under the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States? * * Although the President, like the
Vice President, is elected for a term of four years, and each is elected
for the same term, the President is not to hold the office absolutely
during four years. The limit of four years is not an absolute limit. Death
is a limit. “A conditional limitation,” as the lawyers call it, is imposed
on his tenure of office. And when the President dies his term of four
years, for which he was elected and during which he was to hold provided
he should so long live, terminates, and the office devolves upon the Vice
President. For what period of time? FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM FOR
WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS ELECTED. And there is no more propriety,
under the provisions of the Constitution of the United dictates, in
calling the term during which Mr. Johnson holds the office of President,
after it was devolved upon him, a part of Mr. Lincoln’s term, then there
would be propriety in saying that one sovereign who succeeded another
sovereign by death, holds his predecessor’s term.** They (the Cabinet
officers) were to be the advisers of the President; they were to be the
immediate confidential assistants of the President, for whom he was to be
responsible, but in whom he was expected to repose a great amount of trust
and confidence; and therefore it was that this Act has connected the
tenure-of-office of these Secretaries to which it applies with the
President by whom they were appointed. It says, in the description which
the Act gives of the future tenure-of-office of Secretaries, that a
controlling regard is to be had to the fact that the Secretary whose
tenure is to be regulated was appointed by some particular President; and
during the term of that President he shall continue to hold his office;
but as for Secretaries who are in office, not appointed by the President,
we have nothing to say; we leave them as they heretofore have been. I
submit to Senators that this is the natural, and, having regard to the
character of these officers, the necessary conclusion, that the
tenure-of-office of a Secretary here described is a tenure during the term
of service of the President by whom he was appointed; that it was not the
intention of Congress to compel a President of the United States to
continue in office a Secretary not appointed by himself. * * *

Shortly after this, occurred one of the most amusing and interesting
incidents of the trial. Mr. Boutwell, who was altogether a matter-of-fact
man, though at times indulging in the heroics, ventured, in the course of
his argument, upon a flight of imagination in depicting the punishment
that should be meted out to Mr. Johnson for venturing to differ with
Congress upon the constitutionality of an act of that body. He said:

Travelers and astronomers inform us that in the Southern heavens, near the
Southern cross, there is a vast space which the uneducated call the “hole
in the sky,” where the eye of man, with the aid of the powers of the
telescope, has been unable to discover nebulae, or asteroid, or comet, or
planet, or star, or sun. In that dreary, cold, dark region of space, which
is only known to be less infinite by the evidences of creation elsewhere,
the great author of celestial mechanism has left the chaos which was in
the beginning. If this earth were capable of the sentiments and emotions
of justice and virtue which in human mortal beings are the evidences and
pledge of our divine origin and immortal destiny, it would heave and throb
with the energy of the elemental forces of nature, and project this enemy
(referring to President Johnson) of two races of men into that vast
region, there forever to exist in a solitude eternal as life or as the
absence of life, emblematical of, if not really, that outer darkness of
which the Savior of mankind spoke in warning to those who are enemies to
themselves and of their race and of God.

Mr. Evarts followed Mr. Boutwell, and in the course of his argument
referred to this paragraph in Mr. Boutwell’s speech in the following
humorously sarcastic vein, during the delivery of which, the Senate was
repeatedly convulsed with laughter. Mr. Evarts said:

I may as conveniently at this point of the argument as at any other pay
some attention to the astronomical punishment which the learned and
honorable manager Mr. Boutwell, thinks should be applied to this novel
case of impeachment of the President. Cicero, I think it is, who says that
a lawyer should know everything, for sooner or later, there is no fact in
history, science or human knowledge that will not come into play in his
arguments. Painfully sensitive of my ignorance, being devoted to a
profession which “sharpens and does not enlarge the mind,” I yet can
admire without envy the superior knowledge evinced by the honorable
manager. Indeed, upon my soul, I believe he is aware of an astronomical
fact which many professors of the science are wholly ignorant of; but
nevertheless, while some of his colleagues were paying attention to an
unoccupied and unappropriated island on the surface of the seas, Mr.
Manager Boutwell, more ambitious, had discovered an untenanted and
unappropriated region in the skies, reserved, he would have us think, in
the final councils of the Almighty as the place of punishment for deposed
and convicted American Presidents.

At first, I thought that his mind had become so enlarged that it was not
sharp enough to observe that the Constitution has limited the punishment,
but on reflection I saw that he was as legal and logical as he was
ambitious and astronomical; for the Constitution has said “remove from
office,” and has put no limit to the distance of removal so that it may be
without the shedding of a drop of his blood or taking a penny of his
property, or confining his limbs. Instant removal from office and
transportation to the skies. Truly this is a great undertaking, and if the
learned manager can only get over the obstacle of the laws of nature, the
Constitution will, not stand in his way.

He can contrive no method but that of a convulsion of the earth that shall
project the deposed President to this indefinitely distant space; but a
shock of nature of so vast an energy and for so great a result on him
might unsettle even the footing of the firm members of Congress. We
certainly need not resort to so perilous a method as that. How shall we
accomplish it? Why, in the first place, nobody knows where that space is
but the learned manager himself, and he is the necessary deputy to execute
the judgment of the court. Let it then be provided that, in case of your
sentence of deposition and removal from office, the honorable and
astronomical manager shall take into his own hands the execution of the
sentence. With the President made fast to his broad and strong shoulders,
and having already assayed the flight by imagination, better prepared than
anybody else to execute it in form, taking the advantage of ladders as far
as ladders will go to the top of this great capitol, and spurning there
with his foot the crest of Liberty, let him set out upon his flight while
the two houses of Congress and all the people of the United States shall
shout—”Sic itur ad astra!” But here a distressing doubt strikes me.
How will the manager get back. He will have got far beyond the reach of
gravitation to restore him, and so ambitious a wing as his should never
stoop to a downward flight. Indeed, as he passes through the
constellations, the famous question of Carlyle (by which he derides the
littleness of human affairs upon the scale of the measure of the heavens,)
“What thinks Bootes as he drives his hunting dogs up the zenith in their
leash of sidereal fire?” will force itself on his notice. What, indeed,
will Bootes think of this new constellation? Besides, reaching this space
beyond the power of Congress ever to send for persons and papers, how
shall he return, and how decide in the contest there become personal and
perpetual—the struggle of strength between him and the President? In
this new revolution thus established forever, who shall decide which is
the sun and which is the moon? Who determine the only scientific test,
which reflects hardest upon the other?

Gen. Logan, one of the managers, appeared for the prosecution, upon the
close of the examination of witnesses. The following is a brief extract
from his very long and labored argument, and relates to the
Tenure-of-Office Act:

It is a new method of ascertaining the meaning of a law, plain upon its
face, by resorting to legislative discussions, and giving in evidence
opinions affected by the law. As a matter of fact; it is well known the
act was intended to prevent the very thing Mr. Johnson attempted in the
matter of Mr. Stanton’s removal. I think this manner of defense will not
avail before the Senate. The law must govern in its natural and plain
intendment, and will not be frittered away by extraneous interpretation.
The President in his veto message admits substantially this construction.

The proviso does not change the general provisions of the Act, except by
giving a more definite limit to the tenure-of-office, but the last
paragraph of the Act puts the whole question back into the hands of the
Senate according to the general intention of the Act, and provides that
even the Secretaries are subject to removal by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.

The Act first provides that all persons holding civil offices at the date
of its passage appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall only be removed in the same manner. This applies to the Secretary of
War. This proviso merely gives a tenure running with the term of the
President and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The law clearly gives Mr. Stanton a
right to the office from the 4th of March, 1865, till one month after the
4th of March, 1869, and he can only be disturbed in that tenure by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Yet, although Mr. Stanton was appointed by Mr. Lincoln in his first term,
when there was no tenure-of-office fixed by law, and continued by Mr.
Lincoln in his second term, it is argued that his term expired one month
after the passage of the Tenure-of-Office Act, March 2nd, 1867, for the
reason that Mr. Lincoln’s term expired at his death. This is false
reasoning; the Constitution fixed the term of the President at four years,
and by law the commencement of his term is the 4th of March. Will it be
said that when Mr. Johnson is deposed by a verdict of the Senate, that the
officer who will succeed him will serve for four years? Certainly not.
Why? Because he will have no Presidential term, and will be merely serving
out a part of the unexpired term of Mr. Lincoln, and will go out of office
on the 4th of March, 1869, at the time Mr. Lincoln would have retired by
expiration of his term, had he lived. * * *

The only question, then, which remains, is simply this: Has the accused
violated that (Tenure-of-Office) Act? No one knows better than this
accused the history of, and the purpose to be secured by, that Act. It was
ably and exhaustively discussed on both sides, in all aspects. In the
debates of Congress it was subsequently reviewed and closely analyzed in a
Veto Message of the respondent. No portion of that Act escaped his remark,
and no practical application which has been made of it since did he fail
to anticipate. He knew before he attempted its violation that more than
three-fourths of the Representatives of the people in Congress assembled
had set their seal of disapprobation upon the reasons given in the Veto
Message and had enacted the law by more than the constitutional number of
votes required. Nay, more; he was repeatedly warned, by investigations
made looking toward just such a proceeding as now being witnessed in this
court, that the people had instructed their Representatives to tolerate no
violation of the laws constitutionally enacted.

Mr. Groesbeck, in behalf of the defense, said in closing his argument:

What is to be your judgment, Senators, in this case? Removal from office
and perpetual disqualification? If the President has committed that for
which he should be ejected from office it were judicial mockery to stop
short of the largest disqualifications you can impose. It will be a heavy
judgment. What is his crime in its moral aspects, to merit such a
judgment? Let us look to it.

He tried to pluck a thorn out of his very heart, for the condition of
things in the War Department, and consequently in his Cabinet, did pain
him as a thorn in his heart. You fastened it there, and you are now asked
to punish him for attempting to extract it. What more? He made an ad
interim appointment to last for a single day. You could have terminated it
whenever you saw fit. You had only to take up the nomination which he had
sent to you, which was a good nomination, and act upon it and the ad
interim vanished like smoke. He had no idea of fastening it upon the
department. He had no intention of doing anything of that kind. He merely
proposed that for the purpose, if the opportunity should occur, of
subjecting this law to a constitutional test. That was all the purpose it
was to answer. It is all for which it was intended. The thing was in your
hands from the beginning to the end. You had only to act upon the
nomination, and the matter was settled. Surely that was no crime.

I point you to the cases that have occurred—of ad interim
appointment after ad interim appointment; but I point especially to the
case of Mr. Holt, where the Senate in its legislative capacity examined
it, weighed it, decided upon it, heard the report of the President and
received it as satisfactory. That is, for the purpose of this trial,
before the same tribunal, res adjudicate, I think, and it will be so
regarded.

What else did he do? He talked with an officer about the law. That is the
Emory Article. He made intemperate speeches, though full of honest,
patriotic sentiments; when reviled, he should not revile again; when
smitten upon one cheek he should turn the other.

“But,” the gentleman who spoke last on the part of the managers, “he tried
to defeat pacification and restoration.” I deny it in the sense in which
he presented it—that is, as a criminal act. Here, too, he followed
precedent and trod the path in which were the footsteps of Lincoln, and
which was bright with the radiance of his divine utterance, “charity for
all, malice toward none.” He was eager for pacification. He thought that
the war was ended. The drums were all silent—the arsenals were all
shut; the roar of the canon had died away to the last reverberation; the
armies were disbanded; not a single army confronted us in the field. Ah,
he was too eager, too forgiving, too kind. The hand of conciliation was
stretched out to him and he took it? It may be he should have put it away;
but was it a crime to take it? Kindness, forgiveness a crime! Kindness a
crime! Kindness is omnipotent for good, more powerful than gunpowder or
canon. Kindness is statesmanship. Kindness is the highest statesmanship of
heaven itself. The thunders of Sinai do but terrify and distract; alone
they accomplish little; it is the kindness of Calvary that subdues and
pacifies.

What shall I say of this man? He is no theorist; he is no reformer; I have
looked over his life. He has ever walked in beaten paths, and by the light
of, the Constitution. The mariner, tempest-tossed in mid-sea, does not
more certainly turn to his star for guidance than does this man in trial
and difficulty to the star of the Constitution. He loves the Constitution.
It has been the study of his life. He is not learned and scholarly like
many of you; he is not a man of many ideas or of much speculation but by a
law of the mind he is only the truer to that he does know. He is a
patriot, second to no one of you in the measure of his patriotism. He
loves his country; he may be full of error; I will not canvass now his
views; but he loves his country; he has the courage to defend it, and I
believe to die for it if need be. His courage and patriotism are not
without illustration. My colleague (Mr. Nelson) referred the other day to
the scenes which occurred in this Chamber when he alone of twenty-two
Senators remained; even his State seceded, but he remained. That was a
trial of his patriotism, of which many of you, by reason of your locality
and of your life-long associations, know nothing. How his voice rang out
in this hall in the hour of alarm for the good cause, and in denunciation
of the rebellion! But he did not remain here; it was a pleasant,
honorable, safe, and easy position; but he was wanted for a more difficult
and arduous and perilous service. He faltered not, but entered upon it.
That was a trial of his courage and patriotism of which some of you who
now sit in judgment on more than his life, know nothing. I have, often
thought that those who, dwelt at the North, safely distant from the
collisions and strifes of the war, knew little of its actual, trying
dangers. We who lived on the border know more. Our horizon was always red
with flame; and it sometimes burned so near us that we could feel its heat
upon the outstretched hand. But he was wanted for a greater peril, and
went into the very furnace of the war, and there served his country long
and well. Who of you have done more? Not one. * * * It seems cruel,
Senators, that he should be dragged here as a criminal, or that any one
who served his country and bore himself well and bravely through that
trying ordeal, should be condemned upon miserable technicalities.

If he has committed any gross crime, shocking alike and indiscriminately
the entire public mind, then condemn him; but he has rendered services to
the country that entitle him to kind and respectful consideration. He has
precedents for everything he has done, and what excellent precedents! The
voices of the great dead come to us from the grave sanctioning his course.
All our past history approves it. How can you single out this man, now in
this condition of things, and brand him before the world, put your brand
of infamy upon him because he made an ad interim appointment for a day,
and possible may have made a mistake in attempting to remove Stanton? I
can at a glance put my eye on Senators here who would not endure the
position he occupied. You do not think it is right yourselves. You framed
this civil tenure law to give each President his own Cabinet, and yet his
whole crime is that he wants harmony and peace in his.

Senators, I will not go on. There is a great deal that is crowding on my
tongue for utterance, but it is not from my head; it is rather from my
heart; and it would be but a repetition of the vain things 1 have been
saying the past half hour But I do hope you will not drive the President
out and take possession of his office. I hope this, not merely as counsel
for Andrew Johnson, for Andrew Johnson’s administration is to me but as a
moment, and himself as nothing in comparison with the possible
consequences of such an act. No good can come of it, Senators, and how
much will the heart of the nation be refreshed if at last the Senate of
the United States can, in its judgment upon this case, maintain its
ancient dignity and high character in the midst of storms, and passion,
and strife.

A somewhat startling incident, which for the moment threatened unpleasant
results, occurred in the course of the trial. In his opening speech for
the prosecution, Mr. Manager Boutwell used this language, speaking of the
President:

The President is a man of strong will, of violent passions, of unlimited
ambition, with capacity to employ and use timid men, adhesive, subservient
men, and corrupt men, as the instruments of his designs. It is the truth
of history that he has injured every person with whom he has had
confidential relations, and many have escaped ruin only by withdrawing
from his society altogether. He has one rule of his life: he attempts to
use every man of power, capacity, or influence within his reach.
Succeeding in his attempts, they are in time, and usually in a short time,
utterly ruined. If the considerate flee from him, if the brave and
patriotic resist his schemes or expose his plans, he attacks them with all
the energy and patronage of his office, and pursues them with all the
violence of his personal hatred. He attacks to destroy all who will not
become his instruments, and all who become his instruments are destroyed
in the use. He spares no one. * * * Already this purpose of his life is
illustrated in the treatment of a gentleman who was of counsel for the
respondent, but who has never appeared in his behalf.

The last paragraph of the above quotation manifestly referred to a
disagreement between the President and Judge Black, which led to the
retirement of that gentleman from the Management of the Defense of the
President, a few days prior to the beginning of the trial.

To this criticism of the President, Judge Nelson, of Counsel for Defense,
responded a few days later, with the following statement:

It is to me, Senators, a source of much embarrassment how to speak in
reply to the accusation which has thus been preferred against the
President of the United States. * * *

In order that you may understand what I have to say about it I desire to
refer the Senate to a brief statement which I have prepared on account of
the delicacy of the subject; and, although I have not had time to write it
out as I would have desired to do, it will be sufficient to enable you to
comprehend the facts which I am about to state. You will understand,
Senators, that I do not purport to give a full history of what I may call
the Alta Vela case, as to which a report was made to the Senate by the
Secretary of State upon your call. A mere outline of the case will be
sufficient to explain what I have to say in reference to Judge Black:

Under the guano act of 1856, William T. Kendal on the one side, and
Patterson and Marguiendo on the other, filed claims in the Secretary of
State’s office to the island which is claimed by the government of St.
Domingo.

On the 17th of June, 1867, the examiner of claims submitted a report
adverse to the claim for damages against the Dominican government. On the
22d of July, 1867, Mr. Black addressed a letter to the President, (page
10) and another on the 7th of August, 1867. On page 13 it is said that
Patterson and Marguiendo acquiesce in the decision. On page 13 it is shown
that other parties are in averse possession. On page 15 it is asserted
that the contest is between citizens of the United States, and can be
settled in the courts of the United States. The contest now seems to be
between Patterson and Marguiendo and Thomas B. Webster & Co.

On the 14th of December, 1859, Judge Black, as Attorney General, rejected
the claim of W. J. Kendall to an island in the Carribean Sea, called Cayo
Verde, and Mr. Seward seems to regard the two cases as resting on the same
principle in his report of 17th of January, 1867.

On the 22d of July, 1867, Judge Black addressed a letter to the President
enclosing a brief. On the 7th of August, 1867, he addressed another
communication to the President. On the 7th of February, 1868, an elaborate
an able communication was sent to the President, signed by W. J. Shaffer,
attorney for Patterson and Marguiendo, and Black, Lamon &, Co.,
counsel, in which they criticised with severity the report of Mr. Seward
and asked the President to review his decision.

According to the best information I can obtain, I state that ON THE 9TH OF
MARCH, 1868, General Benjamin F. Butler addressed a letter to J. W.
Shaffer, in which he stated that he was “clearly of the opinion that,
under the claim of the United States its citizens have the exclusive right
to take guano there,” and that he had never been able to understand why
the executive did not long since assert the rights of the government, and
sustain the rightful claims of its citizens to the possession of the
island IN THE MOST FORCIBLE MANNER consistent with the dignity and honor
of the Nation.

The letter was concurred in and approved of by John A. Logan, J. A.
Garfield, W. H. Koontz, J. K. Moorhead and John A. Bingham, on the same
day, 9th of March, 1868.

This letter expressing the opinion of Generals Butler, Logan and Garfield
was placed in the hands of the President by Chauncey F. Black, who, on the
16th of March, 1868, addressed a letter to him in which he enclosed a copy
of the same with the concurrence of Thaddeus Stevens, John A. Bingham, J.
G. Blaine, J. K. Moorhead and William H. Koontz.

After the date of this letter, and while Judge Black was the counsel of
the respondent in this cause, he had an interview with the President, in
which he urged immediate action on his part and the sending an armed
vessel to take possession of the island; and because the President refused
to do so, Judge Black, on the 19th of March, 1868, declined to appear
further as his counsel in this case.

Such are the facts in regard to the withdrawal of Judge Black, according
to the best information I can obtain.

The island of Alta Vela, or the claim for damages, is said to amount in
value to more than a million dollars, and it is quite likely that an
extensive speculation is on foot. I have no reason to charge that any of
the managers are engaged in it, and presume that the letters were signed,
as such communications are often signed, by members of Congress, through
the importunity of friends.

Judge Black no doubt thought it was his duty to other clients to press
this claims but how did the President view it?

Senators, I ask you for a moment to put yourself in the place of the
President of the United States, and as this is made a matter of railing
accusation against him, to consider how the President of the United States
felt it.

There are two or three facts to which I desire to call the attention of
the Senate and the country in connection with these recommendations. They
are, first, that they were all gotten up after this impeachment proceeding
was commenced against the President of the United States.

Another strong and powerful fact to be noticed in vindication of the
President of the United States, in reference to this case which has been
so strongly preferred against him, is that these recommendations were
signed by four of the honorable, gentlemen to whom the House of
Representatives have intrusted the duty of managing this great impeachment
against him.

Of course exception was taken to this statement, and to the revisal
inferences therefrom, and the authenticity of the signatures mentioned at
first denied, and then an effort made to explain them away, but it is
unsuccessful.

The incident left a fixed impression, at least in the minds of many of the
Senators, that an effort had been made to coerce the President, in fear of
successful impeachment, into the perpetration of a cowardly and
disgraceful international act, not only by his then Chief of Counsel, but
also by a number of his active prosecutors on the part of the House.

It would be difficult to fittingly characterize this scandalous effort to
pervert a great State trial into an instrumentality for the successful
exploitation of a commercial venture which was by no means free from the
elements of international robbery.

Yet to Mr. Johnson’s lasting credit, he proved that he possessed the
honesty and courage to dare his enemies to do their worst—he would
not smirch his own name and disgrace his country and his great office, by
using its power for the-promotion of an enterprise not far removed from a
scheme of personal plunder, let it cost him what it might. It was a heroic
act, and bravely, unselfishly, modestly performed.

CHAPTER IX. — EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONY.

The initial proceedings to the taking of testimony, while to a degree
foreshadowing a partisan division in the trial, also demonstrated the
presence of a Republican minority which could not at all times, be
depended upon to register the decrees of the more radical portion of the
body. The first development of this fact came in the defeat of a
proposition to amend the rules in the interest of the prosecution, and
again on the examination of Mr. Burleigh, a delegate from Dakota Territory
in the House of Representatives and a witness brought by the prosecution
on March 31st. Mr. Butler, examining the witness, asked the question:

Had you on the evening before seen General Thomas? * * * Had you a
communication with him?

Answer. Yes sir.

Mr. Stanbery objected, and the Chief Justice ruled that the testimony was
competent and would be heard “unless the Senate think otherwise.”

To this ruling Mr. Drake objected and appealed from the decision of the
Chair to the Senate. It appeared to be not to the ruling per se, that Mr.
Drake objected, but to the right of the Chair to rule at all upon the
admissibility of testimony. Mr. Drake representing the extremists of the
dominant side of the Chamber. There seemed to be apprehension of the
effect upon the Senate of the absolute judicial fairness of the rulings of
the Chief Justice, and the great weight they would naturally have, coming
from so just and eminent a jurist. After discussion, Mr. Wilson moved that
the Senate retire for consultation.

The vote on this motion was a tie, being twenty-five for and twenty-five
against retiring, whereupon the Chief Justice announced the fact of a tie
and voted “yea;” and the Senate retired to its consultation room, where,
after discussion and repeated suggestions of amendment to the rules, the
following resolution was offered by Mr. Henderson:

Resolved, That rule 7 be amended by substituting therefor the following:

The presiding officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary
preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the presiding officer in the trial
shall direct all the forms of proceeding while the Senate are sitting for
the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms during the trial not
otherwise provided for. And the presiding officer on the trial may rule
all questions of of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall
stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some member of the Senate
shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be
submitted to the Senate for decision; or he may, at his option, in the
first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the members of the
Senate.

Mr. Morrill, of Maine, moved to amend the proposed rule by striking out
the words “which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate,” which
was rejected without a division.

Mr. Sumner then moved to substitute the following:

That the chief justice of the United States, presiding in the Senate on
the trial of the President of the United States, is not a member of the
Senate, and has no authority under the Constitution to vote on any
question during the trial, and he can pronounce decision only as the organ
of the Senate, with its assent.

It is not insisted here that there was any sinister purpose in this
proposition, yet the possibilities, in case of its adoption, were very
grave. Like the wasp, the sting was in the tail—”he (the chief
justice;) can pronounce decision only as the organ of the Senate, WITH ITS
ASSENT!” Had that rule been adopted, suppose the Senate, with, its vote of
forty-two Republicans and twelve Democrats, upon failure of conviction by
a two-thirds vote had refused or refrained on a party vote from giving
“its assent” to a judgment of acquittal?

The vote upon this proposed amendment was as follows:

For its adoption—Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling,
Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Howard, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morton,
Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Williams,
Wilson—22—all Republicans.

Against its adoption—Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Cole, Davis, Dixon,
Doolittle, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Henderson,
Hendricks, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Vermont, Norton, Patterson
of New Hampshire, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Van
Winkle, Vickers, Willey—26—15 Republicans and 11 Democrats.

So the resolution was rejected—every aye vote a Republican, and all
but one, Mr. Trumbull, afterwards voting to impeach the President at tHe
close of the trial—eleven Democrats and fifteen Republicans voting
nay.

Mr. Drake then offered the following:

It is the judgment of the Senate that under the Constitution the Chief
Justice presiding over the Senate in the pending trial has no privilege of
ruling questions of law arising thereon, but that all such questions shall
be submitted to a decision by the Senate alone.

It would be difficult to formulate a proposition better calculated to
taint the proceedings with a partisan bias than this one by Mr. Drake. The
impeachment movement was in a very large sense, if not entirely, a
partisan enterprise. It had its origin in partisan differences, and was
based mainly on differences as to public policies at issue between the two
great parties of the country—and while it was expected that every
political friend of the President would vote against the impeachment, it
was DEMANDED, and made a test of party fealty, that every Republican
Senator should vote for his conviction. Therefore, and perhaps it was not
illogical from these premises, party leaders of Mr. Drake’s inclination
should not relish the influence the legal, unbiased and non-partisan
rulings of the Chief Justice might have upon his more conservatively
inclined fellow partisans of the body.

Mr. Drake called for the yeas and nays, which were ordered, and the vote
was yeas 20, nays 30. The personality of this vote was very much the same
as on the previous proposition.

The rule proposed by Mr. Henderson was then adopted. The conference closed
shortly after, and the session of the Senate was resumed.

The next day, April 1st, Mr. Sumner renewed in the Senate his proposition
submitted at the Conference the day before but not acted upon, to change
the rules of the Senate in the following form:

It appearing from the reading of the Journal yesterday that on a question
where the Senate were equally divided, the Chief Justice, presiding on the
trial of the President, gave a casting vote; it is hereby ordered that, in
the judgment of the Senate, such vote was without authority under the
Constitution of the United States.

The proposition was put to vote with the following result:

Yeas—Messrs. Cameron, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Cragin,
Drake, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morton, Norton, Ramsay,
Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Williams, Wilson—21—10
Republicans and 1 Democrat.

Nays—Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Corbett, Davis, Dixon,
Doolittle, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes,
Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Vermont, Patterson of
Tennessee, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey—26—16
Republicans and 10 Democrats.

So the proposed order was rejected. The trial then proceeded. The answers
to a very large proportion of the interrogatories propounded to the
witnesses, on both sides, were unimportant, having very little bearing,
either way, upon the case. Twenty-eight of those interrogatories, however,
were more or less important, and were challenged, seven by the defense,
and twenty-one by the prosecution. For convenience of reference, these
interrogatories are numbered from one to twenty-eight, inclusive, with the
answers thereto, when permitted to be answered, as follows:

Question submitted by Mr. Butler, of the prosecution, April 1st, 1868, to
Mr. Walter A. Burleigh, witness on the stand, called for the prosecution:

No. 1.

You said yesterday, in answer to my question, that you had a conversation
with General Lorenzo Thomason the evening of the 21st of February last.
State if he said anything as to the means by which he intended to obtain
or was directed by the President to obtain possession of the War
Department. If so, state all he said, as nearly as you can?

Mr. Stanbery objected.

Mr. Drake called for the yeas and nays, which were ordered, and the vote
was as follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen,
Grimes, Henderson, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of
Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Ross,
Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle,
Willey, Williams, Wilson—39—all Republicans.

Nays-Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Hendricks, Johnson,
McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Vickers—11—all
Democrats.

So, the Senate decided that the question should be answered.

General Butler repeated the interrogatory, and Mr. Burleigh’s answer was
as follows:

On the evening of February 21st last, I learned that General Thomas had
been appointed Secretary of War ad interim, I think while at the
Metropolitan Hotel. I invited Mr. Leonard Smith, of Leavenworth, Kas., to
go with me up to his house and see him. We took a carriage and went up. I
found the General there ready to go out with his daughters to spend the
evening at some place of amusement. I told him I would not detain him if
he was going out; but he insisted on my sitting down and I sat down for a
few moments. I told him I had learned he had been appointed Secretary of
War. He said he had; that he had been appointed that day, I think; that
after receiving his appointment from the President he went to the War
Office to show his authority, or his appointment, to Secretary Stanton,
and also his order to take possession of the office; that the Secretary
remarked to him that he supposed he would give him time to remove his
personal effects, or his private papers, or something to that effect; and
the answer was “certainly.” He said that in a short time the Secretary
asked him if he would give him a copy of his order, and he replied
“certainly,” and gave it to him. He said that it was no more than right to
give him time to take out his personal effects. I asked him when he was
going to assume the duties of the office. He remarked that he should take
possession the next morning at ten o’clock, which would be the 22nd; and I
think in that connection he stated that he had issued some order in regard
to the observance of the day; but of that I am not sure. I remarked to him
that I should be up at that end of the avenue the next day, and he asked
me to come in and see him. I asked him where I could find him and he said
in the Secretary’s room up stairs. I told him I would be there. Said he,
“be there punctually at 10 o’clock.” Said I, “you are going to take
possession to-morrow?” “Yes.” Said he, “suppose Stanton objects to it—resists?”
“Well,” said he, “I expect to meet force by force. Or use force.”

Mr. Conkling: “Repeat that.”

The witness. I asked him what he would do if Stanton objected, or
resisted. He said he would use force, or resort to force. Said I, “Suppose
he bars the doors?” His reply was. “I will break them down.” I think that
was about all the conversation that we had there in that connection.

No. 2.

The next disputed interrogatory put by General Butler to the witness was:

Shortly after this conversation about which you have testified, and after
the President restored Major General Thomas to the office of Adjutant
General, if you know the fact that he was so restored, were you present in
the War Department, and did you hear Thomas make any statements to the
officers and clerks, or either of them, belonging to the War Office, as to
the rules and orders of Mr. Stanton or of the War Office which he, Thomas,
would make, revoke, relax, or rescind, in favor of such officers or
employes when he had control of the affairs therein? If so, state as near
as you can when it was such conversation occurred, and state all he said,
as near as you can.

Mr. Howard demanded the yeas and nays and they were ordered and were as
follows:

Yeas—Anthony Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Henderson Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of
Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross,
Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Wilson—28—all
Republicans.

Nays—Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds, Ferry,
Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery,
Morrill of Maine, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Sherman, Van Winkle,
Vickers, Willey, Wilson—22—11 Republicans, 11 Democrats.

So the Senate decided that the question should be answered.

Mr. Butler: With the leave of the President, I will put this question by
portions.

Did you hear Thomas make any statement to the officers or clerks, or
either of them, belonging to the War Office, as to the rules and orders of
Mr. Stanton, or of the office, which he, Thomas, would revoke, relax, or
rescind, in favor of such officers and employes when he had control
therein?

Answer: The General remarked to me that he had made an arrangement to have
all the heads, or officers in charge of the different departments of the
office come in with their clerks that morning, as he wanted to address
them. He stated that the rules which had been adopted for the government
of the clerks by his predecessor were of a very arbitrary character, and
he proposed to relax them. I suggested to him that perhaps I had better
go. He said, “no, not at all—remain,” and I sat down and he had some
three or four officers—four or five, perhaps—come in, and each
one brought in a roomful of clerks, and he made an address to each company
as they came in, stating to them that he did not propose to hold them
strictly to the letter of the instructions; but when they wanted to go out
they could go out, and when they wanted to come in they could come in;
that he regarded them all as gentlemen, and supposed they would do their
duty, and he should require them to do their duty; but so far as their
little indulgences were concerned—I suppose such as going out across
the street or something of that kind—he did not intend to interfere
with them; all he expected was that they would do their duty. I waited
until he concluded, and we took a walk, and I came away.

Mr. Samuel Wilkinson testified in response to an interrogatory by Mr.
Butler:

I asked him (Thomas) to tell me what had occurred that morning between him
and the Secretary of War in his endeavor to take possession of the War
Department. He hesitated to do so till I told him that the town was filled
with rumors of the change that had been made, of the removal of Mr.
Stanton and the appointment of himself. He then said that since the affair
had become public he felt relieved to speak to me with freedom about it.
He drew from his pocket a copy, or rather the original, of the order of
the President of the United States, directing him to take possession of
the War Department immediately. He told me that he had taken as a witness
of his action General Williams, and had gone up into the War Department
and had shown to Edwin M. Stanton the order of the President, and had
demanded by virtue of that order the possession of the War Department and
its books and papers. He told me that Edwin M. Stanton, after reading the
order, had asked him if he would allow him sufficient time for him to get
together his books, papers, and other personal property and take away with
him; that he told him that he would allow to him all necessary time to do
so, and had then withdrawn from Mr. Stanton’s room. He further told me,
that day being Friday, that the next day would be what he called a dies
non, being the holiday of the anniversary of Washington’s birthday, when
he had directed that the War Department should be closed, that the day
thereafter would be Sunday, and that on Monday morning he should demand
possession of the War Department and of its property, and if that demand
was refused or resisted he should apply to the General-in-Chief of the
Army for a force sufficient to enable him to take possession of the War
Department; and he added that he did not see how the General of the Army
could refuse to obey his demand for that force. He then added that under
the order that the President had given to him he had no election to pursue
any other course than the one that he indicated; that he was a subordinate
officer directed by an order from a superior officer, and that he must
pursue that course.

Hon. T. W. Ferry, called by the Prosecution, testified from memoranda
taken down at the time of the demand of General Thomas for possession of
the War Office (Mr. Ferry being present), as follows:

War Department Washington, Feb. 22, 1867.

In the presence of Secretary Stanton, Judge Kelley, Morehead, Dodge, Van
Wyck, Van Horn, Delano, and Freeman Clarke, at 25 minutes past 12 m.,
General Thomas, Adjutant-General, came into the Secretary of War Office,
saying, “Good morning,” the Secretary replying “Good morning, sir.” Thomas
looked around and said, “I do not wish to disturb you gentlemen, and will
wait.” Stanton said, “Nothing private here; what do you want?” Thomas
demanded of Secretary Stanton the surrender of the Secretary of War
Office. Stanton denied it to him, and ordered him back to his own office
as Adjutant-General. Thomas refused to go. “I claim the office of
Secretary of War, and demand it by order of the President.”

Stanton: “I deny your authority to act, and order you back to your own
office.”

Thomas: “I will stand here. I want no unpleasantness in the presence of
these gentlemen.”

Stanton: “You can stand there if you please, but you can not act as
Secretary of War. I am Secretary of War. I order you out of this office
and to your own.” Thomas: “I refuse to go, and will stand here.”

Stanton: “How are you to get possession? Do you intend to use force?”

Thomas: “I do not care to use force, but my mind is made up as to what I
shall do. I want no unpleasantness, though. I shall stay here and act as
Secretary of War.”

Stanton: “You shall not, and I order you, as your superior, back to your
own office.”

Thomas: “I will not obey you, but will stand here and remain here.”

Stanton: “You call stand there if you please. I order you out of this
office to your own. I am Secretary of War, and your superior.”

Thomas then went into opposite room across hall (General Schriver’s) and
commenced ordering General Schriver and General Townsend. Stanton entered,
followed by Moorhead and Ferry, and ordered those generals not to obey or
pay any attention to General Thomas’ orders; that he denied his assumed
authority as Secretary of War ad interim, and forbade their obedience of
his directions. “I am Secretary of War, and I now order you, General
Thomas out of this place to your own quarters.”

Thomas: “I will not go, I shall discharge the functions of Secretary of
War.”

Stanton: “You will not.”

Thomas: “I shall require the mails of the War Department to be delivered
to me and shall transact the business of the office.”

Stanton: “You shall not have them, and I order you to your room.”

No. 3.

On Tuesday, April 2nd, the prosecution put in evidence a letter from the
President to Gen. Grant, dated Feb. 10, 1868, in answer to a prior letter
front the General. The President’s letter, as introduced in evidence,
purported to contain certain enclosures relating to the subject matter of
the President’s letter. The following is that portion of the President’s
letter which speaks of the enclosures accompanying and included therein:

GENERAL: The extraordinary character of your letter of the 3rd instant
would seem to preclude any reply on my part; but the manner in which
publicity has been given to the correspondence of which that letter forms
a part, and the grave questions which are involved, induce me to take this
mode of giving, as a proper sequel to the communications which have passed
between us, the statements of the five members of the cabinet who were
present on the occasion of our conversation on the 14th ultimo. Copies of
the letters which they have addressed to me upon the subject are
accordingly herewith enclosed.

Counsel for the President objected that the letter introduced by the
prosecution was not evidence in the case unless the managers should also
produce the enclosures therein referred to and made a part of the same.
The following was the vote on sustaining the objection:

Yeas—Bayard, Conkling, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fowler, Grimes,
Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Vermont Norton,
Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Sprague, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers and
Willey—20—10 Republicans and 10 Democrats.

Nays—Anthony, Buckalew, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Frelinghuysen, Howard,
Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy,
Ramsay, Sherman, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, and Wilson—29—28
Republicans and 1 Democrat.

So the evidence offered by the prosecution was admitted as offered,
without the enclosures referred to, the objection by the defense not being
sustained. (For these rejected enclosures see appendix.)

No. 4.

The prosecution offered to prove (Mr. Geo. A. Wallace, of the Treasury
Department, on the stand):

That after the President had determined on the removal of Mr. Stanton,
Secretary of War, in spite of the action of the Senate, there being no
vacancy in the office of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the
President unlawfully appointed his friend and theretofore private
secretary, Edmund Cooper, to that position, as one of the means by which
he intended to defeat the tenure of civil office act and other laws of
Congress.

After debate and Mr. Wallace’s answer in explanation of the usages of the
department in the disbursement of moneys, during which it was shown that
no moneys could be drawn out of the treasury on the order of the assistant
secretary except when authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury to draw
warrants therefor, a vote was taken, and resulted as follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Corbett,
Cragin, Drake, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont, Nye, Pomeroy,
Ramsey, Ross, Sprague, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton and Wilson—-22—all
Republicans.

Nays—Bayard, Buckalew, Conness, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds,
Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks,
Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine, Norton, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Patterson of Tennessee, Sherman, Stewart, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers,
Willey and Williams—27—16 Republicans, 11 Democrats.

So the testimony was not received, as it was shown in the debate thereon
that it would prove nothing against the President which the prosecution
had expected to prove.

No. 5.

Friday April 3rd, the Prosecution offered two telegraphic messages, one
from Lewis E. Parsons to Andrew Johnson, and the other Mr. Johnson’s
answer, as follows:

Montgomery, Ala., Jan. 17, 1867.

Legislature in session. Efforts making to reconsider vote on
Constitutional Amendment. Report from Washington says it is probable an
enabling act will pass. We do not know what to believe. I find nothing
here.

(The State Legislature had previously rejected the Constitutional
Amendment.)

The response is:

U. S. Military Telegraph. Executive Office, Washington D. C., Jan. 17,
1867.

What possible good can be obtained by reconsidering the Constitutional
Amendment? I know of none in the present posture of affairs; and I do not
believe that the people of the whole country will sustain any set of
individuals in attempts to change the whole character of our Government by
enabling acts or otherwise. I believe, on the contrary, that they will
eventually uphold all who have patriotism and courage to stand by the
Constitution, and who place their confidence in the people. There should
be no faltering on the part of those who are honest in their determination
to sustain the several co-ordinate Departments of the Government in
accordance with its original design. Andrew Johnson. Hon. L. E. Parsons,
Montgomery, Alabama.

The yeas and nays were demanded by Mr. Drake, and were as follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Cameron. Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Henderson, Howard, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont,
Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Ross, Sherman, Sprague,
Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Willey, Wilson—27—all
Republicans.

Nays—Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden,
Fowler, Frelinghuysen, McCreery, Morrill of Maine, Norton, Patterson of
Tennessee, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Williams—17—8
Democrats and 9 Republicans.

So the testimony was decided admissible, and was claimed by Mr. Manager
Boutwell to be in substantiation of the charges contained in the eleventh
article.

No. 6.

The prosecution offered in evidence a copy of the Cleveland Leader, a
newspaper purporting to contain a speech delivered by Mr. Johnson at the
City of Cleveland, Ohio, on September 30th, 1866, as evidence against the
President. It was objected to by the defense, and on the call by Mr.
Conness and Mr. Sumner the yeas and nays were ordered, and the vote was as
follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Cameron, Cattell. Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Frelinghuysen,
Henderson, Howard, Johnson, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont,
Norton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Ross, Sherman,
Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Van Winkle, Willey, Williams—35—33
Republicans and 2 Democrats.

Nays—Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fowler, Hendricks, Howe,
McCreery, Patterson of Tennessee, Trumbull, Vickers—11—8
Democrats and 3 Republicans.

So the evidence was received. It related to the tenth article, and was
based on a certain speech delivered by Mr. Johnson at Cleveland, Ohio.

No. 7.

Saturday, April 10th, 1868, General Lorenzo Thomas on the stand, called by
the Defense. Mr. Stanbery asked him, with reference to certain interviews
with the President: What occurred between the President and yourself at
that second interview on the 21st (February)?

Mr. Drake demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered and were as
follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cattell, Cole, Conkling, Corbett,
Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen,
Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morgan, Morrill of
Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Patterson of Tennessee, Pomeroy, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner,
Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey, Williams, Wilson, Yates—42-31
Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Chandler, Conness, Cragin, Drake, Harlan, Howard, Nye,
Ramsay, Thayer—10—all Republicans.

So the testimony was received, and General Thomas’ answer was:

I stated to the President that I had delivered the communication, and that
Mr. Stanton gave this answer: “Do you wish me to vacate at once, or will
you give me time to take away my private property?” and that I replied,
“At your pleasure.” I then said that after delivering the copy of the
letter to him, he said: “I do not know whether I will obey your
instructions or resist them.” This I mentioned to the President and his
answer was: “Very well, go and take charge of the office and perform the
duties.” * * *

Question by Mr. Stanbery: What first happened to you the next morning?

Answer: The first thing that happened to me the next morning was the
appearance at my house of the marshal of the district, with an assistant
marshal and a constable, and he arrested me.

Question: What time in the morning was that?

Answer: About 8 o’clock, before I had my breakfast. The command was to
appear forthwith. I asked if he would permit me to see the President. * *
* He went with me to the President’s and went into the room where the
President was. I stated that I had been arrested, at whose suit I did not
know. He said, “very well, that is the place I want it in the courts.” * *
* I was required to give bail in $5,000. I asked the judge what it meant.
He said it was simply to present myself there at half past ten the
following Wednesday. I asked him if it suspended me from any of my
functions. He said, “no, it has nothing to do with them.” * * * I went
immediately from there, first stopping at the President’s on my way, and
stating that I had given bail. He made the same answer, “very well, we
want it in the courts.”

Question: Did the President at any time prior to or including the 9th of
March, authorize or direct you to use force, intimidation or threats, to
get possession of the War Office?

Answer: He did not.

No. 8.

April 11, Gen. Sherman was called by the defense. In the course of his
examination Mr. Stanbery asked him the following question:

In that interview, (referring to a previously mentioned interview between
the General and the President in the presence of Gen. Grant) what
conversation took place between the President and you in regard to the
removal of Mr. Stanton?

Mr. Butler objected and the yeas and nays were ordered.

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cole, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle,
Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morgan, Norton,
Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Sprague, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle,
Vickers, and Willey—23—22 Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin,
Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Henderson, Howard, Morrill
of Maine, Morrill of Vermont. Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson and
Yates—28—all Republicans.

So the proffered testimony was refused.

No. 9.

Counsel for defense put the following question to Gen. Sherman:

At the first interview at which the tender of the duties of the Secretary
of War ad interim was made to you by the President, did anything further
pass between you and the President in reference to the tender or your
acceptance of it?

Mr. Drake demanded the yeas and nays, and they were as follows:

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin,
Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinhuysen, Harlan, Henderson, Howard, Howe,
Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New
Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams,
Wilson and Yates—29—all Republicans.

So the proffered testimony was refused.

No. 10.

The next question put to Gen. Sherman by the Defense was:

In either of these conversations did the President say to you that his
object in appointing you was that he might thus get the question of Mr.
Stanton’s right to the office before the Supreme Court?

Objected to by Prosecution, and yeas and nays were taken:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Fowler, McCreery, Patterson of Tennessee,
Ross, and Vickers—7—4 Democrats, 3 Republicans.

Nays—Buckalew, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry,
Fessenden, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Harlan, Henderson, Hendricks, Howard,
Howe, Johnson, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton,
Norton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman,
Sprague, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Willey, Williams,
Wilson, and Yates—44—37 Republicans and 7 Democrats.

So this proffered testimony was refused.

No. 11.

Mr. Stanbery, for Defense, suggested that the question had undoubtedly
been overruled upon matter of form, at least, and put it again in this
form.

Was anything said at either of those interviews by the President, as to
any purpose of getting the question of Mr. Stanton’s right to the office
before the courts?

This was put and determined in the negative without a division, when Mr.
Henderson offered it again in this form: Did the President, in tendering
you the appointment of Secretary of War ad interim. express the object or
purpose of so doing?

Prosecution again objected, and the yeas and nays were taken:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine,
Morton, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Sumner,
Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, and Willey-25—14 Republicans and 11
Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett,
Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe,
Morgan, Morrill of Vermont, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy,
Ramsey, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, and Yates—27—all
Republicans.

So the proffered evidence was refused.

No. 12.

April 13, 1868—General Sherman’s examination continued:

Question: After the restoration of Mr. Stanton to office, did you form an
opinion whether the good of the service required a Secretary of War other
than Mr. Stanton; and if so, did you communicate that opinion to the
President?

Mr. Conness called for the yeas and nays and they were ordered, and
resulted:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Dixon, Doolittle. Fowler, Grimes,
Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery Patterson, of Tennessee, Ross, Trumbull, Van
Winkle and Vickers—15—6 Republicans and 9 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett,
Cragin, Davis, Drake, Edmunds, Fessenden, Frelinghuysen, Harlan,
Henderson, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont,
Morton, Norton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman,
Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Willey, Williams, Wilson and Yates—35—33
Republicans and 2 Democrats.

So the proffered testimony was refused.

No. 13.

The next question asked of Gen. Sherman was by Senator Johnson:

Question: Did you at any time, and when, before the President gave the
order for the removal of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War, advise the
President to appoint some other person than Mr. Stanton?

Mr. Drake demanded the yeas and nays, which were as following:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds,
Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery,
Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers—18-9—Republicans
and 9 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett,
Cragin, Dixon, Drake, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan,
Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Nye, Patterson of
New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Willey
Williams, Wilson, Yates—33—30 Republicans and 2 Democrats.

So the proffered testimony was refused.

No. 14.

Counsel for defense offered:

A warrant of arrest of Gen. Thomas, dated February 22, 1868, and the
affidavit on which the warrant issued.

(This warrant had been issued on the affidavit of Mr. Stanton.)

The yeas and nays were as follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cattell, Cole, Corbett, Cragin,
Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes,
Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of
Vermont, Morton, Norton, Patterson of New Hampshire, Patterson of
Tennessee, Pomeroy, Ross, Sherman, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers,
Willey, Williams, Yates—34—24 Republicans and 10 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Conkling, Chandler, Conness, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry,
Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Nye, Ramsay, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Wilson—17—all
Republicans.

So the warrant was received in evidence.

That warrant was issued by Judge Carter, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, upon the complaint of Edwin M. Stanton,
and charged Thomas with attempting forcibly to seize and take possession
of the War Office, in violation of the fifth section of the
Tenure-of-Office Act. The warrant was as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

To David S. Gooding, United States Marshal for the District of Columbia:

I, David K. Carter, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the District of
Columbia, hereby command you to arrest Lorenzo Thomas, of said District,
forthwith, and that you have the said Lorenzo before me at the chambers of
the said Supreme Court in the City of Washington, forthwith, to answer to
the charge of a high misdemeanor in this, that on the 21st day of
February, 1868, in the District of Columbia, he did unlawfully accept the
appointment of the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and did then and
there unlawfully hold and exercise and attempt to hold and exercise the
said office contrary to the provisions of the act entitled “An Act
regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, passed March 2, 1867, and
hereof fail not, but make due return.

Given under my hand and seal of said court this 22nd day of February,
1868,

D. K. Carter. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia.

Attest: R. J. Meigs, Clerk. (Marshal’s Return). Washington, D. C.,
February 22, 1868.

The within writ came to hand at 7 o’clock a.m. and was served by me on the
said Lorenzo Thomas at 8 o’clock a.m, and I now return this writ and bring
him before Chief Justice Carter at 9 o’clock a. m. of to-day.

David S. Gooding, U. S. Marshal, D. C.

No. 15.

Mr. Johnson, (of the Court,) asked this question of General Sherman,
witness on the stand: When the President tendered to you the office of
Secretary of War, ad interim, on the 27th of January, 1868, and on the
31st of the same month and year, did he, at the very time of making such
tender, state to you what his purpose in so doing was?

Counsel for Prosecution objected, and Mr. Drake called for the yeas and
nays, which were taken, as follows:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cole, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle,
Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Johnson, McCreery,
Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Patterson of
Tennessee, Ross, Sherman, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey—16—16
Republicans and 10 Democrats.

Nays-Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake,
Edmunds, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsay,
Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, Yates—22—all
Republicans.

The question was decided to be admissible, and the answer was “yes.”

No. 16.

The next question, in immediate connection with the last, was:

If he did, state what he said his purpose was?

The yeas and nays were ordered and the vote was:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cole, Cobertt, Davis, Dixon,
Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks,
Johnson, McCreery, Morton, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Sherman,
Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey—26—15
Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Cragin, Drake,
Edmunds, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of
Vermont, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Stewart,
Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, Yates—25—all Republicans.

So the question was permitted to be answered, and General Sherman said:

The President told me that the relations between himself and Mr. Stanton,
and between Mr. Stanton and the other members of the Cabinet, were such
that he could not execute the office which he filled as President of the
United States without making provision ad interim for that office; that he
had the right under the law; he claimed to have the right, and his purpose
was to have the office administered in the interest of the Army and of the
Country; and he offered me the office in that view. He did not state to me
then that his purpose was to bring it to the Courts directly; but for the
purpose of having the office administered properly in the interest of the
Army and the whole Country. I asked him why lawyers could not make a case,
and not bring me, or any officer of the Army, into the controversy. His
answer was that it was found impossible, or a case could not be made up;
but, said he “if we can bring the case to the Courts, it would not stand
half an hour.”

Mr. Butler, of the Prosecution, objected, and after debate, General
Sherman continued:

The question first asked me seemed to restrict me so close to the purpose
that I endeavored to confine myself to that point alone. On the first day,
or first interview, in which the President offered me the appointment ad
interim, he confined himself to very general terms, and I gave him no
definite answer. The second interview, which was on the afternoon of the
30th, was the interview during which he made the points which I have
testified to. In speaking he referred to the constitutionality of the bill
known as the civil tenure-of-office bill, I think, or the tenure of civil
office bill; and it was the constitutionality of that bill which he seemed
desirous of having tested, and which, he said, if it could be brought
before the Supreme Court properly, would not stand half an hour. We also
spoke of force. I first stated that if Mr. Stanton would simply retire,
although it was against my interest, against my desire, against my
personal wishes, and against my official wishes, I might be willing to
undertake to administer the office ad interim. Then he supposed the point
was yielded; and I made this point? “Suppose Mr. Stanton do not yield?” he
answered, “Oh! he will make no objection; you present the order and he
will retire.” I expressed my doubt, and he remarked. “I know him better
than you do: he is cowardly.” I then begged to be excused from giving him
an answer to give the subject more reflection, and I gave him my final
answer in writing. I think that letter, if you insist on knowing my views,
should come into evidence, and not parol testimony taken up; but my
reasons for declining the office were mostly personal in their nature.

Mr. Henderson (of the Court) asked this question:

Did the President, on either of the occasions alluded to, express to you a
fixed purpose or determination to remove Mr. Stanton from his office?

General Sherman answered:

If by removal is meant a removal by force, he never conveyed to my mind
such an impression; but he did most unmistakably say that he could have no
more intercourse with him in the relation of President and Secretary of
War.

Mr. Howard (of the Court) asked the General:

You say the President spoke of force. What did he say about force?

General Sherman answered:

I enquired, “Suppose Mr. Stanton do not yield? What then shall be done?”
“Oh,” said he, “there is no necessity of considering that question. Upon
the presentation of an order he will simply go away, or retire.”

Mr. Henderson (of the Court) asked the question:

Did you give any opinion, or advice to the President on either of those
occasions in regard to the legality or propriety of an ad interim
appointment; and if so, what advice did you give, or what opinion did you
express to him?

Mr. Bingham of the prosecution, objected, and the Chair put the question
to the Senate whether it should be answered. The Senate, without a
division, refused answer to the question, and the examination of Gen.
Sherman closed for that day.

No. 17.

Wednesday, April 15th. The defense offered several extracts from records
of the Navy Department, to prove the practice of the Government in cases
of removal from office by different Presidents prior to Mr. Johnson, of
which the following are samples:

NAVY AGENCY AT NEW YORK.

1861. June 20. Isaac Henderson was, by direction of the President, removed
from the office of Navy agent at New York, and instructed to transfer to
Paymaster John D. Gibson, of United States Navy, all the public funds and
other property in his charge. Navy Agency at Philadelphia.

Dec. 26, 1851. James S. Chambers was removed from the office of Navy Agent
at Philadelphia and instructed to transfer to Paymaster A. E. Watson, U.
S. Navy, all the public funds and other property in his charge.

The prosecution objected and the yeas and nays were ordered.

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cole, Conkling, Corbett, Davis,
Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen,
Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine,
Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Patterson of New Hampshire, Patterson of
Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbery, Sherman, Stewart, Sumner, Trumbull, Van
Winkle, Vickers, Willey, Wilson, Yates—36—25 Republicans and
11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conness, Cragin, Drake, Harlan,
Howard, Morgan, Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Thayer, Tipton, Williams—15—all
Republicans.

So the evidence was admitted.

No. 18.

Thursday, April 16, Mr. Walter S. Cox on the stand. The defense offered to
prove:

That Mr. Cox was employed professionally by the President, in the presence
of General Thomas, to take such legal proceedings in the case that had
been commenced against General Thomas as would be effectual to raise
judicially the question of Mr. Stanton’s legal right to continue to hold
the office of Secretary for the Department of War against the authority of
the President, and also in reference to obtaining a writ of quo warranto
for the same purpose; and we shall expect to follow up this proof by
evidence of what was done by the witness in pursuance of the above
employment.

Mr. Drake demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle,
Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson,
McCreery, Morrill of Maine, Morton, Norton, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Sumner,
Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey—29—17 Republicans and 12
Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds,
Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont, Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsay,
Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, Yates—21—all
Republicans.

So the testimony was received, and the witness proceeded to detail the
steps he had taken by direction of the President to procure a judicial
determination of General Thomas’ right to the office of Secretary of War
and to put him in possession, till the following question was asked.

No. 19.

What did you do toward getting out a writ of habeas corpus under the
employment of the President.

Prosecution objected, and the yeas and nays were ordered:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of
Maine, Morgan, Norton, Patterson of New Hampshire, Patterson of Tennessee,
Ross, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers,
Willey—27—15 Republicans and 12 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Cragin, Drake,
Edmunds, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont, Nye,
Pomeroy, Ramsay, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, Yates—23—all
Republicans.

The Senate having decided the evidence to be admissible,

Mr. Cox proceeded:

When the Chief Justice announced that he would proceed as an examining
Judge to investigate the case of General Thomas, and not as holding Court,
our first application to him was to adjourn the investigation into the
Criminal Court then in session, in order to have the action of that Court.
After some little discussion this request was refused. Our next effort was
to have General Thomas committed to prison, in order that we might apply
to that Court for a habeas corpus, and upon his being remanded by that
Court; if that should be done, we might follow up the application by one
to the Supreme Court of the United States. * * * The Chief Justice having
indicated an intention to postpone the examination, we directed General
Thomas to decline giving any bail for further appearance, and to surrender
himself into custody, and announce to the Judge that he was in custody,
and then present to the Criminal Court an application for a writ of habeas
corpus. The Counsel on the other side objected that General Thomas could
not put himself into custody, and they did not desire that he should be
detained in custody. The Chief Judge also declared that he would not
restrain General Thomas of his liberty, and would not hold him or allow
him to be held in custody. Supposing that he must be either committed or
finally discharged, we then claimed that he be discharged, not supposing
that the Counsel on the other side would consent to it, and supposing that
would bring about his commitment, and that we should then have an
opportunity of getting a habeas corpus. They made no objection, however,
to his final discharge, and accordingly the Chief Justice did discharge
him.

No. 20.

The witness, Mr. Cox, was asked by counsel for defense:

After you had reported to the President the result of your efforts to
obtain a writ of habeas corpus, did you do any other act in pursuance of
the original instructions you had received from the President on Saturday
to test the right of Mr. Stanton to continue in the office; and if so,
state what the acts were?

The yeas and nays were ordered on the demand of Mr. Howard.

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine,
Morton, Norton, Patterson of New Hampshire, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross,
Saulsbery, Sherman, Sprague, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey—27—15
Republicans and 12 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Cragin, Drake,
Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont,
Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, Yates—23—all
Republicans.

So the evidence was admitted, and Mr. Cox continued.

On the same day or the next, I prepared an information in the nature of a
quo warranto. I think a delay of one day occurred in the effort to procure
certified copies of Gen. Thomas’ commission as Secretary of War ad
interim, and of the order to Mr. Stanton. I then applied to the District
Attorney to sign the information in the nature of a quo warranto, and he
declined to do so without instructions or a request from the President or
the Attorney General. This fact was communicated to the Attorney General
and the papers were sent to him. Nothing was done after this time by me.

No. 21.

The defense offered to prove:

That the President then stated that he had issued an order for the removal
of Mr. Stanton and the employment of Mr. Thomas to perform the duties ad
interim; that thereupon Mr. Perrin said, “Supposing Mr. Stanton should
oppose the order.” The President replied: “There is no danger of that, for
General Thomas is already in the office.” He then added: “It is only a
temporary arrangement; I shall send in to the Senate at once a good name
for the office.”

Mr. Butler, for prosecution, objected, and the vote was:

Yeas—Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Hendricks, McCreery,
Patterson of Tennessee, and Vickers—9—all Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin,
Drake, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Harlan, Howard,
Howe, Johnson, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye,
Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Ross, Sherman, Sprague,
Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Willey, Williams, Wilson,
and Yates—-37—36 Republicans and 1 Democrat.

So this testimony was rejected.

No. 22.

Friday, April 17. The defense offered to prove:

That on this occasion (a Cabinet meeting previously mentioned), the
President communicated to Mr. Welles, and the other members of his
Cabinet, before the meeting broke up, that he had removed Mr. Stanton and
appointed General Thomas Secretary of War ad interim; and that, upon the
inquiry by Mr. Welles whether General Thomas was in possession of the
office, the President replied that he was, and on further question of
Welles, whether Mr. Stanton acquiesced, the President replied that he did;
all that he required was time to remove his papers.

Mr. Butler objected and the yeas and nays were ordered.

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cole, Conkling, Corbett, Davis,
Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery,
Morton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbery, Sherman, Sprague, Sumner,
Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey—26—15 Republicans and 11
Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Conness, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry,
Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of
Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Stewart, Thayer,
Tipton, Williams, Wilson, Yates—2-3-all Republicans.

So the testimony was received, and the following proceeding was had Mr.
Evarts, of Counsel for the President. Mr. Welles on the stand:

Please state, Mr. Welles, what communication was made by the President to
the Cabinet on the subject of the removal of Mr. Stanton and the
appointment of General Thomas, and what passed at the time?

Mr. Welles: As I remarked, after the Departmental business had been
disposed of, the President remarked, as usual when he had anything to
communicate himself, that before they separated it would be proper for him
to say that he had removed Mr. Stanton and appointed the Adjutant General
Lorenzo Thomas, Secretary ad interim. I asked whether General Thomas was
in possession. The President said he was; that Mr. Stanton required some
little time to remove his writings, his papers; I said, perhaps, or I
asked, “Mr. Stanton, then, acquiesces?” He said he did, as he considered
it. * * *

Question: Now, sir, one moment to a matter which you spoke of
incidentally. You were there the next morning about noon?

Answer: I was.

Answer: I did.

Question: Was it made out before you came there, or after, or while you
were there?

Answer: While I was there.

Question: And you then saw it?

Answer: I saw it.

Question by Mr. Johnson (of the Court): What time of the day was that?

Answer: It was about twelve.

* * * Question by Mr. Evarts: Did you become aware of the Tenure-of-office
bill, as it is called, at or about the time that it passed Congress?

Answer: I was aware of it.

Question: Were you present at any Cabinet meeting at which, after the
passage of that Act, it became the subject of consideration?

Answer: Yes, on two occasions. The first occasion when it was brought
before the Cabinet was on the 26th of February, 1867.

Question: Who were present?

Answer: All the Cabinet were present.

Question: Was Mr. Stanton there?

Answer: Mr. Stanton was there, I think, on that occasion.

Question: This civil tenure act was the subject of consideration there?

Answer: It was submitted.

Question: As a matter of consideration in the Cabinet?

Answer: For consultation for the advice and opinion of members.

Question: How did he submit the matter to your consideration?

Mr. Butler objected and demanded that the offer be put in writing.

No. 23.

That the President at a meeting of the Cabinet, while the bill was before
the President for his approval, laid before the Cabinet the
tenure-of-civil-office bill for their consideration and advice to the
President respecting his approval of the bill: and thereupon the members
of the Cabinet then present gave their advice to the President that the
bill was unconstitutional and should be returned to Congress with his
objections, and that the duty of preparing a message, setting forth the
objections to the constitutionality of the bill, was devolved on Mr.
Seward and Mr. Stanton; to be followed by proof as to what was done by the
President and Cabinet up to the time of sending in the message.

After argument the yeas and nays were taken:

Yeas—Anthony Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson of
Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, and Willey—20—9
Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett,
Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe,
Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Pomeroy, Ramsay Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams,
Wilson, and Yates—29—all Republicans.

So this testimony was rejected.

No. 21.

Counsel for Defense offered to prove:

That at the meetings of the Cabinet at which Mr. Stanton was present, held
while the tenure-of-civil-office bill was before the President for
approval, the advice of the Cabinet in regard to the same was asked by the
President and given by the Cabinet, and thereupon the question whether Mr.
Stanton and the other Secretaries who had received their appointment from
Mr. Lincoln were within the restrictions upon the President’s power of
removal from office created by said act was considered, and the opinion
expressed that the Secretaries appointed by Mr. Lincoln were not within
such restrictions.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the vote was:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson of
Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Trumbull, Van Winkle,
Vickers, and Willey—22—11 Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole. Conness. Corbett, Cragin,
Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghusen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill
of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay,
Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, and Yates—26—all
Republicans.

So this testimony was rejected.

No. 25.

Counsel for defense offered to prove:

That at the Cabinet meetings between the passage of the tenure-of-civil
office bill and the order of the 21st of February, 1868, for the removal
of Mr. Stanton upon occasions when the condition of the public service, as
affected by the operation of that bill, came up for the consideration and
advice of the Cabinet, it was considered by the President and Cabinet that
a proper regard to the public service made it desirable that upon some
proper case a judicial determination of the constitutionality of the law
should be obtained.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson of
Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury Trumbull, Van Winkle, and Vickers—19—8
Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett,
Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe,
Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Willey,
Williams, Wilson and Yates—30—all Republicans.

So the proffered testimony was rejected.

No. 26.

Counsel for defense put this question to witness, (Mr. Welles, then
Secretary of the Navy.)

Was there, within the period embraced in the inquiry in the last question,
and at any discussions or deliberations of the Cabinet concerning the
operation of the tenure-of-civil-office act and the requirements of the
public service in regard to the service, any suggestion or intimation
whatever touching or looking to the vacation of any office by force or
getting possession of the same by force?

Counsel for prosecution objected, and the vote was:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Edmunds, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson of Tennessee,
Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, and Vickers—18—8
Republicans and 10 Democrats.

Nays-Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Ferry,
Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of
Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Stewart,
Thayer, Tipton, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates—26—all
Republicans.

So the proffered testimony was rejected.

No. 27.

Defense offered to prove:

That at the meetings of the Cabinet at which Stanton was present, held
while the tenure-of-civil-office bill was before the President for
approval, the advice of the Cabinet in regard to the same was asked by the
President, and given the Cabinet, and thereupon the question whether Mr.
Stanton and the other Secretaries who had received their appointments from
Mr. Lincoln were within the restrictions upon the President’s power of
removal from office created by said act, was considered and the opinion
expressed that the Secretaries appointed by Mr. Lincoln were not within
such restrictions.

Mr. Johnson: I ask that the question propounded by the Senator from Ohio
(Mr. Sherman) shall now be read.

The Secretary read the question as follows:

State if, after the 2d of March, 1867, the date of the passage of the
tenure-of-office act, the question whether the Secretaries appointed by
President Lincoln were included within the provisions of that act came
before the Cabinet for discussion; and if so, what opinion was given on
this question by members of the Cabinet to the President.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken resulted:

Yeas—Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Patterson of Tennessee,
Ross, Saulsbury, Sherman, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, and Willey—20—9
Republican and 11 Democrats.

Nays—Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett,
Cragin, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan,
Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy,
Ramsay, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, and Yates—26—all
Republicans.

So the proffered testimony was rejected.

No. 28.

The Prosecution proposed to put in evidence the nomination of Lieutenant
General Sherman, to be General by brevet, sent to the Senate on the 13th
of February, 1868, also the nomination of Major General George H. Thomas
to be Lieutenant General by brevet, and to be General by brevet, sent to
the Senate on the 21st of February, 1868.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted: Yeas—Anthony,
Cole, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Morton, Ross, Sumner, Tipton,
Trumbull, Van Winkle, Willey, and Yates—14—all Republicans.

Nays—Buckalew, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry,
Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Hendricks, Howard, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morgan,
Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Patterson of New Hampshire,
Patterson of Tennessee, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart,
Thayer, Vickers, Williams, and Wilson—35—26 Republicans and 9
Democrats.

So the proffered testimony was refused.

GENERAL EMORY’S TESTIMONY.

The Ninth Article of the Impeachment was based upon alleged military
changes in the City of Washington whereby the number of troops on duty
there was rumored to have been largely increased, with a view to their use
in the controversy between the President and Congress, and more especially
for the expulsion of Mr. Stanton from the War Office in case of his
resistance to the order of the President for his retirement. The wildest
rumors of that character prevailed—that Mr. Johnson proposed to
throw off all disguise and assume direct military control and the
establishment of practically a military dictatorship. Congress had some
months previously enacted that all military orders from the President
should be issued through the General of the Army—the Congress
thereby assuming to practically abrogate a constitutional function of the
Chief Executive.

There was considerable confidence among the supporters of the impeachment
that they would be able to prove these allegations by General Emory, then
in local command of the troops and Department of Washington. General Emory
was called by the prosecution, and the following was his testimony.

Examined by Mr. Butler:

Question: Will you have the kindness to state, as nearly as you can what
took place then? (Referring to an interview with the President at the
Executive Mansion.)

Answer: I will try and state the substance of it, but the words I can not
undertake to state exactly. The President asked me if I recollected a
conversation he had had with me when I first took command of the
department. I told him that I recollected the facts of the conversation
distinctly. He then asked me what changes had been made. I told him no
material changes, but such as had been made I could state at once. I went
on to state that in the fall six companies of the 29th infantry had been
brought to this City to winter; but as an offset to that, four companies
of the 12th infantry had been detached to South Carolina on the request of
the Commander of that District; that two companies of artillery had been
detached by my predecessor, one of them for the purpose of siding in
putting down the Fenian difficulties, had been returned to the command,
that although the number of companies head been increased, the numerical
strength of the command was very much the same, growing out of an order
reducing the artillery and infantry companies from the maximum of the war
establishment to the minimum of the peace establishment. The President
said: “I do not refer to those changes.” I replied that if he would state
what changes he referred to, or who made the report of the changes,
perhaps I could be more, explicit. He said, “I refer to recent changes
within a day or two,” or something to that effect. I told him I thought I
could assure him that no changes had been made; that under a recent order
issued for the government of the armies of the United States, founded upon
a law of Congress, all orders had to be transmitted through General Grant
to the army, and in like manner all orders coming from General Grant to
any of his subordinate officers must necessarily come, if in my
department, through me; that if by chance an order had been given to any
junior officer of mine it was his duty at once to report that fact. The
President asked me. “What order do you refer to?” I replied, “To order
number 17 of the series of 1867.” He said, “I would like to see the
order,” and a messenger was dispatched for it. At this time a gentleman
came in who I supposed had business in no way connected with the business
I had in hand, and I withdrew to the farther end of the room, and while
there, the messenger came in with the book of orders and handed it to me.
As soon as the gentleman had withdrawn, I returned to the President with
the book in my hand, and said I would take it as a favor if he would
permit me to call his attention to that order; that it had been passed in
an appropriation bill, and I thought it not unlikely that it had escaped
his attention. He took the order and read it, and observed, “This is not
in conformity with the Constitution of the United States, that makes me
Commander-in-Chief, or with the terns of your commission.” I replied,
“That is the order which you approved and issued to the army for our
government,” or something to that effect. I can not recollect the exact
words, nor do I intend to quote the exact words of the President. He said,
“Am I to understand that the President of the United States can not give
an order except through the General of the Army? Or General Grant?” I said
in reply, that that was my impression—that that was the opinion that
the Army entertain, and I thought upon that subject they were a unit. I
also said, “I think it is fair, Mr. President, to say to you that when
this order came out, there was considerable discussion on the subject as
to what were the obligations of an officer under that order, and some
eminent lawyers were consulted. I myself consulted one—and the
opinion was given to me decidedly and unequivocally that we were bound by
the order, Constitutional or not Constitutional.” The President observed
that “the object of the law was evident.”

The following is that portion of the act referred to:

“Section 2. Be it further enacted: That the headquarters of the General of
the Army of the United States shall be at the City of Washington, and all
orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the
President and Secretary of War shall be issued through the General of the
Army, and in case of his inability, through the next in rank. The General
of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command or
assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters except at his own
request WITHOUT THE PREVIOUS APPROVAL OF THE SENATE; and any orders or
instructions relating to Military operations issued contrary to the
requirements of this section, shall be null and void. And any officer who
shall issue orders or instructions, contrary to the provisions of this
section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office; and any
officer of the Army who shall transmit, convey or obey any orders or
instructions so issued contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing
that such orders were so issued shall be liable to imprisonment for not
less than two nor more than twenty years upon conviction thereof in any
Court of competent jurisdiction.”

By turning to the Congressional Record of that day, it will be found that
Mr. Johnson was perfectly aware of the existence of the foregoing
provision of the Act of Congress in the bill referred to, at the time he
returned the bill to the House with his signature. His reasons for so
signing it are set out in the following communication to the House
accompanying the bill.

The act entitled “An act making appropriations for the support of the Army
for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,” contains
provisions to which I must call attention. There are propositions
contained in the second section which in certain cases deprives the
President of his Constitutional functions of Commander in Chief of the
Army, and in the sixth section, which denies to ten States of the Union
their Constitutional right to protect themselves in any emergency, by
means of their own militia. These provisions are out of place in an
appropriation act, but I am compelled to defeat these necessary
appropriations if I withhold my signature from the act. Pressed by these
considerations, I feel constrained to return the bill with my signature,
but to accompany it with my earnest protest against the section which I
have indicated.

Andrew Johnson. Washington, D. C., March 2, 1868.

That Congress was to expire by limitation at 12 o’clock on the 4th,
thirty-six hours later. If Mr. Johnson had vetoed the bill, as under
ordinary conditions it would have been his duty to the Constitution and to
himself to do, its re-passage through the two Houses in that limited time
would have been impossible, and the appropriations carried by the bill for
the support of the Army would have been lost. To save them Mr. Johnson
submitted to the indignity put upon him by Congress in denying him a
guaranteed and manifest Constitutional right and power. In that act Mr.
Johnson illustrated a magnanimity and a consciousness of public
responsibility that was most creditable to himself, and in marked contrast
to the action of Congress toward him.

CHAPTER X. — A CONFERENCE HELD AND THE FIRST VOTE TAKEN.

A few days prior to the day set for taking the vote on the several
Articles of Impeachment, and after the conclusion of testimony, it was
proposed that there be a private session for conference of the Senate on a
day named, May 11th, to give Senators an opportunity to declare themselves
on the pending impeachment.

Neither the precise object or the utility of a conference were then
apparent, but the result was somewhat of a surprise to those who had, up
to that time, been undoubtingly confident of the President’s conviction.
Comparatively few Senators had previously declared their position. Very
few, if any of the Republican Senators had indicated a disposition to vote
against any of the articles, but the silence of a number of them, and
their refusal to commit themselves even to their associates, was a source
of uneasiness in Senatorial Impeachment circles. Hence, possibly, the
suggestion of a “conference.”

It was taken for granted that every Democratic Senator would vote against
the impeachment. But the idea was not to be entertained that the “no”
votes would extend beyond the Democratic coterie of twelve. There were,
however, anxious misgivings as to that. There was too much silence—too
much of saying nothing when so little that might be said would go so far
to relieve an oppressive anxiety.

So a session for “conference” was ordered and held, much to the surprise
of gentlemen whose silence had become somewhat oppressive, and was
becoming equally painful to those who wanted a conference. It savored of
an attempt to “poll the Senate” in advance of judgment. It was resolved at
the session of May 7th, to hold a session for deliberation on the
following Monday, May 11th. The most surprising development of that
session was the weakness of the bill of indictment at the very point where
it was apparently strongest—the first Article. Two conspicuous and
influential Senators—Messrs. Sherman of Ohio, and Howe of Wisconsin—declared,
and gave convincing reasons therefor, that they would not vote for the
impeachment of Mr. Johnson on that Article.

In his remarks on this occasion, after giving a history of the enactment
of the Tenure-of-Office law, the first section of which specifically
excepts from its operation such members of Mr. Johnson’s Cabinet as had
been appointed by Mr. Lincoln and still remaining, though not
recommissioned by Mr. Johnson, Mr. Sherman said:

I can only say as one of the Senate conferees, under the solemn
obligations that now rest upon us in construing this Act, that I did not
understand it to include members of the Cabinet not appointed by the
President, and that it was with extreme reluctance and only to secure the
passage of the bill that, in the face of the votes of the Senate I agreed
to the report LIMITING AT ALL the power of the President to remove heads
of Departments. * * * I stated explicitly that the Act as reported did not
protect from removal the members of the Cabinet appointed by Mr. Lincoln,
that President Johnson might remove them at his pleasure; and I named the
Secretary of war as one that might be removed. * * * I could not conceive
a case where the Senate would require the President to perform his great
executive office upon the advice and through heads of Departments
personally obnoxious to him, and whom he had not appointed, and,
therefore, no such case was provided for. * * * Can I pronounce the
President guilty of crime, and by that vote aid to remove him from his
high office for doing what I declared and still believe he had a legal
right to do. God forbid: * * * What the President did do in the removal of
Mr. Stanton he did under a power which you repeatedly refused to take from
the office of the President—a power that has been held by that
officer since the formation of the Government, and is now limited only by
the words of an Act, the literal construction of which does not include
Mr. Stanton. * * * It follows, that as Mr. Stanton is not protected by the
Tenure-of-Civil-Office Act, his removal rests upon the Act of 1789, and he
according to the terms of that Act and of the commission held by him, and
in compliance with the numerous precedents cited in this cause, was
lawfully removed by the President, and his removal not being contrary to
the provisions of the Act of March 2nd 1867, the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th
Articles, based upon his removal, must fail.

On this point, Mr. Howe said:

If Mr. Stanton had been appointed during the present Presidential term. I
should have no doubt he was within the security of the law. But I cannot
find that, either in fact or in legal intendment, he was appointed during
the present Presidential term. It is urged that he was appointed by Mr.
Lincoln, and such is the fact. It is said that Mr. Lincoln’s term is not
yet expired. Such I believe to be the fact. But the language of the
proviso is, that a Secretary shall hold not during the term of MAN by whom
he is appointed, but during the TERM of the PRESIDENT by whom he may be
appointed. Mr. Stanton was appointed by the President in 1862. The term of
that President was limited by the Constitution. It expired on the 4th of
March, 1865. That the same incumbent was re-elected for the next term is
conceded, but I do not comprehend how that fact extended the former term.

Entertaining these views, and because the first Article of the Impeachment
charges the order of removal as a violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act, I
am constrained to hold the President not guilty upon that Article.

These declarations, coming from two gentlemen of distinction and influence
in the party councils, both of whom had actively participated in framing
the Tenure-of-Office Act, became at once the occasion of genuine and
profound surprise, and it is unnecessary to say that they tended largely
to strengthen the doubts entertained by others as to the sufficiency of
all the other allegations of the indictment. They naturally and logically
reasoned that the removal of Mr. Stanton, set out in the first Article,
constituted, in effect, the essence of the indictment, and that all that
followed, save the 10th Article was more in the nature of specifications,
or a bill of particulars, than otherwise—that if no impeachable
offense were set out in the first Article, then none was committed, as
that Article constituted the substructure of all the rest—its
essence and logic running through and permeating practically all—and
that without that Article, there was no coherence or force in any of them,
and consequently nothing charged against the President that was
impeachable, as he had not violated the Tenure-of-Office law, and was not
charged with the violation of any other law.

That conference developed, further, that a large majority of the Articles
of Impeachment were objectionable to and would not be supported by a
number of Republican Senators.

Mr. Edmunds would not support the 4th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Articles, being
“wholly unsustained by proof,” but would support the 11th, though
apparently doubtful of its efficiency.

Mr. Ferry could not support the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, or 10th Articles.

Mr. Howard declared that he would not support the 9th Article.

Mr. Morrill of Vermont, would not support the 4th, 6th, 9th, or 10th
Articles, as they were unproven.

Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Yates, Mr. Harlan, and Mr. Stewart, would vote
to convict on the Articles relating to the removal of Mr. Stanton—uncommitted
on all others.

Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Fowler, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Trumbull, and
Mr. Van Winkle, each declared, at that conference, their opposition to the
entire list of the Articles of Impeachment.

But eighteen Republicans committed themselves at that conference, for
conviction, out of twenty-four who filed opinions. While it was taken for
granted that the six Democrats who had failed to declare their position at
that conference would oppose conviction, the position of the eighteen
Republicans who had failed to declare themselves became at once a source
of very grave concern in impeachment circles. Out of that list of eighteen
uncommitted Republicans, but one vote was necessary to defeat the
impeachment. This condition was still farther intensified by the fact that
eight of the eleven Articles of Impeachment were already beaten in that
conference, and practically by Republican committals, and among them the
head and front and foundation of the indictment—the First Article—by
Messrs. Sherman and Howe, two conspicuous Republican leaders.

A forecast of the vote based on these committals as to the several
Articles, would be against the First Article, twelve Democrats and eight
Republicans, one more than necessary for its defeat—the eight “not
guilty” votes including Messrs. Sherman and Howe.

Against the Fourth Article—twelve Democrats and nine Republicans—including
Messrs. Edmunds, Ferry, and Morrill of Vermont.

Against the Fifth Article—twelve Democrats and eight
Republicans-including Messrs. Edmunds and Ferry.

Against the Sixth Article—twelve Democrats and nine
Republicans-including Messrs. Ferry, Howe, and Morrill of Vermont.

Against the Seventh—Article-twelve Democrats and seven Republicans—including
Mr. Ferry.

Against the Eighth Article—twelve Democrats and seven Republicans—including
Mr. Edmunds.

Against the Ninth Article—twelve Democrats and twelve Republicans—including
Messrs. Sherman, Edmunds, Ferry, Howe, Howard, and Morrill of Vermont.

Against the Tenth Article—twelve Democrats and ten Republicans—including
Messrs. Edmunds, Sherman, Ferry, and Morrill of Vermont.

It is somewhat conspicuous that but three gentlemen—Messrs. Sumner,
Pomeroy, and Tipton, in their arguments in the Conference, pronounced the
President guilty on all the charges—though five others, Messrs.
Wilson, Patterson of New Hampshire, Frelinghuysen, Cattell, and Williams,
pronounced the President guilty on general principles, without
specification; and Messrs. Morrill of Maine, Yates and Stewart, guilty in
the removal of Mr. Stanton, without further specification of charges.

As but one vote, in addition to the twelve Democratic and the six
Republican votes pledged against conviction at the Conference, was
necessary to defeat impeachment on the three remaining Articles—the
2nd, 3rd, and 11th—and as nearly a half of the Republicans of the
Senate had failed to commit themselves, at least in any public way, the
anxiety of the advocates of Impeachment became at once, and naturally,
very grave. How many of the eighteen Republicans who had failed to declare
themselves at that Conference might fail to sustain the Impeachment,
became, therefore, a matter of active solicitude on all sides, especially
in impeachment circles in and out of the Senate. Republican committals in
the Conference had rendered absolutely certain the defeat of every Article
of the Impeachment except the Second, Third, and Eleventh, and the
addition of but a single vote from the eighteen uncommitted Republicans to
the “No” side, would defeat them.

It was under this unfavorable condition of the Impeachment cause, that the
Senate assembled on May 16th, 1868, for the purpose of taking final action
on the indictment brought by the House of Representatives, the trial of
which had occupied the most of the time of the Senate for the previous
three months, and which had to a large degree engrossed the attention of
the general public, to the interruption of legislation pending in the two
Houses of Congress, and more or less to the embarrassment of the
commercial activities of the country.

For the first time in the history of the government, practically eighty
years, the President of the United States was at the bar of the Senate, by
virtue of a constitutional warrant, on an accusation of the House of
Representatives of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and his
conviction and expulsion from office demanded in the name of all the
people. No event in the civil history of the country had ever before
occurred to so arouse public antipathies and public indignation against
any man-and these conditions found special vent in the City of Washington,
as the Capitol of the Nation, as it had become during the trial the focal
point of the politically dissatisfied element of the entire country. Its
streets and all its places of gathering had swarmed for many weeks with
representatives of every State of the Union, demanding in a practically
united voice the deposition of the President.

On numbers of occasions during the previous history of the Government
there had been heated controversies between the Congress and the
Executive, but never before characterized by the intensity, not
infrequently malevolence, that had come to mark this and never before had
a division between the Executive and the Congress reached a point at which
a suggestion of his constitutional ostracism from office had been
seriously entertained, much less attempted.

But it had now come. The active, intense interest of the country was
aroused, and everywhere the division among the people was sharply defined
and keen, though the numerical preponderance, it cannot be denied, was
largely against the President and insistent upon his removal.

The dominant party of the country was aroused and active for the
deposition of the President. Public meetings were held throughout the
North and resolutions adopted and forwarded to Senators demanding that Mr.
Johnson be promptly expelled from office by the Senate—and it had
become apparent, long before the taking of the vote, that absolute, swift,
and ignominious expulsion from office awaited every Republican Senator who
should dare to disregard that demand.

Under these conditions it was but natural that during the trial, and
especially as the close approached, the streets of Washington and the
lobbies of the Capitol were thronged from day to day with interested
spectators from every section of the Union, or that Senators were
beleaguered day and night, by interested constituents, for some word of
encouragement that a change was about to come of that day’s proceeding,
and with threats of popular vengeance upon the failure of any Republican
Senator to second that demand.

In view of this intensity of public interest it was as a matter of course
that the coming of the day when the great controversy was expected to be
brought to a close by the deposition of Mr. Johnson and the seating of a
new incumbent in the Presidential chair, brought to the Capitol an
additional throng which long before the hour for the assembling of the
Senate filled all the available space in the vast building, to witness the
culmination of the great political trial of the age.

Upon the closing of the hearing—even prior thereto, and again during
the few days of recess that followed, the Senate had been carefully
polled, and the prospective vote of every member from whom it was possible
to procure a committal, ascertained and registered in many a private
memoranda. There were fifty-four members—all present. According to
these memoranda, the vote would stand eighteen for acquittal, thirty-five
for conviction—one less than the number required by the Constitution
to convict. What that one vote would be, and could it be had, were anxious
queries, of one to another, especially among those who had set on foot the
impeachment enterprise and staked their future control of the government
upon its success. Given for conviction and upon sufficient proofs, the
President MUST step down and out of his place, the highest and most
honorable and honoring in dignity and sacredness of trust in the
constitution of human government, a disgraced man and a political pariah.
If so cast upon insufficient proofs or from partisan considerations, the
office of President of the United States would be degraded—cease to
be a coordinate branch of the Government, and ever after subordinated to
the legislative will. It would have practically revolutionized our
splendid political fabric into a partisan Congressional autocracy.
Apolitical tragedy was imminent.

On the other hand, that vote properly given for acquittal, would at once
free the Presidential office from imputed dishonor and strengthen our
triple organization and distribution of powers and responsibilities. It
would preserve the even tenor and courses of administration, and
effectively impress upon the world a conviction of the strength and
grandeur of Republican institutions in the hands of a free and enlightened
people.

The occasion was sublimely and intensely dramatic. The President of the
United States was on trial. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was
presiding over the deliberations of the Senate sitting for the trial of
the great cause. The board of management conducting the prosecution
brought by the House of Representatives was a body of able and illustrious
politicians and statesmen. The President’s counsel, comprising jurists
among the most eminent of the country, had summed up for the defense and
were awaiting final judgment. The Senate, transformed for the occasion
into an extraordinary judicial tribunal, the highest known to our laws,
the Senators at once judges and jurors with power to enforce testimony and
sworn to hear all the facts bearing upon the case, was about to pronounce
that judgment.

The organization of the court had been severely Democratic. There were
none of the usual accompaniments of royalty or exclusivism considered
essential under aristocratic forms to impress the people with the dignity
and gravity of a great occasion. None of these were necessary, for every
spectator was an intensely interested witness to the proceeding, who must
bear each for himself, the public consequences of the verdict, whatever
they might be, equally with every member of the court.

The venerable Chief Justice, who had so ably and impartially presided
through the many tedious weeks of the trial now about to close, was in his
place and called the Senate to order.

The impressive dignity of the occasion was such that there was little need
of the admonition of the Chief Justice to abstention from conversation on
the part of the audience during the proceeding. No one there present,
whether friend or opponent of the President, could have failed to be
impressed with the tremendous consequences of the possible result of the
prosecution about to be reached. The balances were apparently at a poise.
It was plain that a single vote would be sufficient to turn the scales
either way—to evict the President from his great office to go the
balance of his life’s journey with the brand of infamy upon his brow, or
be relieved at once from the obloquy the inquisitors had sought to put
upon him—and more than all else, to keep the honorable roll of
American Presidents unsmirched before the world, despite the action of the
House.

The first vote was on the Eleventh and last Article of the Impeachment.
Senators voted in alphabetical order, and each arose and stood at his desk
as his name was called by the Chief Clerk. To each the Chief Justice
propounded the solemn interrogatory—”Mr. Senator—, how say you—is
the respondent, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, guilty or
not guilty of a high misdemeanor as charged in this Article?”

Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, was the first of Republican Senators to vote “Not
Guilty.” He had long been a safe and trusted leader in the Senate, and had
the unquestioning confidence of his partisan colleagues, while his long
experience in public life, and his great ability as a legislator, and more
especially his exalted personal character, had won for him the admiration
of all his associates regardless of political affiliations. Being the
first of the dissenting Republicans to vote, the influence of his action
was feared by the impeachers, and most strenuous efforts had been made to
induce him to retract the position he had taken to vote against
conviction. But being moved on this occasion, as he had always been on
others, to act upon his own judgment and conviction, though foreseeing
that this vote would probably end a long career of conspicuous public
usefulness, there was no sign of hesitancy or weakness as he pronounced
his verdict.

Mr. Fowler, of Tennessee, was the next Republican to vote “Not Guilty.” He
had entered the Senate but two years before, and was therefore one of the
youngest Senators, with the promise of a life of political usefulness
before him. Though from the same State as the President, they were at
political variance, and there was but little in common between them in
other respects. A radical partisan in all measures where radical action
seemed to be called for, he was for the time being sitting in a judicial
capacity and under an oath to do justice to the accused according to the
law and the evidence. As in his judgment the evidence did not sustain the
charge against the President such was his verdict.

Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, was the third anti-impeaching Republican to vote. He
had for many years been a conspicuous and deservedly influential member of
the Senate. For some days prior to the taking of the vote he had been
stricken with what afterwards proved a fatal illness. The scene presented
as he rose to his feet supported on the arms of his colleagues, was
grandly heroic, and one never before witnessed in a legislative chamber.
Though realizing the danger he thus incurred, and conscious of the
political doom that would follow his vote, and having little sympathy with
the policies pursued by the President, he had permitted himself to be
borne to the Senate chamber that he might contribute to save his country
from what he deemed the stain of a partisan and unsustained impeachment of
its Chief Magistrate. Men often perform, in the excitement and glamour of
battle, great deeds of valor and self sacrifice that live after them and
link their names with the honorable history of great events, but to
deliberately face at once inevitable political as well as physical death
in the council hall, and in the absence of charging squadrons; and shot
and shell, and of the glamor of military heroism, is to illustrate the
grandest phase of human courage and devotion to convictions. That was the
part performed by Mr. Grimes on that occasion. His vote of “Not Guilty”
was the last, the bravest, the grandest, and the most patriotic public act
of his life.

Mr. Henderson of Missouri, was the fourth Republican Senator to vote
against the impeachment. A gentleman of rare industry and ability, and a
careful, conscientious legislator, he had been identified with the
legislation of the time and had reached a position of deserved prominence
and influence. But he was learned in the law, and regardful of his
position as a just and discriminating judge. Though then a young man with
a brilliant future before him, he had sworn to do justice to Andrew
Johnson “according to the Constitution and law,” and his verdict of “Not
Guilty” was given with the same deliberate emphasis that characterized all
his utterances on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. Ross, of Kansas, was the fifth Republican Senator to vote “Not
Guilty.” Representing an intensely Radical constituency—entering the
Senate but a few months after the close of a three years enlistment in the
Union Army and not unnaturally imbued with the extreme partisan views and
prejudices against Mr. Johnson then prevailing—his predilections
were sharply against the President, and his vote was counted upon
accordingly. But he had sworn to judge the defendant not by his political
or personal prejudices, but by the facts elicited in the investigation. In
his judgment those facts did not sustain the charge.

Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, was the sixth Republican Senator to vote
against the Impeachment. He had been many years in the Senate. In all ways
a safe legislator and counsellor, he had attained a position of
conspicuous usefulness. But he did not belong to the legislative autocracy
which then assumed to rule the two Houses of Congress. To him the
Impeachment was a question of proof of charges brought, and not of party
politics or policies. He was one of the great lawyers of the body, and
believed that law was the essence of justice and not an engine of wrong,
or an instrumentality for the satisfaction of partisan vengeance. He had
no especial friendship for Mr. Johnson, but to him the differences between
the President and Congress did not comprise an impeachable offense. A
profound lawyer and clear headed politician and statesman, his known
opposition naturally tended to strengthen his colleagues in that behalf.

Mr. Van Winkle, of West Virginia, was the seventh and last Republican
Senator to vote against the Impeachment. Methodical and deliberate, he was
not hasty in reaching the conclusion he did, but after giving the subject
and the testimony most careful and thorough investigation, he was forced
to the conclusion that the accusation brought by the House of
Representatives had not been sustained, and had the courage of an American
Senator to vote according to his conclusions.

The responses were as follows:

Guilty—Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Cole, Chandler, Conkling, Conness,
Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard,
Howe, Morgan, Morton, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Nye, Patterson
of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner,
Tipton, Thayer, Wade, Williams, Wilson, Willey, Yates.

Not Guilty—Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden,
Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson
of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers.

Not Guilty—19. Guilty—35—one vote less than a
Constitutional majority.

CHAPTER XI. — THE IMPEACHERS IN A MAZE. A RECESS ORDERED.

THE FINAL VOTE TAKEN.

The defeat of the Eleventh Article was the second official set-back to the
Impeachment movement—the first being the practical abandonment of
the First Article by the change in the order of voting.

The vote had been taken on what its friends seemed to consider its
strongest proposition; the Eleventh Article having been so framed as to
group the substance, practically, of all the pending ten Articles. The
impeachers had staked their cause upon that Article, and lost. They seemed
not to have contemplated the possibility of its defeat. So confident were
they of its success, in which event it would be immaterial what became of
the other Articles, that they apparently had agreed upon no order of
procedure after that should have been defeated. They were in the condition
of a flock of game into which the sportsman had fired a shot and broken
its ranks. They were dazed, and for a moment seemed not to know what next
to do, or which way to turn. They did not dare now go back to the fated
First Article, according to the program agreed upon, as Mr. Sherman and
Mr. Howe had demonstrated its weakness, and they were fearful of going to
the Second or Third, as in the then temper of the anti-impeachers it was
manifest there would be little hope for either of them, and the other
eight had been already beaten without a vote, at the conference previously
held, and by Republican commitals.

The Chief Justice ordered the reading of the First Article, according to
the order agreed upon, but before that could begin, apparently to gain
time for recovery, Mr. Williams moved that the Senate take a recess of
fifteen minutes, but the motion was not agreed to.

The Chief Justice again ordered the reading of the First Article, but
again, before the clerk could begin the reading, Mr. Williams intervened
to move an adjournment to Tuesday, the 26th day of the month.

After numerous conflicting motions relating to the date of the proposed
reassembling, and several roll calls thereon, the anti-impeachers
generally insisting on proceeding at once to vote on the other articles of
impeachment, the motion of Mr. Williams to adjourn to June 26th,
prevailed.

Of course the purpose, and the only purpose then apparent, of that
adjournment, was to gain time, apparently in the hope of more favorable
developments in the next ten days.

The supposably strongest count of the indictment having been beaten, it
was apparent that it would be folly to hazard a vote on any other at that
time. There was a possibility that changes might occur in the personnel of
the Senate in the interim. As but one article had been put to vote, and as
that was beaten by the lack of a single vote, there seemed a further
possibility that influences could be brought to bear, through the industry
of the House, as was very soon after developed, to secure the support of
an anti-impeaching Senator on at least one of the articles of impeachment
yet to be voted upon. A vacancy in the ranks of the anti-impeaching
Republicans to be filled by an impeaching appointee might happen. Many
contingencies were possible during the next ten days for a reversal of the
action of the Senate just had. At all events, everything would be hazarded
by permitting further immediate action, while the situation could be
rendered no worse by delay, and time and other mollifying conditions and
influences might bring changes more promising of success.

The anti-impeachment Republicans had not long to wait for the development
of the purpose of the recess, at least so far its supporters in the House
were concerned. Immediately upon the adjournment of the Senate, the House
re-assembled, and the following proceeding was had:

Mr. Bingham: I have been directed by the Managers on the part of the House
of Representatives, in the matter of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, to
report the following preamble and resolutions for consideration at this
time:

Whereas, information has come to the Managers which seems to them to
furnish probable cause to believe that improper or corrupt means have been
used to influence the determination of the Senate upon the Articles of
Impeachment submitted to the Senate by the House of Representatives
against the President of the United States; therefore.

Be it Resolved, That for the further and more efficient prosecution of the
Impeachment of the President, the Managers be directed and instructed to
summon and examine witnesses under oath, to send for persons and papers,
and employ a stenographer, and appoint sub-committee to take testimony;
the expense thereof to be paid from the Contingent Fund of the House.

This resolution was immediately and without debate adopted by a vote of 88
to 14. It would be stating it mildly to say that the House was in a
tumult. The Republican leaders were wild with rage. They had selected for
the first vote what they deemed the strongest point in their indictment,
and lost; and their vengeance now turned upon those Republican Senators
who had failed to support them. Hence the adjournment of the Senate for
ten days to afford them time to discipline the recusants and force an
additional vote for conviction on the next ballot.

The conspicuous indelicacy of this move was two-fold: 1st, in that the
House proposed to investigate the action of a co-ordinate branch of
Congress: and 2nd, that the trial not being concluded, it had to a pointed
degree the appearance of an attempt to intimidate Senators who had voted
against conviction into changing their votes at the next ballot in fear of
an inquisition for alleged corruption. In that sense it was an act of
intimidation—a warning. It was an ill-disguised threat and a most
unseemly proceeding—yet there was not one among the supporters of
the Impeachment to condemn it, and few who failed openly to justify it.
Partisan rancor and personal and political hostility to the President had
reached a point that condoned this indelicacy of the House towards the
Senate, and justified the public assault upon the dissenting Republican
Senators, and the insult to the Senate itself.

The demand for adjournment and delay seemed to have been understood by the
impeaching majority of the Senate, and was of course promptly granted and
further voting postponed, and the Senate adjourned to May 26th.

The next ten day were days of unrest—of anxiety to all who were
involved or in any way interested in the impeachment proceeding. While the
result of the 16th gave hope and comfort to the opponents of impeachment,
it caused little or no perceptible discouragement to its more radical
friends. They were more active and persistent than ever. The footsteps of
the anti-impeaching Republicans were dogged from the day’s beginning to
its end and far into the night, with entreaties, considerations and
threats, in the hope of securing a reversal of the result of the 16th. The
partisan press of the States represented by the anti-impeaching
Republicans came daily filled with vigorous animadversions upon their
action, and not a few threats of violence upon their return to their
constituents. But it was in vain.

The Senate reassembled on the 26th of May to complete the vote on the
articles of impeachment. After the usual preliminary proceedings, Mr.
Williams moved to begin the voting on the Second Article, which was had
with the same result as on the 11th—and then the Third, and still
with the same result. It then became manifest that it was useless to go
farther, as all the balance had been rendered certain of defeat, and by
still more decisive votes—a considerable number of those so far
voting for impeachment having committed themselves in the previous
conference against all the balance. So, to save themselves from being
forced to vote against impeachment on any of the articles, there was a
unanimous vote of the impeachers to abandon the case and adjourn—and
with it went glimmering the visions of office, and spoils, and the riotous
assaults on the public treasury that had for months been organizing for
the day when Mr. Johnson should be put out and Mr. Wade put in, with the
political board clear for a NEW DEAL.

An analysis of the Eleventh, Article shows that it comprised four distinct
counts, or accusations.

First—That Mr. Johnson had said that the Thirty-Ninth Congress was
not a Congress of the United States, but a Congress of only part of the
States, and therefore had no power to propose amendments the Constitution.

The latter clause of this accusation was the only portion of the first
count that received any consideration during the trial, and the only
testimony brought in its support was the Parsons-Johnson telegraphic
correspondence set out in Interrogatory No. 5.

In that dispatch, referring to then pending Constitutional amendment (the
14th) Mr. Johnson referred to Congress as “a set of individuals.” Mr.
Manager Boutwell declared this expression to be “the gist of the offense
of this particular telegraphic dispatch.”

Counsel for defense objected to this testimony, but it was received by a
vote of yeas twenty-seven, nays seventeen.

As the Fourteenth Amendment was not declared adopted or a part of the
Constitution for more than a year after the transmission of that dispatch,
and as the Constitution of the United States prohibits any abridgment of
the freedom of speech, and as this remark was unaccompanied by any act in
violation of law, it is difficult to see how it could be construed into an
impeachable offense. Moreover, saying nothing of the good taste or
propriety of that dispatch, Mr. Johnson was opposed to the proposed
amendment, and had the same right to oppose it, or to characterize it or
the members of Congress favoring it, as had any private citizen, or as had
the members of Congress to characterize his action in the premises,
without being called to account therefor.

The second count of that article was:

Violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act of March 2nd, 1867, in seeking to
prevent the resumption by Mr. Stanton of the office of Secretary of War.

This clause had been very effectually disposed of by Messrs. Sherman and
Howe several days before the vote was taken on the Eleventh Article, when
they pointed out the fact that the language cage of the first section of
the Tenure-of-Office Act clearly excepted, and was intended by the Senate,
to except Mr. Stanton and all other persons then in Mr. Johnson’s Cabinet
who had been originally appointed by Mr. Lincoln and were still holding
over under Mr. Johnson without having been recommissioned by him; and that
Mr. Johnson had therefore the legal right and power to remove them at his
pleasure.

And so convincing had been the argument of those gentlemen at that time,
that there was unanimous consent on the pro-impeachment side of the
Senate, on two different occasions, to set aside the First Article, of
which the alleged unlawful attempt to remove Mr. Stanton was practically
the principal accusation. Not illogically, that unanimous consent to
abandon the First article by thus setting it aside, and afterwards
refusing to put it to a vote, may be said to have been equivalent to a
vote of its insufficiency.

It is pertinent to suggest here that the President believed the
Tenure-of-Office Act to be unconstitutional, as it was clearly an
attempted abridgment of his power over his Cabinet which had never before
been questioned by Congress. The only method left him for the
determination of that question was in the course he took, except by an
agreed case, but it is manifest from the record that no such agreement
could be had, as an effort thereto was made in the Thomas case in the
District Court, but failed, the prosecution withdrawing the case at the
point where that purpose of the President became manifest.

The third count was:

Attempting to prevent the execution of the Army appropriation Act of March
2nd, 1867.

The means specified in this alleged attempt was the appointment of Mr.
Edward Cooper to be Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, with power to
draw warrants on the Treasury without the consent of the Secretary—the
purpose being to show that, with General Thomas acting as Secretary of
War, and Mr. Cooper as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to honor
General Thomas’ drafts, and thus, in control of expenditures for the
support of the Army, a conspiracy was sought to be proven whereby the
President intended and expected to defeat the Reconstruction Acts of
Congress by preventing the use of the Army for its enforcement.

Mr. Johnson, of the Court, asked this question:

The Managers are requested to say whether they propose to show whether Mr.
Cooper was appointed by the President in November, 1867, as a means to
obtain unlawful possession of the public money, other than by the fact of
the appointment itself?

Mr. Manager Butler answered:

We certainly do.

Mr. Butler read the law on this subject, passed March 2nd, 1867, as
follows:

That the Secretary of the Treasury shall have power, by appointment under
his hand and official seal, to delegate to one of the Assistant
Secretaries of the Treasury authority to sign in his stead all warrants
for the payment of money into the public Treasury and all warrants for the
disbursments from the public Treasury of money certified by the accounting
officers of the Treasury to be due upon accounts duly audited and settle
by them; and such warrants signed shall be in all cases of the same
validity as if they had been signed by the Secretary of the Treasury
himself.

Mr. William E. Chandler, who had been Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
was on the witness stand, called by the prosecution. Mr. Butler asked
whether it was the practice of the Assistant Secretary to act as Secretary
in case of removal of the Secretary.

Answer: I am not certain that it is, without his appointment as Acting
Secretary by the President.

Mr. Fessenden, of the Court, propounded this interrogatory?

1st—Has it been the practice, since the passage of the law, for an
Assistant Secretary to sign warrants unless especially appointed and
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury?

2nd—Has any Assistant Secretary been authorized to sign any warrants
except such as are specified in the Act?

The witness answered as to the first:

It has not been the practice for any Assistant Secretary since the passage
of the Act to sign warrants except upon an appointment by the Secretary
for that purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Immediately
upon the passage of the Act, the Secretary authorized one of his Assistant
Secretaries to sign warrants of the character described in the Act, and
they have been customarily signed by that Assistant Secretary in all cases
since that time.

As to the second question the answer was:

No Assistant Secretary has been authorized to sign warrants except such as
are specified in this Act, unless when acting as Secretary.

That disposed of the third count in the Eleventh Article, and the
testimony was rejected by a vote of yeas 22, nays 27.

These answers to tire interrogatories seemed to prove the reverse of what
the Prosecution had expected. The accusation of the Third count was not
sustained.

As to the Fourth count of the Eleventh Article, that Mr. Johnson sought to
prevent the execution of the “Act to provide for the more efficient
government of the rebel States,” passed March 2nd, 1867, by the removal of
Mr. Stanton from the War Office, the proceedings of the trial disclose no
testimony of a sufficiently direct character for specification, except,
possibly, a number of speeches delivered at different points by Mr.
Johnson, which are set out in the Tenth Article of the Impeachment. As
that Article was by unanimous consent abandoned and never put to vote, all
its allegations logically fell as unproven.

There was, therefore, no force and little coherency in the Eleventh
Article. It fell of its own weight. Every one of its several averments had
been disproven, or at least not proven. It was to a good degree a summing
up—an aggregation, of the entire bill of indictment on the several
distinct forms of offenses charged—a crystallization of the whole.

The entire impeachment scheme was in reality beaten by the vote on that
Article, and the adjournment of ten days then taken could have been only
in the hope on the part of the majority that ultimate success on some one
of the remaining Articles could be made possible, in some way, legitimate
or otherwise, in part by the importunate throng of visitors to the Capitol
who were vociferously and vindictively urging Mr. Johnson’s removal
largely for reasons personal to themselves—but more especially
through the efforts of the House of Representatives to discipline one or
more of the anti-impeaching Republicans of the Senate.

The allegation of the Second Article, put to vote on the 26th, and beaten
by the same vote as was the Eleventh, was a corollary of the
First-violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act in the appointment of General
Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim, WITHOUT THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
THE SENATE. This was the first declaration ever made in the Senate that an
ad interim or merely temporary appointment to fill a vacancy, required
confirmation by that body. The power to make such an appointment is so
clearly possessed by the President without consultation of the Senate-had
been so uniformly exercised by every preceding President without question,
that argument on that point would be superfluous.

In reality the essence of the Second Article, as of the First, was the
removal of Mr. Stanton. If the President could remove him without the
consent of the Senate, which was clearly established in the debate in the
conference by Messrs. Sherman and Howe, the way was clear for the
appointment of an act interim Secretary, to the end that the office be
filled until such time as the President would be prepared to refill the
place with a Secretary on consultation with the Senate. That was the very
thing he attempted to do on the 22nd of February, the day after Mr.
Stanton’s removal, when he sent to the Senate the nomination of Thomas
Ewing, Senior, to be Secretary of War, for the action of that body.

The Third Article was so closely analagous to the Second, that an analysis
of it would be in the nature of repetition. If there were any distinctions
between them, they were so finely drawn that they amounted simply to a
distinction without a difference—a characteristic, indeed, of a
large part of the eleven Articles of Impeachment—a characteristic so
conspicuous that it was not deemed worth while by the majority to go
further in their submission to the Court.

These three Articles—the Second, Third and Eleventh—being the
only Articles of the entire list of eleven put to a vote, and having been
taken up and passed upon out of their numerical but in the order of their
supposed availability—must therefore be regarded as confessedly the
strongest and most likely of the entire list to command the support of the
Senate. They were selected and set out for the test. That selection was
equivalent to saying, “we put the Impeachment cause to test on these three
Articles. If they fail, we have nothing more to offer.”

They were put to test and failed. They failed because of their innate
weakness. Failed because they proved nothing. Failed because not a single
allegation of the entire indictment was or could be proven or tortured
into all impeachable offense. Not a remark made by the President or an act
performed in all the long and bitter controversy that had subsisted
between himself and Congress could be brought nearer to the impeachment
mark, in fact, few if any of them so near, as had been the every day rule
in the House of Representatives during the previous two years in their
treatment of the President. Yet nobody thought of impeaching members of
the House for their every day personal vituperations against him.

Bill after bill had been offered in Congress, and law after law enacted,
with apparently the sole purpose of hampering the Constitutional authority
apparently functions of the President—even the assumption of
Executive powers and judicial functions by Congress—the not remote
purpose of which seemed to be his entrapment into some measure of
resistance upon which could be based an indictment. The House seemed to be
literally “lying in wait” for him, with traps set on every side for his
ensnarement.

At last, after two years of this sort of scheming and impatient and
anxious waiting, the opportunity seemed to have offered in the alleged
violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. The fosterers of the impeachment
crusade, weary with their long vigil and growing desperate with every
additional day’s delay, clutched at the new turn of affairs like a
drowning man at a floating straw, and with the avidity of a starved
gudgeon at a painted fly.

It was not strange that this sort of diplomacy, developed and exposed as
it was in the Senate, in spite of the unfair and partisan maneuvering of
the prosecution to prevent it, should have reacted, and contributed to
turn against the impeachment movement gentlemen who entered upon the
investigation under oath to give Mr. Johnson a fair, non-partisan trial.
The only surprise was that, after the exposure of the malignant partisan
spirit that sat in judgment upon Mr. Johnson, and the utter and absolute
failure to prove any violation of law on his part, but on the contrary, a
determination to preserve from infringement the functions of his office
and prevent a revolution from fundamental political forms by the
absorption of the Executive authority by the legislative branch of the
government—that even a majority, and more especially, that nearly
two-thirds of the Senate, could have been found at the close in support of
the Impeachment.

This record will serve to explain the omission to vote on the First
Article—Messrs. Sherman and Howe being precluded from supporting it
in consequence of the position taken by them in the controversy between
the two Houses of Congress over the first section of the Tenure-of-Office
Bill while that bill was pending, and to avoid defeat on the first vote
taken, which was inevitable on that Article—and also to explain, so
far as any explanation is possible, the zig-zag method of conducting the
ballot—skipping all the first ten Articles and going down to the
bottom of the list for the first vote, with the promise of then going back
to the first Article and continuing to the end, but instead, skipping that
for the second time, and starting in again on the Second and then the
Third.

Of course, the natural effect of this battle-dore and shuttle-cock method
of treating so grave a matter as an impeachment of the President of the
United States, added to the effect of the manifest unfairness of the
majority in their treatment of testimony offered in the President’s
defense—was to disgust some who doubtless entered upon the trial
honestly inclined to vote for Andrew Johnson’s impeachment, but wanted it
done fairly and openly, without any suppression of pertinent testimony or
juggling for a verdict—and amusing to others, who viewed it as proof
of weakness in the indictment, and of misgiving as to the result on the
part of its supporters.

To still others it was more than that. It was not only an indication of
weakness, but of a determination to take every possible advantage, fair
and unfair, to save votes for conviction. The impeachers not unnaturally
feared the effect of the defeat of the First Article by the nay votes of
Messrs. Sherman and Howe, and probably other Republicans, which was
certain to follow the submission of that Article to a vote. Its only
allegation was the unlawful removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of
Secretary of War in violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. That alleged
offense was repeated in varied but more or less specific forms, in every
succeeding Article of the Impeachment except the Tenth, and constituted
the sum and substance—the gravamen—of the entire indictment.
It was the basis upon which the impeachment super-structure had been
erected. Without that Article there was not only no foundation, but no
coherence in the recital of Mr. Johnson’s alleged offenses, and when that
fell by its abandonment, the entire impeachment scheme fell with it—as,
if there were nothing in the First Article on which to hang an
impeachment, there could be nothing in those that followed and were but an
amplification—a mere exploitation—of the First.

In substantiation of this view of the First Article, the declaration of
Mr. Boutwell to that effect is here inserted. Mr. Boutwell was chairman of
the committee of the House appointed to prepare the Articles of
Impeachment upon which Mr. Johnson was tried. On his report of these
Articles to the House he said, after speaking particularly of the Tenth
Article:

The other Articles are based upon facts which are of public knowledge,
growing out of the attempt of the President to remove Secretary Stanton
from the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

That is, that the basis of the entire accusation was the alleged violation
of the Tenure-of-Office Act in the removal of Mr. Stanton, as recited in
the First Article.

So, after taking the vote on the Second and Third Articles and their
defeat by the same vote as that on the Eleventh, it became manifest that
further effort to the impeachment of the president on any of the remaining
eight Articles would be useless, and Mr. Williams moved that the Senate,
sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourn sine die, which motion was
carried by the following vote:

Yeas—Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling Corbett,
Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Morgan,
Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New
Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer,
Tipton, Van Winkle, Wade. Willey, Williams, Wilson, Yates—34.

Nays—Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fowler, Henderson,
Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross,
Saulsbury, Trumbull, Vickers—16.

Every Senator present who had voted for conviction voted to abandon the
prosecution and end the trial, and every Senator present who had voted
against conviction, voted to continue and go through the indictment.

Of course, it was useless to go farther with any hope of success, as, it
will be seen by this record, all the remaining Articles were dead, beaten
in caucus before the voting commenced, and by the professed friends and
leaders of the movement.

Possibly it was the anticipation of this effect of the abandonment of the
First Article, that was the “sickness” to which Mr. Edmunds, at the outset
of the voting, ten days before, ascribed the peculiar order of taking the
vote.

It is not intended to aver that there was any privity or concert in this
particular manipulation—yet it is suggestive. The Impeachment had
been dragging since the 22nd of February, to May 26th—more than
three months,—and had been everywhere the engrossing topic of the
time. It was becoming tiresome-not only to the Senate, but to the general
public.

Notwithstanding the City of Washington was still filled with people who
had been waiting weary weeks and months for the deposition of Mr. Johnson
and the accession of Mr. Wade to the Presidency, for the fulfillment of
pledges of appointment based thereon, and who were still importunate for
impeachment, the business element of the country at large was tiring of it
and its depressing effect upon the commercial activities. Even Senators
and Congressmen were being moved to a sense of the obstructive and
somewhat ridiculous phases the impeachment movement was beginning to take
on—and not a few of those who in its earlier stages had honestly
favored the movement, inside as well as outside the membership of both
Houses of Congress, had begun to realize the actual nature and purposes,
as also the shallowness of the impeachment movement that from whatever
motives it had originated, it had degenerated very much into a game of
personal ambition—of vindictiveness—and office getting and
spoils—and practically nothing higher.

While some of its supporters who had manifestly entered upon the trial
with a determination to convict, were still insistent for further
prosecution had there been a shadow of ultimate success, there were others
who had begun to realize, weeks before the end came, the awkwardness of
the predicament in which they had allowed themselves and their party to be
placed, and desired to abandon the enterprise.

The strain was becoming too great—there was certain to be a recoil
sooner or later. The foundations of the Impeachment were shown to be too
slender. There was a future ahead that must be faced, but Senators must
preserve their consistency. They could not go before their pro-impeachment
constituencies with a record indicating any degree of weakening in the
impeachment crusade. They had insisted for months that Mr. Johnson must be
removed, and it would be politically inexpedient to retract.

But they wanted somebody to “help them let go.”

So the plan of “desultory” procedure herein outlined seems to have
“happened”—whether by design or otherwise, is immaterial—and
that plan was made easy by the concerted abandonment of the head and front
of the indictment—the First Article—which was side-tracked and
logically carried with it all that followed, as would manifestly have been
the result if the voting had begun on that Article.

While, to degree, the turmoils and bitterness of that time have passed out
of public mind, there are still many living who retain a keen remembrance
of the struggle and the enmities it produced. There were during the trial
many thousands of men in the City of Washington awaiting the Impeachment
and removal of the President for the fulfillment of pledges of official
appointment based thereon, and their numbers increased as the trial
progressed.

These anticipated beneficiaries were naturally not idle in efforts to the
stimulation of zeal in the cause of Impeachment, and Senators were
importuned at all seasonable and unseasonable hours in behalf of immediate
and positive action. The lively anxiety, even anxious haste, of these
patriots for their earliest possible entry upon the service of the
Government, was emphasized on every corner and at every place of
gathering, day and night, and the lobbies of the Capitol were thronged by
them during the sessions of the Senate. No opportunity for a word with a
Senator in behalf of the immediate deposition of the President, nor any
appliance that seemed to promise a successful overture, was overlooked or
forgotten.

When these seemed to fail of the desired effect, more direct and, it was
hoped, more effective methods were resorted to. The beleaguered Senator
was reminded that the applicant represented the united sentiment of the
people of the State from which he held his Senatorial seat—that they
demanded Mr. Johnson’s conviction and removal—that that demand could
not be safely denied, trifled with, or delayed; and that if money was
wanted, to use the language of a notorious inquisitor of the House, Mr.
Butler, speaking of the possibility of securing a designated vote for
Impeachment “tell the d——d scoundrel that if he wants money,
there is a bushel of it here to be had!” Mr. Butler’s message was
delivered.

So desperate were the inquisitors, and so close the certainty of the vote,
that even a project of kidnapping a Senator under the pretense of taking a
trip to Baltimore for much needed rest, where, if the terms to be there
proffered were refused, a vacancy was to be created—by
assassination, if necessary—then a recess of the Senate to afford
time for the appointment by the Governor of that Senator’s State of a
successor who would vote for the Impeachment, of the President—was
entered upon and its execution attempted. But the trip to Baltimore for
“rest” was not taken.

These are not pleasant facts to contemplate, but they somewhat
conspicuously characterized the conditions of that time, and illustrate
the real nature of the impeachment scheme. They boded the control of the
Government by the worst element of American politics. It is unnecessary to
say here what that control would have involved. During all the previous
history of the Government—its wars and political turmoils—the
Democratic-Republican forms that characterize its administrations have
never faced so insidious or threatening a danger as during that hour. It
was a crucial test, and the result a magnificent vindication of the wisdom
and patriotism of the founders of our composite form of Government. Its
results have but strengthened those forms and broadened the scope of the
beneficent political institutions that have grown up under and
characterize its operation.

It was a test such as probably no other form of Government on earth could
have successfully passed, and it is to be hoped that its like may never
return.

CHAPTER XII. — WAS IT A PARTISAN PROSECUTION?

The weakest point in the entire record of the Prosecution of President
Johnson, from the indictment by the House of Representatives to the finish
in the Senate, except the Bill of Impeachment itself, was the refusal of
the more than three-fourths Republican majority of the Senate to permit
the reception of testimony in his behalf. That majority naturally gave
them absolute control of the proceedings, and they should have realized
from the outset that they could not afford to give it the least tinge of
partisan bias.

It is therefore not material to discuss in detail the instances of the two
interrogatories put by counsel for the Prosecution and rejected, Nos. 4
and 28, because it was shown that their answer would prove nothing against
the President, but rather to his vindication, and their rejection could
not have occurred but for the intervention of many more nay Republican
than Democratic votes—but will pass to the analyzation of the votes
on the twelve interrogatories propounded by counsel for Defense and
rejected, which rejections could not have occurred but by the intervention
of a large preponderance, in every instance, of the Republican votes cast
thereon, and many of them by a unanimous Republican vote.

Without doubt, many of these votes on the admissibility of testimony were
governed by, the usual rules prevailing in the courts, but it was deemed
by others that every question not manifestly frivolous, or not pertinent,
should be permitted answer without objection, regardless of such rules—that
the Senate sitting for the trial of an Impeachment of the President of the
United States—the occasion a great State Trial—should not be
trammeled or belittled by the technicalities common to ordinary court
practice—that the Senate was composed supposedly of gentlemen and
lawyers of high standing in their profession and familiar with public
affairs and public law—that they were sitting in a semi-judicial
capacity—not merely as Senators or jurors, but, judges also—judges
of fact as well as of law—and constituted the highest trial body
known to our laws—a tribunal from which there was no appeal—that
each of its members had taken a solemn oath to “do impartial justice” in
this cause, absolutely unswerved by partisan or personal considerations,
and that as such each member had not only the right, but it was his duty
under his oath, as well, to hermit no obstacle or condition to
unnecessarily keep from him a knowledge of all available facts pertinent
to the cause, no matter on which side they might weigh—to help or to
hurt. That the body, each member for himself, was the proper party to
determine the admissibility of testimony, as Mr. Manager Boutwell had
declared in his opening argument, “AFTER HE HAD HEARD IT,” and knew its
trend an purport. Every member of that body had the right to know all the
witness knew about the case, and, moreover, the witnesses were brought for
the purpose, and for the sole purpose, of telling what they knew.

The same assurance of absolute fairness as that of Mr. Boutwell, was also
given by Mr. Bingham, another of the Managers of the Prosecution on the
part of the House, in his opening plea before the Senate: “It is,” said
he, “certainly very competent for the Senate, as it is competent for any
court of justice in the trial of cases where questions of doubt arise, to
HEAR THE EVIDENCE, and, where they themselves are the judges of both the
law and the fact, to DISMISS SO MUCH OF IT AS THEY MAY FIND INCOMPETENT,
if any of it be incompetent. * * * Under the Plea of Not Guilty, as
provided in the rules, every conceivable defense that the accused party
could make to the Articles here preferred, can be admitted.”

Mr. Manager Butler also said, on the same occasion: “Upon this so great
trial, I pray let us not belittle ourselves with the analyses of the
common law courts, or the criminal courts, because nothing is so dangerous
to mislead us.”

These and other like assurances were given of the widest reasonable
latitude in the reception of testimony in the trial then opening. There
was thus every reason to expect that Mr. Johnson would have a fair trial.
But no sooner had the Prosecution completed its examination of witnesses,
in which but seven interrogatories had been objected to of the long list
proffered by the Prosecution, than a different rule seemed to have been
established for the treatment of proffered testimony, and a large mass of
relevant and valuable testimony in behalf of the President was ruled out
on objection of the Prosecution, as inadmissible, and, as a rule that, had
very few exceptions, on partisan divisions of the Senate.

Of course it will not be admitted, nor is it here charged, that these
refusals to hear testimony were because of any fear that the answers would
have any improper force or effect upon the Senate. Nor will it signify to
say that the President’s attorneys could not have proved what they offered
to prove. They hail the right to an opportunity to so prove, and the
denial of that right and opportunity was not only a denial of a manifest
right of the attorneys, but especially in this case, a more flagrant
denial of the rights of the accused, and not only that, but they amounted
to an impugnment of the discretion of the Senate.

It is conspicuous, too, that while the defense objected to but seven of
the interrogatories submitted by the Prosecution, and five of them were
permitted answer by the vote of the Senate; twenty-one of the proffers of
testimony by the defense were objected to by the prosecution and but nine
of them permitted answer: and that condition was aggravated by the fact
that the numerical strength of the majority party in the Senate was
sufficient to determine absolutely the disposition of every question, and
they could therefore afford to be strictly fair to the accused, and by the
further fact that the objections to testimony offered in behalf of the
defense were as three to one of the objections to testimony offered in
behalf of the prosecution.

These denials of testimony in behalf of the defense were unfortunate. That
practice lowered the dignity of the occasion and of the proceeding, as
they could but have given ground for criticism of partisan bias and a
vindictive judgment in case of successful impeachment. Most, if not all
these rejected interrogatories implied important information in possession
of the witnesses which the Senate had a right to, and which the party
offering had the right to have produced. Moreover, it was the right and
the duty of the Senate to know what the witness was presumed to know, and
then to judge, each Senator for himself, of the relevancy of the
testimony.

As stated, the principal averment against the President, was his alleged
violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act in the removal of Mr. Stanton from
the office of Secretary of War, presented in various phases throughout the
Articles of Impeachment.

In illustration of the treatment of testimony offered in the President’s
behalf by a majority of the Republican Senators, the record shows that on
the eighth disputed interrogatory, the second put by the defense, General
Sherman being on the witness stand:—Defense asked as to a certain
conversation relating to that removal, had between the General and the
President at an interview specified. The prosecution objected to the
question being answered, and a vote of the Senate was demanded. The vote
was—for receiving the testimony, 23; against receiving it, 28. Of
the latter number, twenty-seven, all Republicans, voted at the close of
the trial to convict the President of violating the Tenure-of-Office Act,
in the removal of Mr. Stanton, after refusing to hear testimony in his
behalf on that charge.

The next interrogatory, No. 9, was “when the President asked the witness
(Gen. Sherman,) to accept the War Office, was anything further said in
reference to it?” This was objected to by the prosecution, and the vote
thereon was 23 to 29. Twenty-eight of the twenty-nine gentlemen thus
refusing answer to this question, afterwards voting to convict the
President, after refusing to bear the testimony of a very important
witness in his behalf, which his counsel proposed to produce and tried in
vain to get before the Senate.

On the tenth interrogatory, by Defense, “whether the President had stated
to the witness, (General Sherman), his object in asking him to accept the
War Office,” the vote was 7 to 44 against receiving it, and thirty-one of
the gentlemen voting not to hear this testimony, at the close of the
hearing voted to convict Mr. Johnson of a high misdemeanor in office in
the removal of Mr. Stanton, after refusing to hear his defense.

The next, No. 11, was as to the President’s attempt to get a case before
the Supreme Court for a judicial determination of Mr. Stanton’s right to
retain the War Office against the President’s wish. This testimony was
refused by a vote of 25 to 27—every nay vote being cast by a
Republican, every one of whom at the close of the trial, voting in effect
to convict Mr. Johnson of a high misdemeanor in office in seeking resort
to the courts to test the legality of an act of Congress passed for the
practically sole purpose of restricting an executive function never before
questioned.

The next interrogatory, No. 12, was whether the witness, (General
Sherman), had formed an opinion whether the good of the service required a
Secretary of War other than Mr. Stanton. It was well understood that
General Sherman believed that for the good of the service Mr. Stanton
ought to retire, and as the Chief Officer of the Army his opinion was
certainly entitled to weight, and the President had a right to the benefit
of his judgment. This interrogatory was objected to by the Prosecution,
and was rejected by a vote of 18 to 35—thirty-one of the thirty-five
being Republicans, who at the close of the trial voted to convict Mr.
Johnson of a high misdemeanor in the removal of Mr. Stanton, after
refusing him the benefit of the opinion of the Chief Officer of the Army
on a question affecting the military service, and to which he was in all
fairness clearly entitled.

No. 13, General Sherman was asked whether he had advised, the President to
appoint a successor to Mr. Stanton. (It was well understood that he had.)
Answer to this was refused, 18 to 32—thirty of the latter, all
Republicans, voting at the close of the trial to convict Mr. Johnson,
after refusing to hear this important testimony in his behalf. No. 16. The
answer to the last interrogatory, (“if he did, state what his purpose
was,”) was received by a majority of one, 26 to 25—every nay vote
being a Republican, and constituting a majority of the Republicans of the
Senate.

No. 21. Mr. O. E. Perrin on the stand, was asked as to the President’s
statement that Mr. Stanton would relinquish the office at once to General
Thomas—”that it was only a temporary arrangement”—that he
would “send to the Senate at once the name of a good man,” (which he did).
This testimony was rejected by a vote of 9 to 37—thirty of the
latter number being Republicans who at the close of the trial voted to
convict Mr. Johnson of a high misdemeanor in sending to the Senate the
name of Thomas Ewing, Senior, for appointment as Secretary of War, vice
Stanton removed in assumed violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act.

The next offer of testimony to be rejected was No. 23—Mr. Gideon
Welles, Secretary of the Navy, on the stand, to prove that the Cabinet had
advised the President to veto the Tenure-of-Office Bill as
unconstitutional. The Chief Justice ruled the testimony admissible for the
purpose of showing the intent with which the President had acted in the
transaction. Prosecution objected, and by a vote of 20 to 29, the decision
of the Chief Justice was overruled. No answer to this interrogatory was
permitted, every vote to refuse this testimony being cast by a Republican,
every one of whom, at the close of the trial, voting to convict and remove
Mr. Johnson for alleged violation of a law which he believed to be
unconstitutional—which he was advised by the head of the Law
Department of the Government was unconstitutional and therefore not a law
which he had sworn to execute, and the constitutionality of which he had
endeavored to get before the courts for adjudication—those 29
Republicans so voting after having refused to hear testimony in his
defense on these identical points.

The next disputed interrogatory was No. 24—that Mr. Johnson’s
Cabinet had advised him that the Secretaries who had been appointed by Mr.
Lincoln and still holding, (Mr. Stanton, Mr. Seward, and Mr. Welles,) were
removable by the President, notwithstanding the assumed restriction of the
Tenure-of-Office Act. The Chief Justice ruled this testimony to be
admissible. Objection was made by the Prosecution, and a vote taken, and
the interrogatory was rejected—22 to 26—every nay vote being a
Republican, every one of whom at the close of the trial, voting to convict
and remove Mr. Johnson from office, after having refused to hear this very
important testimony in his behalf.

Defense next offered to prove (No. 25) that it was determined by the
President, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, that an agreed case for
the determination of the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act
should be made. This testimony was objected to, and a vote taken, which
was 19 to 30. Every one of the gentlemen voting to reject this testimony,
Mr. Johnson’s right to which cannot with any possible showing of fairness
be successfully disputed, were Republicans, and after so voting, at the
close of the trial, declared by their several verdicts that he had been
fairly proven guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, by violation of the
Tenure-of-Office Act in seeking a judicial determination of the validity
of a disputed Act of Congress, and should be expelled from office.

No. 26, was as to any suggestion by the President of the employment of
force for the vacation of any office, (relating of course, to the War
Office.) Mr. Johnson had been charged with seeking the removal of Mr.
Stanton by force, should he resist. Knowing perfectly that the answer
would be in the negative, the Senate refused to permit answer to this
interrogatory, by a vote of 18 to 26, every one of the twenty-six
gentlemen at the close of the trial in effect voting that the President
was guilty as charged, of seeking to remove Mr. Stanton by violence, after
refusing to hear either his denial or witnesses in his behalf on that
point.

No. 27. Defense proposed to prove that the Cabinet had advised the
President that the Tenure-of-Office Act did not prevent the removal of
those members who had been originally appointed by Mr. Lincoln. This
testimony, which, if permitted answer, would, in the minds of unprejudiced
people, have at once set aside the entire impeachment scheme, was not
permitted answer. The vote was 20 to 26—every one of the twenty-six
gentlemen who voted to reject that most important and conclusive testimony
in Mr. Johnson’s behalf, at the close of the examination voting to convict
him of a high misdemeanor in office by violating the Tenure-of-Office Act
in removing Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War—after
refusing this offer to prove by his Cabinet advisers; the witness himself,
(Mr. Welles, and his testimony, if received, was to be followed by that of
Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton, all of whom had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln
and not re-appointed by Mr. Johnson,) that that act did not apply to or
protect them against removal at the pleasure of the President. So that on
eighteen of these twenty-one disputed interrogatories put in behalf of the
Defense, a majority of the Republicans of the Senate refused in every
instance to hear testimony, after having sworn to give Mr. Johnson a fair
and impartial trial.

But the most flagrant case of unfairness to the defendant in this
examination of witnesses occurred in the treatment of interrogatory No. 3,
put by the prosecution, in their introduction of a letter from the
President to General Grant, purporting to enclose letters from different
members of the Cabinet in substantiation of the position of the President
in the controversy then pending between Gen. Grant and himself. These
letters were enclosed with, and specifically referred to and made a part
of the President’s communication, and were necessary to a correct
apprehension of the controversy, from the President’s or any other
standpoint.

Being so enclosed and referred to in the letter transmitting and enclosing
them, they became quite as much a part of the President’s communication as
his own letter which enclosed them. Counsel for Defense objected to the
introduction of the President’s letter without the enclosures, but the
objection was not sustained and the letters were not permitted to be
introduced, but the letter enclosing and referring to them was. The vote
on the production of the enclosures was, yeas 20, nays 29—twenty-eight
of the thirty-eight Republicans present, voting to exclude this essential
testimony in the President’s behalf, and twenty-seven of the number
afterwards voted to convict him of a high misdemeanor in office in
removing Mr. Stanton from the War Office, after refusing him the benefit
of the testimony of his Constitutional Cabinet advisers in this important
matter.

It is possible that under other conditions this proceeding might have been
legitimate and proper; but Mr. Johnson was on trial under grave charges,
before the highest, and supposably fairest tribunal on earth, and had a
right to the benefit of the testimony of his cabinet, in full, and more
especially when that testimony was presented in a distorted and garbled
shape by his accusers. Moreover, every member of the Court had the right
to know what was in those letters, if any part of the correspondence was
to be received. But whether or not Mr. Johnson had the right to the
testimony in his behalf which it was claimed these enclosures contained,
he certainly had the right to resist the introduction of mutilated
testimony against him. The purpose of the trial was to ascertain the facts
in the case—all the facts bearing on either side. The Court was
sitting and the witnesses were called for that purpose, and no other.

This record shows, that in but three instances out of twenty-one, did a
majority of the Republicans of the Senate vote to receive testimony
offered in the President’s behalf—that on one interrogatory there
was an equal division—that on seventeen of the twenty-one
interrogatories put by the Defense, a majority of the Republicans voted to
exclude testimony, in several cases by a two-thirds vote—and that
but nine of the twenty-one interrogatories put in behalf of the President
were by Republican votes permitted to be answered—also that, as a
rule which had very rare exceptions, such interrogatories in behalf of the
President as were permitted answer, were so permitted by very close
majorities.

It is undoubted that every Republican member of the Senate entered upon
that trial in the expectation that the allegations of the Prosecution
would be sustained, but it was also expected that a fair, free, full, open
investigation of all the charges preferred would be had, and that all the
information possible to be obtained bearing upon the case, pro and con,
would be admitted to testimony—but that expectation was not
realized.

To sum up this feature of the proceeding—the Republican majority of
the Senate placed themselves and their party in the attitude of
prosecutors in the case—instead of judges sworn to give the
President an impartial trial and judgment that their course had the
appearance, at least, of a conspiracy to evict the President for purely
partisan purposes, regardless of testimony or the facts of the case-that
public animosity against Mr. Johnson had been manufactured throughout the
North by wild and vicious misrepresentations for partisan effect—that
practically the entire Republican Party machinery throughout the country
was bent to the work of prosecution. The party cry was “Crucify him!”
“Convict him anyway, and try him afterwards!” With rare exceptions, the
Republican Party of the country, press and people, were a unit in this
insensate cry.

They were ready to strike, but not to hear.

There can be but one conclusion from these premises, established by the
record of the trial—that the entire proceeding, from its inception
in the House of Representatives to its conclusion in the Senate, was a
thoroughly partisan prosecution on the part of the majority in both
Houses, and that the country was saved from the shameful spectacle, and
the dangerous consequences of such a proceeding, by the intervention and
self-sacrifice of a few gentlemen who proposed to respect the obligation
of their oath, and give Mr. Johnson, so far as in their power, a fair
trial and judgment—and not having had such a trial—to give him
the benefit of what he claimed he could prove in his own behalf and was
not permitted to—and a verdict of “Not Guilty,” regardless of
consequences to themselves.

What every member of the Court had sworn to do was “impartial justice” to
Andrew Johnson, and nothing less. The Counsel on neither side had taken
that oath, but the Court had; and its performance of that oath was
impossible without possession of all the information relating to and
bearing upon the case that it was reasonably possible to obtain. That is
the essential ingredient and characteristic of a fair trial.

THAT ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF JUDICIAL FAIRNESS WAS NOT SHOWN TO MR.
JOHNSON IN THIS CASE BY THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY OF THE SENATE, as the
official record of the trial clearly establishes. It was an ill-disguised
and malevolent partisan prosecution.

CHAPTER XIII. — THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF IMPEACHMENT.

The power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress to impeach and
remove the President for cause, is unquestionably a wise provision. The
natural tendency of the most patriotic of men, in the exercise of power in
great public emergencies, is to overstep the line of absolute safety, in
the conscientious conviction that a departure from strict constitutional
or legal limitations is demanded by the public welfare.

The danger in such departures, even upon apparent necessity, if condoned
or permitted by public judgment is in the establishment of precedents
whereby greater and more dangerous infractions of organic law may be
invited, tolerated, and justified, till government takes on a form of
absolutism in one form or another, fatal to free institutions, fatal to a
government of law, and fatal to popular liberty.

On the other hand, a too ready resort to the power of impeachment as a
remedial agent—the deposition of a public officer in the absence of
proof of the most positive and convincing character of the impeachability
of the offense alleged, naturally tends to the other extreme, till public
officers may become by common consent removable by impeachment upon
insufficient though popular charges—even upon partisan differences
and on sharply contested questions of public administration.

The power of impeachment and removal becomes, therefore, a two-edged
sword, which must be handled with consummate judgment and skill, and
resort thereto had only in the gravest emergencies and for causes so
clearly manifest as to preclude the possibility of partisan divisions or
partisan judgments thereon. Otherwise, too ready resort to impeachment
must inevitably establish and bring into common use a new and dangerous
remedy for the cure of assumed political ills which have their origin only
in partisan differences as to methods of administration. It would become
an engine of partisan intolerance for the punishment and ostracism of
political opponents, under the operation of which the great office of
Chief Magistrate must inevitably lose its dignity, and decline from its
Constitutional rank as a co-ordinate department of the Government, and its
occupant no longer the political head and Chief Executive of the Nation,
except in name.

It was in that sense, and to a pointed degree, that in the impeachment and
trial of Andrew Johnson the quality of coordination of the three great
Departments of Government—the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial—was
directly involved—the House of Representatives as prosecutor—the
President as defendant—the Senate sitting as the trial court in
which the Chief Justice represented the judicial department as presiding
officer.

The anomaly of the situation was increased and its gravity intensified, by
the fact that the President pro tempore of the Senate, who stood first in
the line of succession to the Presidency in case of conviction, was
permitted, in a measure, indeed, forced by his pro-impeachment colleagues,
on a partisan division of the Senate, to sit and vote as such President
pro tempore for the impeachment and removal of the President whom he was
to succeed.

These facts of condition attending and characterizing the trial of
President Johnson, pointedly accentuate the danger to our composite form
of government which the country then faced. That danger, as it had found
frequent illustration in the debates in the House of Representatives on
the several propositions for the President’s impeachment preceding the
bringing of the indictment, lay in the claim of superiority of political
function for the Legislative branch over the Executive. The quality of
co-ordination of these departments was repeatedly and emphatically denied
by conspicuous and influential members of that body during the initial
proceedings of the impeachment movement, and even on the floor of the
Senate by the managers of the impeachment. To illustrate:

Mr. Bingham, in the House, Feb. 22nd, 1868, announced the extraordinary
doctrine that “there is no power to review the action of Congress.” Again,
speaking of the action of the Senate on the 21st of February, on the
President’s message announcing the removal of Mr. Stanton, he said:
“Neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court can question or review this
judgment of the Senate.”

The declaration was made by Messrs. Stevens and Boutwell in the House,
that the Senate was its own judge of the validity of its own acts.

Mr. Butler, in his opening speech to the Senate, at the beginning of the
trial, used this language:

A Constitutional tribunal solely, you are bound by no law, either Statute
or Common, which may limit your constitutional prerogative. You consult no
precedents save those of the law and custom of parliamentary bodies. You
are a law unto yourselves, bound only by the natural principles of equity
and justice, and salus populi suprema est lex.

Feb. 24, 1868, Mr. Stevens said in the House:

Neither the Executive nor the Judiciary had any right to interfere with it
(Reconstruction) except so far as was necessary to control it by military
rule until the sovereign power of the Nation had provided for its civil
administration. NO POWER BUT CONGRESS HAD ANY RIGHT TO SAY WHETHER EVER,
OR WHEN, they (the rebel States), should be admitted to the Union as
States and entitled to the privileges of the Constitution of the United
States. * * * I trust that when we come to vote upon this question we
shall remember that although it is the duty of the President to see that
the laws be executed, THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE NATION RESTS IN CONGRESS.

Mr. Butler, the leading spirit of the impeachment enterprise, went so far
as to make the revolutionary suggestion of the abrogation of the
Presidential office in the event of final failure to convict the President—set
out in the 8th Chapter.

Mr. Sumner insisted that in no judicial sense was the Senate a Court, and
therefore not bound by the rules of judicial procedure:

If the Senate is a Court bound to judicial forms on the expulsion of the
President, must it not be the same in the expulsion of a Senator? But
nobody attributes to it any such strictures in the latter case. * * In the
case of Blount, which is the first in our history, the expulsion was on
the report of a committee declaring him guilty of a high misdemeanor. At
least one Senator has been expelled on simple formal motion. Others have
been expelled without any formal allegations or formal proofs. * * * The
Constitution provides that “Each House shall determine its rules of
proceeding.” The Senate on the expulsion of its own members has already
done this practically and set an example of simplicity. But it has the
same power over its rules of proceeding on the expulsion of the President,
and there can be no reason for simplicity in the one case not equally
applicable in the other. Technicality is as little consonant with the one
as with the other. Each has for its object the PUBLIC SAFETY. For this a
Senator is expelled; for this, also, the President is expelled. Salus
Populi Suprema Lex. The proceedings in each case must be in subordination
to this rule.”

Thus, Mr. Sumner would have removed the President by an ordinary
concurrent resolution of Congress.

The purpose of all this was apparent—that the President was in
effect, to be tried and judged before a Court of Public Opinion, and not
before the Senate sitting as a High Court of Impeachment, but BY the
Senate sitting in its legislative capacity—to create the impression
in the minds of Senators that in this high judicial procedure they were
still acting as a legislative body—simply as Senators, and not in a
judicial capacity, as judges and jurors, and therefore not bound
specifically by their oaths as such, to convict only for crime denounced
by the law, or for manifest high political misdemeanors, but could take
cognizance of and convict on alleged partisan offenses and allegations
based on differences of opinion and partisan prejudices and partisan
predilections—that it was not essential that the judgment of
Senators should be confined to the specific allegations of the indictment,
but that the whole range of alleged political and partisan misdemeanors
and delinquencies could be taken into account in seeking a pretext for Mr.
Johnson’s conviction.

The superiority of the Legislative branch was thus openly advocated and
insisted, and uncontroverted by any Republican supporting the impeachment.
Mr. Johnson, according to these oft repeated declarations, was to be tried
and convicted, not necessarily for any specific violation of law, or of
the Constitution, but by prevailing public opinion—public clamor-in
a word, on administrative differences subsisting between the President and
the leaders of the dominant party in and out of Congress, and that public
opinion, as concurrent developments fully establish, was industriously
manufactured throughout the North, on the demand of leaders of the
impeachment movement in the House, through the instrumentality of a
partisan press and partisan public meetings, and in turn reflected back
upon the Senate, in the form of resolutions denunciatory of the President
and demanding his impeachment and removal.

That was in fact, and in a large sense, the incentive to the impeachment
movement, and it was—not confined to a faction, but characterized
the dominant portion of the political party then in the ascendancy in and
out of Congress.

In this state of facts lay largely the vice of the impeachment movement,
and it illustrated to a startling degree the danger in the departure from
established forms of judicial procedure in such cases.

It became apparent, long before the close, that it was but little if
anything more than a partisan prosecution—and that fact became more
generally and firmly fixed, from day to day, as the trial approached
conclusion.

In that state of facts, again, and in that sense, the impeachment of the
President, was an assault upon the principle of coordination that
underlies our political system and thus a menace to our established
political forms, as, if successful, it would, logically, have been the
practical destruction of the Executive Department—and, in view of
previous legislation out of which the impeachment movement had to a degree
arisen, and of declarations in the House and Senate quoted in this
connection, the final and logical result of conviction would have been the
absorption of the Executive functions of the Government by the Legislative
Department, and the consequent declension of that Department to a mere
bureau for the registration of the decrees of the Legislature.

Conscious of the natural tendency to infringement by a given Department of
the Government upon the functions of its coordinates, the framers of the
Constitution wisely defined the respective spheres of the several
departments, and those definitions constitute unmistakable admonition to
each as to trespass by either upon the political territory of its
coordinates.

As John C. Calhoun wrote, in the early days of the Republic:

“The Constitution has not only made a general delegation of the
legislative power to one branch of the Government, of the executive to
another, and of the judicial to the third, but it has specifically defined
the general powers and duties of each of those departments. This is
essential to peace and safety in any Government, and especially in one
clothed only with specific power for national purposes and erected in the
midst of numerous State Governments retaining exclusive control of their
local concerns.* * * Were there no power to interpret, pronounce and
execute the law, the Government would perish through its own imbecility,
as was the case with the Articles of Confederation; or other powers must
be assumed by the legislative body, to the destruction of liberty.” Again,
as was eloquently and forcefully said by Daniel Webster in the U. S.
Senate in 1834:

“The first object of a free people is the preservation of their liberty,
and liberty is only to be preserved by maintaining constitutional
restraints and just division of political power. Nothing is more deceptive
or more dangerous than the pretense of a desire to simplify government.
The simplest governments are despotisms; the next simplest, limited
monarchies; but all republics, all governments of law, must impose
numerous limitations and qualifications of authority and give many
positive and many qualified rights. In other words, they must be subject
to rule and regulation. This is the very essence of free political
institutions. The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and fearless
spirit; but it is also a sharp-sighted spirit: it is a cautious,
sagacious, discriminating, far-seeing intelligence; it is jealous of
encroachment, jealous of power, jealous of man. It demands checks; it
seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it entrenches itself behind
strong defenses, and fortifies itself with all possible care against the
assaults of ambition and passion. It does not trust the amiable weaknesses
of human nature, and, therefore, it will not permit power to overstep its
prescribed limits, though benevolence, good intent, and patriotic purpose
come along with it. Neither does it satisfy itself with flashy and
temporary resistance to illegal authority. Far otherwise. It seeks for
duration and permanence; it looks before and after; and, building on the
experience of ages which are past, it labors diligently for the benefit of
ages to come. This is the nature of constitutional liberty; and this is
our liberty, if we will rightly understand and preserve it. Every free
government is necessarily complicated, because all such governments
establish restraints, as well on the power of government itself as on that
of individuals. If we will abolish the distinction of branches, and have
but one branch; if we will abolish jury trials, and leave all to the
judge; if we will then ordain that the legislator shall himself be that
judge; and if we will place the executive power in the same hands, we may
readily simplify government. We may easily bring it to the simplest of all
possible forms, a pure despotism. But a separation of departments, so far
as practicable, and the preservation of clear lines of division between
them, is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our constitutions;
and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty depends on
maintaining these boundaries.”

Each department is supreme within its own constitutionally prescribed
limits, and the Supreme Court is made the umpire for the definition of the
limits and the protection of the rights of all. Neither Congress, nor the
Executive, are authorized to determine the constitutionality and therefore
the validity of their acts, or the limits of their jurisdiction under the
Constitution, but the Supreme Court is so authorized, and it is the umpire
before which all differences in that regard must be determined. It is the
tribunal of last resort, save the people themselves, before whom both
Senate and House, and the Executive, must bow, and its decision is final
in the interpretation of the Constitution.

A due regard, therefore, for the interpretation of law and the division of
powers thus established, constitutes the great safeguard upon which the
harmonious and successful operation of our political system depends. On
its religious observance rests, primarily, the preservation of our free
institutions and the perpetuation of our peculiar system of popular
government. That quality of co-ordination—of the equality of the
several Departments as adjusted by the Organic Act—constitutes the
balance wheel of our political system.

The logical effect of the doctrines promulgated by the House of
Representatives in that regard, and re-echoed on the floor of the Senate,
in the press and on the stump throughout the North, were therefore not
only revolutionary, but destructive. To have removed the President upon
accusations in reality based upon partisan and personal—not
amounting even to substantial political differences—would have been
the establishment of a precedent of the most dangerous character.

In a large sense, the American system of politics and of government was on
trial, quite as much as was Andrew Johnson. The extreme element of
American politics was in absolute control in the House of Representatives,
and practically so, in the Senate. The impeachment and removal of the
President on unsubstantiated, or even remotely doubtful charges, simply:
because of a disagreement between himself and Congress as to the method of
treating a great public emergency, would have introduced a new and
destructive practice into our political system.

Logically, the introduction of such a practice on that occasion would have
been construed as a precedent for the treatment of future public
emergencies. Thus, it would have tended to disturb the now perfect
adjustment of the balance of powers between the co-ordinate branches. That
quality of absolute supremacy of the several departments in their
respective spheres, or functions, and of co-ordination or equality in
their relations to each other, established by the Constitution as a
guarantee of the perpetuity of our political system, would have been
endangered, and the result could not have been otherwise than disaster in
the future.

Logically, the Presidency would in time have been degraded to the position
of a mere department for the execution of the decrees of the legislative
branch. Not illogically, the Supreme Court would have been the next object
of attack, and the legislature have become, by this unconstitutional
absorption of the powers of Government, the sole, controlling force—in
short the Government.

That would, in time, by equally logical sequence, have been the natural,
inevitable result—and the end. The wreckage of the Great Republic of
the age would have been strown upon the sands of the political seashore—relics
of the disregard of the checks and balances established by the wisdom of
its framers, in the fundamental law—and all for the satisfaction of
personal ambitions and the hates of factional animosities.

History affords too many illustrations of that tendency to decadence and
disruption from disregard of the proper and necessary checks and balances
in the distribution and equalization of the powers of government, to
permit us to doubt what the final end would have been had the President
been removed on the unsubstantiated accusation preferred by the House of
Representatives, Our peculiar system of political government—a
Democratic Republic—passed the danger point of its history in that
hour.

It was indeed a narrow escape. The history of civilization records no
precisely similar condition. The country then passed the most threatening
period of its history—but passed it safely. The result was the
highest possible testimonial to the strength and endurance of properly
adjusted Democratic institutions that history records.

It emphasized not only the capacity of the American people for intelligent
and orderly self-government, but also the strength and endurance of our
popular forms. It was a profound surprise to those habituated to different
political conditions. They had witnessed with astonishment the quiet
disbandment of millions of men but as yesterday engaged in mortal strife—the
vast armies as peacefully returning to former vocations as though from a
great parade—and now, from a state of civil convulsion that in many
another nation would have produced armed collision and public disorder,
they saw an entire people quietly accepting the verdict of the highest
authoritive body of the land, and practically dismissing the subject from
thought. It was a splendid world-wide tribute to the strength and
endurance of our system of popular government.

Yet the conclusion must not be deduced that the power of impeachment is
not a wise provision of our Constitution, nor in any sense inconsistent
with our popular forms. Conditions may, and are not unlikely to arise,
some day, when the exercise of the power to impeach and remove the
President may be quite as essential to the preservation of our political
system as it threatened to become in this instance destructive of that
system. Should that day ever come, it is to be hoped that the remedy of
impeachment, as established by the Constitution, may be as patriotically,
as fearlessly, and as unselfishly applied as it was on this occasion
rejected.

SUPPLEMENT.

Copy of letter addressed to each of the members of the Cabinet present at
the conversation between the President and General Grant on the 14th of
January, 1868, and the answers thereto:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., February 5, 1868.

Sir:—The Chronicle of this morning contains a correspondence between
the President and General Grant, reported from the War Department, in
answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives. I beg to call your
attention to that correspondence, and especially to that part of it which
refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant, at the
Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, and to request you to
state what was said in that conversation.

Very respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.

Washington, D. C., February 5, 1868.

Sir:—-Your note of this date was handed to me this evening. My
recollection of the conversation at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the
14th of January, corresponds with your statement of it in the letter of
the 31st ultimo, in the published correspondence. The three points
specified in that letter, giving your recollection of the conversation,
are correctly stated.

Very respectfully, Gideon Welles.

To the President.

Treasury Department, February 6, 1868.

Sir:—I have received your note of the 5th instant, calling my
attention to the correspondence between yourself and General Grant, as
published in the Chronicle of yesterday, especially to that part of it
which relates to what occurred at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday the 14th
ultimo, and requesting me to state what was said in the conversation
referred to.

I cannot undertake to state the precise language used, but I have no
hesitation in saying that your account of that conversation, as given in
your letter to General Grant under date of the 31st ultimo substantially
and in all important particulars accords with my recollection of it.

With great respect, your obedient servant. Hugh McCulloch. To the
President.

Post Office Department Washington, February 6, 1868.

Sir:—I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th of February, calling
my attention to the correspondence published in the Chronicle between the
President and General Grant, and especially to that part of it which
refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the
Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, with a request that I
state what was said in that conversation. In reply, I have the honor to
state that I have read carefully the correspondence in question, and
particularly the letter of the President to General Grant, dated January
31, 1868. The following extract from your letter of the 31st January to
General Grant is, according to my recollection, a correct statement of the
conversation that took place between the President and General Grant at
the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January last. In the presence of the
Cabinet the President asked General Grant whether, “in conversation which
took place after his appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, he did
not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any
judicial proceedings that might follow the non-concurrence by the Senate
in Mr. Stanton’s suspension, or, should he wish not to become involved in
such a controversy, to put the President in the same position with respect
to the office as he occupied previous to General Grant’s appointment by
returning it to the President in time to anticipate such action by the
Senate.” This General Grant admitted.

The President then asked General Grant if, at the conference on the
preceding Saturday, he had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested
General Grant to state what he intended to do; and further, if in reply to
that inquiry he (General Grant) had not referred to their former
conversations, saying that from them the President understood his
position, and that his (General Grant’s) action would be consistent with
the understanding which had been reached. To these questions General Grant
replied in the affirmative.

The President asked General Grant if, at the conclusion of their interview
on Saturday, it was not understood that they were to have another
conference on Monday, before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr.
Stanton.

General Grant replied that such was the understanding, but that he did not
suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday he had been engaged
in a conference with General Sherman, and was occupied with “many little
matters,” and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day.

I take this mode of complying with the request contained in the
President’s letter to me, because my attention had been called to the
subject before, when the conversation between the President and General
Grant was under consideration.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Alexander W. Randall, Postmaster
General. To the President.

Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C., February 6, 1868.

Sir:—I am in receipt of yours of yesterday, calling my attention to
a correspondence between yourself and General Grant, published in the
Chronicle newspaper, and especially to that part of said correspondence
“which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant
at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January,” and requesting me
“to state what was said in that conversation.”

In reply, I submit the following statement: At the Cabinet meeting on
Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1868, General Grant appeared and took his
accustomed seat at the board. When he had been reached in the order of
business the President asked him, as usual, if he had anything to present?

In reply, the General, after referring to a note which he had that morning
addressed to the President, inclosing a copy of the resolution of the
Senate refusing to concur in the reasons for the suspension of Mr.
Stanton, proceeded to say that he regarded his duties as Secretary of War
ad interim terminated by that resolution, and that he could not lawfully
exercise such duties for a moment after the adoption of the resolution by
the Senate. That the resolution reached him last night, and that this
morning he had gone to the War Department, entered the Secretary’s room,
bolted one door on the inside, locked the other on the outside, delivered
the key to the Adjutant General, and proceeded to the headquarters of the
Army, and addressed the note above mentioned to the President, informing
him that he (General Grant) was no longer Secretary of War ad interim.

The President expressed great surprise at the course which General Grant
had thought proper to pursue, and, addressing himself to the General,
proceeded to say, in substance, that he had anticipated such action on the
part of the Senate, and being very desirous to have the constitutionality
of the Tenure-of-Office bill tested, and his right to suspend or remove a
member of the Cabinet decided by the judicial tribunals of the country, he
had some time ago, and shortly after General Grant’s appointment as
Secretary of War ad interim, asked the General what his action would be in
the event that the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension of Mr.
Stanton, and that the General had agreed either to remain at the head of
the War Department till a decision could be obtained from the court or
resign the office in the hands of the President before the case was acted
upon by the Senate, so as to place the President in the same situation he
occupied at the time of his (Grant’s) appointment.

The President further said that the conversation was renewed on the
preceding Sunday, at which time he asked the General what he intended to
do if the Senate should undertake to reinstate Mr. Stanton; in reply to
which the General referred to their former conversation upon the same
subject, and said. “You understand my position, and my conduct will be
conformable to that understanding:” that he (the General) then expressed a
repugnance to being made a party to a judicial proceeding, saying that he
would expose himself to fine and imprisonment by doing so, as his
continuing to discharge the duties of Secretary of War ad interim, after
the Senate should have refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton
would be a violation of the Tenure-of-Office bill. That in reply to this
he (the President) informed General Grant he had not suspended Mr. Stanton
under the Tenure-of-Office bill, but by virtue of the powers conferred on
him by the Constitution: and that, as to the fine and imprisonment, he
(the President) would pay whatever fine was imposed and submit to whatever
imprisonment might be adjudged against him (the General.) That they
continued the conversation for some time, discussing the law at length,
and that they finally separated without having reached a definite
conclusion, and with the understanding that the General would see the
President again on Monday.

In reply, General Grant admitted that the conversation had occurred, and
said that at the first conversation he had given it as his opinion to the
President that in the event of non-concurrence by the Senate in the action
of the President in respect to the Secretary of War the question would
have to be decided by the court; that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to
the court to reinstate him in office; that he would remain in till they
could be displaced and the outs put in by legal proceeding; and that he
then thought so, and had agreed that if he should change his mind he would
notify the President in time to enable him to make another appointment,
but that at the time of the first conversation he had not looked very
closely into the law; that it had recently been discussed by the
newspapers, and that this had induced him to examine it more carefully,
and that he had come to the conclusion that if the Senate should refuse to
concur in the suspension Mr. Stanton would thereby be reinstated, and that
he (Grant) could not continue thereafter to act as Secretary of War ad
interim, without subjecting himself to fine and imprisonment; and that he
came over on Saturday to inform the President of this change in his views,
and did so inform him, that the President replied that he had not
suspended Mr Stanton under the Tenure-of-Office bill, but under the
Constitution, and appointed him (Grant) by virtue of the authority derived
from the Constitution, &c.; that they continued to discuss the matter
some time, and finally he left without any conclusion having been reached,
expecting to see the President again on Monday. He then proceeded to
explain why he had not called on the President on Monday, saying that he
had had a long interview with General Sherman; that various little matters
had occupied his time till it was late, and that he did not think the
Senate would act so soon, and asked, “did not General Sherman call on you
on Monday?”

I do not know what passed between the President and General Grant on
Saturday, except as I learned it from the conversation between them at the
Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, and the foregoing is substantially what then
occurred. The precise words used on the occasion are not, of course, given
exactly in the order in which they were spoken, but the ideas expressed
and the facts stated are faithfully preserved and presented. I have the
honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.

O. H. Browning.

The President.

Department of State, Washington, February 6, 1868.

Sir: The meeting to which you refer in your letter was a regular Cabinet
meeting. While the members were assembling, and before the President had
entered the Council Chamber, General Grant, on coming in, said to me that
he was in attendance there, not as a member of the Cabinet, but upon
invitation, and I replied by the inquiry whether there was a change in the
War Department. After the President had taken his seat business went on in
the usual way of hearing matters submitted by the several secretaries.
When the time came for the Secretary of War General Grant said that he was
now there not as Secretary of War, but upon the President’s invitation,
that he had retired from the War Department. A Blight difference then
appeared about the supposed invitation, General Grant saying that the
officer who had borne his letter to the President that morning, announcing
his retirement from the War Department, had told him that the President
desired to see him at the Cabinet, to which the President answered, that
when General Grant’s communication was delivered to him the President
simply replied that he supposed General Grant would be very soon at the
Cabinet meeting. I regarded the conversation thus begun as an incidental
one. It went on quite informally, and consisted of a statement, on your
part, of your views in regard to the understanding of the tenure upon
which General Grant had assented to hold the War Department ad interim,
and of his replies by way of answer and explanation. It was respectful and
courteous on both sides. Being in this conversational form, its details
could only have been preserved by verbatim report. So far as I know, no
such report was made at the time. I can give only the general effect of
the conversation.

Certainly you stated that although you had reported the reasons for Mr.
Stanton’s suspension to the Senate, you nevertheless held that he would
not be entitled to resume the office of Secretary of War, even if the
Senate should disapprove of his suspension, and that you had proposed to
have the question tested by judicial process, to be applied to the person
who should be the incumbent of the Department, under your designation of
Secretary of War ad interim in the place of Mr. Stanton. You contended
that this was well understood between yourself and Gen. Grant; that when
he entered the War Department as Secretary ad interim he expressed his
concurrence in a belief that the question of Mr. Stanton’s restoration
would be a question for the courts; that in a subsequent conversation with
General Grant you had adverted to the understanding thus had, and that
General Grant expressed his concurrence in it: that at some conversation
which had been previously held General Grant said he still adhered to the
same construction of the law, but said if he should change his opinion he
would give you seasonable notice of it, so that you should in any case, be
placed in the same position in regard to the War Department that you were
while General Grant held it ad interim. I did not understand General Grant
as denying, nor as explicitly admitting, these statements in the form and
full extent to which you made them. The admission of them was rather
indirect and circumstantial, though I did not understand it to be an
evasive one. He said that, reasoning from what occurred in the case of the
police in Maryland, which he regarded as a parallel one, he was of
opinion, and so assured you, that it would be his right and duty, under
your instructions, to hold the War Office after the Senate should
disapprove of Mr. Stanton’s suspension until the question should be
decided upon by the courts; that he remained until very recently of that
opinion, and that on the Saturday before the Cabinet meeting a
conversation was held between yourself and him in which the subject was
generally discussed.

General Grant’s statement was, that in that conversation he had stated to
you the legal difficulties which might arise, involving fine and
imprisonment under the civil tenure bill, and that he did not care to
subject himself to those penalties; that you replied to this remark, that
you regarded the civil tenure bill as unconstitutional, and did not think
its penalties were to be feared, or that you would voluntarily assume
them; and you insisted that General Grant should either retain the office
until relieved by yourself according to what you claimed was the original
understanding, between yourself and him, or, by seasonable notice of
change of purpose on his part, put you in the same situation which you
would be if he adhered. You claimed that General Grant finally said in
that Saturday’s conversation that you understood his views, and his
proceedings thereafter would be consistent with what had been so
understood. General Grant did not controvert nor can I say that he
admitted this last statement. Certainly General Grant did not at any time
in the Cabinet meeting insist that he had in the Saturday’s conversation
either distinctly or finally advised you of his determination to retire
from the charge of the War Department otherwise than under your own
subsequent direction. He acquiesced in your statement that the Saturday’s
conversation ended with an expectation that there would be a subsequent
conference on the subject, which he, as well as yourself, supposed could
seasonably take place on Monday.

You then alluded to the fact that General Grant did not call upon you on
Monday, as you had expected from that conversation. General Grant admitted
that it was his expectation or purpose to call upon you on Monday. General
Grant assigned reasons for the omission. He said he was in conference with
General Sherman; that there were many little matters to be attended to. He
had conversed upon the matter of the incumbency of the War Department with
General Sherman, and he expected that General Sherman would call upon you
on Monday. My own mind suggested a further explanation, but I do not
remember whether it was mentioned or not-namely, that it was not supposed
by General Grant on Monday that the Senate would decide the question so
promptly as to anticipate further explanation between yourself and him if
delayed beyond that day. General Grant made another explanation—that
he was engaged on Sunday with General Sherman, and, I think, also on
Monday, in regard to the War Department matter, with a hope, though he did
not say in an effort, to procure an amicable settlement of the affair of
Mr. Stanton, and he still hoped that it would be brought about.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

William H. Seward.

To the President.

HISTORY OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HIS TRIAL BY THE SENATE FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN OFFICE

1868

By Edmund G. Ross

Burt Franklin Research & Source Works Series #94

PREFACE.

CHAPTER 1. — THE PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION.

MR. LINCOLN’S PLAN

CHAPTER II. — THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION.

LINCOLN AND JOHNSON NOT NOMINATED AS REPUBLICANS.

CHAPTER III. — MR. JOHNSON’S ACCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY.

THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA.

CHAPTER IV. — FIRST ATTEMPT TO IMPEACH THE PRESIDENT.

THE ASHLEY INDICTMENT.

CHAPTER V. — THE TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT.

ITS HISTORY AND PURPOSE—THE PRESIDENTS VETO MESSAGE.

CHAPTER VI. — IMPEACHMENT AGREED TO BY THE HOUSE.

CHAPTER VII. — IMPEACHMENT REPORTED TO THE SENATE.

THE PRESIDENT’S ANSWER.

CHAPTER VIII. — ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL

CHAPTER IX. — EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONY.

CHAPTER X. — A CONFERENCE HELD AND THE FIRST VOTE TAKEN.

CHAPTER XI. — THE IMPEACHERS IN A MAZE. A RECESS ORDERED.

THE FINAL VOTE TAKEN.

CHAPTER XII. — WAS IT A PARTISAN PROSECUTION?

CHAPTER XIII. — THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF IMPEACHMENT.

HISTORY OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES

BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HIS TRIAL BY THE SENATE FOR HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN OFFICE